CP Text: The United States Federal Government should offer Mexico to do
[the plan] if Mexico agrees to meet human rights conditions established by the Merida Initiative
US should withhold future aid unless Mexico meets human rights conditions
Roth, 09 – executive director of the Human Rights Watch (Kevin Roth, JULY 13, 2009,
“Mexico: US Should Withhold Military Aid Rights Conditions in Merida Initiative Remain
Unmet”, Human Rights Watch)//GPastor
The Merida Initiative provides the Obama administration with an important opportunity to strengthen US-Mexican drug enforcement and human rights cooperation. To capitalize on this opportunity, however, the Obama administration should vigorously enforce the human rights requirements included in the aid package.
Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch (Washington, DC) - T he US State Department should not certify Mexico's compliance with the Merida Initiative's human rights requirements so long as Mexican army abuses continue to be tried in military rather than civilian courts, Human Rights Watch said
in a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released today.
The US
Congress mandated that 15 percent of funds to be provided to Mexico under the Merida
Initiative, a multi-year regional aid package to help address the increasing violence and corruption of heavily armed drug cartels, should be withheld until the secretary of state reports to Congress that the Mexican government has met four human rights conditions
. They include the requirement that military abuses be investigated and prosecuted by civilian rather than military authorities. "The
Merida Initiative provides the Obama administration with an important opportunity to strengthen US-Mexican drug enforcement and human rights cooperation," Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, said in the letter. "To capitalize on this opportunity, however, the Obama administration should vigorously enforce the human rights requirements included in the aid package."

US credibility in LA low now—only a commitment to promote human rights solves
Sikkink 04
political science professor at the University of Minnesota, PhD from Columbia (Kathryn A Sikkink, 2004, “Mixed
Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America”, book) //KY
This is just one example of many where the
U.S. government has given mixed signals about its commitment to promoting human rights
and the rule of law as part of foreign policy. Those mixed signals were most frequent in situations of civil war, guerrilla movements, or acts of terrorism.
Latin American military governments often interpreted these cues as green lights to fight terrorism without concern for human rights
or the rule of Law. The problem of terrorism did not begin with the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. Latin American militaries have long used the language of a “war on terrorism” to describe their struggles against domestic guerrilla movements. U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the late twentieth century addressed these unconventional wars. The excesses and mistakes of counterinsurgency wars taught us some lessons. The most important: a war on terrorism fought without regard to the rule of law can lead to massive violations of human rights. States, in responding to guerrilla actions, engaged in what has been called state terrorism. They imprisoned, tortured, and killed thousands of their own citizens. If we in the United
States forget this history and its relevance to our current struggles, we run the risk of once again being complicit with repression. We learned some other lessons. The only long-term solution to the problem of terrorism is one that promotes democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. This is not naïve idealism. It describes a painful process that most of Latin America has passed through in the last three decades. Most of these Countries now have functioning democracies and arc building the rule of law. The message that
Ambassador Hill gave to the Argentine military in 1976 is as relevant to the war against terrorism today as it was to the “dirty war” then.
Still, the ambiguity of U.S. policy hadn’t disappeared
. Within this very embassy a few years earlier,
U.S. officials had told Jennifer Harbury that they had no knowledge of her husband, guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca, all the while knowing that he was being held and probably tortured by Guatemala security forces on the CIA payroll. As in Uruguay in the i 96os, the Bamaca case revealed that in the early 1990s the CIA was continuing to pay for information that it knew was being extracted through torture. To protect their sources, the CIA misled family members and the public about their practices.’2 U.S. officials continued to give contradictory CUCS on the issue of human rights. These contradictions grew from an identity conflict at the heart of U.S. policy toward Latin America during this period.
There was no one U.S. policy, no single vision of who or what the United States was and what it stood for. Nowhere was this
conflict more evident than in U.S. policy toward Latin America
. Since the 1905, intense anticommunism had informed all aspects of U.S. policy in the region. This anticommunism was often justified by referring to the abysmal human rights practices of communist regimes. But by the 1970s, anticommunism led the United States to support, arm, and train authoritarian regimes that carried out massive human rights abuses against their citizens. In principle, anticommunism could be made compatible with a commitment to human rights, hut U.S. policy makers in Latin America had come to accept as an article of faith that anticommunism required strong support for authoritarian military regimes.
Human rights Conditions empirically solve Poverty in Latin America
Barshefsky et al, 2008
– Chair on the Council of foreign relations, senior international Partner at Wilmer Culter
Pickering Hale in Washington D.C. She joined the firm after serving as U.S. trade representative from 1997 to 2001. (Charlene
Barshefsky, James Hill, Shannon K. O’ Neil, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: A New Direction For A New Reality”, Council on
Foreign Relations)//GP
Other Latin American experiences show that poverty and inequality reductions are not wholly dependent on uninterrupted economic growth.
Brazil
, for example, has reduced poverty and inequality during the last two decades despite the absence of consistent strong growth: by controlling inflation, it managed to lower poverty rates from a 1990 high of
48 percent to 36 percent by 1996
. Though poverty levels crept back up to 39 percent in the early 2000’s, modest economic growth combined with conditional cash transfer programs in recent years have helped reduce poverty to 33 percent by 2006. Brazil has also managed to begin lowering its notoriously high levels of income inequality in recent years. In Mexico, similar cash transfers, along with low inflation, helped reduce poverty levels from 47 percent in 1990 to 32 percent in 2006. These achievements represent domestic policy efforts – under civilian democratic governments – to address critical concerns of the voting population and indicate real improvements in the lives of millions of citizens throughout Latin America. These experiences show that domestic solutions
, sometimes

drawing on foreign models adapted to the local environment, can be effective. Conditional cash transfer programs have spread across the region, including Oportunidades in Mexico
(which was recently cited by Mayor Michael Bloomberg as a model for a pilot program in New York City), Familias en Accion in Colombia, and
Bolsa Familia in Brazil.
Such programs provide cash subsidies for the poor in return for a combination of regular school attendance by their children and use of preventative medical care.
Evidence shows that these programs are instrumental in reducing
poverty and increasing primary and secondary school attendance, at least in the short term.
The aff increases the economic inequality of the status quo – the conditions on human rights solves poverty in Latin America
Pogge, 08
(Thomas Pogge, Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, 2008, “World Poverty and
Human Rights” second edition, pg26-28,//DH)
Some hold (and I have been accused of holding) that we are harming the global poor insofar as we choose to treat them worse than we might – that only the best feasible treatment qualifies as non-harmful. My view as outlined in the preceding paragraph defines a notion of harm that is much more restrictive in six distinct respects. First, we are
¶ harming the global poor only if our conduct sets back their most basic
¶ interests the standard of social justice I employ is sensitive only to
¶ human rights deficits.
Second, I am focusing exclusively on human
¶
rights deficits that are causally traceable to social institutions. Third 1
¶ am assigning moral responsibility for such a human rights deficit only
¶ to those who actively cooperate in designing or imposing the relevant
¶ social institutions - and only to them am I then ascribing compensatory
¶ obligations to do their share toward reforming these social institutions ¶ or toward protecting its victims. Fourth, I allow that our active ¶ cooperation is harming the global poor only if it is foreseeable that this
¶ order gives rise to substantial human rights deficits. 29 Fifth, I require
¶ that these human rights deficits be reasonably avoidable in the sense
¶ that a feasible alternative design of the relevant institutional order
¶ would not produce comparable human rights deficits or other ills of ¶ comparable magnitude. Sixth, this avoidability must be knowable: we ¶ must be able to be confident that the alternative institutional design
¶ would do much better in giving participants secure access to the objects
¶ of their human rights.
¶
I believe that we are involved in harming
- and,
more specifically,
¶ in massively violating the human rights of - the global poor in this
¶ quite restrictive sense. This does not mean that we must become hermits
¶ or emigrants. We can compensate for our contribution to collective
¶ harm also by contributing to efforts toward institutional reform or
¶ toward protecting the victims of present institutional injustice.
Focusing
¶
on negative duties alone, I limit such compensatory duties to the
¶
amount of harm one is responsible for by cooperating in the imposition
¶
of an unjust institutional order.
Setting aside any open-ended
¶ positive duty to help the badly off, my appeal to a negative duty generates
¶ then compensatory obligations that are tightly limited in range
¶
(to persons subject to an institutional order one cooperates in imposing),
¶ in subject matter (to the avoidance of human rights deficits), and ¶ in demandingness (to compensation for one's share of that part of the ¶ human rights deficit that foreseeably is reasonably avoidable through
¶ a feasible alternative institutional design).
¶
V Responsibilities and reforms
¶
There is a simple
two-part
explanation for why our
new global economic
¶
order is so harsh on the poor.
The design
of this order is fashioned
¶ and adjusted in international negotiations in which our governments enjoy a crushing advantage in bargaining power and expertise
.
And our representatives in international negotiations do not¶ consider the
interests of the global poor as part of their mandate
.
They
¶
seek to shape each such agreement in the best interests of the people
¶
and corporations of their own country.
To get a vivid sense of the zeal ¶ with which our politicians and negotiators pursue this task, you need ¶ only recall to what incredible length the US government has gone to
¶ shift of its share of the UN general budget onto other countries.
¶
This hard-fought victory now saves the US some $60 million annually,
¶
20 cents per US citizen each year - or 87 cents when one adds the
¶ similarly reduced US share of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations. This is one example, chosen only because it is so well known.
¶
There are plenty of cases illustrating similar zeal by the representatives of other affluent states.
Our new global economic order is so harsh on
¶
the global poor, then, because it is formed in negotiations where our representatives ruthlessly exploit their vastly superior bargaining power and expertise, as well as any weakness, ignorance, or corruptibility
¶
they may find in their counterpart negotiators, to tune each
¶
agreement for our greatest benefit. In such negotiations, the affluent
¶
states will make reciprocal concessions to one another, but rarely
to¶ the weak .
The
cumulative
result of many such negotiations
and agreements
¶ is a grossly unfair global economic order under which the lion's
¶
share of the benefits of global economic growth flows to the most
¶
affluent states.
¶
In many cases, our negotiators must know that, the better

they
¶
succeed, the more people will die of poverty
. Our foreign and trade
¶ ministers and our presidents and prime ministers know this, and so do
¶ many journalists and academics, as well as the experts at the UN and
¶ especially the
World Bank, which bills itself as the official champion of
¶ the global poor even while its management and decision-making are
¶ controlled by the affluent states.
After
the terrorist attacks of
September
¶
11
, 2001, the President of the World
Bank publicized his estimate
¶
"that tens of thousands more children will die worldwide and some
¶
10 million more people are likely to be living below the poverty line of
¶
$1 a day ... because the attacks will delay the rich countries' recovery
¶
into 2002."
Where do we find similar estimates about our tariffs, antidumping
¶ duties, agricultural subsidies, and enforcement of intellectual
¶ property rights in seeds and drugs? Or at least a reasoned denial that
¶ we are causing grievous harms or that these harms are unjustifiable? After some
800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been slaughtered
¶ in Rwanda in early 1994, the world took notice. The massacres
¶ were widely discussed in the media, with many expressing dismay at the decisions by Western governments to avoid both the word
"genocide"
¶ and a peacekeeping operation. 32 Many believe that we should
¶ have stopped the massacres, even if this would have meant risking the
¶ lives of our soldiers and spending a few hundred million dollars or
¶ more. We all felt a bit responsible, but bearably so. The deaths, after ¶ all, were brought about by clearly identifiable villains, and we were ¶ clearly not among them and also did not benefit from the killings in ¶ any way.
Deaths caused by global economic arrangements designed
¶
and imposed by our governments are a different matter: These governments
¶
are elected by us, responsive to our interests and preferences,
¶
acting in our name and in ways that benefit us. This buck stops with us .
We have an obligation to reduce Latin American poverty – complacency represents acceptance – a political approach is key
O’Donnell, 96 –
(Guillermo, Helen Kellogg Professor of Government and International Studies, Academic Director of the
Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame; “POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA:
SOME POLITICAL REFLECTIONS,” http://-www.rrojasdatabank.info/225odonnell.pdf)//HO
Extensive poverty and deep social inequality are characteristics of Latin America
that go back to the colonial period.
We have not overcome these conditions; we have aggravated them
.
One may point out that some problems in some countries did not turn out so badly, especially among those that have registered high rates of economic growth in recent years; but even these countries’ present poverty and inequality data look bad indeed when compared with data from the 1960s and early 1970s. Or, as the dominant mood in the 1980s dictated, one may argue that the current increases in poverty and inequality are the unavoidable consequence of correcting past errors. Or one may simply
ignore these trends, availing oneself of some of the many mechanisms that human beings invent for justifying their callousness toward others.
One way or the other, these stances naturalize poverty and inequality
: although different from arguments of centuries past, they still cast poverty and inequality as inevitable consequences of the natural ordering of things.
From this point of view, while one may regret some of the visible manifestations of such ordering, it would be senseless, if not worse, to try to change it. Poverty-generated needs are so many and so vital that one is morally and professionally impelled to alleviate them
. But these efforts, and the highly specialized knowledge required, should not detract from attempting to grasp the overall picture and forging alliances that are premised on broad agreements about a non-naturalized vision of what poverty and inequality are and what might done about them. Of course, remedial action should be praised: in terms of actual human beings it does make a lot of difference
. Also praiseworthy is moral indignation leading to energetic condemnations of the situation and proposals for a much better world—but too often we are not told how to get from here to there, and in the meantime these invocations often include a disparaging tone toward ‘mere’ remedial actions
.
2) Somewhere in the middle there are various policy prescriptions
, typical of reports of various commissions and international organizations, with which in most cases
I agree
. These include improving tax collection and making the tax system less regressive; investing more resources in social policies and finding more creative means of cooperation between the state and NGOs, churches, and business; correctly targeting some social policies; promoting popular participation; and other good ideas that I need not detail here. Although some progress in some policy areas has been registered in some countries, an obvious question is why so little of so much good advice has been actually implemented.
The third hard fact is that the poor are politically weak. Their permanent struggle for survival is not conducive
, excepting very specific (and usually short-lived) situations and some remarkable individuals, to their organization and mobilization
. Furthermore, this weakness opens ample opportunity for manifold tactics of cooptation, selective repression, and political isolation
.
Democracy makes a difference
, in that the poor may use their votes to support parties that are seriously

committed to improving their lot.
But
, if elected, these parties face severe economic constraints
. In addition, they must take into account that determined propoor policies will mobilize concerns not only among the privileged but also among important segments of the middle class who
, after their own sufferings through economic crises and adjustments, feel that it is they who deserve preferential treatment
.
These concerns
, to which I will return, may coagulate in a veto coalition that threatens not only the policy goals of those governments but also whatever economic stability or growth has been achieved.
Evaluate poverty first – kills 18 million people a year
Pogge, 08
( Thomas Pogge, Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, 2008, “World Poverty and
Human Rights” second edition, pg. 2,//DH)
Since the Enlightenment period, moral norms protecting the vulnerable
¶ and powerless have become increasingly constraining and increasingly
¶ effective. Slavery, autocracy, colonialism, and genocide- practiced
¶ openly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and for millennia
¶ before- are now outlawed and widely regarded as paradigms of injustice.
¶
Apparently, at least, humanity has made substantial moral progress ¶ in its response to these and other forms of harmful conduct and ¶ social organization.
¶ Yet, how well do the vulnerable and powerless actually fare today?
¶ It is estimated that
830 million human beings are chronically undernourished,
¶
1,100 million lack access to safe water, 2,600 million lack¶ access to basic sanitation, 1,000 million lack adequate shelter, and¶ 1,600 million lack electricity. About 2,000 million lack access to essential¶ drugs,
some 774 million adults are illiterate, and there are 218
¶ million child laborers.
2 These severe deprivations persist because
¶ people in the bottom half of the world's population are too poor to
¶ protect themselves against them. As of 2004, the last year for which
¶ full World Bank data are now available, 2,533 million or
39.7 percent¶ of humankind were reportedly living in severe poverty
- precisely: in
¶ households whose consumption expenditure per person per year has
¶ less purchasing power than $785.76 had in the US in 1993. On average,
¶ the people living below this line are said to fall 41 percent below it.
¶
About 950 million of them are reported to be living on less than half,
¶ below the World Bank's official extreme-poverty line. People so incredibly ¶ poor are exceedingly vulnerable to even minor changes in natural ¶ and social conditions as well as to many forms of exploitation and ¶ abuse.
Each year
, some
18 million
of them die prematurely from¶ poverty-related causes. This is one-third of all human deaths - 50,000¶ each day, including
29,000 children under age five.
3
¶
Such severe and widespread poverty persists while there is great and
¶ rising affluence elsewhere. The average consumption expenditure of
¶ citizens in high-income countries is about 30 times greater than that of
¶ the global poor in terms of purchasing power (relative to an international
¶ commodities basket) and about 120 times greater when the comparison
¶ is made at currency exchange rates.

CP Text: The United States Federal Government should offer Cuba to do
[the plan] if:
Cuba agrees to engage in dialogue with the United States Federal
Government over human rights reform and release Alan Gross
Only the CP solves—the plan strengthens the elite’s grip on power
LA Times 07
(Los Angeles Times, 26 Oct 2007, “Carrots for Cuba; We've lifted trade and travel embargoes on China and
Vietnam. Why should Havana be different?, proquest) //KY
In the wake of 9/11,
Washington's thinking about Cuba
-- when it has thought about the island at all
-- has mainly been tinged with the unjustified hope that its oppressive regime will reform or collapse following
the death of Fidel
Castro.
Politicians of both parties generally assume that lifting the trade embargo on the hated revolutionary would be a nonstarter, but that U.S. policy would be ripe for reevaluation after his passing. But in a major speech this week, President Bush attempted to put his stamp on U.S.-Cuba policy through the end of his presidency and beyond with a defiant embrace of the spectacularly unsuccessful U.S. policies of the past. While eloquently describing Cuba's sins against human rights
and economic and political freedoms, Bush offered only the fantasy that the Cuban people will revolt against their rulers. He declared the transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother, Raoul, unacceptable to the United States.
And
he ruled out lifting the embargo until Havana grants its people freedom .
Until then
, Bush said, trading with Cuba "would merely enrich the elites in power and strengthen their grip
."
Unconditional lifting of the embargo strengthens the regime, causes terrorism, and turns Latin America influence
Suchlicki ‘13
(Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-
American Studies, University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? 2/26/13, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/) //KY
Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the U nited
S tates”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the U nited
S tates; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world
; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the
Ford/Carter era,
U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government.
Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention, normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent.
Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba,
Castro would probably restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as
Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well-being.
Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries. If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications.

Latin American terrorism causes extinction
Anderson 08 (10/8/2008, Curt, AP, “US officials fear terrorist links with drug lords,” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-08-805146709_x.htm)
MIAMI —
There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and
Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks
, U.S. officials said Wednesday.
Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in fundraising and finding logistical support.
But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland
Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S.
"The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the
U nited
S tates," said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst
. "
The threats in this hemisphere are real.
We cannot ignore them." Added U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration operations chief Michael Braun: "It is not in our interest to let that potpourri of scum to come together."

CP Text: The United States Federal Government should offer Venezuela to do [the plan] if Venezuela agrees to meet human rights conditions established by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
CP Solves human rights in Venezuela
Noriega & Cardenas, 12 - is a former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs (Canada, Latin
America, and the Caribbean) and a former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. He coordinates AEI's program on Latin America and writes for the Institute's Latin American Outlook series. (Roger F. Noriega, José R. Cárdenas, December 05,
2012, “An action plan for US policy in the Americas”, American Enterprise Institute http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-theamericas/)//GP
This is not only an issue of US self-interest.
Democracy also confers significant benefits on its citizens wherever it has succeeded in taking root, resulting in more effective government, more security, and better prospects for economic development.
The United States can support this process by backing reformers who are working in their countries to
consolidate stable, honest, and rules-based institutions and creating incentives for increased accountability in government through US assistance.
Also critical is the need to increase support for the bedrock of representative government
: civil society nongovernmental organizations. These include, but are not limited to, busi¬ness associations, media organizations, government, labor unions, consumer and environmental groups, and women’s and human rights watchdog groups
. In Cuba, citizens must rise to this challenge by overcoming their fears and claiming their future.
Before they can build that future, they must dismantle the vestiges of the police state and command economy
. The responsibility is theirs, but their friends can help with a series of bold and constructive measures
. Although it is more important than ever to preserve the economic sanctions and use them as leverage to bring about broad, deep, and irreversible reforms , the United States should use the promise of aid, trade,
and normal political relations as an incentive to leverage change . The United
States must be conscientious and bold in its support for democrats in the Americas. It must not allow the hostility of antidemocratic regimes to deter it from
helping struggling democrats in countries such as Venezuela,
Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Nicaragua.
If those democrats are willing to take the necessary risks to advocate for different futures for their countries, the United States must demonstrate its solidarity and support for them
. Again, there is no silver bullet in the policy toolkit for developing democratic institutions, building transparent and apolitical judicial systems, eliminating corruption, and promoting competitive elections. It is a difficult process that is never quite complete, as US history shows.
But only by resolutely supporting democracies and democratizing countries can we achieve and sustain a stable, secure, and prosperous hemisphere
. Some recommendations for promoting democracy: The Organization of
American States: the
Obama administration should
instruct the US permanent representative to work with willing states to promote core values and interests, invigorate the application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and restore the independence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
.
Latin America needs to be reprioritized
as a recipient of the funding allocated to the National Endowment for Democracy, the
International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and related organizations. While democracy
has taken firm root, its institutions need strengthening,
or else the hard-fought-for gains of recent decades will be jeopardized
. Democracy promoters should prioritize support for political parties, independent journalists, and others that are indispensable and constructive protagonists in the political process. In Cuba, the United

States should restore purposeful and focused prodemocracy programs aimed at bringing genuine change to the island. The US president should reactivate the US Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to update transition plans and formulate a specific pledge of robust US aid to a genuine transition.
The United States.

Venezuela violates human rights now– supreme court seizing’s, television censorship and imprisonment of dissent
Human Rights Watch 13
(Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy Dramatic Concentration of Power and Open
Disregard for Basic Human Rights March 5, 2013 http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/05/venezuela-chavez-s-authoritarian-legacy
- BRW)
(New York) – Hugo
Chávez’s presidency
(1999-2013) was characterized by a dramatic concentration of power and open disregard for basic human rights guarantees.
After enacting a new constitution with ample human rights protections in 1999 – and surviving a short-lived coup d’état in 2002 –
Chávez and his followers
moved to concentrate power. They seized control of the Supreme Court and undercut the ability of journalists, human rights defenders, and other Venezuelans to exercise fundamental rights.
By his second full term in office
, the concentration of power and erosion of human rights protections had given the government free rein to intimidate, censor, and prosecute Venezuelans who criticized the president or thwarted his political agenda
. In recent years, the president and his followers used these powers in a wide range of prominent cases, whose damaging impact was felt by entire sectors of Venezuelan society. Many Venezuelans continued to criticize the government.
But the prospect of reprisals – in the form of arbitrary or abusive state action – forced journalists and human rights defenders to weigh the consequences of disseminating information and opinions critical of the government, and undercut the ability of judges to adjudicate politically sensitive cases
. Assault on Judicial Independence In 2004, Chávez and his followers in the National
Assembly carried out a political takeover of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, adding 12 seats to what had been a 20-seat tribunal, and filling them with government supporters
. The packed Supreme Court ceased to function as a check on presidential power. Its justices have openly rejected the principle of separation of powers and pledged their commitment to advancing Chávez’s political agenda.
This commitment has been reflected in the court’s rulings, which repeatedly validated the government’s disregard for human rights
. Lower-court judges have faced intense pressure not to issue rulings that could upset the government. In 2009, Chávez publicly called for the imprisonment of a judge for 30 years after she granted conditional liberty to a prominent government critic who had spent almost three years in prison awaiting trial. The judge, María Lourdes Afiuni, was arrested and spent more than a year in prison in pretrial detention, in deplorable conditions. She remains under house arrest. Assault on Press Freedoms Under
Chávez, the government
dramatically expanded its ability to control the content of the country’s broadcast and news media. It passed laws extending and toughening penalties for speech that “offends” government officials, prohibiting the broadcast of messages that “foment anxiety in the public,” and allowing for the arbitrary suspension of TV channels, radio stations, and websites. The Chávez government sought to justify its media policies as necessary to “democratize” the country’s airwaves
. Yet instead of promoting pluralism
, the government abused its regulatory authority to intimidate and censor its critics.
It expanded the number of government-run TV channels from one to six, while taking aggressive steps to reduce the availability of media outlets that engage in critical programming. In response to negative coverage,
Chávez repeatedly threatened to remove private stations
from the airwaves by blocking renewal of their broadcast licenses. In 2007, in an act of blatant political discrimination, his government prevented the country’s oldest private television channel, RCTV, from renewing its license and seized its broadcasting antennas. Three years later, it drove RCTV off cable TV as well by forcing the country’s cable providers to stop transmitting its programs. The removal of RCTV left only one major channel, Globovisión, that continued to be critical of the president. The Chávez government repeatedly pursued administrative sanctions against Globovisión, which have kept the station in perpetual risk of suspension or closure. It also pressed criminal charges against the station’s president, a principal owner, and a guest commentator after they made public statements criticizing the government.
The sanctioning and censorship of the private media under Chávez have
had a powerful impact on broadcasters and journalists
. While sharp criticism of the government is still common in the print media, on Globovisión, and in some other outlets, the fear of government reprisals has made self-censorship a serious problem
. Rejection of Human Rights Scrutiny
In addition to neutralizing the judiciary as a guarantor of rights, the Chávez government repudiated the Inter-American human rights system, failing to carry out binding rulings of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and preventing the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights from conducting in-country monitoring of human rights problems.
In September 2012,
Venezuela announced its withdrawal from the American Convention on Human Rights, a move that leaves Venezuelans without recourse to what has been for years – in countries throughout the region – the most important external mechanism for seeking redress for abuses when national courts fail to provide it.
The Chávez government also sought to block international organizations from monitoring the country’s human rights practices
. In 2008, the president had representatives of Human Rights Watch forcibly detained and summarily expelled from the country after they released a report documenting his government’s violation of human rights norms. Following the expulsion, his then-foreign minister and now chosen successor, Nicolás
Maduro, announced that, “Any foreigner who comes to criticize our country will be immediately expelled.”
Under Chávez, the government
also sought to discredit human rights defenders by accusing them of receiving support from the US

government to undermine Venezuelan democracy
. While local nongovernmental organizations have received funding from
US and European sources – a common practice in Latin America where private funding is scarce – there is no credible evidence that the independence and integrity of the defenders’ work has been compromised by international support. Nonetheless, in 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that individuals or organizations receiving foreign funding could be prosecuted for “treason.” The National Assembly passed legislation prohibiting organizations that
“defend political rights” or “monitor the performance of public bodies” from receiving international funding. It also imposed stiff fines on organizations that “invite” to Venezuela foreigners who express opinions that “offend” government institutions. Embracing Abusive Governments Chávez also rejected international efforts to promote human rights in other countries. In recent years, Venezuela consistently voted against UN General Assembly resolutions condemning abusive practices in North Korea, Burma, Iran, and Syria. Moreover,
Chávez was a vocal supporter of
Syria’s Bashar al-Assad,
Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, bestowing upon each of these leaders the “Order of the Liberator,” Venezuela’s highest official honor. Under Chávez,
Venezuela’s closest ally was Cuba, the only country in Latin America that systematically represses virtually all forms of political dissent.
Chávez identified
Fidel Castro – who headed Cuba’s repressive government until his health deteriorated in 2006 – as his model and mentor.
CP empirically solves Poverty in Latin America
Barshefsky et al, 2008
– Chair on the Council of foreign relations, senior international Partner at Wilmer Culter
Pickering Hale in Washington D.C. She joined the firm after serving as U.S. trade representative from 1997 to 2001. (Charlene
Barshefsky, James Hill, Shannon K. O’ Neil, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: A New Direction For A New Reality”, Council on
Foreign Relations)//GP
Other Latin American experiences show that poverty and inequality reductions are not wholly dependent on uninterrupted economic growth.
Brazil
, for example, has reduced poverty and inequality during the last two decades despite the absence of consistent strong growth: by controlling inflation, it managed to lower poverty rates from a 1990 high of 48 percent to 36 percent by 1996
.
Though poverty levels crept back up to 39 percent in the early 2000’s, modest economic growth combined with conditional cash transfer programs in recent years have helped reduce poverty to 33 percent by
2006. Brazil has also managed to begin lowering its notoriously high levels of income inequality in recent years. In Mexico, similar cash transfers, along with low inflation, helped reduce poverty levels from 47 percent in 1990 to 32 percent in 2006. These achievements represent domestic policy efforts – under civilian democratic governments – to address critical concerns of the voting population and indicate real improvements in the lives of millions of citizens throughout Latin America. These experiences show that domestic solutions
, sometimes drawing on foreign models adapted to the local environment, can be effective. Conditional cash transfer programs have spread across the region, including Oportunidades in Mexico
(which was recently cited by Mayor Michael Bloomberg as a model for a pilot program in New York City), Familias en Accion in Colombia, and Bolsa Familia in Brazil.
Such programs provide cash subsidies for the poor in return for a combination of regular school attendance by their children and use of preventative medical care.
Evidence shows that these programs are
instrumental in reducing poverty and increasing primary and secondary school attendance, at least in the short term.
The aff increases Latin American poverty in the status quo – the conditions reverses the effects
Pogge, 08
(Thomas Pogge, Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, 2008, “World Poverty and
Human Rights” second edition, pg26-28,//DH)
Some hold (and I have been accused of holding) that we are harming the global poor insofar as we choose to treat them worse than we might – that only the best feasible treatment qualifies as non-harmful. My view as outlined in the preceding paragraph defines a notion of harm that is much more restrictive in six distinct respects. First, we are
¶ harming the global poor only if our conduct sets back their most basic ¶ interests the standard of social justice I employ is sensitive only to ¶ human rights deficits.
Second, I am focusing exclusively on human
¶
rights deficits that are causally traceable to social institutions. Third 1
¶ am assigning moral responsibility for such a human rights deficit only
¶ to those who actively cooperate in designing or imposing the relevant
¶ social institutions - and only to them am I then ascribing compensatory
¶ obligations to do their share toward reforming these social institutions
¶ or toward protecting its victims. Fourth, I allow that our active
¶ cooperation is harming the global poor only if it is foreseeable that this ¶ order gives rise to substantial human rights deficits. 29 Fifth, I require ¶ that these human rights deficits be reasonably avoidable in the sense
¶ that a feasible alternative design of the relevant institutional order
¶ would not produce comparable human rights deficits or other ills of
¶ comparable magnitude. Sixth, this avoidability must be knowable: we
¶ must be able to be confident that the alternative institutional design ¶ would do much better in giving participants secure access to the objects
¶ of their human rights.
¶
I believe that we are involved in harming
- and,
more specifically,
¶ in massively violating the human rights of - the global poor in this
¶ quite restrictive sense. This does not mean that we must become hermits
¶ or emigrants. We can compensate for our contribution to collective
¶ harm also by contributing to efforts toward institutional reform or ¶ toward protecting the victims of present institutional injustice.
Focusing
¶
on

negative duties alone, I limit such compensatory duties to the
¶
amount of harm one is responsible for by cooperating in the imposition
¶
of an unjust institutional order.
Setting aside any open-ended
¶ positive duty to help the badly off, my appeal to a negative duty generates
¶ then compensatory obligations that are tightly limited in range
¶
(to persons subject to an institutional order one cooperates in imposing),
¶ in subject matter (to the avoidance of human rights deficits), and ¶ in demandingness (to compensation for one's share of that part of the ¶ human rights deficit that foreseeably is reasonably avoidable through
¶ a feasible alternative institutional design).
¶
V Responsibilities and reforms
¶
There is a simple
two-part
explanation for why our
new global economic
¶
order is so harsh on the poor.
The design
of this order is fashioned
¶ and adjusted in international negotiations in which our governments enjoy a crushing advantage in bargaining power and expertise
.
And our representatives in international negotiations do not¶ consider the
interests of the global poor as part of their mandate
.
They
¶
seek to shape each such agreement in the best interests of the people
¶
and corporations of their own country.
To get a vivid sense of the zeal ¶ with which our politicians and negotiators pursue this task, you need ¶ only recall to what incredible length the US government has gone to
¶ shift of its share of the UN general budget onto other countries.
¶
This hard-fought victory now saves the US some $60 million annually,
¶
20 cents per US citizen each year - or 87 cents when one adds the
¶ similarly reduced US share of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations. This is one example, chosen only because it is so well known.
¶
There are plenty of cases illustrating similar zeal by the representatives of other affluent states.
Our new global economic order is so harsh on
¶
the global poor, then, because it is formed in negotiations where our representatives ruthlessly exploit their vastly superior bargaining power and expertise, as well as any weakness, ignorance, or corruptibility
¶
they may find in their counterpart negotiators, to tune each
¶
agreement for our greatest benefit. In such negotiations, the affluent
¶
states will make reciprocal concessions to one another, but rarely
to¶ the weak .
The
cumulative
result of many such negotiations
and agreements
¶ is a grossly unfair global economic order under which the lion's
¶
share of the benefits of global economic growth flows to the most
¶
affluent states.
¶
In many cases, our negotiators must know that, the better they
¶
succeed, the more people will die of poverty
. Our foreign and trade
¶ ministers and our presidents and prime ministers know this, and so do
¶ many journalists and academics, as well as the experts at the UN and
¶ especially the
World Bank, which bills itself as the official champion of ¶ the global poor even while its management and decision-making are ¶ controlled by the affluent states.
After
the terrorist attacks of
September
¶
11
, 2001, the President of the World
Bank publicized his estimate
¶
"that tens of thousands more children will die worldwide and some
¶
10 million more people are likely to be living below the poverty line of
¶
$1 a day ... because the attacks will delay the rich countries' recovery
¶
into 2002."
Where do we find similar estimates about our tariffs, antidumping
¶ duties, agricultural subsidies, and enforcement of intellectual
¶ property rights in seeds and drugs? Or at least a reasoned denial that
¶ we are causing grievous harms or that these harms are unjustifiable? After some
800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been slaughtered
¶ in Rwanda in early 1994, the world took notice. The massacres
¶ were widely discussed in the media, with many expressing dismay at the decisions by Western governments to avoid both the word
"genocide"
¶ and a peacekeeping operation. 32 Many believe that we should
¶ have stopped the massacres, even if this would have meant risking the
¶ lives of our soldiers and spending a few hundred million dollars or
¶ more. We all felt a bit responsible, but bearably so. The deaths, after
¶ all, were brought about by clearly identifiable villains, and we were
¶ clearly not among them and also did not benefit from the killings in
¶ any way.
Deaths caused by global economic arrangements designed
¶
and imposed by our governments are a different matter: These governments
¶
are elected by us, responsive to our interests and preferences,
¶
acting in our name and in ways that benefit us. This buck stops with us .
We have an obligation to reduce Latin American poverty – complacency represents acceptance – a political approach is key
O’Donnell, 96 –
(Guillermo, Helen Kellogg Professor of Government and International Studies, Academic Director of the
Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame; “POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA:
SOME POLITICAL REFLECTIONS,” http://-www.rrojasdatabank.info/225odonnell.pdf)//HO
Extensive poverty and deep social inequality are characteristics of Latin America
that go back to the colonial period.
We have not overcome these conditions; we have aggravated them
.
One may point out that some problems in some countries did not turn out so badly, especially among those that have registered high rates of economic growth in recent years; but even these countries’ present poverty and inequality data look bad indeed when compared with data from the 1960s and early 1970s. Or, as the dominant mood in the 1980s dictated, one may argue that the current increases in poverty and inequality are the unavoidable consequence of correcting past errors. Or one may simply

ignore these trends, availing oneself of some of the many mechanisms that human beings invent for justifying their callousness toward others.
One way or the other, these stances naturalize poverty and inequality
: although different from arguments of centuries past, they still cast poverty and inequality as inevitable consequences of the natural ordering of things.
From this point of view, while one may regret some of the visible manifestations of such ordering, it would be senseless, if not worse, to try to change it. Poverty-generated needs are so many and so vital that one is morally and professionally impelled to alleviate them
. But these efforts, and the highly specialized knowledge required, should not detract from attempting to grasp the overall picture and forging alliances that are premised on broad agreements about a non-naturalized vision of what poverty and inequality are and what might done about them. Of course, remedial action should be praised: in terms of actual human beings it does make a lot of difference
. Also praiseworthy is moral indignation leading to energetic condemnations of the situation and proposals for a much better world—but too often we are not told how to get from here to there, and in the meantime these invocations often include a disparaging tone toward ‘mere’ remedial actions
.
2) Somewhere in the middle there are various policy prescriptions
, typical of reports of various commissions and international organizations, with which in most cases
I agree
. These include improving tax collection and making the tax system less regressive; investing more resources in social policies and finding more creative means of cooperation between the state and NGOs, churches, and business; correctly targeting some social policies; promoting popular participation; and other good ideas that I need not detail here. Although some progress in some policy areas has been registered in some countries, an obvious question is why so little of so much good advice has been actually implemented.
The third hard fact is that the poor are politically weak. Their permanent struggle for survival is not conducive
, excepting very specific (and usually short-lived) situations and some remarkable individuals, to their organization and mobilization
. Furthermore, this weakness opens ample opportunity for manifold tactics of cooptation, selective repression, and political isolation
.
Democracy makes a difference
, in that the poor may use their votes to support parties that are seriously committed to improving their lot.
But
, if elected, these parties face severe economic constraints
. In addition, they must take into account that determined propoor policies will mobilize concerns not only among the privileged but also among important segments of the middle class who
, after their own sufferings through economic crises and adjustments, feel that it is they who deserve preferential treatment
.
These concerns
, to which I will return, may coagulate in a veto coalition that threatens not only the policy goals of those governments but also whatever economic stability or growth has been achieved.
Evaluate poverty first – kills 18 million people a year
Pogge, 08
( Thomas Pogge, Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, 2008, “World Poverty and
Human Rights” second edition, pg. 2,//DH)
Since the Enlightenment period, moral norms protecting the vulnerable
¶ and powerless have become increasingly constraining and increasingly ¶ effective. Slavery, autocracy, colonialism, and genocide- practiced ¶ openly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and for millennia
¶ before- are now outlawed and widely regarded as paradigms of injustice.
¶
Apparently, at least, humanity has made substantial moral progress
¶ in its response to these and other forms of harmful conduct and
¶ social organization.
¶
Yet, how well do the vulnerable and powerless actually fare today?
¶
It is estimated that
830 million human beings are chronically undernourished,
¶
1,100 million lack access to safe water, 2,600 million lack¶ access to basic sanitation, 1,000 million lack adequate shelter, and¶ 1,600 million lack electricity. About 2,000 million lack access to essential¶ drugs,
some 774 million adults are illiterate, and there are 218
¶ million child laborers.
2 These severe deprivations persist because ¶ people in the bottom half of the world's population are too poor to ¶ protect themselves against them. As of 2004, the last year for which ¶ full World Bank data are now available, 2,533 million or
39.7 percent¶ of humankind were reportedly living in severe poverty
- precisely: in
¶ households whose consumption expenditure per person per year has ¶ less purchasing power than $785.76 had in the US in 1993. On average, ¶ the people living below this line are said to fall 41 percent below it.
¶
About 950 million of them are reported to be living on less than half,
¶ below the World Bank's official extreme-poverty line. People so incredibly
¶ poor are exceedingly vulnerable to even minor changes in natural
¶ and social conditions as well as to many forms of exploitation and
¶ abuse.
Each year
, some
18 million
of them die prematurely from¶ poverty-related causes. This is one-third of all human deaths - 50,000¶ each day, including
29,000 children under age five.
3
¶
Such severe and widespread poverty persists while there is great and
¶ rising affluence elsewhere. The average consumption expenditure of
¶ citizens in high-income countries is about 30 times greater than that of
¶ the

global poor in terms of purchasing power (relative to an international
¶ commodities basket) and about 120 times greater when the comparison
¶ is made at currency exchange rates.

*Venezuela violates human rights – supreme court seizings, television censorship and imprisonment of dissent
Human Rights Watch 13
(Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy Dramatic Concentration of Power and Open
Disregard for Basic Human Rights March 5, 2013 http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/05/venezuela-chavez-s-authoritarian-legacy
- BRW)
(New York) – Hugo
Chávez’s presidency
(1999-2013) was characterized by a dramatic concentration of power and open disregard for basic human rights guarantees.
After enacting a new constitution with ample human rights protections in 1999 – and surviving a short-lived coup d’état in 2002 –
Chávez and his followers
moved to concentrate power. They seized control of the Supreme Court and undercut the ability of journalists, human rights defenders, and other
Venezuelans to exercise fundamental rights.
By his second full term in office
, the concentration of power and erosion of human rights protections had given the government free rein to intimidate, censor, and prosecute Venezuelans who criticized the president or thwarted his political agenda
. In recent years, the president and his followers used these powers in a wide range of prominent cases, whose damaging impact was felt by entire sectors of Venezuelan society. Many
Venezuelans continued to criticize the government. But the prospect of reprisals – in the form of arbitrary or abusive state action – forced journalists and human rights defenders to weigh the consequences of disseminating information and opinions critical of the government, and undercut the ability of judges to adjudicate politically sensitive cases
. Assault on Judicial
Independence In 2004, Chávez and his followers in the National Assembly carried out a political takeover of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, adding 12 seats to what had been a 20seat tribunal, and filling them with government supporters
. The packed Supreme Court ceased to function as a check on presidential power. Its justices have openly rejected the principle of separation of powers and pledged their commitment to advancing Chávez’s political agenda.
This commitment has been reflected in the court’s rulings, which repeatedly validated the government’s disregard for human rights
. Lowercourt judges have faced intense pressure not to issue rulings that could upset the government. In 2009, Chávez publicly called for the imprisonment of a judge for 30 years after she granted conditional liberty to a prominent government critic who had spent almost three years in prison awaiting trial. The judge, María Lourdes Afiuni, was arrested and spent more than a year in prison in pretrial detention, in deplorable conditions. She remains under house arrest. Assault on Press Freedoms Under Chávez, the government
dramatically expanded its ability to control the content of the country’s broadcast and news media. It passed laws extending and toughening penalties for speech that “offends” government officials, prohibiting the broadcast of messages that “foment anxiety in the public,” and allowing for the arbitrary suspension of TV channels, radio stations, and websites. The Chávez government sought to justify its media policies as necessary to
“democratize” the country’s airwaves
. Yet instead of promoting pluralism
, the government abused its regulatory authority to intimidate and censor its critics.
It expanded the number of government-run TV channels from one to six, while taking aggressive steps to reduce the availability of media outlets that engage in critical programming. In response to negative coverage,
Chávez repeatedly threatened to remove private stations
from the airwaves by blocking renewal of their broadcast licenses. In 2007, in an act of blatant political discrimination, his government prevented the country’s oldest private television channel, RCTV, from renewing its license and seized its broadcasting antennas. Three years later, it drove RCTV off cable TV as well by forcing the country’s cable providers to stop transmitting its programs. The removal of RCTV left only one major channel, Globovisión, that continued to be critical of the president. The Chávez government repeatedly pursued administrative sanctions against Globovisión, which have kept the station in perpetual risk of suspension or closure. It also pressed criminal charges against the station’s president, a principal owner, and a guest commentator after they made public statements criticizing the government.
The sanctioning and censorship of the private media under Chávez have
had a powerful impact on broadcasters and journalists
. While sharp criticism of the government is still common in the print media, on Globovisión, and in some other outlets, the fear of government reprisals has made self-censorship a serious problem
. Rejection of Human Rights
Scrutiny In addition to neutralizing the judiciary as a guarantor of rights, the Chávez

government repudiated the Inter-American human rights system, failing to carry out binding rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and preventing the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights from conducting in-country monitoring of human rights problems.
In September 2012, Venezuela announced its withdrawal from the American Convention on
Human Rights, a move that leaves Venezuelans without recourse to what has been for years – in countries throughout the region – the most important external mechanism for seeking redress for abuses when national courts fail to provide it.
The Chávez government also sought to block international organizations from monitoring the country’s human rights practices
. In 2008, the president had representatives of Human Rights Watch forcibly detained and summarily expelled from the country after they released a report documenting his government’s violation of human rights norms. Following the expulsion, his then-foreign minister and now chosen successor, Nicolás
Maduro, announced that, “Any foreigner who comes to criticize our country will be immediately expelled.”
Under Chávez, the government
also sought to discredit human rights defenders by accusing them of receiving support from the US government to undermine Venezuelan democracy
. While local nongovernmental organizations have received funding from US and European sources – a common practice in Latin America where private funding is scarce – there is no credible evidence that the independence and integrity of the defenders’ work has been compromised by international support. Nonetheless, in 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that individuals or organizations receiving foreign funding could be prosecuted for “treason.” The National Assembly passed legislation prohibiting organizations that “defend political rights” or “monitor the performance of public bodies” from receiving international funding. It also imposed stiff fines on organizations that “invite” to Venezuela foreigners who express opinions that “offend” government institutions. Embracing Abusive Governments Chávez also rejected international efforts to promote human rights in other countries.
In recent years, Venezuela consistently voted against UN General Assembly resolutions condemning abusive practices in North
Korea, Burma, Iran, and Syria. Moreover,
Chávez was a vocal supporter of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad,
Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, bestowing upon each of these leaders the “Order of the Liberator,”
Venezuela’s highest official honor. Under Chávez,
Venezuela’s closest ally was Cuba, the only country in
Latin America that systematically represses virtually all forms of political dissent.
Chávez identified Fidel Castro – who headed Cuba’s repressive government until his health deteriorated in 2006 – as his model and mentor.

US human rights credibility low – War on Terror, Guantanamo, torture, and numerous other factors
Weisbrot 09 is an American economist and co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy
Research in Washington, D.C.
He received his Ph.D.
in economics from the University of Michigan . He has written numerous research papers on economic policy , and is co-author, with Dean Baker , of Social Security: The Phony Crisis [Mark
Weisbrot, “Washington’s Lost Credibility on Human Rights”, VenezuelAnalysis, p. http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/4292 ]
The US state department's annual human rights report got an unusual amount of criticism this year . This time the centre-left coalition government of Chile was notable in joining other countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela and China – who have had more rocky relations with Washington – in question ing the moral authority of the US government's judging other countries' human rights practices. It's a reasonable question, and the fact that more democratic governments are asking it may signal a tipping point.
Clearly a state that is responsible for such high-profile torture
and abuses as took place at Abu Ghraib and Guanátnamo, that regularly killed civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq and that reserved for itself the right to kidnap people and send them to prisons in other countries to be tortured ("extraordinary rendition") has a credibility problem on human rights issues . Although President Barack Obama has pledged to close down the prison at Guantánamo and outlaw torture by US officials, he has so far decided not to abolish the practice of "extraordinary rendition", and is escalating the war in Afghanistan. But this tipping point may go beyond any differences – and they are quite significant – between the current administration and its predecessor . In the past, Washington was able to position itself as an important judge of human rights practices despite being complicit or directly participating in some of the worst, large-scale human rights atrocitie s of the post-second world war era – in Vietnam, Indonesia, Central America and other places. This makes no sense from a strictly logical point of view, but it could persist primarily because the United States was judged not on how it treated persons outside its borders but within them. Internally, the United States has had a relatively well-developed system of the rule of law , trial by jury, an independent judiciary and other constitutional guarantees (although these did not extend to African-Americans in most of the southern United States prior to the 1960s civil rights reforms). Washington was able to contrast these conditions with those of its main adversary during the cold war – the Soviet Union . The powerful influence of the United
States over the international media helped ensure that this was the primary framework under which human rights were presented to most of the world. The Bush administration's shredding of the constitution at home and overt support for human rights abuses abroad has fostered not only a change in image but perhaps the standards by which "the judge" will henceforth be judged. One example may help illustrate the point: China has for several years responded
to the state department's human rights report by publishing its own report on the United States.
It includes a catalogue of social ills in the United States, including crime, prison and police abuse, racial and gender discrimination, poverty and inequality. But the last section is titled "On the violation of human rights in other nations". The argument is that the abuse of people in other countries – including the more than one million people who have been killed as a result of America's illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq – must now be taken into account when evaluating the human rights record of the United States . With this criterion included, a country such as China – which does not have a free press, democratic elections or other guarantees that western democracies treasure – can claim that it is as qualified to judge the United States on human rights as vice versa. US-based human rights organisations will undoubtedly see the erosion of
Washington's credibility on these issues as a loss – and understandably so, since the United States is still a powerful country, and they hope to use this power to pressure other countries on human rights issues . But they too should be careful to avoid the kind of politicisation that has earned notoriety for the state department's annual report – which clearly discriminates between allies and adversary countries in its evaluations. The case of the recent Human Rights Watch report on Venezuela illustrates the dangers of this spillover of the politicisation of human rights from the US government to
Washington-based non-governmental organisations. More than 100 scholars and academics wrote a letter complaining about the report, arguing that it did not meet "minimal standards of scholarship, impartiality, accuracy or credibility". For example, the report alleges that the Venezuelan government discriminates against political opponents in the provision of government services. But as evidence for this charge it provides only one alleged incident involving one person, in programmes that serve many millions of
Venezuelans. Human Rights Watch responded with a defence of its report, but the exchange of letters indicates that HRW would have been better off acknowledging the report's errors and prejudice, and taking corrective measures. Independence from
Washington will be increasingly important for international human rights organisations going forward if they don't want to suffer the same loss of international legitimacy on human rights that the US government has. Amnesty International 's report last month calling for an arms embargo on both Israel and Hamas following Israel's assault on Gaza – emphasizing that the Obama

administration should "immediately suspend US military aid to Israel" until "there is no longer a substantial risk that such equipment will be used for serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses" – is a positive example . The report's statement that "Israel's military intervention in the Gaza
Strip has been equipped to a large extent by US-supplied weapons, munitions and military equipment paid for with US taxpayers' money" undoubtedly didn't win friends in the US government. But this is the kind of independent advocacy that strengthens the international credibility of human rights groups, and it is badly needed.

US credibility in LA low now—only a commitment to promote human rights solves
Sikkink 04
political science professor at the University of Minnesota, PhD from Columbia (Kathryn A Sikkink, 2004, “Mixed
Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America”, book) //KY
This is just one example of many where the
U.S. government has given mixed signals about its commitment to promoting human rights
and the rule of law as part of foreign policy. Those mixed signals were most frequent in situations of civil war, guerrilla movements, or acts of terrorism.
Latin American military governments often interpreted these cues as green lights to fight terrorism without concern for human rights
or the rule of Law. The problem of terrorism did not begin with the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. Latin American militaries have long used the language of a “war on terrorism” to describe their struggles against domestic guerrilla movements. U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the late twentieth century addressed these unconventional wars. The excesses and mistakes of counterinsurgency wars taught us some lessons. The most important: a war on terrorism fought without regard to the rule of law can lead to massive violations of human rights. States, in responding to guerrilla actions, engaged in what has been called state terrorism. They imprisoned, tortured, and killed thousands of their own citizens. If we in the United
States forget this history and its relevance to our current struggles, we run the risk of once again being complicit with repression. We learned some other lessons. The only long-term solution to the problem of terrorism is one that promotes democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. This is not naïve idealism. It describes a painful process that most of Latin America has passed through in the last three decades. Most of these Countries now have functioning democracies and arc building the rule of law. The message that
Ambassador Hill gave to the Argentine military in 1976 is as relevant to the war against terrorism today as it was to the “dirty war” then.
Still, the ambiguity of U.S. policy hadn’t disappeared
. Within this very embassy a few years earlier,
U.S. officials had told Jennifer Harbury that they had no knowledge of her husband, guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca, all the while knowing that he was being held and probably tortured by Guatemala security forces on the CIA payroll. As in Uruguay in the i 96os, the Bamaca case revealed that in the early 1990s the CIA was continuing to pay for information that it knew was being extracted through torture. To protect their sources, the CIA misled family members and the public about their practices.’2 U.S. officials continued to give contradictory CUCS on the issue of human rights. These contradictions grew from an identity conflict at the heart of U.S. policy toward Latin America during this period.
There was no one U.S. policy, no single vision of who or what the United States was and what it stood for. Nowhere was this
conflict more evident than in U.S. policy toward Latin America
. Since the 1905, intense anticommunism had informed all aspects of U.S. policy in the region. This anticommunism was often justified by referring to the abysmal human rights practices of communist regimes. But by the 1970s, anticommunism led the United States to support, arm, and train authoritarian regimes that carried out massive human rights abuses against their citizens. In principle, anticommunism could be made compatible with a commitment to human rights, hut U.S. policy makers in Latin America had come to accept as an article of faith that anticommunism required strong support for authoritarian military regimes.

Removing the embargo without conditions destroys human rights
CHC 12
(Capitol Hill Cubans, November 20, 2012, “Easing Sanctions = More Repression” By Notes from the Cuban Exile
Quarter: http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2012/11/easing-sanctions-more-repression.html) //KY
Furthermore looking beyond Cuba to China, Vietnam and Burma one is presented with a cautionary tale on lifting sanctions unconditionally. In China and Vietnam the United
States lifted sanctions unconditionally and have de-linked human rights considerations from economic considerations.
The result has been a deterioration of human rights
standards in both countries. On the other hand in Burma where sanctions were maintained the military junta, after years of trying to manipulate its way out from under them has had to recognize the political opposition and provide a space for them in Burma's parliament.
Things are still far from perfect but there is hope that serious and permanent reforms are underway. The ability of Aung San Suu Kyi to travel in and out of her country and run for public office is a positive sign. The ability for an independent press to begin to operate in Burma following decades of systematic censorship and control is another positive sign.

Latin America is key to global human rights promotion
Wilde 05
Fellow, Center for Ethics, Jesuit Alberto Hurtado University; Former Executive Director and Chair, Board of
Directors, Washington Office on Latin America, peer reviewed by Kathryn Sikkink (Alexander Wilde, August 2005, “Mixed Signals:
U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America” Journal of Latin American Studies37.3) //KY
Latin America had a prominent role in this global story
. In the 1970s a region long familiar with in the defence of human rights
a way to confront the particular brutalities of its military regimes. dictatorship found
Small organisations, often associated with the Catholic Church, documented violations, attempted to defend victims and worked with allies abroad, gradually establishing a cause in their own societies that resonated throughout the region and beyond.
In
Washington, DC, policy makers were much focused on
those same Latin American dictatorships as human rights b ecame a concern of official policy.
US engagement
shifted in succeeding decades from the Southern
Cone to Central America and then Haiti and the ‘war on drugs’ in the Andes, but human rights remained a salient issue in policy toward the region.
Over this period its ongoing importance in US human rights policy – and the human rights movement in Latin America itself – contributed significantly to the broader rise of human rights in international politics and law.

Impacts

Human rights protection is a d-rule
Sikkink 04
political science professor at the University of Minnesota, PhD from Columbia (Kathryn A Sikkink, 2004, “Mixed
Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America”, book) //KY
Our nation is founded on bedrock beliefs in individual freedom and individual rights. In the early clays of the Republic, of course, many basic rights, including the right to vote, were limited to white male property owners. But over more than two centuries, our c oncept of and support for human rights has broadened
both at home and, increasingly, abroad. The effort to expand and defend these rights continues
to this day. The story of the progress we have made, however, is not a straightforward tale of constant improvement hut rather one that more often involves two steps forward, one step back.
The historical unevenness of America’s commitment to rights may be especially relevant today when the nation is a prime target for terrorists
and our willingness to maintain and extend human, civil, and legal rights is being tested in new ways. In fact, when the history of the current “American Era” is written, we can only hope that if anything is remembered as truly exceptional about our nation it will be our abiding commitment to basic human rights in the face of extraordinary dangers.

Human right promotion key to stop terrorism
Sikkink 04
political science professor at the University of Minnesota, PhD from Columbia (Kathryn A Sikkink, 2004, “Mixed
Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America”, book) //KY
This is just one example of many where the U.S. government has given mixed signals about its commitment to promoting human rights and the rule of law as part of foreign policy. Those mixed signals were most frequent in situations of civil war, guerrilla movements, or acts of terrorism. Latin American military governments often interpreted these cues as green lights to fight terrorism without concern for human rights or the rule of Law. The problem of terrorism did not begin with the 2001 attacks on the World
Trade Center. Latin American militaries have long used the language of a
“war on terrorism
” to describe their struggles against domestic guerrilla movements
. U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the late twentieth century addressed these unconventional wars. The excesses and mistakes
of counterinsurgency wars taught us some lessons
. The most important: a war on terrorism fought without regard to the rule of law can lead to massive violations of human rights. States, in responding to guerrilla actions, engaged in what has been called state terrorism. They imprisoned, tortured, and killed thousands of their own citizens. If we in the United States forget this history and its relevance to our cur rent struggles, we run the risk of once again being complicit with repression. We learned some other lessons.
The only long-term solution to the problem of terrorism is one that promotes
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
This is not naïve idealism. It describes a
painful process that
most of
Latin America has passed through
in the last three decades.
Most of these Countries now have functioning democracies
and arc building the rule of law.

Cuba is a major violator of human rights
HRF 08
(“Human Rights Defenders in Cuba” http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/human-rights-defenders/cuba/)
//KY
Cuba remains the only country in the Western Hemisphere to
effectively outlaw peaceful advocacy for human rights a nd democratic reforms.
Independent civil society
in Cuba – including human rights defenders
, democracy activists, and independent journalists and scholars – are the targets of constant persecution
. The universally-recognized rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly are systematically violated by the State and victims have virtually no means of redress within the judicial system. In a severe crackdown on independent civil society in Cuba,
75 peaceful human rights, democracy and political activists were arrested
in the spring of 2003, summarily tried and sentenced to jail terms of up to 28 years. Although 20 of the original
75 have since been released, conditions for independent civil society activists have deteriorated significantly since July 2005, when an additional 15 activists were jailed. Meanwhile, a number of the activists that remain imprisoned since March 2003 suffer from worsening medical conditions which have been exacerbated – and in some cases triggered – by the harsh conditions of their incarceration. Moreover, actos de repudio (“ acts of repudiation”) are regularly carried out against peaceful human rights activists and their families by the Cuban government
and its “Rapid
Response Brigades” of civilian mobs. Activists have been the targets of harassment, mob intimidation, threats, insults and violence perpetrated against them and their family members.
The transfer of power from
Fidel
Castro to his brother
Raul
on July 31, 2006, and the subsequent election of Raul Castro as President on February 24, 2008, have not produced any
significant change in the human rights situation on the island
. The Raul Castro government continues to hold human rights defenders in prison and violates the Cuban people’s rights of expression and association.

Only the CP solves—the plan strengthens the elite’s grip on power
LA Times 07
(Los Angeles Times, 26 Oct 2007, “Carrots for Cuba; We've lifted trade and travel embargoes on China and
Vietnam. Why should Havana be different?, proquest) //KY
In the wake of 9/11,
Washington's thinking about Cuba
-- when it has thought about the island at all
-- has mainly been tinged with the unjustified hope that its oppressive regime will reform or collapse following
the death of Fidel
Castro.
Politicians of both parties generally assume that lifting the trade embargo on the hated revolutionary would be a nonstarter, but that U.S. policy would be ripe for reevaluation after his passing. But in a major speech this week, President Bush attempted to put his stamp on U.S.-Cuba policy through the end of his presidency and beyond with a defiant embrace of the spectacularly unsuccessful U.S. policies of the past. While eloquently describing Cuba's sins against human rights
and economic and political freedoms, Bush offered only the fantasy that the Cuban people will revolt against their rulers. He declared the transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother, Raoul, unacceptable to the United States.
And
he ruled out lifting the embargo until Havana grants its people freedom .
Until then
, Bush said, trading with Cuba "would merely enrich the elites in power and strengthen their grip
."
Unconditional lifting of the embargo strengthens the regime, causes terrorism, and turns Latin America influence
Suchlicki ‘13
(Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-
American Studies, University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? 2/26/13, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/) //KY
Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the U nited
S tates”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the U nited
S tates; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world
; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the
Ford/Carter era,
U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government.
Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention, normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent.
Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba,
Castro would probably restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as
Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well-being.
Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries. If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications.
Latin American terrorism causes extinction
Anderson 08 (10/8/2008, Curt, AP, “US officials fear terrorist links with drug lords,” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-08-805146709_x.htm)
MIAMI —
There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and
Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks
, U.S. officials said Wednesday.
Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in

fundraising and finding logistical support.
But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland
Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S.
"The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the
U nited
S tates," said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst
. "
The threats in this hemisphere are real.
We cannot ignore them." Added U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration operations chief Michael Braun: "It is not in our interest to let that potpourri of scum to come together."

Lifting the embargo without conditioning strengthens the Castro regime
Santos 8
(Jorge, son of Cuban political activist and exile community leader Jorge Mas Canosa, “Should the U.S. end its embargo on Cuba,” 3/31/08, Proquest, MDM)
The Cuban government came to power-and has held power for half a century-through force and violence, not democratic elections.
After Fidel Castro took control of Cuba in 1959, he confiscated the assets of many American companies operating in Cuba-none of which have been compensated for their losses. In response, the U.S. imposed an economic embargo against Cuba in 1962, in hopes of pressuring Castro's Communist regime. The embargo's purpose has also been to cut the Cuban government off from resources that it can use to repress its own citizens and maintain power. The embargo does not cut off assistance to the Cuban people; to the contrary, it seeks to help them by allowing humanitarian aid to be sent directly to them. other hand,
The Cuban government
, on the forces Cubans to live on food rations while it exports most of its agricultural production overseas.
Today, the Cuban people continue to be denied the right to freedom of
expression, to a free press, and to elect their country's leaders. The U.S. embargo continues to be a powerful weapon that could be used as a bargaining chip to negotiate with a post-
Castro government
. For example
, in exchange for resuming trade or allowing tourist travel, the
United States could require Cuba to release the hundreds of political prisoners currently in its jails or to hold free and fair elections. Lifting the embargo now would only help to legitimize Raul Castro and his regime and extend the Castro brothers' half-century hold on power.

Engagement should be conditioned on human rights
RFE 10
(Radio Free Europe, 9/24/10, “Obama Signals Foreign-Policy Shift With Focus on Human Rights, Freedom”)//KY
Speaking on September 23 at the UN General Assembly in his second annual address to the United Nations, U.S. President Barack
Obama described a new foreign policy to guide Washington in the years ahead. "The idea is a simple one -- that freedom
, justice and peace for the world must begin with freedom
, justice, and peace in the lives of individual human beings
," Obama said. "For the United States, this is a matter of moral and pragmatic necessity
." Obama's remarks followed a similar speech on September 22 at the UN Millennium Development Goals summit in which he announced that "the United States is changing the way we do business" in its foreign-aid policy. In that speech,
Obama said Washington would stop measuring its development efforts in terms of dollars spent and the food and medicines delivered. Instead, he said,
Washington would "seek partners who want to build their
own capacity to provide for their people." Earlier
in his presidency,
Obama only lightly stressed the importance of human
rights and democracy as a pillar of his foreign policy.
Instead, he focused more on the "mutual interests" of countries as a way to promote the goals of the
U.S
. economic and national-security agenda. But Obama's September 23 speech appears to signal a modification in that approach, shifting Washington's emphasis toward efforts that encourage economic and political reforms from within other countries. "Today, as in past times of economic downturn, some put human rights aside for the promise of short-term stability, or the false notion that economic growth can come at the expense of freedom," Obama said. "We see leaders abolishing term limits, crackdowns on civil society, and corruption smothering entrepreneurship and good governance. We see democratic reforms deferred indefinitely."
Obama's
new approach would put the focus on responsibility
and accountability for human righ ts
on the part of governments around the world.
Human rights should be a condition to engagement
White House 10
(White House Press Releases, Fact Sheets and Briefings, Sep 23, 2010 “Fact Sheet: Advancing Democracy and Human Rights”) //KY
As the President made clear
in his speech to the General Assembly today, the promotion of human rights a nd democracy is central to his vision of the world we are trying to build.
Freedom, justice, and peace in the world must begin with freedom, justice, and peace in the lives of individual human beings. Over the past year, the
Administration has helped to advance this vision in the following ways: Engaging
Multilaterally
to Advance Universal Values Taking advantage of our membership, we have used the U.N. Human Rights
Council to: * Extend international mandates to monitor and address human rights situations in several countries, including Burma,
Burundi, North Korea, and Cambodia. * Lead an effort with 55 other countries to criticize the human rights situation in Iran and express solidarity with victims and human rights defenders on the first anniversary of the contested election. * Champion new resolutions on Guinea and Kyrgyzstan calling for accountability and heightened commitment to human rights protection and promotion in the wake of human rights crises in both countries. *
Press for stronger engagement
by the Council and other U.N. human rights mechanisms in Haiti, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo and partnered with Afghanistan to build international support for a resolution on preventing attacks on Afghan school children, especially girls. *
Speak out on serious human rights abuses in
Iran, North Korea, Burma, Sudan, China, Zimbabwe,
Venezuela
, Syria, Russia,
Sri Lanka, and elsewhere.
Resolving human rights first is a pre-requisite to successful engagement
Windsor et. al 12
Associate Dean for Programs, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service writing for the Freedom
House and the Connect US Fund (Jennifer Windsor, “ Ten Critical Human Rights Challenges for the Next American President
Jennifer Windsor” http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Ten%20Critical%20Human%20Rights%20Challenges%20For%20The%20Next%
20American%20President.pdf) //KY
U.S. leadership is critical to
effectively address international human rights issues
. International responses to gross violations and systematic abuses of human rights around the world tend to have the greatest impact when the
United States plays a prominent role or is otherwise actively engaged in promoting a rights-based response. Multilateral human rights institutions similarly make the greatest progress in drawing attention to abuses and maintaining human rights standards when the United States exercises leadership.
Human rights affect almost every aspect of U.S. engagement
abroad.
Governments that abuse human rights make unstable and

unreliable partners
across the range of U.S. interests, from business to arms control to counterterrorism. By strengthening the protection of human rights, the United States
not only promotes its own values but also advances its strategic interests. The
next administration should articulate clear priorities
and implement credible policies on human rights, address human rights in its relations with all foreign governments
that commit significant violations, and select senior officials who have the expertise and authority to carry out effective human rights policy, while ensuring that America’s own policies and practices are consistent with the universal values it promotes around the world. The National Security Advisor should have sufficient authority to ensure consistent implementation of human rights policy across U.S. government departments and agencies, and a key criterion in the selection of the Secretary of State should be the candidate’s commitment to human rights.

Conditioning Cuba solves the internal link best – spurs economic growth very quickly
Herrero, 12 -
Deputy Executive Director for the Huffington Post Cuba Study Group (Ricardo Herrero, 12/27/12, “Getting
Serious About Alan Gross”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ricardo-herrero/getting-serious-about-ala_b_2370767.html)//GP
Earlier this month,
USAID subcontractor Alan Gross began his fourth year in a Cuban prison.
Ever since his incarceration, a debate has raged over whether the United States should halt further efforts to engage with the Cuban people until the Cuban government releases
Gross.
Both Alan and his wife Judy have repeatedly called on the U.S. and Cuba to engage in a dialogue without preconditions.
Sadly, like all things Cuba-related, the debate over Gross' incarceration has since devolved into an ideological three-ring circus where finding a solution has become a secondary objective behind not appearing to be making concessions to the enemy. The
Washington Post perfectly captured the tone deafness of the current debate in a recent editorial: "better relations between Cuba and the
United States must be conditioned on real steps toward democratization by
Havana .
But until Mr. Gross is released, they ought to get worse."
This position reflects exactly the sort of stale, inside-the-box thinking that has long plagued the discourse over U.S.-Cuba policy. For years we've known that the
Cuban government is incredibly adept at manipulating U.S. policy choices. Time and again, any attempt by the U.S. to increase its engagement with the Cuban people has been met with confrontation and repression by Cuban officials, which in turn emboldens hardliners in the U.S. to call for the tightening economic sanctions. This pattern has become all too predictable, and the Gross case is its latest example: arrested in Havana for bringing communication devices to the island less than three months after President
Obama relaxed family travel and remittance restrictions in 2009 and only two weeks after the U.S. House held hearings on lifting the
Cuba travel ban for all Americans. In response to Gross' arrest, U.S. hardliners blocked any further normalization efforts in
Congress, though they weren't able to stop the Obama Administration from further loosening restrictions on people-to-people travel and remittances in January, 2011. Shortly thereafter, Gross was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said "It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasn't happened in Cuba in the last 50 years." If we believe this to be the case, then why don't we use this insight to steer our efforts in securing the release of Alan Gross? The Cubans have often stated that they are willing to swap Gross for five Cuban spies who were arrested in Florida in 1998 for infiltrating a U.S.
Navy base and several anti-Castro groups in Miami. The U.S. has refused to accept the swap, and the negotiations have remained stalled for almost three years. So what can be done? There are three opportunities for securing Gross' release that could also help improve relations between the U.S. and Cuba:
1
. Introduce alternative terms to the negotiation.
The Cubans have dictated the terms of the negotiation from day one, and hardliners in the U.S. government have seemingly been too happy to play along. However
, just because the U.S. won't agree to the spy swap doesn't mean negotiations should stop there.
U.S. sanctions on Cuba remain a decades-old morass of congressional actions, presidential directives and executive orders, resulting in an entrenched and inflexible foreign policy that is as incoherent as it is ineffective. There are plenty of outdated sanctions on the books that the United States could repeal or amend in exchange for Gross' release. 2
. Pursue Gross' release and economic engagement concurrently.
In 2011, the Obama Administration announced a shift in the focus of U.S.-Cuba policy toward empowering civil society and supporting independent economic activity.
If Cuba's burgeoning private sector is to grow into a viable alternative to the Island's top-down economic system, it will need a deeper economic relationship with the American private sector.
By conditioning all further
efforts to engage with the Cuban people on Gross' release, we are playing by the rules of those who benefit from the prolonged confrontation and mutual isolation between the two countries. Denying these private individuals an economic relationship with the United States only serves to further delay the kind of changes that policies like
Helms-Burton were ill-designed to accelerate.
CP Solves Cuban democracy efforts
Noriega & Cardenas, 12 - is a former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs (Canada, Latin
America, and the Caribbean) and a former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. He coordinates AEI's program

on Latin America and writes for the Institute's Latin American Outlook series. (Roger F. Noriega, José R. Cárdenas, December 05,
2012, “An action plan for US policy in the Americas”, American Enterprise Institute http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-theamericas/)//GP
This is not only an issue of US self-interest.
Democracy also confers significant benefits on its citizens wherever it has succeeded in taking root, resulting in more effective government, more security, and better prospects for economic development.
The United States can support this process by backing reformers who are working in their countries to
consolidate stable, honest, and rules-based institutions and creating incentives for increased accountability in government through US assistance.
Also critical is the need to increase support for the bedrock of representative government
: civil society nongovernmental organizations. These include, but are not limited to, busi¬ness associations, media organizations, government, labor unions, consumer and environmental groups, and women’s and human rights watchdog groups
.
In Cuba, citizens must rise to this challenge by overcoming their fears and claiming their future.
Before they can build that future, they must dismantle the vestiges of the police state and command economy
. The responsibility is theirs, but their friends can help with a series of bold and constructive measures
.
Although it is more important than ever to preserve the economic sanctions and use them as leverage
to bring about broad, deep, and irreversible reforms , the United
States should use the promise of aid, trade, and normal political relations
as an incentive to leverage change . The United States must be conscientious and bold in its support for democrats in the Americas.
It must not allow the hostility of antidemocratic regimes to deter it from helping struggling democrats in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. If those democrats are willing to take the necessary risks to advocate for different futures for their countries, the United States must demonstrate its solidarity and support for them
. Again, there is no silver bullet in the policy toolkit for developing democratic institutions, building transparent and apolitical judicial systems, eliminating corruption, and promoting competitive elections. It is a difficult process that is never quite complete, as US history shows.
But only by resolutely supporting democracies and democratizing countries can we achieve and sustain a stable, secure, and prosperous hemisphere
. Some recommendations for promoting democracy: The Organization of
American States
: the Obama administration should
instruct the US permanent representative to work with willing states to promote core values and interests, invigorate the application of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, and restore the independence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
.
Latin America needs to be reprioritized
as a recipient of the funding allocated to the National Endowment for
Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and related organizations.
While democracy has taken firm root, its institutions need strengthening, or else the hard-fought-for gains of recent decades will be jeopardized.
Democracy promoters should prioritize support for political parties, independent journalists, and others that are indispensable and constructive protagonists in the political process
. In Cuba, the United States should restore purposeful and focused prodemocracy programs aimed at bringing genuine change to the island. The US president should reactivate the US Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to update transition plans and formulate a specific pledge of robust US aid to a genuine transition
.
The United States should create a privateenterprise fund and a US-Cuba business council to empower entrepreneurs on the island once a transition is under way to promote the development of a
healthy and independent private sector, respect for private property, and the
rule of law.
Human rights are a priori concern with Cuba - otherwise trade increases state power and kills human rights
Diaz-Balart, 09 - Member of the US Congress (Lincoln, 1/09/2009 , Florida, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/631ba38a-ddf0-11dd-87dc-
000077b07658.html#axzz2YamKStWi)//GP

The reason we maintain a trade and tourism embargo on
the
Cuba n dictatorship (a regime that has kept itself in power through terror and repression for 50 years) is,
first, because it is in the national interest of
the US for there to be a democratic transition in Cuba , as it obviously is in the interest of the long-suffering people of Cuba
; second, because, as in the democratic transitions that occurred in Spain or Portugal or Greece, or in those that took place in South Africa or Chile or the Dominican Republic, it is absolutely critical that there be some
form of external pressure for a democratic transition to take place in Cuba once the dictator is no longer on the
scene
(and Fidel Castro, while very ill, is still the ultimate power in totalitarian Cuba). At the time of the disappearance from the scene of the Cuban dictator, it will be absolutely critical for the US embargo to be in place as it is today, with its lifting being conditional,
as it is by law, on three fundamental developments in Cuba.
Number one, the liberation of all political prisoners. Number two, the legalisation of all political parties, independent labour unions and the independent press. And number three, the scheduling of free, internationally supervised elections.
At the time of the disappearance of the dictator in Cuba
, the US embargo, with its lifting being conditional upon those three developments, as it is by law, will constitute critical leverage for the Cuban people to achieve those three conditions. In other words, for them to achieve their freedom.
With regard to your allegation that US sanctions have “failed”, I would ask you to remember what the Cuban dictatorship used to do when it received $5bn or $6n annually from the Soviet Union, an amount similar to what it would begin receiving each year from US tourism alone if sanctions were lifted. I would ask you to remember Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Eritrea and so on.
This is not the time to give the Cuban dictatorship countless billions of dollars unilaterally, while Cuba’s prisons remain full of heroic political prisoners and while the regime remains a state sponsor of international terrorism.
Releasing the embargo unconditionally allows cuba to further human rights violations
Perales 1o
(August 2010The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship Edited by José Raúl
Perales,* Senior Program Associate WOODROW WILSON CENTER LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf - BRW)
However, there are important pitfalls associated with
deeper economic relations.
In a April 29, 2010, hearing on H.R. 4645, the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (designed to remove obstacles to legal sales of
U.S. agricultural commodities to Cuba—by eliminating the cashin-advance provision required for all such sales to Cuba—and to end travel restrictions on all Americans to Cuba), Representative Kevin Brady (R-TX), the Republican ranking member on the House
Ways and Means Committee, outlined some of these drawbacks. Cuba’s economic climate is intolerant of U.S. firms: there exists no accord on
U.S. individual
or corporate property claims
. Indeed, in spite of the Obama administration’s move to allow
U.S. telecommunication firms to apply for licenses to conduct business in Cuba, few such companies have rushed in.
This is in no small part due to the important challenges associated with policy unpredictability under the current Cuban regime, not to mention significant questions arising from issues of human rights and labor relations.
In spite of these considerations, at the time of this publication, H.R.
4645 had been approved in the House Agriculture Committee and awaited further consideration on the Foreign Affairs and
Financial Services committees before reaching the House floor. Whether or not one agrees with the U.S. embargo against Cuba, what must be kept in mind is the fact that the embargo is there for reasons of human rights, argued
Christopher Sabatini , policy director at the Council of the Americas, and that has been how the embargo been defended.
And in this we can’t lose sight of the fact that Cuba’s record on human rights is abysmal
.
The regime
currently has detained over 200 political prisoners
, many of whom have been arrested for the vague charge of “dangerousness.” Cu ba violates freedom of association, strictly limits freedom of expression, and systematically violates the core covenants of the International Labour Organization (ILO). When the debate strays from this central issue of rights
, Sabatini stated
, we lose sight of the real issues facing Cuba and Cuban citizens today.
For this reason, any and all changes to the U.S. embargo must first and foremost be geared toward strengthening the hand of the island’s independent sectors. According to Sabatini, there is broad scope in the United
States for the executive to make regulatory changes that can give U.S. businesses and institutional actors greater scope to begin

developing closer relations inside Cuba. This is important because any change to the status quo in bilateral economic relations will start
US should engage with Cuba on the condition that they improve human rights
Fisk and Johnson, 01 –
Heritage foundation senior expert and senior fellow (Daniel Fisk and Stephen Johnson,
7/06/01, “How to Help the People of Cuba, Not the Regime”, the Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/07/how-to-help-the-people-of-cuba-not-the-regime)//GP
Because both sets of bills have positive elements, it makes sense to combine the best ideas into a single package and strengthen them
. In doing so, Members of
Congress should be guided by an ethic of keeping pressure on Castro while making it easier for Americans to communicate with, assist, and do business with ordinary Cubans to help them prepare for a democratic transition following his enfeeblement or demise.
Congress should: Retain
the Diaz-Balart spirit of concern for victims of political repression and the Helms bill's targeted assistance for pro-democracy efforts .
Such a combined measure should facilitate interaction with Cuba's fledgling free-marketers, as well as make available aid to the victims of political repression. And it should enable any U.S. group or person to remit money to independent, self-employed Cubans and independent NGOs, i.e., those Cubans who are seeking to work independently of the state. Authorize scholarships for Cuban students . Both the Helms and Dodd/Serrano initiatives would provide scholarships for Cuban students, with the latter set authorizing scholarships only for graduate study "in American schools and institutions of learning located in or outside the United
States."12S cholarships for study in both the United States or other OAS member states, as specified in the Helms bill, should be available for Cubans at the undergraduate, graduate, or even postgraduate levels. Preference should be shown to Cubans who are not employed by the Cuban government or actively participating in the Cuban communist party. Further, a portion of any scholarship funding should be made available to American universities and colleges in the form of a grant to give them the latitude to allow
Cuban students to study from among the array of academic disciplines they offer. Maintain "cash and carry" policies for food and medicine sales to the regime, and include farm machinery plus even "soft" goods like clothing . Although unlikely given the position of the current Cuban government, such principled sales open the door to U.S. commerce
. However, subsidies and credits of any sort should remain out of reach for the Castro regime. Considering Castro's questionable ability to repay creditors,13 any Cuban debts to U.S. citizens or entities--including debts resulting from non-U.S. government credits--potentially will fall on the
U.S. taxpayer for repayment. At the least, any change in current financing restrictions should be conditioned on Cuban market reforms.
Prohibit barter deals with Cuban state entities . The Dodd/Serrano measures allow for creative financing mechanisms to facilitate commerce with the regime, e.g., barter arrangements. Trade under current conditions must be conducted with state entities that are, in fact, monopolies. Not only would such arrangements solely benefit the regime, they would also support unfair labor practices and, in certain categories of goods such as citrus and tobacco, would compete unfairly with U.S. businesses. Mandate a study on the impact on U.S. businesses of allowing Cuban state monopolies access to U.S. markets . Rather than only require the U.S. Department of Agriculture to study how export promotion and credit programs could increase the consumption of U.S. agricultural commodities in Cuba's limited economy, Congress should mandate an analysis of any potential harm that could result from opening trade with Cuban state monopolies, including but not limited to pharmaceuticals, medical devices, citrus, textiles, cigars, distilled spirits, and sugar. Authorize microenterprise credits for independent, self-employed Cubans to buy from Americans . A helping hand for independent, self-employed Cubans is critical, even if at first this support is limited and largely symbolic.
Condition joint ventures on market access and labor reforms
.
The principal focus should be on trade between U.S. businesses and independent, self-employed Cubans.
However, joint ventures with the state should be allowed as long as U.S. companies are able to hire whomever they wish, compensate their employees as they wish, and make the goods and services they produce available to all Cubans.
Such criteria are similar to principles named after Cuban human rights activist
Gustavo
Arcos and elaborated by the Cuban Pro-Human Rights Committee, an independent local monitor. Such a provision keeps the burden of reform on the regime and shows flexibility on the part of the United States.
Conditions solve Cuba
Haass and O’Sullivan, 2K
- Meghan L. O'Sullivan: Fellow at the Brookings Institute, Foreign Policy, Richard N.
Haass: Vice President and Director at The Brooking Institute, Foreign Policy
(Meghan L. O'Sullivan and Richard N. Haass, June 2000, “Engaging Problem Countries” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2000/06/sanctions-haass)//GP
Future Candidates for Engagement Given the disappointments of most sanctionsdominated strategies , the rationale for revisiting U.S. foreign policies toward long-term

problem countries is strong. Already, the Clinton administration has opted to pursue its nonproliferation agenda with North Korea through a strategy of engagement. Incentives-oriented engagement strategies—informed by the guidelines presented above—also offer possible alternatives to policies the United States has in place toward Cuba, Iran, and Libya.
Although U.S.-Iraqi relations are among the most problematic of America's foreign policy challenges, we do not consider prospects for further engagement with Iraq in detail here.
Indeed, conditional engagement is explicit in UN Security Council resolutions, which offer Iraq specific rewards in exchange for compliance. However, Saddam Hussein, by spurning UN resolutions mapping the path to better relations with its neighbors and the West, has rejected the possibility of reciprocal engagement. Limited unconditional engagement with Iraq should be contemplated only if it truly strengthens civil society rather than the regime itself. Cuba When stringent U.S. sanctions were placed on Cuba in 1962, Cuba posed a threat to the United States as an outpost of communism in the Western Hemisphere and an ardent exporter of revolution to its neighbors. However, Cuba's importance has since dwindled and its ability to promote radical politics among its democratizing neighbors has almost entirely evaporated. Not only has much of the rationale for isolating Cuba collapsed, but U.S. policy toward the country —in particular the imposition of 'secondary sanctions'— has created tensions with America's European allies that outweigh Cuba's importance. Most important, there is no evidence suggesting that the current U.S. policy of isolation is close to achieving the objective of a peaceful transition to a democratic, market-oriented Cuba. Rather than continuing with its 40-year-old approach, the United States should simultaneously pursue two forms of engagement with Cuba . First, the U.S. government should test Fidel
Castro's willingness to engage in a conditional relationship and to chart a course toward more satisfactory relations. The United States should enter into a dialogue with
Castro in which reasonable benefits are offered in return for reasonable changes in Cuban behavior . Rather than insisting on regime change or immediate democratic elections in Cuba, U.S. policymakers should make lesser goals the initial focus of their policy; the more ambitious the demands, the less likely Castro is to enter into a process of engagement. For instance , a willingness to settle claims for expropriated assets, release political prisoners, and/or legitimize political parties might be proposed in exchange for lifting various elements of the embargo.
If Castro accepted this dialogue, U.S. policy would advance real political liberalization on the island; if Castro rejected these attempts at conditional engagement, Washington would still ease tensions with its European allies by demonstrating increased flexibility.
Conditions are the only way to solve Cuba - Solve long term relations
Haass and O’Sullivan, 2K
- Meghan L. O'Sullivan: Fellow at the Brookings Institute, Foreign Policy, Richard N.
Haass: Vice President and Director at The Brooking Institute, Foreign Policy
(Meghan L. O'Sullivan and Richard N. Haass, June 2000, “Engaging Problem Countries” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2000/06/sanctions-haass)//GP
Beyond these common sense principles, a number of additional guidelines warrant attention. First, conditional engagement requires a well-delineated road map which outlines with great precision the conditions that must be fulfilled and the benefits that can be reaped by both sides as the relationship advances.
Such a mechanism was the centerpiece of the successful
engagement strategy adopted by the Bush administration and continued by
President Clinton to normalize relations with Vietnam
.
It was also used to good effect by the Clinton administration in managing the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs.
The use of such road maps is not just a question of packaging, but entails real responsibilities. Careful monitoring is indispensable, as the

credibility of a calibrated agenda is only as good as its latest step. If the target country discovers that it is possible to move to the next stage without satisfying earlier conditions, or if the regime suspects that its compliance with commitments is not subject to verification, much of the rationale behind such a framework will be undermined. Second, the provision of a road map obligates the United States to follow certain steps as much as it binds the target country .
Not only are the potential gains of a detailed agenda foregone if U.S. non-compliance forces an end to the agreement, but any hope for crafting an alternative policy which commands domestic and international support will be dashed by the failure of the United States to live up to its responsibilities. Despite the utility of road maps, such step-by-step reciprocal engagement with a problem regime will not always be possible. Opaque domestic politics in the target country may frustrate efforts to discern who is in a position of power and who can deliver on promises made in exchange for certain incentives. Or the overriding goal may be the change of a regime, something no government will voluntarily agree to. Although these sorts of situations may preclude conditional engagement, they may be ideal for the initiation of unconditional engagement—the offering of incentives without any expectation of reciprocal acts. While any type of incentive could be offered unconditionally, cultural incentives or inducements to civil society are the most appropriate measures because they are the least likely to shore up dubious regimes . Such incentives may also be the only realistic option when the U.S. government is faced with domestic lobbies adamant on the isolation of certain regimes, but willing to accept measures geared toward easing physical hardship and cultural isolation of the population in the target country without bolstering the power of the regime.
US should condition the plan on human right promotion—only a bilateral policy like the counterplan solves
Wall 98
LL.MUniversity of Durham (England); J.D., 1997, Brigham Young University; B.A., 1995, Brigham Young University
(Christopher Wall, 1998 “Human Rights and Economic Sanctions: the New Imperialism” Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 22, Issue 2 1998 Article 7) //KY
It would be difficult to dispute the extent of the United Sates'
overwhelming influence and leadership in the world. That economic leadership is perhaps nowhere more evident than in
the United States' efforts to assist
other states in developing their own human rights
policies through economic aid
and economic sanctions. Sanctions can, in fact, be a powerful tool for change; economic sanctions worked well enough to help bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and may have deterred India and Pakistan's nuclear threat for several decades. What is important to note is that those efforts were multilateral efforts. A quick look at unilateral approaches to human rights change,
such as the United States' approach in
Cuba, tells another story. The United
States has had economic sanctions in plac e for nearly forty years, Fidel Castro is still in power, and little progress has been made in the way of Cuban human rights
*Possibly useless** Conditioning works—empirics
NYT 92
(new york times, Published: June 15, 1992 “Making Poor Cubans Suffer More http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/15/opinion/making-poor-cubans-suffer-more.html) //KY
Human considerations aside, would it truly promote democracy in Fidel Castro's island tyranny to further impoverish the Cuban people? Representative Robert Torricelli, Democrat of New Jersey, believes it would. His proposed Cuban Democracy Act has sailed through a House committee, with the blessings of the Bush Administration and Gov. Bill Clinton. Yet this misnamed act is dubious in theory, cruel in its potential practice and ignoble in its election-year expediency
. Tightening an already-harsh
U.S. embargo on Cuba would enable Mr. Castro to blame America for the mess that his own doctrines have spawned. Nationalism is the one trump card left in his depleted hand.
Why not offer instead to relax existing sanctions -- providing that Cub a verifiably permits real dissent, frees political prisoners and ends persecution of human rights monitors?
Congress has taken this approach with other

dictatorships
. But Cuba, partly for political reasons, is treated differently. An influential faction of the Cuban-American community clamors for sticking it to a wounded regime. One result was TV Marti, a Florida-based station that has wasted millions of dollars by beaming programs so easily jammed that its Cuban ratings are close to zero.

Past amendments prove that human rights conditions can be attached to embargo easing
Sullivan 09
(Cuba: Issues for the 111 th congress – Mark P. Sullivan – expert in Latin American affairs – published February 3 rd
2009 – Congressional Research Service –BRW)
In the Senate
, S.
Amendment 3660
(Baucus), which would have eased restrictions on U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba
, was proposed on December 11, 2007, but subsequently withdrawn the same day.
Several amendments regarding Cuba were submitted, but never proposed: S.Amdt. 3668 (Baucus), would have eased restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; S.Amdt. 3796 (Nelson, Bill), would have required a certification of certain human rights conditions in Cuba before restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba would be eased
; S.Amdt. 3792 (Martinez), would have expressed the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights situation in Cuba; and S.Amdt. 3793 (Martinez), would have prevented the easing of restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba as long as the country is identified by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of terror.”

Castro willing to talk about Human Rights now
CBS News, 12
(July 26, 2012, “Raul Castro says Cuba is ready sit down with U.S.” http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-
57480650/raul-castro-says-cuba-is-ready-sit-down-with-u.s/)//GP
(CBS/AP) HAVANA -
Cuban President Raul Castro said
Thursday that his government is willing to mend fences with bitter Cold War foe the United States and sit down to discuss anything, as long as it is a conversation between equals.
At the end of a Revolution Day ceremony marking the 59th anniversary of a failed uprising against a military barracks,
Castro grabbed the microphone for apparently impromptu remarks.
He echoed previous statements
that no topic is off-limits, including U.S. concerns about democracy, freedom of the press and human rights on the island, as long as it is a conversation between equals. "Any day they want, the table is set. This has already been said through diplomatic channels," Castro said. "If they want to talk, we will talk."
Washington would have to be prepared to hear Cuba's own complaints about the treatment of those issues in the United States and its European allies, he added.
"We are nobody's colony, nobody's puppet," Castro said. Washington and Havana have not had diplomatic relations for five decades.
The 50-year-old U.S. embargo outlaws nearly all trade and travel to the island, and
Washington insists Cuba must institute democratic reforms and improve human rights before it can be lifted
.
CBS News'
Portia
Siegelbaum reports Castro addressed that issue in his speech, hitting out at
the U.S. and its western European allies for
"inventing" the issue of human rights, before
adding that Cuba is ready to discuss everything with the U.S.
Cuba says yes
Reuters 09 news agency (Mon Apr 20, 2009, “Fidel Castro say U.S. embargo against Cuba must go” http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/04/20/uk-cuba-castro-usa-sb-idUKTRE53J10520090420) //KY
Former Cuban leader Fidel
Castro said on Sunday the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba must go, b ut he was mum on his brother Raul Castro's recent offer to talk with Washington about
"everything ," including political prisoners and human rights .
Castro's comments in his latest column in Cuba's state-run media were his first about the just-completed Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago.
Latin American leaders there pushed U.S. President Barack Obama to end the Cold War trade ban imposed against Cuba in 1962.
Castro praised Obama for being "very intelligent," but said he was "abrupt and evasive" when he answered questions about the embargo in a closing news conference on Sunday. "I want to remind him of a basic ethical principal related to Cuba: any injustice, any crime in whatever time has no excuse to go on.
The crue l blockade ( embargo) against the Cuban people costs lives, costs suffering
," he said. Before the summit that began on Friday, Obama put small holes in the embargo by granting Cuban-Americans the right to travel freely to Cuba and send unlimited money to their relatives on the communist-ruled island. Obama said he hoped
Cuba would signal its willingness to move ahead by releasing political prisoners and cutting the amount it charges to change U.S. dollars into Cuban convertible pesos. President Raul
Castro said on Thursday that
Cuba was willing to hold talks with the United States in which even sensitive topics for Cuba -- human rights, political prisoners and freedom of the press -- could be on the table.
"The test for all of us is not simply words, but deeds," Obama said on Sunday.
Obama
has said he wants to "recast" the U.S.-Cuba relationship but would use the embargo as leverage for Cuban reforms.
Raul
Castro's words were taken
by the administration as a signal Cuba wants to move towards better relations
, but Fidel Castro said nothing about the comments in his column. He has written previously that
Cuba is not afraid to have a dialogue with the United States.

US should withhold future aid unless Mexico meets human rights conditions
Roth, 09 – executive director of the Human Rights Watch (Kevin Roth, JULY 13, 2009,
“Mexico: US Should Withhold Military Aid Rights Conditions in Merida Initiative Remain
Unmet”, Human Rights Watch)//GPastor
The Merida Initiative provides the Obama administration with an important opportunity to strengthen US-Mexican drug enforcement and human rights cooperation. To capitalize on this opportunity, however, the Obama administration should vigorously enforce the human rights requirements included in the aid package.
Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch (Washington, DC) - T he US State Department should not certify Mexico's compliance with the Merida Initiative's human rights requirements so long as Mexican army abuses continue to be tried in military rather than civilian courts, Human Rights Watch said
in a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released today.
The US
Congress mandated that 15 percent of funds to be provided to Mexico under the Merida
Initiative, a multi-year regional aid package to help address the increasing violence and corruption of heavily armed drug cartels, should be withheld until the secretary of state reports to Congress that the Mexican government has met four human rights conditions
. They include the requirement that military abuses be investigated and prosecuted by civilian rather than military authorities. "The
Merida Initiative provides the Obama administration with an important opportunity to strengthen US-Mexican drug enforcement and human rights cooperation," Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, said in the letter. "To capitalize on this opportunity, however, the Obama administration should vigorously enforce the human rights requirements included in the aid package."
Mexico should increase human rights – Nieto will say yes
Amnesty International, 12 -
Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in over 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. Their vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards.
We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion, and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations.
(Amnesty International Organization Annual Report, 18 December 2012, “Mexico: New President must break with legacy of human rights violations”, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/mexico-new-president-must-break-legacy-human-rights-violations-2012-12-
18)//GP
Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto must implement immediate and
concrete measures to tackle some of the country’s most pressing human rights issues, i ncluding abuses in the context of the public security crisis, said Amnesty International in an open letter
. According to Amnesty International’s research, human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detentions and lack of access to justice became routine during the previous administration.
“Peña Nieto’s positive discourse regarding human rights
, including commitments to move ahead with the General Victim’s Law and reform of laws criminalizing enforced disappearances
, are welcome but promises and good intentions are not
enough to eradicate and prevent human rights violations,” said Javier Zúñiga, Special
Adviser at Amnesty International
. “A very good first step President Peña Nieto can take as as commander in chief of the armed forces is to instruct them to respect human rights or face the consequences. ” During the elections, Enrique Peña Nieto replied to an Amnesty International letter to candidates making a number of policy commitments if elected. “We want to remind the new President of his promises during the campaign and see concrete actions, including the development of a human rights programme in conjunction with all relevant sectors of society, including the judiciary, local authorities and human rights defenders,

one that includes concrete proposals to tackle Mexico’s human rights crisis,” said Javier
Zúñiga “Time is running
out for Mexico. President Peña Nieto must not waste another six years with failed human rights policies and add more victims to those left by President Calderon.”
Amnesty International’s letter details a number of priority issues which the new
President must urgently address in order to strengthen respect and protection of human rights in Mexico, including: Public Security: Human rights abuses committed by the security
and police forces in the context of operations to fight organized crime have become systematic over recent years, as has the lack of effective investigations into the abuses. Peña Nieto’s decision to support the General Victim’s Law is an important recognition of the rights of the thousands of victims of the violence, but it is essential that all public security initiatives protect human rights and justice in practice not merely in rhetoric
.
The Aff alone can’t solve the aff without human rights focus first
IPS News, 4/30/13
– Inter Press News Service (Katelyn Fossett, “In U.S.-Mexico Relations, a Shift from Security to
Economy”, Inter Press News Service, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-toeconomy/)//GP
Development’s Achilles heel Still, for a country like Mexico that is still struggling with issues of citizen security and rampant crime, many suggest that economic growth would have to start from the bottom, with more robust social programmes and safety nets, before the international community becomes too optimistic about economic and trade booms.
Cynthia
Arnson, director of the Latin America programme at the Wilson Center, calls Latin
America “far behind” in developing policies that might leverage inclusive growth
. “There is not a sense of shared responsibility … when your social policy is remittance, when your lack of social policy is permitted,” she told reporters on Friday
. The region, she said, needs “a widespread recognition of the role the private sector needs to play in paying taxes, improving government … [and] institutions.”
In a telephone interview with IPS, she noted that the U.S. relationship with Central
America is likely to remain more focused on security concerns
. “There is a growing consensus in the development community that sustainable growth can’t and
will not happen unless levels of violence are brought under control,” she told
IPS
.
The World Bank recently called citizen insecurity the “Achilles’ heel of
development” in Latin America
. Members of the
U.S. Congress and advocacy groups here are also wary of turning a blind eye to human rights concerns in Mexico. “The dire human rights situation in Mexico is not going to solve itself,” Maureen Meyer, a senior associate for Mexico and Central America with the Washington Office on Latin America
(WOLA),
an advocacy group, said in a statement. “
As the bilateral agenda evolves, it is critical that the U.S. and Mexican governments continue to focus on how best to support and defend human rights in Mexico
.” In a press release issued last week, WOLA expressed agreement with a letter from 23 members of Congress to Secretary of State John K erry that stressed that “[t]he human rights crisis will not improve until there are stronger legal protections, increased human rights training for Mexico’s security forces, and more government agents held responsible for the human rights violations they commit.”
CP is a pre-requisite to economic engagement
Goldfarb and Miroff, 5/02/13 – a
Princeton graduate staff writer covering the White House, focusing on
President Obama’s economic, financial and fiscal policy and UC Berkeley staff writer since 2006, reporting on politics, immigration, crime.
(Zachary A. Goldfarb and Nick Miroff, May 02, 2013, “Obama begins bilateral meeting with Peña Nieto”, The Washington
Post, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-02/world/38979927_1_nik-steinberg-mexican-security-forces-intelligenceagencies)//GP
“There was a sense that law enforcement agencies and individuals have developed rich relationships of collaboration, and that might be much more difficult, if not impossible to do, with these changes,” said Eric Olson, a Mexico expert at the Woodrow Wilson

International Center for Scholars in Washington. During his presidential campaign last year and since taking office in December,
Peña
Nieto has insisted
that his government will fight the drug war just as intensely as his predecessor, but that
“reducing violence” should be Mexico’s priority
. The United States has not acknowledged its role in supporting a flawed strategy that has grown unpopular in Mexico, said Nik Steinberg, Mexico researcher at Human Rights Watch.
An estimated 70,000 people have been killed in drug-war violence since 2006, and 25,000 have gone missing, many at the hands of
Mexican security forces.
If Obama does not advocate for rights improvements or takes a waitand-see approach, “it means we have to let Mexico lead and we’ll follow. But the
Mexicans have shown they don’t want to talk about public security,” Steinberg said.
“
If the U.S. stays the course, then we’ll see more of the same: more Mexicans killed and disappeared, more powerful cartels and more drugs coming to the U.S.” A senior Obama administration official said the United States still expects cooperation, but “it’s natural for the new administration to make adjustments in the mechanics and organization of our security relationship
.”
The meeting
and news conference were held at the Palacio Nacional, the headquarters of the federal branch of government, and led to agreements to begin talks about promoting trade and collaborating on educational initiatives
. It was scheduled to be follow by a working dinner with the two leaders on Thursday evening.
Obama and Peña Nieto spoke about immigration reform sparingly
. Obama repeated that he is optimistic that Congress will strike a deal and said the framework being worked on in the Senate is “a great place to start,” even though “it doesn’t contain everything I want.” Peña Nieto said he appreciates the efforts by Obama and Congress to overhaul immigration laws. He added, “Mexico understands this is a domestic affair for the United States.” On Friday, Obama is scheduled to make a speech at the Anthropology Museum in Mexico City before flying to San Jose, Costa Rica, where he will attend a bilateral meeting, visit with youth and hold a news conference with
President Laura Chinchilla. On Saturday, he will make another address and meet with Latin American leaders as part of the regional
Central American Integration System — including leaders from Nicaragua, Belize, Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. In his remarks earlier this week,
Obama said many Central American countries are
“struggling with both economic issues and security issues, but are important partners for us — because I think that the vision here is that we want to make sure that our hemisphere is more effectively integrated to improve the economy and security of all people.”

Current policies to stop human trafficking won’t solve – Mexican government policies fail
Graham, 10 – Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Associate (Melissa Graham, October
13, 2010, “MEXICO’S NEW WAR: SEX TRAFFICKING”, COHA, http://www.coha.org/mexico%E2%80%99s-new-war-sex-trafficking/)//GP
Since 11 September 2001, the issue of border security has generated an overzealous reaction on the U.S public’s part, galvanized by politicians hungry for an issue, to keep “others” out. As a result, the U.S.-Mexico border became almost impenetrable. However, heightened border security backfired on the U.S. government as it forced many Mexicans into the areas of illegal trafficking groups in hopes that they will give them a better chance of getting across the border. As the debate over immigration continues, stringent U.S. laws will surely play an important role in the growing reliance of Mexicans on illegal trafficking groups.
Recent laws like Arizona’s SB 1070, which critics argue encompass racial profiling, are causing increasing harm to many victims of human trafficking. Amanda Kloer of change.org explains that the law will “up the chances that undocumented trafficking victims will end up detained or deported and documented traffickers walk free.” Kloer reasons that victimizing those who have been subjected to trafficking, via laws like SB 1070, is likely to keep many from coming forward to law enforcement officials out of fear that they will simply be deported back to Mexico.
Any change in the classification of “illegal immigrants” has to take into account that not all of those criminalized by existing U.S. laws are there by choice.
Unfortunately, Calderón’s
attack on drug cartels has left few resources to combat human trafficking
.
Mexico has tried to address the issue through legal changes to combat trafficking as recently as 2007, when “federal legislation to prohibit all forms of drug trafficking”7 was passed
. Nonetheless, according to the U.S. Department of State’s
Trafficking of Persons Report 2010, “some local officials tolerate and are
sometimes complicit in trafficking, impeding the implementation of antitrafficking statutes.”
8 This limits the law and at times makes it completely ineffective in combating the issue.
Last year, according to the same government report, the federal government in Mexico investigated only 48 cases of human trafficking. Only one trafficking ring was apprehended and the leader still remains at large. Obviously,
the laws are not doing nearly enough to stop what is happening by passing laws that, in reality, do very little.
The problem with human and sex trafficking is that it has become a side business for many cartels to supplement their lost income in the “war on drugs.” Kloer again explains it best: “When a drug cartel traffics a pound of cocaine into the U.S., they can only sell it once. When they traffic a young woman into the U.S., they can sell her again and again.”9 Calderón has unwittingly allowed the cartels to become involved in other illicit business, such as human trafficking, and his administration has done little to address this issue.
As human trafficking becomes a growing problem shared by Mexico and the U.S., it becomes the responsibility of both governments to properly address the issue
. Due to both countries’ stance on immigration policy, the current violence taking over the country, and the insubordination of women’s status in Mexico, female trafficking has become the loophole in cartel’s moneymaking abilities and is an issue that can be stopped if given the right attention and awareness.
Calderón, as well as other leaders in
Latin America, must start attacking the cartels’ human trafficking activities to help combat the growth of this industry.
The
United States also has a responsibility to help those that become labeled as “victims” of human trafficking. In situations like this, the United States needs to assert their role as a guiding light in the Western hemisphere and aid victims who are not being helped by their own government.
Solves human trafficking – Nieto will say yes
Amnesty International, 12 -
Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in over 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. Their vision is for

every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards.
We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion, and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations.
(Amnesty International Organization Annual Report, 18 December 2012, “Mexico: New President must break with legacy of human rights violations”, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/mexico-new-president-must-break-legacy-human-rights-violations-2012-12-
18)//GP
Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto must implement immediate and
concrete measures to tackle some of the country’s most pressing human rights issues, i ncluding abuses in the context of the public security crisis, said Amnesty International in an open letter
. According to Amnesty International’s research, human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detentions and lack of access to justice became routine during the previous administration.
“Peña Nieto’s positive discourse regarding human rights
, including commitments to move ahead with the General Victim’s Law and reform of laws criminalizing enforced disappearances
, are welcome but promises and good intentions are not
enough to eradicate and prevent human rights violations,” said Javier Zúñiga, Special
Adviser at Amnesty International
. “A very good first step President Peña Nieto can take as as commander in chief of the armed forces is to instruct them to respect human rights or face the consequences. ” During the elections, Enrique Peña Nieto replied to an Amnesty International letter to candidates making a number of policy commitments if elected. “We want to remind the new President of his promises during the campaign and see concrete actions, including the development of a human rights programme in conjunction with all relevant sectors of society, including the judiciary, local authorities and human rights defenders, one that includes concrete proposals to tackle Mexico’s human rights crisis,” said Javier
Zúñiga “Time is running
out for Mexico. President Peña Nieto must not waste another six years with failed human rights policies and add more victims to those left by President Calderon.”
Amnesty International’s letter details a number of priority issues which the new
President must urgently address in order to strengthen respect and protection of human rights in Mexico, including:
Public Security: Human rights abuses committed by the security and police forces in the context of operations to fight organized crime have become systematic over recent years, as has the lack of effective investigations into the abuses. Peña Nieto’s decision to support the General Victim’s Law is an important recognition of the rights of the thousands of victims of the violence, but it is essential that all public security initiatives protect human rights and justice in practice not merely in rhetoric. Military justice: The deployment of more than 50,000 army and navy personnel in law enforcement roles has resulted in a sharp rise in reports of human rights violations. These have been dealt with by the military justice system which has resulted in a systematic lack of justice for victims. The recent rulings by the National Supreme Court to exclude cases of human rights violations from the military justice system are a positive step. However, the Military Justice Code must be reformed to ensure all alleged abuses are investigated, prosecuted and tried by the civilian justice system.. Human rights defenders: The president must clarify the government’s commitment to fully fund and back the new protection mechanism established in consultation with human rights defenders’ and journalists’ organizations. The new administration must also ensure effective investigations into attacks and harassment of defenders and journalists, including where public officials are implicated.
Migrants: Peña Nieto must specify new and effective measures to tackle the wave of killings, disappearances, rape and other human rights abuses by criminal gangs, often operating in collusion with public officials, against migrants in Mexico. Torture: Torture and ill-treatment has become a systematic practice during the Calderon administration. Information obtained under torture is still accepted in court and few complaints result in full investigations. The proposal to reform the legal framework to fight torture at the federal and state level is positive but only by implementing a range of concrete policies and actions will torture begin to be eradicated. Disappearances: The level of abductions and disappearances in Mexico is shocking, as is the lack of investigations into most cases. A proposal to reform the legal framework to fight enforced disappearances is a positive step. The proposal must meet international human rights standards and the government needs to ensure radically improved measures to fully investigate all reported abductions, including establishing a national database to help identify and locate victims. Justice system: Over 98% of crimes, including human rights abuses, end in impunity. The authorities must ensure that ongoing reforms to the justice system improve capacity and reliability of judicial measures to hold perpetrators to account while guaranteeing rights of victims and accused.
Violence against women:
Recent legislative advances have not translated into a reduction of cases of violence against women.
The President promised Amnesty International to take action on this key issue
but it is worrying that no concrete measures are proposed in the Pact for Mexico.
The government must take a leading role to strengthen prevention, investigation and punishment of violence against women and respect for women’s rights.

CP solves border security and drug trafficking
Seelke* and Finklea**, 6/12/13 -
*Specialist in Latin American Affairs **Analyst in Domestic Security (Clare
Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea, June 12, 2013, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond”, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/210921.pdf)//GP
Mexican President
Enrique Peña
Nieto
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) took office in December 2012 vowing to reduce violence in Mexico and adjust the current U.S.-Mexican security strategy
(see “The Peña Nieto Administration’s Security Strategy and the Mérida Initiative”). As Mexico’s security strategy changes,
Congress may need to examine how those priorities align with U.S. interests
.
When considering the Obama Administration’s FY2014 budget request, Congress may analyze how
Mérida and related funds have been used and the degree to which
U.S.-funded programs in
Mexico complement other U.S. counterdrug and border security efforts. Compliance with Merida’s human rights conditions is likely to be closely monitored to ensure that anticrime efforts are carried out in a way that respects human rights and the rule of law
.
Oversight of U.S. domestic pledges under the Mérida Initiative may also continue, particularly those aimed at reducing weapons trafficking. Congress could also explore how the use of newer tools
— such as aerial drones that monitor criminal activity in the border region— might bolster current security cooperation efforts under Mérida
.
Mexico will implement should increase human rights through public security
Amnesty International, 12 -
Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in over 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. Their vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards.
We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion, and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations.
(Amnesty International Organization Annual Report, 18 December 2012, “Mexico: New President must break with legacy of human rights violations”, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/mexico-new-president-must-break-legacy-human-rights-violations-2012-12-
18)//GP
Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto must implement immediate and
concrete measures to tackle some of the country’s most pressing human rights issues, i ncluding abuses in the context of the public security crisis, said Amnesty International in an open letter
. According to Amnesty International’s research, human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detentions and lack of access to justice became routine during the previous administration.
“Peña Nieto’s positive discourse regarding human rights
, including commitments to move ahead with the General Victim’s Law and reform of laws criminalizing enforced disappearances
, are welcome but promises and good intentions are not
enough to eradicate and prevent human rights violations,” said Javier Zúñiga, Special
Adviser at Amnesty International
. “A very good first step President Peña Nieto can take as as commander in chief of the armed forces is to instruct them to respect human rights or face the consequences. ” During the elections, Enrique Peña Nieto replied to an Amnesty International letter to candidates making a number of policy commitments if elected. “We want to remind the new President of his promises during the campaign and see concrete actions, including the development of a human rights programme in conjunction with all relevant sectors of society, including the judiciary, local authorities and human rights defenders, one that includes concrete proposals to tackle Mexico’s human rights crisis,” said Javier
Zúñiga “Time is running
out for Mexico. President Peña Nieto must not waste another six years with failed human rights policies and add more victims to those left by President Calderon.”
Amnesty International’s letter details a number of priority issues which the new

President must urgently address in order to strengthen respect and protection of human rights in Mexico, including: Public Security: Human rights abuses committed by the security
and police forces in the context of operations to fight organized crime have become systematic over recent years, as has the lack of effective investigations into the abuses. Peña Nieto’s decision to support the General Victim’s Law is an important recognition of the rights of the thousands of victims of the violence, but it is essential that all public security initiatives protect human rights and justice in practice not merely in rhetoric
. Military justice:
The deployment of more than 50,000 army and navy personnel in law enforcement roles has resulted in a sharp rise in reports of human rights violations. These have been dealt with by the military justice system which has resulted in a systematic lack of justice for victims. The recent rulings by the National Supreme Court to exclude cases of human rights violations from the military justice system are a positive step. However, the Military Justice Code must be reformed to ensure all alleged abuses are investigated, prosecuted and tried by the civilian justice system.. Human rights defenders:
The president must clarify the government’s commitment to fully fund and back the new protection mechanism established in consultation with human rights defenders’ and journalists’ organizations.
The new administration must also ensure effective investigations into attacks and harassment of defenders and journalists, including where public officials are implicated.
Migrants: Peña Nieto must specify new and effective measures to tackle the wave of killings, disappearances, rape and other human rights abuses by criminal gangs, often operating in collusion with public officials, against migrants in Mexico. Torture: Torture and ill-treatment has become a systematic practice during the Calderon administration. Information obtained under torture is still accepted in court and few complaints result in full investigations. The proposal to reform the legal framework to fight torture at the federal and state level is positive but only by implementing a range of concrete policies and actions will torture begin to be eradicated. Disappearances: The level of abductions and disappearances in Mexico is shocking, as is the lack of investigations into most cases. A proposal to reform the legal framework to fight enforced disappearances is a positive step. The proposal must meet international human rights standards and the government needs to ensure radically improved measures to fully investigate all reported abductions, including establishing a national database to help identify and locate victims. Justice system: Over 98% of crimes, including human rights abuses, end in impunity. The authorities must ensure that ongoing reforms to the justice system improve capacity and reliability of judicial measures to hold perpetrators to account while guaranteeing rights of victims and accused. Violence against women: Recent legislative advances have not translated into a reduction of cases of violence against women. The President promised Amnesty International to take action on this key issue but it is worrying that no concrete measures are proposed in the Pact for Mexico. The government must take a leading role to strengthen prevention, investigation and punishment of violence against women and respect for women’s rights.

Nieto will say yes to increased US-Mexico human rights cooperation
Glickhouse and Zissis, 4/26/13 – Glickhouse: is editor-in-chief of AS/COA Online, the website of the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, She holds an MA in Journalism and Latin American Studies from New York University and a BA in History from George
Washington University.. (Rachel Glickhouse and Carin Zissis, April 26, 2013, “Explainer:
President Barack Obama's Trip to Mexico and Costa Rica”, American Society/Council of the
Americas, http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-president-barack-obamas-trip-mexicoand-costa-rica)//GP
The U.S. State Department budget request for fiscal year 2014 released this month allocates $205 million for Mexico , marking a $124 million decrease from 2012. But a portion of security funding to Mexico is being withheld over human rights concerns . A group of 23 U.S. legislators hopes Obama will bring up that subject while in Mexico . In a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the lawmakers note that the State
Department is withholding $18 million of security aid “until the United States identifies areas of future collaboration with the Peña Nieto government on key human rights issues ,” pointing out that Peña Nieto’s predecessor saw a quintupling in human rights complaints against Mexican soldiers and police. The congressman added: “ We are encouraged by Peña Nieto’s strong statements affirming his
commitment to human rights and we believe they provide the United States with an important opening to raise our concerns with the Mexican government.”
Mexico should increase human rights – Nieto will say yes
Amnesty International, 12 -
Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in over 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. Their vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards.
We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion, and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations.
(Amnesty International Organization Annual Report, 18 December 2012, “Mexico: New President must break with legacy of human rights violations”, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/mexico-new-president-must-break-legacy-human-rights-violations-2012-12-
18)//GP
Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto must implement immediate and
concrete measures to tackle some of the country’s most pressing human rights issues, i ncluding abuses in the context of the public security crisis, said Amnesty International in an open letter
. According to Amnesty International’s research, human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detentions and lack of access to justice became routine during the previous administration.
“Peña Nieto’s positive discourse regarding human rights
, including commitments to move ahead with the General Victim’s Law and reform of laws criminalizing enforced disappearances
, are welcome but promises and good intentions are not
enough to eradicate and prevent human rights violations,” said Javier Zúñiga, Special
Adviser at Amnesty International
. “A very good first step President Peña Nieto can take as as commander in chief of the armed forces is to instruct them to respect human rights or face the consequences. ” During the elections, Enrique Peña Nieto replied to an Amnesty International letter to candidates making a number of policy commitments if elected. “We want to remind the new President of his promises during the campaign and see concrete actions, including the development of a human rights programme in conjunction with all relevant sectors of society, including the judiciary, local authorities and human rights defenders,

one that includes concrete proposals to tackle Mexico’s human rights crisis,” said Javier
Zúñiga “Time is running
out for Mexico. President Peña Nieto must not waste another six years with failed human rights policies and add more victims to those left by President Calderon.”
Amnesty International’s letter details a number of priority issues which the new
President must urgently address in order to strengthen respect and protection of human rights in Mexico, including: Public Security: Human rights abuses committed by the security
and police forces in the context of operations to fight organized crime have become systematic over recent years, as has the lack of effective investigations into the abuses. Peña Nieto’s decision to support the General Victim’s Law is an important recognition of the rights of the thousands of victims of the violence, but it is essential that all public security initiatives protect human rights and justice in practice not merely in rhetoric
.

CP Solves Venezuela
Noriega & Cardenas, 12 - is a former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs (Canada, Latin
America, and the Caribbean) and a former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. He coordinates AEI's program on Latin America and writes for the Institute's Latin American Outlook series. (Roger F. Noriega, José R. Cárdenas, December 05,
2012, “An action plan for US policy in the Americas”, American Enterprise Institute http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-theamericas/)//GP
This is not only an issue of US self-interest.
Democracy also confers significant benefits on its citizens wherever it has succeeded in taking root, resulting in more effective government, more security, and better prospects for economic development.
The United States can support this process by backing reformers who are working in their countries to
consolidate stable, honest, and rules-based institutions and creating incentives for increased accountability in government through US assistance.
Also critical is the need to increase support for the bedrock of representative government
: civil society nongovernmental organizations. These include, but are not limited to, busi¬ness associations, media organizations, government, labor unions, consumer and environmental groups, and women’s and human rights watchdog groups
. In Cuba, citizens must rise to this challenge by overcoming their fears and claiming their future.
Before they can build that future, they must dismantle the vestiges of the police state and command economy
. The responsibility is theirs, but their friends can help with a series of bold and constructive measures
. Although it is more important than ever to preserve the economic sanctions and use them as leverage to bring about broad, deep, and irreversible reforms , the United States should use the promise of aid, trade,
and normal political relations as an incentive to leverage change . The United
States must be conscientious and bold in its support for democrats in the Americas. It must not allow the hostility of antidemocratic regimes to deter it from
helping struggling democrats in countries such as Venezuela,
Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Nicaragua.
If those democrats are willing to take the necessary risks to advocate for different futures for their countries, the United States must demonstrate its solidarity and support for them
. Again, there is no silver bullet in the policy toolkit for developing democratic institutions, building transparent and apolitical judicial systems, eliminating corruption, and promoting competitive elections. It is a difficult process that is never quite complete, as US history shows.
But only by resolutely supporting democracies and democratizing countries can we achieve and sustain a stable, secure, and prosperous hemisphere
. Some recommendations for promoting democracy: The Organization of
American States: the
Obama administration should
instruct the US permanent representative to work with willing states to promote core values and interests, invigorate the application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and restore the independence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
.
Latin America needs to be reprioritized
as a recipient of the funding allocated to the National Endowment for Democracy, the
International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and related organizations. While democracy
has taken firm root, its institutions need strengthening,
or else the hard-fought-for gains of recent decades will be jeopardized
. Democracy promoters should prioritize support for political parties, independent journalists, and others that are indispensable and constructive protagonists in the political process. In Cuba, the United
States should restore purposeful and focused prodemocracy programs aimed at bringing genuine change to the island. The US president should reactivate the US Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to update transition plans and formulate a specific pledge of robust US aid to a genuine transition.
The United States should create a private-enterprise fund and a US-
Cuba business council to empower entrepreneurs on the island
once a transition is under way to
promote the development of a healthy and independent private sector, respect for private property, and the rule of law.

The US Should offer economic incentives to Venezuela – solves democracy promotion and political stability
Wilson, 05 –
US Army Lietenant Colonel published for the US Army College (Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey K. Wilson, March
18, 2005, “USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT PROMOTING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN VENEZUELA” by United
States Army Dr. Max Manwaring, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA431740)//GP
Whether Chavez continues to build on the momentum he has enjoyed since the recall referendum and is reelected or he is defeated by the opposition, the U.S. needs to continue to support democratic processes in Venezuela.
Popular participation in recent elections and the 2004 referendum indicates that
Venezuelans want to preserve their democracy
.
56 By reinforcing these values, the U.S. government can invest in the future stability of this region and help these people govern themselves
.
In the area of economic ways and means, there are many promising approaches
. The U.S. should continue to lead the effort to establish the FTAA, but this will take a long time to produce results. In the short term, the U.S. should lead the effort to establish an Andean Free Trade Region that would help strengthen the struggling economies in this troubled region. This would boost regional trade and promote the kind of free market economy that the U.S. supports in its National Security Strategy. Venezuela is interested in joining NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement.57
The U.S. should use diplomatic efforts to offer possible sponsorship of Venezuelan membership in NAFTA
as a positive reward for effective economic reforms within the country
. Although some estimates show that Venezuela has restored oil production to levels seen prior to the national strike a year and a half ago, both the U.S. and Venezuela would benefit from increased capacity in the oil industry there. This would mean more revenues for
Venezuela and increased supply for the U.S. The U.S. could facilitate new investments in the oil sector, which would also have a potential economic benefit for U.S. companies. The GOV wants to greatly expand the country’s natural gas industry and use its plentiful reserves (estimated to be the 6th largest in the world) to build a modern and environmentally friendly14 energy infrastructure that would provide inexpensive and clean energy to the country with additional gas available for export.58 Both countries could benefit from such development. SUMMARY
It is definitely in the best interests of the U.S. to keep Venezuela as an anchor of democracy in this very troubled region and the U.S. government must act quickly and effectively to strengthen its policy to succeed in reaching that goal. The U.S. government must realize that political stability,
security and economic prosperity are interdependent and that the most effective way to operate in Venezuela is with the coordinated support of regional partners, international organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs). The U.S. must be prepared for various scenarios, including a slide to civil war and have plans in place for each of them. As U.S. National
Security Strategy makes clear, the U.S. has many interests in Venezuela and the troubled Andean region and must use the approach outlined above to craft and execute an effective strategy to protect those interests.
Conditioning Venezuela is key to Venezuelan pro-democracy efforts
Lehtinen 13
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida Republican, is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the
Middle East and North Africa. ( By Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Thursday, March 14, 2013 ROS-LEHTINEN: Venezuela after Chavez: What comes next? http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/venezuela-after-chavez-what-comes-next/ - BRW)
Since 1999
, the Venezuelan people have suffered under an oppressive, neosocialist dictatorship that disregarded human rights, the rule of law and freedom of the press.
For 14 years, Hugo
Chavez trampled over democratic order, jailed political prisoners and oppressed the Venezuelan people
. Chavez reportedly accumulated vast amounts of wealth estimated in the billions while
Venezuelans suffered from high inflation and joblessness, rampant food shortages and a private sector that is threatened at every turn. Venezuela is a pivotal national security interest for the United States. It is one of the largest foreign suppliers of crude oil to the
United States and is a strategic foothold that continues to pose a threat to our interests in the region.
Chavez was instrumental in bringing the threat of narcoterrorism, illicit activities by foreign terrorist organizations and the Iranian regime, including elements of Hezbollah, to the Western
Hemisphere.
Chavez’s cronies have made it abundantly clear that they do not wish to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement officials on terrorism and countering the narcotics trade. This was made clear once again as the new leadership in Venezuela expelled two U.S. Air Force attaches shortly before Chavez’s death.
This unwarranted, provocative action was reciprocated last week when two Venezuelan diplomats were expelled from Washington
. Still, there is more to be done. In a post-Chavez era, much attention is being focused on new elections and a call for democratic order. However, elections for the sake of elections do not constitute a true democracy.
Venezuela's
National Electoral Council is extremely corrupt and colludes with Chavez loyalists, who aim to intimidate the masses in Venezuela by controlling the media and judicial system.
A free, fair and transparent election cannot be conducted if the same

players continue to control the already tainted electoral process. The authoritarian regime cannot be allowed to simply shift control from one despot to another in an effort to maintain its iron grip over the Venezuelan people
. The United States’ role in the post-Chavez era should be to support democratic order by continuing to promote the
Venezuelan civil society and ensuring that their
rights are respected
.
The freedom-hungry people of Venezuela fear that the
United States is too weak to counter interim President Nicolas Maduro.
Support for pro-democracy leaders cannot be accomplished if the Obama administration continues to cozy up to their oppressors and refuses to draw a line in the sand for Mr. Maduro
, demanding an end to these undemocratic policies. Last year, it was reported that the Obama administration was seeking to exchange ambassadors in an attempt to normalize relations between the countries.
The U.S. State Department’s approach was extremely premature, and it, unfortunately, legitimized Mr. Maduro without even questioning whether the
Venezuelan Constitution was being upheld
. The Obama administration continued to send mixed messages and to undermine the opposition by sending a delegation to attend Chavez’s funeral services last week, alongside enemies of the United
States, such as Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Words matter, but actions matter more, and this decision not only sends mixed signals to the people of Venezuela, but reiterates the failed policy of attempting to re-establish diplomatic relations.
It is in our best interest if political and economic reforms come to Venezuela, but all signs currently point to
the contrary. As the leader of the Chavista movement,
Mr. Maduro
could potentially be worse for the
Venezuelan people and for U.S. national security interests.
Mr. Maduro still controls all branches of government, stifles free speech and was indoctrinated with socialist ideology. He has traveled to Tehran and has strong ties with
Iran, supports the Assad regime in Syria and has become a lap dog for Cuba’s Castro brothers. In January, the Castros orchestrated the violation of the Venezuelan Constitution when Chavez did not take the oath of office.
The U.S. State Department responded that it is up to the Venezuelan people to decide if there was a violation, and that it would not interpret the constitution.
However, those sentiments were nowhere to be found in 2009 when the State
Department led the charge against the people of Honduras, helped expel Honduras from the Organization of American States, and did not recognize Honduras’ constitutional authorities. Why the double standard? Democratic rights under the Inter-American
Democratic Charter cannot be selective; they must be uniform. The United States should be telling the leaders of Venezuela that they need to respect the constitution, abide by the Inter-American Democratic Charter and uphold democratic principles. These democratic processes can only be enforced if the Venezuelan leadership thinks that there will be serious repercussions if they do not take responsible actions to fulfill their obligations.
This is an opportunity for the United States and responsible nations to demonstrate a commitment to restoring true democracy to Venezuela, and I hope the opportunity isn’t missed.

Conditions on human rights can change Venezuelan policy – prefer our ev.
It is post-chavez
Robertson 13
Ewan Robertson is a freelance journalist and staff writer with news website Venezuelanalysis.com. From
Edinburgh, Scotland, he holds a degree in History and International Relations from the University of Aberdeen, and a postgraduate degree in Latin American Studies from the same institution. (Venezuela: An Ethical Foreign Policy? Ewan Robertson | July 10, 2013 http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0083
Venezuela's foreign policy under the late President Hugo Chávez, and now his successor Nicolas
Maduro
, has been subject to sharply differing interpretations
. Some observers see the oil-rich country's foreign relations since Chávez's election in December 1998 as shaped by a visionary who promoted international solidarity with the oppressed, combated poverty, and pushed for a just world order free of uni-polar domination. For critics, however, Venezuela's foreign policy has been incoherent, militaristic, and prejudicial to regional stability.
Does Venezuelan foreign policy include ethical considerations
, as its supporters claim?
The evidence suggests it does and that as a result we can be more optimistic about possibilities for incorporating ethics into international affairs than some scholars would have us believe.
The Ethical Dimension of Venezuelan Foreign Relations To evaluate a possible ethical dimension to Venezuelan foreign policy, it is necessary to understand the ideology Chávez imbued in the country's international affairs. Five concepts are central. The first two are the primacy of national sovereignty and Latin American and Caribbean integration. These are based on an understanding of foreign policy as a continuation of the Pan-American vision of
Venezuela's founder and 19th century independence hero Simon Bolivar, who also gives the name to Chávez's "Bolivarian" political project. The third and fourth are the importance of international solidarity and south-south cooperation, which hold that
Venezuela's development should be based on mutual solidarity and cooperation with the countries of the global south. Finally, these concepts coalesce to form the pursuit of a multi-polar world order, which sees Venezuela's international role in strengthening ties with emerging powers across different regions as part of a shift to a more balanced international system which will guarantee "world peace" and "universal well-being." This implicitly involves an attempt to counter-balance the weight of the United States in international affairs.1 One example of Venezuela's pursuit of these values is the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
(ALBA). This alliance of leftist Latin American nations founded by Venezuela and Cuba in 2004 has implemented regional development strategies based on the principles of "solidarity, cooperation and complementing." Programs aiming to guarantee food security, universal literacy, free education and healthcare, and decent housing are strongly marked by values of social justice and human development.2 Social programs promoted by the ALBA include the "Miracle Mission," which provides free eye treatment and surgery to Venezuelan citizens and those of several Latin American countries. The program has treated around 1.2 million people in
Venezuela since its launch in 2004.3 Development assistance and solidarity have also been evident in Venezuela's outreach to the
Caribbean, particularly with the PetroCaribe initiative. Launched in 2005, the program offers Venezuelan petroleum to Caribbean nations at a discount rate. Participating nations only pay a percentage of the oil's market price up front, with the rest converted into low-interest, long-term loans. A portion of these loans can be amortised through payment in goods and services; for example, Cuba sends medical personnel to Venezuela in exchange for oil shipments. The loans also become important sources of capital spending for the region's governments. Eighteen Caribbean states now participate in the program, and Venezuelan oil minister Rafael Ramirez estimated in 2011 that PetroCaribe covers 43 percent of participating nations' energy needs.4 In the context of rising oil prices in the
2000s, a Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) report on the scheme described it as "the most concrete proposal on the table to alleviate the region's suffering."5 Perhaps no other Caribbean nation has benefitted more from this kind of regional solidarity than
Haiti. Following the devastating January 2010 earthquake, Venezuela pledged $2.4 billion in financial and relief aid, more than any other of 58 donors. This aid has included building power plants, shelters, a new hospital (in collaboration with Cuba), sending food and medical supplies, and assistance to develop Haiti's agricultural sector.6 Venezuela even wrote off $400 million of Haiti's
PetroCaribe debt. This important reconstruction aid was given despite the fact that Haiti is by no means an ideological ally of
Venezuela's leftist government; its president, Michel Martelly, is close to Haiti's business elite and the United States. Nevertheless
Martelly has publicly thanked Venezuela for its solidarity and help since the earthquake, commenting in December 2011 that for
Haiti, "cooperation with Venezuela is the most important right now, in terms of impact, direct impact."7 Africa is another continent where relations seem to be driven as much by ideology and ethical values as by strategic interests. From 2005, Chávez began referring to Africa as "motherland" and pursuing "south-south cooperation," or mutual development strategies, in the region. Over the next six years Venezuela established diplomatic relations with all 54 African countries, opened new embassies, and signed over
200 cooperation agreements with the continent, where only 20 had existed beforehand.8 Many of these agreements contain a clear element of solidarity and humanitarian assistance. In 2009 Venezuela pledged $20 million to the West African ECOWAS group for malarial eradication programs, while in February 2013 it offered technical assistance and personnel training to the Sahrawi
Democratic Republic to improve the population's access to safe drinking water. Further, around 500 students from over 15 African countries study in Venezuela courtesy of government scholarships, many of these in medical courses, with the intention that after their studies these newly-trained professionals return to their home countries to provide much needed public services.9 A similar program is offered to Palestine, where Venezuela has also committed to build medical facilities. Such attempts at greater cooperation with countries of the global south have led Venezuela to play a key diplomatic role in moves toward intensifying Latin American and south-south integration. In addition to founding the ALBA and PetroCaribe, Venezuela was also a founding member of the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008, and played host to the founding conference of the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2011, which brings together every nation in the Americas with the exception of the U.S. and Canada.
Venezuela was also host to the II Africa–South America (ASA) summit in 2009, and is set to host the tri-annual summit of the Non-
Aligned Movement in 2015, to thereafter become the president of the grouping of 130 developing nations. The country was also elected to serve on the UN Human Rights Council for 2013–2016 and is a mediator in peace talks underway between the FARC guerrilla group and the Colombian government. Taken together, these aspects of Venezuela's foreign policy have led observers such

as Venezuelan geographer and analyst Rosalba Linares to conclude that Bolivarian-era foreign relations aim to construct "a sovereign, democratic and more humanitarian multi-polar world, of greater social justice and fair trade in benefit of those most in need in Venezuela and the world."10 The Pursuit of Strategic Interests Of course, it would be mistaken to understand Venezuelan foreign relations as solely motivated by ethical or altruistic considerations. Even solidarity-based policies have clear "soft" benefits such as raising the government's diplomatic and international standing. Venezuela's foreign relations have also been shaped by concrete strategic interests. Chief among these are energy interests, which are woven throughout foreign policy, as Venezuela holds the largest crude oil reserves in the world. The Bolivarian government has sought to increase ties with other energy powers for the extraction of Venezuelan crude and to diversify its oil export markets. In the context of the deterioration of relations with the United
States, strategic policy goals have also included creating a robust network of international alliances and securing alternative sources of financing, technological assistance, and military hardware. In the first years of Chávez's presidency the state oil company PDVSA was brought under greater government control. At the same time the government pushed for the revitalisation of OPEC, advocating the policy of production quotas to help ensure that world oil prices rose to levels favourable to exporting countries. The elevation of oil prices in the 2000s gave the Venezuelan government flexibility to pursue an active energy diplomacy abroad while funding a wave of new social programs at home. The government has built what it calls "strategic alliances" with several energy powers, including Russia and China. Russian energy giant Gazprom now works with PDVSA to explore gas deposits in the Gulf of Venezuela and Russian firms are active in the extraction of oil in Venezuela's Orinoco Belt. Russia is also useful to Venezuela as a source of military hardware, with Chávez's government becoming Russia's biggest customer of military goods after India.11 China, meanwhile, has provided Venezuela with a new market for its petroleum exports. Oil exports to China rose from almost zero in 2004 to 460,000 bpd in 2010, a number that officials want to increase to one million.12 The relationship has also resulted in over 300 bilateral agreements and 80 major projects, and has allowed the Venezuelan government access to financing and technology, the latter exemplified by the launching of Venezuela's first satellites with Chinese assistance in 2008 and 2012. Venezuela has formed a web of links with other countries enjoying oil and gas reserves, such as Iran, Syria, Brazil, and certain African countries. Given their relatively independent diplomatic stance in world affairs, strengthening ties with these nations has also fitted within the ideological goal of building "south-south cooperation" and a "multi-polar world order." Meanwhile relations with Venezuela's traditional commercial partner and top recipient of crude exports, the United States, have been frozen at the charge de affairs level since 2010.
Venezuelan officials blame this on the U.S. government's belligerence and lack of respect for Venezuela's independence and sovereignty, including support for and alleged involvement in the short-lived coup attempt to topple the Chávez administration in
2002. For its part, the United States has accused Venezuela of failing to sufficiently cooperate with counter-narcotics and antiterrorism efforts and of acting against U.S. interests by pursuing relations with "enemy" states such as Iran. Nevertheless, there are signs that the relationship is improving under the presidency of Nicolas Maduro, after Venezuelan foreign minister Elias Jaua met with Secretary of State John Kerry during an OAS summit in early June. "We would like to see our countries find a new way forward, to establish a more constructive and positive relationship," said Kerry following the meeting. However, it remains to be seen whether the recent decision by President Maduro to offer asylum to ex-NSA intelligence leaker Edward Snowden will have an impact on efforts to improve bilateral relations. Criticisms and Contradictions Critics point to contradictions in the conduct of Venezuela's foreign policy, and question the existence of an ethical dimension to Venezuelan foreign relations. An accusation which emanates principally from the United States is that rather than seeking "world peace," Venezuela in fact pursues an aggressive policy of building up its arms stockpile while forming alliances seen as threatening to U.S. national security. In September 2009 then-
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton raised concerns over Venezuela's arms purchases from Russia, arguing that the Chávez administration was engaging in a military build-up which could trigger a South American "arms race." "They [Venezuela] outpace all other countries in South America [in military purchases] and certainly raise the question as to whether there is going to be an arms race in the region," she said.13 Further, some conservative politicians and analysts have argued that Venezuela should be considered a "national security threat" due to its ties with countries regarded as hostile to the U.S, such as Iran and Syria.14 However, neither the figures nor events bear out fears that Venezuela is unduly arming itself or seeking military-style alliances with U.S. adversaries.
According to the CIA World Factbook, in 2009 Venezuela put 1.4 percent of GDP toward military spending, the 5th highest in the region and less than the U.S., Colombia, and Chile. By 2012, military spending in Venezuela had halved as a percentage of GDP to
0.7 percent, with the country spending less than most major countries in the region, being only 153rd out of 173 countries measured globally for military spending.15 Venezuelan government officials meanwhile state that its international alliances are "about peace" and not in any way an aggression toward a third party. This point was highlighted during the visit from former Iranian president
Mahmoud Ahmadinajad to Venezuela in January 2012. Nicolas Maduro, in his capacity of foreign minister, said to press at the time that bilateral ties between the two countries were part of a "peaceful relationship...we have a relationship of cooperation for development... and above all, for peace".16 This appraisal of Venezuela's diplomatic and defence policy appears to be shared by the
U.S. military establishment. In August 2012 General Douglas Fraser, chief of U.S. Southern Command, said that although he would like greater cooperation from Venezuela against drug trafficking, he did not consider Venezuela a security threat to the United
States. When asked if he thought Venezuela's arms purchases constituted a danger to the U.S., Fraser replied, "From my standpoint, no…I don't see them [Venezuela] as a national security threat." Further, when asked whether Venezuela's relationship with Iran amounted to a "military alliance," the general disagreed, stating, "As I look at Iran and their connection with Venezuela, I see that still primarily as a diplomatic and economic relationship."17 President Barack Obama has taken a similar stance, announcing in an interview in July 2012, "Overall my sense is that what Mr. Chávez has done over the last several years has not had a serious national security impact on us."18 Thus the notion that Venezuelan military purchases and bilateral relationships represent a threat to the
United States appears to be an overreaction from certain observers within U.S. political and media spheres, who confuse Venezuela's independent foreign policy with one threatening U.S. security.
Others argue that there exists a contradiction in Venezuelan foreign policy between claims to pursue the values of democracy, humanitarianism, and solidarity, while supporting governments considered authoritarian or with poor human rights records
. In 2011, political sociologist and author Gregory
Wilpert argued that Venezuela ran a "significant" risk of losing legitimacy among progressives when Chávez continued to support former Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi against an insurgency in that country, a point that could be extended to several other of
Venezuela's allies in the Middle East.19 Another seemingly contradictory move by a government purporting to promote ethical values in its foreign policy is
Venezuela's decision to withdraw from the OAS' Inter-American Court and

Human Rights Commission
(IACHR) in 2012
, on the basis of the body's alleged "shameful" bias against the Chávez administration
. The decision is also part of a shifting focus toward Latin
American autonomy and integration,
with several states in the region pushing for the formation of new mechanisms to promote human rights within the UNASUR and CELAC. 20 A final question for Venezuela's foreign relations is the extent to which policies pursued under Chávez will continue under the presidency of Nicolas Maduro, who was elected to power in April, following
Chávez's death in March. Maduro was Chávez's foreign minister from 2006–2012, and in that role helped to build Venezuela's contemporary foreign relations. The new president has pledged to continue these policies and his active foreign diplomacy over the previous three months seems to confirm this. Present challenges for Maduro include assuming the presidency of the Mercosur trade bloc this summer, and seeking productive relationships with the U.S. and Europe; steps toward which appear to have already been taken.
Between Ethics and Interests In common with all nation states, over the past 14 years
Venezuela has pursued clearly defined strategic and economic interests through its foreign policy.
These
have included developing greater links with other energy powers and ensuring access to sources of financing and military hardware.
The government has also sought commercial, technological, agricultural, educational, health, and other forms of cooperation considered beneficial to Venezuela's national development.
Although certain criticisms of contradictory
behaviour can be leveled at Venezuela's foreign relations, policymaking has followed a coherent logic
. From technological cooperation with China to malaria eradication assistance in Africa,
Venezuela's new foreign relations have been built within an ideological framework embodied by the notions of
"south-south cooperation" and a "multi-polar world."
Further, while all nations could be said to act in their own strategic interests, not all have also placed norms of cooperation, solidarity and humanitarianism as a central focus of foreign policy.
These values can be seen in agreements Venezuela has made with countries across all continents, but especially in the Americas and Africa.
Even in the United States, PDVSA subsidiary CITGO aids around 100,000 low-income families during the winter with donated Venezuelan heating oil.21 Thus while it would be false to state that Venezuelan foreign policy is solely motivated by ethical considerations, it would be misleading to explain the country's external relations without reference to these.
This ethical dimension to Venezuela's foreign policy is a demonstration that if the political will exists, governments can pursue such values within their foreign relations.
In doing so, concrete and mutual benefits can be reaped for both the development of societies and the wellbeing of peoples.

The counterplan alone is the only way to solve for human right abuses—the aff sends the wrong signal
Karon 10
senior editor at TIME, where he has covered international conflicts in the Middle East, Asia, and the Balkans since
1997 (Tony Karon, Apr. 21, 2010, “Do We Really Need an Embargo Against Cuba?” http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,48773,00.html#ixzz2ZA7WvDGb) //KY
Easing the embargo before Castro agrees to change sends the wrong signal
Castro continues to defy
international standards on
democracy and human rights, and lifting the embargo now would be to reward that defiance
. His regime rejected even the reformist communism of
Gorbachev in the '80s, but even though it has struggled to survive economically in the '90s, it has steadfastly maintained its hard line.
Democracy should be the condition for lifting the embargo.

Decreasing Human Rights pressure on Mexico links to politics – but its also reverse causal
Shear and Archibold, 5/04/13 – a White House correspondent for The New York Times. Previously, Shear wrote for the Washington Post as a metro reporter covering Virginia politics, the 2008 presidential election and, most recently, as White
House correspondent. Mr. Shear received a B.A. degree from Claremont McKenna College and a M.A. degree in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University and Randal Archibold has been a reporter for The New York Times’s national desk since September 2005, based in the Los Angeles bureau.
(MICHAEL D. SHEAR and RANDAL C. ARCHIBOLD, May 4, 2013, “In Latin America, U.S. Focus Shifts From Drug War to
Economy”, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-fromdrug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//GP
In addition to a focus on reducing violence, which some critics have interpreted as taking a softer line on the drug gangs, Mr. Peña
Nieto has also moved to reduce American involvement in law enforcement south of the border.
With friction and mistrust between American and Mexican law enforcement agencies growing, Mr.
Obama suggested that the United States would no longer seek to dominate the security agenda.
“It is obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States,” he said, standing next to Mr. Peña Nieto on Thursday in Mexico City. “But the main point I made to the president is that we support the Mexican government’s focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems appropriate.” In some ways, conceding leadership of the drug fight to Mexico hews to a guiding principle of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy, in which
American supremacy is played down
, at least publicly
, in favor of a multilateral approach
.
But that philosophy could collide with the concerns of lawmakers in
Washington , who have expressed frustration with what they see as a lack of clarity in Mexico’s security plans
. And security analysts say the entrenched corruption in Mexican law enforcement has long clouded the partnership with their
American counterparts
.
Putting Mexico in the driver’s seat on security marks a shift in a balance of power that has always tipped to the United States and, analysts said, will carry political risk as Congress negotiates an immigration bill that is expected to include provisions for tighter border security
. “
If there is a perception in the U.S. Congress that security cooperation is weakening, that could
play into the hands of those who oppose immigration reform,” said
Vanda
Felbab-Brown, a counternarcotics expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
“Realistically, the border is as tight as could be and there have been few spillovers of the violence from Mexico into the U.S.,” she added, but perceptions count in Washington “and can be easily distorted.” “Drugs today are not very important to the U.S. public over all,” she added, “but they are important to committed drug warriors who are politically powerful.”
Representative
Michael T.
McCaul, a Texas Republican who is chairman of the Homeland Security
Committee, has warned against the danger of drug cartels forming alliances
with terrorist groups.
“While these threats exist, you would be surprised to find that the administration thinks its work here is done,” he wrote
in an opinion article for Roll Call last month, pressing for more border controls in the bill. The Obama administration has said any evidence of such cooperation is very thin, but even without terrorist connections, drug gangs pose threats to peace and security.
Human rights advocates said they feared the United States would ease
pressure on Mexico to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support.
The shift in approach “ suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to
these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said
José Miguel
Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division
.

Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities.
It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk.
In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr.
Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns
, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside
.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa
Rica, lamenting that when it comes to the United States and
Central America,
“so much of the focus ends up being on security.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica. Michael D. Shear reported from San José, and Randal C. Archibold from Mexico City.
Plan decreases human rights protection in Mexico
Shear and Archibold, 5/04/13 – a White House correspondent for The New York Times. Previously, Shear wrote for the Washington Post as a metro reporter covering Virginia politics, the 2008 presidential election and, most recently, as White
House correspondent. Mr. Shear received a B.A. degree from Claremont McKenna College and a M.A. degree in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University and Randal Archibold has been a reporter for The New York Times’s national desk since September 2005, based in the Los Angeles bureau.
(MICHAEL D. SHEAR and RANDAL C. ARCHIBOLD, May 4, 2013, “In Latin America, U.S. Focus Shifts From Drug War to
Economy”, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-fromdrug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//GP
Human rights advocates said they feared the United States would ease
pressure on Mexico to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support.
The shift in approach “ suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to
these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said
José Miguel
Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division
.
Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities.
It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk.
In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr.
Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns
, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside
.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa
Rica, lamenting that when it comes to the United States and
Central America,
“so much of the focus ends up being on security.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica. Michael D. Shear reported from San José, and Randal C. Archibold from Mexico City.

The perceptions of conditioning give credibility to U.S. Human Rights endeavors
104 th Congress 96 (104th Congress Public Law 114] [From the U.S. Government
Printing Office Approved March 12, 1996. H.R. 927 )
(2) At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this economic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to permit free and fair democratic elections in Cuba. (3)
The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it will not engage in any substantive political reforms that would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an economic recovery.
(4) The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on free and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations of fundamental human rights, have isolated the Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western
Hemisphere. (5) As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the economic condition of the country and the welfare of the
Cuban people will not improve in any significant way. (6)
The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve their condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens to risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape from Cuba to freedom.
(7) Radio Marti and Television Marti have both been effective vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news and information and have helped to bolster the morale of the people of Cuba living under tyranny. (8) The consistent policy of the United States towards Cuba since the beginning of the
Castro regime, carried out by both Democratic and Republican administrations, has sought to keep faith with the people of
Cuba, and has been effective in sanctioning the totalitarian Castro regime. [[Page 110 STAT. 787]] (9)
The United
States has shown a deep commitment, and considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed in the
Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
(10) The Congress has historically and consistently manifested its solidarity and the solidarity of the American people with the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people. (11) The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 calls upon the President to encourage the governments of countries that conduct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of that Act. (12) Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 made by the
FREEDOM Support Act require that the President, in providing economic assistance to Russia and the emerging Eurasian democracies, take into account the extent to which they are acting to ``terminate support for the communist regime in Cuba, including removal of troops, closing military facilities, and ceasing trade subsidies and economic, nuclear, and other assistance''.
(13
) The Cuban Government engages in the illegal international narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from justice in the United States.
(14) The Castro government threatens international peace and security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups dedicated to international violence. (15)
The Castro government
has utilized from its inception and continues to utilize torture in various forms
(including by psychiatry
), as well as execution, exile, confiscation, political imprisonment, and other forms of terror and repression, as means of retaining power.
(16) <<NOTE: Fidel Castro.>> Fidel Castro has defined democratic pluralism as ``pluralistic garbage'' and continues to make clear that he has no intention of tolerating the democratization of Cuban society. (17) The Castro government holds innocent Cubans hostage in Cuba by no fault of the hostages themselves solely because relatives have escaped the country. (18) Although a signatory state to the 1928 Inter-
American Convention on Asylum and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which protects the right to leave one's own country),
Cuba
nevertheless surrounds embassies in its capital by armed forces to thwart the right of its citizens to seek asylum and systematically denies that right to the Cuban people, punishing them by imprisonment for seeking to leave the country and killing them for attempting to do so
(as demonstrated in
the case of the confirmed murder of over 40 men, women, and children who were seeking to leave Cuba on July
13, 1994
). (19) The Castro government continues to utilize blackmail, such as the immigration crisis with which it threatened the United States in the summer of 1994, and other unacceptable and illegal forms of conduct to influence the actions of sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere in violation of the Charter of the Organization of American States and other international agreements and international law. [[Page 110 STAT. 788]] (20) The United Nations Commission on Human
Rights has repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary step of

appointing a Special Rapporteur. (21) The Cuban Government has consistently refused access to the Special Rapporteur and formally expressed its decision not to ``implement so much as one comma'' of the United Nations Resolutions appointing the
Rapporteur. (22) The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 47-139 on December 18, 1992, Resolution 48-142 on December 20, 1993, and Resolution 49-200 on December 23, 1994, referencing the Special Rapporteur's reports to the
United Nations and condemning violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. (23) Article 39 of Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter provides that the United Nations Security Council ``shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . ., to maintain or restore international peace and security.''. (24)
The United Nations has determined that massive and systematic violations of human rights may constitute a ``threat to peace''
under Article 39 and has imposed
sanctions due to such violations of human rights
in the cases of
Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia. (25) In the case of Haiti, a neighbor of Cuba not as close to the
United States as Cuba, the United States led an effort to obtain and did obtain a United Nations Security Council embargo and blockade against that country due to the existence of a military dictatorship in power less than 3 years. (26) United Nations
Security Council Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994, subsequently authorized the use of ``all necessary means'' to restore the
``democratically elected government of Haiti'', and the democratically elected government of Haiti was restored to power on
October 15, 1994. (27)
The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 years, and the continued failure to do so constitutes ethically improper conduct by the international community.
(28) For the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and continues to pose a national security threat to the United States.

Conditioning Mexico solves the link to politics
WOLA, 8/02/13 –
Q & A of WOLA’s Senior Associate for Mexico and Central America Maureen Meyer (Washington Office on Latin America, “One Year after Enrique Peña Nieto’s Election” http://www.wola.org/commentary/one_year_after_enrique_pena_nieto_s_election)//GP
As cooperation moves forward, support for police reform efforts in Mexico, particularly focused on increased accountability measures, as well as
continued support for justice reform, will be important.
As several members of the U.S. Congress recently expressed in a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, the defense of human rights should also be a
central part of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral agenda , particularly given the grave human rights situation in Mexico and the human rights conditions placed on U.S. security assistance to the country
.
What has the Peña Nieto administration done to address human rights violations in Mexico? While
Peña
Nieto has stated his commitment to ensuring that “rights established on paper become reality,” the human rights situation in Mexico remains dire
.
Complaints of human rights violations by the Mexican military continue at alarming levels
. In the first five months of 2013, the National Human
Rights Commission
(Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, CNDH) received 585 complaints about abuses by the military
. This included 15 unlawful killings and 15 forced disappearances. For the most part, past cases of abuse also remain in impunity
.
Not a single one of the 7,441 complaints of human rights violations filed against the military between 2006 and 2012 has led to a conviction in civilian court
. As of January 2013, the Mexican military reports that since 2006, only 38 soldiers have been sentenced by military courts for human right abuses.
The Mexican Congress has yet to reinitiate discussions to reform Mexico’s Military Code of Justice so that human rights violations committed by soldiers are investigated and prosecuted in civilian courts. Brazen attacks on migrants and against migrant shelters continue unabated, despite continued national and international pressure. In May 2013, a band of armed individuals boarded a train carrying as many as 500 migrants and demanded payment; more than 16 migrants were injured as a result. Several staff members at a shelter in Tenosique, Tabasco state were forced in early June 2013 to abandon the shelter after frequent death threats, presumably from organized crime. These threats occurred after the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights had ordered precautionary protection measures for the migrant shelter, which, according to Mexican human rights organizations, were not fully implemented. Meanwhile, public officials continue to abuse migrants. More than 30 migrants were arrested at a shelter in Mexico state in June 2013 when members of the Federal Police and agents of the National Migration Institute
(Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM) illegally entered a migrant shelter to arrest migrants. In the context of drug-related violence and the military’s involvement in public security, Mexico has seen an alarming number of disappearances. A government database recently made public in February 2013 revealed the names of more than 26,000 people who disappeared between 2006 and 2012.
The administration has claimed that this number is far too high, and the head of SEGOB, Miguel Angel Osorio Chong, told reporters recently that state and federal officials were purging the list of false positives. After multiple protests from family members of the disappeared, the Mexican Attorney General’s office announced in May 2013 the creation of a specialized unit to investigate disappearances, which will be staffed by 12 agents. The decree to create this office was only recently published, and so far the unit has no office or budget. Meanwhile, disappearances, including forced disappearances, continue; the CNDH received twenty complaints of forced disappearances in the first five months of 2013.
In January 2013, President Peña Nieto signed a law that recognized the right of victims of crimes and human rights violations to receive assistance, reparations, and access to justice.
It would also create several government institutions designed to deliver assistance and information to victims.
The law had been previously vetoed by
President Calderón, and President Peña Nieto’s reversal of this decision was a welcome change
. Needed modifications to the law were passed by Mexico’s congress in April and the law officially went into effect on
May 4, 2013. Meanwhile, human rights defenders and journalists in Mexico continue to face threats, harassment, and, far too often, violence
. One year after the Law to Protect Human Rights Defenders

and Journalists went into force, implementation of the protection mechanism established in the law has fallen short. The National
Center for Social Communication (Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social, Cencos) reports that in the first 100 days of the Peña
Nieto government there were 56 attacks against journalists, including one murder, and 37 attacks against human rights defenders.
Conditioning funding on human rights solve and doesn’t link to politics
Seelke, 3/18/13 -
Specialist in Latin American Affairs for Congressional Research Service (Clare Ribando Seelke, March 18,
2013, “Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in Mexico: The U.S. Role”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43001.pdf)//GP
Should Mexico make judicial reform more of a priority, as security experts have long recommended, U.S. technical assistance and training could play a significant role in supporting the reform process.
During his confirmation hearing,
Secretary of State
John
Kerry vowed to try to protect U.S. assistance under the Mérida Initiative from budget cuts, including support for judicial reform .
54 However, if Mexico does not prioritize the judicial reforms, Congress may question whether funding for such programs in
Mexico should be discontinued , scaled back, or made contingent upon the federal and state governments demonstrating political will to implement the reforms
.
Should
the reforms continue to move forward, congressional funding and oversight of judicial reform programs in Mexico could continue for a number of years.
As Congress considers
President
Obama’s FY2014 budget request for Mexico, it may question how funding for judicial reform in particular, and justice sector reform more broadly, fits into bilateral security priorities, including efforts to combat criminal groups and punish corruption. Is the new criminal justice system more effective
than the old system at convicting DTO leaders and corrupt politicians?
Have any emblematic cases been resolved that might help improve Mexicans’ perception of their criminal justice system and its capacity to deter and sanction crime
? When faced with funding decisions,
Congress may seek to balance the need to ensure that U.S. funds are provided in a way that is flexible enough to respond to changing events in Mexico,
while also retaining adequate control over the way those funds are being spent.
Congress may also consider weighing in on how implementing agencies divide the assistance provided for judicial reform between the federal and state level reform efforts. Finally, Congress may examine the extent to which U.S. agencies are balancing “top down” support for government entities engaged in the reform process with “bottom up” support to civil society groups. Many argue that the award-winning documentary film, Presumed Guilty, which was theatrically released in 2011, did more to galvanize support for the reforms than any government-sponsored efforts.55 The State Department used roughly $100,000 in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding to help promote the film in Mexico. Another area that could be expanded is U.S. support for culture of lawfulness programs that seek to educate all sectors of Mexican society on the importance of upholding the rule of law.56
Congress has closely monitored human rights conditions in Mexico and compliance with human rights conditions on Mérida assistance.
57
Congress has an oversight
interest in ensuring that, as implemented, the new criminal justice system is
strengthening human rights protections.
Some have urged Congress to make
future conditions more specific by
, for example, conditioning aid on whether
Mexico
is videotaping confessions and interviews with witnesses so as to prove that torture or other ill treatment is not occurring
.58 Others have argued against changes to the conditions on U.S. assistance, preferring that the current conditions be more strictly enforced. Congress may also examine how best to ensure that U.S. implementing agencies correctly sequence and coordinate support to key actors within the criminal justice system (police, prosecutors/defense attorneys, courts). At the federal level, is the amount of assistance being provided to the PGR and the courts adequate when compared to the aid provided to the Interior Ministry (which now includes the Federal Police and penitentiary system)? If one federal entity seeks
U.S. cooperation more aggressively than another, should that entity receive more assistance? At the state level, are USAID’s judicial reform efforts being coordinated with the police assistance that the State Department is providing? Are police in states that have adopted or are close to adopting the new criminal justice system being adequately trained to carry out investigations in support of the public prosecutor?
As foreign aid budgets tighten, congressional scrutiny of U.S. programs in Mexico may intensify
. Past reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)59 and the Inspector General of
USAID60 have criticized U.S. agencies for failing to develop “outcome” rather than “output” measures to gauge the efficacy of U.S.

programs. USAID has adjusted its indicators in response to those criticisms and the State Department is in the process of establishing a Metrics Office in Mexico City that will develop indicators for its ROL programs.
The results of those efforts to improve metrics may prove useful for congressional appropriators as they oversee current programs and consider future support for judicial reform in Mexico.

Status quo trade mentality can’t solve human rights violations
Brown et al. 11’
– INTERNATIONAL POLICY CENTER Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy University of Michigan
(Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, Robert M. Stern, August 19, 2011, “Labor Standards and Human Rights: Implications for
International Trade and Investment”, http://ipc.umich.edu/working-papers/pdfs/ipc-119-brown-deardorff-stern-labor-standardshuman-rights-international-trade-investment.pdf)//GP
Over the last three decades, the international trade community has undertaken an exhaustive and exhausting discussion as to whether access to global markets should be conditioned on an acceptable record of labor protections and human rights.
As of the
Singapore Ministerial (1996
), weak labor protections and their accompanying human rights violations are formally excluded as a basis for restricting imports within the WTO multilateral system
. The sole exception applies to goods produced by prison labor. However
, trade–linked labor standards are not prohibited in preferential trading agreements as provided for in WTO
Article XXIV governing the creation of customs unions and FTAs
and the Enabling Clause of 1979,
36 governing special and differential treatment for developing country exports.
While the WTO charter establishes some terms limiting the use of PTAs, there are no restrictions on conditionality relating to labor standards and enforcement.
As a consequence, most current PTAs involving developed and developing countries contain labor-standards provisions.37
The pure theory of labor-standards setting establishes cross-country heterogeneity of labor law, free trade, and humanitarian transfers as the first-best policy configuration.
The pure theory
, however, does not address optimal international-standards setting in the presence of certain market and government failures. The most egregious government failure involves the inability to enforce the property claim that each individual has over his or her own body, giving rise to forced labor and human trafficking
. Less severe human-rights violations involve the exercise of monopsony power that occurs when governments fail to enforce labor agreements. Firms employing low-education, docile female workers with limited market experience may find that the profit-maximizing human-resource-management system consists of payment of a reservation wage, failure to pay wages as promised, excess hours of work, and verbally and physically abusive motivational techniques.
Additional labor and human-rights violations as they pertain to extremely hazardous conditions of work may arise as a consequence of information asymmetries between workers and managers.
Workers may only appreciate the dangers of locked exit doors and toxic materials after the dangers have been realized. As a consequence, an employer will not have a pecuniary incentive to adopt the ex post efficient configuration of workplace hazard mitigation and compensating pay differentials. International labor standards that prohibit forced labor require the enforcement of agreed upon terms of employment and require employers to provide a safe workplace or disclose and compensate for occupational dangers that can improve market efficiency and equity in a global trading context. Basic labor protections also increase the probability that the gains from trade are not procured exclusively by employers. The first cases of strict enforcement of tradelinked labor standards involved high stakes confrontations with nondemocratic regimes violently repressing union rights. However, standards of enforcement were inconsistently applied as developed country government objectives concerning security, business interests, and human rights came into conflict.

The US should condition engagement on human rights—it’s the only way to solve human rights, empirics prove the aff’s form of engagement fails
Lehtinen 13
United States House Representative (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Jan 4 2013, Congressional Documents and
Publications, http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/engagement-chavez-regime-counterproductive-state%E2%80%99sactions-undermine-us-foreign-policy) //KY
"
It is
very troubling
but not surprising that
, once again, the Department of State looks to cozy up with yet another tyrant in the Western Hemisphere
.
Chavez and his cohorts have a long and nefarious track record of supporting illicit activities
such as drug trafficking, aiding the Iranian and Syrian regimes, violent extremist groups, and suppressing human rights. State's policy of engaging bad actors while ignoring their abusive power grabs and oppression of civil society only encourages rogue
regimes' to continue their unlawful and unconstitutional actions.
This approach has failed with regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador but the Department of State does not learn from its mistakes.
The
Obama
Administration's continued policy of appeasing tyrants who undermine democratic principles does nothing to advance our national interest nor does it benefit the Venezuelan people.
The U.
S. must
support true democratic reforms in Venezuela and urge the immediate rejection of transnational illicit networks before any further engagement with the Chavez regime takes place."

Lifting the embargo alone doesn’t affect human rights
Sabatini 09 senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council (Christopher Sabatini, February 25, 2009 “Does the
U.S. Embargo on Cuba Protect Human Rights?” http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/454) //KY
The first issue: what effect does the U.S. embargo have on human rights
? It’s clearly done little to improve them
. Human rights today are certainly no better than when the initial embargo was slapped on the regime by the administration of President Kennedy in 1962. In fact they’ve gotten worse. But does an immediate change in policy bring real change? Unlikely
. And this is something that quite frankly rankles me.
The argument used by those who want to lift the embargo that the policy has failed for 50 years so let’s try something new doesn’t hold any logic
—or at least a very lazy one. There are a number of things that don’t mean that the inverse automatically makes them true. Sure, maybe the embargo’s failed on its primary goal; but reversing it doesn’t necessarily mean success
. The second issue: should U.S. investors do business with a corrupt, repressive regime? Here the argument that the U.S. allows commerce with other repressive nations is both right and wrong. To be sure there is no moral consistency in U.S. policy regarding trade toward countries: we not only trade, we also have fluid and constructive relations with countries such as China and Vietnam. But the argument leveled by embargo proponents is equally true: there is a space for private investment in those countries that doesn’t exist in Cuba. The Cuban state is the primary stakeholder in any outside investment and retains strict controls over resolution of investment conflicts and selection and payments to employees. And here, as a big “D” Democrat, I must admit a certain moral quandary. Whatever I may think of the embargo’s morality or efficacy, there are problems for any labor-loving Democrat about allowing open U.S. investment under a regime that contracts all labor (selecting them on political loyalty) and requires all salary payments to be made directly to the state in which the workers only see reportedly 11% of the salary actually paid. These conditions (along with state restrictions on organization of non-state sanctioned labor unions) clearly violate international labor accords, to which Cuba is a signatory, and core Democratic values regarding labor rights. (Ironically many of the same groups that are advocating for an embargo-free Cuba as prescription for democracy are the same ones who are saying that free trade with a genuinely, popularly elected government, Colombia, will harm democracy.)
Third issue: lifting the embargo will improve relations with our neighbors
. The argument here is that we may get more countries to stand by our side on human rights issues if we abandon our strident efforts to isolate and economically freeze out the island. This may be true. It would certainly cut the legs out from under the Castro regime’s efforts to present itself as a victim.
But does it really give the U.S. more leverage on human rights? I’m not sure that any more countries would be willing to stand side-by-side with the U.S. on issues of detentions and abuses in
Cuba without an embargo. For many, the issue is more one of not wanting to offend the Castros or appear to be undermining the romantic, iconic ideal of the revolution. Changing U.S. policy won’t alter that. It may improve the U.S.’s popularity in the region, but do we really think a more moral, united front vis á vis the Castros’ human rights policies will result because we drop the embargo?
Honestly,
I’m less sure it would improve our ability to rally those same countries to stand up for human rights activists and change inside Cuba.
The US should condition engagement on human rights—it’s the only way to solve human rights, empirics prove the aff’s form of engagement fails
Lehtinen 13
United States House Representative (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Jan 4 2013, Congressional Documents and
Publications, http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/engagement-chavez-regime-counterproductive-state%E2%80%99sactions-undermine-us-foreign-policy) //KY
"
It is
very troubling
but not surprising that
, once again, the Department of State looks to cozy up with yet another tyrant in the Western Hemisphere
.
Chavez and his cohorts have a long and nefarious track record of supporting illicit activities
such as drug trafficking, aiding the Iranian and Syrian regimes, violent extremist groups, and suppressing human rights. State's policy of engaging bad actors while ignoring their abusive power grabs and oppression of civil society only encourages rogue
regimes' to continue their unlawful and unconstitutional actions.
This approach has failed with regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador but the Department of State does not learn from its mistakes.
The
Obama
Administration's continued policy of appeasing tyrants who undermine democratic principles does nothing to advance our national interest nor does it benefit the Venezuelan people.
The U.
S. must
support true democratic reforms in Venezuela and urge the

immediate rejection of transnational illicit networks before any further engagement with the Chavez regime takes place."

The plan ignores human rights conditions in Mexico
Shear and Archibold, 5/04/13 – a White House correspondent for The New York Times. Previously, Shear wrote for the Washington Post as a metro reporter covering Virginia politics, the 2008 presidential election and, most recently, as White
House correspondent. Mr. Shear received a B.A. degree from Claremont McKenna College and a M.A. degree in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University and Randal Archibold has been a reporter for The New York Times’s national desk since September 2005, based in the Los Angeles bureau.
(MICHAEL D. SHEAR and RANDAL C. ARCHIBOLD, May 4, 2013, “In Latin America, U.S. Focus Shifts From Drug War to
Economy”, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-fromdrug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//GP
Last week,
Mr. Obama returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message
.
Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime
should focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors
.
The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the
United States playing more of a backing role
.
That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments
more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it.
Mexico, which is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted
an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports.
“
The problem will
not just go away,” said
Michael
Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue.
“It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond stimulating economic growth and alleviating povert y.
“Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue, and the chief
obstacle to economic progress ,” he added
.
“It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line
.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains clear eyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drugtrafficking industry.

Conditions empirically solve Poverty in Latin America
Barshefsky et al, 2008
– Chair on the Council of foreign relations, senior international Partner at Wilmer Culter
Pickering Hale in Washington D.C. She joined the firm after serving as U.S. trade representative from 1997 to 2001. (Charlene
Barshefsky, James Hill, Shannon K. O’ Neil, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: A New Direction For A New Reality”, Council on
Foreign Relations)//GP
Other Latin American experiences show that poverty and inequality reductions are not wholly dependent on uninterrupted economic growth.
Brazil
, for example, has reduced poverty and inequality during the last two decades despite the absence of consistent strong growth: by controlling inflation, it managed to lower poverty rates from a 1990 high of
48 percent to 36 percent by 1996
. Though poverty levels crept back up to 39 percent in the early 2000’s, modest economic growth combined with conditional cash transfer programs in recent years have helped reduce poverty to 33 percent by 2006. Brazil has also managed to begin lowering its notoriously high levels of income inequality in recent years. In Mexico, similar cash transfers, along with low inflation, helped reduce poverty levels from 47 percent in 1990 to 32 percent in 2006. These achievements represent domestic policy efforts – under civilian democratic governments – to address critical concerns of the voting population and indicate real improvements in the lives of millions of citizens throughout Latin America. These experiences show that domestic solutions
, sometimes drawing on foreign models adapted to the local environment, can be effective. Conditional cash transfer programs have spread across the region, including Oportunidades in Mexico
(which was recently cited by Mayor Michael Bloomberg as a model for a pilot program in New York City), Familias en Accion in Colombia, and
Bolsa Familia in Brazil.
Such programs provide cash subsidies for the poor in return for a combination of regular school attendance by their children and use of preventative medical care.
Evidence shows that these programs are instrumental in reducing
poverty and increasing primary and secondary school attendance, at least in the short term.

Human right violations are inevitable—shunning results in total isolation and protectionism
States,
like individual leaders, are neither perfectly good nor perfectly controlled by law, and this makes repression of human rights at times inevitable
. International organizations
of various kinds have been created for expressly this purpose; to watch over states
and their leaders and to provide them with the incentives and models of ethical and even rational state behavior.
But this world of increasingly organized states is more and more structured around transnational rules and institutions that regulate economies
. These rules and institutions emphasize both instrumental and purposive actions that deeply influence nation-states’ economic policies and practices, but also their human rights behaviors, stimulating common conceptions about what kind of activities states should be engaged in.
Protectionism causes the worst form of atrocities including genocide, and xenophobia turns their ethics claims and independently risks nuclear escalation
Michael
Panzner 8
(Faculty Member at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC,
Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase) 2008 Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138
Rising angst will also wreak havoc with links among markets, financial systems, economies, and countries. Many people could find themselves subject to stricter government controls or even find avenues closed off as a result of attempts to stem contagion effects. The widespread urge to withdraw will feed rising xenophobia , already inflamed by illegal immigration, unfair trade practices, and leaking borders.
Playing to populist sentiment, politicians around the country will respond enthusiastically to calls for restrictions on foreigners. This will further feed a brain drain, as scientists, students, and other temporary visa holders are left with little choice but to uproot and go elsewhere, further sapping America’s economic resiliency
Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of
finance and trade will inspire the U nited
S tates and other nations to spew
forth protectionist legislation
like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the crossborder movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel.
Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange.
Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about
ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over
shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities
as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply.
Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace.
Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters,
often with minimal provocation.
In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that

stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.
Turbulent conditions will encourage
aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations
running amok.
Age-old clashes will
also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will
likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan
, while
Iran may
embark on overt coloniz ation of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel
, for its part, may look to draw
a dwindling list of allies from around the world into
a growing number of conflicts.
Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an
“intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed
from wars of words to battles soaked in blood .
Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring
the basest of human instincts and triggering
genocidal acts .
Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

Human Rights conditions are critical to bringing democracy into cuba – liberalization just causes backlash
Chan 11 ( http://www.policymic.com/articles/2462/cuba-needs-to-focus-on-human-rightsmore-than-economic-freedoms Cuba Needs to Focus on Human Rights More Than
Economic Freedoms Jacinda Chan in World 2011-BRW)
Just as America fears Iran becoming a nuclear power, the U.S. once feared Cuba would posses nuclear weapons that could threaten the United States. To keep itself safe, the U.S. placed intense economic sanctions on Cuba.
Instead of improving the country
, these sanctions forced Cuba into isolated authoritarian rule
.
Cuba remains one of the few communist countries in the world, and it does not show signs of changing its political structure any time soon
. To this day, the U.S. has sanctions on Cuba, even though the country has begun accepting more liberal economic policies recently. The government passed a new law to allow the sales and purchase of private property. However, these policies will not lead Cuba to become a democratic ally, as the country still has significant restrictions on the freedom of movement and prohibition of political opponents
. If Cuba is to ever become a democracy
, policymakers must focus on pressuring Cuban
President Raul Castro to implement human rights policies alongside his economic reforms. Privatizing property
and allowing small businesses to open will never solve the root of
Cuba’s oppression
– restricting freedom of movement and prohibiting political opponents. Within the past year, Castro has passed two new laws that allow Cubans to make transactions of their own free will without government interference. To create jobs and wealth, the government permitted people to open small businesses in March. Businesses could set their own prices and hire and fire employees at their choosing. But Cubans had no money to start businesses and buy supplies. So the government granted citizens and permanent residents even greater rights. They could buy and sell private property, bequeath property to relatives without restriction, and avoid forfeiting their homes if they abandon the country. Despite implementing two major reforms to liberalize the economy
, these policies will not lead to civil and political freedoms. Castro still violates Cubans’ freedom of movement.
He continues to enforce Decree 217 that prohibits “persons in other provinces from moving into Havana.” This decree prevents Cubans from accessing the wealth they need to live free lives. Havana is where a majority of business transactions occur and therefore, holds the countries profits. Without access to Havana, Cubans cannot obtain the wealth they need to get what they want. This leaves
Cubans powerless to determine their lives.
In order for Cubans to live free lives, Castro must stop his methods of social oppression and allow for a multitude of voices to be heard.
This could be difficult, though. The Cuban government prohibits all political opponents. The government harasses those who dare to give voice to the desires of their fellow Cubans and repeatedly beats and tortures dissidents during detentions. According to the Cuban
Committee for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, the number of persons detained temporarily for political reasons rose from 821 between January 2010 and June 2010 to 1,727 between July 2010 and December 2010. The Cuban government only continues to exasperate this trend by imprisoning more political prisoners. With this pattern of human rights abuse, economic reform alone stands no chance at democratizing Cuba.
Instead, policymakers need to focus on pressuring
Castro to implement civil and political freedoms. If Cuba solved the roots of much of its problems – restrictions on movement and oppression of political opponents – Cubans could live freer lives
. The economic reforms that Castro implements would then have a significant impact on the country
.
These economic freedoms could bring about the democracy that Americans have wanted for so long in Cuba.

It’s key to education—the process of economic engagement is important
Fleck and Kilby 06
*Fleck: Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics, Montana State University, **Kilby:
Department of Economics, Vassar College (Robert K. Fleck and Christopher Kilby 2006 “How Do Political Changes Influence US
Bilateral Aid Allocations? Evidence from Panel Data” Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 210–223) //KY
Several factors make it important for economists to understand the politics of foreign aid. First, insight into the process through which aid is distributed contributes
in a very general way to the economics literature
for the simple reason that foreign aid involves a substantial quantity of scarce resources. Second, there is a rapidly growing
empirical literature that seeks to identify the effectiveness of aid in meeting development objectives,
and much of that literature relies on the power of political variables to predict aid allocations
(Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Third, the success or failure of attempts to reform the foreign aid process depends directly on the politics of donor countries as well as on the politics of aid-receiving countries.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the aid allocation process
by analyzing the distribution of US bilateral aid. Our analysis starts from the observation that aid-receiving countries differ in terms of their potential for development, commercial importance, geopolitical role, and form of government. Each year, a recipient country’s share of US aid may reflect these factors.The relative influence of each of these factors may change over time, however, in part because elections in the US alter the composition of the US government. For example, a shift from a liberal to a conservative president or Congress is likely mirrored by a shift in the objectives of foreign aid and, consequently, a shift in the emphasis given to each of the underlying criteria for aid allocation. If the objectives of these politic al actors have a systematic influence on the distribution of aid
across recipient countries, political shifts will cause observable changes in aid allocations. Examining the effects of these political shifts illuminates the political economy of aid allocation. We analyze panel data on US bilateral aid flows to 119 countries from 1960 to
1997.1
We consider
both the decision of whether to provide aid to a country and ,
conditional on the decision to provide aid, the decision of what level of aid to provide.
We identify proxy variables to reflect each recipient country’s importance with respect to four aid allocation criteria: development concerns, commercial importance to the US, strategic importance to the US, and the degree of democratization. To measure political shifts in the US, we place the president and Congress along a liberal-conservative dimension using Poole’s (1998) common space data, then examine whether the estimated effects of the key proxies (development, strategic, commercial, and democratization) vary systematically with the liberal-conservative locations of the president and Congress.2
Discussion of human rights in context of economic relations is especially important in debate
Bouvier 02
Jennings Randolph Program, senior program officer in the Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution at USIP, assistant professor of Latin American literature and culture at the University of Maryland, senior associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (Virginia Marie Bouvier, May 30 2002 “The Globalization of U.S.-Latin American Relations: Democracy,
Intervention, and Human Rights”, book) //KY
Such issues and debates must occur within a new inter-American and global context
. U.S.—Latin
American relations have become more complex as the definition of U.S. security interests has broadened to include a wide range of
political and economic concerns related directly or indirectly to human rights
— debt, trade, democracy, civil—military relations, drug trafficking, environment, sustainable development, and migration.
U.S.—
Latin American relations are now marked by the proliferation of multiple linkages across national borders
, as well as increased cooperation between nations throughout the hemisphere. Wit hin this context of greater political converg ence and democratization, and spurred by the carrot of free- trade arrangements
, a series of summit meeting) have provided important forums
for the development of stronger relationships among Latin American political elites. In 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton hosted the Miami Summit of the
Americas, which committed all of the region’s countries (minus Cuba) to negotiating a free-trade agreement for the Americas by
2005. In a follow-up summit in 1998, Latin American presidents and prime ministers gathered in Santiago to launch the Free Trade

Area of the Americas (F1’AA) to expand neo-liberalism throughout the hemisphere.’3 In 1999, Miami hosted a Mayors’ Summit of the Americas with the participation of some 200 mayors from the hemisphere. The 2000 summit meeting of the twelve democratically elected presidents of South America, called by Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, underscored the convergence of interest among these leaders in working together. An Interparliamentary Forum of the Americas was inaugurated in early 2001 in Ottawa, and a third summit of Latin American leaders took place in April 2001 in Quebec City.
Discussing conditions is uniquely important in the context of the embargo
NJ 13
(National Journal, Updated: May 29, 2013, originally produced May 13, 2000 “LEGAL AFFAIRS - How the Embargo Hurts
Cubans And Helps Castro” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/legal-affairs-how-the-embargo-hurts-cubans-and-helpscastro-20000513) //KY
The harder question is how much to ease the embargo and under what conditions
.
Even
Helms
has indicated he would ease up if Cuba's government would institute
such revolutionary changes as allowing
free and fair elections.
But that's not going to happen while Castro is in charge. And the constructive steps taken by the Clinton Administration since Helms-Burton, such as slightly easing restrictions on travel to Cuba and allowing Cuban-Americans and others to send more dollars to relatives and friends there, have been tiny.

AFF

Conditions will fail
Griffin 4/03/13 – the Harvard Crimson editorial writer, (JOHN Griffin, April 3, 2013, “Engage with Venezuela”, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)//GP
When
Venezuelan
President
Hugo
Chávez died
in early February, his country was thrown into a period of
national mourning as the political equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance.
As Venezuela chooses its next president,
Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperity in the Western hemisphere.
While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela would naturally improve after the death of the combative Chávez, the opposite now seems more likely. Before passing away, Chávez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential election in April. As Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro has already continued with his mentor’s trend of using anti-American rhetoric to bring popularity to his government, even declaring that American agents may have infected Chávez with the cancer that killed him. While Washington has officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chávez’s death, and both nations have started expelling diplomats from the other.
Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other.
Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chávez-style governance in Venezuela. Calling himself a 21st-century socialist,
Chávez nationalized the lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Cuba,repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force, and cooperated with the Iranians in developing nuclear technology. Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of these problems, and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas’ hold on their country.
The diplomatic and economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh the meager benefits reaped from our current policies.
Diplomatically
, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America
.
Chávez
(along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics
. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around
Chávez and his anti-American policies.
In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America
, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed
(but never realized) by the Bush administration
.
Chávez galvanized these nations
—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics— by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position
.
Every time Washington chastises
Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the
Latin American country, the leader in Caracas
(whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler
.
This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s.
If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less
astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela.
Caracas will be unable to paint
Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin
America.
Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable
. With the world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists,
Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically
. Even now,
America can see the possible benefits of economic

engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation:
Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a
Boston-area oil company.
Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America
. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the
United States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade.
In a world where the United States and
Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements.
For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States.
As it stands
, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible
.
While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized
—authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights
, lack of market-friendly policies— nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect
.
The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere
.
We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey.

The negative’s attempt to solve human rights through moral particularism fails—turns the net benefit and entrenches the power of the dominant social group
Mertus 08 co-director of the ethics, peace, and global affairs programme and professor of international relations at American
University (Julie A. Mertus, 2004, “ Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, book) //KY
Human right. can be seen as reflecting a cosmopolitan sentimen t that essay human being should matter equally in relation to all others, arid thus that each human being should be given equal consideration.° Two competing humanitarian ethics arc embodied in this trade-off: ethical universalism and ethical particularism. This section explores these two orientations and explain how
U.S. human rights policy appears universalist but
is actually ... particularist in orientation. Universalism and particularism differ according to their emphasis on: (I) individual as agents capable of making chokes, Il) the significance of prior relationships to other individuals, and (3) the nature and application of principles of ethical behavior. Ethical universalism views all people “as agents capable of making choices surrounded by a universe- of other such agents". The relationship of individuals to one another may be significant in establishing ethical standards for behavior on a less
"fundamental level.” however, on a basic level. the duties that individuals have toward one another are determined by general facts about other individuals, and not by any particular facts about their relation ships. For example, my duty to feed a hungry person is determined primarily by the fact that the person is hungry and that I have food. That the hungry person is my relative, my neighbor, or my student does not matter on a basic level in determining this duty. In contrast, different picture of the ethical universe, iii which ethical particularism
invokes the agents are already encumbered with a variety of ties and commitments to particular other agents, or to groups or collectivities, and they begin their ethical reasoning from those commitements
. In this case, we begin our ethical reasoning by
‘taking account of the various relationships in which we stand to others.”4’ Thus, that the hungry person is related to the person with food, while nor determinative of the existence and nature of a duty, may be a highly significant relational fact in the duty calculus.
David Miller suggests that we can discern the core differences between these two approaches by understanding what the universalist will identify as the main weakness in particularism and, conversely, what the particularist will identify as the main weakness in universalism, Of central concern to the universalist is the apparent disregard of ethical particularism for reason in favor of sentiment, prejudice. md convention
More troubling is the failure of the particularist to search for a set of principles that could establish duties and guide
conduct consistently and the unwillingness of the particularist to subject the purported existence and perceived nature of local relationships to rational scrutiny. This
, notes Miller, leads to two dangers
:
One is moral conservatism, the sanctification of
merely traditional ethical relations, based on the interests of dominant social groups. on outmoded philosophies, or perhaps on sheer ignorance.
The other is incoherence, where the ethical demands that stem from the relationships of dominant kinds
are not brought into any rational relation with one another
, so that a person who follows a particularist ethics would receive no guidance
in cases where he was pulled in one direction by one set of obligations and the opposite direction by a second set
A particularist human rights policy
deters the redress of social injustice and deters progressive social changes
.
Particularism supports the interests of dominant social groups by protecting their rights to the neglect of the
right of less powerful and unpopular minorities
. By emphasizing the territoriality of values, particularism makes geography destiny. ‘lf we adopt this perspective,”
Ken Booth warns, ‘the chessboard of international relations—and hence the politics of human rights—will he entirely synonymous with the geography of meaning.”47 Although spatial relationships are important, people move in many spaces and frequently alter their spatial relationships over time. Given this dynamic movement, local” culture is never pure”; rather, it is influenced by and, in turn, influences international culture.

Plan solves the net benefit—Economic engagement itself causes human right protection
Burton 03 professor at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and director of the Laboratory on
International Law and Regulation, PhD in political science (Emilie Hafner-Burton, 2003, “Globalizing human rights? How international trade agreements shape government repression”, book) //KY
In this dissertation I aim to convince that this growing web of international economic
organizations does indeed influence governments’ social policies
and practices, although these institutions neither compel the death of the state nor wield their influence equally. To be sure, there are many different social policies and practices that such a dissertation might engage. Such outcomes are brought to light by the many anti-globalization protests, which scholars across different disciplines investigate in various ways. I choose to focus this study on one of the most essential social practices that a government must choose: government observance of human rights. I do so not because environmental, social welfare, or labor policies are somehow less important or interesting, but because they themselves depend in some fundamental way on the establishment of basic human rights,
without which laws protecting the rainforest or the worker are empty promises. I also make this choice to focus on government observance of human rights because there is an emergent and innovative literature spanning the fields of international relations and sociology that is centrally concerned with explaining how kinds economic globalization
of various shapes government repressio n, cross-nationally. This literature provides a concrete stepping stone to study the linkage between international economic institutions and government repression, a linkagethat might otherwise prove difficult to maneuver without such a theoretical roadmap in place from which to start
Economic Engagement solves human rights and democracy promotion
USA Engage, 98 -
USA*ENGAGE is a broad-based coalition representing American business and agriculture. The coalition currently includes 670 members including 40 National and State Associations and organizations from major sectors of the US economy. “Economic Engagement Promotes Freedom” http://archives.usaengage.org/archives/studies/engagement.html)//GP
III.
Economic Engagement Advances Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights American values and institutions are attractive throughout the world not because of our power, but
because of our prosperity and the appeal of freedom
.
While the shape of a nation's political and economic institutions ultimately reflects the choices of its own people,
American policy can support, or hinder, such choices.
Through engagement we advance economic growth and transmit fundamental American values
. The United States now has the ability to engage countries that for years were closed to it.
The opening of many of the world's economies has created a tremendous opportunity.
Poles, Chinese, Slovenes, and Indians all seek American trade, investment, and technology, even though their markets for years were effectively closed to Americans. The
World Bank estimates that over 5 billion people
-- 87 percent of the world's population -- now live in economies driven by market forces.
Just ten years ago the number was only
1 billion.13
By exporting, by investing and operating overseas -- engaging -- American businesses, workers and farmers promote freedom .
Trade and the acceptance of democracy and free enterprise worldwide has given hundreds of millions of people a chance to grow, prosper and build free institutions and the rule of law
. Through engagement, the United States has a rare opportunity to help build the long term foundations for a better world
. Change will not be rapid, and there will be reverses. Oppression will continue for years in many parts of the world. But by engaging, the United States contributes significantly to peace, freedom and the rule of law.

Conditions will fail
Griffin 4/03/13 – the Harvard Crimson editorial writer, (JOHN Griffin, April 3, 2013, “Engage with Venezuela”, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)//GP
When
Venezuelan
President
Hugo
Chávez died
in early February, his country was thrown into a period of
national mourning as the political equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance.
As Venezuela chooses its next president,
Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperity in the Western hemisphere.
While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela would naturally improve after the death of the combative Chávez, the opposite now seems more likely. Before passing away, Chávez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential election in April. As Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro has already continued with his mentor’s trend of using anti-American rhetoric to bring popularity to his government, even declaring that American agents may have infected Chávez with the cancer that killed him. While Washington has officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chávez’s death, and both nations have started expelling diplomats from the other.
Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other.
Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chávez-style governance in Venezuela. Calling himself a 21st-century socialist,
Chávez nationalized the lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Cuba,repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force, and cooperated with the Iranians in developing nuclear technology. Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of these problems, and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas’ hold on their country.
The diplomatic and economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh the meager benefits reaped from our current policies.
Diplomatically
, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America
.
Chávez
(along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics
. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around
Chávez and his anti-American policies.
In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America
, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed
(but never realized) by the Bush administration
.
Chávez galvanized these nations
—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics— by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position
.
Every time Washington chastises
Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the
Latin American country, the leader in Caracas
(whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler
.
This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s.
If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less
astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela.
Caracas will be unable to paint
Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin
America.
Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable
. With the world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists,
Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically
. Even now,
America can see the possible benefits of economic

engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation:
Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a
Boston-area oil company.
Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America
. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the
United States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade.
In a world where the United States and
Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements.
For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States.
As it stands
, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible
.
While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized
—authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights
, lack of market-friendly policies— nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect
.
The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere
.
We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey.

Empirics prove – Venezuela will say no
Xinhua News Agency 09
( Venezuelan government rejects U.S. report on human rights Anonymous. Xinhua News
Agency - CEIS [Woodside] 26 Feb 2009. –BRW)
CARACAS, Feb. 26 (Xinhua) --
The Venezuelan government on Thursday rejected a U.S. report that denounced its human rights record
. "
The governmen t in defense of the sovereignty of the Venezuelan people, strongly and firmly rejects the publishing by the U.S. Department of State of a report that pretends to evaluate the general condition of Venezuela's human rights,"
a statement said. The U.S. report on human rights in Latin American countries was published on Wednesday. Regarding Venezuela, the report pointed out "the widespread corruption, the harassment of the press and opposition, the polarization of the judicial system, and the violence against women and traffickers
." The Venezuelan statement said the country does not accept such practices of the U.S., adding that the U.S. has "the darkest record in disregarding and violating human dignity in contemporary history, yet still takes power without mandate and legitimacy to become judges of other countries."
The report was "fake and interfering," it said. The government demands the U.S. authorities "end such practices (of judging other countries)" and requests "respect, equality and non-interference in domestic issues," the statement said.
Maduro says no to human rights—anti-americanism
Bours 13 worked with Congress, political nonprofits, and several Washington, D.C. think tank, staff writer at Policy Mic
(Robinson O'Brien-Bours, 3/14/13 “ Venezuela Election: Why Nicolas Maduro Won't Improve Relations With the United States” http://www.policymic.com/articles/29758/venezuela-election-why-nicolas-maduro-won-t-improve-relations-with-the-unitedstates) //KY
With it not being enough to accuse the U.S. of murdering Chavez,
Maduro
has resurrected the
all-too-familiar rants of his socialist mentor
. “Sooner rather than later the imperialist elites who govern the United States will have to learn to live with
absolute respect with the
insurrectional peoples of America
,” declared
Maduro. “
We decided to be free, and nothing and no one will take that independen ce that was re-conquered with our commander Hugo Chavez at the helm.” Worried by the charisma and support of Henrique Capriles Radonski, the acting president has decided on two obvious paths to victory. The first is playing on the public sympathy and mourning for
Chavez, building a cult around the man's memory to help keep his movement alive. The second is to focus his hatred on the United
States, blaming the Americans for the world's ills and distracting the Venezuelans from the sordid state of affairs that their socialist strongman left them. As a sign of things to come,
Maduro expelled several American diplomats from
Venezuela
. The United States has returned the favor, booting two Venezuelan diplomats out of the country.
Maduro has also kowtowed to that particularly sleazy fraternity of world leaders that his predecessor so very much adored, indicating continuation of Venezuela's disastrous support for
human rights abusers and anti-American regimes
.
Maduro says no to any human rights negotiations
Christy 13 senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative (Patrick Christy, 6/13/13 “ U.S. Overtures to Maduro Hurt
Venezuela’s Democratic Opposition” http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavezsuccessor-maduro-hurt-venezuelas-opposition) //KY
In light of all this, it remains unclear why
the
Obama
administration seeks
, in Secretary Kerry's words, " an ongoing, continuing dialogue
at a high level between the State Department and
the [
Venezuelan
] Foreign
Ministry" – let alone believe that
such engagement will lead to any substantive change in
Maduro's behavior
. To be sure,
Caracas's
recent release of jailed American filmmaker
Timothy
Tracy is welcome
and long overdue.
However, it is clear that the
bogus charges
of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage
in talks with the United States, a
shameful move reminiscent of
Fidel
Castro's playbook
. While Secretary
Kerry
said that his meeting
with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights
and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region gives reason for concern.
President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while
Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the State Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed,

Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the
Organization of American States in Guatemala last week. For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to
the
Maduro
government, that could give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions.

Conditions will fail
Griffin 4/03/13 – the Harvard Crimson editorial writer, (JOHN Griffin, April 3, 2013, “Engage with Venezuela”, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)//GP
When
Venezuelan
President
Hugo
Chávez died
in early February, his country was thrown into a period of
national mourning as the political equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance.
As Venezuela chooses its next president,
Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperity in the Western hemisphere.
While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela would naturally improve after the death of the combative Chávez, the opposite now seems more likely. Before passing away, Chávez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential election in April. As Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro has already continued with his mentor’s trend of using anti-American rhetoric to bring popularity to his government, even declaring that American agents may have infected Chávez with the cancer that killed him. While Washington has officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chávez’s death, and both nations have started expelling diplomats from the other.
Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other.
Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chávez-style governance in Venezuela. Calling himself a 21st-century socialist,
Chávez nationalized the lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Cuba,repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force, and cooperated with the Iranians in developing nuclear technology. Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of these problems, and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas’ hold on their country.
The diplomatic and economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh the meager benefits reaped from our current policies.
Diplomatically
, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America
.
Chávez
(along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics
. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around
Chávez and his anti-American policies.
In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America
, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed
(but never realized) by the Bush administration
.
Chávez galvanized these nations
—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics— by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position
.
Every time Washington chastises
Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the
Latin American country, the leader in Caracas
(whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler
.
This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s.
If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less
astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela.
Caracas will be unable to paint
Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin
America.
Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable
. With the world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists,
Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically
. Even now,
America can see the possible benefits of economic

engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation:
Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a
Boston-area oil company.
Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America
. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the
United States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade.
In a world where the United States and
Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements.
For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States.
As it stands
, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible
.
While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized
—authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights
, lack of market-friendly policies— nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect
.
The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere
.
We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey.
CP can’t solve--only unconditional, positive actions ensure effective engagement and restores US credibility and Latin America relations
Griffin 4/3/13 writer at the Harvard Crimson (John Griffin, April 3, 2013 “Engage with Venezuela”, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/) //KY
Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building
American credibility in the world
at large, especially in Latin America
.
Chávez
(along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support
for his regime by pointing out the United
States’ attempts to forcibly intervene
in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin
America had rallied around Chávez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration. Chávez galvanized these nations—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics—by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position
.
Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests
or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas
(whether it be Chávez or
Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler
.
This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s.
If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend
of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its
first step should
be to adopt a less astringent tone
in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in
Latin America. Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with
Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement
with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation:
Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a
Boston-area oil company. Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America.
It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the United
States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then,
positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States
. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity
in the

hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible .
While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized—authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policies—nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect.
The United
States should stop playing “tough guy”
with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability
and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey.

Even the U.S. government knows that Cuba will say no – this is from a confidential document, leaked in 2013 from the U.S. Embassy #wikileaks
US embassy Cables 2010
(leaked in 2013) (us embassy cables – foreign missions ignoring Cuba´s appalling human rights record leaked December 18, 2010 · by admin · in US embassy cables Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09HAVANA706 2009-11-24 13:01 2010-12-17 22:10
CONFIDENTIAL US Interests Section
Havana
VZCZCXRO7150
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHUB #0706/01 3281333 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 241333Z
NOV 09 FM USINT HAVANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE
WASHDC PRIORITY 4943
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER
STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHWH/WESTERN
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0005 RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY
VALLETTA PRIORITY RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0160 RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RHEHAAA
/NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA
WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC
WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION
01 OF 03 HAVANA 000706 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CCA STATE FOR DRL CNEWLING EO 12958 DECL:
10/23/2019 TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU SUBJECT: FEISTY LITTLE MISSIONS DENT CUBA’S RECORD OF BULLYING
OTHERS TO SILENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS REF: A. HAVANA 619 (RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR) B.
HAVANA 592 (GOC SIGNALS “READINESS TO MOVE FORWARD”) C. VATICAN 117 (“VATICAN TWO-STEP WITH CUBA”)
HAVANA 00000706 001.3 OF 003 –BRW)
The Cuba overwhelming majority of the 100 foreign missions in Havana do not face a human rights dilemma in their dealings with the Cubans.
These countries wouldn’t raise the issue anyway.
The rest, a group that includes most of
Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan and the United
States, claim to employ different approaches to address their human rights concerns in Cuba — but the truth is that most of these countries do not press the issue at all in Cuba.
The GOC does not like to talk about its human rights situation, and even less to be lectured publicly.
It deploys considerable resources to bluff and bully many missions and their visitors into silence. For the most part the rewards for acquiescing to GOC demands are risible: pomp-full dinners and meetings and, for the most pliant, a photo-op with one of the Castro brothers.
In terms of substance or economic benefits, they fare little better than those who stand up to the GOC.
Cuba says no to human rights conditions
Pascual 09
Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at the The Brookings Institution (Carlos Pascual, April 2009 “Cuba : a New Policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement” ) //KY
The second basket of initiatives is distinct from the first because it moves beyond enhancing the ability of Cubans to take a more proactive and informed part in their society and government. The initiatives in the second basket seek to build a foundation for reconciliation by beginning a process of resolving long-standing differences.
A number of
these initiatives could serve as
incentives or rewards for improved human rights
, the release of political prisoners, and greater freedom of assembly, speech and rights for opposition groups and labor unions. i nitiatives that fall within this category include allowing Cuba access
to normal commercial instruments for the purchase of goods from the United States.
None of the initiatives,
however, should be
publicly or privately tied to specific
Cuban actions. As the Cuban government is on record as rejecting any type of
carrot-and-stick tactic , it would be counterproductive to do so
.

Perm do both – the plan allows for internal reformation of the Cuban government – solves the impact
Pascual et al 09
( April 2009 Report of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement members of the Core Group of Advisers Co-directors Carlos pascual Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings institution vicki huddleston Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution –BRW)

The advisory group of the Brookings project on “U.S. p olicy toward a Cuba in Transition” came to the unanimous conclusion that president Barack
Obama should commit to a long-term process of critical and constructive engagement at all levels
, including with the Cuban government
. We believe that only through engagement can the president put into place a strategic vision that would permit the
United States to protect its interests and advance the desire we share with the hemisphere
to help the Cuban people become agents for peaceful change from within the island.
A decision by the president to engage the Cuban government would not reflect acceptance of its human rights abuses or approval of its conduct
. instead, it would prove a realistic evaluation and recognition of the extent to which the Cuban government controls Cuba— essential to the implementation of a new policy that would permit us to work with the region, enhance our influence with the Cuban government, and seek to help Cuba’s citizens expand the politi cal space they need to influence their future.
Engagement should serve to enhance personal contacts between Cuban and U.S. citizens and permanent residents, diminish Cuba’s attraction as a rallying point for anti-American sentiment, and burnish our standing in the region and the wider international community
. if we engage, the Cuban government will no longer be able to use the U.S. threat as a credible excuse for human rights abuses and restrictions on free speech, assembly, travel, and economic opportunity.
This in turn would encourage the international community to hold the Cuban government to the same standards of democracy, rights and freedoms that it expects from other governments around the world.
The Cuban hierarchy will not undertake openings or respond to pressure from the international community or the United States if it considers that doing so would jeopardize its continued existence
. The key to a new dynamic in our relationship is to embark on a course of a series of strategic ac tions that aim to establish a bilateral relationship and put the
United States on the playing field—to counter our hitherto self-imposed role of critical observer. Our priority should be to serve U.S. in terests and values in the confidence that if we do so wisely and effectively, Cubans in the long run will gain as well.
Perm solves—just the perception of human right promotion resolves the net benefit
Sikkink 04
political science professor at the University of Minnesota, PhD from Columbia (Kathryn A Sikkink, 2004, “Mixed
Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America”, book) //KY
A better understanding of the emergence and diffusion of human rights norms on a global scale represents a crucial contribution to international relations scholarship. However, such norms matter in the world only if rhetorical commitments actually lead states to improve their human rights practices. The second part of the book therefore asks under what conditions a human rights policy can be effective.
When do human rights policies and norms lead to improvements in human rights behaviors?
There is not a clear linkage between the ratification of human rights treaties and actual human rights practices.
Be cause ratification is easiest in an authoritarian state, countries that ratify human rights treaties don’t necessarily treat their citizens well. “ So, why should we care about ratifying human rights treaties if they don’t lead directly to better human rights practices? Because ratification of human rights treaties is seen as an important symbol of a country ‘s commitment to the human rights idea. We need to be aware that for many people
around the world,
U.S. failure to ratify these treaties undermines our capacity for leadership in the area of human rights
. Recently, the United States has not only filed to ratify human rights treaties hut the administration of
George V.
Bush ‘unsigned” the statute of the International Criminal Court
and actively lobbied other governments not to abide by its provisions. Officials in the administration claim that they were responding to flaws in the statute.
Because of the symbolic importance of these treaties
, however, such action is often interpreted abroad as reckless disregard for
international rule of law. The emergence of human rights policy is not a simple victory of ideas over interests
. It demonstrates the power of ideas to reshape understandings of national interest. The adoption of human rights policies
does not represent a neglect of national interests but rather signifies a fundamental shift in the perception of long-term national interests.
Indeed, human rights policies emerged because policy makers began to question the causal assumption that U.S. national interests are furthered by supporting repressive regimes that violate the human rights of their citizens and the related assumption that other countries’ internal human rights practices arc not a legitimate topic of foreign policy.

The US should pursue human rights simultaneously with economic engagement—the perm is an act of good faith which allows negotiations to succeed
Herrero, 12 -
Deputy Executive Director for the Huffington Post Cuba Study Group (Ricardo Herrero, 12/27/12, “Getting
Serious About Alan Gross”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ricardo-herrero/getting-serious-about-ala_b_2370767.html)//GP
Earlier this month,
USAID subcontractor Alan Gross began his fourth year in a Cuban prison.
Ever since his incarceration, a debate has raged over whether the United States should halt further efforts to engage with the Cuban people until the Cuban government releases
Gross.
Both Alan and his wife Judy have repeatedly called on the U.S. and Cuba to engage in a dialogue without preconditions.
Sadly, like all things Cuba-related, the debate over Gross' incarceration has since devolved into an ideological three-ring circus where finding a solution has become a secondary objective behind not appearing to be making concessions to the enemy. The
Washington Post perfectly captured the tone deafness of the current debate in a recent editorial: "better relations between Cuba and the
United States must be conditioned on real steps toward democratization by
Havana .
But until Mr. Gross is released, they ought to get worse."
This position reflects exactly the sort of stale, inside-the-box thinking that has long plagued the discourse over U.S.-Cuba policy. For years we've known that the
Cuban government is incredibly adept at manipulating U.S. policy choices. Time and again, any attempt by the U.S. to increase its engagement with the Cuban people has been met with confrontation and repression by Cuban officials, which in turn emboldens hardliners in the U.S. to call for the tightening economic sanctions. This pattern has become all too predictable, and the Gross case is its latest example: arrested in Havana for bringing communication devices to the island less than three months after President
Obama relaxed family travel and remittance restrictions in 2009 and only two weeks after the U.S. House held hearings on lifting the
Cuba travel ban for all Americans. In response to Gross' arrest, U.S. hardliners blocked any further normalization efforts in
Congress, though they weren't able to stop the Obama Administration from further loosening restrictions on people-to-people travel and remittances in January, 2011. Shortly thereafter, Gross was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said "It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasn't happened in Cuba in the last 50 years." If we believe this to be the case, then why don't we use this insight to steer our efforts in securing the release of Alan Gross? The Cubans have often stated that they are willing to swap Gross for five Cuban spies who were arrested in Florida in 1998 for infiltrating a U.S.
Navy base and several anti-Castro groups in Miami. The U.S. has refused to accept the swap, and the negotiations have remained stalled for almost three years. So what can be done? There are three opportunities for securing Gross' release that could also help improve relations between the U.S. and Cuba:
1
. Introduce alternative terms to the negotiation.
The Cubans have dictated the terms of the negotiation from day one, and hardliners in the U.S. government have seemingly been too happy to play along. However
, just because the U.S. won't agree to the spy swap doesn't mean negotiations should stop there.
U.S. sanctions on Cuba remain a decades-old morass of congressional actions, presidential directives and executive orders, resulting in an entrenched and inflexible foreign policy that is as incoherent as it is ineffective. There are plenty of outdated sanctions on the books that the United States could repeal or amend in exchange for Gross' release. 2
. Pursue Gross' release and economic engagement concurrently.
In 2011, the Obama Administration announced a shift in the focus of U.S.-Cuba policy toward empowering civil society and supporting independent economic activity.
If Cuba's burgeoning private sector is to grow into a viable alternative to the Island's top-down economic system, it will need a deeper economic relationship with the American private sector.
By conditioning all further
efforts to engage with the Cuban people on Gross' release, we are playing by the rules of those who benefit from the prolonged confrontation and mutual isolation between the two countries. Denying these private individuals an economic relationship with the United States only serves to further delay the kind of changes that policies like
Helms-Burton were ill-designed to accelerate.

Conditions will fail
Griffin 4/03/13 – the Harvard Crimson editorial writer, (JOHN Griffin, April 3, 2013, “Engage with Venezuela”, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)//GP
When
Venezuelan
President
Hugo
Chávez died
in early February, his country was thrown into a period of
national mourning as the political equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance.
As Venezuela chooses its next president,
Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperity in the Western hemisphere.
While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela would naturally improve after the death of the combative Chávez, the opposite now seems more likely. Before passing away, Chávez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential election in April. As Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro has already continued with his mentor’s trend of using anti-American rhetoric to bring popularity to his government, even declaring that American agents may have infected Chávez with the cancer that killed him. While Washington has officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chávez’s death, and both nations have started expelling diplomats from the other.
Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other.
Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chávez-style governance in Venezuela. Calling himself a 21st-century socialist,
Chávez nationalized the lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Cuba,repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force, and cooperated with the Iranians in developing nuclear technology. Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of these problems, and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas’ hold on their country.
The diplomatic and economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh the meager benefits reaped from our current policies.
Diplomatically
, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America
.
Chávez
(along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics
. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around
Chávez and his anti-American policies.
In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America
, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed
(but never realized) by the Bush administration
.
Chávez galvanized these nations
—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics— by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position
.
Every time Washington chastises
Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the
Latin American country, the leader in Caracas
(whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler
.
This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s.
If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less
astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela.
Caracas will be unable to paint
Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin
America.
Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable
. With the world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists,
Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically
. Even now,
America can see the possible benefits of economic

engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation:
Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a
Boston-area oil company.
Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America
. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the
United States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade.
In a world where the United States and
Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements.
For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States.
As it stands
, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible
.
While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized
—authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights
, lack of market-friendly policies— nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect
.
The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere
.
We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey.
Human rights motivations are a façade for U.S. self interest in cuba – ignore the smoke and mirrors rhetoric of the counterplan
Lamrani 03
(U.S. Economic sanctions against Cuba: objectives of an imperialist policy by Salim Lamrani, La Sorbonne
University, Paris – published online in 2003 – BRW)
The only objectives of the United States are to send Cuba back to the pangs and torments afflicting Third World nations
and which it has dared to escape; to plunder its resources; and to destroy its health care system considered "uniformly as the pre-eminent model for the Third World", according to the American
Association for World Health . The aim of the blockade is to fulfill the wishes of Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams to incorporate Cuba into the U.S. sphere of influence and to enable foreign capital to devastate it.
The logorrhea putting forward the argument of human rights problems in Cuba is only a rhetoric motivated by self-interest and designed to conceal a very clear plan: to make the Cuban people toe the line and to send it back to the destitute standards of living they were used to fret over before the triumph of the Revolution.
Recently, President George W. Bush not only added Cuba to the list of terrorist states
a decision that should cause some mirth among the international community given that this accusation is groundless
but he also declared that the restrictions concerning the travels of U.S. citizens to Cuba would be made tighter. He also called for the creation of a Presidential "Commission for the Assistance to a Free
Cuba", in order to repay the debt he has contracted during the 2000 election campaign with his extreme-right friends of the Cuban-
American National Foundation a powerful entity never reluctant to use terrorism as a tool to express political ideas . What is the truthfulness of those declarations? It is non-existent. It is easy to guess what kind of "Free Cuba" the United States wants to create: a regime that would be "more acceptable to the U.S.", as the Washington administration underlined it as soon as 1959, that is to say a nation completely obedient to its orders.

Aff solves the impact to the counterplan – the embargo is a pre-requisite to
Cuban human rights violations
Pascual et al 09
( April 2009 Report of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition CUBA: A New p olicy of Critical and Constructive Engagement members of the Core Group of Advisers Co-directors Carlos pascual Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings institution vicki huddleston Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution –BRW)
Engagement does not mean approval of the Cu ban government’s policies, nor should it indicate a wish to control internal developments in Cuba
; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans.
If the United States is to play a positive role in Cuba’s future, it must not indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue on issues that would advance democracy, justice, and human rights
as well as our broader national interests. perversely, the policy of seeking to isolate Cuba
, rather than achieving its objective, has contributed to undermining the well-being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and latin America
. it has reinforced the Cuban government’s power over its citizens by increasing their dependence on it for every aspect of their livelihood
. By slowing the flow of ideas and information, we have unwittingly helped Cuban state security delay Cuba’s political and economic evolution toward a more open and representative government. And, by too tightly embracing Cuba’s brave dissidents, we have provided the Cu ban authorities with an excuse to denounce their legitimate efforts to build a more open society.
Aff is a pre-requisite to solve the net benefit
Amash 12
Contributing Writer Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD (Brandon Amash, 7/23/12, “Evaluating the
Cuban Embargo” http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/) //KY
§ 4. Policy Recommendations: Although America’s previous policies of intervention, use of force
and economic sanctions have
all failed at achieving democratization
in Cuba, not all options have been exhausted. One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cub a and reopen diplomatic relations in order to
work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba. Unless Cuba
,
as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States, the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve
. A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.
§ 4.1:
Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially. Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as the renewed relations between Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and
Pascual state, “a great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” (Huddleston 14). The mobilization of the Cuban people on the issues of democratization, which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people, currently lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change. Furthermore, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process. In contrast to a policy of isolation, normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself. § 4.2:
With diplomatic relations in place, the United
States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation.
Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in
Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation
in the nation.
Normalizing diplomatic relations
with the state will
also allow America to truly support freedom of
opinion and e xpression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support,
Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system
, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba’s economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.

Conditioning Cuba destroys US credibility
Pascual 09
Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at the The Brookings Institution (Carlos Pascual, April 2009 “Cuba : a New Policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement” ) //KY
The April 17, 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago provides president Obama with an opportunity to enhance U.S. credibility and leadership
in the region by signaling a new direction in U.S.-Cuba policy. rather than continuing to demand preconditions for engaging the Cuban government
in the multilateral arena, the president should encourage the
Organization of American States and international financial institutions to support Cuba’s integration into
their organizations as long as it meets their membership criteria of human rights, democracy, and financial transparency. if Cuba’s leaders know that Cuba can become a full member upon meeting standard requirements, they could have an incentive to carry out difficult reforms that ultimately benefit the Cuban people
Credibility solves geopolitical wars
Kupchan and Shepardson 11 –
*Professor of international affairs at Georgetown University; **Senior Fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations, (Charles and Whitney, “The false promise of unipolarity: constraints on the exercise of American power,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, June 2011, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 165-173)//Bwang
These examples aside, Brooks and Wohlforth also fail to address another important pathway through which norms and rules constrain the exercise of US power.
They focus exclusively on the costs to the United States of its own failure to comply with the institutions and rules that Washington took the lead in crafting after the close of World War II. But in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
that began in 2008 and amid the ongoing ascent of China, India, Brazil, and other rising states, change in ordering norms may well be driven by the preferences and policies of emerging powers, not by those of the United States.
Moreover, the impressive economic performance and political staying power of regimes that practice non-democratic brands of capitalism—such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia—call into question the durability of the normative order erected during America’s watch.
Well before emerging powers catch up with America’s material resources, they will be challenging the normative commitment to open markets and liberal democracy that
has defined the Western order.
¶
The substantive gap between the norms of the Western order and those that inform the domestic and foreign policies of rising powers has not gone unnoticed (Kupchan and Mount 2009).
Nonetheless, many scholars have offered an illusory response: that the United States and its democratic allies should dedicate the twilight hours of their primacy to universalizing Western norms. According to G John Ikenberry (2008, 37, 25), ‘the United States’ global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century’. The West should ‘sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible’ to ensure that the world continues to play by its rules even as its material preponderance wanes. Such confidence in the universality of the Western order is
, however, based on wishful thinking about the likely trajectory of ascending powers
, which throughout history have sought to adjust the prevailing order in ways that advantage their own interests.
Presuming
that rising states will
readily embrace Western norms is not only unrealistic, but also dangerous, promising to alienate emerging powers that will be pivotal to global stability in the years ahead
(Gat 2007).¶ Brooks and Wohlforth do not address this issue—presumably because they believe that US preponderance is so durable that they need not concern themselves with the normative orientations of rising powers. But facts on the ground suggest otherwise.
2010,
China is the world’s second largest economy, holds massive amounts of US debt, and is
, as of strengthening its economic and strategic presence
in many quarters of the globe; the G-8 has given way to the G-20
; the prime minister of democratic
India has called for ‘new global “rules of the game”’ and the
‘reform and revitalization’ of international institutions
(Mahbubane 2008, 235); the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank have increased the voting weight of developing countries; and the United Nations
Security Council is
coming under growing pressure to enlarge the voices of emerging powers. All of these developments come at the expense of the influence and normative preferences of the United States
and its Western allies. By the numbers, Brooks and Wohlforth are correct that unipolarity persists. But rising powers are already challenging the pecking order and guiding norms of the international system.
If the next international system is to be characterized by norm-governed order rather than competitive

anarchy,
the West will have to make room for the competing visions of
rising powers. A new order will have to be based on great-power consensus and toleration of political diversity rather than the normative hegemony of the West.

Low human rights credibility is preventing the U.S. from pressuring other nations to improve human rights.
The Guardian (London) 2005
<1/14, “Bush under fire over human rights: Watchdog says US setting bad example,” lexis>
The torture and degrading treatment of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay have undermined the credibility of the US as a defender of human rights
and opponent of terrorism, the
New York-based Human Rights Watch says in its annual report. "
The US government is less and less able to push for justice abroad because it is unwilling to see justice done at home,
" says
Kenneth Roth, the group's executive director. The report comes as the Bush administration prepares for inauguration next week.
The administration has shown little interest in moderating its aggressive approach
to its "global war on terror". Yesterday's scathing report argues that the US has weakened its own moral authority at a time that authority is most needed, "in the midst of a seeming epidemic of suicide bombings, beheadings, and other attacks on civilians and noncombatants."
Post-Soviet relations does not favor the US – pressuring counteracts current Russian foreign policy initiatives
Pifer 09 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs [Steven Pifer, “An Agenda for U.S.-Russian Relations in
2009”, The Brookings Institution, p. http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2009/0225_russia_pifer.aspx]
Although Moscow does not appear to have a fully coherent vision of its place in the global order, some of its specific desires are apparent. Russia wants to develop its own political and economic model, free of criticism from the
West
. In the early Putin years, Kremlin pundits spoke of “managed democracy.” They later talked of “ sovereign democracy.” Its key feature appears to be that it is solely up to Russia’s leaders to decide the country’s form of government.
Russia wants the role and the influence of the United States reduced.
President Medvedev said last August that “ the world should be multi-polar. … We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America.
Such a world is unstable …” The Russians calculate that a reduction in
U.S. influence will benefit their power position.
Russia wants a sphere of influence – or
“privileged interests” – in the post-Soviet space
. As Russia regained its strength, it escalated its expectations regarding its neighbors’ behavior. Moscow does not seek to recreate the USSR but wants deference from states in the post-Soviet space to its vital interests. Russia’s stance appears most pointed with regard to how it views NATO’s relations with
Ukraine and Georgia.
Russia wants a seat and to have its views accommodated when major European or global issues are being decided
. Russia insists on a seat almost regardless of whether or not it can bring something to the table to facilitate resolution of the problem. Simply being there appears important to Moscow, part of Russia’s due as a recovered
“great power

Removal alone restores democracy
Perez 10 (Louis, J. Carlyle Sitterson professor of history and the director of the Institute for the
Study of the Americas at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “Want change in Cuba?
End U.S. embargo,” 9/21/10, http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/09/20/perez.cuba.embargo/index.html, MDM)
In April 2009, the White House released a presidential memorandum declaring that democracy and human rights in Cuba were "national interests of the United States."
¶ Assistant Secretary of State
Arturo Valenzuela repeated the message in May of this year to the Cuban-American National Foundation in Miami.
¶
The Obama administration
, he said, wanted "to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
... in ways that will empower the Cuban people and advance our national interests."
¶
Fine words. But if the administration really wanted to do something in the national interest, it would end the
50year-old policy of political and economic isolation of Cuba.
¶
The Cuban embargo can no longer even pretend to be plausible.
¶
On the contrary, it has contributed to the very conditions that stifle democracy and human rights there. For 50 years, its brunt has fallen mainly on the Cuban people.
¶ This is not by accident. On the contrary, the embargo was designed to impose suffering and hunger on Cubans in the hope that they would rise up and overturn their government
.
¶
"The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support," the Department of State insisted as early as April 1960, "is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship."
¶
The United States tightened the screws in the post-Soviet years with the Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act -- measures designed, Sen. Robert Torricelli said, "to wreak havoc on that island."
¶
The post-Soviet years were indeed calamitous. Throughout the 1990s, Cubans faced growing scarcities, deteriorating services and increased rationing. Meeting the needs of ordinary life took extraordinary effort.
¶
And therein lies the problem that still bedevils U.S. policy today.
Far from inspiring the Cuban people to revolution, the embargo keeps them down and distracted.
¶
Dire need and urgent want are hardly optimum circumstances for a people to contemplate the benefits of democracy.
A people preoccupied with survival have little interest or inclination to bestir themselves in behalf of anything else.
¶
In Cuba, routine household errands and chores consume overwhelming amounts of time and energy, day after day: hours in lines at the local grocery store or waiting for public transportation.
¶
Cubans in vast numbers choose to emigrate. Others burrow deeper into the black market, struggling to make do and carry on. Many commit suicide. (Cuba has one of the highest suicide rates in the world; in 2000, the latest year for which we have statistics, it was 16.4 per 100,000 people.)
¶
A
June 2008 survey in The New York Times reported that less than 10 percent of Cubans identified the lack of political freedom as the island's main problem
. As one Cuban colleague recently suggested to me: "First necessities, later democracy." ¶
The United States should consider a change of policy, one that would offer Cubans relief from the all-consuming ordeal of daily life.
Improved material circumstances would allow Cubans to turn their attention to other aspirations.
¶
Ending the embargo would also imply respect for the Cuban people
, an acknowledgment that they have the vision and vitality to enact needed reforms, and that transition in Cuba, whatever form it may take, is wholly a Cuban affair.
¶
A good-faith effort to engage Cuba, moreover, would counter the common perception there that the United States is a threat to its sovereignty.
It would deny Cuban leaders the chance to use U.S. policy as pretext to limit public debate and stifle dissent -- all to the good of democracy and human rights.
¶
And it would serve the national interest.
Removing the embargo creates more interaction between the US and Cuba necessary for democracy
Lloyd 10 (Delia, Senior Policy Manager at the BBC's international development charity, BBC
Media Action and political correspondent for Politics Daily, “Ten Reasons to Lift the Cuba
Embargo,” 8/24/10, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/08/24/ten-reasons-to-lift-the-cubaembargo/, MDM)
It's good politics.
Supporters of the trade embargo
-- like Cuban-American Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) -- have long argued that easing the restrictions would only reward Castro for the regime's ongoing repression of political dissidents
. We need to keep up the economic pressure on Cuba, so this logic goes, in order to keep pressure on the regime to do something about human rights. But there's a long-standing empirical relationship between trade and democracy
. The usual logic put forth to explain this relationship is that trade creates an economically independent and politically aware middle class, which, in turn, presses for political reform. It's not clear that this argument actually

holds up when subjected to close causal scrutiny (although the reverse does seem to be true -- i.e., democratic reform creates pressure for trade liberalization). Still, it's difficult to disagree with the proposition that by enabling visiting scholars and religious groups to stay in Cuba for up to two years (as the presidential order would allow) rather than a matter of weeks (as is currently the case) we'd be helping, not hurting, democracy in Cuba. First, easing the current travel restrictions would allow for far deeper linkages between non-governmental organizations from both countries, which some see as a powerful mechanism for democratic reform. Second, because American visitors would be staying on the island longer, scholars and activists alike would gain much better insight into where the pressure points for democracy actually exist.