Arctic war is unlikely
Beckhusen 12 (Beckhusen, Robert. "Russia and Canada Gear Up for Arctic Non-War | Danger Room | WIRED." Wired.com.
Conde Nast Digital, 07 Aug. 2012. Web. 23 July 2014. <http://www.wired.com/2012/08/arctic/>. Robert Beckhusen is a contributor
at wired.com Fred).
war is exceedingly unlikely — because Russia would lose. For one, the United States has an
overwhelming and decisive advantage in submarines. U.S. subs are more advanced, there are more
of them, and their crews are better trained. It’s unlikely Arctic nations would also begin killing each other
over low-key — and remote — territorial disputes.
But a
Alt cause; they can’t solve climate change which is the root cause of military
challenges in the Arctic
Heininen 13 (Heininen, Lassi. "Valdai. Валдай. Discussion Club. Международный Дискуссионный Клуб." Climate Change in
the Arctic: Geopolitical and Security Implications. N.p., 24 Sept. 2013. Web. 23 July 2014.
<http://valdaiclub.com/economy/63020.html>. University Lecturer and Professor at Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lapland,
Finland. Among his other academic positions are Adjunct Professor at Frost Center for Canadian Studies, Trent University, Canada;
Adjunct Professor at Faculty of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland; and Visiting Professor at University of Akureyri, Iceland. He is
also the chairman of the International Steering Committee for the Northern Research Forum. Fred).
Climate change entails not only socio-economic but also military challenges to the Arctic region,
thus might lead towards the remilitarization of the region. The increasing competition for trade
routes, maritime zones and natural resources has already led and continues to lead to a military
build-up of particular coastal states and intensification of NATO military activities in the region.
In contrast with the Cold war era, the current military efforts aim at protection of economic interests of
the Arctic states and assertion of their national sovereignty over the maritime zones and trade
routes rather than global confrontation between two superpowers or military blocs.¶ ¶ To give some examples of military buildups
in the region, for instance, Canada plans to create a 5000-strong ranger unit in its North. The U.S. and Canada are modernizing the
NORAD system. Besides, the U.S. is strengthening its Alaska Command and even plans to deploy an ABM system in the Arctic region
(either land-based in Northern Norway and/or sea-based if ice retreating to continue). Norway is engaged in a quite impressive
program to modernize its coastal guard (including five new frigates’ acquisition). Russia has resumed it strategic aviation flights over
the Northern Atlantic, develops its Northern Fleet (including its nuclear component) and plans to create special Arctic troops to
control its Arctic Ocean coastline. Moreover, according to the so-called Stoltenberg Report of 2009, the five Nordic nations
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) decided to create joint military units as well as air monitoring system and SAR
infrastructures which are specially designed for the Arctic. They also plan to create a space group of three satellites to enhance the
above structures’ capabilities in communications and navigation.¶ These developments affect the international security regime in
the Arctic should be
negotiated and legal mechanisms to solve climate change-related conflicts should be developed.
The proposals to develop a system of confidence- and security-building measures in the region
are made by the international expert community as well.
the region in a very negative way. Many experts believe that a special arms control regime for
An Arctic treaty inevitably fails – too many disputes
Watson 9 (Watson, Molly. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." AN
ARCTIC TREATY: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION (n.d.): n. pag. Www.mainelaw.com. 2009.
Web. 23 July 2014. <https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>. Springfield,
Massachusetts Area | Public Relations and Communications Current Consultant at EverestPR, Consultant at Ritz Communications
Past Communications Consultant at Westfield State University, Public Relations Consultant at Noble Hospital, Vice President at GCI
Group, Fred).
With regard to claims of territorial sovereignty,
an Arctic treaty might¶ approach the issue in one of three
ways: (1) divide the Arctic among the¶ States based on some formula agreed upon by the States;
(2) direct that the¶ territorial division will be determined under UNCLOS procedure; or (3)¶ like
the Antarctic Treaty, freeze all State territorial claims. The first option¶ for dividing the Arctic is
improbable, as the current dispute exists for the¶ very reason that the States cannot agree. The
next option is also unlikely¶ so long as the United States refuses to ratify the UNCLOS treaty. The¶
United States is not apt to agree to an Arctic treaty that resolves the dispute¶ through the UNCLOS process if it remains unable to
participate within its¶ framework. However, were the United States to ratify UNCLOS, such an¶ approach may prove effective.
Within this option, an Arctic treaty could¶ indicate that UNCLOS is to govern the States’ sovereignty claims while¶ other provisions
of the treaty could address the concerns unique to the¶ Arctic not covered by UNCLOS. States, such as Russia, who have already¶
begun working under the laws of UNCLOS, would likely favor this¶ approach, as they will be able to continue in the UNCLOS process
of¶ submitting claims to the CLCS. By establishing UNCLOS as the governing¶ law, the Arctic States will be bound by the
determinations made by the¶ CLCS, and left without alternatives under, for example, customary law.¶ However, even
were the
United States to ratify UNCLOS, this approach is¶ potentially problematic because the CLCS has
no actual authority to settle¶ disputes or enforce its recommendations. Thus, should more than one
State¶ claim the same territory, as will inevitably occur, it is unclear how the¶ Commission will proceed.165 Claims made by one
State are subject to¶ counter-claims by other States, and while the CLCS’s recommendations are¶ “binding,” the body has no power
to enforce them.166
The Arctic Council solves for miscommunication and tensions in the Arctic
Stavridis 13 (Stavridis, James. "High North or High Tension?" Foreign Policy. N.p., 21 Oct. 2013. Web. 23 July 2014.
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/21/high_north_or_high_tension_arctic_competition>. Former supreme
commander of NATO. He is now the Dean of Tuft's University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Fred).
Second, we need to double down on international cooperation via the Arctic Council. Currently a smallscale international organization, it must be nurtured and resourced. Ratification of the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty, a perennial topic
in American foreign policy, would also increase U.S. influence in the Arctic. For the United States, working closely with Canada in
particular and our NATO partners in the Arctic generally makes good sense and would reduce costs to individual nations. We
should use the Arctic Council to ensure that each nation's military movements, intentions, and
patterns of operation are fully understood -- thus reducing the prospect of inadvertent tension.
There are also important so-called "Track II" projects, like the rapidly growing annual conference
sponsored by ArcticCircle.org, a loose confederation of experts in the region who met in Iceland last week.¶ Third, we
need to work as closely as we can with Russia in the Arctic. Although we will inevitably have disagreements over other topics, it is
possible the High North could be a zone of cooperation with the Russian Federation. We have shown
the ability to work together in Afghanistan, on counternarcotics and counterterrorism, in combating piracy, and in strategic arms
control and reductions. We should do what we can -- working with NATO allies -- to make it so.
Russia holds significant interests in the Arctic and is wary of other foreigners
Mikkola & Kapyla 13 (Mikkola, Juha Käpylä & Harri. The Global Arctic: The Growing Arctic
Interests of Russia, China, the United States and the European Union(n.d.): n. pag. Aug. 2013.
Web. 22 July 2014. <www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/bp133.pdf>. Juha Käpylä is researcher the
Finnish institute of international affairs. Harri Mikkola is a researcher the Finnish institute of
international affairs. Fred).
Russia is the most important player in the Arctic, with significant economic, security and
governance interests in the region. This is primarily because of natural resources. Over 20% of undiscovered global
hydrocarbon reserves are located in the Arctic area and most of them in the Russian Arctic.4 These natu- ral resources
are vital to Russian national security and economy; oil and gas alone account for roughly 20-25% of Russian
GDP.5 Russia’s domestic social programmes, infrastructure investments, and mili- tary modernization are all critically dependent on
revenues from natural resource export.¶ Similarly,
hydrocarbons provide important leverage for Russian
foreign influence. This is especially the case with energy-dependent Europe, where a third of the natural gas consumed is
imported from Rus- sia. The Arctic plays an increasing role in this equa- tion as a strategically vital
resource base for Russia. So far, the Russian Arctic has been responsible for about 10-15% of
Russian GDP and 25% of its foreign exports and there are systematic efforts to increase these
figures.¶ Russia’s increasing northward focus is also due to the fact that Russia’s mature
hydrocarbon sources in Western Siberia are slowly drying up. Recent hydrocarbon activities in the Russian
Arctic have taken place primarily through onshore projects in key locations such as the Yamal Peninsula and in nascent offshore
projects on the Arctic sea bed in the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas. These offshore projects have often taken the form of joint
ventures between Russian and international energy corpora- tions. This signals Russia’s need to seek investments and technological
know-how through international cooperation.¶ However, key offshore projects – such as the¶ Shtokhman gas field and
Prirazlomnoye oil field – have turned out to be extremely challenging and have been suffering from continuous delays and shuffling
of foreign partners up until today. Russia has also set its sights on resource bases outside its territorial borders and submitted a
claim for the¶ extension of its continental shelf to the UN Com- mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) process as early
as 2001.¶ In order to access, exploit and deliver Arctic natu- ral resources to global markets, Russia also aims to develop critical
infrastructure in the Northern Sea Route (NSR), including ports, search-and-rescue (SAR) centres, route administration, ice-breaking
capability, and oil spill response capabilities. In addition, non-maritime parts of the Arctic trans- port system – pipelines, aviation
routes, railways, and roads – and the overall socio-economic con- ditions of the region require development and modernization.¶
Russia seeks to project its sovereign authority in its wide Arctic
region through improved border control (FSB), to provide safety and security espe- cially in the
NSR, and to maintain credible forces to secure critical infrastructures. Russia also seeks to
maintain, develop and project a credible military force – primarily naval, aerial and missile
assets¶ – in the region in order to be able to react in various politico-military scenarios, as well as
to deter the expansion of unwanted foreign military presence into the (Russian) Arctic.
Russia also has security interests in the Arctic.
Further US involvement risks Russian retaliation, actions to gain influence in the
Arctic could be detrimental
Aron 13(Leon Aron, Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the author, most recently, of Roads
to the Temple: Truth, Memory, Ideas, and Ideals in the Making of the Russian Revolution, “The Putin Doctrine: Russia's Quest to
Rebuild the Soviet State”, foreign affairs published by council of foreign relations, March 8, 2013,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine Fred).
Much in Russian foreign policy today is based on a consensus that crystallized in the early 1990s. Emerging from
the rubble of the Soviet collapse, this consensus ranges across the political spectrum -- from pro-Western liberals to leftists and
three geostrategic imperatives: that Russia must remain a nuclear superpower,
a great power in all facets of international activity, and the hegemon -- the political, military, and
economic leader -- of its region. This consensus marks a line in the sand, beyond which Russia cannot
retreat without losing its sense of pride or even national identity. It has proven remarkably
resilient, surviving post-revolutionary turbulence and the change of political regimes from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin.¶ After
his election as president in 2000, Putin added to this agenda an overarching goal: the recovery of
economic, political, and geostrategic assets lost by the Soviet state in 1991. Although he has never spelled it out
formally, Putin has pursued this objective with such determination, coherence, and consistency
that it merits being called the Putin Doctrine. Domestically, the doctrine has guided the regime to reclaim the
nationalists. It rests on
commanding heights of the economy (first and foremost, the oil and natural gas industries) and reassert its control over national
politics, the judicial system, and the national television networks, from which an overwhelming majority of Russians get their news.
In foreign and security policy, the doctrine has amounted to a reinterpretation of Russia's geostrategic triad, making its
implementation and maintenance considerably more assertive than originally intended. Although U.S. President Barack Obama has
signaled lately that he will attempt to revive the "reset" with Russia, Washington's best option may well be a strategic pause: a
much-scaled-down mode of interaction that reflects the growing disparity in values and objectives between the two countries yet
preserves frank dialogue and even cooperation in a few select areas.¶ THE PUTIN DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE
Russia fears US encroachment in the Arctic – its expansion is a security threat
O’Brien 9 (O'Brien, Gregory. "How to Read the Arctic: Structural Theory and the Balance of Arctic Powers." Academia.edu.
N.p., Spring 2009. Web. 23 July 2014.
<https://www.academia.edu/3476953/How_to_Read_the_Arctic_Structural_Theory_and_the_Balance_of_Arctic_Powers>.
RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES Fred).
In response to this threatening 'non-presence' of the United States, and the growing multipolarity of the
global structure, Russia appears to be pursuing a path towards establishing a new balance that
would favour its Arctic power and interests. On this point, Karen Ruth Adams argued in 2003 that US encroachment
on the interests of nuclear powers, including Russia, would propel the development of a new balance 'just around the corner.'235
Russian Chief of Staff Lurii Baluevskii has been more direct; stating that US commitment to its
hegemony "expanding its economic, political, and military presence in Russia's traditional zones
of influence" is the country's top national security threat.236 As a consequence, it is difficult to isolate the
regional security dilemma and polarity trends in the Arctic from the larger international environment. For example, Hubert et al.
note that events such as the Russian Georgian war could easily have led to 'chilled' relations among Arctic Council states as a result
Huebert argues that because both the US and
Russia are Arctic Great Powers, any drive to increase power capabilities is likely to have an effect
on the Arctic balance, and hence, is an Arctic security issue.238 Thus, the Arctic security dilemma is in many
of many of these states also being members of NATO.237 Secondly,
ways inexorably linked to outcomes within the international structure. From this vantage, the ability of Russia, or any comparable
The value of the region is too
great, relative gains are too important, and Great Powers will strive to attain a more favourable
balance where their power is most fungible.
Great Power, to conduct itself in the Arctic isolated from the global environment is unlikely.
It’s a zero sum game – Russia is willing to resort to force if someone challenges
their authority in the Arctic
O’Sullivan 14 (Sullivan. "Opinion: Arctic Development Could Ignite Next Great-Game Competition." Breaking Energy. N.p.,
28 Apr. 2014. Web. 23 July 2014. <http://breakingenergy.com/2014/04/28/opinion-arctic-development-could-ignite-next-greatgame-competition/>. Conor O'Sullivan is a writer at breakingenergy.com Fred).
The flag planting by a Russian submarine in August 2007 underneath the Arctic seabed symbolized Russia’s
intentions to use Arctic exploration as a means of securing its desired imperial status – pursuing
a zero-sum game. The Kremlin plans to establish a new international order in which it becomes a
regional hegemon. It is my opinion that Russia intends to end its role as an isolated entity in
international affairs, becoming closely integrated with the global economy and dictating policy. Russian officials view
the Arctic as securing its energy security ambitions for the next century. Dwindling Russian gas
and energy reserves, in the underdeveloped Siberian fields, and over-reliance on European
imports of its natural gas has led to a push towards the Arctic. Russia’s jurisdictional claim over
the Arctic seabed will challenge the existing international law criteria, the UNCLOS, which specifies
jurisdictional authority over international waters.¶ Arctic stakeholders must be wary of Russian intentions
over Arctic development, considering the nationalistic rhetoric of the current government in power. Russia’s nationalized
energy companies maintain an influence in formulating Arctic Policy and influencing the Russian government to their advantage.
Russia will also use its energy security policy in the Arctic to become a naval superpower as new shipping lanes for trade and energy
production will run along its extensive northern coastline.¶ Russia’s
actions in Crimea and the Ukraine
emphasize their willingness to revert to military action over issues of territorial sovereignty and
that the U.S. requires an assertive foreign policy with Russia. Ensuing competition over Arctic energy
resources and shipping lanes will increase geopolitical competition among the Great Powers. The Bering Sea provides the U.S. with
access to Arctic shipping lanes and can act as a strategic counterbalance to Russia. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13%
and 30% of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural gas respectively lies under the Arctic seabed. I believe that Arctic Council
members, the Nordic States and Canada, will align with the U.S. to impose strict restrictions over extraction and production in the
Arctic Ocean.
The zero sum game is unavoidable – 3 warrants
Bukkvoll 14 (Bukkvoll, Tor. "Prospects for Peace and Cooperation in the Arctic." Arctic.ru. N.p., 2011. Web. 23 July 2014.
<http://arctic.ru/expert-opinions/prospects-peace-and-cooperation-arctic>. Tor BUKKVOLL is Head of the Russia Project at the
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment Fred).
It is of course true that many Arctic states are concerned with their economic and security
interests in the region and the danger of a regional conflict. This is in part reflected in practically all Arctic
states’ increased military presence in the area. At times we see heated rhetoric and mutual accusations of militarization. This
is rooted in three main causes: a zero-sum game over access to natural resources; an insufficient level of
trust among Arctic states; and the fact that the Arctic has been and will remain a militarily
sensitive area, especially for Russia. In addition, climate change and the melting of the Arctic ice cap are likely to
substantially increase commercial activity in the region. This may lead to conflicts that are not yet apparent.¶ Speaking about
oil and gas deposits, this zero-sum game is unavoidable. Politics cannot increase the volume of
available hydrocarbon deposits. Delimitation agreements seem to be the only way of defusing
conflicts. The 2011 agreement between Norway and Russia on a close to fifty-fifty division of the Barents Sea shelf among the
two countries is a case in point. It is, however, important to note here that far from all hydrocarbon deposits are potential sources of
political conflict. In fact, many and probably most deposits are located in undisputed areas. In addition, the possibilities for
cooperation on infrastructure, technology development, etc., in connection with oil and gas exploration and development activities,
might also make this issue less zero-sum.
UQ: Russia has significant interest in the Arctic right now
Padrtova 7/20 (Padrtova, Barbora. "Russian Approach Towards the Arctic Region." Centre for European and North Atlantic
Affairs Analysis RSS. N.p., 20 July 2014. Web. 23 July 2014. <http://cenaa.org/analysis/russian-approach-towards-the-arctic-region/>.
Mgr. Barbora Padrtová holds a Master degree in Security and Strategic Studies from the Faculty of Social Studies of the Masaryk
University in Brno. In 2009 she graduated in International Relations and European Studies from the Metropolitan University in
Prague. She also studied International Relations and Political Science at the Universiteit Twente in Netherlands. In 2011 she worked
at the Political Section of the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Washington, D.C. Currently she is a project manager in CENAA. In her
research she focuses on Russian security and foreign policy, US-Russia relations, NATO-Russia relations, post-Soviet region, and the
Arctic region. Fred).
The Arctic is clearly vital to Russia’s relevance in world affairs. Natural resources are one of the ¶
major forces driving Russian policy as they are viewed as a basis for the economic development ¶ and determine its
geopolitical influence. Moreover, the Arctic has always played a significant ¶ role from the perspective
of Russian Navy. Russia is the only country in the world with a nuclear ¶ icebreaker fleet. On the geopolitical level, the most
important for Moscow is maintaining of ¶ nuclear deterrence by securing the open access of submarines to world’s seas. As the
forecast ¶ promises an ice-free Arctic by 2040, Russia
has a well-developed commercial and transport ¶
infrastructure to take advantage of opportunities offered by the retreating icecap. The
importance ¶ of the Arctic to Russia on the one hand, and growing international interest on the
other, has ¶ fueled Russia’s determination to make its role as a central Arctic nation eminently clear
by ¶ political, economic, and military means. As part of its effort to create a comprehensive presence ¶ in the
Arctic, Russia has been steadily expanding its military component there since 2007. Any ¶ foreign
interest in the area, government, commercial or environmental, is seen as hostile intent. ¶
Naturally, Russian national interests will be challenged by other Arctic states – all NATO ¶ members – who can theoretically speak
with one voice against Russia. Thus the Arctic region is ¶ likely to become a region of geo-political competition.
US-Russian relations are key to solve nuclear terrorism and global stability
Graham 8 (Thomas Graham, Thomas Graham joined the Carnegie Endowment as a senior associate in September 1998. His
areas of interest include Russian domestic politics - especially leadership issues, center-regional relations, and big business
government ties - and U.S.-Russian relations Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University and a B.A. in Russian studies from Yale
University, “US-Russia Relations: Facing Reality Pragmatically, center for strategic and international studies, July 2008,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080717_graham_u.s.russia.pdf Fred).
In this uncertain world, the United States and Russia are not strategic rivals, and neither poses a¶ strategic
threat to the other (despite some overwrought Russian rhetoric to the contrary), in¶ contrast to the situation during the Cold War.
Rather, they share a set of common strategic¶ challenges.
Russia, by virtue of its geographic location, and the
United States, by virtue of its¶ global role, must build new relationships with a Europe that is expanding and
deepening; they¶ both must find a way to cope with the growing instability in the Middle East. the
challenge to energy security that implies, and, at least for Russia, the threat that that instability will infect¶ Russia’s southern
In addition,¶ both countries must deal with the dark
have a keen interest in the¶ role and effectiveness of the institutions of
reaches: and they both must manage relations with a rising China.
side of globalization, and both
global governance, such as the United Nations and the¶ G-8, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Common
challenges, however, are not the same as common interests. And there are deep¶ differences in the way the United States and
Russia think of global order (consider, for example.¶ the role of democracy or the United Nations). But the question each country
Given their standing as
the world’s two leading nuclear powers, the United States and Russia are each indispensable to
dealing with the problems of proliferation of weapons of¶ mass destruction, nuclear terrorism,
and strategic stability.¶ . The United States, as the world’s largest energy consumer, and Russia, as the largest¶
producer of hydrocarbons, are essential to any discussion of energy security and energy’s¶ future.¶ .
Global economic dynamics and transfers of wealth will require bringing Russia, along¶ with China, India, and others, into a more
needs to ask is how¶ important the other is to its achieving its own strategic goals. For example:¶ .
central role in managing the global economy, a¶ service long performed by Europe and the United States.¶ . In East Asia. to create a
favorable new equilibrium, Russia has an interest in a strong¶ power—that is, the United States—acting as a moderating influence
on China, and the¶ United States has no interest in a weakening Russian presence in Siberia and the Russian¶ Far East. regions rich
in the natural resources that fuel modem economies.¶ . In
the Middle East, both the United States and Russia
have levers that could help promote stability, if the two countries were working in concert, or
fuel conflict, if they were not.
US is lagging heavily behind in the Arctic race
AP 14 (Associated Press. "U.S. Lags behind Arctic Nations in Race to Stake Claims to Untapped Resources." PBS. PBS, 1 Jan. 2014.
Web. 23 July 2014. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/us-lags-behind-arctic-nations-in-race-to-stake-claims-to-untappedresources/>. Fred).
The U.S. is racing to keep pace with stepped-up activity in the once sleepy Arctic
frontier, but it is far from being in the lead.¶ Nations across the world are hurrying to stake
claims to the Arctic’s resources, which might be home to 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its
WASHINGTON —
untapped natural gas. There are emerging fisheries and hidden minerals. Cruise liners filled with tourists are sailing the Arctic’s frigid
waters in increasing numbers. Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route, one of two shortcuts across the top of the Earth in
summer, is on the rise. The U.S., which takes over the two-year rotating chairmanship of the eight-nation Arctic Council in 2015, has
not ignored the Arctic, but
critics say the U.S. is lagging behind the other seven: Russia, Norway, Sweden,
par with the other
Arctic nations, we are behind — behind in our thinking, behind in our vision,” Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, said. “We
lack basic infrastructure, basic funding commitments to be prepared for the level of activity
expected in the Arctic.Ӧ At a meeting before Thanksgiving with Secretary of State John Kerry, Murkowski suggested he
Finland, Iceland, Canada and Denmark, through the semiautonomous territory of Greenland.¶ “On
name a U.S. ambassador or envoy to the Arctic — someone who could coordinate work on the Arctic being done by more than 20
federal agencies and take the lead on increasing U.S. activities in the region.¶ Murkowski is trying to get Americans to stop thinking
that the Arctic is just Alaska’s problem. “People in Iowa and New Hampshire need to view the U.S. as an Arctic nation. Otherwise
when you talk about funding, you’re never going to get there,” Murkowski said. She added that even non-Arctic nations are deeply
engaged: “India and China are investing in icebreakers.”¶ The U.S. has three aging icebreakers.¶ The melting Arctic also is creating a
new front of U.S. security concerns.¶ Earlier this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin said expanding Russia’s military presence in
the Arctic was a top priority for his nation’s armed forces. Russia this year began rehabilitating a Soviet-era base at the New Siberian
Islands and has pledged to restore a number of Arctic military air bases that fell into neglect after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet
Union.¶ Putin said he doesn’t envision a conflict between Russia and the United States, both of which have called for keeping the
Arctic a peaceful zone. But he added, “Experts know quite well that it takes U.S. missiles 15 to 16 minutes to reach Moscow from the
Barents Sea,” which is a part of the Arctic Ocean near Russia’s shore.¶ While the threat of militarization remains, the battle right now
is on the economic level as countries vie for oil, gas and other minerals, including rare earth metals used to make high-tech products
like cellphones. There also are disputes bubbling up with environmental groups that oppose energy exploration in the region; Russia
arrested 30 crew members of a Greenpeace ship in September after a protest in the Arctic.¶ China signed a free trade agreement
with tiny Iceland this year, a signal that the Asian powerhouse is keenly interested in the Arctic’s resources. And Russia is hoping that
the Northern Sea Route, where traffic jumped to 71 vessels this year from four in 2010, someday could be a transpolar route that
could rival the Suez Canal.¶ In the U.S., the Obama administration is consulting with governmental, business, industry and
environmental officials, as well as the state of Alaska, to develop a plan to implement the U.S. strategy for the Arctic that President
Barack Obama unveiled seven months ago.¶ Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel rolled out the Pentagon’s Arctic blueprint last month,
joining the Coast Guard and other government agencies that have outlined their plans for the region. There are no cost or budget
estimates yet, but the Navy is laying out what the U.S. needs to increase communications, harden ships and negotiate international
agreements so nations will be able to track traffic in the Arctic and conduct search and rescue operations.¶ Critics,
however,
say the U.S. needs to back the strategy papers with more precise plans — plus funding. With the
country still paying for two wars, the idea of spending money in an area considered a low
security threat makes the Arctic an even tougher sell.¶ “The problem with all of these strategies is that they are
absolutely silent on budget issues,” said Heather Conley, an expert on the Arctic at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“How do we meet these new challenges? Well, we’re going to have to put more resources to them. It’s dark. It’s cold. There’s
terrible weather. We need to enhance our own satellite communications and awareness in the area as ships and commercial activity
increases in the Arctic.Ӧ The
U.S. needs helicopters, runways, port facilities and roads in the Arctic, she
said – not to mention better accommodations in small coastal towns that have a shortage of beds and would be illequipped to handle an influx of tourists from a disabled cruise ship. With few assets, the U.S. might be forced to borrow from the
private sector.¶ “When Shell drilled two summers ago in the Chukchi Sea and the Beaufort Sea, they had 33 vessels and the Coast
“We’re not prepared. It may be another 10 years. The
Arctic is not going to wait, and the increased commercial and human activity is already there.
Other Arctic states are preparing more robustly, and we are choosing not to.”
Guard had one national security cutter,” Conley said.
The Arctic Council can do mapping
CAFF 14 (CAFF. "Arctic Council to Produce Harmonized Map Covering Region Read More: Http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/arcticcouncil-to-produce-harmonized-map-covering-region/." Climate.issd.org. N.p., 18 July 2014. Web. 24 July 2014.
<http%3A%2F%2Fclimate-l.iisd.org%2Fnews%2Farctic-council-to-produce-harmonized-map-covering-region%2F>. Fred).
The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the Arctic Council's biodiversity
working group, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to guide national mapping
organizations in the Arctic in producing a harmonized map covering the entire Arctic region, with data on, inter alia,
18 June:
climate and biodiversity. The aim of the Arctic Spatial Data Infrastructure (Arctic SDI) is to help harmonize, combine and integrate
wide range of data with a spatial component has been generated in the Arctic.
However, the management of such data has mainly been national or issue-specific and, thus,
many of the existing datasets are distributed among many organizations. Thus, the Arctic SDI
will also contribute to improved sharing and analysis across the Arctic, and will be critical in
helping to understand the impacts of climate change on nature, biodiversity management, and
the adaptability and sustainable use of all living resources in the Arctic. Spatial data can be used
in the Arctic as a tool for integrated planning. Arctic SDI users include: the Arctic Council
Working Groups; scientific groups engaged in Arctic research; governmental authorities involved
in decision regarding the Arctic; and the broader public, including the private sector, NGOs and media. The
diverse data sets.A
national mapping organizations participating in the project are from the US, Canada, the Russian Federation, Denmark and the Faroe
Islands, Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. CCAF consists of national representatives assigned by each of the eight
Arctic Council Member States, representatives of Indigenous Peoples' organizations that are Permanent Participants to the Council,
and Arctic Council observer countries and organizations.
Arctic Council guidelines solve for oil environmental damage
Arctic Council 9 (The Arctic Council Was Established In 1996 And Succeeded The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.,
It Is A High-Level Intergovernmental Forum That Provides A Mechanism To Address The Common Concerns, And Challenges Faced By
The Arctic Governments And The Indigenous Peoples Of The Arctic., and The Members Of The Arctic Council Are Canada, Denmark
(Including The Faroe Islands And Greenland),. ARCTIC COUNCIL (n.d.): n. pag. Www.govmin.gl. 29 Apr. 2009. Web. 24 July 2014.
<http://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/petroleum/Arctic_Offshore_Oil_and_Gas_Guidelines_2009.pdf>. Its the Arctic Council.
Fred).
Clean-up Assessment Technique (SCAT) Manual (2004), the Arctic Guide for Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response
(2008), the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (2004), the assessment, Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic—Effects and Potential
Effects (OGA, 2009).¶ 1.2 Goals¶ Purpose of the Guidelines¶ These
Guidelines are intended to be of use to the
Arctic nations for offshore oil and gas activities during planning, exploration, development,
production and decommissioning¶ Recommendations on the transportation of oil and gas are found in the OGA, 2008. The
the Guidelines is thus
primarily the authorities, but the Guidelines may also be of help to the industry when planning
for oil and gas activities and to the public in understanding environmental concerns and
practices of Arctic offshore oil and gas activities. While recognizing the non- binding nature of these Guidelines,
Guidelines should be used to help secure common policy and practices. The target group for
they are intended to encourage the highest standards currently available. They are not intended to prevent States from setting
equivalent or stricter standards, where appropriate.¶ Policy development should take into account the domestic situation with
respect to political, economic, legal, and administrative conditions. Consideration should be given to macro- economic effects,
regional effects, and potential environmental impacts. Such consideration should result in a staged opening plan, and ensure
protection of areas of special environmental concern. While these guidelines do not address socio-economic aspects in any detail,
these are
nonetheless important to consider and integrate into the planning and conduct of exploration
and development.¶ The Guidelines are intended to define a set of recommended practices and outline
strategic actions for consideration by those responsible for regulation of offshore oil and gas
activities (including transportation and related onshore activities) in the Arctic (see Figure 1 and Annex A). It is hoped that
nor do they set standards for assessment of potential socio-economic effects of offshore oil and gas activities,
regulators will identify the key aspects related to protection of human health and safety and protection of the environment for the
management of offshore activities, while at the same time remaining sufficiently flexible in the application of these management
regimes to permit alternative regulatory approaches. It should be recognized that the eight Arctic nations have different systems
with different emphases on the division of responsibility between the operator and the regulator. The goal is to assist regulators in
developing standards, which are applied and enforced consistently for all offshore Arctic oil and gas operators. Sensible regulation
will vary to some degree based upon local circumstances. Thus, it
is expected that, based on the outcome of
environmental impact assessment procedures, regulators will establish policies such that
offshore oil and gas activities are conducted so as to provide for human health and safety and
protection of the environment.
Arctic Council is uniquely key to solve the dispute in the Arctic
Stein and Axworthy 11 (Stein and Axworthy, Janice and Thomas. "The Arctic Council Is the Best Way for Canada to
Resolve Its Territorial Disputes." The Globe and Mail. N.p., 25 Jan. 2011. Web. 24 July 2014.
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-arctic-council-is-the-best-way-for-canada-to-resolve-its-territorialdisputes/article574575/>. Janice Gross Stein is director of the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto and Thomas
S. Axworthy is president and CEO of the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation and a senior distinguished fellow at the Munk School
of Global Affairs. Fred).
For example, the Canada-Russia dispute over the Lomonosov Ridge will take 10 to 20 years if left to the UN Commission on the
What is needed is an Arctic-specific institution where these issues can be
resolved. Luckily, one exists.¶ The Arctic Council, comprised of the eight Nordic countries in the region, is an
effective, high-level venue for discussing substantial concerns, such as the environment and
native rights. However, when it was created in 1996 after a long diplomatic campaign by Canada, peace and security issues
were left out of its mandate at American insistence.¶ But 2011 is not 1996 and, as world interest on the Arctic swells,
peace and security need to be on the agenda to ensure the Arctic Council remains relevant.¶ The
Limits of the Continental Shelf.
survey clearly demonstrates interest in peace and security in the Arctic. On the issue of an Arctic nuclear-weapons free zone (such as
Antarctica), six of the nine constituencies surveyed were very supportive of this idea (82 per cent in Norway, 78 per cent of Southern
Canada, 77 per cent of Finland, 76 per cent of Northern Canada, 75 per cent of Iceland, and 74 per cent of Denmark).¶ Not
surprisingly, American and Russian respondents were the least enthusiastic, with 56 per cent and 47 per cent supporting a nuclearfree Arctic, respectively.¶ The
Arctic Council would be a fitting venue to discuss peace and security, not
only because it includes the world's two largest nuclear superpowers, but also because it
includes as Permanent Participants the indigenous peoples who call this territory their
homeland.¶ Even in Russia, there is an appetite for discussing these issues at the council, with 81 per cent of Russians agreeing
that military security should be discussed and 85 per cent agreeing that the Arctic Council should cover peace-building issues. Upon
becoming chair of the Arctic Council in 2013, Canada will have a rare opportunity to put peace and security back on the agenda.
Scientific diplomacy does not solve
Dickson 10 (David. Director of SciDev.net. “Science in diplomacy: “On tap but not on top”.” June 28,
2010. http://scidevnet.wor...onference-2010 FRED).
There’s a general consensus in both the scientific and political worlds that the principle of science
diplomacy, at least in the somewhat restricted sense of the need to get more and better science into international
negotiations, is a desirable objective. There is less agreement, however, on how far the concept can
– or indeed should – be extended to embrace broader goals and objectives, in particular attempts to
use science to achieve political or diplomatic goals at the international level. Science, despite its
international characteristics, is no substitute for effective diplomacy. Any more than diplomatic initiatives
necessarily lead to good science. These seem to have been the broad conclusions to emerge from a three-day meeting at Wilton
Park in Sussex, UK, organised by the British Foreign Office and the Royal Society, and attended by scientists, government officials and
politicians from 17 countries around the world. The definition of science diplomacy varied widely among participants. Some saw it as
a subcategory of “public diplomacy”, or what US diplomats have recently been promoting as “soft power” (“the carrot rather than
the stick approach”, as a participant described it). Others preferred to see it as a core element of the broader concept of “innovation
diplomacy”, covering the politics of engagement in the familiar fields of international scientific exchange and technology transfer,
but raising these to a higher level as a diplomatic objective. Whatever definition is used, three particular aspects of the debate
became the focus of attention during the Wilton Park meeting: how science can inform the diplomatic process; how diplomacy can
assist science in achieving its objectives; and, finally, how science can provide a channel for quasi-diplomatic exchanges by forming
an apparently neutral bridge between countries. There was little disagreement on the first of these. Indeed for many, given the
increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the
core of science diplomacy should be about. Chris Whitty, for example, chief scientist at the UK’s Department for International
Development, described how knowledge about the threat raised by the spread of the highly damaging plant disease stem rust had
been an important input by researchers into discussions by politicians and diplomats over strategies for persuading Afghan farmers
to shift from the production of opium to wheat. Others pointed out that the scientific community had played a major role in drawing
attention to issues such as the links between chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere and the growth of the ozone hole, or between
carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. Each has made essential contributions to policy decisions. Acknowledging this role for
science has some important implications. No-one dissented when Rohinton Medhora, from Canada’s International Development
Research Centre, complained of the lack of adequate scientific expertise in the embassies of many countries of the developed and
developing world alike. Nor – perhaps predictably – was there any major disagreement that diplomatic initiatives can both help and
occasionally hinder the process of science. On the positive side, such diplomacy can play a significant role in facilitating science
exchange and the launch of international science projects, both essential for the development of modern science. Europe’s
framework programme of research programmes was quoted as a successful advantage of the first of these. Examples of the second
range from the establishment of the European Organisation of Nuclear Research (usually known as CERN) in Switzerland after the
Second World War, to current efforts to build a large new nuclear fusion facility (ITER). Less positively, increasing restrictions on
entry to certain countries, and in particular the United States after the 9/11 attacks in New York and elsewhere, have significantly
impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find ways to ease the burdens of
such restrictions. The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely the use
of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge consensus on contentious issues, or as a
catalyst for peace in situations of conflict. On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate change negotiations, and in
particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the scientific community
can provide a strong rationale for joint international action. But others referred to the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit last
December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking. It was
argued that this failure had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a
commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have. Another example
that received considerable attention was the current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAMEin Jordan, a project that is already
is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt
and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of CERN 60 years ago,
and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME will
become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a
“beacon of hope” for the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific
terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated. Political conflicts have deep roots that
cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues coming from other political
there was even a warning that in the developing world, high profile scientific
projects, particular those with explicit political backing, could end up doing damage by
inadvertently favouring one social group over another. Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in
this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities. Similarly, those who hold
science in esteem as a practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development
were reminded of the need to take into account how advances in science – whether nuclear
contexts. Indeed,
physics or genetic technology – have also led to new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically
lead to the reduction of global inequalities. “Science for diplomacy” therefore ended up with a highly mixed review. The
consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives – and
benefit from diplomatic agreements – but cannot provide the solutions to either. “On tap but not on top”
seems as relevant in international settings as it does in purely national ones. With all the caution that even this formulation still
requires.
Russia’s economy is resilient- foreign reserves provide a backstop to oil price
decline
Adomanis 13 (Mark, Forbes contributor, specializes in Russian economics, “Why Russia’s
economy isn’t going to collapse”,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/01/07/why-russias-economy-isnt-going-tocollapse/)
Hating Russia‘s economy is a full-time job for many people. Owen Matthews in Newsweek is perhaps the most
colorful of the bunch, but the difference between Matthews and other Western journalists is primarily one of degree not of kind.
I’ve been following Russia very closely for about a decade now, and I’ve simply lost count of the number of analyses I’ve read arguing
that the end is nigh and that the economy’s final implosion is mere months away. These articles vary greatly in quality, but the basic
indictment of Russia’s economy consists of a number of actually quite reasonable observations on the country’s corruption, red
tape, and over-reliance on natural resources. However, after
getting decimated during the worse days of the
financial crisis, Russia’s economy has been plugging along with steady and unremarkable
growth in the 3-4% range, hardly world beating but actually faster than almost every country in the EU.
As more time has passed and Russia’s economy has defied predictions by continuing to not collapse, I’ve
become increasingly convinced that its economic stability has been somewhat underrated and that, despite its
many faults, its basic economic model is quite likely to endure through the short and medium
terms. I certainly don’t think that Russia is going to become some sort of economic hegemon, but it seems far more likely than not
that it will evolve gradually, and not through some titanic rupture or revolutionary upheaval. But my hunches and inclinations aren’t
very good evidence, so I thought I would put a few charts together which show why I think that Russia’s economy is basically going
to stay stable over the next several years and that it’s a huge mistake to predict a cataclysm which will sweep away the dread Putin.
1.The price of Brent crude has stayed remarkably robust despite chronic economic weakness in the developed world. I suppose it’s
possible that the EU will never emerge from its current doldrums, but I think that the developed world will eventually get out of its
funk and start to grow again. When it does that growth will likely drive the price of oil even higher, or at least prevent it from going
much lower. 2.
Russia still has very large foreign reserves , some of the largest in the entire world.
Although you often hear, as in Matthews’ piece, that “the Russians used to be responsible with their oil money, now they’re become
totally reckless and irresponsible,” Russia still
has very large foreign reserves that amount to almost 25%
of its GDP. Note the similarity between the oil price graph and Russia’s foreign reserves, their shapes are almost
identical. While the utility of foreign reserves can often be overstated, they can be very handy in averting
economic catastrophes, and, as you might expect, the Russians drew heavily on their foreign reserves
during the worst days of the 2008-09 crisis. I think that the
reserves provide a cushion
that will help to shield Russia from a future shock, such as a rapid and
massive decline in the price of oil. Of course there’s still the chance that Russia will suffer a slow and
gradual decline in competitiveness, but what I’m pushing back against is not that argument but the argument that the whole house
of cards is going to collapse in the next couple of years. 3. The
Russian government still runs a budget surplus,
and its spending as a percentage of GDP is not very high. From January-October 2012 Russia ran a budget
surplus of about 1.4%, smaller than the 2011 figure (3.2%) but a surplus nonetheless. Russia’s total level of government spending
(about 32% of GDP) hardly seems outrageous or unsustainable. Additionally, despite a lot of loose and foolish talk from the Russian
defense ministry about it looming re-armament campaign, Russia’s budget spending is more weighted towards the social sphere
than the military industrial complex. Courtesy of the Gaidar institute, here’s a graph showing where Russia’s consolidated
government spending was directed in the first ten months of 2012: The Gaidar institute is hardly a Kremlin outfit, indeed the overall
tone of the report to which I linked is actually quite gloomy* and critical of the authorities, and considering its track record I don’t
think that it would have spun the numbers in a more pro-Putin direction. When analyzing any country’s budget posture you need to
focus on where the money is actually being spent. While there’s been an awful lot of talk about comprehensively re-arming the
Russian military,
the actual level of spending remains relatively small and well within the country’s
ability to pay. The purse-strings are clearly somewhat looser than they used to be, but a quick glance at Russia’s budget
certainly doesn’t give the impression of a totally reckless and debauched approach. 4. Russian unemployment is at or
near a post-Soviet record low. Russia’s labor market isn’t exactly a model for anyone else, but its arguably more robust
now than its ever been before. I think that this will act as a sort of stabilizing influence in its own right, but, more importantly, it
might allow the government to feel comfortable enough to do some tinkering and implement a few moderate reforms. Basically,
the government is more likely to undertake some modest liberalization if the labor market is
healthy and it’s confident that people will be able to find jobs than if the unemployment rate is already
trending upwards (unemployment is obviously highly politically sensitive in “performance legitimacy” regimes like Russia’s).