Cuba---Condition
Shell
1NC Cuba Condition CP
Text: The United States federal government should _________ if, and only
if, Cuba agrees to release Alan Gross.
Solvency
QPQ on economic engagement for Gross’s release solves
Piccone 12/10/12 – (Ted, “WHAT ROLES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE NEW CUBAN ECONOMY?” The Brookings Institute, Senior Fellow and Deputy
Director, Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute, Available online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/12/10%20cuba/20121210_cuban_ec
onomy.pdf)
SPEAKER: Thank you. Back to the stalemate in which we now find ¶ ourselves with the
Alan Gross case. There is growing pressure on Cuba to release Alan ¶ Gross. And good; we
all want to see him released. But there’s going to have to be some ¶ kind of quid
pro quo . And of course, not the Cuban 5 for Alan Gross; that’s not going to ¶ work. But
what about some kind of economic arrangement that the U.S. would come up ¶
with to facilitate engagement as the quid pro quo? They want to increase trade, ¶
economic relations with us, and this would work in that direction. Isn’t there some -- so ¶
far it’s really disappointing with the United States insisting that Alan Gross be released
or ¶ there won’t be any movement, there won’t be any improvement in U.S.-Cuban
relations. ¶ But you don’t see the United States making any effort to come up
with some quid pro ¶ quo , some arrangement that would lead to his release. We
need to do that, but we can ¶ do it in such a way that would facilitate economic
relations between the two , if would ¶ seem to me. ¶ MR. FEINBERG: Yeah, terrific
questions all around. Maybe I’ll leave it ¶ to Ted to mainly handle the Alan Gross question
Conditioning engagement on Gross release ensures strong
bilateral relations
Herrero 12/27/12 – (Ricardo, “Getting Serious about Alan Gross” The Huffington
Post, Ricardo Herrero is Deputy Executive Director of the Cuba Study Group, Available
online @ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ricardo-herrero/getting-serious-aboutala_b_2370767.html)
Earlier this month, USAID subcontractor Alan Gross began his fourth year in a Cuban prison. Ever since his
incarceration, a debate has raged over whether the United States should halt further
efforts to engage with the Cuban people until the Cuban government releases Gross. Both
Alan and his wife Judy have repeatedly called on the U.S. and Cuba to engage in a dialogue without preconditions. Sadly,
like all things Cuba-related, the debate over Gross' incarceration has since devolved into an ideological three-ring circus
where finding a solution has become a secondary objective behind not appearing to be making concessions to the enemy.¶
The Washington Post perfectly captured the tone deafness of the current debate in a recent editorial: " better
relations between Cuba and the United States must be conditioned on
real steps
toward democratization by Havana. But until Mr. Gross is release d, they ought to get worse." This position
reflects exactly the sort of stale, inside-the-box thinking that has long plagued the discourse over U.S.-Cuba policy.¶ For
years we've known that the Cuban government is incredibly adept at manipulating U.S. policy choices. Time and again,
any attempt by the U.S. to increase its engagement with the Cuban people has been met with confrontation and repression
by Cuban officials, which in turn emboldens hardliners in the U.S. to call for the tightening economic sanctions. This
pattern has become all too predictable, and the Gross case is its latest example: arrested in Havana for bringing
communication devices to the island less than three months after President Obama relaxed family travel and remittance
restrictions in 2009 and only two weeks after the U.S. House held hearings on lifting the Cuba travel ban for all
Americans. In response to Gross' arrest, U.S. hardliners blocked any further normalization
efforts in Congress, though they weren't able to stop the Obama Administration from further loosening restrictions
on people-to-people travel and remittances in January, 2011. Shortly thereafter, Gross was sentenced to 15 years in
prison.¶ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said "It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to
the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for
what hasn't happened in Cuba in the last 50 years." If we believe this to be the case, then why don't we use this insight to
steer our efforts in securing the release of Alan Gross?¶ The Cubans have often stated that they are willing to swap Gross
for five Cuban spies who were arrested in Florida in 1998 for infiltrating a U.S. Navy base and several anti-Castro groups
in Miami. The U.S. has refused to accept the swap, and the negotiations have remained stalled for almost three years.¶ So
what can be done? There are three opportunities for securing Gross' release that could also help
improve relations between the U.S. and Cuba:¶ 1. Introduce alternative terms to the negotiation. The
Cubans have dictated the terms of the negotiation from day one, and hardliners in the U.S. government have seemingly
been too happy to play along. However, just because the U.S. won't agree to the spy swap doesn't mean negotiations
should stop there. U.S. sanctions on Cuba remain a decades-old morass of congressional actions, presidential directives
and executive orders, resulting in an entrenched and inflexible foreign policy that is as incoherent as it is ineffective.
There are plenty of outdated sanctions on the books that the United States could repeal
or amend in exchange for Gross' release .¶ 2. Pursue Gross' release and economic engagement
concurrently. In 2011, the Obama Administration announced a shift in the focus of U.S.-Cuba policy toward empowering
civil society and supporting independent economic activity. If Cuba's burgeoning private sector is to grow
into a viable alternative to the Island's top-down economic system, it will need a deeper
economic relationship with the American private sector. By conditioning all further
efforts to engage with the Cuban people on Gross' release , we are playing by
the rules of those who benefit from the prolonged confrontation and mutual isolation
between the two countries. Denying these private individuals an economic relationship with the United States
only serves to further delay the kind of changes that policies like Helms-Burton were ill-designed to accelerate.¶ 3. Look to
the Angel Carromero case as a model. We don't know what deal the Spanish government struck with the Cubans to secure
the release of Angel Carromero, the Popular Party's pro-democracy activist who was charged with the negligent homicide
of Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero and will now serve his sentence in Spain. What is clear is that through direct
diplomacy, the Spanish have been far more successful at liberating political prisoners, democracy advocates, and
businessmen from Cuban jails than any other country, all while promoting democracy inside the island through direct
support to pro-democracy groups. On the other hand, our confrontational approach has only perpetuated the conflict
without any progress to show for it.¶ The United Nations recently condemned Cuba's arbitrary detention of Alan Gross for
the first time and the U.S. Embargo on Cuba for the 21st year in a row. By pivoting negotiations for Gross's
release away from a spy-swap and toward win-win alternatives, both the United States and Cuba
stand to gain credibility within the international community. The United States could
finally pave the road to a future where it can lead an effective multilateral policy toward
Cuba focused on the advancement of human rights and helping the Cuban people. Just as
importantly, Alan would finally come home.
Conditioning the bill on Gross release is best
Rush 5/9/13 – (Bobby, “RUSH REINTRODUCES LEGISLATION URGING
CONGRESS TO LIFT TRADE EMBARGO ON CUBA” House.gov, Bobby Rush is a
current Congressman, Available online @ http://rush.house.gov/pressrelease/thursday-may-9-2013-rush-reintroduces-legislation-urging-congress-lift-tradeembargo)
Congressman Bobby L. Rush reintroduced legislation to lift trade restrictions on Cuba.
Improved U.S. relations with Cuba have been a longtime goal of Congressman Rush and this
legislation follows in the footsteps of the United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act that he initially introduced in 2009.
¶ Specifically, Rush’s current legislation lifts the embargo, travel and parcel restrictions,
normalizes trade relations, and removes Cuba from the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list.
The key component of Rush’s bill calls for the release of Alan Phillip Gross , a
U.S. international development professional arrested in Cuba in December 2009, and
makes
implementation of this legislation contingent on the Cuba governments
compliance.¶ “Lifting the trade embargo with Cuba is long overdue,” said Rush. “Cuba has a
rich history and is a close neighboring country that offers access to cultural growth and learning for many Americans. We
have shut the door on our two nations coming together to work to build a strong alliance.
Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States and the continuation of the embargo on trade between the two countries
declared in 1962 is not fulfilling the purpose for which it was established. We are the only nation in the
Western Hemisphere that still maintains an embargo and its removal is long overdue.Ӧ
Rush’s bill asks for a major point of contention between the countries to come to end by
asking for the release of Alan Phillip Gross . Gross was arrested while in Cuba working as a U.S.
government subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of a program funded under
the 1996 Helms-Burton Act. He was prosecuted in 2011 after being accused of crimes against the Cuban state for bringing
satellite phones and computer equipment to members of Cuba’s Jewish community without the permit required under
Cuban law. After being accused of working for American intelligence services in January 2010, he was ultimately convicted
for “acts against the independence or the territorial integrity of the state" in March 2011, and is currently
serving a 15-year prison sentence in Cuba
AT: Aff Args
Say Yes
Increased pressure and QPQ means Cuba caves in
Piccone 12/10/12 – (Ted, “WHAT ROLES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE NEW CUBAN ECONOMY?” The Brookings Institute, Senior Fellow and Deputy
Director, Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute, Available online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/12/10%20cuba/20121210_cuban_ec
onomy.pdf)
On the negative sides, pretty much since then any further progress has ¶ been frozen
largely because of the arrest of a USAID contractor named Alan Gross -- I’m ¶ sure you’ve
heard of this case -- which is getting a tremendous amount of attention lately. ¶ And I
don’t know if anyone has been noticing, but the U.S. Senate just adopted a ¶ resolution
condemning the arrest, calling for his immediate release. Secretary Clinton ¶ has just
issued a videotape Q&A in which she calls Alan Gross a political prisoner. The ¶ U.N.
working group on arbitrary detention has declared the detention of Alan Gross to be ¶
arbitrary and that he should be released. And folks here in Washington, particularly on ¶
the Hill who were moderately open or friends of a new approach to Cuba, are starting to
¶ turn away from that position. And so I think the pressure is really on Cuba to
start looking ¶ differently at this case. ¶ Up until now it’s been a matter of trying to get a
swap going with five ¶ Cubans who were arrested in the United States and tried on
espionage charges and ¶ have in some of those cases very long prison terms still to serve.
And this has been ¶ tabled for some time now as a possible exchange, which I think for
most of us who have ¶ worked in the U.S. government and understand the way our legal
system works, it’s really ¶ not in the cards. And Secretary Clinton made that very clear in
her last interview. CUBA-2012/12/10 ¶ ANDERSON COURT REPORTING ¶ 706 Duke
Street, Suite 100 ¶ Alexandria, VA 22314 ¶ Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 ¶ 25¶
So I think the pressure is on to come up with some new formulas to get ¶ past this case. I
think both governments recognize that they’ve dug themselves into a ¶ hole ,
painted themselves into a corner and need to get out of it, and the economic ¶
opportunities probably provide a way out of this dilemma because I think if you look
at it ¶ from the point of view of traditional U.S. policy of trying to support change in
Cuba, the ¶ economic reforms are really an effort, a possibility to empower the Cuban
people to ¶ become more independent of the state. And this is certainly within U.S.
interest, ¶ proclaimed interest. ¶ So I think there is an opportunity given the state
of the Cuban economy ¶ and the assistance that they need, and the United States’
own policy goals in supporting ¶ the Cuban people, to set forth a whole set of steps that
the president could take under his ¶ executive authority, would not require congressional
action but would allow the president ¶ to set forth a number of measures, for example,
supporting the small business ¶ community by allowing U.S. businesses and citizens to
interact with them directly through ¶ technical assistance, through pooled remittances,
through actual trade that we could buy ¶ products from companies, small businesses that
are certified to be small businesses ¶ independent of the state. There are a number of
things that could be done to support ¶ that sector and have ramifications more broadly
for -- positive ramifications for our policy ¶ goals. So I wanted to mention those ideas as
well.
Cuba will say yes to the condition
Sweig 2/28/12 – (Julia, “The Frozen US-Cuba Relationship” Nelson and David
Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, Available online @
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/frozen-us-cuba-relationship/p27510)
Fifty years after the United States enacted an embargo on all trade and commercial transactions with Cuba, relations
between the two countries remain at a standstill. Julia E. Sweig, CFR's director of Latin American studies, says the Obama
administration has prioritized domestic politics over foreign policy in its relationship with Cuba, even as Cuban President
Raul Castro has been "moving in the direction of the kind of reforms that every administration over the last fifty years has
called upon Cuba to make." The case of American USAID contractor Alan Gross, currently serving a fifteen-year prison
sentence in Cuba (CubanTriangle) on charges of attempting to upend the regime through a U.S.-authorized democracy
promotion program, has also heightened tensions, she says. Meanwhile, Sweig adds, Cuba is strengthening ties with global
powers like Brazil, as well as the Catholic Church, as the Castro administration seeks to open up new economic and social
spaces for its citizens.¶ We've passed the fifty-year mark of the breakdown of diplomatic ties between Cuba and the United
States. Where do we stand now? Is normalizing relations even remotely on the table on either side?¶ Let me start by
talking about three geographical points on the map that are relevant to the answer. In Washington, the Obama
administration, consistent with the approach of the Bush administration, has made a political decision to subordinate
foreign policy and national interest-based decisions to domestic politics with respect to its Cuba policy. There is a
bipartisan group of members of Congress--Democrats and Republicans, House and Senate--who represent Florida, a state
where there are many swing votes that deliver the electoral votes for any president. Those individuals not only deliver
votes, but they deliver campaign finance, and generally make a lot of noise, and that combination has persuaded the White
House that reelection is more of a priority than taking on the heavy lifting to set the United States on the path of
normalization with Cuba for now.¶ "Brazil is clearly stepping into a space where the United States should be, and the
United States has made a decision to watch as that happens."¶ The second point is what's happening in Cuba. It's not
realistic to expect the United States to undertake a series of unilateral moves toward
normalization; it needs a willing partner . I believe we have one in Havana but have
failed to read the signals . Raul Castro has now been in office since the beginning of 2008. Raul holds the
reins on both foreign policy and domestic policy, and, domestically, the politics of implementing a fairly wide range of
economic and political and social reforms are his priority. In a deal that was coordinated with the help of
the Cuban Catholic Church and Spain, he released all of the political prisoners in Cuba.
He also is taking a number of steps that imply a major rewriting of the social contract in
Cuba to shrink the size of the state and give Cuban individuals more freedom-economically, especially, but also in terms of speech--than we've seen in the last fifty years. He has
privatized the residential real estate and car market[s], expanded much-needed agrarian reform, lifted caps on salaries,
and greatly expanded space for small businesses. He also is moving to deal with corruption and to
prepare the groundwork for a great deal more foreign investment. He's moving in the
direction of the kind of reforms that every administration over the last fifty years has
called upon Cuba to make, albeit under the rubric of a one-party system. There's a broad range of cooperation-neighborhood security in the Gulf of Mexico, as Cuba has just started drilling for oil, counternarcotics, and natural
disasters--between the two countries that is still not happening, and that gives me the impression that the United
States has been unwilling to take "yes" for an answer and respond positively
to steps taken by Cuba .¶ The third geographic part of the story is south Florida. When they're polled, the
majority of Cuban-Americans say that the embargo has failed, and support lifting the travel ban or loosening the embargo
or some steps along that continuum of liberalization and normalization. The one most significant step that Obama did
take when he took office was to eliminate the restriction on Cuban-American travel and remittances to Cuba. CubanAmericans are now voting with their feet. If you go to the Miami airport, you will see thirty, forty flights to Cuba a week
just out of Miami. Cuban-Americans are now investing in their families' small businesses on the island. The politics of this
are strange because we are told by the Obama administration that we can't rock the boat of the Cuban-American vote, but
those very voters are in fact demonstrating that they support a radically different set of policies than, in fact, the Obama
administration has supported.¶ The ongoing case of USAID contractor Alan Gross (AP) has stoked tensions between the
United States and Cuba. At the heart of the matter is the U.S. democracy promotion program that authorized
Gross' travel to Cuba. What impact does this case have on U.S.-Cuba relations?¶ Precisely because we have no
overarching framework for diplomacy in place and no political will to establish it for
now, the Alan Gross case casts a huge shadow over U.S.-Cuban relations . The
heart of the issue is the context in which those [pro-democracy] programs were being implemented. We have a full-blown
economic embargo with extra-territorial dimensions that are felt in the banking and finance world--a very comprehensive
and well-enforced sanctions program. The democracy programs sound very mom and apple pie--USAID has them around
the world, its officials will tell you. But having them in Cuba is an extraordinary provocation. They were inherited from the
previous administration's concept of regime change, and under Obama, they remain largely intact. The programs are
purposely kept secret from the American public. There is no public information about the private and not-for-profit
subcontractors in the United States and around the world, and Cuban institutions and individuals who may be targets of
the programs are likewise not told they are part of such U.S. government programs. The democracy promotion programs
have been deliberately politicized in order to provoke, and they have succeeded in provoking.¶ What's key is the context.
There's been no real diplomacy; there's no negotiating framework that I've seen for a very long
period of time, and again, that has to do with domestic politics. It's
very hard to understand otherwise why
this guy's still in jail. The United States has repeatedly asked the Cuban government to
release Gross unilaterally, with no commitments on our end. Asking for unilateral
gestures, having rebuffed or ignored or failed to read the signals from Cuba, has created
this impasse. Having said that, there can be a diplomatic, humanitarian solution, and I see no value to keeping Gross
in jail and hope he will be released as soon as possible. But we will need real diplomacy and a framework
for negotiating a range of issues both countries care about.
Give-and-Take approach means Cuba says yes
CBS 2/24/13 – (Associated Press, “Senator: `Give And Take’ Needed To Free Md.
Prisoner In Cuba” Available online @
http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2013/02/24/senator-give-and-take-needed-to-free-mdprisoner-in-cuba/ )
WASHINGTON (AP) — A senator just back from Cuba says it will require “give and take on both sides”
and “quiet negotiation” to secure the release of an American man imprisoned in Cuba.¶
it’s time to re-examine the overall U.S.Cuban relationship and move on from the “Cold War mentality” of the 1960s and 1970s.¶ Leahy
met last week with Gross and raised his case during a meeting that a congressional delegation had with
Cuban President Raul Castro.¶ Gross, who’s from Maryland, is serving a 15-year-sentence for bringing communications
Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy
of Vermont says that Alan Gross isn’t going to be released by the Cuban government because of pressure from the United States.¶ Leahy tells CNN’s “State of the Union” that
equipment to the island illegally while on a USAID-funded democracy-building program.
Cuba has agreed to free Gross in return for economic programs
in the past, but the US pulled out at the last minute
Tamayo 1/7/13 – (Juan, “Sen. John Kerry reportedly met with Cuban officials over
Alan Gross” McClatchy News, Available online @
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/01/07/179138/sen-john-kerry-reportedlymet.html#.Udh4Zvm1Fsk)
Sen. John Kerry, nominated as the next secretary of state, held a secret meeting with
Cuba’s foreign minister in 2010 in a failed bid to win the release of jailed USAID
subcontractor Alan Gross, according to a published report.¶ A senior state department
official also met in secret with Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez to discuss the Gross
case, but the foreign minister lectured the U.S. official for an hour, added the report in
the respected magazine Foreign Affairs.¶ José Cardenas, a former top official at the U.S.
Agency for International Development, wrote that the article amounted to a “lesson on
the folly of attempting to appease dictators.Ӧ A knowledgeable Senate aide also
challenged the article’s description of the role that Fulton Armstrong, a senior staffer in
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and former CIA analyst, played in the campaign
to free Gross.¶ Gross was arrested in Havana in late 2009 and sentenced to 15 years for
giving Cuban Jews sophisticated communications equipment paid for by USAID’s “prodemocracy” programs, outlawed by Cuba as designed to bring about “regime change.”
His continued detention has been a key block in efforts to improve U.S.-Cuba relations.¶
The report authored by R.M Schneiderman, an editor at Newsweek, includes previously
unknown details of a U.S. effort to win Gross’ freedom by cutting back funding for the
pro-democracy programs and making them less provocative to Cuba.¶ In September of
2010, Spanish government officials helped arrange a secret meeting between thenAssistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela and Rodríguez to discuss a possible
release of Gross, according to Schneiderman.¶ “The Cubans were far less flexible than the
Americans expected. The U.S. … wanted Cuba to release Gross, and only then would it
press ahead on any other policy changes,” he wrote. “Rodríguez allegedly lectured
Valenzuela for roughly an hour on Cuba’s history of grievances.”¶ A month later, at the
request of Cuban diplomats in Washington and with State Department approval, Kerry
met with Rodríguez at the home of Cuba’s ambassador to the United Nations in New
York, according to the report.¶ “There was no quid pro quo, but the meeting seemed to
reassure the Cubans that the democracy programs would change, and the Cubans
expressed confidence” that Gross would be freed after his trial, which was held in March
of 2011, the report noted.¶ President Barack Obama has nominated Kerry, a
Massachusetts Democrat and backer of improving relations with Cuba, to succeed
Hillary Clinton. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Kerry chairs, is
expected to easily approve the nomination.¶ Schneiderman wrote that in early 2010, the
State Department and USAID asked Armstrong, who had long criticized the programs as
inefficient and wasteful, to help them make the programs less offensive to Havana —
hoping Cuba might then free Gross.¶ And that summer, “at State’s behest,” Armstrong
began meeting with officials at the Cuban diplomatic mission in Washington to tell them
about the changes that were being made to the programs, Schneiderman wrote.¶ “We
said, ‘Look, message received,’ ” he quoted Armstrong as saying. “‘These [programs]
are stupid. We’re cleaning them up. Just give us time, because politically we can’t kill
them.’” The Cubans seemed appreciative. “We asked them, ‘ Will this help you
release Alan Gross?’ ” Armstrong went on. “And the answer was yes .’”¶ But Sen.
Bob Menendez, a powerful Cuban American Democrat from New Jersey, stepped in to
defend the programs in the spring of 2011 and persuaded the White House to roll back
most of the changes, Schneiderman wrote.¶ Havana grew chary at the same
time , he added, as Raúl Castro faced domestic opposition to his economic reforms and
a U.S. jury acquitted Luis Posada Carriles, a Cuban exile blamed for several Havana
bombings, of lying to U.S. immigration officials.¶ “Mired in mistrust and miscalculation,
each side seemed to be waiting for the other to blink,” he wrote. “Eventually,
however, the United States appeared to step back from an opportunity to free
Gross from jail and strike a blow against the antiquated politics of the Cold War … The
Cuban-American lobby had won.”
Cuba will say yes to a QPQ
AP 9/12/12 – (“Cuba prepared to negotiate fate of jailed American Alan Gross” Fox
News, Written by the Associated Press, Available online @
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/09/12/cuba-prepared-to-negotiate-fate-jailedamerican-alan-gross/)
HAVANA – A senior Cuban diplomat said Wednesday her country is prepared to negotiate a
solution in the case of a jailed American contractor, but is awaiting a U.S. response.¶
Foreign Ministry official Josefina Vidal also rejected allegations by the wife of 63-year-old Maryland native Alan Gross
that her husband's health is failing after more than 2 1/2 years in custody.¶ "Cuba reiterates its willingness to
talk with the United States government to find a solution in the case of Mr. Gross and
continues to await an answer," Vidal, who heads the ministry's Office of North American Affairs, said in a
statement sent to The Associated Press.¶ She gave no details. It was the first time a Cuban official has hinted that a specific
proposal has been made and indicated that the ball was in Washington's court.¶ Previously, senior officials in
President Raul Castro's government have raised the case of five Cuban agents sentenced to long jail terms in the United
States, though they have not spelled out publicly that they are seeking an exchange.¶ U.S. officials say privately,
however, that Havana has made it increasingly clear they want a quid pro quo, something
Washington has repeatedly rejected.¶ Gross's wife, Judy, traveled to Cuba and visited her husband in custody several times
last week. She said upon her return to the United States that she feared he would not survive his ordeal.¶ Gross, who was
obese when he was arrested in December 2009, has lost more than 100 pounds in custody. His wife and lawyer say he also
suffers from arthritis and has developed a mass behind his right shoulder blade that is not believed to be cancerous.¶ Vidal
said the American's physical condition is fine.¶ "Mr. Gross's health continues to be normal and he exercises regularly," she
said in the brief statement.¶ Gross was working on a USAID-funded democracy building program when he was arrested at
Havana's Jose Marti airport. He says he was only trying to provide internet service to the island's small Jewish
community.¶ Cuba says the multimillion dollar programs are an effort by Washington to undermine the government, and
has noted that Gross was carrying sophisticated communications equipment.¶ Gross was sentenced to 15 years, and has
lost his final appeal, leaving him out of legal options.
AT: Perm Both
Unilateral engagement makes Cuba unwilling to compromise
Latell 4/28/9 – (Brian, “Beware of Unilateral Concessions” CIA National
Intelligence Officer of Latin America, Available online @
http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2009/04/beware-of-unilateral-concessions.html)
observation from the CIA's former National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, Brian
Latell, in today's Miami Herald:¶ ¶ Regional demands for the end of the U.S. economic
embargo, readmission of Cuba to the OAS and an end to the years of hostility have
become deafening. Innumerable calls have also been heard from leading members of
Congress, influential Washington think tanks and commentators of many stripes who
argue that the time finally has come for the impasse with Cuba to end. From Castro's
perspective at least, unilateral concessions by Washington, such as lifting the travel
ban or all of the embargo, now seem within the realm of the possible. With so much now
converging in Cuba's and his favor, Fidel sees no need to make compromises.
AT: Spy Trade
US will not trade 5 spies for Gross
Tamayo 7/6/13 – (Juan, “Secretary of State: No swap of Cuban spies for Alan
Gross” The Miami Herald, Available online @
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/18/3352048/secretary-of-state-no-swapof.html)
Secretary of State John Kerry has declared the U.S. government will not swap five Cuban
spies held in the United States for American Alan Gross, serving a 15-year prison term in Havana, but
is pushing to win his release as a “humanitarian gesture.”¶ “They were and have been attempting to trade
Alan Gross for the five spies that are in prison here in the U.S., and we’ve refused to do
that because there’s no equivalency,” Kerry testified Wednesday before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee.¶ “Alan Gross is wrongly imprisoned, and we’re not going to trade as if it’s spy for
spy,” Kerry added in response to a question from Rep. Albio Sires, a Cuban-American Democrat from New Jersey.¶ But
the U.S. government is “trying to find whether there is a humanitarian capacity or not” in Cuba to free Gross, a
subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development.¶ Kerry did not detail those efforts but noted he himself
had tried to help Gross before he became secretary of state in February, and Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont, visited Cuba
recently, met with Gross, “and talked to the government.”
US says no to spy trade - only economic engagement is a mutual
condition
Herrero 12/27/12 – (Ricardo, “Getting Serious about Alan Gross” The Huffington
Post, Ricardo Herrero is Deputy Executive Director of the Cuba Study Group, Available
online @ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ricardo-herrero/getting-serious-aboutala_b_2370767.html)
So what can be done? There are three opportunities for securing Gross' release that could also help improve relations
between the U.S. and Cuba:¶ 1. Introduce alternative terms to the negotiation. The Cubans have dictated the terms of the
negotiation from day one, and hardliners in the U.S. government have seemingly been too happy to play along. However,
just because the U.S. won't agree to the spy swap doesn't mean negotiations
should stop there. U.S. sanctions on Cuba remain a decades-old morass of congressional actions, presidential
directives and executive orders, resulting in an entrenched and inflexible foreign policy that is as incoherent as it is
ineffective. There are plenty of outdated sanctions on the books that the United States could
repeal or amend in exchange for Gross' release.¶ 2. Pursue Gross' release and economic engagement
concurrently. In 2011, the Obama Administration announced a shift in the focus of U.S.-Cuba policy toward empowering
civil society and supporting independent economic activity. If Cuba's burgeoning private sector is to grow into a viable
alternative to the Island's top-down economic system, it will need a deeper economic relationship with the American
private sector. By conditioning all further efforts to engage with the Cuban people on Gross' release, we are playing by the
rules of those who benefit from the prolonged confrontation and mutual isolation between the two countries. Denying
these private individuals an economic relationship with the United States only serves to further delay the kind of changes
that policies like Helms-Burton were ill-designed to accelerate.¶ 3. Look to the Angel Carromero case as a model. We don't
know what deal the Spanish government struck with the Cubans to secure the release of Angel Carromero, the Popular
Party's pro-democracy activist who was charged with the negligent homicide of Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero and will
now serve his sentence in Spain. What is clear is that through direct diplomacy, the Spanish have been far more successful
at liberating political prisoners, democracy advocates, and businessmen from Cuban jails than any other country, all while
promoting democracy inside the island through direct support to pro-democracy groups. On the other hand, our
confrontational approach has only perpetuated the conflict without any progress to show for it.¶ The United Nations
recently condemned Cuba's arbitrary detention of Alan Gross for the first time and the U.S. Embargo on Cuba for the 21st
year in a row. By
pivoting negotiations for Gross's release away from a spy-
swap and toward win-win alternatives, both the United States and Cuba stand to gain
credibility within the international community. The United States could finally pave the road to a future
where it can lead an effective multilateral policy toward Cuba focused on the advancement of human rights and helping
the Cuban people. Just as importantly, Alan would finally come home.
AT: Keeping Gross Good
Costs outweigh benefits to detaining Gross for Cuba
Alfonso 12/24/12 – (Haroldo, “Cuba: What to do About Alan Gross?” The Havana
Times, Available online @ http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=84034)
HAVANA TIMES — Alan Gross should be released soon and unilaterally. Not because
he’s innocent or because he’s some martyr of democracy, because obviously he’s not.¶ His
case involves an agent employed by a hostile foreign government to engage in illegal
operations in Cuba. His actions were in line with a US law (the embargo) whose
repudiation today is one of the issues with the greatest consensus around the globe.¶ This
was within the framework of an interventionist program that as a Cuban I oppose,
because I reject everything that turns the US or any other foreign country into a domestic
political actor beyond what is essential in this globalized and asymmetric world.¶
Speaking directly, Alan Gross should be released because that would be a very low cost
but high impact gesture for generating understanding with the United States. This is
because Cuba desperately needs a normal access to the US market, tourists and
capital to boost its faltering economy.¶ Cuba also needs a normal political
relationship with the US . Though this would have all the contradictions and
conflicts that are expected of such an unequal relationship, it needs open channels for
communications and negotiations.¶ If to achieve this, to begin exchanging steps in the
lukewarm minuet proposed by Obama in his second term, Mr. Gross will have to be
taken to the airport. It’s time to do so.¶ To raise this issue to the level of the five
imprisoned spies (The Cuban Five) seems a serious mistake, and also a sign of political
immaturity. There’s no comparison between a network of spies, some of whom have
been credited with the loss of human lives, and the case of Alan Gross.¶ This is especially
when we know that these Cuban agents, who have lost significant portions of their lives
locked up, were political pieces sacrificed by Fidel Castro to maintain policies to keep
alive his exhausting nationalist campaign after the return of Elian Gonzalez.¶ Cuba has
spies imprisoned in the US with many more stripes and records than the “five heroes in
the empire” about which nothing is said, simply because in the world of espionage the
rule is to look to the side and find surreptitious solutions.¶ This isn’t a personal position. I
think the American government would be doing itself a favor and one for all of us if it
were to take steps towards returning the Cuban Five to the island. But it’s also time that
the Cuban government understand that their relationship with the US is asymmetric.¶
Faced with this asymmetry, what is required is an intelligent policy that sets aside the
typical bravado of a schoolyard bully to make way for a constructive and negotiated
policy about the real reasons behind the dispute.¶ Again, Cuba requires access to the US
market and to guarantee its national integrity through negotiations, which today are
exposed to great fragility given in its dependence on Venezuelan oil, and the
militarization and internal repression at home.¶ If it is needed to release Alan Gross to
obtain a nation whose sovereignty rests in the national consensus, on the prosperity of
its inhabitants, and the full dignity of its people, then Cuban leaders should put aside
their neutered machismo, and release him.¶ I repeat: Having Alan Gross in prison
is more costly and less promising than releasing him . Keeping him locked up is
to continue pursuing the bad politics of the anti-imperialist show. Good politics suggests
taking him to Havana’s Jose Marti International Airport tomorrow.
AT: Unilateral Action Better
Unilateral American Concessions impirically legitimize Castros
regime to end pro-democracy activists
Newsmax 4/13/9 – (“GOP Lawmakers: Obama's Cuba Policy Helps Castro
Regime” Newsmax Independent News, Available online @
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/obama-cuba-castroregime/2009/12/14/id/342167)
GOP lawmakers most familiar with Cuba criticized President Obama’s decision Monday
to allow more travel by Cuban-Americans to the island, warning that it could end up
buttressing the island’s ailing Communist regime with a huge infusion of American
dollars.¶ The criticism ran the gamut across the GOP, though, as some lawmakers
recognized that many Cuban-Americans long to visit families and help loved ones with
medicine, food and other needs.¶ Reps. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, R-Fla. and Mario DiazBalart, R-Fla., called Obama’s move a “serious mistake” and a reward to a dictatorship
that has recently increased its repression of pro-democracy activists. Besides lifting the
travel restrictions, Obama said he would allow Cuban-Americans to transfer money to
relatives in Cuba.¶ “President Obama has committed a serious mistake by unilaterally
increasing Cuban-American travel and remittance dollars for the Cuban dictatorship,”
the two congressmen, who are brothers, said in a joint statement.¶ “ Unilateral
concessions to the dictatorship embolden it to further isolate , imprison and
brutalize pro-democracy activists, to continue to dictate which Cubans and CubanAmericans are able to enter the island, and this unilateral concession provides
the dictatorship with critical financial support ,” the two said in their statement.¶
But U.S. Sen. Mel Martinez, who is also Cuban-American, praised Obama’s plan.¶ "It's
going to bring families together," Martinez, R-Fla., told the Associated Press. But
Martinez, too, said he was concerned some in the United States might abuse the open
door travel policy as a guise to conduct business in Cuba.¶ "It would be good if the
remittances had some boundaries. Otherwise it could be a windfall to the Cuban
government," he said.¶ "Will they now curtail the 20 percent they take on remittances?
Will they now allow more of the Cuban families who are denied permission to travel
abroad?" he asked, according to the AP.
Relations NB
1NC shell
Alan Gross freedom key to relations -- Top Officials agree
Luxner 2/24/11 – (Larry, “Gross Release Crucial to Better US-Cuba Ties” Luxner
News was founded in 1995 and covers exclusively Latin American developments,
Available online @ http://www.luxner.com/cgi-bin/view_article.cgi?articleID=1956)
The United States and Cuba won't see any improvement in their hostile relationship until
Alan Gross is freed from his Havana jail cell and allowed to come home.¶ That's the word from
Bill Richardson - former member of Congress, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Clinton administration and two-term governor of New Mexico who's just been
named U.S. envoy to the Organization of American States.¶ Richardson, speaking at a Brookings Institution seminar on Cuba last week, has been to the island three times in the past 18 months as part of troubleshooting missions that have taken
him to hot spots from North Korea to Iraq to Sudan throughout the years.¶ During his most recent trip to Cuba, in August, Richardson, who 10 years ago managed to secure the release of three prisoners from Cuba, specifically lobbied the Castro
regime to free Gross, 61, a Jewish telecommunications expert from Potomac, who was arrested in December
2009 at Havana's airport as he was about to fly out of the country.¶
"The
Cubans need to free Alan Gross," Richardson said of the man whom political analysts
have labeled a "pawn" and a "human bargaining chip" in deteriorating relations between
Washington and Havana. "He's been in
prison 14 months, his family is not well, and the charges are dubious.¶ Nonetheless, there's a legal process going on, but for humanitarian reasons,
I believe this man should be released. That should be the next step. Beyond that, there are other steps the United States should consider taking." Among them: removing Cuba from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism;
expanding cooperation on oil spills and other common environmental threats; lifting restrictions on U.S. citizens opening bank accounts for their families in Cuba; and letting U.S companies export telecom equipment to the island.¶ In fact, it was
telecom equipment that landed Gross in prison in the first place. The Cuban government insists Gross - whose company had a $690,000 contract with Bethesda-based Development Associates Inc. through the U.S. Agency for International
Development - had entered Cuba on a tourist visa and was illegally distributing satellite phones to dissidents. Both
DAI and the U.S. government counter that he was only helping
the island's tiny Jewish community get online.¶ Earlier
this month, Cuban prosecutors announced
they'd attempt to put Gross behind bars for 20 years for "actions against the independence and
territorial integrity of the state" - a euphemism for spying.¶ Reaction from both the
administration and Congress was swift and furious.¶ "We deplore the Cuban
government's announcement that Cuban prosecutors intend to seek a 20-year sentence for Alan Gross. His imprisonment without charges for more than a year is contrary to all international human rights
obligations. He should be home with his family now," Gloria Berbena, spokesperson at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, said in a statement.¶ "The news that the Castro brothers are seeking a 20-year imprisonment of Alan Gross for
distributing cell phones to the Jewish community of Havana - after he has languished in a Cuban cell without access to medical care for 14 months - is outrageous," Rep
. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-Fla.)
said in a statement.¶ "This
affront is magnified by the recent announcement by the Obama
administration that the United States will be loosening travel restrictions, which will
pump much-needed money into the desperate Cuban economy, boosting the Castro
regime."¶ Yet
Richardson said President Barack Obama is doing exactly what must be done - and that the latest development isn't necessarily bad news.¶ "On the one hand, it's good that the prosecution has moved forward with
this charge of 20 years that is totally absurd. At least the judicial process has been started," he explained in response to a question.¶ "The next step is for the courts to hand out whatever sentence emerges. My hope is that the court says 'Mr. Gross,
you can go,' and that there's a political process involved. My understanding is that after charges have been filed, the court is obligated to move fairly soon, but this case has become very significant with the American public, with the Obama
so."¶ Richardson added: "If they let Gross go, it will open a huge panoply of potential
discussions that will lead to continued progress. Without
administration, and rightly
talking about a quid pro quo, the last good move was the president's [relaxing of] travel
restrictions. Hopefully someday, there'll be a total lifting of the travel ban so everybody can go to Cuba. I believe the Cubans are moving in that direction by settling it with this charge."¶ Gross, a longtime member of Congregation Am Kolel, has
reportedly lost 90 pounds in detention, and is said to be suffering severe health problems. His daughter, Shira, 26, has been diagnosed with breast cancer , and his wife, Judy, visited him in Cuba last year, and was even allowed to accompany him
to the beach.¶ Peter Kahn, the Gross family's attorney, did not return messages left at his D.C. law firm of Williams & Connolly LLP.¶ Joe Garcia, former executive director of the Cuban American National Foundation who ran for Congress in
both times to Republicans opposed to any change in U.S.-Cuba ties - agrees Washington could be
doing more to win Gross' freedom. "I've spoken to almost every American official involved in U.S.2008 and 2010 on the Democratic ticket but lost -
Cuba policy, even tangentially, and they all say the Gross case is a central stumbling
block to open thinking,"
Garcia said.¶ "The Cubans clearly should not
have put him in jail. We saw the charges. They've had Gross in custody for 14 months, but if there's something that distinguishes Raul from
Fidel, it's pragmatic response to crisis. Fidel responds with charisma. Raul has to make the charisma work on a daily basis." Raul Castro succeeded his ailing brother, Fidel, as president in 2008.¶ Nick Miroff of Global Post has his own take on the
case. "If the Internet is the new battlefield in the long, simmering standoff between Cuba and the United States, then jailed American contractor Alan Gross is the conflict's first POW," he wrote. "No trial date has been set, but the Gross case,
along with several other web-related developments, has offered the best insight yet into the Castro government's evolving views of the Internet, as Cuban authorities cautiously attempt to introduce modern technology while pushing back against
U.S. efforts to wield it against them."
[insert US-Cuba relations impact]
2NC Internals
Gross is the only impediment to bilateral relations
Orsi 3/23/13 – (Peter, “US on verge of momentous Cuba decision: Whether to take
island off controversial terror list” The Associated press, Fox News Online, Available
online @ http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/03/23/us-on-verge-momentous-cubadecision-whether-to-take-island-off-controversial/)
HAVANA – A normally routine bit of Washington bureaucracy could have a big impact
on U.S. relations with Cuba, either ushering in a long-stalled detente or slamming the
door on rapprochement, perhaps until the scheduled end of the Castro era in 2018. ¶ U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry must decide within a few weeks whether to advocate that
President Barack Obama should take Cuba off a list of state sponsors of terrorism, a
collection of Washington foes that also includes Iran, Syria and Sudan.¶ Cuban officials
have long seen the terror designation as unjustified and told visiting American
delegations privately in recent weeks that they view Kerry's recommendation as a litmus
test for improved ties. They also hinted the decision could affect discussions over the
release of jailed U.S. subcontractor Alan Gross, whose detention in 2009 torpedoed
hopes of a diplomatic thaw.¶ Inclusion on the list means a ban not only on arms sales to
Cuba but also on items that can have dual uses, including some hospital equipment. It
also requires that the United States oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other
international lending institutions, among other measures.¶ U.S. officials agree the
recommendation, which Kerry must make before the State Department's annual terror
report is published April 30, has become ensnared in the standoff over Gross. The
American was sentenced to 15 years in prison after he was caught bringing
communications equipment onto the island illegally while working for a USAID-funded
democracy-building program.¶ Cuba has been on the terror list since 1982, and is also the
target of a 51-year U.S. economic embargo — the reason why the island of beaches, music
and rum is the only country Americans cannot visit as tourists. Removal from the list
would not change that.¶ Critics say Cuba's inclusion on the list has little to do with any
real threat posed by the Communist-run Caribbean island, and they say the list has
become so politicized it's useless. North Korea was removed in 2008 during nuclear
negotiations that ultimately failed, and was never put back on. Pakistan, where Osama
bin Laden had been hiding out, is not on the list in large part because of its strategic
importance.¶ Longtime Cuba analyst Philip Peters of the Virginia-based think tank the
Lexington Institute said removing Cuba from the list "makes sense ... just because it's
been a specious allegation that the United States has repeated for many years ... It would
improve the atmosphere."¶ Others argue against rewarding Havana unless it releases
Gross.¶ "I have long believed it's in our interest to see an improvement in relations with
Cuba," said Rep. Chris Van Hollen, a Democrat from Gross's home state of Maryland
who traveled with a congressional delegation to Havana last month. But " the first step
needs to be resolving Alan Gross's situation. "¶ Voices calling for a change in the
policy are growing louder, however.¶ Last month, The Boston Globe cited administration
sources saying high-level diplomats determined Cuba should be dropped from the list.
That prompted State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland to say there were "no
current plans" to do so, though she did not explicitly rule out the possibility.¶ Last week, a
Los Angeles Times editorial called for Cuba's removal from the list, and other
newspapers have voiced similar opinions. The Cuba Study Group, a Washington-based
exile organization that advocates engagement to promote democratic change, issued a
white paper in February calling for an "apolitical" reexamination of the terror
designation.¶ While Kerry can review the designation even after the State Department's
report comes out, Cuba's continued inclusion on the list in April would almost certainly
rule out its chances of removal in 2013.¶ A U.S. official involved in deliberations told The
Associated Press that Kerry will ultimately decide and nobody under him is in a position
to predict what will happen. "It's very much up in the air," he said.¶ But another
administration official said that lifting the terror designation will be a hard sell while
Gross remains imprisoned.¶ "It's very unlikely," the second official said. "There is no
consensus. And if you are on (the list), you stay on as long as there is no consensus on
taking you off."¶ The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not
authorized to discuss the matter publicly.¶ Ostensibly, Cuba has been designated a terror
sponsor because it harbors members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) rebel group, the Basque militant organization ETA and a handful of U.S.
fugitives, many of whom have lived here since the 1970s.¶ But much has changed in
recent years.¶ Late last year, peace talks began in Havana between Colombia and the
FARC, and even Washington has voiced hope that the negotiations will end Colombia's
half-century old conflict.¶ ETA announced a permanent cease-fire in 2011, and Madrid
has not openly called for the return of any Basque fugitives. Cuba has enjoyed improved
relations with Spain and Colombia in recent years, and both countries routinely vote at
the U.N. against continuing the U.S. embargo.¶ Under President Raul Castro, Cuba has
freed dozens of dissidents and has begun opening its economy and society, though it
remains a one-party political system that permits no legal opposition. Castro announced
in February that he would step down in 2018 and signaled a likely successor.¶ The time
might also be ripe in terms of U.S. politics.¶ While in the Senate, Kerry was an outspoken
critic of America's policy on Cuba, saying it has "manifestly failed for nearly 50 years."
He called for travel restrictions to end and held up millions of dollars in funding for the
type of programs Gross worked with.¶ His boss, President Obama, no longer has to worry
about reelection or pleasing Cuban-Americans, an all-important voting bloc in the
crucial swing state of Florida.¶ Ann Louise Bardach, a longtime Cuba observer and the
author of "Without Fidel: A Death Foretold in Miami, Havana and Washington," said all
the political winds would seem to point toward a reboot in relations — except for
Havana's decision to hold Gross and try to swap him for five Cuban agents in the U.S.¶
"In a way they cooked their goose with Alan Gross," she said. "The Cubans thought, 'Gee
what a brilliant idea, we'll have a chit to trade.' Little did they know that they would be at
this moment where you have considerable momentum to move on in Washington, and
politically, because of the Gross mess, Washington can't act."
Alan Gross imprisonment destroys relations
EFE 12/4/13 – (“US Lawmakers Demand Cuba Free Alan Gross” EFE is a Spanish
International News agency created in 1939 to monitor Latin American developments,
this report was sent to Fox and the American-storyline was incorporated, Posted on Fox
News Online, Available online @
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/12/04/us-lawmakers-demand-cubafree-alan-gross/)
The imprisonment in Cuba of U.S. contractor Alan Gross is an obstacle to better relations
between Havana and Washington, senators said Tuesday, demanding the Maryland man's immediate and
unconditional release.¶ The prisoner's wife, Judy Gross, was joined by Sens. Ben Cardin and Barbara Mikulski - both
Democrats from Maryland - and Jerry Moran, a Kansas Republican, at a press conference.¶ "Mr. Castro, a message from
the U.S. Senate: let Alan Gross go, let him go today, let him go now," Mikulski said, addressing Cuban President Raul
Castro.¶ "Mr. Castro, you are illegally holding him on a trumped up charge against his own will to the devastation of his
health," she said.¶ "I'm one who since July of 2000 have been engaged in trying to create greater opportunities for
American agriculture, farmers and ranchers to deal with Cuba and have the opportunity to sell our products," Moran
said.¶ "I'm no
longer willing to pursue this further engagement until Alan Gross is released," the
detention is preventing any progress in bilateral
Republican added.¶ Cardin stressed that Gross'
relations.¶ "We are all looking forward to a better relation bet Cuba and the us ... and we all hope that Cuba will do the
right thing," he said.¶ Now 63, Gross was detained in Havana three years ago in possession of satellite communications
equipment he said he was planning to distribute among Cuba's Jewish community.¶ Havana says he was illegally aiding
dissidents and inciting subversion on the Communist-ruled island. Last August, Cuba's highest court upheld the 15-year
jail sentence imposed on Gross five months earlier.¶ "We have to start on a clean slate, meaning let's forget
about the five (Cuban intelligence officers held in the United States), let's forget about what's happened in the past, let's
just sit down and talk," Judy Gross said Tuesday in comments to Efe.¶ Cuba says the five intelligence officers were sent to
Florida in the wake of several terror bombings in Havana allegedly masterminded by anti-Castro militant Luis Posada
Carriles, a former CIA operative.¶ The five were arrested in 1998 and convicted three years later by a federal jury in
Miami.¶ One of the spies is free on probation, but must remain on U.S. soil. The others are still behind bars. EFE
Politics NB
2NC
Key Senators Durbin and Moran support the CP
Tamayo 6/19/12 – (Juan, “Senators who favor more trade with Cuba plan halt
advocacy to push for Alan Gross release” The Miami Herald, Available online @
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/19/2856278/senators-who-favor-moretrade.html)
The senators from Kansas and Illinois say they want to put pressure on Cuba to free U.S.
government subcontractor Alan Gross.¶ Two U.S. senators who have long pushed to ease
restrictions on trade with Cuba say they have put their advocacy on hold in hopes of
pressuring Havana to free jailed U.S. government subcontractor Alan P. Gross.¶ The
decisions by Sens. Jerry Moran R-Kansas, and Dick Durbin D-Il., underlined how the
case of Gross, serving a 15-year prison sentence, has become a persistent roadblock in
almost any attempt to warm up U.S.-Cuba relations.¶ “I have tried to change the trading
relationship with Cuba. I am taking a hiatus from that effort,” Moran told the
congressional newspaper The Hill. “I hope that this will put pressure on Cuba to release
him.Ӧ Durbin, who as the Senate majority whip is the second-highest ranking Democrat
in the chamber, declared that his meeting with Gross in his Havana cell this spring
convinced him that more needs to be done to free him, according to The Hill report
Sunday¶ Durbin has been an advocate of using trade to open up closed societies like
Cuba, and along with Moran has submitted several legislative proposals over the years to
ease the U.S. trade embargo on the island.¶ Calls to Moran and Durbin’s Washington
spokespersons on Monday seeking additional comment for this story were not returned.¶
Gross, 63, a development specialist working for a U.S. government pro-democracy
program, is serving a 15-year sentence for acting against Cuba’s sovereignty when he
delivered three illegal satellite phones to Cuban Jews that allowed them independent
access to the Internet, bypassing government controls. Cuba has outlawed cooperation
with the programs, arguing they are designed to topple the government.¶ The Obama
administration has demanded his release as a humanitarian gesture, arguing that he is in
ill health, that his mother has inoperable cancer and that one of his daughters is
undergoing treatment for breast cancer.¶ Havana has made it clear Gross will be freed
only in exchange for the five Cuban intelligence officials convicted in Miami in 1998.
Four are serving long sentences and the fifth completed his prison term but is on parole
somewhere in the United States.¶ The White House has repeatedly said that it will not
swap Gross for the Cuban spies, and that it can make no major effort to improve bilateral
relations until the Maryland man is released.¶ Moran and Durbin, both from farm states,
have been trying for years to ease U.S. trade sanctions on Cuba in order to make it easier
for the island to buy U.S. food and other agricultural goods — which totaled $347 million
in 2011.
Durbin is critical to legislation passage
The Washington Post 3/12/13 – (“Richard D. Durbin” Who Runs Gov, The
Washington Post, Available online @ http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/richardj-durbin-d-ill/gIQArl8V9O_topic.html)
"Dick" Durbin is the second most powerful Senate Democrat, but he could easily be
described as his party's unofficial spokesman .¶ The majority whip sells the
party's agenda on cable news shows and on the Senate floor. An incisive questioner and
skilled debater, Durbin has won several high-profile legislative victories.¶ The St. Louis
native worked for an Illinois Senator during his senior year of college and fell in love with
politics, accepting a series of staff slots before winning a House seat in 1982.¶ Once in
Washington, Durbin proved a skilled legislator. He sponsored a bill that banned smoking
on airplanes. He is considered a true liberal and led the effort to block many of the Bush
administration's judicial appointments while promoting sweeping consumer protection
reforms.¶ Durbin is one of President Barack Obama 's closest advisers and his most
important Congressional ally . Long before his colleagues were willing to climb
aboard the Obama bandwagon, Durbin was stumping for his junior Senate colleague and
was instrumental in helping him lock up key support in the superdelegate race during
the bitter primary battle with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.). Expect
Durbin to be a key Hill liaison for Obama.
No Chance of a link – 73 House Members support Gross’s
release PRIOR to engagement
Hollen 12/1/11 – (Van, “Van Hollen leads Bipartisan Congressional Letter Urging
Release of Alan Gross” House.gov Official Government Press Release, Available online @
http://vanhollen.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=270870)
Van Hollen Leads Bipartisan Congressional Letter Urging Release of Alan Gross ¶ Letter
Calls Gross’s Continued Incarceration a Major Setback in Bilateral Relations ¶
Washington, Dec 1, 2011 -¶ Today Maryland Congressman Chris Van Hollen and 72
Members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to the Cuban Government urging
the immediate and unconditional release of Alan Gross. Mr. Gross, who has dedicated
his life to providing humanitarian assistance and was in Cuba as part of a USAID
contract to provide support to members of the Cuban Jewish community when he was
arrested, has been held in prison Cuba since December 3, 2009. ¶ The full text of the
letter is below:¶ December 1, 2011¶ Mr. Jorge Bolaños¶ Chief of Mission¶ Cuban Interests
Section¶ Embassy of Switzerland¶ 2639 16th Street, NW¶ Washington, DC 20009¶ Dear
Mr. Bolaños,¶ It is with deep concern that we write to you regarding the ongoing
imprisonment by your government of Alan P. Gross. On the eve of the second
anniversary of his arrest and detention in Cuba, and with the legal process having
formally concluded, his fate and that of his family now lie in the hands of your president,
Raúl Castro. The Cuban Government has indicated that it would be open to resolving Mr.
Gross’s case through diplomatic channels. We hope that you will honor that commitment
and release Mr. Gross on humanitarian grounds immediately.¶ After two years in a Cuban
prison, Mr. Gross and his family have paid an enormous personal price for his actions in
Cuba. Mr. Gross has lost 100 pounds and suffers from numerous medical conditions. In
addition, the Gross family situation is one that warrants compassion. As you know, Mr.
Gross’s daughter and mother are both fighting cancer, and his wife is struggling to make
ends meet. We respectfully urge the Cuban Government to immediately release Mr.
Gross on humanitarian grounds and allow him to be reunited with his loved ones. ¶ As
Mr. Gross explained to both the trial Court and Cuba’s Supreme Court, his intention was
never to harm the Cuban Government in any way. In fact, Mr. Gross spoke in court of his
affection for the Cuban people and respect for the island’s sovereignty. As we mark two
years since Mr. Gross has been in Cuban custody, we hope that your government will
release Alan so he may return to his family.¶ In light of the above, Mr. Gross’s continued
incarceration is viewed by all Members of Congress, regardless of their political views on
Cuba, as a major setback in bilateral relations. It is unlikely that any further positive
steps can or will be taken by the Obama Administration or this Congress as long as Mr.
Gross remains in a Cuban jail. We urge your government in the strongest possible terms
to immediately and unconditionally release Mr. Gross so that we can move forward.¶
Sincerely,¶ Chris Van Hollen¶ Sander Levin¶ Jared Polis¶ Charles Rangel¶ Marcy Kaptur¶
John Culberson¶ Rush Holt¶ Scott Garrett¶ Sheila Jackson-Lee¶ Bill Pascrell, jr.¶ Kathy
Hochul¶ Charles Dent¶ Edward Markey¶ Mike Quigley¶ Anna Eshoo¶ Ted Poe¶ Jerrold
Nadler¶ David Cicilline¶ James Himes¶ Peter Welch¶ Rodney Frelinghuysen¶ Joe Courtney¶
Jesse Jackson, Jr¶ Leonard Lance¶ Steny Hoyer¶ Lois Capps¶ Sam Farr¶ William Keating¶ C.
A. Dutch Ruppersberger¶ Frederica Wilson¶ Adam Kinzinger¶ Adam Schiff¶ Steve Israel¶
Steven LaTourette¶ Joe Heck¶ Carolyn Maloney¶ Michael Capuano¶ Eliot Engel¶ Jan
Schakowsky¶ Eldolphus Towns¶ Corrine Brown¶ Heath Shuler¶ Henry Waxman¶ Brian
Higgins¶ Gary Ackerman¶ Gerald Connolly¶ Tim Ryan¶ John Shimkus¶ Dan Burton¶ James
McGovern¶ Bob Filner¶ Gary Peters¶ Aaron Schock¶ Allyson Schwartz¶ John Olver¶ John
Sarbanes¶ Steve Cohen¶ James Moran¶ Howard Berman¶ Alcee Hastings¶ Ted Deutch¶ Nita
Lowey¶ W. Todd Akin¶ Barney Frank¶ Steve Stivers¶ Paul Tonko¶ Luis Gutierrez¶ Robert
Dold¶ Joseph Crowley¶ Jerry Costello¶ Daniel Lipinski¶ Timothy Johnson
Huge Bipartisan Senate Coalition Supports Freeing Alan Gross
Reuters 9/25/12 – (“Senators urge Cuba to release American Alan Gross” Reuters,
Available online @ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/25/us-cuba-grosscongress-idUSBRE88O0ZU20120925)
(Reuters) - A bipartisan group of U.S. Senators has sent a letter to Cuban President Raul
Castro urging the release of an American contractor jailed in Cuba for nearly three years,
saying his detention is "a major obstacle" to improving relations.¶ The letter, signed by 44
senators, is the strongest appeal yet by members of Congress in the case of Alan Gross,
who is serving a 15-year sentence for illegally setting up Internet networks in Cuba.¶ In
the letter, the senators urge Cuba to release Gross, 63, on humanitarian grounds, saying
he has lost 105 pounds (47.63 kg) since his arrest and suffers from degenerative arthritis
and an untreated mass behind his shoulder.¶ "He also suffers from mental anguish
because of separation from his family, several of whom have serious medical conditions,"
the letter states, noting that his daughter is being treated for breast cancer and his 90year-old mother has also been diagnosed with inoperable cancer.¶ Gross' imprisonment
has halted efforts by President Barack Obama to improve long-hostile relations between
the two countries just 90 miles apart.¶ "Mr Gross's ongoing detention in your country
presents a major obstacle to any further actions to improve our bilateral relations," the
letter states.¶ His wife, Judy Gross, said earlier this month she feared for her husband's
life because his health is deteriorating. Cuba has said, however, that his condition is
"normal," noting that he is being held in a military hospital and not a prison.¶
The Jewish Community and Key Leaders support Gross Release
Swerdlow 12/28/11 – (Deborah, “Alan Gross to Remain Imprisoned in Cuba”
Action Center News, Available online @http://blogs.rj.org/rac/2011/12/28/alan-grossto-remain-imprisoned-in-cuba/)
In a speech to Cuban lawmakers shortly after last week’s announcement, President Raul
Castro said the 2,900 prisoners to be released are mostly inmates who are older than 60,
ill, female, or young people with little or no previous criminal activity. Gross fits into the
first two categories, but Cuban authorities still refuse to release him.¶ The Jewish
community, along with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former President Jimmy
Carter and former Cabinet Secretary and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, has
been a vocal advocate for Gross’ release. For nearly two months, Jews and other people
of faith in the D.C. area have been holding weekly vigils outside the Cuban Interests
Section to call for Gross’ release.
Ext---Sen. Rush pushes the CP
Congressman Rush Pushes the CP
Rush 5/9/13 – (Bobby, “RUSH REINTRODUCES LEGISLATION URGING
CONGRESS TO LIFT TRADE EMBARGO ON CUBA” House.gov, Bobby Rush is a
current Congressman, Available online @ http://rush.house.gov/pressrelease/thursday-may-9-2013-rush-reintroduces-legislation-urging-congress-lift-tradeembargo)
Congressman Bobby L. Rush reintroduced legislation to lift trade restrictions on Cuba.
Improved U.S. relations with Cuba have been a longtime goal of Congressman Rush and this
legislation follows in the footsteps of the United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act that he initially introduced in 2009.
¶ Specifically, Rush’s current legislation lifts the embargo, travel and parcel restrictions,
normalizes trade relations, and removes Cuba from the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list.
The key component of Rush’s bill calls for the release of Alan Phillip Gross , a
U.S. international development professional arrested in Cuba in December 2009, and
makes
implementation of this legislation contingent on the Cuba governments
compliance.¶ “Lifting the trade embargo with Cuba is long overdue,” said Rush. “Cuba has a
rich history and is a close neighboring country that offers access to cultural growth and learning for many Americans. We
have shut the door on our two nations coming together to work to build a strong alliance.
Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States and the continuation of the embargo on trade between the two countries
declared in 1962 is not fulfilling the purpose for which it was established. We are the only nation in the
Western Hemisphere that still maintains an embargo and its removal is long overdue.Ӧ
Rush’s bill asks for a major point of contention between the countries to come to end by
asking for the release of Alan Phillip Gross . Gross was arrested while in Cuba working as a U.S.
government subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of a program funded under
the 1996 Helms-Burton Act. He was prosecuted in 2011 after being accused of crimes against the Cuban state for bringing
satellite phones and computer equipment to members of Cuba’s Jewish community without the permit required under
Cuban law. After being accused of working for American intelligence services in January 2010, he was ultimately convicted
for “acts against the independence or the territorial integrity of the state" in March 2011, and is currently
serving a 15-year prison sentence in Cuba
1NR – Aff Links
Hardliners hate Unilateral Concessions
Center for Democracy 7/22/11 – (Center For Democracy in the Americas,
“Cold Warrior Counterattack against Travel to Cuba Grows into Combat with Entire
Hemisphere!” Available online @ http://cubacentral.wordpress.com/2011/07/22/coldwarrior-counterattack-against-travel-to-cuba-grows-into-combat-with-entirehemisphere/)
There is a systematic effort in the U.S. Congress by hardline legislators to redraw U.S.
relations with Latin America along Cold War lines, a campaign that starts but clearly
does not end with Cuba; one that is accompanied by a world view that is ossified,
ideological, and not always connected with reality.¶ From the very beginning, these
hardliners of both parties opposed President Obama’s policies to gradually increase U.S.
engagement with Cuba. Modest decisions liberalizing travel and remittance rules were
met, at first, with simply extreme rhetoric.¶ But their angry words – rewarding the
terrorist Castro dictatorship with unilateral concessions, comparing some Cuban
Americans who visit family on the island to welfare cheats –are now accompanied by
some rather significant threats to those policies and other developments in Cuba.¶
They’re for cutting off family travel and remittances. Blocking U.S. airports from serving
the Cuban market. Browbeating civil servants to stop the Treasury Department from
issuing travel licenses that are totally permissible under the law. Threatening oil
companies who help the Cubans drill with economic sanctions and withdrawing their
rights to drill in U.S. waters because “We cannot allow the Castro regime to become the
oil tycoons of the Caribbean.”
*Aff*
US Says No
US says no
The Washington Post 12/7/2012 – (Written by the Editorial Board, “U.S.
shouldn’t hand Cuba an Alan Gross-for-spies deal” The Washington Post, Available
online @ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-05/opinions/35639087_1_alangross-castro-regime-cuban-president-ra-l-castro)
There is no equivalence between Mr. Gross and the five prisoners, as Havana itself
acknowledges. It agrees the Florida prisoners were its spies, but it has never charged Mr.
Gross with espionage. But Mr. Castro sees Mr. Gross as the leverage to spring his agents, whom the state
propaganda apparatus portrays as heroes. More significantly, by arranging an exchange, the regime
believes it can reshape U.S.-Cuban relations on its own terms, without having to make
concessions on human rights.¶ The Gross family has appealed to Mr. Obama to send a
high-level envoy to Cuba and to do what is necessary to obtain his release. That’s
understandable, but the administration ought to stick to its refusal to countenance such a
bargain. On the contrary, Mr. Obama should consider new steps to punish the Castro regime for the continued
imprisonment of Mr. Gross, and the administration should do more to raise his case in international forums.
Cuba Says No
Cuba only wants to swap Gross for its 5 Spies
The Washington Post 12/7/2012 – (Written by the Editorial Board, “U.S.
shouldn’t hand Cuba an Alan Gross-for-spies deal” The Washington Post, Available
online @ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-05/opinions/35639087_1_alangross-castro-regime-cuban-president-ra-l-castro)
WITH THE presidential election over, supporters of better U.S.-Cuban relations are calling on President Obama, who won
a majority of the Cuban American vote, to seek accord with the Castro regime. They forget the case of Alan Gross, the
American development contractor who this week began his fourth year in a Cuban military prison.¶ Mr. Gross, of Potomac,
was arrested on Dec. 3, 2009, after he delivered satellite telephones to members of Cuba’s tiny Jewish community. He had
been hired to provide the equipment by the U.S. Agency for International Development; the aim was to help Cuban Jews
connect to the Internet.¶ In 2011, Mr. Gross was convicted of crimes against the state and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
There the now-63-year-old has remained, despite health problems that include a severe loss of weight, arthritis and a
growth on his shoulder. His appeals to visit his gravely ill, 90-year-old mother have been denied. Cuban president Raúl
Castro has repeatedly turned down proposals to release Mr. Gross on humanitarian grounds, despite visits from envoys
ranging from U.S. senators to former U.N. ambassador Bill Richardson.¶ The Castro government says it
wants to repair relations with the United States, win the lifting of what remains of the
U.S. trade embargo and attract investment from American companies. So why keep Mr.
Gross in prison? The answer, unfortunately, is relatively simple. Cuba wants to swap its
prisoner for five Cuban spies who were arrested in Florida in 1998. The network infiltrated a U.S.
Navy base and anti-Castro groups and provided information that facilitated Cuba’s 1996 shoot-down in international
airspace of two planes carrying members of one of the groups. Four U.S. citizens died. The head of the network was
sentenced to life in prison after a 2001 trial, while others were given lesser terms. One is now out on probation.¶ There is
no equivalence between Mr. Gross and the five prisoners, as Havana itself acknowledges. It agrees the Florida prisoners
were its spies, but it has
never charged Mr. Gross with espionage. But Mr. Castro sees Mr.
Gross as the leverage to spring his agents, whom the state propaganda apparatus
portrays as heroes. More significantly, by arranging an exchange, the regime believes it
can reshape U.S.-Cuban relations on its own terms, without having to make concessions
on human rights.
Venezuela---Pressure
Shell
1NC Venezuela Pressure CP
Text: The United States federal government should threaten to
implement economic sanctions if the government of Venezuela
does not [ ].
Economic engagement fails absent a demand for corruption
reform—only the counterplan solves relations in the long-term
Christy 3/15/13 – (Patrick, “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez
Venezuela” US News, Senior policy analyst at the Foreign policy Initiative, Available
online @ http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blo/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavezus-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela)
What's perverse is how the Obama administration's move to "reset" relations with Maduro is doing more
to legitimize him as the rightful heir to Venezuela's presidency than to resuscitate relations between the
two governments. The move showed itself to be even more naive after Maduro accused the United States of plotting to poison
Chavez shortly after the strongman's death.¶ [Check out our editorial cartoons on President Obama.]¶ Washington must realize that a
strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a
renewed and
improved
partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence
America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition. The
Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a postChavez Venezuela. In particular, it should: Pressure Caracas to implement key
election
reforms . Venezuela's opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim President Maduro will use the government's near-
monopoly control of public airwaves, its established networks of political patronage and last-minute public spending programs to bolster
his populist agenda.¶ Washington should stress publicly and privately that any attempts to suppress or intimidate the opposition runs
contrary to Venezuela's constitution and the principles defined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela
in 2001. To this point, José Cárdenas, a former USAID acting assistant administrator for Latin America, writes, ¶ The Venezuelan opposition
continues to insist that the constitution (which is of Chavez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms
that would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign interference.¶
Demand free, fair and verifiable elections. Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez
will be held next month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make a democracy. Indeed, Chavez
long embraced the rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic
political system and altered the outcomes of election through corruption, fraud and intimidation. ¶ [Read the U.S. News Debate: Given The
Current Deficit Crisis, Should Foreign Aid Be Cut?]¶ The Obama administration should make clear that free and fair elections, properly
monitored by respected international election observers, are essential to Venezuela's future standing in the hemisphere and the world.
Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry should work with regional partners—including (but not limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and
Mexico—to firmly encourage Maduro's interim government. A unified regional voice would send a powerful signal to Chavez's cronies in
Caracas and longtime enablers in China, Iran and Russia.¶
Economic sanctions work and force Maduro to reform
Halabi ’13 (Sammy Halabi—London School of Economics, co-founder of Global Risk
Insights; “Reasons for Optimism in Venezuela”; May 3, 2013;
http://globalriskinsights.com/2013/05/03/spring-is-coming-we-should-be-optimisticabout-venezuela/)
Though Venezuela will continue to be able to export oil, slightly mitigating some of Chavez’s more disastrous economic
policies, Maduro sits on a ticking time bomb. Inflation is sky high, moving past 30%. Murder
rates are skyrocketing while foreign investment continues to plummet due to past expropriations. And with
increased American energy independence the era of $100 oil may be coming to an end.¶
Chavez had both the ideological conviction and public support necessary to withstand pressures to liberalize and integrate
the Venezuelan economy in the face of such terrible indicators. Yet given his weakened mandate, and the
fractured political climate under which he operates, Maduro will not be able to withstand
pressures for long.¶ Already there have been signs that Venezuela is inching
towards change, with Maduro going so far as to temporarily open a back-channel with the US State Department
such
during Chavez’s cancer treatments. While
it would be difficult to see an overnight reversal of USVenezuelan relations, these subtle steps are more indicative of a pragmatist than an
ideologue. This is cause for optimism, and may be the root of better ties with Venezuela’s biggest export market in the
medium term.¶ In the short term, expect Venezuela to pursue its liberalization on a more regional
basis. Importantly, Brazil very quickly recognized Maduro’s government in spite of the electoral controversies.
Additionally, Brazil and Peru have shown that there is a viable “third way” through which Venezuela can integrate into the
international system. States like these have contributed to the general decline in anti-American
sentiment, and give Venezuela a workable model for change.¶ For all the fever and emotion
associated with Latin America, the logic of Venezuela’s economic problems remains cold and calculating. Maduro is not
the reincarnation of Chavez and attempts to analyze Venezuela’s future on its Chavismo past are superficial at best. In
short, spring is coming.
Solvency
2NC---Solvency Cards
Sanctions are justified and empirically work in Venezuela—
forces them to promote US interests
GPO ’11 (the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform and Foreign Affairs;
“VENEZUELA’S SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY”; June 24, 2011;
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71297/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg71297.pdf)
Venezuela continues to extend a lifeline to Colombian¶ narcotrafficking organizations by
providing significant support and safe haven along the border, and it remains one of the most preferred trafficking routes
for the transit of cocaine out of South¶ America.
U.S. sanctions have successfully targeted and
applied financial measures against narcotic traffickers and their
organizations in Venezuela, helping to ensure regional security. Venezuela¶ has
proven that it cannot be trusted and the United States should¶ take the necessary measures to stifle
its powers and ensure regional security, but we must do so in a tactful manner, as not to¶ further empower
Chavez. The national security threats posed by¶ Venezuela are complex. We must implement the
appropriate measures to protect the people of Venezuela and promote U.S.
interests
Edward Snowden case proves economic sanctions are an
effective threat in Venezuela—relations and economics
Gaist 7-8-13 (Thomas Gaist, editor for Global Research; “US escalates threats against
governments considering asylum for Snowden”; http://www.globalresearch.ca/usescalates-threats-against-governments-considering-asylum-for-snowden/5342042)
Top US officials escalated their threats over the weekend against any government that grants asylum to Edward Snowden,
the source of leaks detailing illegal government surveillance programs directed at the population of the United States and
the entire world.¶ On Friday, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro said that the country
would offer Snowden “humanitarian asylum,” and the leaders of Nicaragua and Bolivia both indicated
that Snowden could receive asylum in those countries as well. The statements came in the wake of the forced grounding of
Bolivian president Evo Morales’s plan last week under suspicions that Snowden may have been on board.¶ An anonymous
State Department official said over the weekend: “There is not a country in the hemisphere whose government does not
understand our position at this point.” The official asserted that granting Snowden asylum “would
put relations in a very bad place for a long time to come.” The official continued, “If someone thinks
thin would go away, it won’t be the case.”¶ Representatives of both Democrats and Republicans jumped in with threats.
“Clearly such acceptance of Snowden to any country…is going to put them directly
against the United States, and they need to know that,” Senator Robert Menendez,
Democrat of New Jersey, declared on NBC’s Meet the Press Sunday.¶ Congressman Mike Rogers, the Republican head
of the House Intelligence Committee, told CNN that the US should consider responding to
asylum-granting governments with economic sanctions, so as “to send a
very clear message that we won’t put up with this kind of behavior.”¶ These
threats are in line with the international campaign of thuggery and intimidation launched by the Obama administration in
response to the revelations of secret programs that involve the collection of communications on hundreds of millions of
people all over the world.¶ Regarding the downing of Morales’s plane, more information has emerged making clear that
the US was behind the action. Latin American media have reported that a US diplomat spread rumors that Snowden was
on board the flight, prompting the efforts to force a landing. The Austrian newspaper Die Presse reported that US
Ambassador to Austria William Eacho “claimed with great certainty that Edward Snowden was onboard.”¶ Maduro
reported that he was personally informed by a European minister that “it was the CIA that gave the order to the air traffic
authorities, which gave the alert that Snowden was going in the plane.” While the details surrounding the forced landing
remain unclear, it is in blatant violation of international law.¶ The downing of Morales’s plan makes clear that Snowden
will face enormous obstacles as he attempts to travel to any asylum-granting country, even if he receives approval from its
government.¶ If he accepts asylum in Venezuela, Snowden would still need to get there from his current location in the
Russian airport. The commercial flight from Moscow to Venezuela stops in Cuba and passes through European airspace. It
would thus be in danger of being forced to land by European governments acting at the behest of the United States. ¶ For
its part, Russia is pushing for Snowden to leave quickly. Prominent Russian parliamentarian Alexei Pushkov, who is very
close to the Kremlin, tweeted Sunday: “Venezuela is waiting for an answer from Snowden. This, perhaps, is his last chance
to receive political asylum.”¶ “He needs to choose a place to go,” said Russian deputy foreign minister Sergey Ryabkov.¶
Maduro said late Saturday night that Snowden has until today to contact the Venezuelan government in response to the
asylum offer.¶ Russia has made clear that it is unwilling to sour relations with Washington
over the issue, and that Snowden would have to accept censorship—an end to his exposures of mass spying—as a
condition for staying in Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin offered asylum to the whistleblower, but Snowden
declined after Putin demanded that he cease “harming our American partners.”¶ Moreover, any asylum granted
from Venezuela or any other Latin American country must be seen highly conditional.
Latin American heads of state are using the occasion to burnish their images as
opponents of US imperialism. However, all these countries are heavily
susceptible to US pressure and dependent on the US economy.¶ In spite of his tough
talk, Maduro has made clear that he wants to improve relations with the United States. At the same
time, the leader of the main opposition party in Venezuela, Henrique Capriles, has denounced the offer of asylum.
2NC---Solves Corruption/Democracy
A pressure strategy will democratize Venezuela and put an end
to corruption
Walser and Zuckerman ’13 (Ray Walser and Jessica Zuckerman—Senior Policy
Analyst for Latin America and Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies; “Venezuela After Chavez: U.S. Should Rally to
Democracy”; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/venezuela-afterdeath-of-chavez-us-should-rally-to-democracy)
A principled U.S. policy toward Venezuela should be guided by continued commitments
to broad-based—not just electoral—democracy enshrined in the 2001 Inter-American Democratic
Charter. Preservation of the constitutional order in Venezuela requires new elections that are not only
free but fair. The interests of the U.S. will be best served with the return of fully
functioning democracy (separation of powers, rule of law, protection of individual rights and liberties) in Venezuela. To
achieve these objectives, the Obama Administration should:¶ Deliver by public diplomacy channels a comprehensive
report on the costs and consequences of the Chavez regime;¶ Insist on maintaining the 30-day electoral
timetable and press for real international electoral observation;¶ Signal clearly that anything other than
free and fair elections will open the door to possible diplomatic and
economic sanctions;¶ Continue to investigate narco-corruption and collect
intelligence on criminal, terrorist, and Iranian activity in Venezuela; and¶ Refrain from
restoring relations at the ambassadorial level without a firm Venezuelan commitment to cooperate
in fighting drug trafficking and international terrorism.¶ Too Big to Ignore¶ The weeks and months ahead
are a period of opportunity and peril in Venezuela. The Obama Administration should not be content with leading from behind or claiming
more pressing engagements. From
defending democracy to preserving stability, a post-Chavez
Venezuela is too big to ignore.
Economic sanctions effectively promote democracy—
comparative study
Collins ‘9 (Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and
International
Affairs at Kennesaw State University; December 2009, “Democracy Sanctions: An
Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion”;
http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069-096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf)
Democracy promotion is often dismissed as a futile American foreign policy endeavor. Economic sanctions
conventionally are derided as ineffective and counterproductive. Consequently, one might predict that the use of
economic sanctions to promote democracy would represent a hopelessly inept strategy. This study finds, conversely, that
sanctions represent a relatively effective instrument of democracy promotion. The idea that
sanctions were futile was minted in the bipolar era, when the structural attributes of the international system limited the
effectiveness of superpower sanctions. After the marked shift in the polar configuration of power upon the disappearance
of the Soviet Union, however, the structural attributes of the system presented a more benign
environment for the sanctions efforts of the United States. A comparative analysis of the
use of democracy sanctions in the bipolar era versus those implemented in the 1990s
reveals that sanctions became significantly more effective. This essay examines the
causal origins of the increase in the effectiveness of democracy sanctions, and considers
whether the high success rate for the approach can be sustained into the near future in
light of recent challenges to American hegemony.
Threatening economic pressure solves democratization—
Guatemala proves
Collins ‘9 (Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and
International
Affairs at Kennesaw State University; December 2009, “Democracy Sanctions: An
Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion”;
http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069-096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf)
In a number of instances, democracy-promotion sanctions delivered deep and rapid
results. In 1993, when Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano dissolved Congress and the
judiciary, and attempted to establish an autocratic government, the United States led a
coalition of states in terminating all nonhumanitarian aid, and threatening sharp
trade sanctions if democracy was not immediately restored. The grave threat of
worked to drive a wide number of sectors in Guatemalan society-including business, the
military, and civil society-to abandon Serrano. The disgraced Serrano was ousted by the military,
Guatemala’s human rights ombudsman took over as president, and the country’s
democratic institutions were restored. The coup was reversed within days.26
comprehensive sanctions
Maduro is already implementing minor corruption reform—
more economic pressure solves
Reuters 6-20-13 (Reuters- a CNN news site; “Venezuelan anti-corruption drive
snares senior tax official”; http://news.yahoo.com/venezuelan-anti-corruption-drivesnares-senior-tax-official-215330610.html)
CARACAS (Reuters) - Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro announced the arrest of a senior
tax official on Thursday in the latest move in what he says is a concerted effort to stamp
out corruption in the South American OPEC nation.¶ Maduro said the local director of the SENIAT tax authority in
the coastal city of La Guaira had been caught by state intelligence agents with more than 4 million bolivars in cash (about
$635,000 at the official exchange rate).¶ "We raided the luxury apartment in eastern Caracas where
this bandit was doing business. He was caught in the act with his accomplices," said Maduro,
who won a presidential election in April after the death of his mentor, Hugo Chavez.¶ "He was walking around freely,
personally taking bribes ... I call on everyone, the revolutionaries, the honest people, to support
me in the fight against corruption."¶ So far, Maduro's new drive against graft has snared several senior
officials from state companies, organizations and government ministries. None have been heavyweight leaders of the
leftist "Chavismo" movement forged by his late mentor.¶ That has prompted opposition leaders such as Henrique
Capriles, who lost April's election to Maduro, to accuse his administration of only going after
smaller, less politically connected targets.¶ "Our country is governed by a cartel which has a boss, or
various bosses, who use Venezuelans' resources like a network of extortion," Capriles said in an interview with local
media.¶ Under pressure because of economic woes, Maduro has hit back with the launch
a government program called "Efficiency or Nothing," which involves undercover state
inspectors investigating claims of corruption in publicly funded projects and
organizations.¶ Among those caught in the latest dragnet have been a former president of a state mining company
of
and various senior figures at the state's consumer protection body, Indepabis. Maduro was due to launch a restructured
Indepabis later on Thursday.¶ "Some people are underestimating this fight," Maduro said in his televised comments. "We
will catch them red-handed!"
2NC---Anti-Americanism
Only the counterplan would resolve anti-Americanism in Latin
America via pressure—appeasement fails
Walser et al ’12 (Ray—Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage
Foundation; “Time Is Ripe for U.S. Policy to Address Anti-Americanism in Latin
America”; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/us-policy-to-addressanti-americanism-in-latin-america-needed)
No sensible person advocates a return to gunboat diplomacy or trading verbal barbs and insults with Chávez and the
Castros. The U.S. therefore should do the following:¶ Cancel or suspend all beneficial commercial
arrangements with ALBA countries. These would include, among others, waivers of the type granted to
Nicaragua and all trade preferences in whatever form.¶ Oppose grants and concessionary loans to ALBA
countries from the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and the World Bank.¶ Fund, where possible, nonpartisan pro-democracy groups in ALBA
countries.¶ Push back with public diplomacy in response to particularly egregious statements from ALBA
presidents to point out the many failin, inane statements, and erratic behavior of these very leaders.¶ End
diplomatic appeasement by ceasing to court ALBA governments at a senior level. The U.S.
should make no attempt to send ambassadors to those countries that have rejected or expelled U.S.
envoys in the recent past and should not negotiate cooperative or framework agreements with
ALBA countries.¶ Standing Against Anti-Americanism in the Americas¶ Until the U.S. begins to
send a clear message that there will be genuine consequences for
undemocratic, anti-American actions, the Bolivarian anti-American alliance will
continue to run roughshod over its own people and fan the flames of anti-Americanism in the
Western Hemisphere.
Anti-Americanism in Venezuela threatens American
hegemony—ALBA and Iran pose serious threats
Walser et al ’12 (Ray—Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage
Foundation; “Time Is Ripe for U.S. Policy to Address Anti-Americanism in Latin
America”; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/us-policy-to-addressanti-americanism-in-latin-america-needed)
Anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in the Western Hemisphere. Because of U.S. military interventions in the
past century, anti-Americanism got a head start in the region.¶ In the post–Cold War era, anti-Americanism has
staged a substantial comeback owing to persistent tyranny in Cuba and the emergence of
Chávez and the Bolivarian movement in Venezuela and elsewhere. The narcissistic Chávez, a cashiered
lieutenant colonel and failed coup plotter, burst onto the international scene in 1999. As president of Venezuela, he
inherited a corrupt, oil-rich democracy with yawning disparities in wealth. Since April 2002, when Chávez was nearly
toppled by internal opposition, he has
blamed the U.S. for nearly all of his nation’s ills. Like the
has likened a U.S. President (George W. Bush) to Satan and called the U.S. “the greatest
terrorist nation.”¶ But Venezuela proved too small a country to contain Chávez’s ambitions. He launched a
Latin American unity campaign in emulation of his hero, the great liberator Simon Bolivar, recasting
Iranians, Chávez
the historic Bolivar as primarily an anti-U.S. nationalist. Chávez fashioned an alliance with his other great hero, Fidel
Castro, importing Cuban doctors and teachers in exchange for billions in financial aid. He worked with Cuba to
launch the ALBA alliance in 2002 to contest U.S. “hegemony” in Latin America. Chávez
threatened neighboring Colombia, the U.S.’s closest ally in the region, and offered aid and safe haven
to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a ruthless terrorist group that derives much of its
funding from drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping.¶ Using discounted oil as an enticement
and rallying like-minded leftists to his cause, Chávez enlisted Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, and several Caribbean islands
under ALBA’s banner. In turn, ALBA has become the fulcrum for anti-Americanism in the
Americas. It defended the regime of Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi until his death. While the Venezuelan foreign
ministry regretted the recent deaths of U.S. diplomats murdered in Libya and denounced the terrorist attack, it was quick
to blame the attack on “colonialist aggression” by NATO and demanded an “end to interventionism and campaigns of
hatred against Arab and Muslim peoples.” In advance of the October 7 presidential elections in Venezuela, Chávez has
sought to portray his rival as a puppet of U.S. imperialism.¶ Chávez and his Bolivarian partners continue
to offer diplomatic and economic support for the murderous, Iranian-backed Bashar alAssad regime in Syria. ALBA members hosted Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad this year
and promised to forge closer political, economic, and security ties with Iran. Reports of
secretive financial deals with Iran and other sanctions-busting actions appear regularly. And just last month, Ecuador’s
Rafael Correa offered diplomatic asylum to the notorious Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, who is now holed up in
Ecuador’s embassy in London.¶ Domestic assaults on private property, rule of law, and individual rights continue
unabated among the Bolivarian states. There is an aggressive campaign against media freedom in
the region, from virtually absolute control in totalitarian Cuba to increasing curbs on free speech and the imposition of
gag rules on those who investigate and criticize government malfeasance in Venezuela. Similarly, the Bolivarian states
have increasingly blocked outside assistance to pro-democracy civil society, replicating democracy backlash tactics from
Cairo to Moscow.
[Insert Heg Impact]
2NC---Economy
Corruption reform solves the economy—Maduro key
Helios Global 6-4-13 (Independent news agency covering Latin American affairs
in conjunction with Fair Observer; “Change in Venezuela Yields Political and Economic
Uncertainty”; http://www.fairobserver.com/article/change-venezuela-yields-politicaland-economic-uncertainty)
Nicholas Maduro’s narrow electoral triumph over opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski in Venezuela’s
April 14 elections — to serve out the remainder of the late president Hugo Chavez’s current presidential term —
signifies a turning point in Venezuelan politics. Maduro’s victory has also reverberated beyond
Venezuela’s borders. Due
to its role as a major source of oil, the course of political events in
Venezuela also has important implications for the world economy . The death
of Chavez has also raised concerns about the prospects of social, political, and economic
stability in Venezuela. The victory of Chavez’s heir apparent – Chavez and his supporters went to great lengths to
ensure the survival of the Bolivarian Revolution launched by Chavez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (known by its
Spanish acronym PSUV) – in a politically charged and polarized climate has already resulted in unrest and violence
between Maduro’s supporters and his opponents. Venezuela’s increasingly dire economic predicament
has further exacerbated tensions across the country.¶ Despite a contentious bilateral relationship,
Venezuela remains the fourth-largest supplier of imported oil to the United States. Given
the peculiarities of its oil, namely, the category of relatively low quality heavy crude oil that represents the bulk of its oil
capacity, Venezuela relies heavily on US refineries located in the Gulf of Mexico that were
designed to refine oil from Venezuela (and Mexico). Roughly 40 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports are delivered to the
United States. Consequently, the United States is Venezuela’s top trade partner. This is the case even as
US imports of Venezuelan oil have steadily declined in recent years. In 1997, the United States imported about 1.7 million
barrels of oil per day (bpd) from Venezuela. In contrast, only about one million bpd of Venezuelan oil makes its way to the
United States today. Venezuela also boasts major natural gas reserves, possibly the second-largest natural gas reserves in
the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, Venezuela’s oil production capacity continues to
deteriorate due to mismanagement, corruption , and antiquated infrastructure.
Maduro will reform the economy—dire economic situation
necessitates a shift in strategy
The Economist 4-20-13 (“Maduro’s lousy start”;
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21576399-narrow-tainted-election-victoryfitting-epitaph-his-rotten-predecessor-venezuela)
There is at least some justice that the mess created during the Chávez years now falls to a fellow chavista. The
economy is in ruins. Growth has stalled, the currency is digesting a 32% devaluation in
February and inflation is likely to reach 30%. Price controls, the expropriation of farms
and anti-business policies have created food shortages. The appearance in Caracas of sugar or cooking
oil can create queues and excitement otherwise seen only in Cuba.¶ Chávez loyalists, of whom there are many
millions, will tell Mr Maduro to be more chavista: more populist, more profligate, more authoritarian. He
has already aped his predecessor, and fawned on his memory, to the point of parody. Describing Chávez as a
“Christ of the Americas”, he referred to the election as “Resurrection Day”.¶ Yet chavismo’s bill is now due. Last year the
budget deficit was 8.5% of GDP. Even with oil at over $100 a barrel, Venezuela’s public spending is unsustainable. Power
cuts are frequent and roads are crumbling. Under an ineffective police force, the murder rate has soared to twice that of
Mexico.¶ Reap what you sow¶ Now is the time for Mr Maduro to unite his country, not crush dissent.
He should agree to recount the ballots. The state’s institutions, above all the judiciary and armed forces, need to regain
their neutrality. And
the weak economy will grow only if the government seeks
rapprochement with the private sector and scraps controls on prices and
foreign exchange . Mr Maduro’s tainted, wafer-thin victory suggests that Venezuelans want less
chavismo,
not more. That is certainly what their unfortunate country needs.
2NC---Relations
Pressuring Maduro solves relations—now is key
Pagano 3-18-13 (James Pagano, contributing editor for Truman National Security
Project, “Moving Venezuela to the Center”; http://trumanproject.org/doctrineblog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/)
After over a decade in power, Hugo Chavez is now dead, providing U.S. policy makers an opening to
mend fences and steer Venezuela’s next president towards the center. With smart policy and a light
touch, the United States can help Venezuela ’s next president lead his country out of the
mess that Chavez built.¶ Chavez won the presidency in 1999 on a promise to “sow” the oil wealth of
Venezuela into its social program. Bolstered by record high oil prices, Chavez spent billions on such programs. While
millions of Venezuelans were able to obtain healthcare and an education, the poorly designed programs left little money to
reinvest in oil exploration; output in Venezuela declined threatening the longevity of all Chavez’s initiatives.¶ Meanwhile,
Chavez became an increasingly authoritarian leader, consolidating power in the executive. He blacklisted opposition
figures, altered the constitution and unevenly enforced laws for personal benefit. By creating a steeply slanted playing
field, Chavez was able to retain power.¶ Venezuela’s next president will have to decide whether to
reverse these trends, or continue the slide to outright authoritarianism. The United
States can and should influence this decision.¶ The United States must support
the democratic process and engage the likely winner of April’s election, Chavez’s chosen successor, Nicolás
Maduro. He will have a real opportunity to put Venezuela back on the path to a freemarket democracy.¶ The next president will face an extremely politicized Supreme Court and military and
reforms are likely more palatable if made by Maduro. Changes to apportionment, food subsidies or tax
rates coming from Enrique Capriles (the opposition candidate) could spark a legal challenge from the supreme court; or
worse, opposition from the military.¶ What should the U.S. role be? It must work with its Latin American
allies in the region, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to gently pressure Maduro into making the
types of institutional and economic changes necessary for Venezuela to prosper. Failure to do so
could lead to the reemergence of authoritarianism in Latin America, instability in world oil
markets and serious regional security repercussions.¶ Chavez was infamous for his anti-American
tirades. George W. Bush’s poor global standing gave Chavez an easy target. With a more positive global image, the most
important step President Obama can take is to normalize relations with Cuba. As Venezuela’s closest ally, Cuba has
remained a persistent problem in U.S.-Latin American relations.¶ By normalizing relations, Obama would take a huge step
in reducing anti-Americanism in Venezuela. Simultaneously, Obama would ingratiate himself to the rest of the region by
ending the dated embargo. Perhaps most importantly,
eliminating this issue would give
Venezuela’s next president the political cover necessary to mend relations
with the United States.¶ The U.S. should push for economic reform with the help of Brazil which seeks a
greater role in international and regional politics. Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva has close ties to Venezuela, and
touting the recent successes of his center-left government in Brazil could help persuade Maduro to moderate his
government.¶ Brazil has made huge societal gains without suffering the kind of economic setbacks seen in Venezuela.
Friendly cajoling, along with the promise of closer economic ties could help lead Maduro onto a path of economic reform
necessary to extend certain “Chavista” social programs.¶ Colombia, Brazil and the U.S. also have a shared interest in
improving Venezuelan security. Under Chavez, Venezuela became on the most violent countries in Latin America, as drug
related crimes skyrocketed.¶ Violence is the number one concern of Venezuelans, and significant reductions would be a
major political victory for whoever is in power. Brazil and Colombia together should pressure Venezuela to accept sorely
needed D.E.A assistance with the tacit acceptance of modest political reforms, most importantly freer press.¶ The
death of Chavez is a critical juncture in U.S.-Latin American relations and it is important the
United States not miss this opportunity. Having a stable trustworthy Venezuela would
allow the United States to continue to draw down operations in the ever-volatile Middle
East, fight narcotrafficking and expand trade.¶ Careful, well thought-out overtures and policy changes
will help quell lingering anti-Americanism while also improving regional stability. Ending the Cuban embargo would
provide absolute economic gain for all parties, while providing cover for Maduro to thaw relations with the United States
and receive aid to stop uncontrollable violence. Strategic engagement with regional allies could help spur the economic
and institutional reforms necessary for Venezuela to prosper moving forward.¶ The situation in Venezuela could be
potentially destabilizing to the region. The United must act deliberately to make Hugo Chavez’s passing an unmitigated
positive development.
2NC---Drug Trafficking
Reform critical to ending drug trafficking—judicial system
Coronel ’08 (Gustavo Coronel, as president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de Vida, was
the Venezuelan representative to Transparency International from 1996-2000. He was a
member of the board of directors of Petroleos de Venezuela from 1976- 79; March 2008;
“The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela”;
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela)
Drug trafficking. Venezuela has become a haven for Colombian guerrillas who move dru across the country with
impunity due to the absence of border controls. A report by Andy Webb-Vidal for Jane’s Intelligence Review in May 2006
reveals that cocaine operations are shifting to Venezuela; he notes that drug volumes going through the
country have skyrocketed during the last 10 years. Prominent
drug traffickers of Colombian origin live
without fear of prosecution in Venezuela.¶ Chavez obviously has failed to live up to his
electoral promises to end corruption. The record is clear. The Corruption Perception Index, published by
Transparency International, has shown a progressive deterioration of the ranking of Venezuela, both in Latin America and
the world. The latest index shows Venezuela in position 138 among 163 countries. This is the worst ranking of all Latin
American nations with the exception of Haiti. Vice Pres. Jorge Rodríguez, expressing the official position of the
government, claims that Transparency International “was a discredited institution since it charges a tariff for positioning
countries favorably in the rankin.” Transparency International is headquartered in Berlin, Germany, and has chapters in
more than 100 countries, including Venezuela. It is a highly respected organization and its corruption rankin are accepted
by the international community as the best source of information on this global problem.¶ Meanwhile, the Venezuelan
ranking in the Economic Freedom of the World Index is 126 out of 130 nations, above only the Republic of Congo,
Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This ranking has been declining steadily since Chavez came to power.
It has been established that countries with little economic freedom, characterized by exchange
controls, military influence in government, and predominance of state-owned
enterprises display the highest levels of corruption. Moreover, the Human Development Index
produced yearly by the United Nations also charts Venezuela in free-fall. The country has lost 30 places in this index in the
last six years.
2NC---Human Rights
A pressure strategy has empirically solved human rights issues
Sikkink ’93 (Kathryn Sikkink, Arleen C. Carlson Professor of Political Science at the
University of Minnesota; “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in
Latin America” – The MIT Press, Summer 1993,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2706982.pdf?acceptTC=true)
To become effective, the means had to be found to translate the human rights ideals of
the declaration and treaties of the postwar period into widely shared understandin and
practices. The human rights network helped foster these means in two ways. International organizations
developed formal procedures to discuss and investigate human rights situations in
member states. But formal procedures are ineffective if not used. The work of NGOs made states'
repressive practices more visible and salient, thus forcing states that otherwise would have
remained silent to respond. As they became more aware of human rights violations, some states demanded
explanations from others. Faced with increased pressures , repressive states tried to provide
justifications. In the give-and-take of exposing violations, demanding explanations, providing justifications, and
changing practices, states and NGOs gradually questioned traditional understandin of sovereignty and began
constructing the elements of a modified sovereignty. When a state recognizes the legitimacy of interna-
tional interventions on the topic of human rights and changes its domestic human rights
practices in response to these international pressures, it reconsti- tutes the relationship
between the state, its citizens, and international actors. To make the argument about the
transformation of sovereignty more precise, I will specify a continuum of state actions and declarations that move from
reinforcing traditional understandin of the scope of sovereignty to revealing a reconceptualized sovereignty in which a
state accepts that gross violations of human rights will no longer be an issue solely within its domestic jurisdiction
Economic pressure solves Human Rights—Cold War proves
Collins ‘9 (Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and
International
Affairs at Kennesaw State University; December 2009, “Democracy Sanctions: An
Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion”;
http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069-096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf)
Economic sanctions were applied by the United States on numerous occasions during the Cold
War to promote democracy abroad. Washington levied trade and aid sanctions on
states in Latin America , Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe to foster democratic political rights
and civil liberties. The goals of democracy promotion sanctions during the bipolar era were less grandiose, however,
than those levied in the unipolar era. With a few notable exceptions, sanctions were not designed to stimulate major
changes in foreign states’ political systems; that is, they were not designed to foster genuine democratization. Rather, the
objective of economic pressure was to compel states to improve human rights
practices. Rhodesia and South Africa represent exceptional cases in which sanctions were designed to force those
states to enfranchise their black populations and provide them with a role in the political system commensurate with their
majority status. Genuine enfranchisement for the black populations of Southern Africa would have constituted a sweeping
democratic reform. Sanctions applied against other states strove to produce more modest
political changes, such as dissuading specific human rights abuses. These objectives, while
valuable, constitute more limited requirements than the demands for democratization that Washington would make in the
unipolar era.
2NC---Prolif/Terrorism
Pressure is key to solve prolif and terrorism
DeMelfi ‘6 (Christy M. DeMelfi, New York Lawyer and author for the Journal of
International Business and Law; 1/1/2006; “Nothing But The Facts: An In-Depth
Analysis Of The Effects Of Economic Sanctions Against Cuba”;
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=ji
bl)//
The exact purpose of economic sanctions varies by situation.¶ According to Richard N. Haass, director of the
Foreign Policy Study of the¶ Brookin Institute in Washington, D.C., there are four basic purposes of¶ economic
sanctions. These purposes are deterrence, punishment, coercion, and¶ signaling. Deterrence is
the goal of trying to prevent something from occurring,¶ while coercion is trying to
convince a country to act in a certain way.¶ Punishment and signaling are similar goals in that they both
express a dislike of¶ another country's actions. Punishment is done after the action has occurred,¶ while signaling is done
prior to the action. Sanctions may be implemented in¶ order to achieve any one or a combination of these goals. Although
there are¶ only four main purposes of sanctions, there are many more specific goals which¶ fall under one of the general
categories. One common reason for imposing economic sanctions is to achieve a¶ national
security objective. The basic goal may be " to deter military aggression¶ or to force an
aggressor to withdraw its armed forces from a disputed territory."¶
1997, pg. 4) Another goal may be
(O'Quinn,
to "discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles, end support for terrorism or¶ discourage
armed aggression." (Haass, 1998, pg. 1) In this case, the sanctions¶ will serve as a signal for a
country to discontinue its threat to the sender¶ country's security or else face military
action. The goal of a sanction may even¶ be the replacement of a government if the threat from that regime is very high.
2NC---Oil Affirmative
Only counterplan solves PDVSA corruption
Coronel ’08 (Gustavo Coronel, as president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de Vida, was
the Venezuelan representative to Transparency International from 1996-2000. He was a
member of the board of directors of Petroleos de Venezuela from 1976- 79; March 2008;
“The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela”;
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela)//
High levels of mismanagement at the state-owned petroleum company, Petroleos de
Venezuela. Corruption here takes many shapes. It includes the naming of six presidents
and boards in seven years, in an effort to control the company politically. This finally was
accomplished by naming the Minister of Energy and Petroleum president of the
company, in violation of good management practice, since he now supervises himself.
As a result, oil production has declined by some 800,000 barrels per day
during the last decade . In a recent public hearing, Luis Vierma, the firm’s Vice
President for Exploration and Production, admitted giving an oil well drilling contract
for some $20,000,000 to a company with only three employees and no ri.
AT: Aff Args
2NC---AT Perm
Our threat is the only way to solve—there have to be
repercussions without concessions—positive inducement links
to the appeasement DA
Ros-Lehtinen ’13 (Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen is chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa; 3/14/13; “Venezuela after
Chavez: What comes next?”;
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/venezuela-after-chavez-whatcomes-next/)//
Since 1999, the Venezuelan people have suffered under an oppressive, neosocialist
dictatorship that disregarded human rights, the rule of law and freedom of the press. For
14 years, Hugo Chavez trampled over democratic order, jailed political prisoners and oppressed the Venezuelan people.
Chavez reportedly accumulated vast amounts of wealth estimated in the billions while Venezuelans suffered from high
inflation and joblessness, rampant food shortages and a private sector that is threatened at every turn.¶ Venezuela is
a pivotal national security interest for the United States. It is one of the largest foreign suppliers of
crude oil to the United States and is a strategic foothold that continues to pose a threat to our interests in the region.
Chavez was instrumental in bringing the threat of narcoterrorism, illicit activities by foreign terrorist organizations and
the Iranian regime, including elements of Hezbollah, to the Western Hemisphere. Chavez’s cronies have made it
abundantly clear that they do not wish to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement officials on terrorism and countering the
narcotics trade. This was made clear once again as the new leadership in Venezuela expelled two U.S. Air Force attaches
shortly before Chavez’s death. This unwarranted, provocative action was reciprocated last week when two Venezuelan
diplomats were expelled from Washington. Still, there is more to be done.¶
In a post-Chavez era, much
attention is being focused on new elections and a call for democratic order.
However, elections for the sake of elections do not constitute a true democracy. Venezuela's
National Electoral Council is extremely corrupt and colludes with Chavez loyalists, who aim
to intimidate the masses in Venezuela by controlling the media and judicial system. A free, fair and transparent
election cannot be conducted if the same players continue to control the already tainted
electoral process. The authoritarian regime cannot be allowed to simply shift control from one despot to another in
an effort to maintain its iron grip over the Venezuelan people.¶ The United States’ role in the post-Chavez era
should be to support democratic order by continuing to promote the Venezuelan civil
society and ensuring that their rights are respected. The freedom-hungry people of Venezuela fear that
the United States is too weak to counter interim President Nicolas Maduro. Support for pro-democracy leaders cannot be
accomplished if the Obama administration continues to cozy up to their oppressors and refuses to draw a line in the sand
for Mr. Maduro, demanding an end to these undemocratic policies.¶ Last year, it was reported that the Obama
administration was seeking to exchange ambassadors in an attempt to normalize relations between the countries. The U.S.
State Department’s approach was extremely premature, and it, unfortunately, legitimized Mr. Maduro without even
questioning whether the Venezuelan Constitution was being upheld. The Obama administration continued to send mixed
messages and to undermine the opposition by sending a delegation to attend Chavez’s funeral services last week, alonide
enemies of the United States, such as Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Words matter, but actions matter more, and
this decision not only sends mixed signals to the people of Venezuela, but reiterates the failed policy of attempting to reestablish diplomatic relations.¶ It is in our best interest if political and economic reforms come to
Venezuela, but all signs currently point to the contrary. As the leader of the Chavista movement, Mr. Maduro
could potentially be worse for the Venezuelan people and for U.S. national security
interests. Mr. Maduro still controls all branches of government, stifles free speech and
was indoctrinated with socialist ideology. He has traveled to Tehran and has strong ties with Iran, supports
the Assad regime in Syria and has become a lap dog for Cuba’s Castro brothers.¶ In January, the Castros orchestrated the
violation of the Venezuelan Constitution when Chavez did not take the oath of office. The U.S. State Department
responded that it is up to the Venezuelan people to decide if there was a violation, and that it would not interpret the
constitution. However, those sentiments were nowhere to be found in 2009 when the State Department led the charge
against the people of Honduras, helped expel Honduras from the Organization of American States, and did not recognize
Honduras’ constitutional authorities. Why the double standard? Democratic rights under the Inter-American Democratic
Charter cannot be selective; they must be uniform.¶ The United States should be telling the leaders of
Venezuela that they need to respect the constitution, abide by the Inter-American
Democratic Charter and uphold democratic principles. These democratic processes
can only be enforced if the Venezuelan leadership thinks that there will be
serious repercussions if they do not take responsible actions to fulfill their
obligations. This is an opportunity for the United States and responsible nations to
demonstrate a commitment to restoring true democracy to Venezuela, and I hope the
opportunity isn’t missed.
Economic sanctions don’t work alongside concessions
DeMelfi ‘6 (Christy M. DeMelfi, New York Lawyer and author for the Journal of
International Business and Law; 1/1/2006; “Nothing But The Facts: An In-Depth
Analysis Of The Effects Of Economic Sanctions Against Cuba”;
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=ji
bl)
Economic sanctions are the most common tool in international politics.¶ Sanctions serve
as an important aspect of foreign policy, because of the¶ frequency with which they are used. In order to
understand why sanctions are¶ so important, one must first know the definition of a sanction. An economic¶
sanction can be defined as a restriction imposed on one country, the target, by¶ another
country, the sender. This restriction is meant to persuade the target¶ country to change a
policy by affecting international commerce engaged in by¶ the target. In other words,
sanctions are policy tools imposed by a country to¶ influence another country in order to
achieve some political goal.
Perm is impossible—a pressure strategy can’t be coupled with
unconditional engagement
Caro ’06 (Ariela Ruiz Caro is an economist with expertise in economic integration
processes at the University of Buenos Aires, was appointed Attaché for Economic Affairs
at the Embassy of Peru in Argentina by Foreign Minister Rafael Roncagliolo, an
international consultant on trade, integration and natural resources in the ECLAC, Latin
American Economic System, SELA, Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the
Caribbean, INTAL; “U.S. Trade Sanctions Seek to Pressure Latin America”, 8/24/2006,
http://www.globalpolitician.com/default.asp?22078-foreign-latin)
The U.S. government's announcement that it will review the possibility of limiting,
suspending, or withdrawing trade preferences under the General System of Preferences
(P) to three Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela—is political
pressure to make these nations participate in the model of regional integration
proposed by the United States. The P is a mechanism through which developed countries
(especially the United States, the European Union, and Japan) offer preferential access
to their markets to products from underdeveloped countries, through exemption from
tariffs and customs fees. This preferential and unilateral treatment from industrialized
nations, delivered for more than three decades, has been used often as an instrument of
political intimidation toward the beneficiary countries. The recent failure of
multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the recognition
by industrialized countries that they will only be able to impose a trade system based on
their requirements if it is built through bilateral agreements, has led some countries that
give preferences to threaten to withdraw them. Specifically, the United States has
announced it will carry out a review to determine whether to continue to offer the
preferences to twelve countries, among them, the three Latin American nations
mentioned.
2NC---AT: Squo Solves
Maduro is shoving democracy aside—US intervention is critical
Washington Post 4-16-13 (Washington Post Editorial Board; “Nicolas Maduro
shoves aside democracy in Venezuela”; http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0416/opinions/38584114_1_nicolas-maduro-recount-mr)
THE ATTEMPT by the followers of Hugo Chavez to install a successor to the dead caudillo through a one-sided election is
faltering. Now the Venezuelan regime appears to be preparing to maintain itself in power
through brute force — and the oil-producing country is headed for a crisis that demands
the attention of the United States and Latin America’s democracies.¶ On Tuesday, Nicolas
Maduro, the former bus driver and Cuban protege who was designated as Mr. Chavez’s successor, went on
national television to announce that he would “not permit” a march Wednesday called by
the opposition to support its call for a recount of votes in Sunday’s election. Promising
to use “a strong hand” — a hoary phrase from Latin America’s history of dictatorship — Mr. Maduro spoke
of protesters “filling [Caracas] with death and blood,” words that rang like a threat. The government said that seven people
already had been killed in post-election clashes and claimed that a coup was being prepared.¶ In fact, if anyone is
preparing a coup, it is Mr. Maduro and his Cuban advisers. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski has put
forward a peaceful and reasonable demand: that an audit be undertaken of the suspect presidential vote count. Mr.
Maduro himself said Sunday that he would agree to a recount — but on Monday the electoral commission he controls
abruptly ratified a result that gave him a margin of 260,000 votes out of 14.8 million cast. The narrow outcome clearly
shocked the Chavistas, who had already installed Mr. Maduro in the presidency by unconstitutional means; they expected
that their domination of the media and orchestration of voting by state employees would produce an easy “victory” and
legitimize the regime’s continuation.¶ In fact a majority of Venezuelans, including many former Chavez supporters, appear
to be fed up with a “revolution” that has produced double-digit inflation, severe shortages of power and staple foods and
one of the world’s highest murder rates. Mr. Maduro has offered no answers to these problems —
only ludicrous claims that they are the product of conspiracies by the opposition and the
United States. Amid signs that his movement may be splintering, Mr. Maduro appears to be preparing
repressive measures that should be intolerable to members of the Organization of
American States, who are bound by treaty to resist violations of democratic order.¶
Fortunately the Obama administration, which until recently was prematurely and unwisely courting Mr.
Maduro, has questioned the quick certification of the election and supported the call for the recount;
so has the government of Spain and OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza. The administration should
begin coordinating with Mexico, Chile and other important Latin American democracies to prevent Mr.
Maduro from killing his way into power.
2NC---Say Yes
Several factors prove Maduro would cooperate
SRI 5-1-13 (Strategic Risk Index and Aegis Advisory Strategic Risk Alert—a specialist
consultancy that supports businesses in assessing and adjusting their exposure to risk by
providing privileged insights and timely intelligence; “Tentative economic reform looms
in Venezuela”;
http://www.strategicriskindex.com/pdf/Tentative%20economic%20reform%20looms%
20in%20Venezuela%201%20May%202013.pdf)
Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s new president, has quickly made efforts to assert his authority,
announcing his new ¶ administration in late April after taking office on 19 April. He has brought 14 new faces
into the 31-member cabinet, the ¶ most significant being the new finance minister Nelson Merentes, who
replaced the long-serving Jorge Giordani. This ¶ may signify a more pragmatic approach towards
economic policy from the Maduro government after the presidency of ¶ Hugo Chávez,
potentially relaxing access to hard currency as well as easing price controls. But anyone expecting a ¶ major economic shift
should bear in mind the extent to which Maduro is hostage to political necessity, with his ebbing ¶ popularity making
him vulnerable to pressure from both the opposition and his so-called allies.¶ Maduro won the election on
14 April with a wafer-thin majority of 50.7 per cent to 49.1 per cent for opposition leader ¶ Henrique Capriles. This was a
surprise, given that Chávez, his predecessor and mentor, won re-election in October ¶ 2012 with a 10-point lead over
Capriles. Although Maduro was expected to suffer in comparison to the charismatic ¶ Chávez, losing such a lead in
the month since Chávez’s death on 5 March is a worrying signal for his new
administration ¶ and may trigger a reassessment of current strategy.¶ Throughout the campaign,
Maduro presented himself as Chávez’s heir, making a virtue of the fact that he was offering ¶ no new policies. However,
while Chávez had managed to hold onto his fervent supporters despite the deteriorating ¶ economy, rising crime rates and
surging inflation, the most recent election result illustrates that Maduro lacks this ¶ ability. Without being able to
rely on sheer personality to win votes in the same way, Maduro’s hand will therefore be ¶
forced into tackling some difficult issues, particularly the economy and crime. Hence the
appointment of the more ¶ moderate Merentes to the finance ministry: Giordani was a Chávez ideological standard-bearer
on the economy, ¶ overseeing the introduction of price and exchange controls, which had the side effects of food and
currency shortages as ¶ well as a spike in the inflation level to 31 per cent. Although Giordani is still in the cabinet as
Planning Minister, the rise ¶ of Merentes may be an acknowledgement that these policies now need to be relaxed or
amended
An economic sanction would spark Venezuela reaction
Duddy ’12 (Patrick D. Duddy is a senior lecturer in international studies at Duke
University and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela; “Political Unrest in Venezuela”;
September 2012; http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936)
Economic Interests: A significant number of U.S. companies have operations in Venezuela; it
remains an important market for U.S. goods and some services, especially oil services.
Many of these companies could be at risk if violent internal conflict broke out. Venezuela is consistently among the five
largest foreign suppliers of oil to the United States. The United States is Venezuela's largest market,
buying up to nine hundred thousand barrels of oil daily, up to 45 percent of Venezuela's
total oil exports. Around six hundred thousand barrels of Venezuelan crude per day are refined at CITGO facilities in
the United States. Although a cut off of Venezuelan oil to the United States is theoretically
possible, it is unlikely given Venezuela's dependence on the U.S. market.¶ The United States is
now less vulnerable to a cut off of supply from Venezuela as U.S. domestic production has risen and imports from
elsewhere could relatively quickly replace Venezuelan oil. Venezuela's economy, on the other hand, has
become more dependent on petroleum. Although production has stagnated since 2003, oil accounts
for over 95 percent of Venezuela's export earnin, and export revenue pays for nearly 50
percent of the government's budget. Thus, although Venezuela is vulnerable to pressure via
its dependence on its oil exports generally and the U.S. market and refineries specifically,
global markets would likely react negatively to either an interruption of Venezuelan production or a crisis in U.S.Venezuelan relations that threatens the bilateral trade in oil.
2NC---Now Key
Chavez’ death means now is key for US pressure to end
corruption in Venezuela
Walser and Zuckerman ’13 (Ray Walser and Jessica Zuckerman—Senior Policy
Analyst for Latin America and Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies; “Venezuela After Chavez: U.S. Should Rally to
Democracy”; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/venezuela-afterdeath-of-chavez-us-should-rally-to-democracy)
On Tuesday, cancer claimed the life of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, silencing one of Latin America’s most
controversial leaders in the 21st century. Chavez’s death opens the way to an uncertain succession process,
continued polarization, and potential instability
in oil-rich Venezuela.¶ Dealing with a post-
Chavez Venezuela will require an ongoing U.S. commitment to free and fair
presidential elections, to the defense of individual rights and liberties, and
to leveraging future improvements in bilateral relations to genuine
cooperation in the fight against transnational crime and terrorism. Working
with Venezuela for a more stable and secure hemispheric energy market is also a desired, if still distant, objective.¶ From
Coup-Maker to Kingmaker¶ During his 14-year presidency (1999–2013), Chavez developed a unique combination of
populism, authoritarianism, socialism, and combativeness that won him the adulation of the masses and a large
international following. Born in 1954, the career military officer and failed military coup-maker of 1992 emerged as the
self-proclaimed revolutionary kingmaker of Venezuela’s politics. As president, Chavez survived an inept 2002 coup, a
massive oil strike, a recall referendum, and a battle to institute term limits. He won re-elections in 2006 and 2012 by
comfortable margins. His goal was to govern until 2032.¶ By tapping Venezuela’s enormous oil wealth, Chavez advanced a
hybrid economic program of nationalizations, socialist economics, free spending social programs, price and exchange
controls, and crony capitalism dubbed “Socialism of the 21st Century.” Under the banner of “participatory democracy,”
Chavez offered a grassroots strategy that gave limited authority to local communities, forged loyal political cadres, and
created a network of citizen-clients. Subsidies, social missions, and patronage power were the ties holding the system
together.¶ Via constitutional suicide, Chavez concentrated unprecedented powers in the executive’s
hands. He ushered in a new model for elected authoritarianism that ended separation of
powers and institutional autonomy in Venezuela while toppling rule of law and
constricting basic rights and liberties. Admirers hailed him as the greatest Latin American since Fidel
Castro. Chavez’s legacy, they claim, is a genuine revolution of social justice that has improved the lives of millions. The
October 2012 presidential re-election demonstrated that his style and plan for governance could still deliver electoral
victories.¶ Nonetheless, Chavez’s successor will face many challenges, including over-
dependence on oil revenues and a comparatively stagnant oil industry starved of muchneeded re-investment. High inflation, a recent currency devaluation, capital flight, food
shortages, and extremely high levels of homicide and criminal violence will be handed
down. National investment has been haphazard, and infrastructure has crumbled. Venezuelan society
remains polarized, overly militarized, and ripe with corruption. A fall in oil prices or a debt
crisis could send it into recession. From economic freedom to perceptions of corruption, Venezuela raced relentlessly
toward the bottom in global rankin.
*Aff*
Pressure Fails / AT Snowden Proves
Venezuela won’t adhere to pressure—South American alliances
and international law prove—most recent ev
Daly 7-12-13 (Marilyn Daly—graduate of the University of Miami with a B.A. in
Communications. She is a life long teacher and tutor in the field of History, Government,
Economics, and Law. She earned a Masters Degree from Florida International
University, and is presently the developing editor for NewsNetworkReport.com; “South
American countries unite against U.S. policies”;
http://www.examiner.com/article/south-american-countries-unite-against-u-s-policies)
Reuter reports that leaders from Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay and Bolivia will be
meeting today to discuss many issues of mutual concern, including the alleged spying by the United
States at the international level, possible asylum for Edward Snowden, and the detention of Bolivian President Evo
Moralas last week in Europe, after he was denied access to travel airspace by several European countries. Morales was
suspected of having Edward Snowden aboard his airplane, an allegation that ended up being false. Edward Snowden is
wanted by the United States on suspicion of espionage and theft, and has been formally charged by the U.S. Department of
Justice.¶ The South American group meeting today is part of Mercosur, or the “Common
Market of the South.” Mercosur is a South American Trade Bloc. It includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay, and Venezuela, with five associate members: Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, who do not have
access to all the cooperative benefits, but do receive tariff reduction in return for the same from participating countries.
Their mission is to promote free trade among the participating nations in goods and
services. Mercosur came out of the 1991 "Treaty of Asuncion" between South American nations, with hopes of creating
a union similar to the European Union, uniting all of the South America countries in a cooperative economic bloc. ¶ Ever
since the allegations that the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) targeted
many Latin American countries with spying programs, the leaders of some of these
nations want clarification and details of the extent of the spying from U.S. officials. ¶
Edward Snowden is still presently delayed at a Russian Airport evaluating his options for asylum, with many nations not
wanting to cooperate due to U.S. pressure. Nonetheless, Reuter further reports that Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias
Jaua announced:¶ "We believe that the international community must demand the right of all
citizens of the world to request asylum: diplomatic, political, humanitarian, whatever
you want to call it," "Venezuela is going to exercise its right under
international law regardless of threats, regardless of retaliation, regardless
of consequences,"
Maduro Says No
Maduro won’t give in to pressure—has to gain legitimacy
through Chavismo policies
Grais-Targow ’13 (Risa Grais-Targow is an associate in Eurasia Group's Latin
America practice. Previously, Risa covered Latin American economies for financial
clients at the Institute of International Finance, based in Washington, DC; “Maduro’s
victory is the worst possible outcome for Venezuela’s economy”; April 15, 2013;
http://qz.com/74567/maduros-victory-is-the-worst-possible-outcome-for-venezuelaseconomy/)
Further complicating matters, Maduro begins his presidency in a very difficult economic context. The economy is plagued
by sluggish economic growth (0.9% in 2013 according to local consultancy Ecoanalitica), high inflation (25% year-overyear in March), dollar and goods scarcity, stagnant oil production, and fiscal accounts that are in disarray. In this context,
Maduro will struggle to recover popularity.¶ Consequently, economic policy and political
stability will likely suffer. Maduro will be an inherently weak president, and will be under
pressure to reverse social discontent, which means he is unlikely to make needed
economic adjustments. This means that foreign exchange and price controls will likely remain in place, and
demands on state-run oil company PDVSA for financing will remain high, limiting the firm’s investment capacity.
Moreover, Maduro will be constrained in his ability to implement more pragmatic policies,
as he will need to prove his revolutionary credentials in order to legitimize his role as
heir to Chavez. In this context, Maduro will likely attempt to rally his support base by finding
common enemies. This means he will probably have to take some tough actions ,
especially towards the private sector, such as further nationalizations or more stringent
controls.¶ In this context, political dynamics will likely deteriorate further, and rapidly, which will also worsen economic
conditions, increasing the risk of political instability.
Maduro won’t cooperate—more pressure only pushes him over
the edge
O’Reilly ’13 (Andrew O’Reilly--bachelor’s degree in journalism from the University of
Pittsburgh and a joint master’s degree in journalism and Latin American studies from
New York University. His regional focus in reporting is Mexico and Central America.
Andrew now works at Fox News Latino; “U.S.-Venezuelan Relations Remain Tense
Under Maduro, Experts Claim”; April 17, 2013;
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/17/us-venezuelan-relations-remaintense-under-maduro-experts-claim/)
While the ultimate impact of the Venezuelan presidential election remains to be seen, what's for sure is that relations
between the United States and the administration of President-elect Nicolás Maduro will continue to
be as tense as under the late Hugo Chávez, experts said.¶ After voting on Sunday in a Caracas slum, Maduro
said that while he would like to reestablish relations with the U.S. “in terms
of equality and respect,” Washington will always try to undermine his rule.¶
These words followed a steady rhetoric on the campaign trail of Maduro accusing the U.S. of conspiring against him and
causing disruptions in Venezuela to unseat his rule, including working with opposition labor unions and causing electric
power blackouts. ¶ Experts argue that given Maduro’s anti-American sentiments leading up to the
election, as well as the controversy surrounding his victory and the polarization in Venezuela,
there is little
hope for a change in relations between the countries.¶ It’s hard to see [Maduro]
backing off his rhetoric in the aftermath of the election...Americans will insist on a level of respect that he is not
going to give them.¶ “It’s hard to see [Maduro] backing off his rhetoric in the aftermath of the election,” Eric Hershberg,
the director of American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, told Fox News Latino. “Americans
will insist on a level of respect that he is not going to give them.”¶ The death of Hugo Chávez put Maduro and the rest of
the Venezuelan left in a difficult position. Chávez’s charisma held the movement together and his social spending allowed
him to skirt the dicey issues of rising inflation, high crime and a fledgling economy.¶ While the current election results are
still being debated, how
Maduro faces the country’s mounting problems – both politically and
socially – are what will decide is he and Chavismo survive his six-year term.¶ In 2009, Chávez
led a successful push for a constitutional referendum that abolished term limits for the offices of President, state
governors, mayors and congress members. The previous provision established a three-term limit for deputies and a twoterm limit for the other offices, but with the 2009 referendum, Chávez – or any other leader – could ostensibly stay in
power indefinitely. ¶ Maduro does not have the charm or power to hold the Chavista movement together nor make
Venezuelans forget about the problems plaguing their nation. If Sunday’s vote is any indication, Venezuela is torn between
Chávez’s legacy and a dismal future, with the official results giving Maduro 51 percent of the vote to challenger Henrique
Capriles’ 49 percent – although opposition sources showed Capriles winning by more than 300,000 votes.¶ “Chávez could
overcome the detractors because he was viewed as a national hero, Maduro doesn’t have that,” said Larry Birns with the
Council for Hemispheric Affairs.¶ To maintain his credibility within the Chavista movement and fend off
opponents from within his own party, Maduro needs to maintain his opposition to the
U.S. and continue to paint Americans as imperialist intruders, experts said.¶ “He’s
got to worry about the opponents that will pose a threat to his rule,” Birns said. “These are difficult times for Maduro and
no one knows how the scenario will play out.Ӧ For its part, the United States is not in better shape when it comes to its
relations with Venezuela – or other Latin American nations. Diplomatic disputes with Venezuela and touchy relations with
neighboring Bolivia and Ecuador have led to a schism between the United States and the countries in the Bolivarian
Alliance for the Americas.¶ Hershberg said that the Obama administration's refusal to accept the official results of
Venezuela's election will not only anger Maduro, but could be viewed as hypocritical in the light of the scandal
surrounding the uncounted votes during the 2000 U.S. presidential election that saw George W. Bush defeat Al Gore. ¶ The
U.S. has a long history of political involvement – both overtly and covertly – in elections throughout Latin America.¶
“For the Americans to say this only 12 years after Bush. V. Gore is remarkable,” he said.
"Latin America looked at the U.S. and said that the U.S. will never again be able to tell us
how to conduct our elections.”¶ “This makes them look absurd,” he added, about the State Department’s refusal
to recognize the election of Maduro.¶ The State Department said it was "difficult to understand" why the commission
certified ruling party candidate Nicolás Maduro as the winner in the absence of a recount, which challenger Henrique
Capriles is demanding.¶ It also condemned the post-election violence that has killed at least seven people and injured 61.¶
In a televised broadcast Tuesday, Justice Minister Nestor Reverol accused Capriles of numerous crimes, including
insurrection and civil disobedience.¶ Maduro blamed Capriles personally.¶ "You are responsible for the dead we are
mourning," he said, calling Capriles "the defeated candidate."¶ Government officials have been alleging since Monday that
Capriles is plotting a coup, and President-elect Maduro announced that he was prohibiting an opposition march scheduled
for Wednesday in the capital.¶ On Tuesday Capriles' supporters protested in cities including Merida and Maracay.
No Solvency—Maduro Recognition
Failure to recognize Maduro guts solvency—seen as an act of
belligerence
CSM ‘13 (Christian Science Monitor; “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on
Washington's recognition”;
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-stillwaiting-on-Washington-s-recognition)
More than a month after Venezuela’s contested presidential election, President Nicolás Maduro’s narrow victory
has yet to be recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial
recount of the vote is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a
relationship historically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo Chávez. ¶ A
handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over the democratic standards of the
election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. Venezuela’s opposition party is calling for the
results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavistastrongholds to polling booth intimidation.¶ “Obviously, if there are huge irregularities we are going to
have serious questions about the viability of that government,” said Secretary of State John
Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following the announcement of President Maduro’s victory
in April.¶ While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to
recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how – if at all – it will
impact Venezuela post-Chávez.¶ “[The US isn’t] recognizing or failing to recognize,” says David Smilde, professor of
sociology at the University of Georgia. “They’re just waiting. But here in Venezuela that’s seen as an act of
belligerence.”
Recognizing Maduro is a pre-requisite to counterplan solvency—
pressure fails absent recognition
Carlsen ’13 (Laura Carlsen—director of the Americas Policy Program in Mexico City
and journalist for Foreign Policy In Focus; “US Efforts to Block Democracy in Venezuela
Harm Hemispheric Relations”; May 2, 2013;
https://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/05/02-8)
At worst, it is an example of U.S. external pressure that encourages a break
with the rule of law and violates the principle of self-determination that
President Barack Obama claims to uphold .¶ This is the first time the U.S. government has refused to
recognize a Venezuelan election result, as Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Political Research points out.
Weisbrot notes, “Washington's efforts to de-legitimise the election mark a significant escalation of US efforts at regime
change in Venezuela. Not since its involvement in the 2002 military coup has the US government done this much to
promote open conflict in Venezuela.Ӧ The Obama administration is bending over backwards to spur on an opposition
movement that has no virtually legal leg to stand on in its desire for new presidential elections. There are some indications
that the strategy to refuse to accept defeat at the polls was considered even before the close vote. Although Capriles
conceded rapidly and gracefully to former President Hugo Chavez in the presidential elections last fall, it was a bad omen
when he refused to sign a pre-electoral pact to respect the results prior to this election.¶ Now violent opposition protests in
the streets have led to the deaths of nine people. Maduro has attended the funerals of his supporters killed in the
disturbances with vows to defend his victory and prosecute those inciting and participating in violent acts. Health clinics
established by Chavez have been frequent targets.¶ It is highly unlikely that Capriles would stake his
future on rejecting legal electoral institutions if he did not have the support of the U.S.
government. It is even more unlikely that he could sustain a movement for non-recognition. Even many members of
his own coalition will not go so far as to say they honestly believe he won the April 14th elections. The other countries of
the region recognized Maduro as the new president within hours of the results. Not only did the left-leaning governments
provide their diplomatic welcome, but also Colombia, Mexico, and other nations closely allied with the United States.¶
Capriles’ actions and de facto U.S. support for prolonging post-electoral unrest not only
endanger peace and stability in Venezuela, but also potentially the entire region. Venezuela
is a geopolitical hub—for its oil, for its role in building south-south integration projects like ALBA and Unasur, for its
solidarity trade pacts, and for its defiance of U.S. hegemony.¶ To illegally disrupt the constitutional order there will not be
as easy as it was in Honduras, where even a broad opposition movement couldn’t restore the constitutionally elected
president after a right-wing coup in 2009. Inevitably, nations
across the hemisphere and the world will
react with anger if the Obama administration decides to maintain this course, both in defense
of their neighbor Venezuela and also in what they see as a threat to their own sovereignty. Already former Brazilian
president Lula da Silva has warned that
"Americans should take care of their own business
a little and let us decide our own destiny." ¶ The longer the United States remains
globally isolated in its refusal to accept Venezuela’s election results, the longer the
instability, uncertainty, and violence will continue. Extending the conflict could very well end up
unnecessarily costing more lives.¶ The Obama administration should consider that its stubbornness about what it
considers an adverse election result in a foreign country is a direct cause of bloodshed. It harms relations with
our hemispheric neighbors and partners and sows the seeds of distrust and enmity in a region where we have a
good chance at building cooperation on issues of vital importance to all of our countries. Venezuela’s elections must be
accepted at once to show that the United States will uphold democratic processes and the rule of law, even when its
government is not particularly pleased with the results.
Only Cooperation Solves
Any type of threat will harm relations—only cooperation solves
Venezuelan Embassy ’13 (“Calixto Ortega Designated as Chief of Venezuelan
Embassy in Washington”; 4/24/2013; http://venezuela-us.org/2013/04/24/calixtoortega-designated-as-chief-of-venezuelan-embassy-in-washington/)
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro announced Tuesday his decision to name Deputy Calixto Ortega as charge d’affaires
for Venezuela in the United States.¶ “For some time I have been evaluating naming a new charge d’affaires at our Embassy
in Washington and I have decided to name Deputy Calixto Ortega as the new charge d’affaires
so that he can increase dialogue with US society,” Maduro said at a meeting with governors at Miraflores
Presidential Palace in Caracas.¶ Dialogue in the US, he said, should include “universities, the academic world, the social
world, unions, the African-American community, the Latino community, the Congress, senators, representatives, the
economic world, economic and commercial sectors with which we have relationships.”¶ “Calixto Ortega is a man
with a lot of experience and knowledge of US society and we believe he can play an
important role in bringing the truth about Venezuela [to the United States] to continue
opening up understanding so that, sooner rather than later, there is respect for Latin
America, the Caribbean, respect for the Bolivarian Revolution.Ӧ The head of state said
that the Venezuelan government wants to have the best possible relations with all governments
around the world, including the United States, but on the basis of respect.¶ “There
cannot be any type of threats,”
he said.¶ To the US government,
Maduro said: “If you
want to have relations based on respect, conversations, cooperation, that’s
welcome.”
Pressure Fails—Maduro
Status quo rhetoric guts solvency—more pressure only
emboldens Maduro’s Anti-American stance and wrecks relations
Oppenheimer ’13 (Andres Oppenheimer is an Argentine journalist who resides in
the United States. He is the Latin American editor and syndicated foreign affairs
columnist with The Miami Herald. His column, "The Oppenheimer Report," appears
twice a week in The Miami Herald and more than 60 U.S. and foreign newspapers;
“Andres Oppenheimer: Venezuela Vice President Maduro will raise anti-U.S. rhetoric —
for now”; 3/6/13; http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/06/3270595/maduro-willraise-anti-us-rhetoric.html)
With record inflation and skyrocketing crime rates, Venezuela’s Vice President Nicolas Maduro’s best bet to win
Venezuela’s upcoming elections will be to campaign on late President Hugo Chávez’s memory, and to raise tensions with
Washington.¶ He has already started.¶ On Tuesday, shortly before announcing Chávez’s cancer-related death, Maduro
— the Venezuelan government’s candidate for elections expected within the next 30 days — suggested that the United
States had “inoculated” Chávez’s with the cancer.¶ At the same time, he expelled two U.S. diplomats from
Venezuela. Maduro was in full campaign mode when he made those claims, U.S. officials say. The vice president, a
former bus driver and union leader who was designated by Chávez as his political heir, needs to cast himself as a
hard-line “anti-imperialist” leader both to keep the Chavista movement united, and to
rally Venezuelans behind him against an imaginary U.S. threat, they say.¶ The Obama
administration has turned the other cheek on Maduro’s accusations. It has categorically denied having caused Chávez’s
death, and called the charge “absurd.”¶ Interestingly, Maduro and the U.S. State Department’s top official in charge of
Latin American affairs, Roberta Jacobson, had discussed improving bilateral relations during a telephone conversation as
recently as late last year.¶ In a Nov. 21 telephone call initiated by Jacobson, Maduro had suggested restoring the two
countries’ ambassadors. Jacobson, in turn, had proposed a step-by-step approach to upgrade relations, starting with
counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism cooperation measures, the U.S. official said at the time.¶ On Wednesday, I asked
Jacobson why she thinks Maduro made his claim earlier this week that the U.S. government had “inoculated’’ Chávez with
cancer.¶ “We find it really unfortunate that at a time when we were, and are, seeking a more productive relationship with
Venezuela, they use this kind of rhetoric publicly and expel two of our officials,” Jacobson said. “It’s disappointing. But we
remain interested in having a productive relationship with Venezuela.”¶ Jacobson didn’t want to speculate on Maduro’s
motives, but other well-placed Venezuela watchers in Washington see it is as an obvious electoral ploy.¶ Maduro, a former
bus driver who is very close to Cuba’s military government, does not have Chávez’s charisma, and does not have a record
to run on. And with Venezuela’s inflation and crime rates reaching record highs, his best hope to win the election is
capitalizing on Chávez’s popularity, and showing that he is as tough on the Gringos as Chávez was, they say.¶ “The
harder days in U.S.-Venezuelan relations are not behind us, but ahead of us,” says Carl
Meacham, Americas Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., and until
recently a senior analyst with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¶ “Maduro is shoring up political
support within Chavismo,” Meacham added. “ His charges against the United States
and his expulsion of the two U.S. diplomats were his way of telling his
followers, “I’m like Chávez.” We can expect his rhetoric to get worse in coming weeks.”¶ My opinion: I
agree that Maduro is likely to raise his “anti-imperialist’’ rhetoric during the campaign, but I wouldn’t be surprised if he
resumes his amicable dialogue with the Obama administration afterward should he win the elections, as now seems
likely.¶ Right now, Maduro is following Chávez’s script of provoking confrontations and
inventing domestic and foreign conspiracies, so as to present himself as the protector of the fatherland
and cast his political rivals as alleged U.S. stooges. It’s a script that Chávez followed for the past 14 years, and that worked
well for him.¶ But Maduro is pretty much managed by remote control from Cuba — which has depended on Chávez’s petro
dollars to keep the island’s economy afloat — and the Cuban regime’s top priority will be helping Maduro consolidate
power at home, and maintaining stability in Venezuela.¶ Cuba will probably tell Maduro, “You have a divided Chavismo,
growing economic problems and a serious crime epidemic on the streets. The last thing you need now is it to open a new
front by stirring up trouble with Washington.Ӧ So Cuba will be among the most interested in preventing a larger U.S.Venezuelan confrontation. But before getting better,
worse.
U.S.-Venezuelan ties are likely to get
Mexico---Consult Canada
Top Level
1NC Canada CP
Consultation with Canada on Mexican economic engagement
Ayon et al. 9 (David R. Ayon, is a political analyst and writer, who serves as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for the
Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University and as the U.S. Director of the Focus Mexico/Enfoque México Project. Robert
Donnely, is Program Associate of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and was previously the Coordinator of the Justice in
Mexico Project at the University of San Diego's Transborder Institute. Dolia Estevez, is a career journalist who currently writes tor Poder
magazine and El Semanario and serves as the consulting coordinator of the U.S.-Mexico Journalism Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson
Center. Eric Olson, is Senior Advisor to the Security Initiative of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and has held senior
positions at the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and the Washington Office on Latin America. Andrew Seele, is
Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University. “THE UNITED STATES
AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, January 2009,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf)
Crises offer challenges and opportunities ¶ for long term strategies. The current downturn ¶
highlights, perhaps more than other times in the ¶ past, the need for better macroeconomic policy ¶
consultation and short-term crisis management ¶ mechanisms to avoid sudden shocks
to the ¶ economies of both countries by developments ¶ that take place on either side of
the border. ¶ History shows us that each country benefits from ¶ its partner’s
success and each is diminished by ¶ the other’s problems. The United States has
a ¶ vested interest in Mexico’s economic and social ¶ stability and long-term health, given
the impact ¶ that Mexico’s economy has on U.S. exports and ¶ on migration. Financial
mismanagement and ¶ insufficient regulation in the United States have ¶ had a direct impact in Mexico. And although ¶
good macroeconomic management has allowed ¶ Mexico’s economy to grow gradually since the late ¶ 1990s, the lack
of
attention to crucial structural ¶ reforms, including rule of law, competition policy, ¶ tax
collection, labor laws, primary and secondary ¶ education, energy and monopolies have
limited the potential for growth and highlighted weaknesses ¶ in Mexico’s economy.23
Insufficient investment in ¶ infrastructure and human capital create long-term ¶ drags on the Mexican economy and, in
turn, limit ¶ the potential for economic growth, with secondary ¶ effects on the U.S. economy. While these are ¶
essentially matters of domestic policy in each ¶ country, both governments have a
vested interest in ¶ improving communication , pursuing a more viable ¶ process
of engagement on macroeconomic policy and ¶ maintaining a critical
dialogue about the need for ¶ sound economic policies in both countries.
Given the importance that bilateral ¶ economic integration has for economic growth ¶ and
development in both countries, the two ¶ governments could do far more to
maintain highlevel attention on the best ways of managing this ¶ relationship.
hee principal institutional framework ¶ for economic dialogue in recent years has been ¶ the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP); ¶ however, the issues related to
security have almost ¶ always trumped those related to prosperity, and ¶ the design of the
process has largely excluded ¶ most important stakeholders in the economic ¶ relationship
between the two countries. Similarly, ¶ the labor and environmental commissions, which ¶ were designed parallel to NAFTA, have been left ¶ to languish with
insufficient funding and unclear ¶ mandates. The North American Development ¶ Bank (NADBank), created as a parallel tool for development for Mexico and the United States, ¶ has only a
. A new ¶ U.S. administration brings the
opportunity to ¶ deepen the process of consultation and dialogue ¶ and to assess
limited mandate and is far from meeting ¶ the larger challenges the two countries face
the effectiveness of existing bilateral ¶ institutions. "The two countries, together and
in ¶ partnership with Canada , have an opportunity to ¶ design new
institutional arrangements that ensure ¶ high-level communication and
problem-solving on ¶ economic issues and allow them to address major ¶
challenges that economic integration produces.¶ Mexico and the United States
would benefit ¶ from an enhanced dialogue on economic policy, ¶ including closer
consultation
in dealing with ¶ economic shocks.
Much of the work that needs to ¶ be done on each side
of the border to invigorate ¶ both economies requires unilateral action by each ¶ government, but ongoing dialogue between them ¶ could help encourage
Keeping the bilateral relationship in mind when¶ pursuing measures to
stabilize the economy ¶ during a crisis. Because major shifts in monetary ¶ and fiscal policy
in one country can have sharp ¶ effects on the other, prior consultation can ¶ mitigate
cooperation. Policy options ¶ include:¶
secondary effects across the border. ¶ Institutionalizing periodic consultations
between ¶ the Secretary of the Treasury and Mexico’s ¶ Finance Minister
through regular yearly meetings ¶ with their Canadian counterpart .
Extraordinary ¶ meetings can be called for in moments of crisis . ¶
NB—Politics
Canada says yes and the CP avoids the link to politics
Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where
he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His
research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies.
Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf)
How would such a proactive and comprehensive approach to continental security be
received by the two partners in the process? One could speculate that it would be received
with enthusiasm by both but for different reasons. To the extent that the Canadian
contributions aligned themselves with established Americans strategies and measures,
the United States would welcome the approach for all of the reasons provided previously
and for the added benefit that it would reduce the commitment of American resources.
Having Canadian participation would also provide political cover
domestically and internationally with the associated positive political
effects. That this type of cooperation is already under consideration by Canada and the United States is evidenced by
the discussions between US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and Canadian Minister of National Defence Peter McKay
on joint military co-operation relating to continental defence, including anti-drug efforts and weapons control at their
meeting in Halifax on 18 November, 2011.33
Mexico would likely welcome Canadian
participation as well if only for the reason that it would reduce American participation and presence on issues of
vital Mexican interests. This position is supported also by the fact that Mexican public opinion polls since 2004 have
consistently put Canada at, or near, the top of the list of most popular foreign countries by both the general public and the
informed elite that regularly considers Mexican foreign policy.34 While the implementation of a visa requirement may
have dampened this affection somewhat, a large portion of the Mexican population see Canada as a positive example of a
smaller state that has successfully resisted integration with a more powerful neighbour and maintained its sovereignty in
the face of sometimes daunting pressure.35 There may also be some benefits and synergies for the Mexicans in the ways
that Canadians approach governance, security and judicial issues. Lastly, the Mexicans may appreciate what is often a less
intrusive approach to providing assistance to our friends and allies. There would also be several
benefits to Canadian interests of adopting this strategy. First, it would put
Canadians “at the table” when issues central to continental security are
discussed with the result that Canadian governments would be informed and current
on the thoughts and actions of their continental allies and in the best position as
possible to influence their actions and decisions in those areas vital to
Canadian interests. Such participation in a variety of security, governance, and judicial capacities would also
provide invaluable experience and develop expertise in addressing threats and situations that while not directly affecting
Canadians at present, clearly threaten to do so in the future. Along these lines, Canada would be doing what it
has always done in the realm of national security, addressing the threat before it
actually reaches our shores, or in this case, our borders.
Exts – doesn’t link to ptx
Avoids politics - no congressional oversight and no attention
Corsi 10 (Jerome R., a Harvard Ph.D in Poli Sci, “Towards a North American Union? Removed from the
Public Eye, Top Level Consultations behind Closed Doors”, December 2010,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/towards-a-north-american-union-removed-from-the-public-eye-top-levelconsultations-behind-closed-doors/22545)
With little attention from mainstream media, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met
with the foreign ministers of Canada and Mexico in a North American Foreign Ministers
Meeting in Quebec, Canada. The Dec. 13 meeting is a prelude to the next North American
Summit Leaders meeting in 2011, a yet unscheduled trilateral summit that is the continuation of the
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. Under the low-key format, the continental
meetings have been carried out with little fanfare and outside of
congressional oversight.
NB—North American Integration
Trilateral cooperation is key to North American economic
integration
Barrio-Terrazas 12 – Francisco is the Mexican Ambassador to Canada. (“North America: Continental
competitiveness, trilateral cooperation”, Jan/Feb 2012, http://www.2020magazine.ca/en/magazine/january-february2012/north-america-continental-competitiveness-trilateral-co-operation/, Callahan)
Our common objective was clear: we needed to cement historical trends in the movement of
people, goods and capital among our three countries. That shared dream resulted in the largest
free trade zone in the world, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since then, integration has
been the true spirit of our partnership. NAFTA has been widely criticized and highly praised, but outcomes
have undoubtedly been positive: the creation of more than 40 million jobs; trade flows have tripled to an estimated value
of $1 trillion US this year; our combined GDP has doubled, and we have developed some of the most competitive supply
chains in the world. Mexico is Canada's third largest partner and the third largest for the US as well. The three nations
have learned that the best way to compete successfully is by -capitalizing on each other's
-competitive advantages. Since NAFTA came into effect in 1994, other regions and countries have intensified the
negotiation of regional and bilateral agreements with more than 489 FTAs that have been notified to the WTO. This trend
urges us to move faster by adapting our strengths and experiences to the new global conditions and challenges.
Unfortunately, our response in the face of this changing scenario has fallen short of meeting
the true needs of our industries and citizens; our leadership in the international context
has faded. The surge of security as a top priority and the new economic global order, where emerging economies will
lead growth, have deviated our focus as a single block. Canada has evolved, the US has changed, Mexico
has transformed, but contrary to the spirit of the NAFTA, the new dynamic emerging in
North America seems to run in the opposite direction. The North American region has
lost competitiveness vis-a-vis other regions: our share in global markets has decreased from 19 per cent in
2000 to 12.9 per cent in 2010, while the Asia-Pacific region (including India) has increased its market participation from
29.6 per cent to 35.4 per cent in the same period. In December, Canada and the US signed an historic
agreement on security and economic competitiveness and Mexico has intensified its
bilateral approach with the US — both efforts geared toward addressing the specific
issues that prevail along our shared borders. However, if we closely review each initiative, common
ground is identifiable. Key elements like competitiveness, the necessity to diversify markets, security, trade
facilitation, transportation and infrastructure, energy, and regional supply chains are in our common interest; let us avoid
dealing with them from a partial perspective. Bilateralism is undeniable and unavoidable in the global context, but we
must not forget that North America is the keystone in our integration process. Bilateralism is a part of the
equation, not the whole. Mexico maintains its firm conviction to preserve the trilateral vision in our relationship.
We are convinced that by working together, an extensive and ambitious agenda focused on
competitiveness will be of benefit for the region. NAFTA has been a key element in opening new
markets, bolstering innovation and enhancing our supply chains. This is not only an inward commitment; we must
visualize the North American region as a unique body competing successfully in the
international field. Global market forces are moving quickly and determinedly. The world is on the verge of
witnessing the emergence of the most ambitious trade and economic integration initiative of recent years, a process that
will involve countries across the Pacific Rim and incorporate modern principles — the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Asia is
projected to be the new engine of economic growth. Canada, Mexico and the US are facing a new
opportunity to demonstrate our capacity to capitalize on our joint strength . During the last
APEC Leaders Meeting in Hawaii, Mexico and Canada officially expressed our intention to participate in this process led
by the US. Mexico is convinced that maximum benefits can be reaped only if we act jointly. For Mexico and Canada, active
participation in this process represents a unique opportunity to access new markets and share in the benefits of this
outstanding co-operation zone. The most renowned economic research agencies have -recognized
Mexico as one of the largest -economies for the coming years. We can -supply the US and
Canadian markets in -shorter times and we can jointly -produce under competitive cost
-conditions; these realities must be recognized by our North American -partners . It is
imperative that we -urgently -mobilize to work together in a streamlined -approach aimed
at -recovering our global presence and influence. The three countries share borders and
an entrepreneurial culture, which -obliges us to co-operate and recoup our joint position.
Canada, Mexico and the US must work together, -transforming -institutions, -creating
-common -strategies and - renewing -trilateral dialogue -mechanisms . We must lead
our -industries and -address the needs of our citizenry by -attending to their -requirements, -providing the certainty they
require for long-term planning, we must -create jobs and attract -investment; their real goals must -supersede -short-term
events. Better results will be achieved if North America's countries work from a -common
ground. Beyond the border must run from the Usumacinta River to the Arctic, crossing the Rio Grande and the Great
Lakes. Let's produce and buy North America.
NB—Competitiveness Impact
North America is uniquely key
Pastor 13 – Robert is a Professor and Founding Director of the Center for North American Studies at American
University. (“Shortcut to U.S. Economic Competitiveness: A Seamless North American Market”, March 2013,
http://www.cfr.org/competitiveness/shortcut-us-economic-competitiveness-seamless-north-american-market/p30132,
Callahan)
In looking abroad to promote economic growth, the United States need go no further
than its two closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico. But the three governments have failed
to pursue collaborative efforts to address a new generation of issues that were not
anticipated by the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Instead of tackling new transnational
problems such as regulatory harmonization together, the United States and its neighbors reverted to old
habits of bilateral, ad hoc negotiations. Instead of forging a unified competitiveness strategy toward the
European Union and East Asia, each government has negotiated on its own. The three North American governments
should create a seamless market, one in which it is as easy and cheap for a Chicago merchant to sell products in Monterrey
as in San Francisco. This requires negotiating a common external tariff, eliminating restrictions on transportation and
services, funding new continental infrastructure, and fostering a sense of community among the publics of the three
countries that will also enhance the region's influence in negotiations with Asia and Europe. One estimate suggests that
the benefits to the three countries would exceed $400 billion. The Case For a North American Market With rising
competitive pressures from overseas and weak growth at home,
the quickest external route to
economic recovery and enhanced competitiveness is to stretch the U.S. market
to include 113 million Mexicans and 34 million Canadians. The Obama administration has made it a
priority to complete the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Asia and has announced its intention to launch a new U.S.European Union Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. But the administration has neglected its
two neighbors despite the fact that their combined product is more than six times that of other TPP countries and
that U.S. exports to them exceed those to the EU. Mexico and Canada are already the United States'
two largest export markets, its two largest sources of energy imports, and in the case of
Mexico, the largest source of immigrants. The three countries also make products together. Unlike U.S.
trade with most other countries, roughly 25 to 40 percent of the value of U.S. imports from
Canada and Mexico comes from components made in the United States, and then
assembled into finished goods in one of the two countries. Closer integration would
translate into a more efficient supply chain and improved competitiveness. With labor costs in
China rising to those in Mexico, and the cost of transportation across the Pacific increasing, a North American
supply chain is not only more efficient than an Asian route, but it could also become a
strong export platform to Asia. Moreover, if the United States seeks a unified approach to trade negotiations
with Mexico and Canada, Asia and Europe will recognize that Washington has other options,
and prospects for concluding transpacific and transatlantic trade deals would likely
improve. For example, in the 1990s, world trade talks were stalemated until NAFTA was signed. Where NAFTA Went
Astray North America was on track to create a competitive market in the 1990s. The most
rapid job expansion in recent U.S. history occurred between 1993 and 2001. This
coincided with the onset of NAFTA and the end of most trade and investment barriers
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Trade tripled and foreign direct investment grew
fivefold. But 2001 proved to be a turning point for North America just as the outlines of a
continental market were becoming visible. Growth in trade has since declined by twothirds and foreign investment by half.
Competitiveness is key to solve global nuclear war
Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan,
Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director
of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992 “The Economy and
National Security” http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-andnational-security-zalmay-khalilzad?pg=3)
Today, economic and fiscal trends
pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’
position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the
economies of rival powers are developing rapidly . The continuation of these two
trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar
global system , leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among
the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business
cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of
debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of creditfueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed,
and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S.
government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three
years.Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach
dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger
than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut
economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for
U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis
that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios
would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and
France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their
empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east
of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to
their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and
allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be
compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international
commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth.
Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic
problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends
could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is
not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the
United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major
powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another,
and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher
risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the
great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been
unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars
among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American
retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional
powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a
heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation , or other crises spiraling into
all-out conflict . Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their
geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive
moves in their regions. As rival powers rise,
Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of
great-power competition . Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military
buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite
capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United
States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s
expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea —
have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the
most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.
Econ decline causes war
ROYAL 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense
[Jedediah Royal, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of
War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of
external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of
economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been
considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level.
Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms
in
the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the
often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks
such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin.
19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of
miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of
power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may
seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global
economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and
small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security
conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that
'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of
states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic
view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly
for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict
increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises
could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist
moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline
and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong
correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of
economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn
internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a
recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external
conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has
also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a,
2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions .
Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary
theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline,
sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military
conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg.
Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti)
correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards
diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are
generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided
evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity,
are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively
correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises,
whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al
systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not
featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves
Exts—Integration I/L
The CP is key to revitalize NAFTA and integration—bilateralism
fails
Belanger 10 – Louis Bélanger has been an adjunct professor in the department of Political Science at Laval
University, and also was a research associate of the Institute of International Studies. (“Canada, Mexico and the Future of
Trilateralism in North America”, February 2, 2010,
http://www.fss.ulaval.ca/cms/upload/pol/fichiers/north_american_dialogue_no8_louis_belanger[9].pdf, Callahan)
Many of its critics maintain that North-American trilateralism is flawed because there is
no real community of interests between Canada and Mexico ―beyond the NAFTA treaty
itself‖ (Daudelin 2003, p. 10; see also From Correct to Inspired 2009, p. 15). In this short paper, I will argue, rather,
that NAFTA‘s preservation and maintenance is, in itself, more than a sufficient reason for
Canada and Mexico to commit to a trilateral agenda. Furthermore, recognition of this common interest
should lead Canada and Mexico to strategically develop more substantive bilateral relations. If Canada and
Mexico are not able to get their act together and pursue a coordinated trilateral strategy
in defence of the NAFTA advantage, they will lose it. This will happen for three reasons. First, if
nothing is done, NAFTA‘s comparative edge will erode as its provisions will become obsolete
and outmatched by more ambitious trade agreements negotiated by the United States or
overseas regional blocs. Second, if something is to be done about it, it is highly inconceivable that a
solution could be negotiated bilaterally; concessions offered by Washington to Ottawa
will also have to be offered to Mexico City, and vice versa. Furthermore, the type of
institutions that will be needed to secure the NAFTA advantage cannot realistically be
decoupled along bilateral lines. Third, due to evident asymmetries in power and relative dependence,
Washington will not take the initiative in favour of a reinvigorated North American free trade area. The initiative will have
to come from the smaller partners and will probably be ignored if Canada and Mexico do not push in the same direction.
Consultation is key – solves North American integration
Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American
Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU
where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs
on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a
Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”,
2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf)
North America’s model of integration is different from Europe’s. It respects the market more and trusts bureaucracy less.
Still, some institutions are needed to develop continental proposals, monitor progress,
and enforce compliance. The three leaders should institutionalize summit
meetings at least annually, and they should establish a North American commission composed
of independent and distinguished leaders from academia, civil society, business, labor, and agriculture and with an
independent research capacity. The commission should offer continental proposals to the three leaders. The leaders
would continue to be staffed by their respective governments, but they would respond to
a continental, rather than a dual-bilateral, agenda. The commission should develop a North American
plan for transportation and infrastructure and plans on labor, agriculture, the environment, energy, immigration, drug
trafficking, and borders. The three heads of state must also commit to building a new
consciousness, a new way of thinking about one’s neighbors and about the continental
agenda. Americans, Canadians, and Mexicans can be nationals and North Americans at
the same time. Indeed, an appreciation of one’s neighbors as part of a compelling North
American idea could enhance the prestige of each country. To educate a new generation of students
to think North American, each country should begin by supporting a dozen centers for North American studies. Each
center should educate students, undertake research, and foster exchanges with other North American universities for both
students and faculty. This is a formidable agenda that could transform North
America and each of its states. It is not possible without a vision, and it is not feasible without
real leadership and credible institutions. But with all three, a North American Community can be built.
The existence of such a community would mean that the United States would consult
its neighbors on important issues that affected them. It would mean that Canada would work
closely with Mexico to build rule-based institutions and to develop a formula for closing the development gap. It would
mean that Mexico would undertake reforms to make good use of the additional resources.
Exts—Competitiveness
Key to us economic growth and competitiveness
Alden 12 – Edward Alden is a Bernard L Schwartz Senior Fellow at CFR. (“The North American Market: A
Competitive Edge That Shouldn’t Be Squandered”, June 8, 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/06/08/thenorth-american-market-a-competitive-edge-that-shouldnt-be-squandered/, Callahan)
If there’s a golden rule for economic competitiveness, it’s this: “ Always
exploit your advantages .” Yet
United States has systematically undermined one of its biggest – our
proximity to a wealthy, resource-rich partner to the north and a developing, labor-rich
partner to the south. Robert Pastor’s fine recent book The North American Idea, makes a compelling case that the
strong U.S. economic growth of the 1990s was directly linked to growing economic
integration with Canada and Mexico, and that the weak growth of past decade is in no
small part the result of disintegration, brought about largely by unwarranted fears over NAFTA and the
unfortunate U.S. response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Two documents released this week drive that home. The first is a
paper by Erik Lee of the North American Center for Transborder Studies and Christopher E.
Wilson of the Woodrow Wilson Institute called “The State of Trade, Competitiveness and Economic Wellbeing in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region.” It lays out succinctly the benefits of what is essentially a
joint production system between the two countries in sectors like automobiles,
aerospace, and medical devices, with a supply chain that straddles the border. Crossborder production has allowed for more efficient location of business activities in ways
that enhance productivity, lower costs, and help North American-based companies to
compete more effectively with Asia and Europe.
for more than a decade, the
Most qualified
PRN 09 – PRNewswire is a news agency that is citing a report by ASU experts. (“Obama Administration
Urged to 'Seize North American Opportunities' on Security and Competitiveness”, Feb 10, 2009,
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/obama-administration-urged-to-seize-north-americanopportunities-on-security-and-competitiveness-65715702.html, Callahan)
WASHINGTON, Feb. 10 /PRNewswire/ -- As President Obama prepares for his first foreign presidential trip to Canada on
leading experts in the U.S., Canada and Mexico are urging his administration to
strengthen U.S. partnerships with its neighbors on challenges ranging from border
security to global competitiveness and environmental protection. Their recommendations were
Feb. 19,
released today in a report entitled "North America Next: Report to President Obama on Building Sustainable Security and
Competitiveness". The report, prepared by the Arizona State University's North American
Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS), represents more than a year of intensive
consultations by its consortium of leading experts and universities in the three countries.
"Despite the multiple crises facing the new administration," NACTS Director Rick Van Schoik said recognition of
the "urgency next door" is required "because a number of significant challenges facing
the United States also have created unprecedented North American opportunities for
enhancing our nation's competitiveness, security and sustainability. Almost 40 million jobs were
created in the US, Canada and Mexico between 1993-2007," he noted, "and today Canada and Mexico are
respectively the first- and third-ranked trading partners and foreign suppliers to the U.S.
Our challenge should not be to undo NAFTA," Van Schoik added, "but to build a North
American strategy for the 21st century, one that generates economic development and
job creation for all three nations. Post-9/11 border congestion has left the U.S. in many ways poorer, less
secure and with major environmental challenges in the border region itself, Van Schoik said. One estimate cited a $7.2
billion annual output loss, or the equivalent of 62,000 jobs, between just two border sister cities in 2007 due to border
congestion, traffic and paperwork. In contrast, Van Schoik said "smart infrastructure investments can simultaneously
enhance U.S. and North American security, competitiveness and sustainability by creating jobs, enhancing outdated
infrastructure and facilitating faster and 'greener' trade." Other urgent challenges cited by Van Schoik include:
The necessity of increasing global competitiveness with other trading blocs, a vital
element for sustainable economic recovery. Security threats to North America from the narcoinsurgency
waged by Mexican organized crime that is raging along the border, fuelled by guns and cash from the U.S. Rapidly
accelerating climate change that underscores the need to not only deal with emissions, but also water shortages and lost
biodiversity. The prospect of "achieving energy security next door, not an ocean away, if we do a few things right...and
right now." Mexico's difficult commitment to economic, legal, and political reform, which "offers a vital window of
opportunity that simply must be supported, as potential risks and benefits extend far beyond its borders."
UQ—Canada Relations Low
Relations low
Hampson, Chancellor’s Professor and Director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton
University, 7/21/2012
(Fen Osler H. and Derek Burney, Senior Strategic Adviser at Norton Rose Canada,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/how-obama-lost-canada)
Obama’s choice marked a triumph of campaign posturing over pragmatism and diplomacy, and it brought U.S.-Canadian
relations to their lowest point in decades. It was hardly the first time that the administration has fumbled
issues with Ottawa. Although relations have been civil, they have rarely been productive. Whether on
trade, the environment, or Canada’s shared contribution in places such as Afghanistan, time and again the United
States has jilted its northern neighbor. If the pattern of neglect continues, Ottawa will get
less interested in cooperating with Washington. Already, Canada has reacted by turning
elsewhere -- namely, toward Asia -- for more reliable economic partners. Economically, Canada and
the United States are joined at the hip. Each country is the other’s number-one trading
partner -- in 2011, the two-way trade in goods and services totaled $681 billion, more than U.S. trade with Mexico or
China -- and trade with Canada supports more than eight million U.S. jobs. Yet the Obama administration has
recently jeopardized this important relationship. It failed to combat the Buy American provision in
Congress’ stimulus bill, which inefficiently excluded Canadian participation in infrastructure spending. What’s more, by
engaging in protectionism, Washington has violated the substance and spirit of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the trade bloc formed in 1994 among Canada, the
United States, and Mexico. As a result, NAFTA, which was initially intended as a template for broader trade
expansion by all three partners, has languished while each country has negotiated a spaghetti
bowl of bilateral trade agreements with other countries. Trilateral economic summits
among the NAFTA partners have become little more than photo-ops accompanied by
bland communiqués. Bilateral meetings between U.S. and Canadian leaders, which were a regular feature of
the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush eras, have also mostly fallen by the wayside. Meanwhile, the United
States demanded upfront concessions from Canada as the price of entry to negotiations
over the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a regional free-trade group, while preserving massive
agriculture subsidies of its own. The protracted wrangling over a seat at the table does not augur well for
meaningful progress. After years of procrastination, Canada finally secured an agreement for a new Detroit-Windsor
bridge -- over which 25 percent of trade between Canada and the United States crosses -- but only after it offered to cover
all of the initial costs. The U.S. share is to be repaid over time by the tolls collected, but any shortfalls will rest with
Canadian taxpayers. Canada was essentially forced to hold negotiations with Michigan; the U.S. federal government
observed quietly from the sidelines.
Solvency
2NC – Solvency
Trilateral consultation is key to effectiveness – takes out the aff
Ayon et al. 9 (David R. Ayon, is a political analyst and writer, who serves as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for the
Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University and as the U.S. Director of the Focus Mexico/Enfoque México Project. Robert
Donnely, is Program Associate of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and was previously the Coordinator of the Justice in
Mexico Project at the University of San Diego's Transborder Institute. Dolia Estevez, is a career journalist who currently writes tor Poder
magazine and El Semanario and serves as the consulting coordinator of the U.S.-Mexico Journalism Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson
Center. Eric Olson, is Senior Advisor to the Security Initiative of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and has held senior
positions at the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and the Washington Office on Latin America. Andrew Seele, is
Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University. “THE UNITED STATES
AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, January 2009,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf)
Strengthening the U.S. partnership with Mexico ¶ will require new channels for
communication and ¶ ongoing consultation that allow strategic thinking ¶ to take
place. From the early 1980s through 2006, ¶ the primary formal structure for dialogue between ¶ the two countries was
the Binational Commission ¶ (BNC), which brought together cabinet officials ¶ from both governments for an annual
meeting that ¶ focused on a range of bilateral topics. As contacts ¶ among cabinet officials of the two governments ¶
accelerated in recent years, however, the BNC ¶ increasingly became an unfocused bureaucratic ¶ exercise, and it has not
met since 2006 by mutual ¶ agreement of the two governments. In 2005 ¶ the U.S., Mexican, and Canadian
governments ¶ started a series of annual North American Leaders’ ¶ Summits, tied in with
the Security and Prosperity ¶ Partnership, a trilateral effort to get agencies ¶ in the
three governments to work together on ¶ economic and security issues. A North
American ¶ Business Council, made up of CEOs of large ¶ companies, was invited to participate in this ¶ process. The North
American Leaders’ Summits ¶ and SPP have been useful in addressing common ¶ standards and border policies. However,
they have ¶ left out other stakeholders in North America, ¶ including labor, environmental organizations, ¶ and small and
medium businesses, and provided ¶ insufficient opportunities to address major issues ¶ of integration among the three
countries, such as ¶ education, technology transfer, and environmental ¶ cooperation.¶ A
will need to create
¶ both
bilateral (U.S.-Mexico) and
new administration
trilateral (U.S.-¶ Mexico-Canada)
channels for consultation and ¶ cooperation. While most consultation across ¶ the
border takes place among cabinet agencies ¶ routinely in the process of their operations, ¶
structuring an annual leadership meeting each ¶ year with the leaders of the three
North American ¶ countries, which can include a separate bilateral ¶ leadership
meeting, would help focus attention ¶ on major issues that need to be resolved
and to ¶ develop strategic thinking .
Trilateral consultation key
Ayon et al. 9 (David R. Ayon, is a political analyst and writer, who serves as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for the
Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University and as the U.S. Director of the Focus Mexico/Enfoque México Project. Robert
Donnely, is Program Associate of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and was previously the Coordinator of the Justice in
Mexico Project at the University of San Diego's Transborder Institute. Dolia Estevez, is a career journalist who currently writes tor Poder
magazine and El Semanario and serves as the consulting coordinator of the U.S.-Mexico Journalism Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson
Center. Eric Olson, is Senior Advisor to the Security Initiative of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and has held senior
positions at the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and the Washington Office on Latin America. Andrew Seele, is
Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University. “THE UNITED STATES
AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, January 2009,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf)
Redesigning Institutions for Cooperation and Consultation¶ To achieve these
objectives, the governments ¶ would do well to rethink the current institutional ¶ structure
for economic dialogue. While the ¶ Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) has ¶ helped
address some barriers to trade, it has been ¶ conducted without monitoring by the public
in ¶ all three countries involved, has no mechanism to ¶ address other critical
concerns in the economic ¶ relationship, and has been overshadowed by the ¶ security
components of SPP. Meanwhile, the labor ¶ and environmental commissions have languished ¶ as underfunded bodies
with limited mandates. ¶ Policy options for the future include:¶ Institutionalizing annual North
American¶ summit meetings attended by the heads of State ¶ from Mexico,
the United States, and Canada. ¶ Creating trilateral working groups that include¶
government, business, and civil society from all ¶ three countries that takes into account
the views ¶ of stakeholders in each area under discussion. ¶ This can be tied into the
annual North American ¶ Heads of States meetings and include areas ¶ of current or
potential cooperation such as ¶ health standards, technology transfer, education ¶
cooperation, environmental cooperation, and ¶ labor standards.¶
2NC – Consultation Key/Say Yes
Consultation is key to overall engagement
Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where
he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His
research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies.
Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf)
As can be seen from the forgoing examples,
the Canada-Mexico bilateral relationship is both healthy
and robust and is augmented by trilateral inputs and consultations when and where
trilateralism is seen to be of advantage to Canadian interests and as such, might be considered to be optimal in its present
form. Mexico has been assessed as a failing state by some, languishing under a deeply
entrenched system of political corruption that undermines the three branches of
government and compromises Mexico’s law enforcement and national security
capabilities. There is a culture of corruption that pervades the state and frustrates the
rule of law in Mexico. The political elites, the judiciary, and police officials embrace corruption as a primary means
for career advancement and for acquiring personal wealth. Mexico appears to many as a country overwhelmed by a system
of government and commerce that has grown dependent on corruption in order to function. It may well take a
massive breakdown and reordering of Mexican society to free Mexico from corruption’s
stranglehold. But the individuals who have the capacity to lead such a drastic reform are the same individuals who
would have the most to lose from doing so.46 The American strategy has not so far been successful in
reducing this threat to their southern border and their citizens nation-wide in spite of the
dedication of massive volumes of funds, resources and manpower. The result is a
growing likelihood that the crisis presently building in the southern part of the North
American continent will increasingly influence Canadian interests in the realms
of security, economics, and social welfare. While the threat posed by international terrorism remains a real
one, it is in decline and no longer warrants the unwavering attention of the Canadian security infrastructure or that of the
government of Canada. Rather, attention must now be paid to a threat that has been developing
closer to home while the Canadian focus has been further afield. The most effective Canadian strategy
to address this evolving threat is a proactive one of engagement with the
continental partners that, while proceeding in accordance with Canadian values and
desires to help others, addresses the specific goals and objectives in the priority stated in
the preceding paragraphs. The informed and proactive engagement of both American
and Mexican authorities on either a bilateral or trilateral basis should be decided by the
specifics of each situation and circumstance. Failure to recognize this looming threat to
Canadian security and welfare and/or failure to aggressively pursue Canadian interests
in issues of continental security will doom Canada to the progressive infiltration of
the narco-culture into every aspect of Canadian society . Internationally, it will put
Canada in a reactive posture where Canadian citizens are forced to accept American solutions to Canadian concerns or the
application to Canada of policies focused upon security issues that exist only on the southern border. The existing
Canadian strategy of selective engagement with Mexican and/or American agencies should continue to be pursued and
proactively expanded upon when and as the need arises to maximize Canadian interests on the continent.
Including and consulting Canada is key
Wilson-Forsberg 01 – Stacey Wilson-Forsberg is a Policy Analyst for FOCAL. (“Overcoming Obstacles on
the Road to North American Integration: A View from Canada”, November 2001,
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1093/1/Overcoming%20Obstacles%20on%20the%20Road%20
to%20North%20American%20Integration%20A%20View%20from%20Canada.pdf?1, Callahan)
Political integration between Canada, the United States, and Mexico will evolve slowly
and naturally from economic integration, personal and professional interactions, and
increased trilateral cooperation. However, it would be completely unreasonable to expect Canada to put
trilateral North American relations before bilateral relations with its powerful and uniquely important US neighbour. After
all, Canada is highly dependent on access to the US market. About 70% of Canadian GDP crosses the border and 50% of
Canadian manufactured exports are inter-company trade with the United States. Yet, it is in Canada’s interest to
invest more time and resources in the North American relationship. There are a number of
foreign and domestic policy issues that warrant a coordinated, collective North American response. Two such issues,
security concerns and energy supplies, were underscored in this paper. Canada could maximize its influence
in the integration process by considering the following measures: • Adopt a trilateral
approach to the process of North American integration. The approach should be used when policy
issues lend themselves particularly well to trilateral cooperation. It should be driven by, but not exclusive to the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Government departments with “functional”
responsibilities (i.e. Transport Canada, Heritage Canada etc.) should continue to seek out and
strengthen their contacts with Mexican and US officials when designing both policies
and programs. Face-to-face meetings on a trilateral basis should become a regular
feature of government-to-government contact . • Establish a high-level commission to deal
with trilateral policy issues. Ideally the commission would be comprised of Cabinetlevel officials from Canada, the United
States, and Mexico along with non-governmental advisors. Such a commission could be chaired jointly by the three
Foreign Affairs Ministers who could oversee a series of functional or thematic projects. The commission might also task
non-governmental entities to study and report on emerging issues that are primarily trilateral in nature. • Get the message
out. Canada needs to articulate a position as soon as possible on the “North America” question. The Canadian government
did not issue an adequate public response to Vicente Fox’s overtures during his visits to Ottawa in August 2000, and April
2001. This silence resulted in much detailed speculation in Canadian newspapers on integration, including articles on
“seamless” or “disappearing borders”, “backroom talk” in Ottawa on deepening NAFTA, much exaggerated sovereignty
and cultural identity arguments, and the “continentalist tendencies” of the Liberal Party. Work should begin immediately
on a major speech to be delivered by the Prime Minister that would address the trilateral issue in a strategic way. Such a
speech could provide Canadian officials with a reference point vis-à-vis their day-to-day activities. • Include Mexico
in thinking about North America. North American solutions to problems that are clearly
trans-national in nature will not be found if Mexico is missing from the equation. Moreover,
trilateral relations will not grow if the Canada-Mexico bilateral relationship remains underdeveloped. This paper therefore
reiterates a policy recommendation made in “High Expectations in Mexico: Responding to the Priorities of A New
Government” (Source: FOCAL February 2001). Canada’s foreign policy toward Mexico essentially needs a shot in the arm.
It needs to do a better job adjusting to changes in Mexico, be flexible enough to anticipate further reform in the country,
and it needs to be consistent so as to develop a relationship that is not shaken up every time a crisis occurs there.
Canada should also
negotiations.
ask to
be consulted on United States-Mexico bilateral
2NC – Spillover
Specific issues spill over by providing the basis for further
integration
Wilson-Forsberg 01 – Stacey Wilson-Forsberg is a Policy Analyst for FOCAL. (“Overcoming Obstacles on
the Road to North American Integration: A View from Canada”, November 2001,
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1093/1/Overcoming%20Obstacles%20on%20the%20Road%20
to%20North%20American%20Integration%20A%20View%20from%20Canada.pdf?1, Callahan)
Many experts argue that Canada, the United States, and Mexico should build on the successes
of NAFTA to find other areas that could bring mutual benefit to the citizens of all three
countries. Trilateral cooperation on specific policy issues will open possibilities
for increased integration . The coming into effect of NAFTA in 1994 created the
underpinnings for trilateral cooperation between Canada, the United States and Mexico on
issues outside of trade and commerce. Such cooperation evolved rapidly at the state/provincial and local
levels, and even more so at the more informal level of civil society. While very difficult to measure, relationships
have been built between parliamentarians, government officials, business associations,
universities, churches and cultural institutions. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from the three
countries have established a wide web of networks, collaborating on a variety of issues, including: environmental
protection, labour issues, human rights, women’s issues, indigenous issues, and economic and social development. Many
of these NGOs share a common concern about the consequences of NAFTA and the path that continental integration is
following. Some progress has been made in this area at the foreign policy level, but any
steps taken have been cautious and perhaps even half-hearted . Former Foreign Affairs
Minister Lloyd Axworthy, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and former Foreign Secretary Rosario Green
signed a Framework for a North American Partnership in 1998 that dealt with such areas as development cooperation,
disaster preparedness, culture and education, youth initiatives, and environmental issues. The three ministers discussed
further collaboration at trilateral meetings in 1999 and 2000. As Director of the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues
at the University of British Columbia, Lloyd Axworthy continues to promote trilateral cooperation between Canada and its
North American counterparts.
2NC – Say Yes/Ptx NB
Canada says yes and the CP avoids the link to politics
Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where
he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His
research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies.
Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf)
How would such a proactive and comprehensive approach to continental security be
received by the two partners in the process? One could speculate that it would be received
with enthusiasm by both but for different reasons. To the extent that the Canadian
contributions aligned themselves with established Americans strategies and measures,
the United States would welcome the approach for all of the reasons provided previously
and for the added benefit that it would reduce the commitment of American resources.
Having Canadian participation would also provide political cover
domestically and internationally with the associated positive political
effects. That this type of cooperation is already under consideration by Canada and the United States is evidenced by
the discussions between US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and Canadian Minister of National Defence Peter McKay
on joint military co-operation relating to continental defence, including anti-drug efforts and weapons control at their
meeting in Halifax on 18 November, 2011.33
Mexico would likely welcome Canadian
participation as well if only for the reason that it would reduce American participation and presence on issues of
vital Mexican interests. This position is supported also by the fact that Mexican public opinion polls since 2004 have
consistently put Canada at, or near, the top of the list of most popular foreign countries by both the general public and the
informed elite that regularly considers Mexican foreign policy.34 While the implementation of a visa requirement may
have dampened this affection somewhat, a large portion of the Mexican population see Canada as a positive example of a
smaller state that has successfully resisted integration with a more powerful neighbour and maintained its sovereignty in
the face of sometimes daunting pressure.35 There may also be some benefits and synergies for the Mexicans in the ways
that Canadians approach governance, security and judicial issues. Lastly, the Mexicans may appreciate what is often a less
intrusive approach to providing assistance to our friends and allies. There would also be several benefits to
Canadian interests of adopting this strategy. First, it would put Canadians “at the table”
when issues central to continental security are discussed with the result that Canadian
governments would be informed and current on the thoughts and actions of their
continental allies and in the best position as possible to influence their actions and
decisions in those areas vital to Canadian interests. Such participation in a variety of security,
governance, and judicial capacities would also provide invaluable experience and develop expertise in addressing threats
and situations that while not directly affecting Canadians at present, clearly threaten to do so in the future. Along these
lines, Canada would be doing what it has always done in the realm of national security,
addressing the threat before it actually reaches our shores, or in this case, our borders
2NC – Say Yes
Canada supports Mexican development
Aspe at al. 5 (Pedro Aspe is Chief Executive Officer of Protego, a leading investment banking advisory firm in
Mexico. Mr. Aspe was most recently the Secretary of the Treasury of Mexico He has been a Professor of Economics at
Instituto Tecnolo ́ gico Auto ́ nomo de Me ́ xico (ITAM) and has held a number of positions in the Mexican government.
“Building a North American Community”, 2005, pg. 5)
Shared challenge of uneven economic development. A fast lane to development is
crucial for Mexico to contribute to the security of the entire region. Mexico’s
development has failed to prevent deep disparities between different regions of the
country, and particularly between remote regions and those better connected to international markets. Northern states
have grown ten times faster than those in the center and south of the country. Lack of economic
opportunity encourages unauthorized migration and has been found to be
associated with corruption, drug trafficking, violence, and human suffering.
Improvements in human capital and physical infrastructure in Mexico, particularly in the center
and south of the country, would knit these regions more firmly into the North American
economy and are in the economic and security interest of all three countries.
Leaders in our three countries have acknowledged these problems and indicated their
support for a number of promising measures, including immigration reform, but there
remains considerable scope for more individual, bilateral, and joint efforts to address development needs.
Canada is pursuing cooperation now – they say yes
Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American
Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU
where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs
on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a
Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”,
August, 2012, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269)
The Presidents of the United States and Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada
should seek to construct a North American Community that would invigorate their economies and improve
the region’s competitiveness with Asia and Europe, enhance continental and public security, address more effectively the
new transnational agenda, and design lean but effective trinational institutions for the
21st century. Such a Community would advance the principal goals of each country. For Mexico, it would
narrow the development gap and lift its people to First-World status. For Canada,
it would create institutions that would bind the three nations to agreed standards. For the United States, it would create a new style of
leadership more aligned with long-term goals than with short-term special interests. For all three countries, it
would allow a
more cooperative and effective approach to transnational issues like
transportation, infrastructure, immigration, anti-narcotics policies and the environment.
The vision that undergirds this proposal is based on a principle of managed
interdependence. If one country suffers a setback, all are hurt ; success for one
helps the others . The principle is simple and often lauded by leaders , but rarely
acted on. If the United States actually accepted its “shared responsibility” for the drug problem, for example, it would get serious about
making sure the 7,500 gun shops on the U.S. side of the border do not sell weapons to drug cartels. And if all three countries
actually incorporated a sense of community, they would advertise “Buy North America”
instead of “Buy USA”, “Buy Mexico” or “Buy Canada.” The word “Community” refers to a group in which the
members feel an affinity and desire to cooperate . It is not a union, and their relationship would differ
from Europe’s, although, as already suggested, it should try to learn from Europe’s experience. It would be flexible enough for the three
countries to define the new relationship that they would seek. Like the people and states of North America, the Community would be
eminently pragmatic, choosing policies based on what advances the interests of all. By
moving from a dual-bilateral
relationship to a trilateral approach, the three countries could avoid duplication
and clashing efforts. They would replace power imbalances with fair rules and would mobilize all three peoples to attack
problems rather than each other. In December 2011, the U.S. and Canadian governments presented “Action Plans” on the border and
regulatory convergence, and the U.S. and Mexican governments repeated the same exercise. The three countries restated the goal that they
announced a decade before in the two “Smart Borders” agreements: to make the border efficient and secure. And they affirmed the need to
harmonize regulations, just as they did in 2005, when they established the Security and Prosperity Partnership to avoid “the tyranny of
small differences in regulations” that serve only to protect companies rather than benefit consumers. As it turned out, the “Action Plans”
were really inaction plans. They set one-year deadlines for studies on virtually every issue identified a decade ago without ever trying to
explain why the three governments had failed to achieve their goals. The Obama Administration waited until its third year to announce
studies that won’t be completed until December 2012. The leaders called the plans “game-changers”, but anyone who bothered to read them
knew they were playing the same old games. This was little more than a full-employment act for bureaucrats. It is possible, of course, that a
trilateral approach might not yield any more effective policies than the dual-bilateral efforts have so far. Nevertheless,
it is
clear that the only way to move forward on the agenda is for the leaders to grasp the
North American opportunity, give it a high priority and organize their governments to
accomplish their goals. It’s also clear we need to create institutions to help the
three governments think continentally. At a minimum, we need a North American Advisory Commission to
prepare continental options for all three leaders to consider and choose at annual summits.
The Summit generates support and ensures Canada says yes
Aspe at al. 5 (Pedro Aspe is Chief Executive Officer of Protego, a leading investment banking advisory firm in
Mexico. Mr. Aspe was most recently the Secretary of the Treasury of Mexico He has been a Professor of Economics at
Instituto Tecnolo ́ gico Auto ́ nomo de Me ́ xico (ITAM) and has held a number of positions in the Mexican government.
“Building a North American Community”, 2005, pg. 5)
An annual summit of North American leaders would do more to carry out our overall
goal of creating a North American community than virtually any of the
report’s other recommendations. As we have seen with the annual Group of Seven/Eight (G-7/8) and AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summits, regular meetings of leaders not only help
promote a sense of community and shared objectives , but channel the
various bureaucracies each year to work on those common objectives.
Whether on matters of security, education, or economic integration and development,
annual summits will drive a process that will hasten the goals that we outline in our
report. More to the point, an annual summit can be announced and implemented right away, giving tangible impetus to
the good beginning made at the March 2005 summit and to the goals we promote here.
Canada says yes – consultation and US
Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where
he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His
research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies.
Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf)
Having identified some of the potential threats and pitfalls associated with the contemporary state of internal Mexican affairs and the American desire for a closer
continental security relationship, one should now consider the Canadian alternatives in dealing with these circumstances. First, one option that cannot be adopted
is a “head in the sand” attempt to ignore the situation and do nothing. The only outcome resulting from this course of action will be Canadian irrelevance in the
Canadians
have always done well in their interactions with their American neighbours.
In part this is due to the generosity of the American spirit towards a country that they see
as a mirror of their own in many ways. In other cases it is because what is seen as a small concession by the Americans over the
decision-making process and ultimately the imposition of an American border security regime upon the Canadian public. Historically
course of the negotiating process is seen as a much larger benefit to Canada when disparities in the size of our nations are considered. But most importantly,
Canadians have always done particularly well with America whenever they have pursued
a course of action involving the potent combination of informed and pro-active
engagement with demonstrations of bald-faced intransigence when and as required. Thus the bold pursuit
of Canadian interests with both the Americans and Mexicans promises to be
a winning strategy in the circumstances. A strategy of informed and pro-active engagement
will require the quintessential “whole of government” approach internally and a process that others have called,
“trilateral bilateralism” externally.30 This external process is where issues that primarily concern two of
the states are pursued bilaterally and those few instances of truly trilateral concern are
addressed with all three partners in consultation . Thus the situation in addressing any given issue may
well be one that involves paraphrasing MacKenzie King’s well known saying, “trilateralism if necessary, but not necessarily trilateralism.”
Say yes – security calculations
Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where
he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His
research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies.
Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf)
Nonetheless, the
inclusion of Mexico in the continental security matrix does appear to be a
long term objective for the Americans and as such it should be a long term concern
for Canada . In the interim however, and regardless of how much Canadians wish to be
considered separately from Mexico on many security issues, the reality is that an American
problem on their southern border will inevitably influence the thickness and
permeability of their northern border if Canada does not actively engage both the
Americans and the Mexicans on the issue.27 Thus as much as Ottawa would like to avoid
becoming embroiled in United States-Mexico issues, Canadians have a vested interest
in the resolution of Mexican security and economic issues as they pertain to their
American neighbour.
Yes – US pressure
Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where
he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His
research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies.
Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf)
Having identified a number of advantages to a trilateral relationship for the United States and Mexico, one is hard-pressed to do the same
for the Canadians. One possible advantage that could be put forward by Canadian nationalists would be a variation of one just mentioned
for Mexico. That with Canada and Mexico opposing an American initiative or policy there would be the mistaken belief that American
authority and influence upon the relationship as a whole would be weakened and Canadian interests would be better served in the process.
The reality is that the last vestiges of special consideration and a special security
relationship between Canada and the United States would likely disappear as Canada
and Mexico were lumped into the same security strategy envelope, with the specific security interests
of neither state being directly addressed. With Mexico in the relationship, Canada could be used by the
United States as additional support for its views as is already the case with its
membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). America could prevail
upon Canadians to go and talk to the Mexicans to bring them around to the
shared Canada-United States perspective on issues that Canada and the
United States agree upon. It can use the Mexicans in the same way against the Canadians on issues upon which the
Mexicans and the Americans agree. The United States would be able to use both Canada and
Mexico against each other, but refuse to yield when the two junior partners are united against an American position.
2NC—Mexico Says Yes
Both countries say yes
Parliament of Canada 02 – Obvi. (“CHAPTER 5: A CANADIAN AGENDA FOR ENHANCING
BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA”, 2002 (based on dates in the cites and in the
article),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1032320&Mode=1&Parl=37&Ses=2&Language=E&Fi
le=344, Callahan)
Interestingly, as Wood and MacLean observed, a few years ago it had been the Canadian government
that seemed to be the prime advocate of “trilateralism” (then-foreign minister Axworthy in particular
promoted the idea of developing a “community” relationship within North America that could also provide an “important
model of regional cooperation”61), whereas the Mexican government was seen as most sceptical and wary of potential
intrusions into Mexican domestic affairs.62 A few years later the roles seemed to be reversed when the new Mexican
administration of Vicente Fox presented a long-term “Vision 20/20” for such a continental
community that was “met with polite scepticism in Ottawa” during Mr. Fox’s first Canadian visit in August 2000.63
Canada now appears more ready to engage with Mexico on some aspects of a North American agenda. Speaking for
DFAIT, Marc Lortie stated to the Committee before its visit to Mexico: “The Government supports the
development of a North American relationship. President Fox has said that a common
currency and customs union are long-term goals. Over the short term, we are working to
identify issues that would be best served through trilateral engagement.”64 At the same time,
the current Mexican government has clearly been the most enthusiastic about pursuing
trilateral North American approaches and the “community” concept. Indeed, in Monterrey the
Mexicans submitted proposals to Canada and the United States to further the study of ambitious initiatives along these
lines.65 Several senior Mexican officials who spoke to the Committee in Mexico City in
March also suggested that some sort of expert group or commission might be formed,
reporting to the three governments, as a possible vehicle for moving forward the agenda
for trilateral cooperation.
2NC – Currency Swaps Solvency
Consultation is key
Ayon et al. 9 (David R. Ayon, is a political analyst and writer, who serves as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for the
Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University and as the U.S. Director of the Focus Mexico/Enfoque México Project. Robert
Donnely, is Program Associate of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and was previously the Coordinator of the Justice in
Mexico Project at the University of San Diego's Transborder Institute. Dolia Estevez, is a career journalist who currently writes tor Poder
magazine and El Semanario and serves as the consulting coordinator of the U.S.-Mexico Journalism Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson
Center. Eric Olson, is Senior Advisor to the Security Initiative of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and has held senior
positions at the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and the Washington Office on Latin America. Andrew Seele, is
Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University. “THE UNITED STATES
AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, January 2009,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf)
The interdependence of the two economies makes Mexico one of the most vulnerable
countries in Latin America during the present global financial turmoil. Mexico will be affected
especially from a fall in U.S. imports, declining remittances from the United States and reduced demand for tourism. The
U.S. recession, which is expected to deepen in 2009, will have a dramatic effect on Mexico’s prospects for growth.18
Increased unemployment in the U.S. labor market and a slowdown in the construction and service industries, are expected
to force unprecedented number of documented and undocumented Mexican migrants to go back to Mexico where they
have little hope of finding jobs in the formal economy. In addition, the financial crisis has caused
the value of the Mexican peso to drop to record levels, despite the Banco de
Mexico deployment of billions of dollars of reserves to try to maintain its value during
October 2008. The Bolsa, Mexico’s stock market, paralleled the extreme volatility of its U.S., European and Asian
counterparts. Although Mexico was virtually free of the toxic mortgage-backed securities at the heart of the crisis, and the
Mexican government has followed conservative and responsible fiscal policies, the country’s economy has been hit by
declining oil prices and the turmoil of the highly speculative derivatives market in which Mexican corporations were
involved. The
move by the U.S. Federal Reserve to extend emergency currency swap
lines to Mexico and other emerging economies helped restore confidence in the Mexican
currency.20!e Fed’s concern about Mexico’s financial well-being is not new. In the
aftermath of the assassination of the ruling party’s presidential candidate in 1994 which provoked massive capital flight,
the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee established the North American Framework Agreement (NAFA), and the
associated bilateral reciprocal currency (“swap”) arrangements with the Banco de Mexico and the Bank of Canada. The
Fed’s swap arrangements, which are renewed yearly, are in the amount of $3 billion to Mexico and $2 billion to Canada.
The Department of Treasury, through its Exchange Stabilization Fund, which was used
to lend funds to Mexico in 1995, is also a NAFA participant. During the 1982 debt crisis
and the 1994–95 peso crisis, the Fed played a pivotal role in assisting Mexico to
renegotiate with its foreign creditors and meet its dollars liquidity needs.21 This close
collaboration between Mexican and U.S. financial authorities underscores the
importance of timely and coordinated actions in crisis management. Crises offer
challenges and opportunities for long term strategies. The current downturn
highlights, perhaps more than other times in the past, the need for better macroeconomic
policy consultation
and short-term crisis management mechanisms to avoid sudden shocks to the economies
of both countries by developments that take place on either side of the border. History
shows us that each
country benefits from its partner’s success and each is diminished by the
other’s problems. The United States has a vested interest in Mexico’s economic and social stability and long-
term health, given the impact that Mexico’s economy has on U.S. exports and on migration. Financial mismanagement
and insufficient regulation in the United States have had a direct impact in Mexico. And although good macroeconomic
management has allowed Mexico’s economy to grow gradually since the late 1990s,22 the lack of attention to crucial
structural reforms, including rule of law, competition policy, tax collection, labor laws, primary and secondary education,
energy and monopolies have limited the potential for growth and highlighted weaknesses in Mexico’s economy.23
Insufficient investment in infrastructure and human capital create long-term drags on the Mexican economy and, in turn,
limit the potential for economic growth, with secondary effects on the U.S. economy. While these are essentially matters of
domestic policy in each country, both
governments have a vested interest in improving
communication , pursuing a more viable process of engagement on
macroeconomic policy and maintaining a critical dialogue about the need
for sound economic policies in both countries.
2NC – China exports impact
Failure to commit to trilateral shit causes Canadian energy shift
to China
Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the
Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 200207, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study
abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language
immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin
America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at
the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”, August, 2012, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269)
There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of
NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S.
government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United
States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade
Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply
with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood
lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep
out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of
the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011
President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of
treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that
depending on the United States was the wrong decision. ¶ Imagine for a moment
what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might
divert its energy exports to China , especially if China guaranteed a long-term
relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and
China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s
length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth
would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part
because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far
behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security
of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan.
2NC – Energy Solvency
The counterplan solves the aff better
Hufbauer and Schott 04 – Gary C. Hufbauer is the Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Institute for
International Economics (IIE) in
Washington. He is one of the authors of NAFTA: A Ten-Year Appraisal. Jeffrey J. Schott is a Senior Fellow at the IIE. He is
one of the authors of NAFTA: A Ten-Year Appraisal. (“The Prospects for Deeper North American Economic Integration: A
US Perspective”, January 2004, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer0104.pdf, Callahan)
High on a future agenda is the common U.S., Canadian and Mexican interest in
expanding regional energy production, especially production of North American natural
gas. The U.S.-Canada energy infrastructure is already fairly well integrated, but
distribution of supplies faces numerous obstacles both within and between countries.
U.S.-Mexico energy relations are sharply constrained by the Mexican constitutional
prohibition on foreign participation in the exploitation of oil and gas. Mexico must reexamine
these policies if the country is to avoid a major power shortage in the coming years.14 Unfortunately, the Mexican
Congress seems reluctant to proceed on even modest reforms that could boost investment in electricity generating plants.
It is even less willing to contemplate foreign energy companies playing a role in developing deep Mexican oil reserves (in
the Gulf) or gas reserves (in the northern states). What could be done? Dobson (2002) proposes a constructive
starting point: use the existing bilateral and trilateral mechanisms to coordinate efforts
at regulatory reforms that would encourage production and distribution of natural gas.15
Other 2NC Things
a/t: bilateralism/perm
Perm fails – bilateral treatment is unsuccessful
Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American
Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU
where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs
on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a
Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”,
2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf)
The dual-bilateral strategy (U.S.-Canada, U.S.-Mexico) is also failing. It
exacerbates the defining and debilitating characteristic of the United States’ relations
with its neighbors— asymmetry . It leads Washington to ignore them or impose
its will, and it causes Ottawa and Mexico City to either retreat or be
defensive. Given the imbalance in power and wealth, a truly equal relationship may
be elusive , but it is in the long-term interests of all three countries to build institutions that will reduce the
imbalance. The genius of the Marshall Plan was that the United States used its leverage not for short-term gain but to
encourage Europe to unite. That kind of statesmanship is needed to step beyond short-term and private interests and
construct a North American Community
Binding key
Consent by all parties is key
Parliament of Canada 02 – Obvi. (“CHAPTER 5: A CANADIAN AGENDA FOR ENHANCING
BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA”, 2002 (based on dates in the cites and in the
article),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1032320&Mode=1&Parl=37&Ses=2&Language=E&Fi
le=344, Callahan)
The Committee accepts the point that voluntary North American associations and alliances are
essential if trilateral relations are to be more than just occasional official rhetoric about
partnership and cooperation; more than just a top-down intergovernmental affair
decided in distant capitals with minimal public engagement. However, such informal
“community-building” as Blank recommends only partially sidesteps, and does not resolve, the dilemmas of
designing adequate democratic institutions at a North American level. It does not address how governance
decisions might be arrived at trilaterally through transparently democratic structures
and processes in key policy areas, especially if, as a result of continuing integration,
certain older instruments or levers of democratic control are no longer available or
effective at the national and/or local levels.
In sum, a democratic “North American community” may well be desirable over the longer term. But its content, form, and
feasibility are all still far from being clearly or consensually defined, much less established. Referring to a new book on
North American integration published by Washington’s Brookings Institution, and based on the proceedings of a
December 2001 conference that brought together leading thinkers from Canada and Mexico as well as the United States,
David Crane writes that it “shows why the idea of a North American Community, our continent’s version of the European
Union, would be so difficult.”125
Certainly, the concept of such a community is not one that can simply be asserted or wished into being. Accordingly, we
believe that realizing progress on trilateral relations needs to start at a practical level by
governments pursuing and supporting initiatives that could be achievable within a time
frame of the next few years. The measures we have in mind would not unduly affect the sovereignty of any of the
partners. And they would be undertaken for the demonstrable purpose of benefiting each partner’s citizens. If there is
to be a common trilateral vision, it will be one based on a mutual recognition of each
partner’s interests, and on a shared commitment to forms of North American
cooperation that serve each other’s interests. It is to these final considerations for action
that we now turn.
The permutation bypasses Canada’s interests which reinforces
status quo fragmentation
Clarkson and Mildenberger 11 – Stephen and Matto are writers for the Globe and Mail. (“Sad
but true: Canada and Mexico have no clout in Washington”, Oct 7, 2011,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/sad-but-true-canada-and-mexico-have-no-clout-inwashington/article557286/, Callahan)
The paradox of North America’s skewed development is that, although Canada and Mexico
make
extraordinarily large contributions to America’s economic strength, homeland security
and international effectiveness, they have virtually no influence in Washington’s
corridors of power . Starting with the economic realm, Canada and Mexico are the United States’ largest
external sources of material strength. Although the GDP of Mexico and Canada taken together would only constitute the
world’s fifth-largest economy, their intense, proximity-driven economic ties make them America’s largest trading and
investment partners. This relationship boosts the U.S. economy’s productivity and raises its GDP by some 2 to 3 per cent,
supplementing the average American’s income by a very considerable $1,000 every year. Economic relations with Canada
alone support eight million American jobs. These bilateral linkages literally fuel the U.S. economy. Together, Canada and
Mexico provide a third of U.S. oil imports and almost all of its natural gas imports. Low-wage labour from Mexico has
become indispensable in many American service industries and supplies a third of its agricultural work force. When it
comes to security, Canada’s and Mexico’s land masses are a potential menace, since they could be used by terrorist
organizations to infiltrate the United States. But this proximity also turns the Canadian and Mexican governments into
Washington’s prime associates in its war on terrorism, as they are in its war on drugs. Specifically, Ottawa has focused on
financing joint border-toughening measures, harmonizing its visa policies, supplying the Department of Homeland
Security with data about its citizens’ air-travel movements, and integrating its counterintelligence capacities with
Washington’s. In foreign policy matters, Canada
and Mexico have occasionally proved to be an
essential support for achieving U.S. aims. Without Canada’s and Mexico’s participation
in developing the precedent-setting North American free-trade agreement, the U.S.
would not have managed to pull off its remarkable feat 16 years ago of transforming the
limited General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade into the muscular World Trade
Organization that reinforced its corporations’ power overseas. There are two reasons why
America’s material and security dependence on its two next-door neighbours does not
translate into their political influence in Washington. First, the U.S. has shaped the
governance structures within which continental policy processes play out ‒ including
disempowering any institutions that could give the continental periphery a voice in
affecting American policies. Institutionalizing its two bilateral relationships with the Canada-U.S. free-trade
agreement and NAFTA was a masterstroke that established rules that, for instance, constrain Canada from turning off its
oil taps as a bargaining lever. The second reason has to do with the historically rooted deference of our
business and political elites who will make almost any concession in order to get access to
the U.S. market. Their resulting limp bargaining culture causes Ottawa’s negotiators to
back off from confrontations, then claim the resulting compromises as victories – as we saw
with the Harper government’s capitulation in the softwood lumber agreement of 2006 and last year’s pathetic government
procurement deal. The impending report of the bilateral Beyond the Border Working Group in which the Canadian
government is committing another $1-billion to harmonize its immigration and border operations still further with
American practices in the hope that Homeland Security will modify some of its border controls confirms North America’s
enduring puzzle. While Canada and Mexico are essential to American prosperity and security,
they remain impotent in Washington, unable to prevent it from pursuing its antiterrorism-fixated border thickening that is strangling the commercial flows that are the
lifeblood of North America’s economic position in the world.
*Aff*
2AC Perm Consult+do plan inev
Perm solves
Clarkson 9 (Stephen, Professor of Political Economy @ University of Toronto, “North America: A Trilateral,
Bilateral, or Unilateral Space?”, 2009, http://www.jfki.fu-berlin.de/faculty/history/dates/clarkson_chapter.pdf)
However, the Committee believes that there may be a way to take some elements from
this
idea, considered together with the Mexican idea for creating a high-level “wise persons”
advisory group of some kind. What we suggest is that the three governments, rather
than simply managing business as usual or dismissing ideas such as Robert Pastor’s out of hand, could benefit from
the in-depth investigation and reflection of a small expert panel. The panel’s mandate would be to
examine and report back to the governments on the future of the North American partnership overall and the feasibility of
trilateral next steps in particular. Such a panel could be very small, perhaps only three persons,
with each of the three governments appointing one member in consultation with the
others. We see the mandate of this panel being defined only as broadly as the
three governments are able mutually to agree . Moreover, none of its
recommendations would be in any way binding . At the same time, we believe the
striking of such a panel would provide an opportunity for a rigorous exploration of
promising future agendas for North American cooperation, together with possible forms
of institutional development and innovation, that would be extremely useful to feed into
the more intensive executive and parliamentary trilateral processes that we have
recommended. In addition, the expert panel would be encouraged to consult widely within the three societies. Its findings
would be released publicly and would hopefully stimulate more informed debate.
2AC Internal Link Turn to NB
Canadian consultation sucks
Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where
he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His
research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies.
Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf)
Having identified a number of advantages to a trilateral relationship for the United States and Mexico, one is hard-pressed to do the same
for the Canadians. One possible advantage that could be put forward by Canadian nationalists would be a variation of one just mentioned
for Mexico. That with Canada and Mexico opposing an American initiative or policy there would be the mistaken belief that American
authority and influence upon the relationship as a whole would be weakened and Canadian interests would be better served in the process.
The reality is that the last vestiges of special consideration and a special security relationship between Canada
and the United States would likely disappear as Canada and Mexico were lumped
into the same security strategy envelope, with the specific security interests of
neither state being directly addressed. With Mexico in the relationship, Canada could be used by the United
States as additional support for its views as is already the case with its membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). America
could prevail upon Canadians to go and talk to the Mexicans to bring them around to the shared Canada-United States perspective on issues
that Canada and the United States agree upon. It can use the Mexicans in the same way against the Canadians on issues upon which the
Mexicans and the Americans agree. The United States would be able to use both Canada and Mexico against each other, but refuse to yield
when the two junior partners are united against an American position. The effect would essentially be one of a significant reduction in the
Canadian “room to manoeuvre” within the Canada-United States relationship. The
added complexity of a third
party and issues in the institutions of the existing bilateral relationship
would reduce the speed and effectiveness with which common CanadaUnited States issues and interests could be addressed at every level of the
relationship. The differences between Canada and Mexico in the levels of trust between
agencies, governance capabilities, and the specifics of the issues to be dealt with as they
pertain to the United States, would all complicate the relationship and reduce the
precision with which Canada could employ its established policy threads in pursuit of
quintessentially Canadian interests.22
2AC – a/t: integration NB
Engagement with Canada on Mexican policy internal link turns
the net-benefit
Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where
he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His
research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies.
Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf)
Having identified a number of advantages to a trilateral relationship for the United States and Mexico, one is hard-pressed to do the same
for the Canadians. One possible advantage that could be put forward by Canadian nationalists would be a variation of one just mentioned
for Mexico. That with Canada and Mexico opposing an American initiative or policy there would be the mistaken belief that American
authority and influence upon the relationship as a whole would be weakened and Canadian interests would be better served in the process.
The reality is that the last vestiges of special consideration and a special security relationship between Canada
and the United States would likely disappear as Canada and Mexico were lumped
into the same security strategy envelope, with the specific security interests of
neither state being directly addressed. With Mexico in the relationship, Canada could be used by the United
States as additional support for its views as is already the case with its membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). America
could prevail upon Canadians to go and talk to the Mexicans to bring them around to the shared Canada-United States perspective on issues
that Canada and the United States agree upon. It can use the Mexicans in the same way against the Canadians on issues upon which the
Mexicans and the Americans agree. The United States would be able to use both Canada and Mexico against each other, but refuse to yield
when the two junior partners are united against an American position. The effect would essentially be one of a significant reduction in the
Canadian “room to manoeuvre” within the Canada-United States relationship. The
added complexity of a third
party and issues in the institutions of the existing bilateral relationship
would reduce the speed and effectiveness with which common CanadaUnited States issues and interests could be addressed at every level of the
relationship. The differences between Canada and Mexico in the levels of trust between
agencies, governance capabilities, and the specifics of the issues to be dealt with as they
pertain to the United States, would all complicate the relationship and reduce the
precision with which Canada could employ its established policy threads in pursuit of
quintessentially Canadian interests.22
-- integration high now
Meetings ensure sufficient integration
Gabriel 12 (Dana, is an activist and independent researcher. He writes about trade, globalization, sovereignty, security, as well
as other issues, Beyond NAFTA: Shaping the Future of North American Integration within the Global Economy, December 2012,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/beyond-nafta-shaping-the-future-of-north-american-integration-within-the-global-economy/5315136)
In a move that signaled the importance placed on the NAFTA partnership, Mexico’s new
president visited the U.S. and Canada before his inauguration. This was seen as a step
forward in further strengthening political, economic, energy and security ties
between all three countries. Other recent high-level meetings and policy papers
are also shaping the future of North American integration. Before his recent trip to the
U.S., Mexico’s new President Enrique Pena Nieto emphasized in a Washington Post editorial the
opportunity both countries have to build on their economic partnership. He explained that, “in
NAFTA we have a solid foundation to further integrate our economies through greater investments in finance,
infrastructure, manufacturing and energy.” As part of his government’s strategy to reduce violence,
he stated that it is, “important that our countries increase intelligence-sharing and
crime-fighting techniques and promote cooperation among law enforcement agencies.” In
a White House press release, Pena Nieto invited President Barack Obama to participate in the next North American
Leaders Summit which will take place in Mexico sometime in 2013. With regards to U.S.-Mexico relations,
Obama said that he was also looking forward to finding ways, “to strengthen
our economic ties, our trade ties, our coordination along the border,
improving our joint competitiveness, as well as common security issues.”
Integration/competiveness is high now – shale boom
Addison 12 (Velda, Associate editor (E&P) at Hart Energy Publishing, “Energy Renaissance
Strengthens North America’s Competitiveness”, August 2012, http://www.epmag.com/Exploration/EnergyRenaissance-Strengthens-North-Americas-Competitiveness_104927)
A natural gas production surge is reducing US reliance on foreign countries to meet
energy needs. The transformation, fueled by shale development, also is increasing
investment opportunities. With the shale boom driving unprecedented growth in US
natural gas production, the nation is likely to import less and export more
energy over the next decade. Already, change in the nation’s energy climate is
sparking more investment in North America , where low domestic natural gas
prices are impacting not only power generation and petrochemical production, but also
natural gas intensive manufacturing. Foreign companies are “placing bets” in the
US, sinking billions of dollars into North American shale plays. Plays aside,
development in the US Gulf of Mexico also has a growing potential. Its large resource base of 16 Bbbl and short time to
first production – about 5.5 years – places it among the most attractive deepwater regions in the world. These facts,
presented during Deloitte’s Aug. 7 webcast called “US Energy Independence?:
Implications for Imports and Exports of Major Energy Resources,” show that the energy
renaissance under way in North America has established the US as a major competitor in
the energy world. “We have a fantastic opportunity here in the US,” said Peter
Robertson, an independent senior advisor for Deloitte LLP. “We have the resource base to supply our
own energy, but it is not a given .... Our industry has to perform extremely well, and
government policy is critical to making this resource base work for the country.” Shale gas
production has increased from less than 2 Bcf/d in 2000 to about 20 Bcf/d in 2011. Analysts previously predicted the US
would be importing more energy sources at this time, but shale discoveries changed the situation. Also, North
America’s oil supply potential is predicted to well exceed 20 Mbbl/d, with
unconventional oil making up the bulk of the supply by 2035, Deloitte said. “We’re
getting almost a million barrels a day of oil coming from these kinds of
plays,” Robertson said, referring to North Dakota’s Bakken and Texas’ Eagle Ford plays. Continued growth of shale gas
also could support LNG exports, US production for which could reach 80 Bcf/year by 2030, according to Deloitte. The
exports aren’t likely to impact energy security, Robertson said, referencing a chart that shows LNG exports at 44 Tcf over
20 years compared to a US demand of 520 Tcf with technically recoverable gas at 2,170 Tcf. Deloitte predicted LNG
exports could generate US $300 billion in cumulative exports by 2025. Similar growth is being seen in tight
oil plays. Major plays have sent production from about 100 Mb/d in 2000 to about 900
Mb/d in 2011. The same thing is happening in Canada, where tight oil production
from selected plays climbed from less than 5 Mb/d in 2005 to more than 160 Mb/d in
2011. There, oil sands also have witnessed a production surge, jumping from
about 0.6 MMb/d in 2000 to about 1.5 MMb/d in 2011. No one really knows where all of this will
lead, Robertson said, but there is opportunity. The US already has become a significant exporter of refined products such
as distilled fuel oil and motor gasoline, Deloitte said. Exports of total petroleum products jumped to more than 2,500
Mb/d in 2011 from about 1,000 Mb/d in 2000. And the nation is reducing its dependence on petroleum imports. US net
imports of petroleum continue to drop, going from 60% in 2005 to 45% in 2011, as US petroleum production increases.
That number went from 40% in 2005 to 55% in 2011. Overall, the energy developments are
attracting interest in North America , something Robertson called “pretty
profound.”
-- alt causes
Alt causes prevent integration
Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American
Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU
where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs
on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a
Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”,
2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf)
The first step is to deepen economic integration by eliminating the costly and
cumbersome “ rules of origin” regulations , allowing all legitimate goods to move
seamlessly across the borders, and permitting border officials to concentrate on stopping
drugs and terrorists. To eliminate the rules of origin, the three governments will need to negotiate
a common external tariff at the lowest levels. This will not be easy , as there are other
free-trade agreements that would need to be reconciled, but it will make the North
American economy more efficient .A smaller measure, which could have as large an economic impact, would
be to comply with NAFTA and harmonize the three countries’ regulations on truck safety so as to permit trucks to travel in
all three countries.
Alt causes – tons of other things are necessary – consultation
insufficient
Gabriel 12 (Dana, is an activist and independent researcher. He writes about trade, globalization, sovereignty, security, as well
as other issues, Beyond NAFTA: Shaping the Future of North American Integration within the Global Economy, December 2012,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/beyond-nafta-shaping-the-future-of-north-american-integration-within-the-global-economy/5315136)
According to the new policy brief, A New Agenda with Mexico put out by the Woodrow Wilson Center, “declines in illegal
immigration and organized crime violence in Mexico, open up an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to deepen the
economic relationship.” The report recommended working, “together with Mexico and Canada to
strengthen regional competitiveness and to grow North American exports to the world.”
It further elaborated on how, “Economic issues can drive the next phase in deepening U.S.Mexico cooperation. Investments in trusted shipper programs, pre-inspection
programs, and enhanced border infrastructure will be crucial .” The study
called on Washington to offer more, “support for Mexico’s criminal justice
institutions, and strengthen U.S. anti-money laundering efforts in order to
combat organized crime and violence.” It also recommended engaging, “Mexico
more actively on hemispheric and extra-hemispheric foreign policy issues, ranging
from terrorism to international trade and finance, as Mexico’s role as a global power grows.”
In a recent article, Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas Policy Program scrutinized some the new Mexican president’s
policy initiatives. In the area of security, she pointed out that, “A real change in paradigm would require
two measures that the Pena government has said it will not take: withdrawing the armed
forces from counternarcotics efforts and renegotiating security cooperation with the U.S.
government.” She noted, “Pena Nieto has reassured the U.S. that his administration will continue the drug war.”
Carlsen acknowledged how, “The U.S. government has actively promoted and supported the drug war model of
enforcement and interdiction through the Merida Initiative and spearheaded the massive expansion of U.S.
counternarcotics activities in the country.” She further added, “U.S. defense, intelligence and security companies depend
on the Mexican drug war to obtain multi-million dollar government contracts. The Pentagon and other U.S. agencies have
achieved unprecedented freedom to act and even direct actions on Mexican soil.” As far as economic policy goes, Carlsen
was also critical of President Pena Nieto’s commitment to deepen rather than fix NAFTA. Just days before being sworn in
as Mexico’s new president, Pena Nieto also visited Canada. In a press statement, Prime Minister
Stephen Harper said he was looking forward to working with him in improving trade
ties, as well as strengthening North American competitiveness and security. In an editorial
that appeared in the Globe and Mail, Pena Nieto announced that, “One of the areas with the
largest potential for co-operation between Mexico and Canada is energy
production and development. Mexico’s energy sector is about to change. I want to
enhance its potential by opening it up to national and foreign private investment.” He went on to say, “We can
cultivate a closer relationship in this area in order to attain North American energy
security.” Canada-U.S. energy issues are also at the forefront. Following his re-election, President Obama is under
pressure to make a decision on the Keystone XL pipeline. The proposed project would carry oil from western Canada to
the Texas gulf coast. In the report, Forging a New Strategic Partnership between Canada and Mexico, Perrin Beatty and
Andres Rozental recognized the opportunity both countries have to reshape bilateral relations. Among other
things, the policy paper recommended removing the visa requirement for Mexican
visitors to Canada. It supported increasing funding to the Anti-Crime Capacity Building
Program which is aimed at enhancing the ability, “of government agencies, international organizations
and non-governmental entities to prevent and respond to threats posed by transnational criminal activity throughout the
Americas.” In addition, the study called for institutionalizing the North American
Leaders Summit and establishing a complementary North American
Business Council. It also advocated pursuing further economic cooperation with the U.S. on a pragmatic basis
and suggested that, “Ongoing border and regulatory initiatives should be results-oriented and pursued in the most
effective way possible, bilateral or trilateral, as the case may be. This policy recommendation can be extended to any North
American issue, including continental security perimeter initiatives and anti-narcotics efforts.”
2AC – Possible Perm
Perm?
Burney 11 (Derek H., CDFAI Senior Research Fellow and Senior Strategic Advisor to Norton
Rose OR LLP, “A FRESH START ON IMPROVING ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS AND
PERIMETER SECURITY”, August, 2011,
http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/dburney_0.pdf)
There is certainly scope for trilateral cooperation on differences in regulations and
standards.¶ The difficulty for Mexico stems less from inconsistency on definitions but
more from the¶ relative weakness of enforcement capability — a deficiency that manifested itself
much earlier¶ when environmental accords were being negotiated. For an administration under relentless¶
assault from organized crime and drug traffickers, the enforcement of safety and health¶
measures inevitably becomes secondary. That is why it would be easier and more
practical to¶ begin with greater convergence bilaterally and move to a
trilateral approach over time. A¶ troubled America beset with seemingly intractable
political and economic challenges and with¶ new undercurrents of isolationism is not
good news for either of its immediate neighbours.¶ Canada and Mexico both need a more resilient and
more confident America as a necessary¶ basis for avenues of new cooperation.
2AC – Say No – Generic
Canada says no – dismissiveness
Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the
Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 200207, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study
abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language
immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin
America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at
the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”, August, 2012, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269)
Mexico, the weakest of the three partners, has been the boldest in proposing ways to deepen the
relationship. The United States has been courteous but mostly unresponsive to new ideas, and it has
violated the agreement without notable qualms when special interests have insisted it do so. Canada has been
altogether dismissive of Mexico and its trilateral proposals. Embracing its
“special relationship” with the United States, Canada remains oblivious to the
overwhelming evidence that its affections are reciprocated with empty gestures, not
agreements. The result is that the noble experiment of creating a genuinely
new North America that soared in its first decade has been in decline ever
since.¶ Instead of forging a community of interests to make the continent more
competitive and secure, instead of negotiating a customs union, regulatory
harmonization, a single North American pass to transit both borders, a mechanism for
reducing the income gap between Mexico and its northern neighbors, a North American
Transportation and Infrastructure Plan, proposals for joint research and educational
exchanges, a common policy on climate change and energy security, higher labor
standards—instead of implementing all of these initiatives, or for that matter, any of
them, the political leadership of all three countries from administration to
administration in Washington, Toronto and Mexico City essentially
reverted to the dysfunctional dual-bilateral relationships—U.S.-Canada and
U.S.-Mexico—that had characterized the pre-NAFTA era.
1AR – Say No – Generic
Canada is extremely dismissive
Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the
Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 200207, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study
abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language
immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin
America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at
the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”, August, 2012, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269)
Mexico, the weakest of the three partners, has been the boldest in proposing ways to deepen the
relationship. The United States has been courteous but mostly unresponsive to new ideas, and it has
violated the agreement without notable qualms when special interests have insisted it do so. Canada has been
altogether dismissive of Mexico and its trilateral proposals. Embracing its
“special relationship” with the United States, Canada remains oblivious to the
overwhelming evidence that its affections are reciprocated with empty gestures, not
agreements. The result is that the noble experiment of creating a genuinely
new North America that soared in its first decade has been in decline ever
since.¶ Instead of forging a community of interests to make the continent more
competitive and secure, instead of negotiating a customs union, regulatory
harmonization, a single North American pass to transit both borders, a mechanism for
reducing the income gap between Mexico and its northern neighbors, a North American
Transportation and Infrastructure Plan, proposals for joint research and educational
exchanges, a common policy on climate change and energy security, higher labor
standards—instead of implementing all of these initiatives, or for that matter, any of
them, the political leadership of all three countries from administration to
administration in Washington, Toronto and Mexico City essentially
reverted to the dysfunctional dual-bilateral relationships—U.S.-Canada and
U.S.-Mexico—that had characterized the pre-NAFTA era.
Say no (this card sucks)
Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American
Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU
where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs
on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a
Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”,
2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf)
It would be desirable for Canada and Mexico to join in making a comprehensive proposal
for a North American Community, but Canada’s aloofness from Mexico makes
that unlikely . Therefore, the responsibility for defining North America’s future will lie with the new U.S. president. If the next
administration seeks to renegotiate NAFTA, presses for enforceable labor and environmental provisions, and allows special interests, such
as the Teamsters Union and the trucking industry, to prevent competition and avoid compliance with the agreement, the United States’
neighbors may look back on the Bush years with nostalgia. Canada and Mexico would be under pressure to seek their own exemptions to
NAFTA, and they would likely remind Washington that when it comes to enforceable sanctions, the United States has been more guilty of
noncompliance than they have. Renegotiating NAFTA would require a significant investment of the new administration’s time and political
capital without, in the end, helping workers or the environment much, if at all
2AC – Say No – Visas
Say no – doesn’t care about Mexico’s interests
Nossal 10 (Kim Richard, Prof of Poli Sci and Director of School of Policy Studies @ Queens University,
Canadian Policy Towards Mexico: Pastor’s Puzzle Reconsidered”, February 2010,
http://cedan.ccm.itesm.mx/wpcontent/uploads/2010/08/north_american_dialogue_no13_kim_richard_nossal.pdf)
I have looked at Canada‘s
visa requirement decision in such detail because it is an excellent
example of the essence of unilateralism in world politics. In other words, when explained
from the perspective of Canadian interests, the visa decision makes considerable sense.
Needless to say, however, the unilateralist doesn‘t care about the interests of others – that‘s
what makes it unilateralist. So in this case, only Canadian interests were considered;
Mexican interests were completely unimportant, as were all those business
interests in Canada affected by the dramatic decrease in visitors from Mexico. Moreover,
officials in Ottawa calculated correctly that Mexico was in no position to introduce a
mirror visa requirement, which would have instantly dried up tourists from Canada. But the visa
decision is important because it demonstrates so clearly how little impact
multilateralism has on Canadian policy towards Mexico, thus making sense of
Pastor‘s puzzle. It also shows how little interest the Canadian government has in developing a relationship with
Mexico that goes beyond the dual-bilateralism that has marked the North American project since NAFTA came into being.
2AC – Links to Politics
The CP causes the right and left to freak out
Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American
Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU
where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs
on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a
Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”,
2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf)
Assaults from both ends of the political spectrum have transformed the
debate on North America in recent years. From the right have come attacks based
on cultural anxieties of being overrun by Mexican immigrants and fears that greater
cooperation with Canada and Mexico could lead down a slippery slope
toward a North American Union. Dobbs, among others, viewed a report by a 2005 Council on Foreign
Relations task force (which I cochaired), Building a North American Community, as the manifesto of a conspiracy to
subvert American sovereignty. Dobbs claimed that the CFR study proposed a North American Union, although it did not.
From the left came attacks based on economic fears of job losses due to unfair trading
practices. These two sets of fears came together in a perfect storm that was
pushed forward by a surplus of hot air from talk-show hosts on radio and television. In the
face of this criticism, the Bush administration was silent, and the Democratic candidates competed for votes in the rustbelt states, where unions and many working people have come to see nafta and globalization much as Dobbs does. The
debate in the United States became so insular that Americans essentially reversed roles
with their neighbors. For nearly two centuries, many in Canada and Mexico built walls to
limit U.S. influence. Within two decades of their decision to dismantle the walls, the
United States is being pressed by anti–North American Union populists to
rebuild the barriers to keep out its neighbors. The idea that the United States
should fear being taken over by its weaker neighbors is bizarre, but it is becoming a staple of
the populist critique
AT: NAFTA
NAFTA ineffective
Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American
Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU
where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs
on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a
Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”,
August, 2012, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269)
NAFTA generated a sunny set of hopes and a thunderstorm of fears. Mexicans
hoped that their country would rise to First-World status; Canadians hoped that the
agreement would compel the United States to stop imposing duties on soft-wood lumber
and comply with dispute-settlement mechanisms; and the United States hoped that
NAFTA would put an end to undocumented migration from Mexico. Alas, none of
these hopes panned out. Mexico and Canada feared that U.S. investors would
purchase their country’s assets, but despite substantial additional foreign
investment in both countries, the percentage owned by U.S. firms actually declined.
The United States feared that its jobs would march south to Mexico, but the greatest period of NAFTA-promoted trade growth in the United
States (1993-–2001) coincided with the largest U.S. job-creation expansion in U.S. history. So the fears also fell short. Leaving aside hopes
and fears, if the criteria for evaluating NAFTA were whether it achieved its explicit goal of removing barriers and expanding trade and
investment, then it succeeded grandly. In its first seven years, trade among the three countries of North America tripled, foreign direct
upward
trajectory has not been sustained. Since 2001, the growth in trade among
North American countries declined by two-thirds; in foreign direct investment
the rate of growth shrunk by half, and the share of the world product sank to 29 percent.
investment quintupled and North America’s share of world product soared from 30 to 36 percent. Unfortunately, that
Intra-regional trade as a percent of the three countries’ world trade rose from 40 percent in 1992 to 46 percent in 2001, only to fall back to
40 percent in 2009. Why? What happened? Will
Rogers once said that even when you are on the right
road, you’re going to get run over if you sit down. To some extent, that’s what happened to
North America: We sat down in 2001, and China ran over us. Although Canada and Mexico remain the
most important markets for U.S. goods, China replaced them as the largest source of U.S. imports. But the China factor is hardly the whole
story, and it’s the least important part of it from a policy perspective. Besides
China’s commercial success,
new security barriers erected after 9/11 took a major toll on commerce
without any discernable benefit to security. Barely eight years after NAFTA began
to lower barriers to trade, the United States raised new and more formidable
barriers to our two closest neighbors. We slowed traffic and insisted on a plethora
of credentials, forms and fees to cross the border, driving many of the small trucking
firms in Canada out of business. Since 9/11, on average, each year 65 million people transit between San Diego and
Tijuana, but the Department of Homeland Security has not arrested a single individual on suspicions of terrorism. The impact
was paradoxically most severe on our neighbors because NAFTA had begun
to transform the way the three countries traded with each other. Instead of
just trading products, we started making them together on a “just in time” basis,
meaning that parts would be shipped across the border within a day. The automotive industry had
long been the most important segment of North American trade, with car parts crossing the borders many times before ending up fully
assembled. The added
cost of 9/11 restrictions, therefore, transformed the North
American advantage into a disadvantage; other countries only had to
surmount one border just once instead of two borders seven times. Also
responsible for the North American reversal were the ongoing U.S.
underinvestment in infrastructure (a folly for which both parties are responsible) and U.S. non-compliance with some
NAFTA provisions (in trucking, for example).