UNCLASSIFIED
Al-Qaida’s Use of the Mass
Media in Infowar/Netwar
Briefer: Michael Knapp
Asymmetric Warfare
Analyst
Africa/Middle East
Division, NGIC
Image: Mappa.Mundi Magazine, Sept. 2001
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Preface

Two years of initiative research on a “moving target” (global,
adaptive cellular network with changing MOs) but with a
consistent ideology and culture

More than 200 documents, from Jan 2002-Nov 2003

Based mostly on English translations of on-line AQ articles and
“books,” but also includes selected Arab/Muslim news articles

Mostly FBIS products, but also a few translations from
commercial research centers

This is a detailed analysis of AQ’s use of the mass media as a
“window” and “weapon” in information warfare/netwar

Buttressed by Western professional journal and press insights
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Primary Sources
Jihadist Internet websites:
News media:

Al-Ansar*

Al-Sharq al-Awsat**

Alneda*

Al-Majallah**

Al-Qal’ah

Al-Quds al-Arabi

Jihad Online (www.jehad.net)

Al-Hayah**

www.faroq.org***

Al-Arabiyah Television (Dubai)

Waaqiah


Jihad Unspun
Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel
Television (Qatar)

Al Muhajiroun (UK)

The Observer (London, UK)

www.alfjr.com

IslamOnline.net
*Various websites/service providers
**Saudi-owned, UK-based newspaper

www.cybcity.com***
***Recent Alneda web address
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Global Info Environment

Advances in/rapid growth of comms and info technologies has
increased connectivity and dissolved barriers to info flows; but has
produced a “cacaphony of voices” instead of global dialogue

Marked by divisiveness and conflict between the “haves” and “have
nots”: cultural openness, cooperation and info sharing vs. anger over
inequities from disaffected groups with different values and interests
(anti-modernity/anti-globalization)

Reflects the way non-Westerners see new world order: struggle for
power, lack of acceptance of Western ideas in developing cultures;
increases support for religious fundamentalism among the young

Electronically connected communities of interest are increasingly
important as global players and conduits of info; and rise of
transnational NGOs and loose coalitions that are a critical “third force”
(beside governments, corporations)

More diverse, unconventional (and non-static) threat: smaller groups
that are more difficult to identify, analyze and track
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
What Kind of Warfare Is It?

Information Warfare (Infowar or IW): Range of actions taken during
conflict to achieve information superiority over an adversary while
defending one’s own information, information processes and information
systems. (CJCSI 3210.01)

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): Usually considered a subset of IW.
Operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and,
ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and
individuals. Its purpose is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and
behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (Joint Pub 3-53)

Netwar: Information-related conflict at a grand level between nations or
societies. It means trying to disrupt or damage what a target population
knows or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. A netwar
may focus on public or elite opinion, or both. It may involve diplomacy,
propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and cultural
subversion, deception of or interference with local media, infiltration of
computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote dissident or
opposition movements across computer networks. (John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming,” RAND, 1997)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
How Do Terrorists Use Netwar?

Protagonists are likely to consist of diverse, dispersed, small groups
(“nodes”) who share a set of ideas and interests

Such nodes communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in
an internetted manner: relationships tend to be more horizontal or (as
in Al-Qaida’s case) can be laid out in chain, “hub and spoke” or “allchannel” structures, which emerge and change according to the
specific task at hand

Relationships are often informal and marked by varying degrees of
intensity, depending on the organization’s needs

Internal networks are usually complemented by linkages to individuals
or groups outside the organization, often spanning national boundaries

Both internal and external ties are thus governed by common values
as well as by a sense of reciprocal trust

Employ own communications/information arteries of open societies
against them
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Terrorist Network Structures
Source: Networks and Netwars, RAND Corp., Nov. 2001
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Why is the Internet Important to AQ?

Perfect C2 means: globally dispersed network is unhindered by
distance; can be secure with easily available encryption software, use of
steganography in graphics, and codes in open text

Effective recruiting and fundraising tool; ensures continuity of operations
despite capture/death of leaders and breakup of cells

Widely disseminate propaganda or disinformation, use for PSYOPS to
intimidate or spread fear/hate (AQ knows it must remain engaged to
dominate the debate and survive)

Intelligence collection means against info-based adversaries

Rich, almost limitless source of/repository for information, with
sophisticated search capabilities

Provides and promotes anonymity and deception; hard for governments
to monitor user activities, learn true identities or agendas, and control
contents or usage
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Why is the Internet Important? (2)

“Tool of the Weak”: groups with limited resources and less
sophisticated capabilities can compete with or even outmatch
advanced nations’ huge media machines

Provides operational flexibility (no physical state to defend) and longrange strike capability (puts distance between attack planners and their
targets)

Means to divert attention from a real attack scenario or confuse or
disrupt defense/security efforts

Mobilization means: can create solidarity and brotherhood within the
larger community (diaspora) and between groups; way to maintain
morale in the face of obvious reverses since 9/11

Promotes/supports “franchise” operations: can rely on regional/local
Islamist movements to achieve aims (“network of networks”); these
groups pose comparable threat to AQ itself

Allows AQ to advance its traditional mission by non-military means
using the mass media; helps build worldwide support base
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Value of OSINT

“The source of first resort”:
- Provides foundation and context for analysts that can be fused with
classified info (but not substitute for it)
- Provides knowledge/foreknowledge of events and significant trends
for decision makers, can be shared widely
- Can serve as a “flag” to re-evaluate info from other sources, and is
sometimes more accurate/timely
- Can meet up to 80-85 percent of intelligence information needs

Warning and alert function: unique source in crisis situations

Important source for analyzing asymmetric/unconventional actors and
environments (helps adjust to new target sets)

Provides understanding of strategic plans and intentions; especially
useful in forecasting cultural turmoil and societal upheavals, and in
planning/conducting IW operations
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
OSINT Challenges

Deluge of information and easier access to it (through the
Internet) complicates identifying/compiling what is pertinent

As volume of info has soared, so have opportunities for
disinformation; importance of the culturally knowledgeable
analyst has grown (and the ability to screen/validate info)

OPSEC: Limit adversary’s use of our OSINT against us

Wide availability of sophisticated info search and filtering tools
provides customers with their own open source capabilities,
allows our foes to compete more effectively

Expanded translation requirements are stretching scarce assets;
language needs are changing more frequently

Info providers must balance legitimate need for access against
limits from copyright protection and licensing agreements
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
FBIS Role in OSINT

Unique and valuable role in a key niche:
- Worldwide monitoring, collection, translation and dissemination of
foreign mass media
- Driven by IC requirements (principal customer): “smart front end” to
filter relevant info, act as overt/UNCLASSIFIED collector

Regional field collection sites:
- Provide immediate access to, timely processing of perishable
broadcasts and press reports
- Function as part of US diplomatic or military stations, with knowledge
and consent of host governments
- Remote sites feed collected signals to regional bureaus, HQs

HQs: exploitation of less perishable/time sensitive sources, and longer
term analysis of intentions, key policy shifts

24x7 Ops Center connects US Gov’t consumers, field bureaus
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
What Do AQ’s Motives Tell Us?

Provide rationale for its pursuit of political power, and why they
have chosen violence to get it

Reconciles the risks with the cause: violence requires a
purpose in harmony with the action to be understood as rational

Serve to recruit followers: both true believers in the cause and
opportunists (who like action and the feeling of belonging)

Motives develop a sense of camaraderie that ensures group
loyalty, solidarity, and self-protection

One overriding theme: injustice from a repressive political
authority; terrorists not getting their due (independent system
organized by their ideology)

If how injustice is perceived is understood, that perception can
be removed or altered (redressal of grievances); this decreases
the pool of recruits and creates divisions in terrorists’ ranks
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
“Under the Shade of Swords”:
Inside the Mind of an Islamic Terrorist

Hard for Westerners to understand what leads a person to cause his
(or her) own violent end: Death is inevitable, so pursue martyrdom –
the ultimate submission to God

Promise to Muslims from a hadith that “the gates of Paradise are under
the shade of the swords” – meaning that death for Allah’s sake
(martyrdom) is the only assured way to personal entry (and favorable
consideration for one’s family) into Paradise

Involves personal, spiritual, intellectual and emotional considerations -martyr must: love God more than life; be willing to sacrifice himself
against power of the devil and infidel forces; see the answers to all of
these questions clearly; and must overcome the physical fear of death

“The purest joy in Islam is to kill and be killed for Allah” – Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini

Appears prominently in AQ literature: heading for a key series of
articles in Alneda on “Why We Fight America”
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Al-Ansar and Alneda: AQ’s
Main Doctrinal Platforms

Al-Ansar: posted every two weeks from Jan 02-Apr 03

Created to provide “a correct view of the conflict” between the
“International Crusade” and the Islamic Ummah, and revive the path of
jihad taken by the first generation of Muslims

First “on-line magazine” – four section format:
- Unattributed editorial
- “Vision of Faith” by Sayf al-Din al-Ansari
- “Strategic Studies” by Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi
- “Political Analyses” by Abu Ayman al-Hilali

On-line “books” (Internet “zip” files) started in Sep 02: more in-depth
coverage of political, military and religious topics

Alneda: AQ’s official website; repository for single essays, up to one or
more per day but not regular schedule; closed from Apr-Sep 03

Contents of both keyed to current developments in the “depressed
situation” in the Arab/Muslim world, and in the US-led GWOT
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Center for Islamic Studies & Research

Hosted by multiple legitimate ISPs, including in US (frequently uses
Alneda web address), but subject to many shutdowns

Multiple sections:
- Center’s own reports of fighting in Afghanistan, other theaters
- Regular digest of world media coverage of the conflict
- Books of jihad theology, and poetry about jihad
- Videos such as 9/11 hijacker’s testament
- Info about mujahedin prisoners in Guantanamo and Pakistan

Like Al-Ansar, provides strategic guidance, theological arguments and
moral inspiration (“virtual leadership”); may be used to direct AQ
operational cells

One of main sources for recent Internet “Zip” books

Considered to be AQ’s official media organ; resilience of site shows its
importance to the network
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Sawt al-Jihad: AQ’s Newest
Mass Media Vehicle

Biweekly on-line magazine published by CISR since mid-Oct 03

Concerned with the situation of mujahedin and the jihad in the Arabian
Peninsula

2-3 feature articles in each issue:
- Interviews with top AQ leaders, and first hand “battle stories” from
participants in attacks
- Wills of mujahedin who have been martyred
- Religious justifications for jihad (articles and religious rulings)
- Coverage/criticism of international cooperation and domestic anti-terror
activities of the Saudi regime
- Excerpts from AQ books, such as al-Zawahiri’s “Knights Under the
Prophet’s Banner”

Appears to be a replacement for Al-Ansar
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Al-Qaida: Key Political Themes

Palestinians’ plight and their “liberation” is a central cause for
Muslims, as is fighting against the anti-Islamic campaigns in
Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Kashmir

Bin Ladin is not only the leader of AQ, but the imam for all
Muslims, thus the Islamic “nation” should rally around him

Muslims need to wake up to their “depressed condition,” not
stand passively by but actively participate in the (armed) jihad

Complicity of the Arab/Muslim “agent regimes” makes them
legitimate targets of the jihad too

The “far enemy” must be targeted first, but beware of the
continuing threat from the “near enemy”

Since the UN is a lackey of the US and its tool for oppression,
and is itself against Islam, it is also a legitimate target
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Key Political Themes (2)

Two forms of terrorism:
- “Commendable”: the fight to stop America’s oppression
of/injustice toward Muslims, and its support for the Zionists
(Israel); and
- “Abhorred”: what Israel is practicing (and US supporting) in
Palestine, and what America is doing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
all over the world

America’s “crusade” against the Islamic world will fail: Muslims
adhere to their principles/faith; they are more cohesive
domestically and internationally; AQ and Taliban are now a
major presence on the world political and psychological map;
and the Crusader “enemy front” is in conflict/disintegrating

Fall of Baghdad marks the return of “direct colonialism” in the
Arab world (and follows fall of Jerusalem, Beirut and Kabul)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Key Political Themes (3)

US really out to control region’s oil wealth, dominate Muslim territories:
“veiled colonization”

The 9/11 ghazwah (“raids”) were legitimate and justified, due to US
mistreatment of Muslims, continuing “occupation” of Saudi Arabia, and
support to Israeli aggression

US is mistreating, illegally holding the mujahedin at Guantanamo (in
subhuman conditions), they are suffering for a noble cause, and must
be freed

UBL is still alive, and AQ will “stay the course” in the fight against the
US, in spite of losses in personnel and its base of operations in
Afghanistan

Women mujahedin are being mobilized to join the jihad

AQ even took credit for the Aug 03 power outages in the Eastern US,
and highlighted America’s structural weakness and ineffectiveness of
response to the situation
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Al-Qaida: Key Military Themes

AQ is familiar with the art of war, but US military has ignored past
lessons in favor of technology, and is ignorant of its current foe

AQ is familiar with US writings on 4th generation/asymmetric warfare,
and is using this strategy effectively to defeat the US (which still has a
Cold War mentality)

Guerilla warfare is the best weapon Muslims have, and the best way to
prolong the conflict with the “Crusader enemy”

Examined US “nightmares” – threats from: WMD; “naval jihad”
attacks; attacks against oil supplies and US economy; “Internet jihad”;
and the forging of interests/links between jihad groups and organized
criminal groups

US doesn’t understand Arab/Middle East/Muslim culture, and is thus
losing the “information war”

Frequency of strikes has increased from one every two years (before
9/11) to two operations per year

Iraq is now the key battlefield for the global jihad
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Key Military Themes (2)

Use of historical comparisons/lessons:
- 1972 Munich Olympics attack and 9/11 New York and Washington
attacks: “great propaganda victories”
- Surprise achieved in 9/11 “conquest” exceeded that of the Japanese
attack against Pearl Harbor
- Victories of Soviets at Stalingrad and Palestinians in Jenin were both
“decisive battles”: revealed stronger side’s weaknesses (and “urban
jihad ops” is a strategic choice since it’s an Israeli COG)
- US military has a history of barbarity, war crimes against civilians;
targets civilians deliberately as “political pressure card” and for
psychological warfare
- Al-Aqsa Intifada is Israel’s “Vietnam”: winning the battles does not
win the war
- Iraq fell to America in the second Gulf War due not to US combat
proficiency but “treachery of Ba’athist regime”
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Key Military Themes (3)

Al-Qaida has the right to use “germ warfare”/WMD against the US (projihadist fatwa issued thereafter)

US Intelligence will continue to fail due to: “bureaucratic obesity” and
interagency competition; and a lack of understanding of a “determined
and creative enemy” (mujahedin’s unconventional structure and
methods, strong religious faith, decentralized ops, and constantly
adapting military doctrine (denotes detailed study of our vulnerabilities)

Sniper tactics are a neglected but effective tactic against infidel forces
(on-line sniper manual posted soon after)

US is trying to apply center of gravity theory to AQ but has missed it;
but AQ knows our COG (our economy), and they are targeting it all
over the world

Al-Qaida has been recruiting “blue eyed foreign fighters” for operations
in the West since they can move freely, disappear in target societies

New kidnapping manual reportedly provides tactics for snatching
Americans in Muslim countries, to force release of detainees
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Al-Qaida: Key Religious Themes

Qur’anic basis for perpetual hostility between Muslims and
unbelievers; and (armed) jihad is obligatory (and an individual
duty) for all against the infidels

The West is conducting a “New Crusade” against all of Islam,
not a “war against terrorism” as it claims

Not all ulama (Islamic scholars) truly represent Islam: beware of
those under the control of the “agent regimes”

All who cooperate with the “Crusaders” are infidels

Those ulama not under apostate government control need to
actively support the jihad to free Muslims from injustice

The importance of jihad as a means of destroying the infidel
countries: “annihilation of the infidels is a divine decree”

The “Islamic Awakening” is frightening the enemies of Islam
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Key Religious Themes (2)

Islamic law permits the killing of infidels (7 grounds); and the killing of
fellow Muslims (6 grounds)

The West is using “radical Christian doctrine” and the Crusader Church
(Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox) to “Christianize” the Muslim world
in a two-stage process:
- Separate the people from Islam so they no longer have morals or ties
to the faith; they then live like animals and are spiritually empty;
- Missionary organizations can then influence and control Muslims, get
them to do what the West wants

“Christianization” can only take place after the campaign to spread vice
and corruption succeeds; main methods are sex, corruption of women,
alcohol and drugs, and imposition of deviant curricula in schools
- US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate this process
- NGOs have helped to corrupt Muslim societies
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Key Religious Themes (3)

The Jews intend to make Iraq part of “Greater Israel”

Shi’a “renegades” in Iran and Iraq are as much of a threat as the
Christians and Jews are

Western intellectuals are helping to mobilize public opinion against
Muslims, justify waging a long-term crusade against Islam: “Islamic
threat to Western civilization” (Friedman, Huntington, Lewis, Pipes)

Client governments are aiding the “Zionist-Crusader alliance” by
supporting its Westernization/anti-Islamist campaign

US is imposing secularism on the region by force, and will implement
this throughout the Muslim world after occupation of Iraq

Separation of religion and state transforms the human being from a
servant of God into a base animal driven by self-interest

Democracy: one of “fruits of secularism” that takes ultimate authority
away from God, places people’s will above God’s
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
AQ Lays Out Its Strategy

Primary mission before 9/11: arm, train, ideologize and finance as
many mujahedin as possible, and assist Islamist groups worldwide

Objectives of 9/11 attacks: provoke massive Western response to
show it is really at war with Islam; and force Westerners and Muslims to
take sides (since their fundamental values are incompatible)

Another consequence of 9/11: successfully “globalized” Islamist war
against the West (negated regional perceptions, nationalist dimension
of the conflict)

Convince both Muslims and Westerners that they are in a “fight to the
death”: make violent “clash of civilizations” (Huntington) a reality

Attacks help to show “high treason” of Arab governments against their
publics, as well as emphasize Western ineffectiveness

Increased investment in propaganda to compensate for physical losses

Current focus: “expand the battlefield and exhaust the enemy”:
targeting US interests everywhere stretches resources, spreads fear
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
AQ’s “Counterpropaganda Strategy”

“Scientific foundations & principles” to counter US media use and
psychological warfare:
- Determine strongest parts of enemy propaganda to identify degree of
importance, then refute them
- Remove enemy’s ideas from symbolic and emotional framework so
they can be attacked and contradictions identified
- Attack weak points and avoid confrontation when enemy propaganda
is at its strongest
- Respond with events
- Turn people’s eyes toward their leaders to put enemy on defensive,
and take the initiative to affect public opinion

US “Info Dominance” strategy must be understood, opposed

Muslim technical experts need to break US computer monopolies so
infidels won’t know mujahedin’s secrets
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Four Strategic Stages to Conflict
1. Current guerilla and information war against the “external
enemy”, since the West can’t be defeated in a traditional
confrontation
2. Defeat Arab “agent regimes” by influencing/removing their
patron: getting US to limit their power and direct their actions
removes their legitimacy; and undermining US support makes
them more vulnerable
3. “Stage of Isolation”: remove the US Administration from its own
citizens and from its allies (exploit Afghan and Iraqi campaigns)
4. Direct confrontation with the US: defeat of “Great Crusader” on
its own soil will lead to loss by the West, shift international COG
back to the Islamic world
But…no real political vision of how modern Islamic world would look
post-conflict; utopian shari’a-based society and global jihad are
the only well-defined goals
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Shifts in Targets and Audiences

Main targets (physical attacks):
- Initial focus on US and Israel, and Arab/Muslim “agent regimes”
- Shift to non-Arab/ -Muslim allies: France, UK, Australia, Russia, Japan
- “Hard” -> “soft” targets; expand to third world regions
- Fellow Muslims anywhere, if they are aiding the infidels

Primary audiences (virtual influence):
- Focus on Muslims in Arabian Peninsula, Middle East, South Asia ->
Central and Southeast Asia, Europe (especially Balkans)
- Muslim diaspora (ummah) worldwide, particularly “brethren” in Palestine
and Iraq, and Muslim youth everywhere
- Mujahedin networks (both affiliated and not with AQ)
- US public: accept Islam or prepare for more attacks; policies in
Afghanistan and Iraq doomed to fail
- Publics of US allies and even non-aligned nations

Ability to move quickly from compromised/blocked websites
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
“AQ University for Jihad Sciences”

Reported attempt (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 20 Nov 03) to establish “Internet
University”; claims hundreds of Muslims are joining, some specialists
and leaders have already graduated

Described as follow-on to Mujehedin Services Bureau (MAK) and
training camps in Afghanistan; designed to teach “all jihad sciences and
their rules and types”

Vehicle for recruiting and ideological/technical training

Faculty reputed to be mujahedin leaders, headed by UBL (“Dean of
podium of the university”)

Supposedly consists of several colleges offering specialties in:
“electronic jihad,” “media jihad,” “jihad with self and money,”
“technology of explosive devices,” “booby trapped cars and vehicles”

Could be virtual replacement for lost ops base, training facilities
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Conclusions

Though its methods continue to change and its targets to shift,
AQ’s underlying goals and ideology have not

AQ’s intention to attack has not diminished, even as its
operational capabilities have suffered

Perception management is central to AQ’s war against the West

Leadership clearly describes network’s doctrine, strategy (and
even some tactics) in its Internet and news media articles

Anniversaries exploited for propaganda value, but not tied to
strikes

AQ’s hallmark is adaptability: becoming more a state of mind
(ideology), less an operational structure to survive, inspire/
instigate wider Muslim community and other movements, and
remain the Islamist vanguard
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Conclusions (cont’d)

As Americans, we must first understand our adversaries – “get
inside their head” – to discern what motivates them, how they
think and why

Study of AQ’s writings and speeches provides insight into the
cultural and religious “language” they are applying against the
West and their own governments and populations

Lack of a counter ideology by Muslims is damaging their world,
has tilted environment in favor of radical Islam and violence

Poor planning and inappropriate conduct of IW/PSYOPS by the
West has allowed terrorists to define, shape info environment

Knowledge of terrorist political goals and motives matters: can
help frustrate their objectives, isolate terrorists from the rest of
the community they thrive in (“sea of injustice”), and protect our
own forces and society
UNCLASSIFIED