Jean
Nicod
Lectures
2007
Moral Theory Meets Cognitive
Science
How the Cognitive Sciences Can
Transform Traditional Debates
Stephen Stich
Dept. of Philosophy
& Center for Cognitive Science
Rutgers University
sstich@ruccs.rutgers.edu
1
Jean
Nicod
Lectures
2007
Lecture 3
Egoism vs. Altruism
Deconstructing the Debate
2
Introduction
 Psychological (Ψ) Egoism & Psychological
(Ψ) Altruism offer conflicting accounts of the
nature of human motivation
 The debate between Ψ Egoists & Ψ
Altruists has been raging since Hobbes
…some would say since Plato
 In the last ¼ of the 20th century, the debate
was joined by a growing number of
psychologists & biologists
3
Introduction
 I think work in psychol-
ogy, particularly the work
of Daniel Batson & his
colleagues, has made
more progress toward
resolving the debate than
philosophers have made in
the last 400 years
4
Introduction
 I don’t agree with
Batson’s contention
that he has shown
altruism to be true
 But that’s a topic for
another occasion
5
Introduction
 The biological arguments, in my view, have
contributed little to the resolution of the
debate
 But one recent biological argument for
altruism has made a rather different sort of
contribution
6
Introduction
 It has made it clear that the traditional debate
has assumed a far too limited view of the
sort of cognitive architecture that might
underlie human motivation
 When that restrictive assumption is
abandoned, it undermines the traditional
debate …
 by challenging the pervasive assumption that
moral philosophers need to worry about
psychological egoism
7
Introduction
 It is this
“deconstruction” of the debate
that I want to develop in this talk
 But before doing that, I’ll need to devote a fair
amount of time justifying my claim that the
biological arguments have not resolved the
debate
8
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
9
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
10
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
“No man giveth but with
intention of good to himself,
because gift is voluntary; and
of all voluntary acts, the object
is to every man his own good;
of which, if men see they shall
be frustrated, there will be no
beginning of benevolence or
trust, nor consequently of
mutual help.” (Leviathan,1651, Ch. 15)
Thomas Hobbes
11
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
 What Hobbes is claiming is that all human
motivation is egoistic



Of course people sometimes help others
But they do this only because they believe that
it will result in some benefit for themselves
If they did not believe this, “benevolence” and
“mutual help” would come to an end
12
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
 Other philosophers take a less pessimistic
view of human motivation


They grant that people are often motivated by
self-interest
But they insist that people sometimes act
altruistically
 i.e. people are sometimes motivated only
by a desire to promote the well-being of
someone else
13
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
Adam Smith
“How selfish soever man
may be supposed, there are
evidently some principles in
his nature, which interest
him in the fortunes of others,
and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he
derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing
it.” (Theory of Moral Sentiments, I)
14
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
Adam Smith
“How selfish soever man
may be supposed, there are
evidently some principles in
his nature, which interest
him in the fortunes of others,
and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he
derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing
it.” (Theory of Moral Sentiments, I)
15
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
 This is, it seems, a debate about the nature of
human motivation.
 It is an interesting psychological question
 But why should moral philosophers care
which side is right?
16
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
 Some philosophers maintain that altruism
is central to, or necessary for, or even
identical with morality

“Moral behavior is, at the most general level,
altruistic behavior, motivated by the desire to
promote not only our own welfare but the welfare
of others.” (Rachels, “Naturalism”)
17
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care

“[O]ne central assumption motivating ethical
theory in the Analytic tradition is that the function
of ethics is to combat the inherent egoism or
selfishness of individuals. Indeed, many thinkers
define the basic goal of morality as ‘selflessness’ or ‘altruism’.” (Schroeder, “Continental Ethics”)
18
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
 This is a extreme view of the relation between
altruism & morality for which I have been unable
to find any serious argument

Some influential thinkers – most notably Kant –
deny that altruistically motivated behavior has
“true moral worth”
19
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
 The quote from Hobbes suggests a more
plausible reason for moral philosophers to be
interested in the debate
20
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
If Ψ Egoism is true, then
Philosophers
Care
helpful or “pro-social”
behavior will be fragile &
“No man giveth but with
easily undermined intention of good to himself,
because gift is voluntary; and
of all voluntary acts, the object
is to every man his own good;
of which, if men see they shall
be frustrated, there will be no
beginning of benevolence
or trust, nor consequently
of mutual help.” (Leviathan,1651,
Thomas Hobbes
Ch. 15)
21
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
 Similar concerns were
high on the agenda of
both Bentham & Mill
John Stuart Mill
22
Egoism vs. Altruism: Why
Philosophers Care
 Both Bentham & Mill were Ψ Egoists
 As Utilitarians, they believed that people should
chose the action that will lead to the greatest good
for the greatest number


But Ψ Egoism entails that people are only
motivated to chose the action which they believe
will lead to the greatest good for themselves
This led them to propose some draconian
measures to insure that people were motivated to
do what Utilitarian moral theory said they should do
23
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
24
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
25
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
26
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism
 The sort of altruism that moral philosophers
are concerned with is psychological
altruism

To say that behavior is psychologically
altruistic is to make a claim about the
motivation for the behavior
27
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism

Behavior is psychologically altruistic if it is
motivated by ultimate desires for the wellbeing of others

Two bits of jargon need to be explained
28
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism

Behavior is psychologically altruistic if it is
motivated by ultimate desires for the wellbeing of others

Two bits of jargon need to be explained
29
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism

Behavior is psychologically altruistic if it is
motivated by ultimate desires for the wellbeing of others

Two bits of jargon need to be explained
30
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism

Behavior is psychologically altruistic if it is
motivated by ultimate desires for the wellbeing of others

Though there is a lot to be said about this
notion, in this talk we can safely rely on some
intuitive examples
31
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism

Behavior is psychologically altruistic if it is
motivated by ultimate desires for the wellbeing of others

Desires to





save someone else’s life
alleviate someone else’s pain
cure someone else’s illness
make someone else happy
are all desires for the well-being of others
32
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism

More needs to be said about what it is for
behavior to be motivated by a particular
ultimate desire

The intuitive idea is that a desire is ultimate if the
object of the desire is desired for its own sake
rather than because the agent thinks that
satisfying the desire will lead to the satisfaction
of some other desire

This can be made more precise by appeal to one
interpretation of the traditional notion of practical
reasoning
33
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism

Practical reasoning is a causal
process via which a desire + a belief
give rise to or sustain a new desire

E.g. If I want a great sorbet, and believe
Berthillon makes the best sorbet in the
world, then I will form a desire to go to
Berthillon
 If I believe the best way to get to
Berthillon is to take the Metro then I’ll
form a desire to take the Metro
 Etc.
34
BELIEF 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 1
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
ACTION
PRACTICAL REASONING
The best place to get a
sorbet is Berthillon
The best way to get to
Berthillon is to take the Metro
BELIEF 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 1
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
…
DESIRE 4
ACTION
I get a sorbet
I go to Berthillon
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism

Desires formed or sustained by practical
reasoning are instrumental desires


But if we are to avoid circularity or infinite regress,
not all desires can be instrumental
Desires that are not the product of practical
reasoning are ultimate desires
37
BELIEF 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 1
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
ACTION
INSTRUMENTAL
ULTIMATE
PRACTICAL REASONING
This provides another way of explaining the
difference between psychological altruists and
psychological egoists
If I save John’s life, I’ll
get a large reward
BELIEF 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 1
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
I get a large
reward
DESIRE 4
ACTION
I save John’s
life
Both Egoists & Altruists
think this is psychologically
possible
BELIEF 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 1
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
ACTION
I save John’s
life
Altruists think this is
psychologically possible;
Egoists don’t
BELIEF 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 1
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
ACTION
INSTRUMENTAL
ULTIMATE
Hedonists – an historically important sub-class of
Egoists – maintain that there are only two sorts of
ultimate desires: the desire for pleasure and the
desire to avoid pain
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
42
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
43
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism
 A behavior (or behavioral disposition) is
evolutionarily altruistic iff it decreases the
inclusive fitness of the organism exhibiting the
behavior and increases the inclusive fitness of
some other organism

Inclusive fitness is (roughly) a measure of how
many copies of an organism’s genes exist in future
generations
44
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism

Thus an organism can increase it’s inclusive
fitness either by reproducing or by helping
kin to reproduce


So behaviors that help kin to reproduce are
typically not evolutionarily altruistic
“Behavior” is interpreted broadly; paramecia &
even plants can behave
45
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism
 Evolutionary altruism & psychological
altruism are logically independent – neither
entails the other

Evolutionary altruism without psychological
altruism

It is (logically) possible for an organism to exhibit
evolutionary altruism even though it has no mind
at all, and thus can’t have any ultimate desires
 Plants and paramecia can be evolutionary
altruists
46
Psychological Altruism &
Evolutionary Altruism
 Evolutionary altruism & psychological
altruism are logically independent – neither
entails the other

Psychological altruism without evolutionary
altruism
 If an organism has ultimate desires for the wellbeing of it’s offspring, it is a psychological
altruist
 But the helping behaviors these desires lead to
will typically not be evolutionarily altruistic,
since they will increase the parent’s inclusive
fitness
47
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
48
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
49
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Many theorists believe that evolutionary
altruism is biologically impossible

“Scratch an ‘altruist’ and watch a ‘hypocrite’
bleed.” Michael Ghiselin (1974)
 And some have claimed that if this is right
then psychological altruism is biologically
impossible as well
50
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 But since the two concepts are logically
independent, there is no easy or obvious
way to go from facts about evolutionary
altruism to conclusions about psychological
altruism
51
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 It has also been suggested that evolutionary
considerations impose important limits on
the scope of psychological altruism in
humans
 The argument is usually developed along the
following lines
52
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Psychological altruists are disposed to help
others even when their helping behavior
lowers the likelihood of their own reproductive
success
 There are only two ways in which such a
disposition can evolve

Kin selection

Reciprocal altruism
53
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Kin selection

Hamilton showed how
genes leading to costly
helping behavior could
spread thru a population, provided that the
recipients of help are
kin
54
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Reciprocal altruism

Trivers showed how
dispositions to help can
evolve when episodes
of helping are part of a
longer term reciprocal
strategy in which the
organism that is the
beneficiary of helping
behavior is disposed
to help its benefactor
on some subsequent
occasion
55
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 So it is biologically possible for organisms to
have ultimate desires to help their kin, and
to help non - kin with whom they engage in
ongoing reciprocal altruism
 But apart from these special cases,
psychological altruism can’t evolve
56
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Though remarkably influential, this
argument is far from convincing
57
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Psychological altruists are disposed to help
others even when their helping behavior
lowers the likelihood of their own reproductive
success
 There are only two ways in which such a
disposition can evolve

Kin selection

Reciprocal altruism
The Argument
58
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Psychological altruists are disposed to help
others even when their helping behavior
lowers the likelihood of their own reproductive
success
 There are only two ways in which such a
disposition can evolve

Kin selection

Reciprocal altruism
There is good
reason to be very
skeptical about this
premise
59
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 It has long been recognized that group selection, in
which one group of individuals leaves more
descendants than another group, can lead to the
evolution of helping behavior
 Until recently the reigning orthodoxy in evolutionary
biology has been that group selection is very
unlikely to occur in species like ours
 This view has been boldly challenged by Sober and
Wilson
 While their view is very controversial, I think that the
extent to which group selection played a role in
human evolution is very much an open question
60
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Much less controversially, Boyd and Richerson
have developed models demonstrating that
helping behavior (and, indeed, just about any
sort of behavior) can evolve if informal
punishment is meted out to individuals who do
not help in circumstances when they are
expected to
61
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Sripada has argued that ultimate desires for the well-
being of others could evolve via a different route



There are many situations in which people are better
off if they act in a coordinated way, but where no
specific way of acting is best. In these situations
several different “coordination equilibria” may be
equally adaptive.
To deal with this problem, natural selection may well
have led to the evolution of a psychological
mechanism that generates ultimate desires to
adhere to locally prevailing customs or practices
Since some of those locally prevailing customs may
require helping others, some of the ultimate desires
produced by that psychological mechanism might well
be psychologically altruistic
62
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 If Boyd & Richerson and Sripada are right,
(and I think they are)
then evolutionary theory gives us no
reason to suppose that psychological
altruism must be restricted to kin and
individuals involved in reciprocal
exchanges
63
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Psychological altruists are disposed to help
others even when their helping behavior
lowers the likelihood of their own reproductive
success
 There are only two ways in which such a
disposition can evolve

Kin selection

Reciprocal altruism
The Argument
DISOLVES
64
Evolutionary Arguments Against
Psychological Altruism
 Psychological altruists are disposed to help
others even when their helping behavior
lowers the likelihood of their own reproductive
success
The Argument
DISOLVES
65
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
66
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
egoism?
67
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism
Elliott Sober
David Sloan Wilson
68
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism
 The focus: Parental care


An excellent strategic choice, because human
parental care is surely importantly shaped by
natural selection, and one mechanism that
natural selection might exploit is an ultimate
desire for one’s children’s welfare
Since parental care is not evolutionarily
altruistic concerns about evolutionary
altruism can be put off to the side
69
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism
 Sober & Wilson’s game plan
= typically
altruismwant
+ egoism
“We conjecture that human parents
their children
to do well – to live rather than die, to be healthy rather than sick,
and so on. The question we will address is whether this desire
is merely an instrumental desire in the service of some egoistic
ultimate goal, or part of a pluralistic motivational system in which
there is an ultimate altruistic concern for the child’s welfare. We
will argue that there are evolutionary reasons to expect
motivational pluralism to be the proximate mechanism for
producing parental care in our species.” (301)
“We will focus … on hedonism as the main competitor that
the altruism hypothesis must confront…. By pitting altruism
against hedonism, we are asking the altruism hypothesis to
reply to the version of egoism that is most difficult to refute.”(297)
70
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism
 Would natural selection prefer altruism or
hedonism?
 S&W maintain that 3 factors influence which
sort of solution will evolve

Availability – trait must be present in the
population

Reliability

Energetic efficiency
71
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism
 There is, S&W argue, no reason to think
hedonism & altruism differ in


energetic efficiency
availability
 But they maintain that an altruistic
mechanism would be more reliable
 And thus it is more likely that the altruistic
mechanism would be the one that evolved
72
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism
 Are they right?
 In debates about cognitive mechanisms, the
devil is in the details
 So let’s look at some of those details
73
ALTRUISM
My kid
needs help
My kid needs
help
Other Beliefs
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
Action
Future Pain
Hedonism
My kid
needs help
If I don’t do
what will be
most helpful
for my kids, I
will feel bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
My kid needs
help
Other Beliefs
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
Action
My kid
needs help
If I feel bad b/c
my kid needs
help, then if I do
what is most
helpful for my
kid, I will stop
feeling bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
My kid needs
help
If I do what is
most helpful for
my kid, I will stop
feeling bad
Other Beliefs
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
Action
I feel bad b/c my
kid needs help
I feel bad b/c my kid needs help
Current Pain
Hedonism
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism
 Sober & Wilson offer a total of four
arguments for the greater reliability of
altruism – focusing on Current Pain
Hedonism
 Three of these arguments are easily refuted

For details, see Stich, “Evolution, Altruism & Cognitive
Architecture: A Critique of Sober & Wilson’s Argument for
Psychological Altruism, Biology & Philosophy, 2006
 Since time is short, I’ll focus on their 4th
argument, from which there is much to
learn
77
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

The Argument:
“Suppose a hedonistic organism believes on a given
occasion that providing parental care is the way for it to
attain its ultimate goal of maximizing pleasure and
minimizing pain. What would happen if the organism
provides parental care, but then discovers that this action
fails to deliver maximal pleasure and minimal pain? If the
organism is able to learn from experience, it will probably
be less inclined to take care of its children on subsequent
occasions. Instrumental desires tend to diminish and
disappear in the face of negative evidence of this sort.
This can make hedonistic motivation a rather poor control
device.” (314)
The “instrumental desire will remain in place only if the
organism …. is trapped by an unalterable illusion.” (315)
78
My kid
needs help
If I feel bad b/c
my kid needs
help, then if I do
what is most
helpful for my
kid, I will stop
feeling bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
My kid needs
help
If I do what is
most helpful for
my kid, I will stop
feeling bad
Other Beliefs
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
Action
I feel bad b/c my
kid needs help
I feel bad b/c my kid needs help
Current Pain
Hedonism
My kid
needs help
If I feel bad b/c
my kid needs
help, then if I do
what is most
helpful for my
kid, I will stop
feeling bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
My kid needs
help
If I do what is
most helpful for
my kid, I will stop
feeling bad
Other Beliefs
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
the belief S&W
are concerned
about
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
I feel bad b/c my
kid needs help
I feel bad b/c my kid needs help
Current Pain
Hedonism
Action
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

S&W are making an important point




Both versions of Hedonism rely on specific (& prima
facie empirical) beliefs
Those beliefs, like other beliefs, might be
undermined by evidence (including misleading
evidence) or by more theoretical beliefs (rational or
irrational) that a person could acquire by a variety of
routes
All of this makes the process underlying parental
care look quite vulnerable to disruption
and suggests that natural selection would likely opt
for some more reliable way to get this crucial job
done
81
My kid
needs help
If I feel bad b/c
my kid needs
help, then if I do
what is most
helpful for my
kid, I will stop
feeling bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
My kid needs
help
If I do what is
most helpful for
my kid, I will stop
feeling bad
Other Beliefs
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
the belief S&W
are concerned
about
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
I feel bad b/c my
kid needs help
I feel bad b/c my kid needs help
Current Pain
Hedonism
Action
My kid
needs help
If I feel bad b/c
my kid needs
help, then if I do
what is most
helpful for my
kid, I will stop
feeling bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
My kid needs
help
If I do what is
most helpful for
my kid, I will stop
feeling bad
Other Beliefs
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
Action
I feel bad b/c my
kid needs help
I feel bad b/c my kid needs help
Current Pain
Hedonism
My kid
needs help
If I feel bad b/c
my kid needs
help, then if I do
what is most
helpful for my
kid, I will stop
feeling bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
My kid needs
help
If I do what is
most helpful for
my kid, I will stop
feeling bad
Other Beliefs
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
Action
I feel bad b/c my
kid needs help
I feel bad b/c my kid needs help
Current Pain
Hedonism
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

So has altruism been vindicated?
 I am not persuaded
 To explain why, we’ll need to take a more careful
look at the account of ultimate & instrumental
desires that S&W (and much of the rest of the
altruism literature) rely on
 and at the assumptions about cognitive
processing and cognitive architecture that
this account presupposes
85
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

An instrumental desire was defined as desire that is
produced or sustained by a process of practical
reasoning like this one:
BELIEF 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 1
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
INSTRUMENTAL
ULTIMATE
ACTION
86
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

Nothing was said about the notion of belief involved
in this process; it was simply taken for granted

Like others in this area, including S&W, I tacitly
adopted the standard view that beliefs are
inferentially integrated representational states
that play a characteristic role in an agent’s
cognitive economy

To say that a belief is inferentially integrated is
to say (roughly) that it can be both generated
and removed by inferential processes that can
take any (or just about any) other beliefs as
premises
87
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

But the psychology, cognitive science &
philosophy literature often discuss belief-like
states that are “stickier” than this


Once acquired, these “stickier” belief-like
states are harder to modify by changing
other beliefs
In a paper written a zillion years ago, I called
these “sub-doxastic states”
88
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

Examples include:


The grammatical rules that, according to
Chomsky, underlie comprehension, speech
production & linguistic judgment
“Core beliefs” like those posited by Carey &
Spelke



They underlie early inferences about
the physical and mathematical
properties of objects
They are innate
They are unalterable – still lurking
and relied on, even when more
sophisticated theories are acquired
89
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

Since sub-doxastic states can play a role in
inference-like interactions, and since practical
reasoning is an inference-like interaction, it is
possible that sub-doxastic states play the belief-role
in some episodes of practical reasoning

So instead of this
BELIEF 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 1
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
90
ACTION
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

We might sometimes have this
SUB-DOXASTIC
STATE 1
DESIRE 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
91
ACTION
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

What makes practical reasoning structures like this
important for our purposes is that, since SUBDOXASTIC STATE 1 is difficult or impossible to
remove using evidence or inference, DESIRE 2 will
be reliably correlated with DESIRE 1
SUB-DOXASTIC
STATE 1
DESIRE 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
92
ACTION
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

What makes practical reasoning structures like this
important for our purposes is that, since SUBDOXASTIC STATE 1 is difficult or impossible to
remove using evidence or inference, DESIRE 2 will
be reliably correlated with DESIRE 1
SUB-DOXASTIC
STATE 1
DESIRE 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
93
ACTION
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

What makes practical reasoning structures like this
important for our purposes is that, since SUBDOXASTIC STATE 1 is difficult or impossible to
remove using evidence or inference, DESIRE 2 will
be reliably correlated with DESIRE 1
SUB-DOXASTIC
STATE 1
DESIRE 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
94
ACTION
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism


Let’s now ask: Is DESIRE 2 instrumental or ultimate?
Since the objects of ultimate desires are “desired for
their own sakes” and since the object of DESIRE 2 is
not desired for its own sake, it seems natural enough
to say that DESIRE 2 is instrumental
SUB-DOXASTIC
STATE 1
DESIRE 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
95
ACTION
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

But if desires like DESIRE 2 do count as
instrumental, then Sober & Wilson’s evolutionary
argument for psychological altruism is in trouble.
SUB-DOXASTIC
STATE 1
DESIRE 1
BELIEF 2
BELIEF 3
DESIRE 2
DESIRE 3
DESIRE 4
96
ACTION
My kid
needs help
If I feel bad b/c
my kid needs
help, then if I do
what is most
helpful for my
kid, I will stop
feeling bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
My kid needs
help
If I do what is
most helpful for
my kid, I will stop
feeling bad
Other Beliefs
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
the belief S&W
are concerned
about
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
I feel bad b/c my
kid needs help
I feel bad b/c my kid needs help
Current Pain
Hedonism
Action
My kid
needs help
If I feel bad b/c
my kid needs
help, then if I do
what is most
helpful for my
kid, I will stop
feeling bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
My kid needs
help
If I do what is
most helpful for
my kid, I will stop
feeling bad
but if this is a
sticky subOther Beliefsdoxastic state
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
this desire
can’t be
undermined
by experience
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
I feel bad b/c my
kid needs help
I feel bad b/c my kid needs help
Current Pain
Hedonism
Belief
Action
An Evolutionary Argument FOR
Psychological Altruism

Thus Sober & Wilson have not made their
case that
ALTRUISM
is more reliable than
HEDONISM
99
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
Egoism?
100
Overview
 Ψ Egoism vs. Ψ Altruism: Why Philosophers
Care
 Can Evolutionary Theory Resolve the
Debate?



Psychological Altruism & Evolutionary
Altruism: A Crucial Distinction
Evolutionary Arguments Against Altruism
An Evolutionary Argument For Altruism
 Should Moral Philosophers Worry about Ψ
Egoism?
101
Should Moral Philosophers Worry
About Ψ Egoism?
 Recall Hobbes, Bentham & Mill were worried
about Ψ Egoism because they believed it
made pro-social behavior fragile

If people believe that behaving pro-socially will
not lead to their “own good … there will be no
beginning of benevolence or trust, not
consequently of mutual help” (Leviathan,1651, Ch. 15)
102
Should Moral Philosophers Worry
About Ψ Egoism?
 But one lesson to be learned from the critique
of Sober & Wilson’s argument is that if
“Mother Nature” (or natural selection, or
God) wanted to foster pro-social behavior
in a given domain, she need not have made
us Ψ altruists in that domain
 It would be equally effective to make us Ψ
egoists (indeed, hedonists!) with an
appropriate sub-doxastic state
103
ALTRUISM
My kid
needs help
My kid needs
help
Other Beliefs
This Altruist
will behave in exactly
the same way as
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
Action
Future Pain
Hedonism
My kid
needs help
My kid needs
help
if this is a
Other Beliefs sticky subdoxastic state
This Altruist
If I don’t do
what will be
most helpful
for my kids, I
will feel bad
I maximize my
pleasure &
minimize my pain
will behave in exactly
the same way as
A* is the best
way to help
my kid
This Egoist
I do what will be
most helpful for
my kids
I do A*
A*
Ultimate Desire
Instrumental Desire
Belief
Action
Should Moral Philosophers Worry
About Ψ Egoism?
 Of course, the Egoist’s instrumental pro-
social desire may be overridden by a
stronger self-interested desire
 But the Altruist’s intrinsic pro-social desire
can ALSO be overridden by a stronger selfinterested desire
106
Should Moral Philosophers Worry
About Ψ Egoism?
 So contrary to what generations of
philosophers have assumed, pro-social
behavior is no more fragile if Ψ Egoism is
true than if Ψ Altruism is true
 Moreover, by my lights, a Ψ Egoist who is
reliably prosocial is more morally appealing
than a Ψ Altruist whose desire to help is
ultimate and unconnected to affect
107
Should Moral Philosophers Worry
About Ψ Egoism?
 Arguably, Mother Teresa helped the wretched
because she found their distress painful and
alleviating that distress brought her joy
The End
 And these are the motives of a Ψ Egoist!