Kobe Earthquake
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Kobe Earthquake
• January 17, 1995 5:46 AM
• Kobe, Japan
 epicenter on Northern tip of Awaji Island, 20km
from Kobe (hypocenter 20km deep)
• Magnitude 7.2 (Richter) for 20 seconds
• +5,000 deaths, 30-40,000 injured
• Destroyed 67,421 houses, partially 55,145
houses
Tectonic Causes
• Long-term tectonic cause
 within triple junction area, involving Pacific, Eurasian, Philippine
plates
 near Median Tectonic Line, a zone of strike-slip faults (200km N
of triple junction)
• Short-term/Immediate tectonic cause
 Nojima Fault, movement of right-lateral strike-slip fault
Nojima Fault
• alongside NW shore of Awaji Island
 branches off Median Tectonic Line
• Lateral movement, 5 feet 7 inches
• Vertical slip, 4 feet 3 inches
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 movement accommodated the east/west
shortening of Eurasian plate in its collision with
North American plate along the Izu-Itoigawa
line
Damage Factors
• Factors
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Proximity to fault
Soil & foundation conditions
Age of buildings
Types of structural system
Proximity
• Kobe’s proximity to the epicenter made it endure a
‘direct hit,’ which produced destructive seismic
shifts
 during seismic shaking, ground moved 7 inches
horizontally & 4 inches vertically
 resulted in earthquake faults, damages to roads and
railways, liquefaction at reclaimed lands, fires, crushed
houses, landsides
• Epicenter’s proximity to a highly populated &
urbanized area, increases deaths & damage
inflicted
Soil & Foundation Condition
• Kobe is built on a complex formation of various
hardnesses of ground
 ranges from solid Rokko Mountain to the soft
reclaimed land of Port Island
• amplitude of shockwaves were magnified at the
border between soft & hard ground, which
increased damage
• worst damage in areas bordering the port or
stream/rivers
 soils poorly consolidated alluvial deposits
Liquefaction of Port
• Kobe’s port was constructed on 2 artificial
islands made of relatively loose fill &
constantly saturated by water
 suffered widespread liquefaction & settlement
 car companies (Honda, Mistubishi, Toyota &
manufacturers (beer, machinery, appliances)
were disabled for 2 months
Building Structures
• newer buildings were designed to strict seismic codes, revised in 1981,
which were mostly undamaged
• BUT:
 many buildings were built prior to 1981
• only 48% of all buildings were in conformance to revision
 many middle floors of buildings collapsed
• high vibrations coincide in middle floor
 many soft first story floors created for garages
 Failure of steel structures at welding connection
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Building Structures
• many residential buildings were traditional
wooden structures with clay tile roofs
 highly expensive to retrofit houses, many citizens
ignore the idea
 heavy clay tile roofs attract large inertia forces during
earthquake shakings & result in collapse
• Japanese philosophy of strong, thick columns &
pillars with intent of standing through ground
shaking
 results in failed designs & destroyed structures
Damage on Life
• most utilities, roadways, railways, the port, and other
lifelines to the city center suffered severe damage, which
delayed rescue efforts
• restoration time
 basic services of electricity, +1 weeks
 water, 2 weeks
 gas,1 month
• 200,000 people take refuge in unheated gyms or in parks
with limited blanket supplies
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 limited space & blankets force many to endure night temperatures
of -2 C
 city eventually builds temporary homes for victims
Fires
•
•
•
•
caused by ruptured gas lines
burned 6,965 houses, partially 421 houses
many old wooden houses fueled fires
175 fires consumed an area of 819,000 m2
equivalent to 70 U.S. blocks
• Response to fire nearly impossible due to
destroyed lifelines & utilities
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Subway & Train
• one intersection a subway station collapsed,
leaving the road above to sink
• only 30% of the Osaka-Kobe railway tracks
were operational
• entire Shinkansen (bullet train) line shut
down
 quickly rebounded w/80% operability in a
month
Hanshin Expressway
• large sections of the Hanshin Expressway
collapsed
 likely where roads crossed areas of softer,
wetter ground allowing stronger & longer
lasting shaking
 result of failure in steel welding connections of
columns & brittle fractures in steel columns
Hanshin Expressway
• half of elevated expressway's piers were damaged
 entire route not reopened until Sept. 30, 1996
 retrofitted w/steel cables & brackets (used to connect &
hold up girders) to prevent collapse
• other expressways & bridges received damage
 But surprisingly Kansai Airport (artificial island) &
Akashi Kaikyo suspension bridge (under-construction)
were unaffected
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Prediction?
• Kobe region was thought to be fairly safe in
terms of seismic activity
• the fracture of active faults due to constant
compression stresses are known to occur
rarely (1 in 1-3000 year)
 Difficult to predict location & timing
 ie. prediction of major earthquake in
Shizuoka/Tokyo area in near future
Luck
• specialists claim Kobe lucky
• If earthquake had struck 30-60 minutes
later, the death toll would have been 50,000
due to rush hour
• If earthquake had struck anytime during 8
am to 9 pm, the death toll would have been
around 150,000 due higher % of people in
buildings, subway systems, streets &
highways
Future Mitigation Efforts
•
•
•
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Base/seismic isolation systems
Retrofitting reinforced concrete columns
Retrofitting reinforced steel columns
Examination of buildings
 prior 1981
• Alterative for clay tile roofs
Policy Flaws
•
•
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Overconfidence in Japanese Ability to Respond to Large Scale Disaster
After earthquakes in San Francisco and L.A. in 1989 and 1994, the Japanese
government is quoted as saying it was more capable than the U.S. at handling
large earthquakes.
Preparedness was Severely Lacking
The Kobe government, not thinking the city was vulnerable to large earthquakes,
had not adequately prepared for such a large event. Evacuation plans were
unpracticed and emergency supplies were not adequately available.
Absence of a Central Government body to Organize Relief Effort
There was no governmental body that was specifically designed to respond to
such an event; thus, response suffered.
Former U.S. Director for Japanese Affairs Glen S. Fukushima describes the
phenomenon best:
•
“What one saw was tatewari gyosei ("vertical administration," where
agencies jealously guard their turf and refuse to cooperate with each other)
at its worst.”

Orr, Robert M. Jr. “The Relief Effort Seen by a Participant”
Consequences Resulting from
Inadequate Policy
•
A Japanese Government that was both reluctant
and unprepared to respond

The government:
•
•
Refused international offers of doctors and rescue teams.
Instead of providing food and supplies, asked banks to
remain open so that people could get money to pay for
supplies themselves.

•
Suleski, Robert. “Japan After the Bubble Burst: Traditional Values Inhibit Quick Comeback”
Of note: The Yakuza were able to provide aid and support
to quake victims more quickly than the government.
Consequences Resulting from
Policy Inadequacy
•
•
Nikkei Market Collapsed 1000 points
Loss of Economic Infrastructure

Businesses like Sumitomo Rubber, whose locations had been severely
damaged, decided to move their fixed capital to other locations. This
ultimately removed vital infrastructure elsewhere.


Okuyama, Yasuhide. “Economics of Natural Disasters: A Critical Review.”
Around 400,000 building suffered damage, more than half of which
were more than half destroyed.
Infrastructure like electricity, natural gas, water, sewage, and highways
were all destroyed.

•
Horwich, George. “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake.”
How Japanese Society
Responded
•
Private Involvement

Corporations stepped in
•
•
Convenience Store Chains like Seven-Eleven chartered helicopters and put
their employees on motorcycles in order to fill their stores with supplies,
which then were sold cheaply to victims.
National Phone Companies like Nippon Telegraph and Telephone set up
phone banks. Motorola handed out cell phones to relief workers.

•
Morse, Andrew and Todd Zaun. “Views from Two Observers.”
Japan Produced more

GDP growth in 1995 was 1.4% in comparison to 1994 where GDP
growth was 0.6%; in fact, GDP growth in 1995 was substantially
greater than any other year since 1990.
•
•
Horwich, George. “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake,” 521.
Volunteer Involvement

1,000,000 volunteers responded without overall coordination.
•
Horwich, George. “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake,” 529.
How Japanese policy
Changed
•
Japan realized that top-down bureaucracy was
ineffective at providing relief as fast as was required

Volunteer organizations such as the Kobe Community Support
Center were established as a grassroots initiative towards
building a strong community fabric that could be responsive to
disasters and other local issues
They define their mission as having two major roles:

•
Support role

•
Supporting the establishment of NPOs and their activities by providing
financial support and a physical location out of which to base
operations.
Active role

Actively engaging in society by joining NPO’s to local businesses and
providing training, research and lectures to citizens, administrative
officers and corporate officers.

Kobe Community Support Center, Objective Paper.
Support of the Private and Civil sectors is
Crucial
To Responding to Future Disasters
•
George Horowich, in his article “Economic Lessons of the Kobe
Earthquake,” suggested that the government should play the role as
overseer, but allow the private sector and the volunteer sector to go to work
on the ground.
In a statement by the Global Industrial and Social Progress Research
institute, the importance of NPO’s and civilian involvement is emphasized:
•

“Now, we find the emergence of a civilian sector that voluntarily and selfmotivatedly addresses these new types of social issues. Initiated by massive
volunteer efforts offered for the aftermath of the big Kobe earthquake in 1995, volunteer activities
have won greater recognition in the society for their necessities and
importance, leading to the legislation of Specific Non -Profit Activity
Promotion Law (NPO Law) in 1998 that truly recognized the role of such
activities in the society. Today, about 9000 NPOs and other local NPOs address wider issues
ranged from citizens ’ and communities ’ level to international and global scale.”
•
Global Industrial and Social Progress Committee. “Building a new socio-economic system”
Bibliography
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Fukushima, Glen S. “The Great Hanshin Earthquake.” Japan Policy Research Institute. Occasional
Paper No. 2 (March 1995). <http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op2.html>
Global Industrial and Social Progress Committee. “Building a New Socio-Economic System - Policy
Proposal for Cooperation Among NPOs, Businesses, and Governments.” Global Industrial and Social
Progress Research Institute. January 28, 2003
Horwich, George. “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake.” Economic Development and
Cultural Change. Vol. 48, No. 3. (April 2000), pp. 521-542.
Kobe Community Support Center. Objective statement. http://www.cskobe.com/english1.html
Morse, Andrew and Todd Zaun. “Views from Two Observers.” Japan Policy Research Institute.
Occasional Paper No. 2 (March 1995). <http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op2.html>
Okuyama, Yasuhide. “Economics of Natural Disasters: A Critical Review.” Research Paper 2003-12.
West Virginia University. <http://www.rri.wvu.edu/pdffiles/okuyamawp2003-12.pdf>
Orr, Robert M. Jr. “The Relief Effort Seen by a Participant” Japan Policy Research Institute.
Occasional Paper No. 2 (March 1995). <http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op2.html>
Suleski, Robert. “Japan After the Bubble Burst: Traditional Values Inhibit Quick Comeback” The
Journal of the International Institute. <http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/journal/vol6no3/suleski.htm>
Bibliography
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“Dai-Hanshin Earthquake Information Database”. http://sinsai.fdma.go.jp/search/
Anderson, Kobe Earthquake of 1995.
http://www.warnercnr.colostate.edu/avprojects/98proj/world_volc/web_docs/kobe.html
“The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Statistics and Restoration Progress”. City of
Kobe, Jan. 1, 2005
Somerville, Paul. Kobe Earthquake: An Urban Disaster Eos, Vol. 76, No. 6, February 7,
1995, pp. 49-51.
Louie, John. Earthquake Effects.
http://www.seismo.unr.edu/ftp/pub/louie/class/100/effects-kobe.html
Terry, Kathee. Kobe Earthquake. http://vathena.arc.nasa.gov/curric/land/kobe.html
“The Kobe Earthquake: Applying Lessons Learned, 10 years after the Disaster.” Kajima
New & Notes. Spring 2005. Vol. 32