Leadership
and Political Regime
Policy Formulation in Developing Countries
GRIPS Development Forum
Leadership is Crucial
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
Top leader with proper vision and decisive action
is crucial for development.
Not all strong leaders are effective leaders.
Economic literacy is the key requirement.
A good leader is the primary force in institutional
change, because he/she can build other
necessary conditions and systems.
All
leaders
Strong
leaders
Effective
leaders
Good Leaders:
Given or Can be Promoted?


Obviously, for anyone and for any political regime,
existence or absence of good leaders is not directly
controllable.
But there are indirect ways to raise the probability
of emergence of good leaders:
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Leadership and elite education
Comparative studies in development politics
Systematic analysis of technical aspects of effective policy
making (eg. This course and my book, Learning to
Industrialize)
Well-calculated cooperation and pressure from foreign
governments and aid agencies (eg. Leftwich’s DLP)
Regional contagion of good leadership (eg. East Asian AD)
Biographies, dramas, movies of excellent national leaders
Typology of State
Robert Wade’s lecture at GRIPS (May 2006)
1. Neopatrimonial state (predatory state)
No separation of public & private domain, leaders and
officials use state power to enrich themselves.
2. Fragmented-multiclass state (populism, soft state)
Public & private domain are separated, but power base is
diverse and decisions are fragmented.
3. Cohesive-capitalist state (developmental state, hard state)
Authority is centralized, power base is narrow (serves
capitalists only), and state power penetrates deeply.
Wade argues that 2 and 3 can implement industrial
policies, but not 1 – but static analysis?
East Asia’s Solution
Adopt Authoritarian Developmentalism (AD) during
the take-off (for a few decades)
Key ingredients of AD
 Powerful and wise (=economically literate) top leader
 Development as a supreme national goal (obsession)
 Technocrat group to support leader and execute
policies
 Legitimacy derived from successful development
 Popular support (because of rising income)
The leader, as the primary force of change, creates the
other four conditions.
Why Power Concentration is Needed?


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Growth requires a critical mass of mutually
enforcing policies. A free hand of the state is
needed to mobilize resources quickly and flexibly.
Private sector is weak in most developing
countries. The state must lead initially.
If broad participation is allowed, policies are too
slow and can’t achieve critical mass due to:
--Power struggle, party politics, interest groups, etc.
--Processes which require patience and compromise,
including parliamentary debate and consensus building
--Some groups refuse to cooperate with state purposes
Authoritarian Developmental States in East Asia
1945
50
55
60
65
70
75
49
48
79 80
Rhee Syng-man
Nationalist Party
48
53
Quirino
61
92
Noh Taewoo
75
78
88
Yen
Chiang Ching-kuo
CK
86
Chiang Kai-shek
57
65
Marcos
Garcia
49
55
Singapore
59
92
65
98
Lee Kuan-yew
70
UMNO / Rahman
46 48
Thailand
57 58
Phibun
Razak
63
Sarit
76
Vietnam
80
88
Labor Party
Laos
91 92
53
60
Independent
Kingdom
48
01
Chuan
Chuan
76
Khmer
Republic
79
Kim Tu Bong
57
Chai YongKun
89
06
Thaksin
08
11
Ahbisit
Kingdom of Cambodia
97
88
62
01
06
11
Bounnh
Bouasone
ang
93
People's Republic
of Kampuchea
Burma Socialist Programme Party ･Ne Win
U Nu
98
Sisavat
Khamtai
h
Kayson Phom Vihane
70
MonarchyRegency
91
62
48
North Korea
97
Vietnamese Communist Party
Kingdom of Laos
Myanmar
09
Abdullah Najib
Mahathir
75
Cambodia
Lee Hsien
Loong
76
Indochina
Communist
Party
49
01
04
Mega
Wahid
Yudhoyono
wati
04
03
Prem
51
BA
99
Goh Chok-tong
Hussein
Thanom
10
Arroyo
81
73 75 76 77
Ma YJ
01
Ramos Estrada
90
57
Malaysia
Chen Shuibian
Suharto
Labor
People's
Party Action Party
08
Roh MooLee MB
Kim YN Kim Dae-jung
hyun
04
08
98
Sukarno
10
Hu Jintao
03
Lee Teng-hui
Aquino
05
02
97
67
Indonesia
2000
Jiang
Zemin
87
Chun Doohwan
Park Chung-hee
49
46
95
Deng Xiaoping
60 61
Taiwan
90
97
Mao Zedong
South Korea
85
76
China
Philippines
80
SLORC
11
SPDC/Than Shwe
94
Kim Il Sung
11
Kim Jong Il
Pink area shows authoritarian developmental leaders and the dark area indicates pre-independence periods. For China, the most influential leader among those holding highest positions is indica
Note: The grey
Source: Information in Suehiro (2000), p.115 was revised, updated, and expanded by the author.
Emergence of AD
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
AD emerges through election as well as a coup.
AD is more likely to rise when the nation’s
existence is threatened by:


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External enemy
Internal ethnic/social instability
Incompetent and corrupt leader
The rise and fall of AD depends on:
- Development stage of each country
- International environment
Eg. Cold War – reduced global criticism of authoritarian states
Present – non-democratic states are not allowed
Guaranteed Failure of Development?
Samuel P.Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation
in Developing Countries, Harvard Univ. Press, 1976.
Technocratic Model
Populist Model
Economic
growth
Equalization
START
START
Political
suppression
(authoritarianism)
Rising
inequality
Increased
participation
(democracy)
Political
instability
END
Social
explosion!!!
Economic
stagnation
Political
instability
END
Political
suppression!!!
E.Asia’s Authoritarian Developmentalism
Economic growth
START
Developmental policies
New social problems
(inequality, crime, pollution...)
Political stability
END
A few decades later
(checked)
Supplementing
policies
Exit to a richer & more democratic society
(examples: Korea, Taiwan)
Exit of AD



Catching-up
period
(AD useful)
High income
society
Democracy
Pluralism
Low
income
trap
AD is a temporary regime of convenience, needed
only to push up the country to a higher level.
Once a certain level is reached, AD becomes an
obstacle to further development.
Watanabe (1998) argues that successful AD melts
away automatically through social change and
democratic aspiration.
“if development under authoritarian regime proceeds successfully, it
will sow the seeds of its own dissolution” [improved living standards
and diversified social strata]
The Rise and Fall of East Asian Authoritarian Developmentalism
Government-capitalist
coalition
(undemocratic)
Gov’t
‫װ‬
Capitalists
Gov’t
‫װ‬
Capitalists
Suppress
Workers, urban dwellers
20-30 years of
sustained growth
Demand for
democracy
Middle Mass
Workers, urban dwellers,
professionals, students
Farmers
Farmers
Features:
- Crisis as a catalyst
- Developmental ideology
- Strong leader
- Legitimacy through economic results (not election)
- Elite technocrat group
- Social change after 2-3 decades of success
Exit of AD – A Less Optimistic View


However, there are also barriers to exit: stubborn
leader, bureaucratic resistance, interest groups.
Therefore, leadership, policy and struggle are
also needed for an exit.
Succession problem--strong leaders often refuse
to step down because they will be revenged,
jailed and even executed after transition, with
most (all?) of their policies denied and reversed.
 For a smooth exit, political maturity must
accompany economic growth (difficult, but not
impossible)
Opponents of AD

Many people oppose AD for lack of democracy.
“I do not subscribe to the idea that you need to delay
democratization just so that you can actually have growth or
that you can have democracy only when you can afford it.”
(Dani Rodrik, 2006)

Some argue that freedom, equality, participation,
empowerment are required for development.
“Expansion of freedom is viewed… both as the primary end and
as the principal means of development.” (Amartya Sen, 1999)
Millennium Development Goals (MDG), pro-poor growth,
endogenous development, human security
Korean Experience
N.T.T.Huyen “Is There a Developmental Threshold for Democracy?:
Endogenous factors in the Democratization of South Korea” (2004)
“Democracy as an advanced form of politics is not
independent from socio-economic development.”
“Developmental threshold for democracy [is] a point in
the development process beyond which democracy can
be effectively installed and sustained.”
History of South Korean Politics
1960
1970
1980
1990
Minjung Movement
Syngman
Rhee
(dictator)
Student
protests
Corrupt &
inefficient
Park Chung Hee
(dictator)
Yushin
Constitution
(1972)
Growth under AD &
North threat
Chun Doo
Hwan
(dictator)
Kwangju
Massacre
(1980)
People’s protest
mounts
Roh
Tae
Woo
Return to
democracy
(1987)
Picked by
Chun to be
elected
Korea: Per Capita GDP in 1990 USD
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1960 62
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
Political culture
Economic
growth
Social
mobilization
Urbanization
Industrialization
Modernization
Ms. Huyen’s Model
Compromise as common political culture
Active political participation
Values such as equality, moderation
Democracy
Social structure
Rise of workers & middle class
Old classes losing power
Emergence of civil society
Rulers
Rulers and upper
bourgeoisie
Students and
professionals
Middle
class
38.5%
Farmers
80%
1961
Source: N.T.T.Huyen (2004)
Industrial workers,
peasants, miners
More than 50%
1985
Form vs. Substance of Democracy in the
Context of Latecomer Development
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Is AD replicable in Africa? Central Asia? Elsewhere?
Does 21st Century allow AD? The Cold War already ended.
Can we separate “authoritarian” elements from
“developmental” elements, and take only the latter?
Countries that already have free election, functioning
parliament, human rights—can they adopt developmentalism
without sacrificing their political achievements?
 Need to go beyond simple dichotomy between AD vs.
democracy
 Need to decompose democracy into components and stages
and analyze its structure
Components of Democracy
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Human rights and freedom
Legitimacy (election)
Rule of law
Participation
Public purpose
Power decentralization (L-E-J, center-local)
Only some components should be restricted, if at all, to
conduct development policy. Amount of restriction
should be reasonable.
Random, excessive oppression should never be allowed.
Instability of
Developing Country Politics
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Even under the form of democracy, politics may
be characterized by instability, personal gains,
intolerance and radicalism.
Rules have not been institutionalized, and
authority is not firmly established or accepted.
Election results, human rights, parliamentary rules
can be bended, and contested by opponents.
Disputes go to extremes (violence and terrorism).
Negotiation and compromise are rejected.
“Revenge politics” – prosecution, ousting or even
execution of former PM or President; complete
denial of his/her policies.
Africa: Political Regimes 1955-2010
Number of countries (total 48)
40
Transition period
30
At civil war
Multi-party system
20
Military regime
One-party system
Colony
10
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
0
Sources: Author’s classification based on the following datasets and studies: M. Miyamoto & M. Matsuda, eds, Shinsho African History, Kodansha (1997); B.
Ndulu, S.A. O’Connell, R.H. Bates, P. Collier and C.C. Soludo, eds, The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960-2000, Cambridge University
Press (2008); CIA, World Fact Book, various issues; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Basic Data of Countries, various issues.
Ethiopia’s
Democratic Developmentalism (DD)
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Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (in power 1991-2012)
Aiming at paradigm shift from Neo-liberalism to DD
DD: “A developmental regime that stays in power for long
by winning free elections under multiple parties”
- Strong state promoting value creation and punishing rent
seeking
- Small farmers as political base (not capitalists)
- Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI)
Example: leather industry promotion
- Sticks: tax & ban for unfinished/semi-finished exports
- Carrots: Leather Institute (training, technology, etc.),
donor support, twinning with India, prioritized allocation of
loans/forex, matching with foreign firms, monthly gov’tbusiness meetings and monitoring, etc.
Leadership by strong
developmental state
Institutions, policies,
incentives (carrots &
sticks) for allocating
rents to value creators
and punishing rent
seekers
Drivers of
industrialization
Donors
Professionals
Intellectuals
Gov’t
‫װ‬
Ruling party
Capitalists
(Large & medium size producers,
merchants, banks, foreign firms)
Urban workers, SMEs, service providers
Small farmers
(Drivers of agriculture?)
Ethiopia: DD, ADLI, GTP
Political
coalition
Are AD and DD Really Different?
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Today’s latecomers are not necessarily more
advanced than past latecomers in political
maturity, HRD or PSD.
They must adopt “democracy (elections),” free
market and globalization because these principles
now rule in the world (since 1990s).
The substance of development (productivity,
competitiveness, policy quality, etc) cannot be
realized just by changing political or economic
frameworks.
AD and DD are different adaptations by national
leaders to shifting global environments for the
same purpose of development through receiving
international aid and support.
PM Meles of Ethiopia
（Letter dated July 30, 2009)
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“Democratization in developing countries that comes as a
result of external pressure is in my view unsustainable…
because the external pressure is unsustainable. The neoliberal triumphalism… is coming to an end.”
“There is an unavoidable trade-off between democratization
and policy continuity… There is always the risk that the
developmental state will be voted out… [but] it is not
inevitable.”
“One last point I want to stress however is that AD and DD
are much closer to each other than AD is to other
Authoritarian governments or DD is to other democratic
governments.”
Pure
dictatorship
AD
DD
Advanced
democracy
REFERENCES
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Huntington, Samuel P., and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political
Participation in Developing Countries, Harvard University Press, 1976.
Iwasaki, Ikuo, Ajia Seiji wo Miru Me: Kaihatsu Dokusai kara Shimin
Shakai e (The Perspective on Asian Politics: From Developmental
State to Civil Society), Chuko Shinsho, 2001, Japanese.
Leftwich, Adrian, "Democracy and Development: Is There Institutional
Incompability?" Democratization, 12:5, Dec. 2005, pp.686-703.
Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen, "Is There a Developmental Threshold for
Democracy?: Endogenous Factors in the Democratization of South
Korea," in AsDB and VDF, Which Institutions Are Critical to Sustain
Long-term Growth in Vietnam? AsDB, 2004 (English and Vietnamese).
Noman, A., K. Botchwey, H. Stein, and J.E. Stiglitz, eds, Good Growth
and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies, Oxford
Univ. Press, 2012.
Ohno, Kenichi, Shijo Iko Senryaku (Strategy for Market Transition),
Yuhikaku, 1996, Japanese.
Ohno, Izumi, and Kenichi Ohno, “Dynamic Capacity Development:
What Africa Can Learn from Industrial Policy Formulation in East Asia,”
ch.7, A. Noman, et al. eds (2012), pp.221-245.
Ohno, Kenichi, "The Role of Government in Promoting Industrialization
under Globalization: The East Asian Experience," in ADB and VDF,
Which Institutions Are Critical to Sustain Long-term Growth in
Vietnam? Asian Development Bank, 2004 (English and Vietnamese).
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Ohno, Kenichi, Learning to Industrialize: From Given Growth to
Policy-aided Value Creation, Routledge, 2013.
Ohno, Kenichi, and Izumi Ohno, eds, Japanese Views on Economic
Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, Routledge, 1998.
Rodrik, Dani, "Home-grown Growth: Problems and Solutions to
Economic Growth," an interview with Harvard International Review,
Winter 2006, pp.74-77.
Sen, Amartya, Development as Freedom, Anchor Books, 1999.
Suehiro, Akira, Catch-up gata Kogyoka ron (Catch-up Type
Industrialization), Nagoya University Press, 2000, Japanese.
Wade, Robert, "The Case for Open-economy Industrial Policy,"
paper for PREM conference on the Institutional Foundation of
Growth, World Bank, April 2006, Washington, DC, and GRIPS
seminar, May 2006, Tokyo.
Watanabe, Toshio, Shinseiki Asia no Koso (Designing Asia for the
Next Century), Chikuma Shinsho, 1995, Japanese. English
translation in Ohno-Ohno (1998).
Zenawi, Meles, “States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the
Case for a Developmental State,” ch.5, A. Noman et al. eds (2012),
pp.140-174.