An enduring logic of conflict in
world politics?
Paul Bacon
SILS
IR201
Continuity?
• Realist conflict cycle.
• Perpetual anarchy.
• Alliances/balances of power/war
• Gilpin – do we know more than
Thucydides?
Change?
• The world is shrinking – flight times and costs,
and missile delivery times have all decreased
significantly.
• Global Internet communication is almost realtime, and extremely cheap.
• Threat of ‘double death’.
• 9/11 – threat from remote, poor countries.
• HIV/AIDS
• Global warming.
Three basic forms
• A world imperial system
– One government controls most of the world with which it has
contact.
– Rome, Sumer, Persia, China, Britain, the US.
• A feudal system
– Human loyalties and political obligations not fixed primarily by
territorial boundaries.
– Europe after the collapse of Rome.
• An anarchic ‘Westphalian’ system of states
– Cohesive, territorial, sovereign states, with no higher
government above them.
– Ancient Greece, 15thC Italy, Europe and the world post-1648.
Differing views on anarchic politics
•
•
•
•
•
•
Realism
Liberalism
Dependency theory
Neo-realism/neo-liberalism
Constructivism
Feminism
Building blocks
• Actors
• Goals
• Instruments
Actors
– Realists believe that states are the only significant
actors.
– Realists also believe that only the big states really
matter.
– The number of states in the world has increased
by a factor of 4 since 1945.
– However, the rise in the number of non-state
actors has also been highly significant.
– Many large MNCs straddle international borders,
and command more economic resources than
many states (see textbook, p. 10).
Actors
– At least 177 MNCs have annual sales that
are larger than the GDP of more than half
the 200 states in the world.
– States, especially the powerful ones, are
usually still the main actors.
– New, complex coalitions between state and
non-state actors have important
implications.
– States remain the major actors in the world,
but they do not have the whole stage to
themselves.
Actors
• Important actors in the Middle East:
– Of course, the warring states in the region, and the
outside powers, such as the US and Russia.
– MNCs such as Shell and BP.
– Intergovernmental institutions such as the UN, OPEC,
and the Arab League.
– Human rights NGOs such as the Red Cross and
Amnesty International
– Transnational ethnic groups such as the Kurds.
– Terrorist groups, drug cartels and mafia organizations.
– International religious movements and political
ideologies (Wahaabi Islam and liberal democracy).
Goals
– According to realists, the dominant goal of states
in an anarchic system is military security.
– However, today states care as much or more
about their economic wealth.
– Human rights and human security have become
very important goals for some states in the
international system.
– Although military security has not been replaced
as the dominant goal, the agenda of international
politics has become more complex as states
pursue a wider range of goals.
Instruments
• The traditional realist view is that military
force is the only instrument that really matters.
• AJP Taylor – ‘A great power is one which is
able to prevail in war’.
• However, it is costlier to use force than it was
in earlier times.
• The link between military strength and
positive achievement has been loosened.
Instruments
• Nuclear weapons are too ‘muscle-bound’ – too costly
and damaging to have a practical use in war.
• Foreign rule is very costly and difficult in an age of
nationalism and global mass communications.
• In democracies, there are increasingly norms of antimilitarism, and democracies are reluctant to suffer too
many casualties. Unjust uses of force can be costly to
soft power, both internally and externally.
• A number of contemporary issues, such as trade
disputes between democracies, do not lend
themselves to forceful solutions.
The Peloponnesian War
• Athens
• Corcyra
• Sparta
• Corinth
• Epidamnus
• Potidea
• Megara
• Persia
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
• The realist ‘security dilemma’ is a particular type of Prisoner’s
Dilemma
• There are a number of different possible outcomes. In our
example, these are as follows:
Prisoner One
– 0 (Squeal)
– 1 (No squeal)
– 10 (Squeal)
– 25 (No Squeal)
Prisoner Two
25 (No squeal)
1 (No squeal)
10 (Squeal)
0 (Squeal)
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the
Pelopponesian War
• Should Athens have co-operated with Sparta and
Corinth by turning down Corcyra?
• But, what would have happened if Sparta and
Corinth had captured Corcyra’s ships, and the
naval balance become 2-1 against Athens?
• Athens could have trusted S and C to keep their
promises.
• However, Athens decided to ally with Corcyra.
This is the equivalent of ‘squealing’ on the other
prisoner.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the
Pelopponesian War
• The problem is that Athens came to believe
that war was inevitable.
• If there was to be a war, then better to have 21 superiority than 2-1 inferiority.
• From a game theory perspective, it is always
difficult to show trust when the game is only
played once.
• The big decision is whether to take the risk
and co-operate.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the
Pelopponesian War
• Game theory suggests that if a game will be played
many times, then the best, most rational strategy is to
co-operate on your first move, and then copy what
your opponent/partner does.
• However, crucially, it is always rational to defect if you
think that you are playing last.
• This is why it is so dangerous if you come to believe
that war is inevitable. It means that you are close to
the last move, and it is rational to worry whether you
can trust your opponent/partner.
• For Thucydides, states will also always be caught in this
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Limits on ethics in IR
• 1. There is only a weak international consensus
on values.
• 2. States are not like individuals. (Should a
president be a Kantian?)
• 3. Causation is more complex in international
politics than in domestic politics.
• 4. International institutions are particularly weak,
and the disjunction between order and justice is
greater in international than in domestic politics.