Slots
Game Protection and Internal
Theft
SLOT CHEATS WOULD TURN A
MACHINE ON IT’S SIDE IF THEY
THOUGHT THEY COULD GET AWAY
WITH IT!
Slots Protection
In today’s world, we have to deal with both
the oldest and newest of cheating
techniques.
In the first part of this presentation, we will
deal with old methods, still in operation, for
cheating coin-operated gaming devices
(slots).
Slots Protection
We will then phase in, through other, more
modern methods of cheating, and end up
with Internal Theft in Slots.
Be aware that all of these methods,
together, demonstrate one thing:
Slots Protection
No matter what technology is
developed, there will always be
someone who will try, and probably
succeed, in figuring out
a way to get around it
Slugs
Slugs
Slugs are poor-quality approximations,
cast in lead or other base metal, of a slotmachine token.
They will be accepted generally into old or
poorly maintained machines.
Occasionally the slugger will force a coin
acceptor, effectively breaking it, so that it
will accept a slug or different denomination
coin or token.
Slugs
Tells:
Playing out of Pockets
Coin in from one pocket or bucket and winnings out
into another pocket or bucket
Rubber-necking
Separation of tokens from payouts
Coins frequently fall through to tray
Catching coins as they fall into the tray
Distinctive sound
Slugs
Slugs
Slugs
Preventive/Detection Procedures:
Consistent surveillance of slot areas
Notification of suspicious players to
Surveillance by Slots personnel
Hard Count notifies of slugs found in drop
Slot floor and techs notify of slugs in
machines
Fix the coin acceptors
Slugs
Detection Techniques:
Surveillance coverage & foot patrols by
slots and security
Look for rubber-necks
Establish dedicated coverage of areas being
hit
Review slots area tapes for suspects
Counterfeit Tokens
Counterfeit Tokens
Tells:
Maximum coin in , then cash out credits
Minimal play
On-and-off play
JDLR
Rubber-necking
Brings tokens into the casino: plays from
pockets or bag, frequently cashes out,
never buys tokens
Frequent cash-out, but still has tokens to
play
Counterfeit Tokens
Preventive/Detection Procedures
Dedicated coverage of high-action slots
Monitor high action players, fills and
jackpots
Check by tech and hard count of the
machines and drop
Tighten up or repair the coin acceptors
Counterfeit Tokens
Detection Techniques
Routinely check high action players
Monitor unknown high action players
Determine a reason for hopper fills
Check in drop buckets of high-action
machines
Shaved Tokens
In coin-operated slot machines, there is a device
which counts the coins as they run through the
payout chute by counting the number of times a
beam of light is interrupted by the passing coins.
Shaved tokens do not interrupt this beam on
certain types of slot machines.
The coins or tokens are reduced in diameter by
as little as 3% or as much as 10%
Shaved Tokens
Standard Token
Light Receiver
Light Emitter
Coin Chute
Light Receiver
Shaved Token
Standard Token
Light Emitter
Shaved Token
Coin Chute
Shaved Tokens
Tells:
Rubber-necking
Sorting coin from payout
Frequent cash-out of tokens, retaining one part of
sort
Coins frequently fall through to tray
Blockers/Distracters
Coin out doesn’t match win meter
Frequent cash-out of credits
Shaved tokens found in drop during weigh/wrap
Suspects will catch tokens as they are paid out of
machine
Brings tokens to the casino but does not buy
them
Shaved Tokens
Shaved Tokens
Shaved Tokens
Preventive/Detection Procedures:
Hard Count and/or Slots must report unusual
sized tokens/coins and/or different
denominations found in hopper or drop
Slot Dept. must report hopper fills on any
machine left unattended
Slot Dept. must report any machine filled 3
times within a 24 hour period
Tighten up or repair the coin acceptors
Shaved Tokens
Detection Techniques
Observe rubber-neckers
Determine reason for unusual amount of fills
Investigate reports of unusual sized coins
and/or different denomination coins or
tokens
Check players who frequently cash-out coin
or credits
Check payout meter to reel symbols for
correct pays
Counterfeit Cash
Counterfeit Cash
No matter what changes the Treasury
Department makes in our bills, the counterfeiter
is only one very short step behind, especially
with today’s computer technology.
It is unfortunately very common for people to
feed counterfeit bills through dirty or poorly
maintained or adjusted bill validators.
Counterfeit Cash
Tells:
Frequent input of cash, frequent cash-out
of credits
Minimal and/or no play
Player or associate continuously at cage
or booth cashing out
Unknown player (does not use player card)
Will return several times to a machine that
accepts counterfeit money
Counterfeit Cash
Tells:
Rubber-necking
Bills will be rejected often, suspect will try
same bill repeatedly
Counterfeit & good money will be kept
separate, bills into validator from one
location and bills from cash-out to
another.
Moves from machine to machine until one
is found that will accept the money
Counterfeit Cash
Preventive Procedures:
Investigate reports of counterfeit bills
found by soft count
Contact Validator Unit manufacturer for
repair/tuning of units
Preventive maintenance/cleaning of bill
validators
Counterfeit Cash
Detection Techniques:
Review existing recordings to provide a
description of suspects
Dedicate coverage to machines where
bills were found
Payout Scams
There are a number of other scams that
focus on the payout mechanisms of slot
machines.
Payout Scams
Tells:
Coin payout meter does not match coin paid
out.
Payout does not match symbols on reel
Player reaches up into payout chute to
place/retrieve device
Hoppers found empty or near empty without
players present
Rubber-necking
Optic Devices
Coin-operated slot machines have in the
payout chute, an optic coin counter, that
works by counting the number of times a
coin interrupts a beam of light.
Devices have been designed that “fool”
this counting device by shining a strong
light into the receiver.
Optic Devices
Light Receiver
Light Emitter
Light Receiver
Shaved Token
Coin
Coin
Light Emitter
Coin Chute
Coin Chute
Optic
Device
Optic Devices
Optic devices (known as Mini-Lights) must
be tailored exactly to a particular type of
machine: it is shaped exactly to be
inserted through the payout chute or other
opening.
Optic Devices
Optic Devices
Optic Devices
Tells:
– Hand in unusual position in the payout tray
Flexing fingers on the hand in the payout tray
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Credit meter does not match number of coins paid
Pauses in payout meter while coins still falling
Hopper empties without matching coin-out reader
Too many fills
Rubber-necking
Two people working, one runs credit meter up and the
other cashes out while the first one blocks
– Machine requires fill but no player present
Optic Devices
Optic Devices
Optic Devices
Optic devices
Prevention/Detection procedures
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Visible foot patrols in coin machine areas
Check coin-out meter against SDS system
Consistent Surveillance patrols
Check out unknown players (no player card)
Check people frequently cashing out coin, unusual
amounts of win
– Check out rubber-neckers
– Coverage of any coin machines with payout
inconsistent with number of fills
Shims and Other Manipulators
Other devices have been designed over
the years to fool or otherwise manipulate
the coin-out chute, by holding it open.
Shims and Other Manipulators
Shims and Other Manipulators
Kickstand Device
Shims and Other Manipulators
Variations of the kickstand
Shims and Other Manipulators
Shims
Shims and Other Manipulators
Tells:
– Hand in payout tray in unusual position
Hand will be flexing during payout
– Pauses in credit meter while coins are falling
– Too many fills on one machine or bank of
identical machines
– Fill required on machine with no player
present
– Coin out does not match meter
Shims and Other Manipulators
Prevention/Detection procedures
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Visible foot patrols in coin machine areas
Check coin-out meter against SDS system
Consistent Surveillance patrols of coin machine areas
Check out unknown players (no player card)
Check people frequently cashing out coin, unusual
amounts of win
– Check out rubber-neckers
– Coverage of any coin machines with payout
inconsistent with number of fills
Stuffing Coin Chutes
This is definitely low-tech cheating.
By stuffing a piece of paper, tape or a
magnet into the end of the coin-out chute,
one can cause the last few coins of a
payout to stop in the chute.
Later, the cheater comes back and
removes the blockage, and a few coins will
fall out into his hand.
Stuffing Coin Chutes
Tells:
– Rubber-necking
– Payouts with no play
– Legitimate guests complain at change booth
of short payout
– Hand in chute inserting the blockage
– Hand in chute retrieving coin with no play
Stuffing Coin Chutes
Tells:
– Bits of paper or tape in payout tray
– Apparent random wandering through slots
areas, no play but sits at several machines
and puts hands into payout area
– Coins falling into tray with no credit-paid
registering
Stuffing Coin Chutes
Stuffing Coin Chutes
Preventive Procedures:
Slot employees should check for
blockages upon receiving reports of partial
or short pays
Slot employees should report individuals
acting suspiciously to Surveillance
Stuffing Coin Chutes
Detection techniques
Surveillance patrols of Slots areas
Teamwork between Slots floor and
Surveillance
ID suspicious individuals
Stuffing Coin Chutes
Detection Techniques
Check out machines where guests
complain of short payouts
Monitor Slot areas for subjects casing or
loitering about
Report to Security any subjects observed
attempting to reach into coin chutes
Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout
Tells:
Rubber-necking
Places hand at payout chute to disguise
amount of or manipulate payout
Payout does not respond to symbols on
machine
Wins consistently and cashes out frequently
Disproportionate number of jackpots
Machine loses money consistently
Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout
Tells:
Display shows unusual activity, such as jumping
rapidly between Help and other displays
Abnormal amount of hopper fills
Same individuals consistently play and win
Expert input of coins or use of play/credit buttons
Machine constantly being played by suspicious
individuals
Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout
Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout
Preventive Procedures:
Slots must report machines that are
consistent losers
Slots must report machines with 3 hopper
fills in 24 hour period
Investigate machines with same player
returning and winning
Investigate machines at which unusual
activity occurs
Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout
Detection Techniques:
Investigate machines that are consistent
losers or abnormal amount of fills
Monitor rubber-neckers and unusual play
Check players who display expert playing
techniques
Investigate players who have unusual
items by machine
Coin-In Scams
Just like the optic and other devices used
to fool the payout section of the machine,
other devices have been designed to fool
the coin acceptors.
– Clicker
– Stringing
– Breaking acceptor
Coin-In Scams
Tells:
– Hands at coin slot in unusual position, or
unusual motions
– Rubber-necking
– Coin-in/out meter does not match with
inventory
– Blockers
Coin-In Scams
Coin-In Scams
Coin-In Scams
Coin-In Scams
Coin-In Scams
Clicker
Coin-In Scams
A “Stringer” operates much the same way:
a piece of monofilament fishing line (or
braided line called Spiderwire) is glued to
a coin, which is put into the coin acceptor
and pulled out multiple times, causing the
acceptor to count many coins.
Coin-In Scams
Another way of fooling the coin acceptor is
sometimes done for slugs or coins or
tokens of different denomination.
By slamming a token into the acceptor, it
can sometimes be damaged in such a way
that it will accept almost any coin.
Another way of fooling it has been to use a
drink straw to slide a coin through the
acceptor.
Coin-In Scams
Fast-feeder:
The final method we will speak about is not
considered cheating in many jurisdictions.
The perpetrator takes advantage of a poorly
adjusted or dirty coin acceptor, or one of low
quality.
By feeding coins through very rapidly, the
acceptor can be fooled into counting more than
are fed.
Coin-In Scams
Fast-feeder Tells:
– Arranging coins or tokens in hand to fall
rapidly through the acceptor
– Little or no play, immediate cash-out
– Returns again to the same machine
– Often will feed the coins back through and
cash out again
– Rubber-necking
Coin-In Scams
Coin-In Scams
Counterfeit Tickets
Tickets (TITO vouchers) can be
counterfeited and cashed in at change
booths and the cage.
To a criminal, they are as good as cash,
provided he can turn them in.
Counterfeit Tickets
In order for this scam to work, the cage or
change-booth cashier must be very lax in
his or her procedures.
The scammer will scout to find a place and
a person who does not first verify every
ticket through the computer system.
Counterfeit Tickets
The next step is to acquire a valid ticket,
which is scanned into a computer.
The computer file is duplicated and parts
of it are changed, including the value and
other information.
Several tickets are printed.
Counterfeit Tickets
The scammer then goes to the casino
during a busy period, gets several valid
vouchers, and hands them all to a cashier
at once, usually when several people are
waiting in line.
He already knows this cashier will not
scan the tickets prior to cashing. He gets
his money and leaves the casino
immediately, as it will be only moments
before the cashier discovers the scam.
Counterfeit Tickets
This scam requires only two things to
operate:
– First and most important, a lazy or careless
cashier
– A computer, scanner, and printer for creating
the tickets (all available on the open market)
– A third item that helps the scammer is to be
able to steal valid blank vouchers on which to
print the tickets
Counterfeit Tickets
Tells:
– Individual feeding money into a slot machine
and cashing without play, possibly on several
machines
– Same individual cashing several tickets at
once at cage or change booth
– Suspect will be in a hurry, and may scout the
area for security or suits prior to cashing
– Cashier is not scanning each ticket prior to
paying out
Counterfeit Tickets
Preventive Procedures:
– Require that all TITO vouchers be scanned
and checked in the computer prior to cashing.
Drill this into your cashiers
– Suspicious persons: Both Surveillance and
Slots floor personnel watch for people feeding
machines and cashing without play
– Safeguard supplies of blank TITO vouchers
from theft
Counterfeit Tickets
Detection Techniques:
– Review cage/booth tapes for ID of suspect
when counterfeit tickets are found
– Suspect multiple ticket transactions when
cashier has history of skipping the scan.
Manual Vouchers
This is a false-claim scam.
When ticket printers fail, a manually
printed or hand-written TITO voucher can
be generated in many systems
Manual Vouchers
These manual vouchers can be scammed,
by getting the manual voucher made and
then cashing both the originally printed
voucher and the manually generated
duplicate.
This scam also requires a gullible cashier
or two, and a carelessly checked TITO
printer
Manual Vouchers
Tells:
– Player claims no ticket was generated
– Machine shows a ticket was printed, but no
evidence of printer failure
Manual Vouchers
Preventive Procedures:
– For all manually generated tickets, whether printed or
handwritten, get the player’s name
– Require that for handwritten tickets, both a tech and a slots
manager sign for it
– For machine generated duplicates, the same signatures should
be required
– Require that the manual ticket be scanned and checked in the
computer like any other for cashing out
– Require that the original ticket printed (or not) is cancelled in the
system prior to issuing a manual ticket
– For sizable amounts, require Surveillance coverage review
before generating a ticket.
Manual Vouchers
This scan also be an internal scam,
whereby a floorperson, supervisor or tech
generates a manual ticket and hands off to
another person to cash.
Prevention: require notification to
Surveillance on generation AND cashing
out of manually generated payout
vouchers.
Counterfeit currency on ticket paper
Recently there has been a scam where a
person printed cash facsimiles on TITO
paper
How this worked is not fully understood,
but probably required a poorly maintained
validator to accomplish.
Counterfeit currency on TITO paper
The tells and prevention/detection would
be the same as for any other counterfeit
Modern Cash-in Scams
Several more scams have been designed
to work on the cash-in function on slots.
Zip Strips
Scams have been designed to allow
“players” to feed currency into a bill
acceptor, then pull the bill out of the
machine and retain the credits
These are called Zip Strips, and there are
several variations
Zip Strips
Zip Strips
Zip Strips
Zip Strips
Zip Strips
Zip Strips
Tells:
– Unusual activity at bill validator
– Blockers
– Count on currency in the can does not match
machine records
– Minimum or no play
– Once this scam is successful, the scammers
will return to the same area and machines, as
not all BV acceptors will work for this
Zip Strips
Preventive Procedures
– Surveillance and floor people alert for unusual activity
with bill validators
– When cash counts come up short against machine
records, review available surveillance coverage for
unusual activity and suspect IDs.
– Slots execs should contact the manufacturers and get
the BV acceptors repaired, updated or replaced
Radio Device
This is a false-claim scam
There are some bill acceptors which can be
jammed by a relatively powerful radio
transmitter, causing a time-out.
the person watches until a player puts a bill in
the machine, then waits for the player to leave.
He then times out the validator with a hand-held
radio, and makes a claim that his bill ($20, $100,
whatever) was eaten by the machine. The can is
checked and his claim is validated.
Radio Device
Tells:
– Time-out on bill validator
– Unusual activity near the validator prior to the
time-out
– Possible blockers
– Individual moving in on a machine right after a
player leaves.
Radio Device
Preventive Procedures
– Check machine records on any claims that
acceptors ate the money.
– Review machine records for the last five bills,
and see what play was done and whether
play or cash-out occurred after the last bill
– Machine records should show that a bill was
accepted for the last one, and no play
afterward, if the claim is valid
Radio Device
Detection:
– Investigate unusual people watchers
– Review available surveillance coverage if
machine records are questionable
– Tell the claimer as a routine matter that
Surveillance is reviewing their coverage of the
area
– Be aware of people carrying radios
Credit Meter Devices
Devices exist which are claimed to be able
to run up, very fast, the numbers on some
kinds of credit meters
The scam is obvious: put a little money in,
run up the meter and cash out
Credit Meter Blaster
Credit Meter Blaster
Ad for this device on the internet:
GAMBLING MACHINE JACKPOTTER & CREDIT
SIGNALER MICRO EDITION This device used to
manipulate all kinds of gambling machines including
video slots, video poker, video blackjack, fruit,
electromechanical slot machines, etc. Tested on different
machines with positive results including: credits added,
larger payouts, and the outright emptying of entire
machine contents. This concealable device can be
placed in an ordinary handbag, camera case, pocket,
etc... So small, it will fit in a pack of cigarettes,
including the battery, and still have room for several
cigarettes!!! Powered by a standard 9 volt battery.
Credit Meter Devices
Key Fob Device:
This completely remote-controlled device affects the
coin mechanism and hopper payout counters on modern
post-1996 machines. It will increase credits as well as
increase payouts making it so you can literally EMPTY a
machine in as little as 15 minutes of play. The device
emits a variable, invisible signal from the key-chain
transmitter all done remotely without contact to the target
machine. In fact, it affects ONLY the machine you are
playing, as the signal is directional. The signal is
completely undetectable by current security measures.
The unit is powered by a mini 12 volt battery commonly
available at most retail, electronics, and convenience
stores.
Credit meter device
Tells
– Little or no play, large cash out with no
jackpots showing on Slots computer system
– Unusual activity near the slot machine face
– Coin out does not match play records
– Possible blockers
Credit Meter Device
Preventive Procedures:
– Consistent video, security and slots foot
patrols of slots areas
– Investigate remotely anyone who appears to
cash out too often and too much for short play
– Communication from Slots floor to
Surveillance: TEAMWORK
High-Tech Scam
Injecting Chips with false information
Tells:
New/unknown player
Blockers/Distractors blocking camera angles
Substantial jackpot over $30,000 -usually a
progressive
Must open machine
Injecting Chips with False Information
Preventive Procedures:
Dedicated coverage of large-jackpot
machines and progressive banks
Hold large jackpot payouts until
Surveillance reviews tape completely
Tell the winner that Surveillance is
reviewing the coverage.
Injecting Chips with False Information
Detection Techniques:
Review recordings of the area thoroughly,
including at least half an hour prior to the
win.
Distract & Grab
Wherever there is money, there are
people trying to steal it. Distract and Grab
scams include:
– Bucket theft
– Purse (and other belongings) theft
– Cashing and stealing the credits on a
machine
– Major theft from casino patrons
Distract & Grab
Theft from your patrons makes the casino
a victim: Each time one of your players
gets ripped off, you lose future customers.
Distract & Grab
Tells:
– Lone individuals moving around casino floor,
not playing, and checking out the players
– Small groups entering together, then splitting
up and re-forming as a group.
– Individuals walking about with coins in hand,
looking at players
– JDLR
Distract & Grab
Tells:
– Sloppy appearance
– Don’t fit customer profile
– Watching players, not looking at machines
– Avoiding security and other employees
– Approach slot players and engage in
conversation or toss coins on the floor
– JDLR
Distract & Grab
Distract & Grab
Distract & Grab
Distract & Grabs
Preventive Procedures:
Report suspicious non-playing people to security
for approach and ID
Escort out or 86 subjects who roam or loiter
about the slot areas
Train Slots employees to approach and greet
subjects and /or report to Surveillance
All thefts from persons should be reported to
surveillance for tape review and possible ID of
suspects
Distract & Grabs
Detection Techniques:
Patrol Slots and other areas for subjects
casing or loitering
Review tapes of all thefts to identify
subjects for future response
Employee Impersonators
Tells:
Dressed as or similar to casino employees
Roaming Slot areas without playing
Approaches players, obtains cash, coin,
tokens or tickets and then exits property
Employee Impersonators
Preventive Procedures:
Train Slot employees to approach and
greet subjects and /or report to
Surveillance
Review tapes of reported thefts for
suspects
86 subjects whenever possible
Employee Impersonators
Detection Techniques:
Patrol Slots areas for subjects casing or
loitering
Monitor subjects who are dressed similar
to Slot employees
Review recordings of reported incidents to
identify suspects for future response
“Professional” Players
Also known as “slots advantage players”
Frequenting banks with “predictable”
jackpots, progressives
This is not an illegal activity
Their only disadvantage occurs when they
discourage other guests from playing the
machines
“Professional” Players
Techniques:
– Occupy a whole bank of machines when they
think the jackpot is likely to hit
– Discourage non-team members from play
– Operate from a common bankroll, split
winnings
– Use of “cash-back” comps whenever possible
– Often several players using the same player
club account to build comp points
“Professional” Players
Tells:
All machines of type in constant play
Players are adept at putting coins or bills
into acceptor, using credit buttons, playing
machine
Players appear to be locals and are
familiar with the casino environment,
policies & procedures
“Professional” Players
Preventive procedures:
Signage preventing team play
Remove machines if not profitable
86 individuals who bully or otherwise
discourage other guests from play
“Professional” Players
Detection Techniques:
Investigate why specific types of machines
are attracting professional players
Monitor players to determine methods of
play
Obtain Slot statistics to determine machine
profitability
Direct Theft
Often the most obvious method of theft is
neglected: breaking into the machine to
steal the money
Vulnerable areas:
– Coin operated slots: drop area, hoppers
– Bill validators
– Booths and slots banks
Direct Theft: Machines
Tells:
– Often two or more people, a lookout and the
person who breaks in
– Machine candle lit
– Person seated but not playing the machine
– Avoiding attention of security and Slots floor
personnel
– Can be off-duty or ex-employees who did not
turn in keys
Direct Theft: Machines
Tells:
Illegal drop door or illegal machine entry signal
Drop Door Open signal at unusual time of day
without prior notification from Slot Department
Suspicious Individuals loitering in drop areas
Unsecured and/or broken drop door or lock
Drop crew leaves behind drop bucket or
validator can
Direct Theft: Machines
Preventive Procedures:
Utilize recessed drop locks
Maintain drop security
Slots must report any broken drop door,
suspicious circumstances or individuals
Slots must strictly monitor Slot Data
System (SDS) for drop alarms
Direct Theft: Machines
Preventive Procedures:
Missing keys must be reported
Slots personnel maintain alertness and
reports suspicious individuals to
Surveillance
Surveillance maintains SDS monitor and
investigates illegal machine openings
– For this to work, ALL slots personnel must
ALWAYS use machine entry cards
Direct Theft: Machines
Detection Techniques:
Monitor Slot Data System (SDS) and
investigate drop door or illegal entry
alarms
Enforce required drop security procedures
Monitor drop for suspicious circumstances
or individuals
Ensure drop buckets and validator cans
are picked up and doors are secured
Direct Theft: Machines
Direct Theft: Machines
Direct Theft: Booths
There is also the even more direct method
of stealing from complacent or distracted
change persons in the booth.
Direct Theft: Booths
Direct Theft: Booths
And then, there is always armed robbery.
Direct Theft: Booths
Direct Theft: Booths
Direct Theft: Booths
Tells:
Distracted cashier
Individual avoids area when security is
near
Hands inside the booth area
Frantic activity in the booth
Direct Theft: Booths
Preventive Procedures:
Visible Security presence
Cameras visible and in position to ID
anyone at the window
Alertness of booth personnel
Wide counters and other barriers to keep
money out of reach from outside
Quick Change Artists
Tells:
Attempts to confuse cashier with more
than one transaction at a time
Sleight of hand move, changing one bill for
another
Or leaves booth window and returns
Claims to have been given lower
denomination than received
Con Artist
Quick Change Artists
Preventive Procedures:
Cashiers perform and complete one
transaction at a time
Alert Supervisor Immediately for count
down of bank prior to giving subject any
money
Tell the person claiming that Surveillance
is reviewing the video of the transaction
Quick Change Artists
Detection Techniques:
Review videotape of all reported short
change incidents to identify suspect
Release photos of subject to Security and
Slots Managers and cashiers
ID suspects who don’t want to wait for a
Surveillance review
INTERNAL THEFT
Slots Department
Internal Theft
With the newer, high-tech safeguards, it
nearly requires the collusion and
conspiracy of an inside person, an
employee of the casino, in order to
successfully perpetrate a scam.
Internal Theft
In most cultures in the world today, it
requires an extreme amount of stress, or a
completely unethical person, to perpetrate
fraud or theft upon the employer—the
person upon whom one’s living depends.
Internal Theft
Now let’s look at a few of the ways that
internal theft can be, and has been,
accomplished in casinos.
False Jackpots
By creating and paying a jackpot that does
not in fact exist, the Slots employee hopes
to “lose” the money and paper trail
amongst legitimate payoffs.
False Jackpots
Tells:
Required number of personnel not present
at jackpot
Jackpot not located at machine listed on
Slot system and/or paperwork
Signatures of verifying personnel not
legible or identifiable
Jackpot form not signed at location of
jackpot
False Jackpots
Preventive Procedures:
Strictly enforce slot jackpot procedures
Surveillance should be notified of large
jackpots for verification
False Jackpots
Detection Techniques:
Audit jackpot procedures routinely and
consistently
Watch for slot employees with expensive
habits (gambling, etc.) or living outside
their means
False Hopper Fills
Filling out the paperwork for a fill, and then
diverting either the bag of coin or other
cash to cover it.
This is relatively easy for a slots
floorperson or a supervisor.
In the past, a supervisor inserted the
paperwork for a fill amongst jackpot slips
for a booth attendant, and was issued the
cash for a fill as if it were a jackpot.
False Hopper Fills
Tells:
Required number of personnel not present at fill
Fill not located at machine listed on Slot Data
System (SDS) and/or paperwork
Signatures of verifying personnel not legible or
identifiable
Fill slip not signed at location of fill
Coin for fill not placed directly into hopper
Fill bag opened prior to arrival at machine
False Hopper Fills
Preventive Procedures:
Strictly enforce Slots Fill Procedure
Surveillance should be notified of fills for
high denomination machines for
verification
Surveillance should be notified of any
machines with three fills in 24 hour period
False Hopper Fills
Detection Techniques:
Audit fill procedures routinely and
consistently
Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Tells:
Unauthorized counting of bank
Counting and manipulating funds in bank
Rolls or racks of coins or tokens short,
cashier often handling rolls
Racks of high-denomination tokens short,
sometimes pushed to back of bank
Removing coins from coin bag
Bags not weighed when sent
Complaints by customers
Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Tells
Coin cans missing roll, placed behind other cans
Straps of currency short, positioned in back of drawer
Out-going cashier enters amount of funds counted by incoming cashier
Hands to body without clearing
Closed hand after entry into drawer
Money set aside in drawer separate from other funds
Markers (coins, clips, etc.) set aside after some
transactions
Covering money with paperwork or otherwise concealing
it
Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Preventive Procedures:
Strictly prohibit unauthorized count of bank
Verify and rotate stored cash and coin
routinely
Weigh all coin bags, investigate shortages
In-coming cashier must both count funds
and enter figures on check-out sheet
Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Detection Techniques:
Monitor cashiers and changepersons
frequently
Audit shift-change counts, plus one hour
prior to change
Monitor employees who are observed or
reported to display any of the Tells
Investigate shortages and overages
Audit change booths frequently
Shorting Players
In order to remove funds from an imprest
bank without detection, the cashier or
changeperson must create an overage.
This is done by short-changing players or
by short-changing fill and jackpot monies
going out of the bank.
Shorting Players
Tells:
Cashier or Changeperson does not empty
all the coins/tokens from bucket
Cashier or Changeperson does not run all
the coin through coin counter, sets aside
some in tray
Short rolls or racks
Unauthorized countdown of bank
Hands to body without clearing
Shorting Players
Tells:
Complaints by customers
Handling racks of tokens, “recounting”
“Helping” the players to rack tokens
Not turning the change bucket over
Hands in the jet-sort machine
Change machine read-out turned away from
window
Not counting the money clearly for the players
Shorting Players
Tells:
Funds or “counters” set aside in drawer
TITO tickets set aside from multiple cash-outs
Cashier occasionally does not follow TITO
cashing procedures, especially on multiple-ticket
cash-outs
– Use of a calculator rather than slot computer and
scanner
Multiple counts prior to end of shift
Discarded or concealed paperwork
Shorting Players
Preventive Procedures:
Complaints from guests must be reported to Surveillance
Prohibit unauthorized counting of bank
Require cashier or changeperson to always turn coin
bucket upside down to show empty
Install mirror over coin tray to show all coin is run
through
Occasional random mid-shift counts by managers
Ruthless enforcement of TITO procedures
Require money to be counted in the window under the
camera as it is sent to the players
Shorting Players
Detection Techniques:
Monitor cashiers and change personnel
frequently
Investigate personnel observed or
reported to display tells
Investigate shortage complaints from
customers
Frequently audit last hour of shift
Audit procedures during shift
Machine Theft
Tells:
Floorperson or technician entering machine for
no apparent reason or without player present
Hands to body without clearing after entering
machine
Does not sign entry card and/or use system card
Hands in hopper for no apparent reason
Passes coin to player
Machine Theft
Machine Theft
Machine Theft
Preventive Procedures:
Slots Floor and Tech personnel must clear
hands after entering machine and prior to
touching body
Enforce use of system entry cards and
machine entry cards
Machine Theft
Detection Techniques:
Monitor Floor and technical employees on
a routine basis
Always observe floor and technical
employees when entering machines alone
Routinely observe floor and techs when
entering machines
Machine Theft
Detection Techniques:
Investigate illegal machine entries
Investigate entry into machines with no
players present
Observe conduct around well-known
players
Internal Theft
General Prevention
As with all other parts of the casino and
hotel operation, prevention of internal theft
starts with hiring: is the person honest?
– Background checks of new hires
Credit history
Arrest history
Drug and/or gambling problems
Excessive monetary outflow/debt
Bankruptcies
Work history: why is he looking for a job?
Internal Theft
General Prevention
The second most important part of internal
theft prevention is to HAVE preventive
procedures in place, beginning with the
internal controls required by state and/or
local and federal law.
Procedures BEGIN with the internal
controls.
Internal Theft
General Prevention
Next is always training of personnel
Without training in the particular policies
and procedures of the department, the
person cannot be expected to follow them.
Part of the training in procedures is to
instruct staff on the reasons for each
procedure, and to show them that
following procedures protects them from
accusations or investigations of theft.
Internal Theft
General Prevention
Enforcement of procedures by reporting
violations and requiring managers to
retrain and follow progressive disciplinary
procedures as needed on staff.
Investigation of all shortages over a set
amount, and investigation of staff who
repeatedly violate procedures.
Pickpocket
Distract & Grab
That concludes the Slot
presentation
Questions and Answers