SEVENTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATES
PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION
OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND
STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL)
AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
Secretariat:
BWC Implementation Support Unit
United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs (Geneva Branch)
Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland
Geneva, 5-22 December 2011
tel:
+41 (0)22 917 2230
fax: +41 (0)22 917 0483
e-mail:bwc@unog.ch
web: http://www.unog.ch/bwc
BIOSAFETY, BIOSECURITY & BIODEFENCE:
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 2011
Effective Implementation of & Compliance with the
Biological Weapons Convention: The Way Forward
Keynote address by Ambassador Paul van den IJssel,
President-designate of the Seventh Review Conference
Tuesday 19 July 2011, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
His Excellency Dato' Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Bin Hamidi, distinguished delegates, ladies and
gentlemen,
I would like to begin by conveying my sincere appreciation to the Government of Malaysia,
the Asia-Pacific Biosafety Association, and the other organizers of this congress. I am
delighted to be in Kuala Lumpur for this important event that is being held in just the right
place, at just the right time.
In the Asia-Pacific region, and in Southeast Asia in particular, we are seeing rapid
advancements in biotechnology which have tremendous potential benefits for regional
development. There is a great deal of investment, in infrastructure, in technology, in
education and training, in health, veterinary and agricultural systems. Trade is increasing, and
the exchange of personnel, equipment, technology and know-how is expanding rapidly.
Regional capabilities in biosafety and biosecurity will need to grow to keep pace with this.
Such growth will require coordinated efforts, within and across national systems,
incorporating the capacities and contributions of the different sectors. I would like to talk to
you today about the role the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) can play in helping to
achieve this growth, and the way that everyone participating at this congress can contribute to
regional and international efforts to manage biological risks and strengthen barriers against
the use of disease as a weapon.
The Biological Weapons Convention was created to ensure that the life sciences and
biotechnology are used only for the benefit of humanity. It matches a broad and absolute
prohibition of biological and toxin weapons with protections for the development of the
peaceful applications of biological science and technology. Negotiated 40 years ago, at the
height of the Cold War, the BWC is an elegant and concise piece of international law whose
key obligations can be summarised as follows:
-2-

Never under any circumstances to acquire or retain biological weapons (Article I);

To destroy or divert to peaceful purposes biological weapons and associated resources
(Article II);

Not to transfer, or in any way assist, encourage or induce anyone else to acquire or
retain biological weapons (Article III);

To take any national measures necessary to implement the provisions of the BWC
domestically (Article IV);

To consult bilaterally and multilaterally to solve any problems with the
implementation of the BWC (Article V);

To request the UN Security Council to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC and
to comply with its subsequent decisions (Article VI);

To assist States which have been exposed to a danger as a result of a violation of the
BWC (Article VII); and

To do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of biological science
and technology (Article X).
Responding to an evolving threat
The BWC was, and is, a security instrument. Over much of its history, its members have
argued about the need to add verification machinery to the treaty – in the form of inspections,
monitoring and so on – but these efforts ultimately foundered in 2001 in the face of
intractable political and technical challenges. This was a difficult time in the Convention's
history, and many feared that it might mark the end of collective, multilateral efforts against
biological weapons. But, happily, these fears proved unfounded. Rather than grind to a halt,
international efforts instead moved off in a different and remarkably productive direction.
Member states of the BWC realised that because of the pervasiveness of biotechnology and
rapidity of change and development in the biosciences, governments alone could not confront
the threat of biological weapons in the traditional arms-control sense. No government or
international organisation could hope to monitor the tens of thousands of small biotechnology
facilities spreading around the world. The number of facilities and the capability of the
technology were ever increasing, while the cost and size of the equipment dropped steadily.
At the same time, following the events of 2001, international concern about the threats posed
by terrorism grew sharply. BWC members recognised that the deliberate development and
use of a biological weapon was one end of a continuous spectrum of biological risks that also
included naturally occurring disease, unintended consequences, accidents, lack of awareness,
and negligence. An integrated response was therefore required.
Through a work program conducted since 2003, BWC member governments have attempted
to harmonise and coordinate efforts across this spectrum, to help reduce the risks of biology
being deliberately or inadvertently misused for malign purposes. If the potential problem lies
in many hands, ran the logic, so must the solution. The work program has brought defence
-3and security experts together with representatives of the public health, veterinary, agriculture,
law enforcement, and education sectors, as well as with the international scientific
community and professional biosafety associations. There has also been some limited but
very helpful involvement from industry representatives.
This work program forms the backbone of the treaty's efforts to stay relevant and effective
against the evolving threat posed by biological weapons. Each year the BWC hosts
international meetings on specific issues. The topics are agreed upon by all members in
advance and are those thought to be particularly important in the global fight against the
deliberate spread of disease. The meetings are designed to discuss, and promote common
understanding and effective action on various issues – not to negotiate binding international
commitments. This was at first thought to be a weakness, but in fact the meetings have
proved highly successful in creating an atmosphere of and constructive collaboration and
prompting practical action at a national level. Bringing in the different perspectives and
expertise of different sectors and actors resulted in a much broader, deeper and more
comprehensive approach to the issues. The intersessional meetings have proved to be an
effective means not only of exchanging useful, practical information, but also of finding
overlaps, commonalities and potential synergies.
The meetings are also important as a means for exchanging information on needs and
capabilities. Some member states come with offers of assistance: technical expertise, training,
capacity-building and so on. Others come with requests for assistance, or with outlines of the
challenges they face and their plans for meeting them. Many arrangements have been made
for cooperation between countries, both formal and informal. Sometimes the greatest benefit
is simply making contacts between counterparts in relevant agencies, who can then
communicate informally on how to tackle their common problems.
Supporting implementation and building capacity
A further recent innovation under the Convention is the Implementation Support Unit (ISU).
The ISU assists in matters related to administration, implementation and universalization of
the treaty. The ISU helps to drive forwards the day-to-day work of the Convention, foster
new initiatives and support efforts to expand treaty membership. The ISU helps sustain the
growing network of partners focusing on the various aspects of health security and opens
doorways for further work to build capacity.
The ISU is the treaty’s focal point for facilitating communication. The Unit consolidates and
maintains details of how states are meeting their various obligations. It also gathers details of
relevant initiatives in other international forums and the efforts of international, regional,
national and local bodies – both inside government and without. It does all this with a staff of
three. Because of its size, the ISU serves as an information exchange point for assistance; it
does not provide assistance itself. It is a useful first port of call for all those seeking
assistance on how to address biological risks and threats and how to build biosafety and
biosecurity capacity. The ISU is the centrepiece of the broader expert network developing
under the BWC.
The ISU is also heavily involved in facilitating and organizing workshops around the world
on combating biological risks and threats. In the last three years, the ISU has been involved in
around 125 such events. These meetings allow information to flow from experts to BWC
member governments and from member governments back to experts, so that the greater
-4community can evolve together. I encourage everyone here to contact the ISU in the first
instance for any information on any aspect of the BWC and related activities. The ISU's
website, www.unog.ch/bwc, is an excellent source of information, and the best way to stay in
touch with developments in the BWC world.
Enhancing global biosecurity in light of advances in the life sciences
Another important development is the work that has been done under the BWC to examine
scientific and technological developments and to interact with scientists and technologists.
The life sciences and associated biotechnologies continue to advance at increasing speeds.
New practices, procedures and capabilities are added on a weekly basis. The range of
disciplines which could be relevant to efforts to prevent the weaponization of disease also
continues to grow. It is increasingly important to examine the current status of a wide range
of scientific disciplines: from chemistry to engineering; from molecular biology to
mathematics; and from manufacturing processes to computational modelling. Advances
appear from all around the world and keeping abreast of what is happening is a truly
international pursuit, one likely to be beyond the capacity of any single individual or
institution. It is becoming increasingly clear that a collaborative effort is required.
Through its work over the past few years, the BWC has made significant progress in
strengthening its relationship with scientists and technologists. Recent meetings have placed
great emphasis on incorporating the views of technical experts to help develop common
understandings and promote effective action for improving the implementation of the treaty.
As a result, many technical experts across a broad range of disciplines from around the world
have made valuable contributions. Experts have been able to take part as members of national
delegations, representatives of international organizations, guests of the meeting and as nongovernmental experts. Scientists and technologists have made presentations and statements,
taken part in panel discussions and poster sessions, and have become critical components of
the day-to-day work of the treaty.
The ISU also has a role to play in strengthening such ties. It increasingly acts as a bridge
between the BWC and scientific communities: helping transmit insights on advances in
science and technology into the framework of the Convention, and providing information on
the BWC to scientists. There is potential for ever greater cooperation on a wide range of
issues associated with the Convention. The BWC's confidence-building measures (CBMs),
for example, are one area where the scientific community might have much to contribute,
both to the design of the system, and to its successful operation.
In the past, BWC review conferences have examined how scientific advances might affect the
scope of the treaty. Could developments in science or technology enable new types of, or
ways to acquire, biological weapons? As a result, the Final Declarations of past review
conferences have clarified that the treaty covers all advances in the life sciences, and have
identified developments of particular concern. The relevance of advances in the life sciences
to the BWC, however, is not confined to issues of scope. New developments in science and
technology can also affect implementation of other aspects of the treaty. For example, they
can provide new options for detecting and diagnosing disease outbreaks, including those
deliberately instigated. They can lead to new prophylactics and treatments, reducing the
impact of an attack and possibly the utility and desirability of the weapons themselves. They
could also possibly open up new avenues for strengthening the treaty, for example, by the
creation of sensitive, accurate and reliable verification technologies. It will be important that
-5both our efforts at the review conference and any process that might emerge from it have the
flexibility to cover all the aspects of the relationship between science and technology and the
BWC.
The Seventh Review Conference
The Seventh Review Conference, which will be held at the United Nations Office in Geneva
from 5 to 22 December 2011, is of particular importance to the BWC. These meetings, which
occur every five years, review the treaty’s operation, examine relevant scientific and
technological developments and determine the future direction of the Convention and its
programme of work. We will look back at what we have achieved, and forward to what we
wish to accomplish in the next five years.
Preparations for the review conference are already well under way. In April, we held a
Preparatory Committee to agree many of administrative details, clearing the deck for
substantive discussions in December. Much thinking has already taken place. There have
been informal events held around the world to consider what the review conference should do.
These efforts started with an event in the United Kingdom last September. That was followed
by meetings in China, Switzerland, Germany, the Philippines – and we are now continuing
the discussion here in Malaysia. Other events are planned for Africa, Latin America and the
Netherlands later in the year. Discussions so far have highlighted seven areas likely to be
explored by the review conference:

A new work programme for the BWC – on what and how should member states take
their efforts forward? Should we create a series of thematic working groups to
increase flexibility and facilitate the continuation of efforts between official meetings?
Who should be involved?

Annual exchanges of information – how best to improve the BWC's Confidence
Building Measures reporting system? Are there specific reforms that we can already
agree in December? Will we need a continuing process to examine more fundamental
changes?

Relevant advances in science and technology – there seems to be broad agreement on
the need for a more structured, regular way of monitoring scientific developments and
assessing their significance for the treaty. What format would best fit the nature of the
BWC? Should we make use of a standing advisory panel or create a more flexible,
multi-stakeholder process?

The future of the Implementation Support Unit – what institutional support do
member states need to continue their work? How should the Unit evolve to best
support the efforts of the member states to fully implement the Convention?

Cooperation and assistance – how can we improve the way member states work
together and with their international partners in building capacity and promoting the
peaceful uses of biological science and technology? Do we need some sort of focal
point or mechanism to coordinate such efforts?

Compliance and verification – what, if anything, can be done to ensure that member
states are complying with their obligations and properly implementing the treaty?
-6How do we approach this issue in a practical, de-politicised way that produces
tangible security benefits for all the international community? Is this something that
can be dealt with effectively in December, or do we need to create some additional
space to consider this issue?

Universalization – how to increase treaty membership, which at 164 members lags
behind other important security treaties? Who is going to undertake which tasks? How
are we to improve coordination and add value to efforts to increase membership?
Views on some of these issues are more developed than on others. Some of these issues
present no great problems of principle or politics: we will need only to settle the details (and
perhaps find the necessary financial resources). Others, such as compliance and verification,
are more sensitive and will require all member states to show flexibility, resourcefulness and
innovation. We must be realistic about what we can achieve. However, the messages I have
heard so far are largely positive. I am convinced that we will be able to make considerable
progress across the full scope of the treaty. We must not shy away from reaching for success.
We must be ambitious if we are to make most of the opportunities which are presented to us.
For this reason, I have advocated an approach of ambitious realism.
A community dedicated to safe, secure and beneficial biotechnology
I would like to take this opportunity to emphasise the importance of the role all of you can
play in the BWC. It does not matter whether you come from the public or private sector,
whether you are a practising scientist, a safety or security expert, or involved with biodefence
programmes. Your efforts are vital to ensure that the life sciences do not become the death
sciences. The BWC community may not be very large but it is certainly dedicated. Reaching
out, through forums such as this, to those that drive biotechnology is critical to efforts to
prevent their misuse. The BWC community must engage more frequently and more
constructively. All of us here in Kuala Lumpur have closely aligned interests and face similar
risks and threats. I believe there is a real opportunity for us to help each other.
I am particularly keen to ensure we work even harder to engage the private sector. I am
convinced that there is much that we can still learn from the biotechnology industry. Those
that translate advances in science into real world applications can provide insights not only on
where future risks may come from but also where our future defences might lie. They can
help us ensure that our international and domestic efforts are flexible enough not to unduly
hamper commercial enterprise, but are robust enough to prevent others misusing the life
sciences or biotechnology to cause deliberate harm. The pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries underpin health and agricultural initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region and around
the world, improving the health and quality of life of many of the most vulnerable people. As
we in the BWC community work together to strengthen our security, we can also build
capacity to improve public, animal and plant health. The biotechnology sector can be a
powerful ally for the BWC in this, and conversely, the BWC can help industry. The BWC
provides an international forum where an increasingly diverse network of influential
individuals work together to leverage advances in the life sciences for our collective good.
The way forward
Our task now is to encourage and facilitate collaboration. We must ensure our networks
continue to grow. We need to build ties, not just domestically but internationally as well. We
-7must also redouble our efforts to focus on practical action. I believe there is now an excellent
opportunity for greater and more visible engagement in BWC activities. We can work with
new partners in a flexible, mutually beneficial way.
I believe that there are a number of practical issues which would really benefit from
contributions by the community represented in this room. For example, we must:

Continue to develop and apply biosafety and biosecurity best practices and standards
around the world;

Increase awareness among life scientists and other staff on the risks of misuse of
biology;

Commit to building laboratory, diagnostic, public health and disease response
capacities in the developing world;

Foster an environment which generates the very best expert advice on proportionate,
practical and cost-effective measures to manage biological risks and threats.
There are already success stories in these areas. The advances made in establishing a global
biosafety and biosecurity community over the last few years have been most impressive.
Virtually the entire globe is now covered by national and regional associations, and recently
the community has established a global presence with the creation of the International
Federation of Biosafety Associations. I am delighted that today we will see the launch of the
Malaysian Biosafety and Biosecurity Association, and I warmly congratulate all those
involved in creating this important step for developing and strengthening the biosafety and
biosecurity communities in Malaysia.
Equally, there are a number of educational efforts, such as the Educational Module Resources
produced by the University of Bradford, which provide practising scientists with the
necessary resources to be able to train the next generation in how to approach dual-use issues.
Innovative partnerships between countries are already strengthening capacity. For example,
cooperation between the governments of Indonesia and Norway resulted in the construction
of the new BSL3 high containment laboratory at the Eijkman Institute in Jakarta.
These are also areas where several pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies already
have a good story to tell. We believe they should tell it: to inspire industry colleagues, to
inform and reassure governments, to add to corporate social responsibility credentials, and to
communicate opportunities for cooperation and coordination with other actors. AstraZeneca,
for example, has led the way with its SHE Supporting Global Standard on Biosafety and its
innovative internal training module on dual-use issues in biological research. At the industry
association level, the International Association Synthetic Biology has adopted a code of
conduct for gene synthesis and the International Gene Synthesis Consortium has adopted a
similar "harmonised screening protocol" for gene sequence and customer screening. There is
a tremendous opportunity for similar initiatives, and I encourage you all to consider steps
your own organizations might take. The BWC community is ready to listen to you, and to
help.
-8In conclusion
I would like to reiterate that as we prepare for the Seventh Review Conference, and as we
begin any work programme to follow, the BWC needs you. All those gathered here at this
event have a clear role to play in preventing the acquisition and use of biological weapons. I
am confident that the discussions we will have here in Kuala Lumpur will illustrate the
importance of drawing more heavily on this wider community.
I encourage all of you to come to the Review Conference, to contribute your views – either
directly, or through your institutions, governments or associations – and to share the task of
building a successful future for the effective control of biological risks and threats. As the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, said in 2008: "Governments alone
cannot confront the risks posed by biological weapons ... to manage the full spectrum of
biological risks – from naturally-occurring diseases, accidents and negligence to terrorism
and the deliberate use of biological weapons – you need a cohesive, coordinated network of
activities and resources. Such a network will help to ensure that biological science and
technology can be safely and securely developed for the benefit of all".
I am convinced that we share a belief that the BWC deserves our undiminished support and
that we need to further strengthen its regime. So I encourage you to get involved, join our
community, help us build the network and support our common interests of safely and
securely developing biological science and technology for the benefit of all – in Malaysia, in
the Asia-Pacific, and worldwide. The BWC, and everything its stands for, is worth it.
Thank you, and I wish you a productive and stimulating discussion over the next two days.
________