Ethical naturalism
Michael Lacewing
enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk
Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism
• What are we doing when we make moral
judgments?
• Cognitivism: moral judgments, e.g. ‘Murder is
wrong’
– Aim to describe how the world is
– Can be true or false
– Express beliefs that the claim is true
• Non-cognitivism: moral judgments
– Do not aim to describe the world
– Cannot be true or false
– Express attitudes towards the world
Three quick arguments
• If there were no facts about moral right and
wrong, it wouldn’t be possible to make
mistakes.
• Morality feels like a demand from ‘outside’
us, independent of what we want or feel.
• How is moral progress possible, unless some
views about morality are better than others?
Types of realism
• Moral realism: good and bad are properties
of situations and people, right and wrong are
properties of actions
• Moral judgements are true or false depending on
whether they ascribe the moral properties
something actually has
• What is the nature of these properties?
Ethical naturalism
• Naturalism: moral properties are actually
natural (psychological) properties
– Reductionism: things in one domain are identical
with things in another
• Utilitarianism as naturalism
– Goodness is happiness
– Rightness is maximizing happiness
– Cf. non-reductive reading: maximizing happiness
and rightness are correlated
Objection
• How can we prove the identity claim?
– Which natural property, if any, is identical with
goodness isn’t obvious
• We can’t use empirical reasoning
– Science can show whether, e.g. someone is
happy, but can’t show whether this is good
• We can’t deduce it: conceptual analysis of
‘happiness’ doesn’t establish that it is good
• Philosophical argument will be necessary
Was Mill a naturalist?
• Moore argues that Mill defines good as
‘desired’
– Mill argues that happiness is desired, and then
infers that happiness is good
– But this only works if what is desired is good
– Likewise, Mill says that to think of something as
desirable (good) and as pleasant is the same
thing – so pleasant, desired, good are all the
same
Was Mill a naturalist?
• But Mill could be taking what is desired
as evidence as what is good
– Not the same property, but evidence that
a different property is possessed
Was Aristotle a naturalist?
• Aristotle argues that eudaimonia – the good for
people – what we achieve if we perform our
‘function’ well
– There are psychological facts about what traits enable
us to do this
• Reply: but what eudaimonia is can’t be
identified with any set of natural facts
– The person with practical wisdom understands the
reasons for feeling and acting a certain way
– Whether something is a reason isn’t a natural fact