The UN Takes Its Turn at Posturing on Genocide in Darfur and Eastern Chad:
US and Britain offer a token Security Council sanctions resolution, which is promptly rejected by China,
Russia, and Qatar
Eric Reeves
April 18, 2006
The international community seems to have an inexhaustible capacity for disingenuousness, expediency, and bad faith
in responding to resurgent genocide in Darfur and eastern Chad. Even as all humanitarian indicators strongly suggest
that human mortality and displacement are rapidly accelerating, there is no action in prospect---diplomatic or military--that might address the acute insecurity that threatens civilians and continues to attenuate humanitarian capacity and
operations. This growing insecurity ensures that the deaths of huge numbers of innocent children, women, and men
will continue through the coming rainy season and hunger gap (May through September)---and well beyond.
The UN took its turn this week with a telling display of small-minded irrelevance. In response to UN Security Council
Resolution 1591 (March 2005), authorizing targeted sanctions, and in light of a report made months ago by a UN panel
of experts, the US and Britain finally proposed sanctioning four individual Sudanese: a Janjaweed militia member, two
rebel officials, and a mid-level member of the National Islamic Front. The stature of the "middle-ranking member of
the Sudanese government" designated for sanctioning was reported by Associated Press last week (April 13, 2006
[dateline: UN, New York]). The dispatch cited "Security Council diplomats" as the source of information.
Such a very small list of actors---and none of them senior members of the National Islamic Front regime---was
sufficiently embarrassing to prompt both the US and UK ambassadors to the UN to insist that this was only a "downpayment" on some larger sanctions effort. But even the "down-payment" proffered yesterday (April 17, 2006) was
rejected by veto-wielding Security Council members China and Russia, along with the only Arab League member of
the Security Council, Qatar.
The US, the UK, and other supporters of the sanctions measure were certainly well aware that their effort was directed
at none of those most responsible for genocide in Darfur. The UN panel-of-experts list of those who should be
sanctioned, per UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (again, March 2005---over a year ago) was leaked in February
2006; it is a matter of public record that those judged responsible by the panel for "impeding the peace process" and for
"failure to take action to neutralize and disarm non-state armed militia groups in Darfur" (the Janjaweed) include:
*Major General Saleh Abdallah Gosh, head of the National Security and Intelligence Service;
*Elzubier Bashir Taha, Minister of the Interior;
*Major General Abdel Rahmin Mohamed Hussein, former Minister of the Interior and current Defense Minister;
*Major General Ismat Zain al-Din, Director of Operations for the Sudanese Armed Forces in Khartoum (where Darfur
military actions are planned).
(Notably, NIF President and Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Omar el-Bashir, is also named for "possible future
designation"; the logic of his current exclusion---given his relation to those who are explicitly designated by the panel--is incomprehensible.)
Far from imposing travel bans or assets freezes on these men, the UK recently allowed Saleh Gosh to travel to London,
ostensibly for medical treatment. This accommodation was made for a man who bears immense responsibility for the
denial of all medical care to hundreds of thousands of civilians in Darfur and eastern Chad, people now beyond
humanitarian reach because of the violence that Gosh has helped to orchestrate.
Despite the centrality of these men in efforts to sustain targeted ethnic destruction in Darfur and eastern Chad, despite
their roles in obstructing humanitarian relief, and despite their directives to impede the operations of African Union
forces on the ground in Darfur, none was targeted for sanctions. The expedient calculation of the UK, the US, and
others was evidently that if none of the "big fish" were named in a sanctions resolution, China and Russia would accept
this, and a "moral victory" on behalf of Darfur could be claimed. But expediency on Darfur was a clear signal of
weakness, one easily sniffed out by the seasoned Chinese and Russian diplomats at the UN. And dismayingly, the
inevitable effect of an ignominious defeat for such a modest sanctioning effort will be to convince Khartoum's
genocidaires that they have nothing more to fear from the UN Security Council than they do from the International
Criminal Court, which has been contemptuously stiff-armed by Khartoum.
The performance at the UN was as cynical as President Bush's claim that the US is committed to "NATO stewardship"
for Darfur security operations...when this turns out to mean nothing more than some "dozens" of NATO advisors for
Darfur. The Bush administration told the Washington Post (April 10, 2006) that it had,
"settled on the idea of sending up to several hundred NATO advisers to help bolster African Union peacekeeping
troops in their efforts to shield villagers in Sudan's Darfur region from fighting between government-backed Arab
militias and rebel groups, administration officials said. The move would include some US troops and mark a
significant expansion of US and allied involvement in the conflict."
The Bush administration implied to the Washington Post that the number could be as great as 500. But the same day
that the Washington Post article was published, the word from NATO was remarkably at variance:
"NATO spokeswoman, Carmen Romero, declined to comment on a report by the Washington Post newspaper that said
the US backed a proposal to send several hundred NATO advisers to support an African Union peacekeeping mission
in Darfur. 'We are not talking of a NATO force in Darfur, this is out of the question,' she said, adding any personnel
would be involved only in logistical support or training." (Reuters [dateline: Brussels], April 10, 2006)
"Officials at alliance headquarters said the US would struggle to persuade allies to commit so many troops. One
official said the military planners were looking at dozens rather than hundreds of NATO experts to support the AU."
(Associated Press [dateline: Brussels], April 10, 2006)
It is important to bear in mind here that in its Darfur policy, the National Islamic Front regime has fully marginalized
the southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement, nominally part of the "Government of National Unity." SPLM
"foreign minister" Lam Akol has proved a willing tool of the NIF genocidaires, and the Movement has yet to find its
voice on Darfur in any significant fashion. At the same time, the NIF feels no significant pressure from the
international community: the threats of "NATO stewardship" are patently hollow; the NIF has denied, without
consequence, access to Darfur for a UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations assessment mission (Washington
Post, April 10, 2006; Agence France Presse, April 17, 2006); and in his most recent report on Darfur (April 5, 2006),
Secretary-General Kofi Annan again reports on Khartoum's continued disguising of its military aircraft as belonging to
the African Union:
"On 31 January, a Government [of Sudan] helicopter was spotted in Tine, North Darfur, with the inscription "AMIS"
[African Union Mission in Sudan] on it; and a similar sighting was reported the same day in Zalingei, West Darfur."
(Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur," April 5, 2006, paragraph 7)
This follows numerous previous reports, by both the UN and the AU, of Khartoum's deliberately disguising the
military identity of its aircraft and combat ground vehicles. The results will likely soon be tragic, and bring additional
security pressure on humanitarian operations. Annan also reports in the same paragraph that, "on February 7 [2006],
shots were fired at a UN helicopter in the Jebel Marra area of West Darfur" (paragraph 7).
Certainly Khartoum is feeling no meaningful pressure to relent in its escalating war on humanitarian operations in
Darfur. Notable recent events have included the denial of access to Jan Egeland, head of UN humanitarian operations,
and the expulsion of the distinguished Norwegian Refugee Council, the lead organization at the giant Kalma camp
outside Nyala, South Darfur (see analysis by this writer at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=99).
The collective effects of these concerted efforts to block, harass, and threaten humanitarian relief in Darfur are
analyzed further below, even as they have been chronicled by various UN and nongovernmental humanitarian
organizations for almost three years.
"A CULTURE OF IMPUNITY"
What human rights and UN officials have described as a "climate of impunity" in Darfur was again highlighted last
month by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan reported:
"A culture of impunity still reigns in Sudan's western Darfur region, and a special Sudanese court set up to try
perpetrators of war crimes in the three-year-old Darfur conflict has failed to prosecute any suspected war criminals,
according to a UN envoy in Khartoum. Sudan set up its own special criminal court for Darfur last spring to counter a
call from the international community call for Khartoum to send Darfur war crimes suspects to the International
Criminal Court in the Hague."
"Sudan refused international intervention and formed the court to illustrate that it could try war criminals internally.
But Sima Samar, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan, told reporters in Khartoum Monday [March
6, 2006] that the local courts have failed to try those responsible for war crimes. 'There has been not much
accountability for the serious crimes that have been committed in Darfur. A special court established to bring people to
justice has so far not accused or prosecuted anyone with command responsibility,' she said."
"Samar said the security situation on Darfur is worsening and accused both rebels and Sudan government forces of
violating ceasefire agreements.
She painted a bleak picture of the human rights situation in Sudan, charging that arbitrary arrests, detentions and
torture were still commonplace throughout the country. The expulsion of two American aid agencies from the eastern
Kassala region earlier this week is a stark reminder that conflict threatens to engulf both the west and east of the
Islamist country." (Deutsche Presse Agentur [dateline: Khartoum], March 7, 2006)
We must increasingly depend upon fewer and fewer international officials to report on realities in Darfur, as Khartoum
continues to punish brutally those who would speak to foreigners, especially foreign news reporters. As Kofi Annan
notes in his most recent report to the Security Council:
"From December 2005 to the present, the UN Mission in Sudan has documented six cases of local leaders being
arrested for raising concerns about internally displaced persons or providing information to 'foreigners.' In three of the
cases, charges were brought against the leaders in local courts. This has resulted in internally displaced persons being
reluctant to share concerns with the international community for fear of reprisals. Harassment and arbitrary arrests of
community leaders by police and national security personnel are contributing to a climate of intimidation in Southern
and Western Darfur."
"Civilians who share the same ethnicity as the rebel groups in Darfur continue to be targeted for arbitrary arrest and
detention by national security organs. Detainees are arrested on suspicion of supporting the rebels and held for periods
of up to five months without formal charge. Detainees interviewed during a visit to Ed Deain prison reported being
subjected to torture or threats of torture during interrogation. Fair trial protections, including the right to be informed of
criminal charges and to be brought to trial without undue delay, are enshrined as unconditional rights in the Interim
National Constitution and cannot be suspended even in times of emergency." (paragraphs 15 and 16)
The power of the security services in Sudan remains supreme, and will so long as they and the military forces are
dominated completely by the National Islamic Front.
KHARTOUM AND CHAD: LARGER POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS
The attack last week on N'Djamena, capital of Chad, by rebel groups supported by Khartoum continues to have very
significant humanitarian implications, even as it raises the specter of instability in the Central African Republic (which
has closed its border to Sudan because the CAR was used by Khartoum-backed rebels to enter Chad), and possibly
even Cameroon and Nigeria. There is also well-placed fear that the "United Front for Democratic Change" (FUC)
rebel groups will be Khartoum's agents for targeted ethnic destruction in eastern Chad. The courageous and
distinguished Sudanese human rights expert Suliman Baldo of the International Crisis Group is cited by Reuters:
"Analysts say the rebel United Front for Democratic Change (FUC), a loose but fractious alliance of opponents of
Deby who carried out the attack on N'Djamena, includes Chadian Arab groups who are pro-Khartoum and rivals to the
Zaghawa clan. 'If they take power in Chad, they are likely to cooperate with Khartoum militarily to attack the refugees
in Darfur...Khartoum is backing them precisely for this purpose,' Suliman Baldo, Africa program director of the
Brussels-based International Crisis Group, told Reuters. 'There is a real threat of ethnic cleansing,' he added." (Reuters
[dateline: N'Djamena], April 16, 2006)
Further, there is grave concern on the part of the UN World Food Program that Chad might retaliate against Khartoum
by sealing the border presently used by food convoys from Libya:
"Every month, around 6,000 tonnes of food is trucked by relief agencies from Libya through Chad and into western
Darfur---enough to feed some 400,000 people or about 20 percent of those who have fled their homes but remain in
camps in Sudan. 'If the border is closed, we may not be able to send supplies in,' Etienne Labande, head of the UN
World Food Programme in eastern Chad, told Reuters." (Reuters [dateline: Abeche, eastern Chad], April 17, 2006)
Further, the military actions in eastern Chad---by not only the Chadian rebels but the Khartoum-backed Janjaweed
militias, as well as Khartoum's regular military forces---have produced intolerable levels of insecurity. The UN's
Integrated Regional Information Networks reports (April 13, 2006):
"The UN, which has already evacuated non-essential staff from N'djamena to Yaounde in Cameroon, announced to
staff on Thursday [April 13, 2006] afternoon that non-essential personnel from field stations in the east [of Chad]
would be evacuated on Saturday morning [April 15, 2006], said UN employees in Chad. A convoy of 150 aid workers
from outlying areas in the east gathered in Abeche late Thursday in readiness for their departure, said an aid worker.
The UN refugee agency UNHCR, which on Tuesday [April 11, 2006] pulled staff back from two refugee camps in the
east after one of the camps was occupied overnight by [Chadian] rebel fighters, is also pulling staff out of its Forshana
field office, an hour's drive from Adre [eastern Chad]. That office supports four camps in the region, and a nearby suboffice at Guereda." (dateline: N'Djamena, April 13, 2006)
The IRIN dispatch concludes ominously:
"UN aid workers have warned that the current instability is a particular threat in eastern Chad which is nearing the end
of a short window of opportunity to build up food stocks, before the rainy season makes roads impassable from the end
of June."
The fighting in eastern Chad could also lead to a catastrophic increase in violence in Darfur, a fact recently highlighted
by a spokeswoman for the distinguished Irish humanitarian organization Concern:
"Angela O'Neill, Concern's regional director for Sudan, told RTE radio: 'The crisis in Darfur has been going on now
for over three years and the insecurity there is just getting worse and therefore delivering aid and operating in the area
is becoming increasingly more and more difficult.'"
"She said heavy gunfire and mortar shelling had been heard in the area by aid workers on Thursday [April 13, 2006].
'The worry is that the rebels fighting the Chadian government will cross the border, if they are not successful, back into
Darfur. There is the a possibility of the Chadian government soldiers will come after them.' She said the resultant
battle could lead to a response by Sudanese soldiers, with the region then descending into chaos."
"Ms O'Neill said all aid agencies were currently on standby to evacuate its staff." (Irish Independent, April 15, 2006)
"Ms O'Neill said all aid agencies were currently on standby to evacuate its staff"---this is the situation to which
Western countries propose responding by means of a few "dozens" of NATO advisors to the hopelessly outmanned
and outgunned African Union force. In the face of such realities, UN debates about an inconsequential list of
potentially sanctioned individuals seem obscenely irrelevant.
THOSE WHO WILL DIE
The number of civilians that are inaccessible to humanitarian relief now far exceeds half a million in the greater
Darfur/eastern Chad humanitarian theater; it could conceivably reach to almost 1 million in the very near term. An
assessment by UNICEF in March 2006 concluded that:
"Over 100,000 internally displaced persons and 71,000 conflict-affected people in host communities cannot be reached
due to ongoing conflict in North Darfur. In West Darfur, the situation is worse, with more than 184,000 displaced
people and about 209,000 members of host communities isolated by poor security." (UN Integrated Regional
Information Networks [dateline: Nyala, South Darfur], March 9, 2006)
To this figure of over 550,000 must be added those who are inaccessible in South Darfur, as well as the growing
number of conflict-affected and displaced civilians in eastern Chad. Speaking of the situation in South Darfur in his
most recent report to the Security Council, Kofi Annan reports:
"In North and South Darfur, all of the parties to the conflict have pursued a deliberate strategy of targeting civilians in
an effort to stem alleged support for enemy groups. This has provoked further movements of populations, including
from the Shearia, Mershing and Gereida areas of South Darfur. The increase in abuses and violations perpetrated
against civilians has been compounded by the reduced capacity of international actors to contribute to their protection,
as increased insecurity has severely curtailed safe access." (paragraph 10)
Altogether, about one-third of the displaced population within Darfur---more than 2 million human beings---have no
access to humanitarian relief:
"Because of a lack of security and dwindling funding, relief agencies say they can't reach 30 percent of the refugees in
Darfur, the lowest level of access in two years. 'We have no security for our work,' Jan Egeland, the United Nations'
emergency relief coordinator, said Friday in Nairobi. 'We are witnesses to massive attacks against the civilian
population.'" (Knight Ridder news [dateline: Nairobi], April 7, 2006)
The same dispatch highlighted deliberate obstruction of humanitarian efforts by Khartoum's genocidaires:
"Astrid Sehl, a spokeswoman at the [Norwegian Refugee Council/NRC] headquarters in Oslo, [ ] said NRC and other
relief agencies have faced a number of obstacles from the [Sudanese] authorities. Recently, authorities would allow
foreign aid workers permits to travel to Darfur for only three days at a time, Sehl said. They also restricted the amount
of fuel that the workers could transport to Darfur, severely limiting relief operations in a region with almost no
infrastructure."
"Sehl said the council had estimated the amount of time its staff in Sudan lost in dealing with the bureaucracy as one
month for every year. 'In the past four to five months, the whole situation for humanitarian organizations has been
worse and worse, and our ability to access the beneficiaries has become more and more difficult,' she said."
In Chad, the number of civilians beyond the reach of humanitarian efforts could explode at any moment, since all relief
comes from the west. The attack by Khartoum-back FUC rebels in the Boz Beida area is the most ominous portent:
"On Monday [April 10, 2006] armed rebels also thought to be with the FUC seized Goz Amer refugee camp outside
the village of Koukou [ ] close to the Sudan border---host to 18,000 refugees from the war-torn Darfur region of
Sudan. 'The rebels occupied the camp and accused us of kidnapping the refugees,' an aid worker in the camp who
asked not to be named told IRIN by satellite phone on Tuesday. 'They stayed in the camp until the morning, took food
and stole satellite phones.'"
"The rebels told the aid worker they were going on to Am Timan 300 kilometres west of the camp before striking the
capital N'djamena before presidential elections on 3 May. The aid worker estimated that the FUC forces had up to 150
vehicles in the area. The UN High Commission for Refugees told IRIN that it will pull staff out of the Goz Amer camp
and another nearby refugee camp at Goz Beida." (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks [dateline:
N'Djamena], April 11, 2006)
A broader assessment of the implications of the attack on Goz Amer was offered by UN High Commission for
Refugees spokesman Ron Redmond. The New York Times (dateline: N'Djamena]) reports:
"The janjaweed militias that have been supported by the Sudanese government and have set fire to so many villages in
Darfur are now extending their reign of terror into Chad, displacing Chadians from their homes. Attacks by janjaweed
gunmen have even been launched on some of the refugee camps in Chad. 'It's impossible to comprehend that the
innocent victims of the violence and abuse in Darfur could yet again suffer as a result of this situation,' said Ron
Redmond, the spokesman for the United Nations refugee agency in Geneva." (April 14, 2006)
Even before this attack, the UN's World Food Program has warned of the consequences of insecurity for eastern Chad:
"The UN's World Food Programme warned in late March that spreading violence in the deserts of eastern Chad could
severely hamper humanitarian aid for over a quarter-million Sudanese refugees and displaced Chadians."
After the Goz Amer attack, the UN High Commission for Refugees gave an especially grim assessment of
humanitarian operations. UNHCR spokeswoman Jennifer Pagonis:
"'We always look at a worst-case scenario,' [Pagonis] said. 'But, in this case [eastern Chad], it is particularly difficult to
almost imagine how one could cope with that. This is an extremely hostile region of the world. It is a desert region. It
has been one of the major challenges that we have faced of even find sites for camps where refugees can have water.
So, where they would flee to, if the situation deteriorated is a question that is unanswerable at the moment, and,
indeed, we feel it incredibly acutely that the options are very, very limited.'" (Voice of America [dateline: Geneva],
April 14, 2006)
"We feel it incredibly acutely that the options are very, very limited"---these are the "options" that the international
community has offered to the people of eastern Chad, and Darfur, and to the courageous humanitarians who seek to
save lives. The UN High Commission for Refugees today estimated that there are approximately 220,000 Darfuri
refugees in eastern Chad and 40,000 internally displaced Chadians (press release, Abeche, eastern Chad, April 18,
2006). The number of conflict-affected Chadians is much greater yet, though there has been no effective humanitarian
assessment because of insecurity.
RESOURCES
As of march 30, 2006 only 20% of the funding for the UN's Humanitarian Action in Darfur (required by end of
December 2006) had been secured: $131 million had been pledged, leaving a shortfall of over $470 million (2006
Work Plan for Sudan: Funding Overview, March 30, 2006). Donor fatigue has set in and the consequences will be
disastrous, compounding the effects of limited humanitarian access. In the grim calculus that defines the world of
humanitarian funding, Khartoum's denial of access to UN humanitarian chief Jan Egeland has enormous consequences:
"Sudan risks losing funding for its millions of people in need of aid because of its refusal to allow UN Under Secretary
for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland to visit crisis areas, a senior UN official said on Thursday. 'If people feel that our
capacity to operate is restricted so much...all these things make donors think maybe it's better to use the money in other
places,' said Manuel Aranda da Silva, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Sudan." (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum],
April 6, 2006)
Of course the terrible irony is that in the eyes of Khartoum, the loss of funding only furthers its genocidal goals, and
works to remove international eyes as witnesses to ongoing, ethnically-targeted human destruction and the cruelly
calculated denial of humanitarian aid. But there should be no mistaking the near-term consequences of this funding
short-fall: Kofi Annan recently warned in his report to the Security Council that,
"UN World Food Program stocks in Darfur and supplies now on their way will only meet requirements until mid-April
[2006]. Shortages of some non-cereal commodities will start at that time, and major pipeline breaks will begin in May,
two months before the start of the hunger season." (paragraph 21)
Over a month ago UN IRIN reported (March 13, 2006):
"A 'critically slow' response to appeals for emergency operations in Sudan has forced the United Nations World Food
Programme (WFP) to reduce rations of pulses [greens and leguminous], sugar and salt for some 3.5 million
beneficiaries in that country. While supplies of some commodities such as cereals, which form the major part of
general food-distribution rations, have not yet been affected, complete breaks in the supply of other rations are now
imminent, WFP said in statement released on Friday [March 10, 2006]."
IRIN provided a critical overview at the same time:
"Many of the major donors [for Darfur] have announced reductions in funding for 2006, and instead of expanding
humanitarian assistance from camps to under-served rural areas, aid agencies are struggling to maintain their current
levels of services."
And yet the dispatch continued: "protection of civilians outside the camps has never been so bad. Never been so
terrible." (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks [dateline: Nyala, South Darfur], March 9, 2006)
HOW MANY ARE DYING EVERY DAY?
As deadlocked peace talks grind on in Abuja---holding out less and less hope that any possible signed "agreement" can
halt the escalating violence---and as the international community signals to Khartoum and there will be no
international force on the ground to protect civilians or humanitarians, nor any serious punishment for the crime of
genocide, the question becomes increasingly insistent: how many will die? How will the daily consequences of our
inaction be measured in human destruction?
It is a question had that obtruded itself over two years ago, and does so now in terribly similar fashion. Words by this
writer published in February 2004 are as true today as they were then:
"Khartoum has so far refused to rein in its Arab militias; has refused to enter into meaningful peace talks with the
insurgency groups; and most disturbingly, refuses to grant unfettered humanitarian access. The international
community has been slow to react to Darfur's catastrophe and has yet to move with sufficient urgency and
commitment. A credible peace forum must rapidly be created. Immediate plans for humanitarian intervention should
begin. The alternative is to allow tens of thousands of civilians to die in the weeks and months ahead in what will be
continuing genocidal destruction." ("Unnoticed Genocide," The Washington Post, February 25, 2004)
"Tens of thousands of civilians" did indeed die in subsequent weeks and months, as genocide continued unchecked and
unacknowledged. Now it seems equally obvious that hundreds of thousands will die in the coming months---before
the very eyes of a fully apprised international community. The people of Darfur and eastern Chad have no way to
leave, no way to protect themselves---only a slender humanitarian lifeline that daily grows more tenuous, and could
soon snap entirely.
We have left these people in a timeless setting of destruction and suffering. A grim vignette offered by a UNICEF
worker in Darfur also hearkens back to two years ago:
"Every day, I used to sense a slight improvement in the general situation compared to how it felt in August 2004 when
I first came to the field, but now I worry we are heading back to where we were two years ago. Indelible images of
suffering are now deeply rooted in my mind: Endless queues of women wait for food rations under a sizzling sun.
They carry crying children on their backs. Other kids wander around them, closely watched so they don't disappear. A
child dying of malnutrition sits on his mother's lap. Children scream, watching strangers come and go in the camps. All
they dream of at night are the horsemen who destroyed their villages." (Eman Musa Eltighani, April 17, 2006 [Darfur]
UNICEF press release)
The horsemen are still there, still destroying villages, and attacking those who dare to return to their lands and what
remains of their homes. They are doing the bidding of Khartoum's genocidaires, as they have for the past three years.
And they will continue to kill, rape, and destroy because there is nothing to stop them. Nothing.
===================================================
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Africa Report N°106
31 March 2006
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
More than a year after it was signed, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is
showing signs of strain. While the agreement ended one of Africa’s longest and bloodiest civil
wars, it was an agreement between only two parties, the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and continues to
lack broader support throughout the country, particularly in the North. The current equation
for peace in Sudan is a worrying one: the NCP has the capacity to implement but lacks the
political will, whereas the SPLM has the commitment but is weak and disorganised. There is a
real risk of renewed conflict down the road unless the NCP begins to implement the CPA in
good faith, and the SPLM becomes a stronger and more effective implementing partner. The
international community, which has largely abandoned the political engagement and
commitment that was so crucial to achieving the peace agreement in the first place, must
forcefully reengage with the process to ensure the agreement’s successful implementation.
The implementation process has been an uphill battle, with the NCP exploiting the gaps within
the CPA and the weaknesses of its junior partner, the SPLM, to delay and frustrate the
process. Following the death of SPLM Chairman Dr. John Garang in July 2005, the SPLM vision
has blurred, and the NCP has abandoned its strategy for a political partnership with the SPLM.
It is increasingly clear that if this does not change soon, then all peaceful paths forward in
Sudan – full implementation of the CPA, comprehensive political solutions to the conflicts in
Darfur and the East – will likely lead to eventual regime change and an ousting of the NCP
either via free and fair elections, or by simply whittling away its control of the structures of
government to a minority stake.
Under growing pressure, the NCP is attempting to manage all these challenges to ensure its
own political survival. It has largely succeeded in keeping the international community at bay
over Darfur by facilitating increased chaos on the ground and promoting divisions within the
rebels. It is achieving a similar containment of the international community on the CPA by
selectively implementing elements of the agreement without allowing for any weakening of its
grip on power or fundamental change in the way the country is governed. Yet these strategies
are not sustainable, and will ultimately lead to renewed or increased conflict. The NCP must
begin to implement the agreement in good faith to help assure its political future in a peaceful
Sudan by making partnership an attractive option to the SPLM, and unity an attractive option
to southern Sudanese.
The SPLM is facing enormous challenges which are severely undermining its ability to function
as an effective partner in government. The SPLM faces two simultaneous tasks: as the lead
party in the new autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and the minority
partner in the new Government of National Unity (GNU).[1] Wracked by internal divisions and
contradictions, and with no functional party structures or party decision-making mechanisms
from mid-July 2005 through late February 2006, the SPLM has been completely overwhelmed
thus far, unable to successfully or consistently challenge the NCP on most issues relating to
implementation. This is most apparent in Khartoum, where the minority SPLM controls only a
handful of Ministerial or State Ministerial positions, as well as the 1st Vice-President position,
but does not yet have any members integrated into the national civil service or other national
institutions. As a result, it has been losing an uphill battle to implement the CPA and begin to
change the policies of a government that still faces active civil wars in the East and West.
The SPLM is faring better in the South, as the GoSS slowly inches forward in the face of
enormous physical and structural challenges. The 8 January Juba Declaration to integrate the
bulk of the government-aligned southern armed groups operating within the umbrella South
Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) into the SPLA will help consolidate peace in the South, though
implementation of the agreement will be difficult. Yet the GoSS is also facing some acute
threats, most noticeably from the lack of progress on reorganising the SPLA into a
professional army, and the extended delays in paying its troops and civil servants. These
delays are creating an environment exploited by the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA), which is allegedly still receiving support from the Sudan Armed Forces and has
significantly expanded its activities in Western Equatoria, threatening to become a homegrown Sudanese problem.
However, there are early signs that the SPLM is beginning to overcome some of its internal
challenges and refocus its efforts on implementation of the CPA. Without a functioning and
effective SPLM, there is little chance that the CPA will hold.
In the face of all of this, the international community has remained largely silent. Heavy on
monitoring but weak on follow-through, the international community – particularly the key
countries involved in the negotiation of the CPA – has not yet embraced its role as a
guarantor of the CPA, and continues to lack a consistent, coordinated approach to dealing
with the parties, particularly the NCP, let alone holding them to their respective commitments.
More consistent, proactive and forceful engagement by the international community is another
required ingredient to see this agreement peacefully through the pitfalls that lie ahead.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
ON THE DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTATION
To the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement:
1. Immediately reconstitute the National Constitutional Review Commission with the proper
mandate to retroactively review all new bodies and legal acts related to the implementation of
the CPA and ensure that they comply with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution.
To the UN, World Bank, U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, other Donor Countries and IGAD
Member States:
2. Work to improve international coordination and strategies around the implementation
process by forming a Technical Secretariat attached to the Assessment and Evaluation
Commission, preferably headed by General Sumbeiywo, to track implementation and act as a
central information clearinghouse for the international community on information relating to
the CPA.
3. Link donor funding, both bilateral and through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, to the
implementation records of the parties, as determined by the Assessment and Evaluation
Commission, and develop clear benchmarks tied to future funding for the parties to achieve in
Khartoum and Juba.
4. Channel financial support and technical expertise in the short-term to combat the greatest
immediate threats to the CPA, by funding and helping to operationalise key commissions such
as the Ad Hoc North-South Boundary Commission, the National Petroleum Commission, and
the National Civil Service Commission; and neutralise potential spoilers by supporting the
implementation of the Juba Declaration.
ON ABYEI
To the National Congress Party:
5. Immediately cease all inflammatory rhetoric designed to mobilise the Misseriya people
against the Ngok Dinka and the Abyei Boundary Commission Report, and cease efforts to
unconstitutionally administer Abyei from Southern Kordofan State.
6. President Bashir should immediately appoint the Local Executive Council for Abyei, in
consultation with 1st Vice-President Kiir and Vice-President Taha, in accordance with the CPA.
To the UN Mission in Sudan:
7. If the stalemate on Abyei continues and the formation of an administration is not
forthcoming, UNMIS should seek to set up a temporary administration in Abyei, while
facilitating discussions between the SPLM and NCP, and between the Ngok Dink and Misseriya
peoples, on the following:
(a) definition of citizenship and residency in Abyei, based on the CPA, the Abyei Boundary
Commission Report, and the situation on the ground;
(b) implementation of the Abyei Boundary Commission report in light of demographic
changes on the ground;
(c) developing guarantees for nomadic grazing rights in and through Abyei; and
(d) scenario planning should Abyei vote to join an independent South, including:
i. discussions on provisions for dual citizenship for residents of the area;
ii. protection of traditional grazing rights for non-residents of Abyei; and
iii. discussions between the SPLM and NCP on the longer-term sharing of oil revenue from
Abyei between North and South.
ON PROBLEMS IN THE OIL SECTOR
To the NCP:
8. Immediately provide the SPLM with access to existing oil contracts and full oil production
and revenue information, as required by the CPA.
9. Cease blocking the establishment of an effective National Petroleum Commission with the
mandate agreed upon in the CPA.
To the SPLM and Government of Southern Sudan:
10. Immediately cancel all oil agreements in the South signed in violation of the CPA.
11. Take steps to ensure that the rights of citizens in oil producing areas are being protected.
To the International Community:
12. Provide the SPLM with the technical expertise and information, as required, to help it
attain its fair share of oil revenue, and develop the capacity to manage the oil sector in the
South.
TO ADDRESS SPLM AND SPLA CONSTRAINTS
To the SPLM:
13. Work to resolve internal divisions and contradictions, and immediately move to begin
rebuilding party structures, working towards an SPLM national convention, in order to be a
more effective partner in the implementation process.
To the SPLA:
14. Take immediate steps to develop a common internal approach on the reorganisation of
the SPLA. Prioritise the reorganisation of the army, together with a transparent and
accountable salary structure, in order to help improve security in the South and combat the
growing threat posed by the LRA.
To the U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, other Donor Countries and IGAD Member States:
15. Provide the SPLM with financial and technical support, as needed, for it to help reestablish functioning party structures and be a positive force for peace in Sudan.
16. Provide the SPLA with technical and financial support to help it reorganise its forces,
integrate the SSDF troops who have joined the SPLA, and develop a professional standing
army, capable of combating security threats in the South such as the LRA. In the case of the
U.S., consider legislative exemption for the GoSS from anti-terrorist sanctions, on a year-byyear basis.
17. Support the implementation of the Juba Declaration by providing food aid and transport,
as necessary, to help counter the efforts by the NCP’s military intelligence to rebuild its
southern militias as spoilers in the South.
ON THE LRA
To the SPLM/A:
18. Urgently reorganise the SPLA and develop a targeted military strategy to counter the
LRA’s growing presence in Equatoria, including through necessary support from the
international community.
19. Cease to pursue its own mediation efforts, and instead coordinate with and support the
existing initiative led by Ugandan mediator Betty Bigombe.
To the NCP and the Sudan Armed Forces:
20. Cease all support to the LRA in southern Sudan.
To the UN Security Council:
21. Without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Sudanese authorities, direct UNMIS to use
all necessary means to fulfil its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence and require UNMIS to act proactively and robustly against the LRA, including in a
preemptive manner.
22. Appoint a panel of independent experts to investigate the membership, funding of, and
support for the LRA. The panel should consult with relevant governments, UN missions, and
other UN-appointed expert bodies. It should advise the Security Council on further measures
to be taken by the Council in relation to the LRA.
To the UN Mission in Sudan:
23. Establish a verification unit, to be negotiated directly with the SPLA and the Sudan Armed
Forces, to verify continued SPLA claims of Sudan Armed Forces’ support to the LRA.
Nairobi/Brussels, 31 March 2006
[1] According to the CPA, the SPLM controls 70 per cent of the appointed positions in the
GoSS until elections, the NCP 10 per cent, and other southern parties the remaining 20 per
cent. At the level of the GNU, the NCP maintains 52 per cent of the appointed positions, the
SPLM 28 per cent, other northern parties 14 per cent, and other southern parties 6 per cent.
The SPLM must also establish 10 new state governments in the South (where it will maintain
its 70 per cent control, with 20 per cent going to the NCP and 10 per cent to other parties),
and fill 45 per cent of the positions in the state governments of Blue Nile and Southern
Kordofan, and 20 per cent in all other northern state governments.
=====================================
Chad's vulnerable president
Analyst Andrew Manley explains why President Idriss Deby has appeared
increasingly vulnerable in a piece written for the BBC Focus On Africa magazine
shortly before Chad's government announced it had foiled a coup plot.
The World Bank has
prevented money being
used on arms
The phrase "power comes from the east'' has become virtually a national motto in Chad
following Idriss Deby's Sudan-backed overthrow of previous Chadian head of state Hissene
Habre in December 1990.
Deby, who has been slowly hemmed in by the complex ethno-political conflict that started
three years ago in Sudan's Darfur region - which borders Chad to the east - does not need
reminding.
Recent months have seen a spate of defections of former allies from his ruling Zagawa clan to
Darfur-based Chadian rebels. With the Zagawa itself only 1.5 per cent of the country's 10
million-plus population, this was especially ominous for a president with little genuine
domestic support.
Moreover, he has lost trust in the wider region due to the split with his original sponsors in
Khartoum, and also in Paris.
With Libya, France has long been the major outside influence in N'Djamena, but has never
recovered from what it saw as the double game Deby played over the allocation of drilling
rights for the Doba Basin oil project in the far south-east during the 1990s.
French oil giant Elf walked out of the project in 1999 for various reasons, and Exxon's
subsequent arrival as lead player was felt in Paris as a stinging defeat in the geopolitical game
with the United States for influence in African oil territories.
Greater Zagawaland
Despite the continuing presence in Chad of France's 1,000-strong Operation Epervier force,
relations remain poor.
For a man whose arrival in power was helped greatly by the French secret services, this was a
wrong move.
Meanwhile, regional neighbours have never been comfortable. Gabon has long been an
unofficial bolthole for some of Deby's veteran opponents from the Habre era.
And Cameroon fears N'Djamena's potential to destabilise its three northern provinces, and has
long complained that the heavily-armed zaraguina - highway robber - bands that terrorise key
roads in Extrême-Nord Province have been effectively exported from among unpaid elements
of the Chadian armed forces.
Others remain unhappy about Chad's involvement in the chaos that has periodically engulfed
the Central African Republic since the mid-1990s, much of it the work of Zagawa irregulars including Deby clan members, who aided current head of state François Bozize to power in
2002.
A telling sign of the balance of opinion turning against the regime is the reported sighting of
at least one important ally of Chadian rebel leader Mahamat Nour in Ouagadouou recently.
Under President Blaise Campaore, Burkina Faso has traditionally been close to Deby and was
one of his regional sponsors on his march to power.
Then there is the Zagawa question itself.
Even before the age of the internet, rumours have circulated about the Chadian head of
state's ambitions for a pan-regional zone of influence, often pejoratively known as Greater
Zagawaland.
Assuming that at least some of Sudan's leadership suspect this of their former protégé, it is
little surprise that they regard Darfur insurgent groups as a direct threat.
Oil issue
Chad's eastern border now presents not only a military threat, but a financial one too.
Here, Deby's recent dispute with the World Bank is critical. As the key international brokers
for Doba, bank staff were horrified in 2005 by Chad's decision to shift millions of dollars from
a fund set up to tackle long-term poverty to deal with more pressing financial difficulties.
Chad's rebels are keen to
seize power
The bank decided to hold back funds. N'Djamena is now near insolvent, making access to the
global arms market difficult. But it is this kind of spending that the bank is determined to
forestall.
Finally, rumours deepen about the 56- year-old leader's health. This is important, given his
apparent wish to appoint his widely disliked son Brahim as successor.
Many other major Zagawa figures are against that, fearing marginalisation for their own
relatives.
Presidential elections are due in May and many people doubt they will be free and fair. If Nour
or anyone else feels prepared to take Deby on before the next rainy season, this is their
practical deadline to move.
Linking all these factors is what now seems to be the simple recognition by virtually all major
players in Chad that the Deby era is coming to an end as the country's post-colonial political
vacuum once again opens up.
This time round, even more than when Deby supplanted Habre, the oil issue underlies the
thinking of virtually all of them.
Beyond Doba itself, there are promising oil fields elsewhere in southern Chad. Just as
important is the potential of major exploration backing from China, which would reduce any
future leader's need to depend on the World Bank's say-so.
This leads back to what may prove to be the most interesting current questions about Nour:
just whose direct numbers does he have on his satellite phone? And how often is he calling
them?
======================================
"Matching Rhetoric with Action in Darfur",
by John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen in allAfrica.com
17 March 2006
allAfrica.com
Last month, in the town of Mershing, South Darfur, there was chaos and carnage. On a
scorching day in February, four hundred Janjaweed militiamen attacked, firing indiscriminately
on civilians, destroying homes, and looting livestock. Eight hours after the initial onslaught,
the Janjaweed returned for a second round of mayhem, assaulting women and children and
looting the town's main market.
Following a terror-filled night, the 55,000 residents of Mershing fled for their lives. Thirteen
infants were trampled to death and 220 children separated from their families in the exodus.
The day after, here in Washington, a senior State Department official told journalists that
"there isn't large-scale organized violence taking place" in Darfur.
President Bush has called for a doubling of the number of peacekeeping troops in Darfur and
said that the transition from the current African-led force to a larger, more robust UN
peacekeeping mission will require significant NATO involvement. This pronouncement is
laudable, but likely to be viewed as yet another example of schizophrenic U.S. policy on
Darfur.
The administration's rhetoric has been consistently inconsistent with its actions and with the
reality on the ground. Despite the government of Sudan and their proxy Janjaweed militias'
sadistic campaign to murder and displace Darfur's non-Arab civilians, some U.S. officials
continue to heap disproportionate public blame on Darfur's rebel groups for the lack of
security. Although the rebels frequently commit atrocities against civilians and should be
censured, Khartoum's counterinsurgency strategy has caused the deaths of more than
200,000 people and displaced two million more.
While U.S. diplomats have credited Sudanese officials with "acknowledging what's taking place
in Darfur," Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir recently said that "the so-called Darfur
conflict is an invention by foreign interests." Indeed, the Sudanese government has made
numerous commitments to disarm its militias and prosecute war criminals, only to flaunt its
disregard for these obligations by denying responsibility and continuing to support the
Janjaweed. Government helicopters that provided air support for recent Janjaweed attacks on
civilians in eastern Chad confirm that this patron-killer relationship remains intact.
Some U.S. officials blame this growing insecurity on "tribal" violence, the same code language
that previous U.S. administrations used in Rwanda and Bosnia as they twiddled their thumbs
in inaction. Further, "tribal war" denotes anarchy, removing clear culpability for atrocities.
Sudan's ruling party has traditionally employed a divide-and-destroy strategy to eliminate
enemies, and claims of anarchy in Darfur are self-fulfilling. Sudanese military intelligence
agents manipulate local ethnic divisions and exacerbate tensions, and then the government
blames the bloodshed on lawlessness and tribalism. The U.S. government must recognize that
ethnic violence is not the root cause of the conflict but a deliberate tactic of the barbaric
braintrust in Khartoum.
What is behind all this rhetorical contortionism? The answer is simple: the Bush administration
wants to look tough on Darfur without jeopardising Khartoum's cooperation on
counterterrorism. Many of the Sudanese military intelligence officials who offer information to
the CIA are the principal perpetrators of atrocity crimes in Darfur, responsible for arming,
training, and unleashing the Janjaweed on innocent civilians. But the administration cannot
justify this moral sacrifice on national security grounds: it is in U.S. interests to oppose a
regime it accuses of genocide.
It is not too late for this administration to act. The U.S. and European Union are leading the
international effort to deploy a robust UN force. The African Union's recent communiqué has
paved the way for UN deployment. While the UN prepares its mission, the U.S. must do three
things urgently:
-- First, the administration must work with congress and with other donor nations to ensure
that the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) is fully funded until the UN deploys. The U.S. should
also provide logistical support and assist the AU with intelligence gathering to enhance the
mission's ability to protect civilians and monitor an enhanced ceasefire agreement.
-- Second, President Bush should appoint a special envoy to increase the level of pressure on
the warring parties to negotiate an enhanced ceasefire agreement, reach a comprehensive
political settlement through the AU-facilitated Abuja negotiations, and persuade Sudan to
accept and the AU to confirm transition of AMIS into a strong UN peacekeeping mission.
Without U.S. leadership and pressure, the peace process and the transition to a robust UN
force have little chance to succeed.
-- Third, the U.S., in consultation with the AU, should work with its allies to identify a nation
or nations to lead an advance UN-Mandated stabilization force of some 5,000 troops to
buttress the AU and focus on the Chad-Sudan border enhancing civilian protection efforts.
President Bush needs to secure greater U.S. support for this intervention.
Some of the residents of Mershing have returned to their homes, but many have chosen not
to go back for fear of further Janjaweed attacks. Speaking about Darfur, President Bush said
recently that, "There has to be a consequence for people abusing their fellow citizens." One
could hardly blame Mershing's displaced and vulnerable civilians for thinking that the
President's comments are more hollow rhetoric that leave them with no homes, no future, and
no hope.