The Problem of Evil II
Mackie on the logical problem and
Swinburne’s theodicy.
J.L. Mackie
A very compact version of the argument:
1. God is omnipotent.
2. God is wholly good.
3. Evil exists.
According to Mackie, these three claims
(once their logical relations are made
explicit) are inconsistent: they cannot all
be true.
Adequate Solutions
• An ‘adequate solution’ must remove the
inconsistency.
• So, given that there is a real logical
incompatibility between three claims, an
adequate solution must backtrack, i.e. it must
withdraw (at least) one of the claims.
• Generally, the withdrawn claim is replaced by a
similar but weaker claim that
– Satisfies the theist, and
– Removes the inconsistency.
Examples of Adequate Solutions
1. Limit omnipotence: If God’s ominipotence isn’t
absolute, it might turn out that God cannot
prevent all evil.
2. Dismiss evil: If what we call ‘evil’ is somehow
illusory (or not really evil), then an absolutely
omnipotent and wholly good God might exist.
3. Limit God’s goodness: If God is ‘good’ in a
limited or incomplete way, then an omnipotent
God can be reconciled with the existence of
evil.
What does Mackie think of these solutions, and of
the views of philosophers who adopt them?
Fallacious Solutions
• The general idea here is simple: a fallacious
solution looks like an adequate solution, but in
fact it cheats.
• The pattern Mackie sees here involves implicitly
rejecting one of the three inconsistent claims,
while explicitly defending it.
• For instance, someone might claim that God is
absolutely omnipotent, but then assume, when
explaining evil, that there are limits on God’s
power.
The central question
“I shall also be considering whether an
adequate solution could be reached by a
minor modification of one or more of the
constituent propositions, which would,
however, still satisfy all the essential
requirements of ordinary theism”
Limited Omnipotence
• A popular way to limit omnipotence is to say that
God can do or create anything, so long as it’s
logically possible.
• This isn’t universally agreed amongst theists
(Descartes, for example, seems to think that
even logic and mathematics are up to God to
determine). However,
• If accepted, it might provide a starting point for
the claim that evil is logically necessary, or at
least a logically necessary ‘counterpart’ to good.
Evil as a Means
• Means-ends relations are often invoked
here: we often do things we’d rather not
do to achieve something we value.
• But applying this to God conflicts with
omnipotence: the link between what we do
and what we achieve here is causal.
• Could an omnipotent God really be
constrained by causal relations?
The ‘greater good’ response
• The idea here is to drop talk of means, and
simply claim that the world is better overall with
some evil in it than it could be if there were no
evil.
• Some Christian theologians both regard Jesus’
death on the cross as a great evil, and
simultaneously regard it as a much greater
good, one that could not exist without that evil.
• Others say the opportunity for Christians to
convert non-believers is a good that can’t be had
without non-belief, and that is good enough to
more than compensate for the evil of non-belief.
Orders of good and evil
• Mackie considers the view that first order
evil (pain and suffering) might be more
than compensated by second order good
(sympathy for others, the struggle to
reduce pain and suffering and progress in
that struggle).
• But for any such second order good, we
can also find second order evils (cruelty,
increases in pain and suffering).
Free Will
• An important version of this kind of reply invokes
free will:
– The good/value of human free will outweighs the evil
that we do.
– Given that we are free, that we do some evil is
inevitable (logically so).
• Freedom here seems to be a third-order sort of
good.
• But does the existence of freedom really imply
that we will do evil? Couldn’t we always freely
choose good?
Two Puzzles
• What is free will? Is mere randomness
enough? Or is it determination by reason?
If the first, it seems worthless; if the
second, it seems we can’t do anything but
what our ‘reason’ tells us to. But what else
could it be? Further, can it fit with God’s
omniscience and omnipotence?
• Omnipotence: Can an omnipotent God
create limitations on her own power?
Richard Swinburne
• The project of theodicy:
– ‘theodicy’ comes from ‘theo’, meaning God,
and ‘dikē’, meaning right or justification, thus
(roughly) the justification of God.
– The aim is to reconcile the existence of a
perfect God with the existence of evil.
– Swinburne’s approach is to argue that, if there
were a God, s/he would allow certain evils to
occur. So when such evils are observed, this
isn’t evidence against God’s existence.
What would a Perfect God Give to
us?
• Not just pleasure and contentment;
• “Deeper” good things: responsibility, great
value for our lives.
• What’s needed for these deeper goods?
• Preliminaries: A taxonomy of evils.
– Moral evil
– Natural evil
On having responsibility
• Swinburne suggests that God would give us real
responsibility, a share in the creative process
that determines how the world will be.
• This, he says, will require that we can choose to
harm, as well as help others.
• “A good God, like a good father, will delegate
responsibility.”
– What are the limits here? A good father won’t allow a
10 year old to murder his younger sister, even in
order to give the boy ‘responsibility’!
– How can we, without being evil already, choose to do
what’s wrong and hurtful to others?
The blessing of suffering at the
hands of others
• “Being allowed to suffer to make possible
a great good is a privilege, even if the
privilege is forced on you.”
• So, “I am fortunate if the natural possibility
of my suffering if you choose to hurt me is
the vehicle which makes your choice really
matter.”
• This is because that your choice matters is
a great good, and outweighs my suffering.
Challenge and Response
• Doctors can’t use my suffering (in some
experiment) to benefit others (even greatly)
without my permission.
• Is it OK for God to do so? Swinburne says yes–
but what do you think of his reasons?
• May we do this to our children, in some limited
ways?
• Does that make less limited uses OK for God?
• Can it be OK for God to risk even extreme cases
of such use? (Can an omniscient God ‘take
chances’ at all?)
Minimizing Evil
• Swinburne suggests that the limits of our
lifespan and the degree of pain and
suffering we can feel corresponds to the
kind of limit a parent might impose on the
harm one child would be allowed to do to
another.
• Is this a way of minimizing monstrous
evils? Or is it perfectly true, and an
important point?
Natural Evil
• Swinburne declares that ‘natural evil’ is to “make
it possible for humans to have the kind of choice
which the free-will defence extols”.
• First, it allows us to learn how to do harm (and
good) to others, and it does so without
compromising our freedom (if God told us such
things, we’d know there was a God, and mind
our P’s and Q’s).
• Second, it increases the range of significant
actions we can engage in, individually and
collectively.
A hard life
• If natural evils were much less, we’d have
no occasion to develop or show great
courage, make great efforts, be heroic.
• Animal suffering doesn’t come to much,
since they aren’t as brainy as we are (sic).
• Further, higher animals enjoy similar
higher goods, in their efforts to live, eat,
mate, raise their young etc.
Who will agree?
“(T)he reader will agree with me to the extent to
which he or she values responsibility, free
choice, and being of use very much more than
thrills of pleasure or absence of pain.”
Swinburne’s choice: pleasure, or productive pain?
(Is this really a fair summary of our situation?)
A final offer: the after-life as compensation. (What
would Ivan say to this?)