2013
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND EU – FINAL EXAM
BSC. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND POLITICS
Integration Theories in EU
The Increasing Power of the European Parliament
Christian Peter Roswalld Borggaard
11 June, 2013
Signature:
STU: 22,740
Exam, Spring 2013
Question 2
Compare the main features of two theories of European Integration and discuss
whether the increasing role of the Parliament in the last two decades lends more
support to one theory than the other
Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
Table of Contents
1.0. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 2
2.0. Neofunctionalism ....................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1. Definition and Main Features ................................................................................................................. 3
2.2. Critique of Neofunctionalism ................................................................................................................. 3
3.0. Liberal Intergovernmentalism .................................................................................................................... 4
3.1. Definition and Main Features ................................................................................................................. 4
3.2. Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism .............................................................................................. 5
4.0. The Increasing Power of the European Parliament .................................................................................... 5
4.1. Historical Context of Treaties ................................................................................................................. 5
4.2. The European Parliaments in Treaty Negotiations................................................................................. 6
4.3. The European Parliaments own Struggle for Power .............................................................................. 8
5.0. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 9
6.0. Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................. 10
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
“… the most important institutional development in the last two decades has been the increased power of
the European Parliament” (Hix, 2008, p. 73).
1.0. Introduction
As the quote above states, the European Parliament (EP) and its power has been of great importance in the
last two decades. The EP is a supranational institution in EU; it is the only institution which is directly public
elected, and composes of 751 members after the Lisbon Treaty1. Its primary functions, as of pre-Lisbon, involves partnering with the Council in the budgetary procedure; to supervise, control, appoint and dismiss
the European Commission; and being a law-maker in corporation with the European Council (Bache, et al.,
2011, p. 293). From having close to no influence in EU, the EP has been subject to a substantial power increase, mainly due to the Treaty reforms in the last two decades. In addressing these powers, two questions come to mind: how the EP obtained this power, and which theory of European integration can best
explain this power increase. Scholars have developed theories on European Integration, and there have
been a few prominent theories of European Integration; this assignment takes point in neofunctionalism
(Haas 1958) and liberal intergovernmentalism (LI; Moravcsik 1993). Despite these theories addressing European integration with different assumptions and implications, there still exists confusion on which theory
remains the better in explaining the increasing power of the EP. This theoretical confusion will be solved by
an objective analysis, in which EPs influence in the Treaty negotiations together with its own arguments for
powers will be considered.
This paper consists of 4 sections. The first section will define the main features of neofunctionalism, followed by critical points, explaining why most scholars have departed from the theory. The second section
defines the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, followed by critique. The third section will elaborate on
EPs power increase by reflecting on the Treaties in the last two decades. After doing so, this paper focuses
on EPs influence in the negotiation of the Treaties together with EPs own struggle for power, and whether
either lends support towards neofunctionalism or LI. In the analysis of EP, the distinctions between assumptions and implications of neofunctionalism and LI will be outlined. A brief conclusion summarizes the
solution to the theoretical confusion; that neofunctionalism is the better theory in explaining the increasing
powers of EP.
1
There are 754 MEPs until the 2014 election.
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
2.0. Neofunctionalism
2.1. Definition and Main Features
The neofunctionalistic approach to European Integration was first discussed by Haas in 1958. In defining
neofunctionalism, Haas emphasize his assumption of the state being a non-unitary actor in international
policy-making; non-state actors like interest groups and bureaucrats are also important actors in policymaking (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 8). A second assumption is that interest groups are not only confined to the
domestic political area, but rather they work on an international level (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 8). One of the
more controversial assumptions is that once the EUs supranational institutions, like EP, have been established, they take on a life of their own, thus detaching themselves from the control of the member states
(Bache, et al., 2011, p. 9). If this holds true, then the EP is expected to be detached from the member states
control in striving for more power. Moreover, in the struggle for power, EP is expected to ally itself with
sub-national actors such as courts or interest groups (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 9)
Haas moreover assumes that European Integration is advanced through the process of spillover, which is:
“… [referring] to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which
the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and
a need for more action, and so forth (Lindberg, 1963, p. 10). There are three types of spillover; however this
paper will disregard functional spillover and cultivated spillover, only focusing on political spillover, defined
as the political and economic elite socializing at a supranational level, thus pressuring for further power and
integration (Bache, et al., 2011, pp. 9-10). This is because political spillover has the highest relevance for
the question.
2.2. Critique of Neofunctionalism
Because of the severe critique applied to neofunctionalism, it has been phased out in the current theorization of European integration. One of the most prominent critiques of neofunctionalism is the notion of
spillover, to which critical scholars argue that the member states set the tempo for European integration,
not the process of spillover (Bache, et al., 2011, pp. 10-11). The “empty-chair crisis” in 1965-66, where UK
integration was delayed by de Gaulle is an excellent example of the member states setting the agenda for
integration, and scholars must therefore never rule out the influence of the member states. Another critique is that neofunctionalism does not explain disintegration nor does it explain a spill-back process
(Bache, et al., 2011, pp. 8-12). Even though Haas (1968) attempted to revise his theory, the death of
neofunctionalism was inevitable. Few scholars, however, still argue that neofunctionalism is applicable to
European integration (for example Schmitter 2005), even though scholars have in general moved away
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
from neofunctionalism to other theories like liberal intergovernmentalism where the role of the member
states is emphasized. To this paper, neofunctionalism seems prominent in that it still excels in emphasizing
on the role of the EP and of supranational institutions in general.
If neofunctionalism does the better job in explaining the increasing power of the EP, I should find that: The
EP has increased its power due to the process of spillover, and by themselves, thus being independent on
the member states.
3.0. Liberal Intergovernmentalism
3.1. Definition and Main Features
In 1993, Andrew Moravcsik presented his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism as a critical response
aimed at neofunctionalism. There are numerous scholars who use LI today, proving that it is an important
theory which is why it has been chosen for this paper. LI is a rational theory, and Moravcsik assumes that
states are playing a “two-level game”, in which national interests, decided from a domestic political process, determines the position that the governments takes to international negotiations; for example in
Treaty negotiations (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 13). The primary determinant of government preferences is the
balance between economic interests within the domestic area. In explaining the process of European integration, Moravcsik elaborate on three steps (Bache, et al., 2011, pp. 13-14):
The first step is emphasizing the domestic preference formation. These preferences are influenced by national non-state societal actors such as labour unions (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 482). The factors which determine the preferences of these societal actors are being decided on both a national level and an international level. The second step, interstate bargaining, is the bargaining between states, to which LI assumes
that the outcome and determination is a reflection of the member states economic interests and their relative bargaining powers (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 13). Moravcsik assumes that: “The influence of supranational
actors [in interstate bargaining] is generally marginal, limited to situations where they have strong domestic
allies” (Moravcsik, 1995, p. 612), thus EP is not expected to have any influence unless it enjoys strong domestic allies. The third and final process of European integration is the delegation of sovereignty to the supranational actors. The delegation is a reflection of the bargaining process from the second step, and LI argues that by reaching the lowest common denominator between the member states the delegation of
power is decided. (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 13; Moravcsik, 1995, p. 612).
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
3.2. Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism
One of the prominent critiques of LI is that it fails to explain everyday decision making and only describes
the history-making decisions of European Integration. Working in an everyday environment grants more
power to the supranational institutions compared to the preferences and interest of the states (Bache, et
al., 2011, p. 14). As it will be elaborated later on in this paper, Moravcsik fails to see that supranational institutions are also enjoying influences even in the major reforms in the EU. Scholars have moreover criticized LI for putting too much emphasis on economic preferences, thus leaving out social and cultural reasons for European Integration (Bache, et al., 2011, pp. 40-43). Moravcsik has defended LI, by arguing that
the critique: “…were said to have “small kernels” of theoretical truth but be generally “overstated”” (Bache,
et al., 2011, p. 14).
If LI does the better in explaining the increasing power of the EP, I should find that: The EP has increased its
powers due to interstate bargaining and not by themselves, thus being dependent on the member states.
4.0. The Increasing Power of the European Parliament
When testing the various hypotheses, it is first and foremost important to analyse the historical context of
Treaties; that is, when did the EP gain their power in the last two decades? Afterwards, it follows logically
to focus on whether EP had influence in the Treaty Negotiations, or whether the Treaties were determined
by the Member States; that is, how EP obtained their powers.
4.1. Historical Context of Treaties
Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the EP had limited power in the decision-making process of EU. However,
this changed with the implementation of the co-decision procedure introduced in Maastricht, which ensured that the EP and the Council cannot adopt legislation by themselves; support from the other institution is needed, as article 289 of the Maastricht Treaty implies: “The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on
a proposal from the Commission.” (The European Union, 1992, p. 126). The co-operation procedure was also extended, however with the agreement of the Lisbon Treaty this procedure was phased out, and it will
therefore not be elaborated on in this paper (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 299). In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam
was signed, and the Parliament had the right to approve the Commission President, which is implied in Article 214: “The governments of the Member States shall nominate by common accord the person they intend to appoint as President of the Commission; the nomination shall be approved by the European Parliament (The European Union, 1997, p. 272) . The co-decision procedure was moreover extended to cover
more areas than previous.
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
In 2002, the Treaty of Nice was agreed upon, increasing the legislative and supervisory power of the EP, by
having the co-decision extended to cover more areas (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 189). At last, the Lisbon Treaty
was put into force. One of the main goals of the Lisbon Treaty was to address the lack of democratic accountability in EU, and it is therefore natural that EP once again saw an increase in their powers, being the
only directly elected body in EU (Biondi, et al., 2012, p. 248). Lisbon puts the EP on equal terms with the
Council in several new areas such as agriculture with another extension of co-decision. Furthermore, the EP
now had the right to propose Treaty amendments, which will undoubtedly be used in the future Treaties in
order to strive for more power, implied in article 48(2) (The European Union, 2007).
4.2. The European Parliaments in Treaty Negotiations
Testing the hypotheses now requires understanding on whether the Treaty negotiations were influenced by
the member states (LI), or if it was influenced from the EP directly (neofunctionalism). In the Maastricht
Treaty negotiations, Devuyst (1998, p. 616) argues, that EPs comments had to be taken serious. Yet, this
was because the Italian and Belgian governments had linked their approval of the Treaty to a positive opinion from EP. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty was to a large degree the result of the French President and
German Chancellors common interest in: “the adaptation of the European construction following the end of
the Cold War” (Devuyst, 1998, p. 621). Applying these points to the two hypotheses, interstate bargaining
and the member states contributed to the formation of the Maastricht Treaty, and thus the liberal intergovernmental hypothesis is better in explaining Maastricht compared to the neofunctionalistic.
In the negotiations leading to the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Council introduced a Reflection Group
in 1994 in order “… to move from the variety of demands for adaptation to a formal agenda for Treaty reform” (Devuyst, 1998, p. 618). This Reflection Group involved representatives from EP, and the Parliament
was for the first time playing a formal co-agenda-setting role without any influence from the member
states (Devuyst, 1998, pp. 618-619). This Reflection Group should be considered a spillover process since
the implementation of co-decision in Maastricht led towards further influence of the EP in the decisionmaking process in the years following Maastricht. It is also clear that EP exercised their powers to the fullest extent in order to obtain power while simultaneously allying itself with the Council (Devuyst, 1998).
Testing the hypotheses, the Amsterdam Treaty is taking a different form of that compared to Maastricht in
that the neofunctionalistic excels in explaining the negotiations since EP gained its powers because of a
spillover process. The LI hypothesis cannot be applicable to this Treaty negotiation in explaining the creation of the Reflection Group.
In the Nice Treaty, Beach argue that: “… the influence of the EP in the 2000 IGC [intergovernmental conference] was negligible” (Beach, 2007, p. 1274), and that the “… outer bounds of the possible [Nice Treaty]
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
were dictated by the preferences of governments” (Beach, 2007, p. 1272). In the 2000 IGC, the EP used tactics which included public speeches and debates; however these tactics failed to influence the 2000 IGC,
mostly due to EP interventions in the negotiations were out of synchronization, and thus not noticeable
(Beach, 2007). The EP attempted to gain influence in Nice through Members of European Parliament (MEP)
trying to provide effective inputs in the negotiation. However these inputs were limited to areas where particular concerns and expertise of MEPs have been considered, contrary to Amsterdam negotiations where
the EP acted beyond its areas; thus, the MEPs did not have any influence in the overall Treaty Negotiations
(Christiansen, 2002, p. 43). Looking at Moravcsiks earlier assumption of supranational actors generally enjoying influence only where they have strong allies, this claim is verified in the negotiations of Nice. Conclusively to the 2000 IGC, the EP did not enjoy much influence, and thus the LI hypothesis does the better job
in explaining the EPs increased powers.
The Lisbon Treaty was to a large extent not affected by the EP. Varela & Prado-Dominguez argues that, although the EP was present at the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty, the main roles were played by member
state governments (Varela & Prado-Dominguez, 2012). Another literature from Devuyst argues that: “The
European Parliament was closely associated with and involved in the work of the Conference [2007 IGC]
with three representatives” (Devuyst, 2008, p. 259), contradictive to Varela & Prado-Dominguez. In order to
make a stronger conclusion to the Lisbon Treaty negotiations, this paper turns its focus towards the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 (CT). CT has been pronounced the predecessor for the Lisbon Treaty, and the Lisbon
Treaty was to a large reflection a development of CT (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 213). In CT, EP had the opportunity to influence the negotiations, since they enjoyed a strong position in the conference (Beach, 2007, p.
1287). This position was self-acquired through MEPs pressuring their own governments for influence in the
negotiations of CT (Beach, 2007, p. 1287), which can be seen as a political spillover in that the political elite
(MEP) are pressuring their own governments for more power. What can be concluded in the Lisbon Treaty
is that EP enjoyed strong influence in CT; therefore, the neofunctionalistic hypothesis prevails, while the LI
hypothesis fails to explain the negotiations.
What has been proven in this section is that neither hypotheses excels nor fails to explain the increasing
power of EP in considering influence at Treaty negotiations. Rather there are some Treaties which favour
neofunctionalism and the concept of spillover, while others favour LI and interstate bargaining as the explanation of the EPs increasing power. However, it is of mark that EP gained powers in each Treaty, even
though it did not have influence in some; as Christiansen mentions: “… [Treaties] after-effects have a habit
of “spilling over” into the preparation of their next round of negotiations” (Christiansen, 2002, pp. 45-46).
By allowing EP to gain more power in Maastricht, the member states started a process of the EP continu11 June 2013
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
ously striving for more power, succeeding to do so in each Treaty. Even though the EP has not directly influenced the negotiation process in each Treaty, it has been argued that EP often used indirect, non-visible
means to gain more power (Christiansen, 2002, p. 43). By concluding this, it is clear that the neofunctionalistic hypothesis overall does the better in explaining the increasing power of the EP compared to the LI hypothesis in addressing Treaty negotiations
4.3. The European Parliaments own Struggle for Power
Having analysed the Treaty negotiations, this section will clarify whether the EPs own struggle for powers
favours any of the hypotheses. What is important to emphasize is that MEPs are acting like interest groups
themselves, pressuring for more power and influence from their respective national parliaments as it was
mentioned briefly in the negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty (Bache, et al., 2011). This pressure has
had an indisputable influence in the negotiations of the Treaties, being a clear indication of political spillover, where the political elite (in this case, MEPs) are continuously pressuring their own governments for
power and eventually succeeding. The member states did not have any control over this spillover, and
therefore the liberal intergovernmentalism hypothesis fails to explain the fact that MEP acted on a national
level, while the neofunctionalistic hypothesis emphasize a spillover process, thus confirming the expectations.
Moreover, the argument that the EPs power needs to be increased in order to reduce the democratic deficit has been continuously used by EP in the negotiations of Treaties (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 296). Liberal intergovernmentalism sees democratic deficit as more of a “non-problem” (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 70), but the
lack of democratic accountability has remained one of the main topics of EU, which is again a focus-point LI
lacks. Even though Moravcsik has made clear arguments in that he assumes the member states are controlling EU, thus it is democratic legitimate, this argument fails to explain why the EP has used the democratic
deficit as an own incentive to increase its powers (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 296). Neofunctionalism is the only
theory which can explain why the EP used the argument of democratic deficit in order to gain more power.
Christiansen mentions: “… all governments, over time, came to accept that something would need to be
done about the EU’s lack of democratic accountability” (Christiansen, 2002, p. 45), which the MEPs used to
convince the member states that they need more power (Christiansen, 2002, p. 46). Conclusively, the
neofunctionalistic hypothesis is strengthened in that the argument of democratic deficit has been used, together with the political spillover from MEPs to their respective national governments, while LI once again
ignores an important point in the increasing powers of EP.
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
5.0. Conclusion
This paper set out to define and compare the main features of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, followed by an analysis on whether one of the theories can be applied to the increase in the EPs
powers. The main difference is that neofunctionalism favours the EP taking a life of its own, striving for
more power itself, while allying with other actors; having the concept of spillover as its main driver of European integration. LI contradicts neofunctionalism, by assuming that the member states themselves are in
full control of the integration process together with the delegation of power to the EP. While the Parliaments influence in the outcome of the Maastricht Treaty and the Nice Treaty were negligible compared to
the member states, the outcome of the Amsterdam Treaty together with the Lisbon Treaty (Or the predecessor CT) were largely influence by the EP themselves. However, each Treaty negotiation can be seen as a
spillover process (Christiansen, 2002, pp. 45-46), thus neofunctionalism remains the better theory. Moreover, this paper explained EPs own struggle for power, and this paper found that political spillover from the
MEPs has granted more power to the EP together with the lack of democratic accountability in EU. Given
that LI chooses to ignore prominent facts such as democratic deficit, even though the EP continuously has
used this arguments, the neofunctionalistic hypothesis is the better theory in explaining the EPs increase in
power overall, although at some points neofunctionalism still fails to provide a better explanation compared to that of LI, proving that no theory is perfect as of yet. The question now is, whether the increasing
powers of the EP have contributed to more democratic legitimacy or not.
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
6.0. Bibliography
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loser to winner. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(8), pp. 1271-1292.
Biondi, A., Eeckhout, P. & Ripley, S., 2012. EU Law after Lisbon. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.
Christiansen, T., 2002. The Role of Supranational Actors in EU Treaty Reform. Journal of European Public
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Devuyst, Y., 1998. Treaty Reforms in the European Union: the Amsterdam process. Journal of European
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Devuyst, Y., 2008. The European Union's institutional balance after the Treaty of Lisbon: "community
method" and "democratic deficit" reassessed. Georgetown Journal of International Law, Volume 39, pp.
247-276.
Haas, E., 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-57. London: Library of
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Stanford University Press.
Hix, S., 2008. What's wrong with the European Union and how to fix it. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Lindberg, L., 1963. The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford: Stanford University
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Moravcsik, A., 1993. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist
Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), pp. 473-524.
Moravcsik, A., 1995. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder. Journal of Common Market
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Schmitter, P., 2005. Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism. Journal of European Public Policy,
12(2), pp. 255-272.
The European Union, 1992. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. [Online]
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[Accessed 24 May 2013].
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Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1997:340:FULL:EN:PDF
[Accessed 1 June 2013].
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Christian Borggaard
Copenhagen Business School
BSc. International Business and Politics
Regional Integration
and EU
The European Union, 2007. The Treaty of Lisbon. [Online]
Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF
[Accessed 5 June 2013].
Varela, D. & Prado-Dominguez, J., 2012. Negotiating the Lisbon Treaty: Redistribution, Efficiency and Power
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