Darfur Community Peace-building and Conflict Resolution
Intervention Summary
What support will the UK provide?
The UK will provide a contribution of £8.5 million for community peace building and conflict
resolution in Darfur. This project will run across four financial years, from August 2011 to
March 2015.
Why is UK support required?
The Darfur civil war between armed rebel groups and government forces began in 2003 as a
result of long-held grievances about the region’s social, economic, and political
marginalization.
Conflict was also driven by increasing social and resource-based conflicts. Darfur’s ecology
has always been fragile and access to natural resources (agricultural land, water and grazing,
for example) has been a key driver of inter-communal and inter-livelihood conflict. This
dynamic has increased with the effects of climate change and rapid population growth.
Conflict is ongoing after eight years of fighting. This protracted crisis has left 252,997
settlements damaged or destroyed, 419,000 Darfuri refugees overseas, 200,000 Chadian
refuges in Darfur and 1.9 million, almost 25% of a 7.5 million population, internally displaced
(UN - Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre, March 2011).
Responding to this conflict through humanitarian relief ($840m spent in 2010) and an UN-AU
peacekeeping mission ($1.9bn in 2010) is a significant and unsustainable cost to the UK and
international community (69% of aid to Darfur is classified as food security, OCHA, 2009).
The African Union High Level Panel on Darfur cited three different levels to the conflict:
i)
Local disputes, internal to Darfur, over resources and administrative authority;
ii)
Conflicts between Darfur and the centre of power in Khartoum, relating to the
political and economic marginalisation of Darfur and power and wealth sharing
iii)
Conflict between Sudan and Chad.
Conflict is also driven by increasing social and resource-based disputes. This dynamic has
increased with the effects of climate change and rapid population growth. Each of these
drivers of conflict must be resolved for peace, security and reconciliation in Darfur to become a
reality.
The UK’s overarching aim in Sudan includes a clear commitment to working towards an
inclusive peace with justice in Darfur, and to promote national and regional stability.
The DFID Sudan operation plan includes in its objectives “peace-building in Darfur, including
through support to community-level development programmes which reduce conflict and
improve access and voice for excluded groups” and “a gradual transition from humanitarian
programmes to support for more durable and sustainable livelihoods in conflict-affected
areas”.
The UK has separate investments supporting the second and third conflict drivers identified
above, including support for Darfur peace talks in Doha. However, there also needs to be a
community-based, bottom-up approach to peace-building in Darfur, to create the conditions for
local peace (stabilisation). This Business Case aims to address this gap.
Funding will support communities in conflict to coalesce around a common agenda leading to
reconciliation and peaceful coexistence at local level. The evidence suggests that the demand
at the community level for such intervention is extremely high, with over 95% of Darfuris
seeking mechanisms for nomads, farmers, and government to reconcile (‘Assessing Attitudes
and Public Opinion in Darfur’, Albany Associates 2010).
Localized peace can both transform and improve the lives of those affected. Between 2008
and 2010 almost 3,300 people died in as a direct result of conflict in Darfur. 48% of these were
due to inter-tribal clashes. Of Darfur’s estimated 8,300 settlements, 36%, or 2,997 were
damaged or destroyed, 2003-09. As a result the poverty and MDG data are very poor, even
compared to elsewhere in Sudan. For example UN-RCSO office states that global chronic
malnutrition for under-5s in Darfur (by stunting to height/age) ranges between 31.8 and 40.1%.
Net secondary school attendance in Darfur is 14% (2008).
It is understood that this intervention will have direct conflict and poverty impacts, including in
terms of a decrease in the number of communities and people affected by conflict, a reduction
in number of new IDPs cased by community based conflict, an increase in the number of IDPs
able and willing to return to their original homes and improvements in access to basic
services, particularly health, education, water and sanitation.
The preferred option for UK fund management is a UNDP administered multi-donor trust fund,
which has proven its ability to deliver results on the ground.
What are the expected results?
This intervention is based on the following theory of change: That through the provision of:
i.
Effective community-level conflict resolution and prevention platforms;
ii.
That help communities cooperate over disputed livelihoods assets, income generating
opportunities, and access to natural resources;
iii.
Backed up by projects that allow these communities to gain equally from more
equitable and sustainable growth;
Communities are able to live in peace (stabilised) for a reasonable period.
iv.
The evidence of what works and the appetite for peace at a community level will be fed
into wider peace dialogues and to those investing in Darfur, be they Sudanese
government, donor, NGO or private sector, resulting in increased pressure for a
comprehensive peace agreement and more conflict sensitive programming by others.
The outcome of all this will be “more Darfur communities stabilised, with trust and confidence
between communities restored, paving the way towards early recovery” as measured by an
increase in the percentage of community members sampled declaring that trust and
confidence is restored and an increase from 60% to 90% in the percentage of tribal/civil
society leaders sampled agreeing to a common and/or collaborative approach on how to
address the root causes of conflict.
The impact will be “an increase in local level peace and stability in Darfur, supporting more
inclusive, sustainable and successful Darfur-wide peace negotiations”.
Darfur Community Peace-building and Conflict Resolution
The Strategic Case
A. Context and need for DFID intervention
Context: The Darfur civil war between armed rebel groups and government forces began in
2003 as a result of long-held grievances about the region’s social, economic, and political
marginalization.
Conflict is ongoing after eight years of fighting. This protracted crisis has left 252,997
settlements damaged or destroyed, 419,000 Darfuri refugees overseas, 200,000 Chadian
refuges in Darfur and 1.9 million, almost 25% of a 7.5 million population, internally displaced
(UN - Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre, March 2011).
Responding to this conflict through humanitarian relief ($840m spent in 2010) and an UN-AU
peacekeeping mission ($1.9bn in 2010) is a significant and unsustainable cost to the UK and
international community (69% of aid to Darfur is classified as food security, OCHA, 2009).
4.9 million people in Darfur are reliant on humanitarian assistance (UN Sudan Work plan
2011, p.58).
The need: The African Union High Level Panel on Darfur, in 2010, cited three different levels
to the ongoing conflict:
i)
local disputes, internal to Darfur, over resources and administrative authority;
ii)
Conflicts between Darfur and the centre of power in Khartoum, relating to the
political and economic marginalisation of Darfur and power and wealth sharing;
and
iii)
An internationalised conflict (Darfur borders and has impacted and been
influenced by actions in Chad, Libya and the Central African Republic)
Conflict is also driven by increasing social and resource-based disputes. Darfur’s ecology
has always been fragile and access to natural resources (agricultural land, water and
grazing, for example) has been a key driver of inter-communal and inter-livelihood conflict.
This dynamic has increased with the effects of climate change and rapid population growth.
Each of these drivers of conflict must be resolved for peace, security and reconciliation in
Darfur to become a reality.
Darfur is not however homogeneous. Some areas continue to experience active conflict
whereas others are more stable. In other areas communities have successfully brokered
local-level peace deals, however as the conflict has progressed, these have become harder
to deliver, as different tribes and communities are increasingly divided and native and
particularly government authorities have gradually lost credibility as peace brokers.
Efforts to support the conditions for local, community-based peace are an essential part of
the package required to support a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement for
Darfur.
UK and DFID role: HMG’s overarching aim in Sudan is to support “a Sudan at peace with its
neighbours, with accountable institutions and able to provide security for its people” (Sudan
Strategy Refresh, 2010). This strategy includes a clear commitment to working towards an
inclusive peace with justice in Darfur, and to promote national and regional stability.
The DFID Sudan Operational Plan includes in its objectives “peace-building in Darfur,
including through support to community-level development programmes which reduce
conflict and improve access and voice for excluded groups” and “a gradual transition from
humanitarian programmes to support for more durable and sustainable livelihoods in conflictaffected areas”.
The UK has separate investments supporting the second and third conflict drivers identified
above, specifically: support for Darfur peace talks (led by the Joint AU-UN Mediation Support
Team); a more inclusive national constitution and political system (led by Conflict Dynamics
International); and dialogue in support of a PRSP that results in increased funding for substate and local governments in Sudan’s peripheries.
However, there also needs to be a community-based, bottom-up approach to peace-building
in Darfur, to create the conditions for local peace (stabilisation). This Business Case aims to
address this gap. Funding will support communities in conflict to coalesce around a common
agenda leading to reconciliation and peaceful coexistence at local level.
Demand for support: The evidence suggests that the demand at the community level for
such intervention is extremely high, with over 95% of Darfuris seeking mechanisms for
nomads, farmers, and government to reconcile (‘Assessing Attitudes and Public Opinion in
Darfur’, Albany Associates 2010).
Evidence also suggests that Darfuris look towards their traditional, native leaders to play the
leading role in such processes. 66.7% of Darfuris seek the involvement of tribal leaders in
peace negotiations and these leaders, in their role as native administrators, are the group
most trusted to mediate, over all other options, including Sudan government officials and
internationals (Albany Associates 2010).
Equally, there is a growing evidence base, that in the absence of an overarching peace
agreement for Darfur, efforts to help communities cooperate over disputed livelihoods
assets, income generating opportunities (IGAs) and access to natural resources, and / or
gain equally from newly provided assets, IGAs or resources will significantly increase the
sustainability of any local peace agreement (Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund –
Independent Annual Review, DFID, 2010).
This approach is increasingly important due to rapidly growing population and livelihood
pressures in Darfur. Over 52% of the population is under 17 years. It is the youth who tend to
be unemployed or underemployed, frustrated and are more likely to be involved in fighting
(Beyond Emergency Relief, UN-RCSO 2010). Equally the likelihood of a failed agricultural
season in Darfur has already and is projected to, rapidly increase (from 20 to 80% between
now and 2050, UN-RCSO 2010).
Impact on conflict and poverty: Localized peace can both transform and improve the lives
of those affected, and also create momentum for a broader peace agreement, by
showcasing that peace is desired, achievable and what is required for peace to be delivered
and sustained.
Between 2008 and 2010 almost 3,300 people died in as a direct result of conflict in Darfur.
48% of these were due to inter-tribal clashes. Of Darfur’s estimated 8,300 settlements, 36%,
or 2,997 were damaged or destroyed, 2003-09.
As a result the poverty and MDG data are very weak, even compared to elsewhere in
Sudan. The UN-RCSO office states the following: Global chronic malnutrition for under 5’s in
Darfur (by stunting to height/age) ranges between 31.8 and 40.1%. Net secondary school
attendance in Darfur is 14% (2008). 44% have access to improved drinking water (2006) and
26% to improved sanitation. Under 5 mortality in Darfur (per 1,000) is 104 (2008) and
maternal mortality (per 100,000) is 1,142 (2008). Net primary school attendance is 58%
(2006).
It is understood that this intervention will have direct conflict and poverty impacts, including in
terms of a decrease in the number of communities and people affected by conflict, a
reduction in number of new IDPs cased by community-based conflict, an increase in the
number of IDPs able and willing to return to their original homes and improvements in
access to basic services, particularly health, education, water and sanitation.
Consequences of not funding: If work in this area is not funded there will be direct
impacts, in terms of an increase in community-level conflict in Darfur, highlighted by a likely
increase in the number of deaths due to conflict, the number of IDPs displaced and a
reduction in development indicators, such as access to basic services. Indirectly, there
should be an increase in bottom-up momentum for a comprehensive peace agreement or for
pro-poor, conflict sensitive spend by the Government of Sudan and others.
Key stakeholders: If these proposed interventions succeed in establishing and sustaining
peace, at the community level, the evidence base generated as regards what works and
why should be fed into ongoing efforts for a comprehensive Darfur peace agreement and to
those spending significant funds in Darfur. In Sudan, the Federal government officially
transfers $2.6bn to State Governments, however only a small percentage of this is allocated
to the three Darfur State Governments ($285m). Of this $285m, 84% is spent on salaries
and basic operational costs (UN-RCSO 2010). If the evidence base from these interventions
can be used to catalyse additional allocations of Federal funding to Darfur, or for more
conflict sensitive spend by Darfur State governments, or other stakeholders (including nontraditional donors), then the benefits of such interventions would be increased multiple times.
At present the major donors for this area of work in Darfur are the UK and Dutch. Without UK
funding, technical, development and diplomatic leadership in promoting this approach such
initiatives would likely significantly reduce in scale and quality. If future work has the goal of
influencing and engaging others (as above) in supporting this approach then reliance on UK
inputs will reduce.
The evidence base: This Business Case draws on a significant quantitative and qualitative
research base as referenced in the text and endnotesi. The case also builds from and the
approach is supported by the internal analysis of the DFID Sudan policy team, represented
by the Darfur Region Policy and Programming Framework paper.
B. Impact and Outcome
The Impact to which the programme aims to contribute will be “an increase in local level
peace and stability in Darfur, supporting more inclusive, sustainable and successful Darfur wide
peace negotiations”.
In order to contribute towards this Impact, the directly attributable Outcome is “more Darfur
communities stabilised, with trust and confidence between communities restored, paving the
way towards early recovery” as measured by an increase from 30% to 85% of community
members sampled declaring that trust and confidence is restored and an increase from 60%
to 90% in the percentage of tribal/civil society leaders sampled agreeing to a common and/or
collaborative approach on how to address the root causes of conflict.
We expect to deliver this outcome and impact, through the provision of:
 Effective community-level conflict resolution and prevention platforms;
o As measured by: an additional 100 community-based resolution mechanisms
that are functioning effectively; Led by tribal and civil society leaders that have
a stronger common understanding (75% to 95%) of reconciliation initiatives;
Increasing by 25%, the percentage of community members with access to and
satisfaction with reconciliation mechanisms;
 That help communities cooperate over disputed livelihoods assets, access to basic
services, income generating opportunities and access to natural resources;
o As measured by: 90 new, joint-managed education and health initiatives; 45
newly equipped or rehabilitated schools attended by combined communities;
170 new, jointly-managed, water resources (such as water points, hafirs,
boreholes, water pumps) and; an increase by 350,000 in the number of people
with reasonable access to primary health care services;
 Backed up by projects that allow these communities to gain equally from more
equitable and sustainable growth;
o As measured by: a 20% increase in enrolment in formal or non-formal
(vocational) training by diverse communities; 30 new, or re-established markets
that enable diverse communities to interact and cooperate; An additional 180
community initiatives that deliver collaborative livelihoods and income
generating strategies; a 30% increase in commercial interactions between
target sample communities.
Darfur Community Peace-building and Conflict Resolution
The Appraisal Case
A. Determining Critical Success Criteria (CSC)
Each CSC is weighted 1 to 5, where 1 is least important and 5 is most important based on
the relative importance of each criterion to the success of the intervention.
CSC
Description
Weighting (1-5)
1
Effective community-level conflict resolution and
prevention platforms in Darfur are in place.
5
2
Increased cooperation between communities over disputed 5
livelihoods assets, income-generating opportunities and
access to natural resources
3
Equitable and sustainable growth promoted, with particular 3
attention to ensuring that stabilised rural and urban areas
remain stable
4
Evidence of effective grassroots peace building initiatives
collected and fed in wider peace fora and Darfur agendas
2
B. Feasible options
Option 1: Support to the UN-led Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund [DCPSF]
Phase II
The DCPSF was established on the rationale that, alongside any progress at the Darfur
peace talks in Doha, the deployment of UNAMID and humanitarian assistance, there needs
to be a community-based, bottom-up approach to the stabilisation of Darfur and the creation
of conditions for local peace and equitable and sustainable growth.
DCPSF focuses on addressing the root causes of conflict at grass-root and locality (local
government) level. It does this by promoting conflict sensitive approaches to stabilisation that
aim to promote trust and confidence across diverse communities. In so doing, DCPSFsupported activities and processes enable diverse communities to coalesce around a
common agenda leading to reconciliation and peaceful coexistence on a local level.
To do this DCPSF programming has tended to be designed along two axes:
i. Independently brokered processes of dialogue and consultation that lead to the
restoration of trust and confidence amongst diverse communities; and
ii. The delivery of material inputs (programmes and services) that respond to community
needs, whilst underpinning processes of dialogue and consultation;
Learning from reviews of Phase I regards improving sustainability of interventions (the length
of time peace lasts between stabilised communities) DCPSFII will also cover equitable and
sustainable growth initiatives that directly contribute to maintaining stability.
Phase II also includes:
iii. A focus on ensuring that the aggregated impact and learning from DCPSF-funded
community-peace building is fed into and informs broader Darfur peace processes and is
used to inform the way development funds are programmed by other stakeholders,
particularly by GoS and international donors.
iv. An evidence and capacity mapping component to fill key Darfur specific gaps in
knowledge and understanding on issues including land management, gender and the
interaction between native and local government administration;
v. A capacity development component with a view to increase peace-building and
monitoring and evaluation capacity skills of partner CSOs/NGOs.
vi. Selected analytic work to provide more understanding of the context of the programme
environment and to strengthen the impact of the of the programme through a study on
the economic impact of the programme (the balance of the cost and benefits) and a
review of the capacity of civil society in Darfur and its role in peace building.
Additional information on DCPSFII is available in the DCPSFII Terms of Reference at Flag
B.
Option 2: Support to the USAID Darfur Security and Stabilization Initiative (DSSI),
specifically Output 1 on Stabilization and 4 on Traditional Dispute Resolution
The DSSI is a $5.8m fund designed to assist the African Union (AU) in developing an
operational strategy to implement the goals and objectives of the AU High Level Panel on
Darfur. Specifically to enhance peace and security efforts in Darfur. These activities are
intended to complement, and be accomplished in parallel with, the AU/UN mediated political
talks.
DSSI was contracted via a USAID tender process to a US-based contractor AECOM. The
contractor is tasked with providing technical and advisory support to AU initiatives in Darfur,
specifically:
i. Supporting AU stabilization projects in order to bolster local peace and security
agreements. Stabilization projects in this case are seen as small-scale, rapidly
implementable non-military projects, which help increase stability, decrease conflict, and
support local peace agreements under the auspices of the AU;
ii. Coordinating the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups
under AU auspices in coordination with the UN country team as needed. Specific
activities include providing advice and logistical support to the AU for the DDR of armed
groups in Darfur as well as helping to coordinate community arms collection.
Peacekeeping Operation funds may also support the provision of technical support to
monitor and implement ceasefire agreements;
iii. Providing logistical support to AU-led Darfur consultations in centre-periphery security
dialogue. Specific activities could include: 1) providing support to the AU (in coordination
with UNAMID) on implementation of Darfur Peace Agreement security initiatives in the
form of programs and workshops on these issues, and 2) providing technical advice to
community leaders on security arrangements and other security issues, including
training and workshops;
iv. Supporting AU-negotiated security arrangements for IDPs and nomadic populations. In
particular, funds may enhance traditional dispute resolution mechanisms by conducting
training for local leaders. Funds may also enhance security arrangements for nomadic
migration by coordinating security mechanisms developed by the AU and key
stakeholders.
No additional information on DSSI is currently available.
Option 3: UK Bilateral contracting of NGOs/Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to
deliver to support community peace and stability
Under this option the UK could seek to bilaterally contract NGOs and CSOs to deliver
activities that support the first three critical success criteria: i) Effective community-level
conflict resolution and prevention platforms in Darfur are in place, ii) Increased cooperation
between communities over disputed livelihoods assets, income generating opportunities and
access to natural resources, and iii) Equitable and sustainable growth promoted, with
particular attention to ensuring that stabilised rural and urban areas remain stable.
By way of estimating the number of contracted partners that would be required, DCPSF
contracted 26 programmes, implemented by 13 NGOs and 3 UN organizations. It is
expected that the larger investment justified in this business case would result in an increase
in the number of programmes and implementing partners.
In the table below:

The quality of evidence for each option as is rated either Strong, Medium or Limited,

The likely impact on climate change and environment is categorised as A, high
potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity; C,
low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
Option Evidence rating
Climate change and
category (A, B, C, D)
environment
1
Strong
A
2
Limited
- (not enough information to assess)
3
Medium
- (not enough information to assess)
Climate change and environmental impact of the proposed area of work and Option 1
(DCPSF) are assessed in detail at Flag C. A climate and environment assurance note is at
Flag F.
C. Appraisal of options
A detailed social, political, institutional, economic, conflict and environment appraisal, against
the three options, is attached at Flag C. Below is a summary.
Costs, benefits and risks
Option 1 – DCPSF: This option is assessed strongly in the detailed appraisals as the
preferred option for UK funding.
The economic appraisal concludes that “the very large economic impact of conflict on
communities, as well as the cost of humanitarian support and peacekeeping operations
mean that a successful peace-building effort (through DCPSF) stands to make a significant
economic return”. The appraisal could provide only non-quantifiable benefits at this stage.
The reason is that, although evidence from the first phase showed significant direct benefits
from the programme1, these interventions are only instruments to help support local
reconciliation efforts through empowering local leaders mediating disputes over assets.
Therefore, much larger returns should be realised through the prevention of conflict and
associated costs.
The social appraisal concludes that, this option, and option 3 are equally preferable. The
appraisal states that “Sustainable peace is a prerequisite for increased and sustainable
livelihoods opportunities for all and especially for poor and marginalised communities in
Darfur. The delivery of material inputs (programmes and services) that respond to
community needs, whilst underpinning processes of dialogue and consultation outlined in
this option has the potential to contribute to improved livelihoods and in the long term a
reduction in poverty”.
The political, conflict, institutional and environmental appraisals assess DCPSF / Option 1 as
the preferred option. If this option is approved, the detailed appraisals cite the following
requirements for implementation:
-
DFID Economic Adviser and the DCPSF Technical Secretariat complete the
suggested steps, laid out in the economic appraisal, over the next six months, for a
final cost-benefit analysis to be completed and for this to influence the project
approach;
-
DCPSF Technical Secretariat minimises social risks by considering and monitoring
equity of programme benefits in the geographical and social distribution amongst
diverse livelihood communities;
-
DCPSF Technical Secretariat are tasked with regular analysis of the conflict dynamics
and their impact on livelihoods, to ensure that resources are allocated according to
changing needs and that the programme ‘does no harm’;
-
DCPSF Technical Secretariat are tasked to monitor and ensure that marginalised
groups, including pastoralists, and women and the youth are involved in and benefit
from peace-building activities and from material inputs;
-
DFID annual reviews check that the funding mechanism remains flexible enough to
direct funding to newly accessible areas, or to re-direct funding, to areas that can be
accessed, or to partners that are allowed to work;
-
DFID ensures that the UK maintains a comprehensive package of interventions
designed to support a positive peace in Darfur (including financial and technical
support for formal and Track 2 and 3 peace talks);
1
Provision of livelihood and other support, including 3326 people receiving training in agricultural
extension, 18,736 livestock being vaccinated and 200,000 new seedlings planted
-
The DCPSF Technical Secretariat is tasked, in reviewing whether a ‘Reconciliation
and Peaceful Coexistence Mechanism’ RPCM style at state-level reconciliation
mechanism would be useful and feasible for Darfur, and if so, how such a mechanism
could be established;
-
DFID and the DCPSF Steering Committee give priority to the proposed “market study
on alternative management arrangements that will be conducted leading to a tender
with a view to seek alternative more cost-efficient management arrangements”.
Depending on the outcome of the tender, the management arrangements should be
found either cost-effective, or new, cost effective arrangements put in place.
-
Programme management team ensure that UNDP develop a costed 4 year staffing
plan with details of all the posts at the Technical Secretariat, contract start and end
dates, recruitment timelines etc by end October 2011
-
The need for proper water resource assessments before embarking on extensive
infrastructure development:
i. The Technical Secretariat should immediately be tasked with drafting a matrix of
infrastructure that could be supported by the fund, which will be updated during
quarterly reporting;
ii. The steering committee should task the Technical Secretariat with ensuring there
are environmental assessments of all new infrastructure that is supported
(including location and vulnerability of new infrastructure to flooding and its
potential to increase the adverse impact of floods).
iii. The Technical Secretariat should develop standard procedures to ensure that the
maximum amount of local materials are used for infrastructure development;
iv. For water infrastructure, the Technical Secretariat should ensure that available
groundwater resources have been assessed and a sustainable level of
abstraction is understood (likely through other actors and projects – such as
UNEP) before work starts (where necessary, Integrated Water Resource
Management – IWRM – plans should be in place before water resources are
developed;
-
As it is likely that more extreme environmental events are likely, establishing
mechanisms to facilitate conflict resolution is critical, but the future programme
reviews must assess the ability of such mechanisms to cope not just with existing
climate variability but to future climate variability;
-
DFID to track the possible confirmation of oil in Darfur and if fields are confirmed and
developed consider how it tackles this possible issue through this programme
(community conflict resolution platforms) and additional work (e.g. through the
extractive industries transparency initiative).
-
DFID to ensure selected analytical work is undertaken to provide more understanding
of the context of the programme environment and to strengthen the impact of the of
the programme, (e.g. a study on the economic impact of the programme (the balance
of the cost and benefits) and a review of the capacity of civil society in Darfur and its
role in peace building).
Option 2 – DISSI: At this stage not enough is known about this option to provide a full social,
institutional, environment or economic appraisal. From a political perspective this option is
assessed as high risk. From a conflict perspective it is concluded that “this option should not
receive funding unless significant additional information can be provided on the proposal,
ensuring all critical success criteria are addressed in the approach”.
Option 3 – Bilateral Contracting: At this stage not enough is known about this option to
provide a full economic or environment appraisal. From a political and social perspective this
option is seen as an acceptable alternative to option 1 but politically a higher risk, given that
DFID is unlikely to be able to shift implementing partners and funds around as easily as the
DCPSF project.
The conflict appraisal concludes that “this option should not receive funding unless an
additional implementing partner is contracted to assess and build capacity of the proposed
partners and funding is set aside in the proposal to enable DFID to contract support for the
collection of evidence of effective grassroots peace building and to help the UK feed this into
wider peace forums”. The institutional appraisal also concludes that this option “should not
receive funding unless an additional implementing partner is contracted to assess and build
capacity of the proposed partners”.
D. Comparison of options
The same weighting is used as for CSCs above. The score ranges from 1-5, where 1 is low
contribution and 5 is high contribution, based on the relative contribution to the success of
the intervention.
Analysis of options against Critical Success Criteria (CSC)
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
CSC
Weight Score Weighted Score Weighted Score
(1-5)
Score
(1-5) Score
Weighted
Score
1
5
4
20
2
10
3
15
2
5
4
20
1
5
3
15
3
3
4
12
1
3
3
9
4
2
4
8
0
0
0
0
Totals
60
18
30
With scores provided based on the analysis summarized above and provided in detail in
Flag C, Option 2 scores 18, Option 3 30, and Option 1 60. Option 1 is therefore the preferred
and recommended option.
Assessment of gender sensitivity – As per the social appraisal in Flag C, Option 1 is
assessed as strong on gender sensitivity, but clear recommendations for monitoring,
improving and strengthening gender sensitivity are provided, and highlighted in the appraisal
summary above.
E. Measures to be used or developed to assess value for money – A detailed process
has been established for the first 6 months of implementation, to ensure value for money can
be adequately assessed and monitored. For full details see the economic appraisal at Flag
C.
Business Case for Reducing Conflict Between Darfur Communities in Sudan
Commercial Case
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
DFID will provide funds to the DCPSF programme through UNDP. The agreement format will
be an MoU, falling under the standard umbrella agreement DFID already has with UNDP.
This funding mechanism is in line with DFID guidelines.
B. Value for money through procurement
A DFID-funded review of the first phase of the DCPSF found that the mechanism of UNDP
acting as managing and administrative agents was expensive, with a set fee rate making
overheads high compared to the overall value of the fund and the grants being made from it.
In working with the DCPSF Technical Secretariat on the terms of reference for the second
phase of the programme we have pushed for greater options to achieve improved value for
money. The terms of reference now include plans to tender for a managing agent during the
second phase of the programme. This approach has the agreement of the Steering
Committee, including DFID. It was agreed that this tender process would not be immediate in
order not to cause a gap in programming. UNDP will be free to bid for the role but it is hoped
that a transparent tendering process will help achieve improved value for money from which
ever party is selected. In the meantime DFID will continue to monitor closely the value for
money of UNDP’s management of the DCPSF funds.
Business Case for Reducing Conflict between Darfur Communities in Sudan
Financial Case
A. How much it will cost
Eight donors contributed a total of $33.5m to the DCPSF (phase 1) as follows: Denmark $
942 thousand, Germany $ 513 thousand, Italy $ 2,557,800 million, Netherlands $15,500
million, Norway $ 2,548 million, Sweden $2,832 million, Switzerland $300 thousand and UK
$ 8,332 million.
The overall project budget for the DCPSF (phase 2) is a minimum of $40 million (approx.
£24.2 million) out of which other donors have made soft pledges in this financial year
2011/12 totalling about $9 million.
DFID is proposing to provide up to £8.5 million which is available in the current DFID Sudan
framework and included in DFID Sudan BAR offer.
The project budget is broken down as follows:
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Total
£1.6m
£1.6m
£1.6m
£1.6m
£6.4m
Out of the £6.4 million a 6.2 million will be disbursed directly to the DCPSF (phase 2)
programme while a £200,000 will be allocated by DFID to conduct analytical work to provide
more understanding of the context of the programme environment and to strengthen the
impact of the programme. That amount is included in the budget breakdown above.
The balance of £2.1 million will not be programmed immediately but will allow for DFID to
respond to a cost and/or time extension to the programme.
B. How it will be funded: capital/programme/admin
This intervention will be wholly programme funded.
The programme budget will contribute to the different components as follows:
1. the direct disbursed DFID’s contribution to the DCPSF (phase 2) (£6.2 million) is
distributed, as follows:
Grants
Technical secretariat
73%
5%
Administration agent
20%
Monitoring and Evaluation
(lessons-learned and impact
evaluation exercises in the
entry of DCPSF (phase 2)
dates to be confirmed and
mid term review by July
2013)
Total
£4,520,000.00
£320,000.00
£1,240,000.00
2%
100%
£120,000.00
£6,200,000.00
2. Analytical researches and studies (out of the direct disbursement to DCPSF (phase 2)
up to £200,000
C. How funds will be paid out
An MoU will be signed with UNDP. As UNDP will require the funds in order to place calls for
proposals, funds will be paid out in six monthly advances of approximately 50% of each
annual financial allocation. Funds may be paid out more frequently than six monthly where
UNDP can provide evidence that previous funds have been wholly utilised.
In the event that a private sector company takes over the role of managing agent they will be
contracted to the UN and not DFID.
D. How expenditure will be monitored, reported, and accounted for
DFID will actively participate in the DCPSF steering committee. Participation in the
committee will allow us a say in how funds are allocated and to participate in field monitoring
visits. Both the managing agent and the technical secretariat will perform monitoring and
evaluation roles and report to the steering committee. Consolidated financial statements will
be provided by UNDP as managing agent on a quarterly basis, showing income and spend
across the fund.
Any assets procured for the fund will be paid for by multiple donors. At the end of the
programme DFID will agree, in conjunction with the other donors and the DCPSF Technical
Secretariat the best course for disposal. Any disposal will take account of DFID guidance on
assets.
Business Case for Reducing Conflict between Darfur Communities in Sudan
Management Case
A. Oversight
The DCPSF governance structures have been set up in line with agreed Multi Donor Trust
Fund (MDTF) architecture.
The DCPSF is to be overseen by a governing Steering Committee (SC), under the
chairmanship of the Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), with
representatives of each donor, an appointed INGO representative and an appointed UN
agency representative. The SC will be responsible for mobilising resources, providing
strategic guidance, commissioning independent evaluations and reviewing progress,
amongst other responsibilities.
The SC will have a four voting member decision-making body (the RC/HC Chair, an
appointed donor representative, an appointed INGO representative, a UN agency) for
decisions on proposals for DCPSF funding and on DCPSF project extensions.
In addition, a Technical Secretariat (TS) has been established to oversee the preparation
and decision-making processes related to the DCPSF.
Other important stakeholders, including the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST), World
Bank and the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, are invited to the SC as observers.
Beneficiaries will be represented through the implementing agent representatives (INGO and
UN), on the SC.
This structure ensures that all major stakeholders are directly represented.
UNDP will provide the administrative and legal architecture for the DCPSF, in its dual role of
Administrative Agent (AA) and that representing Participating UN Organisations as
Managing Agent (MA). As per the structures outlined above, this ensures that the managing
agent is accountable to the oversight body (SC) and SC decisions will be binding to the MA.
The performance of the project will be assessed through a Mid Term Review to be
commissioned by July 2013 and an independent ‘lessons-learned and (impact) evaluation
exercise’, to be commissioned by the SC in the final year of the fund.
Note: more information is at Flag B – the DCPSF Terms of Reference.
B. Management
The core governance structures have been outlined above. These are represented in the
following chart:
FIGURE (1): DCPSF GOVERNANCE
ARRANGEMENTS
DCPSF Steering
Committee (SC)
Recommended
proposals for approval to
SC
Technical
appraisal
DCPSF
Technical
Secretariat
(TS)
Fieldbased
appraisal
Proposals in response to
CfPs by TS
Participating UN
agencies and IOM
Contribution to
the DCPSF
SC approval and
instruction to AA to
disburse funds
Non-governmental
organizations
(NGOs)
DCPSF
Administrative
Agent (AA) Funds disbursed
UNDP
Funds disbursed
Managing
Agent (MA) UNDP
Participating UN
agencies and IOM
Non-governmental
organizations
(NGOs)
Following the findings and recommendations of the DCPSF (phase 1) Mid-Term Review, in
20010, at the start of this phase, in 2011, the Steering Committee will commission a study to
corroborate the most cost efficient management arrangements, while taking into account the
Darfur specific working environment. Recommendations of the study will be submitted to the
SC for consideration by early 2012.
For DFID the fund will be managed by the Humanitarian and Conflict team Programme
Officer. Advisory oversight will be provided by the DFID Sudan Conflict Adviser supported by
the DFID Sudan Governance Adviser, as lead, with cross-cutting support from the DFID
Sudan Social Development and Economic Advisers.
DFID programme staff and advisers will draw on internal expertise where possible, including
relevant Stabilisation Unit, Policy Division and Africa Regional Department staff.
Through the agreed mid-term review and regular quarterly reporting, annual reporting and
annual DFID review, all based on a very strong, agreed results-framework (logframe), there
is a clear process to measure results-based delivery. DFID’s project performance is laid out
in the deliverables of the agreed results-framework. If the fund did not achieve the expected
results or fail to represent good value for money and / or clear and timely measures have not
been put in place to improve performance, DFID will then discuss the option whether to
suspend its funds.
Note: more information is at Flag B – the DCPSF Terms of Reference.
C. Conditionality
Not applicable.
D. Monitoring and Evaluation
The DCPSF has a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation strategy designed to:
i)
Gain an improved understanding of the DCPSF funded projects, the conflict
sensitivity and the conflict context in which it is being implemented;
ii)
Assess operational progress towards achieving outputs;
iii)
Factor
in
lessons
learned
programming/allocation decisions;
iv)
Measure the impact of DCPSF on stabilising Darfur.
from
ongoing
initiatives
into
future
The DCPSF has the following tools to deliver against these objectives:
i)
A detailed results framework to enable the project to measure progress against
milestones, targets and outputs. Monitoring data will be gathered from a range of
sources, as outlined in the results framework;
ii)
Each sub-project that receives funding from the DCPSF mechanisms will provide
i) quarterly updates on progress; ii) annual narrative progress reports and iii) final
narrative progress reports;
iii)
Desk monitoring by a technical secretariat;
iv)
Regular DCPSF partner meetings to ensure a forum open for debate and
exchange of information, ideas and lessons learned;
v)
Field monitoring to enable first-hand observation of the project environment and
setting;
vi)
The DCPSF will provide i) consolidated six-monthly progress updates; ii)
consolidated annual narrative progress reports; and iii) consolidated final narrative
progress reports;
vii)
Finally a Mid Term Review will be commissioned by July 2013 and an
independent ‘lessons-learned and (impact) evaluation exercise’, will be
commissioned by the SC in the final year of the fund.
In addition project progress will be regularly monitored against expenditure and the DFID
logical framework through the DFID annual review process.
The independent evaluation cited above will feed into DFID’s Project Completion Report
(PCR) which will be arranged by DFID staff.
Note: more information is at Flag B – the DCPSF Terms of Reference.
E. Risk Assessment
The key risks that threaten the successful delivery of this fund are below. Mitigating actions
for each risk are detailed
Risk
Likelihood
Impact
Mitigation Strategies
Broader conflict spoilers Medium
interfere in the processes
necessary to restore trust
and
confidence
at
community level
High
- Broader UK and international
support to the Darfur Peace Process;
New
or
reformed Low
conflict
resolution
platforms fail because
of lose of credibility
after being established
due to inability to meet
expectation.
Low
- Improved quality of peace building
training and increase in funding
available for conflict resolution
platforms to implement conflictmitigation activities ensuring such
platforms are more able to meet
expectations.
Conflict is not resolved Medium
because
vulnerable
groups,
such
as
women, youth and the
poor are not effectively
included and unable to
voice their concerns.
Medium
- Improved monitoring of ‘inclusion’ by
DCPSF implementing agents and UN;
Limited
absorption Medium
capacity and availability
of adequate implementing
partners in Darfur
High
- DCPSF Projects work to increase
inter-community dialogue specifically
focusing on mitigating risks of spoilers
and establishment of early warning
mechanisms.
- Improved protocols for sub-projects
to ensure ‘inclusion’ in design and
implementation;
- Cross-cutting inputs of DFID Sudan
Social development Advisor.
- Increased focus on capacity building
of implementing agents through
tailored training and support for
partnerships between International
NGO and National NGOs;
- Provide more time for applicants to
design proposals in reply to DCPSF
Calls for Proposals.
Access to project sites is Medium
impossible
due
to
unstable
and
unpredictable
security
situation in the three
Darfur States, continued
presence
of
armed
groups; prolonged rainy
season, road closures
and inaccessibility; safety
of staff travelling by road
and otherwise
High
- Implementing through the UN
platform, enables access to UN
security
(UNDSS)
who
offer
supporting, including armed escorts,
that enables greater activity;
- If necessary, suspend DCPSF
projects until security on the ground
permits quality service delivery;
- Implementing partners supported to
factor environmental risks into their
action plans;
-
increase
delegation
of
M&E
functions to local partners, and
technical support for national partners
to improve their understanding of
M&E, reducing reliance on externals
who may not be able to access project
sites.
Implementing
partners Low
become targets
of
violence because of
collaboration with UN or
because of unclear or
inadequate engagement
with authorities
Medium
- DCPSF TS transparently engages
with government on purpose and
activities of the Fund, and seeks
high-level UN support where/when
needed;
- Reduce exposure through lowprofile approach in sensitive areas;
- Develop and effect a clear, open
and
continuous
communication
strategy and manage expectations,
pre-empt open communication with
key-stakeholders and the wider
public.
The project is not
implemented to time
High
Medium
due to organisational and
programme management
being challenged by slow
recruitment and the
overall regulatory and
operational environment.
- Senior-level UN engages with
UNDP HR with a view to prioritise
staffing;
- UNDP to develop a costed 4 year
staffing plan with details of all the
posts at the TS, contract start and
end dates, recruitment timelines etc
by end October 2011
-Senior-level UN timely engagement
with relevant government bodies for
expedient issuance of visas and stay
permits.
Project does not meet
funding target of $40m.
High
Medium
_-TS to monitor spend of project and
provide biannual reports to SC ahead
of disbursement of each funding
tranch.
- DFID to meet quarterly with the TS
to monitor spending and ensure
delivery of key results.
- TS to develop a prioritisation
mechanism to ensure proposals for
funding match the available funds to
avoid overspending.
DFID Sudan believes that the most significant risk is that broader conflict spoilers interfere in
the processes necessary to restore trust and confidence at community level.
Based on evidence and experience from the first phase, DFID Sudan believes that benefits
of increasing stability/reducing conflict in this case, outweigh the risks and is willing to go
ahead with this programme. Residual risk is low. Major risks and mitigating actions are identified
above. More information is at Flag B – the DCPSF Terms of Reference.
The risks that UK funds are not used for their intended purposes are low. The multi-donor
trust fund model has strong processes in place to ensure funds are fully accounted and
audited.
The risk that the fund does not deliver the expected results is mitigated through the
monitoring and evaluation methodology as laid out in sections B and D above.
In case the fund overachieves, it is recommended that the UK submit for additional funding,
above the initial amount to be provided to the fund, so additional support can be easily
provided.
F. Results and Benefits Management
DFID has a detailed and strong logframe, based on the DCPSF results framework. This
framework will provide evidence of progress against realistic milestones, targets and
outputs, including under or over achievement. The logframe is a results-based version of the
theory of change required for this intervention, and outlined in the situational analysis above.
i
MENARG paper, Darfur in 2011: The elusive peace
Buchanan-Smith, M. et al (2011) City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan. Nyala case
Study. London: HPG ODI;
Young, H. et al (2009) Livelihoods, power and choice: The vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat,
Darfur, Sudan. Medford: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University;
Buchanan-Smith, M. et al (2008) Adaptation and devastation: the impact of the conflict on trade and
markets in Darfur. Medford: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University;
Jaspars, S. et al (2010) Coping and change in protracted conflict: the role of community groups and
local institutions in addressing food insecurity and threats to livelihoods. A case study based on the
experience of Practical Action in North Darfur. London: HPG ODI;
Young, H. (2011) Navigating Without a Compass: The Erosion of Humanitarianism in Darfur.
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Darfur : The Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation; Report of the African Union High Level
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Darfur : Towards a new strategy for achieving comprehensive peace, security and development
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OECD DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation
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Traditional Justice in Darfur July 2010 DfID paper
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GoS Darfur Strategy
Albany Associates, ‘Assessing Attitudes and Public Opinion in Darfur’, 2010
Heidelberg Group, ‘Darfur Dialogue Outcomes’, 2010
USAID , ‘Darfur: Changing Dynamics at the Local Level’, 2010
UN-RCSO, ‘Beyond Emergency Relief in Darfur’, September 2010
UN-RCSO, ‘Darfur Humanitarian Profile Narrative’ 2009
UN-RCSO, ‘Darfur Aid Sustainability’, 2010
UNDP Sudan, ‘Brief on Budgets and Aid in Darfur’, 2010
UNDP Sudan, ‘Darfur Fact Sheet’, 2010
UNDP Narrative 2011 Regional Workplan – Darfur
DCPSF Implementing Partners’ Progress Reports
DFID, Report on the Review of the DCPSF March 2010
World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap, Policy Research Report, 2003
DFID, Working effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations, a DfID practice paper, 2010
DFID, Urbanisation in Darfur September 2010
DFID, Traditional Justice in Darfur July 2010