Daria Kholodova
St Petersburg State University, School of International Relations.
Framing Public Dialogue in Public Sphere
Defending Russians: Putin’s Ukrainian policy from the point of view of
securitization theory
Recent events in Ukraine have provoked many tensions between the states of the world. To some
extent it can be claimed that Russia now happens to be alienated from the mainstream of the
world politics due to its policy towards Ukrainian crisis. Russia no longer has its place in G8 and
suffers from limited but still morally significant sanctions posed by the USA. The consequences
of this alienation can be hard for Russian economy that already lives through a recession. But
what is surprising, the public support for the President is on its peak (ВЦИОМ, 2014), according
to official statistics. Moreover, as we can see, recent measures on centralizing power have
successfully been implemented without any social tension. For example, introducing of the
institute of “presidential senators”, 17 members of upper chamber of Parliament named directly
by President and the reform of local government (city mayors are from now on named and not
elected).
To my mind the situation taking place now in Russia can be successfully described using terms
of the securitization theory. The term securitization was first introduced by Ole Wæver, a scholar
related to the Copenhagen School, in 1995.
It is a theory on the merge of realism and
constructivism that claims that “It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one”
(Wæver, 2004). Security is a social and intersubjective (emerges only in communication between
subjects, does not belong to a single one) construction. There is a basic, realist structure of
security action that consists, according to the Copenhagen School, of three elements: (1) the
speech act; (2) the securitizing actor and (3) the audience (Stratzel, 2007). Furthermore,
dynamically, a successful securitization act consists of three steps. These are: (1) identification
of existential threats; (2) emergency action; and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking
free of rules (Buzan, 1998).
Now, I will try to implement these tools proposed by the securitization theory on the act of
adhering of the Crimea into Russia. As a securitizing speech act I take the co-called Crimean
speech made by President Putin in 18th of March 2014.The mobilizing significance of the speech
has been compared to that of the Munich speech of 2007, both of them are called historic
speeches of President Putin. The securitizing actor here is, obviously, Mr. President. His
authority and popular support give him the power that is essential, according to the theory, for a
subject to be able to “securitize”. The audience is the people of Russia. The speech has mostly
internal character and aimed to make an effect upon the inner auditorium.
The object that is securitized is “the interests of Russian people”. It is reiterated that they were
repeatedly neglected: “We have only heard promises <…> Russia was robbed! <...> Russia
dropped its head and put up <…>” (Путин, 18/03/2014) The existential threats are clearly
defined in the speech. Those are “primitive and direct utilitarism” (ibid.) of Western states and
NATO forces coming closer to Russia. An emergency action was to “answer the call for defense
of fraternal people” that we could not avoid, as “it would be a betrayal” (ibid.). And as a result of
this answer the Crimea became Russian. We cannot state here that Russian forces were
introduced into the Ukrainian territory as it is rejected by the officials but for the theoretical
approach we take the most important is the fact that Russia is claimed by most developed
countries to have broken the international law. And it actually has broken its own Constitution
that does not allow adhering new territories to the Federation. So we can state that breaking the
rules took its place in the event.
Thus, we can see a clear pattern of a successful act of securitization in the event of Crimea
annexation. The sense of this event is that a controversial action has been made but has not
caused popular disagreement because general discourse of a “state of emergency” has been
generated by the considered and other speech acts. This discourse has made possible extensive
popular support for the President and all the measures initiated by him while the “objective”
conditions have not changed and even worsened. Some analysts, such as G.Tulchinskiy, claim
that the observed event was needed by the government to distract popular attention from difficult
economic situation and unpopular but necessary measures (such as devaluation of ruble). I
cannot assert whether it is true, but the unfavorable economic conditions that Russia faces are a
fact, as well as the harmful influence of conflict external environment and the need to urgently
orient the economy to the substitution of import.
To conclude, I have tried in this short essay to use the theory of securitization to conceptualize
the recent events in Russian politics. I have shown that the Crimean speech of the President Putin
securitized the “interests of Russian people” and by so doing legitimized the annexation of the
Crimea.
References
Buzan, B. O. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Stratzel, H. (13(3) 2007 r.). Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond. European
Journal of International Relations, стр. 357-383.
Wæver, O. (2004). Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins
between Core and Periphery. ISA Conference. Montreal.
ВЦИОМ. (15 05 2014 r.). РЕЙТИНГ ПУТИНА – МАКСИМАЛЬНО ВЫСОКИЙ ЗА ПОСЛЕДНИЕ ШЕСТЬ ЛЕТ.
http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=114824.
Обращение Президента Российской Федерации. (б.д.). http://news.kremlin.ru/news/20603.
Путин, В. (18/03/2014). Обращение Президента Российской Федерации.
http://news.kremlin.ru/news/20603.