Francesca Recanatini
Senior Economist
The World Bank
Prepared for the European Anti-Corruption Training
Laxenburg, September 20, 2011
1.
Brief history of ACAs in the World and in Europe
2.
Challenges faced by ACAs
3.
Structure and mandate of ACAs
4.
Institutional structure and relation with other agencies
5.
Resources and internal organization
6.
Independence, oversight and accountability
7.
External stakeholders and expectations
8.
Lessons learnt and emerging issues

Anti-Corruption Authority (ACA): a specialized
agency, body, unit or department established
by a government that has the mandate of
addressing corruption

1980s and 1990s: establishment of
international standards and agreements and
parallel mushrooming of ACAs
Anti-Corruption Authorities in our work
Croatia
Czech
Case Studies: Rwanda,
(2001)
Republic
Romania
Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco,
(1991) Slovakia
Moldova
Serbia
(2002)
Sierra Leone, Ethiopia,
Slovenia
(2004)
(2002)
(2010)
Austria
Hungary
Korea, Mongolia, Slovenia,
Latvia (2004)
Estonia
(2010)
(1995)
Tanzania Kosovo Montenegro
(2002)
Macedonia
(1918)
(2007)
(2001)
Mongolia
(2002)
Jordan
(2007)
(2008)
Morocco
UK
Senegal (2007)
Yemen
(2003)
Bhutan
(2007)
Sierra Leone
(2006)
Haiti
Ethiopia
(2000)
(2004) Burkina Faso
(2001)
Kenya
(2007)
(2005)
Rwanda
Cameroon
Mauritius
(2003)
(2006) Malawi
(2002)
(1997)
(2007)
Jamaica
(1962)
Guatemala
(2008)
Costa Rica
Mexico
(2004)
(1999)
Brazil
(2001)
Argentina
(1999)
Peru
(2010)
Barbados
(1961)
Uganda
(1986)
South Korea
(2002)
Philippines
(1987)
Singapore
(1952)
Indonesia
(2004)
Madagascar
Hong Kong
(2004)
Sri Lanka
(1974)
Botswana
(1994)
Namibia
Nepal
Tanzania (1994)
Mozambique
(2006)
(1992)
(2007)
Lesotho
(2004) India Bangladesh
Zambia
(NA) Pakistan
(1984)
(1972)
(1982)
(1999)
Anti-Corruption Authorities
in Europe
 ACAs have been established in many European
countries starting from mid-late 1990s.
 24 of the EU member countries have ratified the
UNCAC; excepting, Czech Republic, Germany
and Ireland
 There is no single European model, but different
approaches ranging from law enforcement,
prevention, and multi-purpose anti-corruption
bodies.
Anti-Corruption Authorities in…
Latvia
2003
Germany
1995
Norway
1989
Lithuania
2004
Ireland
1995
Poland
2006
Czech R.
1991
UK
The Serious Fraud Office
(SFO) 1987
Anti-corruption Unit (OACU)
2006
Portugal
2001
Spain
1995
Belgium
1998
France
1993
Italy
2004
Austria
2010
Ukraine
2004
Hungary
Moldova
2004
2002
Romania
Bulgaria
2002
2001
Macedonia
2002
Croatia
2001
Slovenia
2004
Montenegoro
2005
Slovakia
Bosnia
–H
2004
2002

Wide support of ACAs by multi/bilateral donors

However, observed limited “impact” (Meagher
(2005), Doig et al.(2005), Heilbrunn (2004), U4
(2007), UNDP (2005), Pope (1999), De Souza
(2009), Council of Europe (2004))

GRECO reviews. 2010-2011: UNCAC review.
Any lesson learnt?
Council of Europe and GRECO
Reviews
 Most countries in Europe have followed up on
the requirements of the 20 Guiding Principles
and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
and established specialized anti-corruption
services .
 Many ACA combine several functions.
 Public education and preventive functions have
been neglected throughout Europe. Even ACAs
that have a mandate in this field, public
education and prevention remain marginal.
Council of Europe and GRECO
Reviews, cont.
 In some countries, ACAs have been sufficiently
resourced to fulfill their functions; in many
others, however, staff, financial and other
means remain a challenge.
 The independence of anti-corruption services, in
particular of those with law enforcement
functions, remains a difficult issue.
 In many cases the precise role of anti-corruption
services and their relationship to other
institutions and actors may need to be defined
more clearly.

Can ACAs be (or become) an effective tool in
the fight against corruption?

If so, which factors or policies can be used to
make ACAs more effective?
=> Starting point: a more systematic analysis of
ACAs and of “factors” that can affect their
functioning and effectiveness




Initial information based on Workshop (March
2010) with 10 ACAs
Factual information from 58 ACAs collected
through a mailed-in survey. Plus 10 case studies
(in-depth interviews in the field)
Data Portal on ACAs forthcoming (launch
planned for November 2011)
On going work and data collection







Need to have key institutions and laws in place
jointly with support of the country leadership
Politics and ACAs
Tension between prevention and prosecution
Trade-offs: the “big fishes” or small ones?
Limited resources
Perceived unfair evaluation of ACAs and their
activities especially in the area of prevention
Engaging the private sector
ACAs can take many forms and display different
functions and mandates, from prevention to
investigation and prosecution, policy and research
and outreach.
 Tension among practitioners when it comes to the
functions that ACAs should have.
 Organizational theory recommends single
mandate to increase effectiveness. But =>
“effective” ACAs among both single function
agencies and multi-function agencies (Hong Kong,
Brazil vs. Slovenia).





Sierra Leone’s Anti-Corruption Commission (2000)
Its mandate: prevent corruption and investigate
allegations of corruption.
No prosecutorial powers: all prosecutions were to
be authorized by the Attorney General’s office
before going to trial.
Attempts to establish an independent Committee to
review investigations and approve prosecution of
cases were rejected as unconstitutional.
Historical difficulty in securing convictions led to the
revision of the mandate of the ACC through a new
Anti-Corruption Act in 2008.
The new Act grants prosecutorial powers to the ACC
and establishes a prosecutorial unit for that purpose;
it increases the number of corruption offenses; and
establishes an Advisory Board on Corruption made
up of representatives of civil society.
 In 2009 the ACC handled 122 investigations. 11
cases resulted in convictions and 10 in cautions; 9
cases are still pending trial; 24 were closed for lack
of evidence; and the rest are ongoing.
 => Importance of creating an enabling institutional
and procedural environment for anti-corruption
efforts


Clear mandate leads to better coordination among
different agencies

Need for clear agreements among agencies

Important to understand who was performing some of
the functions that the ACA is taking over and why it
was not working

Good examples of “links” with central banks, judicial
agencies and revenue monitoring agencies

Less common => relations with regulatory agencies
and agencies at the local level

Remaining challenge: de jure versus de facto
The Supreme Audit Board (BPK)
Provide the Investigative audit report,
initial data, state loss estimation
Financial Intelligence Unit (PPATK)
Provide the Suspicious Transaction to
support investigation process
Bank and Insurance Companies
Provide the Financial Statement to
support investigation and asset tracing
process
Other Departments (National Land
Agency, Immigration, Department of
Law and Human Rights, etc)
Provide supporting data related to the
case (People Movement System,
Company Profile, etc)
UNCAC does not distinguish between federal and state
(local) level anti-corruption efforts. The mandates and
establishment of ACAs should be “in accordance with
the fundamental principles of its legal system”.
 Decentralizing ACAs at the state and municipal level
demands a coordination system among the different
agencies.
 If the AC legislation/institution covers both federal and
local level, it is essential to clarify the institutional
arrangement in terms of mandates and coordination
with state authorities. Plus, enough resources need to
be available to have a central authority and many field
offices.




Critical to get the technical and organizational
foundations established. But…
…resources are a constraint.
Potential factors :
 Lack of a long term horizon commitment
 Unskilled staff
 Donors’ involvement

Strategy for coping with limited resources (ex.
triage of allegations, focus on innovation and IT)
Donor Involvement
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Africa
Europe
East Asia
Yes
Latin
America
No
South Asia Middle East
and North
Africa

Importance of legislative set up

Independence: selection/removal of ACA
leadership and freedom of action

Importance of legislative set up

Independence: selection/removal of ACA
leadership and freedom of action

Reporting line

Accountability: administrative and judicial

Established mechanism to show results.
81 % of the 58
Surveyed ACAs
measure the
performance of their
activities somehow.
Does your agency measure performance?
No
19%
Yes
81%
Does your agency measure performance?
Prosuction
Investigation
Prevetion
Yes
No
0%
20%
Prevetion
37
6
40%
60%
Investigation
24
7
80%
100%
Prosuction
20
32
The mandate of the ACAs
included in the sample is
- 86 % Prevention,
- 77% Investigation and
- 38% Prosecution.



Mongolia: number of cases investigated and solved
under the law, percentage of public officials who
submitted income and asset disclosure forms,
number of actions plans adopted by public
organizations and local governments
Indonesia: number of cases investigated and
conviction rate
Brazil: number of internal investigations completed
and penalties enforced, number of companies
suspended or debarred, data portals and number of
visits, number of training delivered and of
participants

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Importance of legislative set up
Independence: selection/removal of ACA
leadership and freedom of action
Reporting line
Accountability: administrative and judicial
Need for a clear and established mechanism to
show results. But…
Political interference remains the key challenge

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

2004: a government’s change in Slovenia shifted the tide of
political support away from the Commission for the
Prevention of Corruption.
February 2006: Parliament passed a new law that
eliminated the need for a separate agency in favor of a
commission composed of deputies from the National
Assembly.
The Commission organized a group of experts to prepare a
counter proposal while lobbying 30 MPs to communicate
the arguments to the Constitutional Court.
April 2006: The Constitutional Court suspended the law as a
temporary measure and later declared at least a quarter of
the provisions unconstitutional.
The Commission faced political pressure in 2008 and 2010,
when the National Assembly demanded the resignation of its
Director in two separate cases.
 In 2008, Parliament adopted a decision to remove the Director
unless he provided proof of the Commission’s findings in a
bribery case involving the Prime Minister and the previous
government => not a lawfully valid reason for the Director’s
removal from office. He was able to remain in office.
 In 2010, formal proceedings for the Director’s removal were
initiated by the Parliamentary group serving as the oversight
mechanism for the Commission, in response to the
Commission’s refusal to provide confidential details about
corruption cases, including the names of whistleblowers.

The decision was postponed indefinitely when it
became apparent that the majority required to carry
the decision would not be achieved.
 In June 2010, this Parliamentary oversight group was
abolished by virtue of the new Integrity and
Corruption Prevention Act.
 Emerging Lessons: The existing legal framework
paired with a strong internal leadership was essential
to fence off the repeated political attempts to
interfere with the Commission’s work.

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Critical: To manage expectations and to balance
sensationalism with prevention work are key (SL,
Nigeria, Kenya, Indonesia)
Citizens and the media are powerful tools that can
create an enabling environment. But…
…the ACA needs:
 Continuous engagement with public and with the media
for inputs and for feedback (KPK)
 To provide unrestricted access to information
 To have communication strategy to avoid risks linked to
political pressure (Slovenia)
•
•
The Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
has a mandate to prevent, investigate and prosecute
corruption.
Two critical factors:
1. KPK has achieved 100 % conviction rate in corruption
prosecutions. It has in-house investigators, a staff of
prosecutors (seconded from the Attorney General’s
Office), and a dedicated Anti-Corruption Court presided
over by ad hoc judges (selected and screened).
Between 2003 and 2009 KPK successfully prosecuted
over 150 senior officials: 68 percent received
sentences of 2-5 years, 10 percent of 5-10 years, and
less than 5 percent of more than 10 years.



In contrast, Courts of General Jurisdiction in Indonesia
have an almost 50 percent acquittal rate on (more minor)
corruption cases brought by the Attorney General’s
Office.
Important factors that can help explain the KPK’s success:
KPK investigators have the authority to gather evidence
(wire-taps, bank accounts, tax statements); are trained in
gathering evidence; and have the authority to make
arrests and seize assets;
Investigators and prosecutors work closely together, and
the Commissioners review all cases to ensure only those
with sufficient evidence to secure a conviction are taken
to trial
2.
Social media played a vital role in KPK’s political survival
 KPK’s Chairman was arrested on murder conspiracy charges, and
two other Commissioners suspended and arrested on charges of
corruption in 2009.
 The Chairman was convicted. The public felt that these charges,
particularly the unrelated charges against the two
Commissioners, were an attempt to undermine KPK.
 Popular support for the Commissioners was widespread and
vocal. Public demonstrations were held, and a support page was
launched on Facebook, attracting over a million members.
 A Presidential Commission was rapidly established to review the
cases. The charges were eventually dropped after wire-tapped
evidence was produced before the Constitutional Court that the
allegations had been rigged.


ACAs can have an impact. The challenge may be to
be able to measure it.
Factors that emerge as determinants of success:
 Strong political support from the country leadership as
necessary but not a sufficient condition
 Middle management needs to work for change as well.
 Implementation of a comprehensive and clear legal
framework for anti-corruption work.
 Effective mechanisms for inter-agency coordination.
 Adequacy of financial and human resources.
 Effective and continuous communication with citizens.

Replication of “successful experiences” should be done
only with caution, after having carefully understood and
integrated country-specific factors

Political pressure, vested interests and State Capture are
the critical challenge
Key to manage expectations and establish performance
indicators (in order to capture the impact of ACAs
activities), beyond the number of cases investigated
and/or prosecuted.
 External assistance should be tailored and donors should
work in partnership with ACAs to promote a mediumterm view, focused on building local capacity and
promoting the sustainability of anti-corruption efforts.

The Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) is the internal
audit unit and the anti-corruption agency of the Brazilian
Federal government. Main functions: Corruption Prevention
and investigation (Administrative investigation only)
 CGU has launched several initiatives aimed at raising
awareness and preventing corruption, including:
1. Public Spending Observatory (ODP) – was established in
2008. Data-matching and tracking system designed to detect
fraud and corruption. ODP provides CGU and other
government agencies information on the quantity and quality
of public spending as well as with indications of sensitive
areas of public spending in terms of corruption risk.

2. Transparency portals – information on resources applied by
federal bodies, federal resources transferred to local
governments and transactions on the federal government’s
Payment card.
3. National Debarment List – list of firms currently debarred
and temporarily suspended by the Government.
4. Education for ethics and citizenship – CGU launched an
ethics and citizenship education program now included in the
national school curriculum.
5. Eagle Eye on the Public Money Program – focuses on
education and access to information.
established the CGU’s virtual school courses on : internal
control; social control; social control of the government
education program and public procurement and contracts.
From 2004 to 2009 the virtual school has trained:
7,176 public officials, 8,305 counselors, 8,652
municipal leaderships, 8,709 teachers and students
and 586 municipalities participated.
The school also designed the Distance Course on
Social Control, which presents living examples of
active social participation.
Belgium ACAs
 The Belgium Investigations of the Office Central
Pour la Repression de la corruption (OCRC)
have led to the conviction of a number of highranking officials, politicians and business
leaders.
 Success factors have been the recruitment and
training of specialized officers and the building of
multi-disciplinary team. The possibility to use
special investigative techniques (such as
wiretapping) is also an advantage.
The Norwegian ACAs
 Due to the preventive work, good relations
have been developed with the private sector.
The Anti-corruption Team has successfully
prosecuted a number of corruption cases.
 Most of the cases have been entirely private
sector cases. A number of investigations have
been related to the oil industry


Success -- the CPIO was been able to investigate a number
of cases of high-level corruption and detected the infiltration of
regional police headquarters and a prosecution office by a
criminal organization. According to the Council of Europe the
level of police corruption is not increasing to any further
extent. The main success factors are good cooperation with
the police headquarters and prosecution office and
information received from society based on trust in the CPIO.
Issues -- the CPIO is not allowed to engage in international
police cooperation. Since the CPIO is also investigating
politicians, there is sometimes strong political pressure on the
CPIO and the Prosecutor General. Such pressure is the main
concern of the CPIO. In addition, there is an unclear
understanding on corruption within the criminal justice system.

Success – Most measures foreseen under the
2002-2004 anti-corruption program have been
implemented. A range of prevention and public
awareness measures have been carried out.
New regional anti-corruption councils have been
established.

Issues -- Low levels of salaries and the
insufficient control capacities within the public
administration continue to negatively affect the
anti-corruption effort.

Success – the achievements are limited to criminal
justice operations against bribery, misuse of office,
fraudulent bankruptcy or similar. In 2002/2003, 182
persons of active and passive bribery were prosecuted.
More than 600 cases were reported but proved to
provide insufficient evidence to even start preliminary
investigations.

Issues -- lack of insufficient interest of young and skilled
people to work with USKOK, lack of adequate IT and
communication equipment. Given that only the
Prosecution Department is operational the department
does not receive the support from other departments.
•
•
•
•
Serious Fraud Office (SFO): arm of the Government of the United
Kingdom, accountable to the Attorney-General. Established by the
Criminal Justice Act 1987
It investigates fraud and corruption. It has special powers to
obtain and assess evidence, to prosecute fraudsters, freeze
assets and compensate victims. The SFO has jurisdiction over
England and Wales and Northern Ireland but not Scotland, the
Isle of Man or the Channel Islands.
The SFO acts as the focal point for receiving any allegations of
corruption offences by UK nationals or incorporated bodies
overseas. It is responsible for the initial review of all allegations
received.
The City of London Police has a division called the Overseas Anticorruption Unit (OACU) that has a specific function of supporting
overseas corruption investigations undertaken by SFO.
•
The United States has a multi-agency model to fight corruption,
with law enforcement agencies at the federal level, the state level,
the county level, and the local level. Prosecution takes place at the
federal level (US attorneys), the state level (attorneys general), and
the county level (prosecutors). US's strong commitment to
separation of powers means that anti-corruption efforts can be
diffuse and uncoordinated.
•
Brazil does not have a specialized anti-corruption body. Its high
level of decentralization has been reported as one of the main
obstacles for the implementation of solid anti-corruption initiatives
by the federal government. Several agencies scattered between
Brazil's 27 states and 5,651 municipalities have mandates to deal
with corruption. Implementation and enforcement deficits of the
legal and institutional framework are cited as the main challenges

In Australia, the New South Wales Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is a good
example of a well-functioning sub-national anticorruption agency. The ICAC has jurisdiction over state
and local government in New South Wales. This extends
to parliamentarians, local councilors, public servants,
police and staff of universities and state-owned
corporations. Anyone can refer matters to the
commission. The commission has the coercive powers
of a Royal Commission and can compel witnesses to
testify.



The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)
was established in 2002.
The ICAC is accountable to a parliamentary committee
which put in place mechanisms that ensure proper checks
and balances in the operations of the ICAC.
The Parliamentary Committee monitors and reviews the
ICAC’s functions:
 reviews the budgetary estimates of the Commission,
and issues such instructions as it considers
appropriate with regard to the financial management;
the staffing requirements of the Commission, and
the allocation of resources to the various operations of
the ICAC
The Committee is composed of nine members of
Parliament. One of the members is designated as
Chairperson by the Prime Minister. The Committee meets
at least once a month
 The Committee’s role does not extend to monitoring a
matter related to any investigation being carried out by
ICAC or the findings of the Commission in relation to a
particular investigation.
 In matters where the Commission is of the view that an
investigation has disclosed prima facie evidence against a
person and considers prosecution, the matter is referred to
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).
 No prosecution can be instituted by ICAC without the
consent of the DPP
