1
Federation of European Explosives
Manufacturers
Meeting
of the
Transport Working Group on
Tuesday, 10 March 2015
in Brussels, Hotel Manos
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Opening of the Meeting by the
Chairman
Normally the meetings are opened by the
Chairperson. Unfortunately, our
chairlady Marlies Becker has left Orica
and consequently also our organization.
Therefore, we are in need to elect a new
head to this group. We will come to this
under AOB.
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Meeting of the Transport Working Group
List of Participants
1. Jon Jones, Austin, UK
2. Ivana Jakubkova, Austin Detonators, CZ
3. Maurice Delaloye, SSE, Switzerland
4. Martin Klein, DynaEnergetics, Germany
5. Lucie Holubova, Explosia, CZ
6. Marin Dorobantu, Weatherford, Romania
7. Thierry Rousse, EPC, France
8. Rafael Lopez, Maxam, Spain
Apology
1. Marlies Becker, Orica Europe, Germany, Chairlady
2. Janusz Dryzga , Nitroerg, Poland
In attendance: Hans H. Meyer, FEEM, Belgium
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2.) Compliance with European Competition Law
As an Association, FEEM operates in strict compliance with
European competition laws. Respect for these laws is a core value
applying to all FEEM activities. All members of this Group
have been informed by the Secretary General about prohibited
discussion topics which apply not only during meetings but also to
social gatherings before and after meetings. By signing the
participation form, the delegates declare their adherence to the
Competition Compliance Programme and agree to comply with
Competition Law.
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Compliance with European Competition Law
(cont.)
Very clearly: You are not allowed to discuss or exchange information
which is not in conformity with competition legislation, including
e.g. on:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Prices
Production details
Transportation rates
Market procedures
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Transport Working Group
3. AGENDA
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
a)
Opening of the Meeting by the President
Compliance with the European and National
Competition Laws and Regulations
Agenda and Approval of the Agenda
Minutes of the last meeting on Tuesday, 30th September 2014 in
Lisbon and approval
Secretary General’s Report
with in particular:
Latest developments with European Explosives Legislation
I.
Export of explosives to restricted countries
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Transport Working Group
5. AGENDA (cont.)
II. T&T postponement for “non-registered” products
manufactured between 2013 and 2015
III. Single code for the manufacturing site to be used for all
imports into the EU
6. Any other business:
1. Colour Coding
2. Recording the location of each explosive
3. Date and place of the next meeting
4. Transport related incidents
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Transport Working Group
5. AGENDA (cont.)
II. Situation T&T postponement for “non-registered”
products manufactured between 2013 and 2015
III.Results and résumés of XML file ring test
IV. Single code for the manufacturing site to be used for all
imports into the EU
6. Any other business:
1. Colour Coding
2. Recording the location of each explosive
3. Date and place of the next meeting
4. Transport related incidents
7. Subjects for the next meeting
8. Date & Place of the next meeting
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Transport Working Group
Item 3: Approval of the Agenda
Do I find your agreement to this Agenda?
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Transport Working Group
Item 4:
Minutes of the last Meeting in Lisbon on 30 September
2015 and approval
Do I find your agreement to these Minutes?
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Transport Working Group
Item 5:
Secretary General’s Report
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Latest Developments with European Explosives
Legislation
EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED
COUNTRIES
There are several European Council Regulations which
prohibit the export of some types of civil explosives and
ALL INITIATION SYSTEMS to certain “sensitive
countries” under the concept of “products which can be
used for internal repression”.
But the industry has to be careful! The ban refers not only
to products and countries but also to individual persons,
organisations and companies, e.g. in Russia and other
sensitive countries. So you responsible export staff must
investigate if their customers are not mentioned in some
lists.
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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIES
Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force are based on
Article 215 TFEU and Decisions adopted in the framework
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) provides a legal basis for the
interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of the
Union’s economic and financial relations with one or more
third countries, where such restrictive measures are
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Common
Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP).
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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIES
Some of these countries comprise:
BELARUS, REPUBLIC OF GUINEA, IRAN, LIBYA,
MYANMAR, SYRIA, ZIMBABWE, AFGHANISTAN,
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, DEMOCRACTIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO, COTE D’IVOIRE,
ERITREA, REPUBLIC OF GUINEA (CONAKRY),
GUINEA-BISSAU, IRAN, LIBERIA, LIBYA, MOLDOVA,
RUSSIA
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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIES
However, there are several International and Multinational
Companies working in these countries in the fields of:
Exploration projects for fuel and gas, Cement, Iron,
Fertilizers, Aluminium, Precious Metals (Gold, Silver,
Platinum) and other Minerals and Raw Materials.
These companies are potential export customers and the
European explosives industry is prohibited to supply them.
This is a competitve disadvantage since non-EU suppliers
(including US, South-Africa, India, Australia) do not face
such restrictions.
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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIES
According to EUROSTAT, the EU imports gas, fuel and mining
products from practically all the aforementioned countries under
the internal repression ban; a number of multinational
companies produce and export to EU from those countries
cement, iron, fertilizers, aluminium, ornamental stones, gold,
silver, platinum, fuel, gas, and other minerals and raw materials;
it is important to say that nearly all the aforesaid activities
require unavoidably the use of civil explosives and initiation
systems.
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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIES
Based on these facts FEEM has made an Application for a
REVISION OF THE EUROPEAN LIST OF PRODUCTS
which can be used for internal repression (In practical
terms this means, that FEEM has provided the text of the
law, which has been taken over 1:1). FEEM argued that
civil explosives and initiation systems - listed under the
point 4 of the “internal repression list” - are specially
conceived, designed and shaped for blasting activities in
the fields of public infrastructure works and mining and
fuel extraction and prospecting activities; its explosives
properties, characteristics and the conditions and methods
of use, are totally different to the military initiations
systems and explosives and therefore it is possible to say
that they can hardly be used for internal repression.
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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIES
Generally, military explosives need to be stabile, thus implying resistance
to shock, moisture and other considerations that come about through the
nature of their use. They usually need to be capable of being stored for
long periods of time (about 10 years) without significant deterioration.
They differ against blasting explosives by their chemistry (e.g. density
about 1.8 g/cm³) and their physical properties like detonation velocity (e.g.
Octogen: > 9,000 m/s). Civil industrial explosives like Dynamites,
Emulsion Explosives or ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil) are only of
limited shelf-lives which range between 6 months and 18 months. Their
densities are between 0.9 g/cm³ (ANFO) and 1.4 g/cm³ (Dynamite).
Detonation velocities are between 2,000 m/s and 5,500 m/s. Military
explosives are readily available to repressive countries from various sources
so there would be no call or need to use civil explosives anyway.
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Competitive Situation
As mentioned before no other countries in the world have such type
of ban; the prohibition has been established only at European level
and consequently Non-European companies can sell / export all
types of civil explosives and initiation systems without any restriction
or export controls to the countries under the internal repression ban;
in this sense it is important to highlight that civil explosives and
initiation systems are not included neither in the international LISTS
OF DUAL USE GOODS nor in the MUNITIONS LIST (Wassenaar
arrangement).
Therefore, the negative effect for the European Industry of civil
explosives is very significant because our competitors are supplying
the goods, mainly from USA, Canada, South Africa and Australia.
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A first success of FEEM’s Activities has already been achieved,
because the “EU FOREIGN MINISTRY” relaxed in a 1st action
the COTE D’IVOIRE sanctions to allow certain prohibited goods.
On 10 February 2015, the European Union published Council
Regulation (EU) 2015/192 (which amends Council Regulation
(EC) No 174/2005) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/202 (which
amends Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP).
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COTE D’IVOIRE sanctions
An additional derogation from the prohibition on the sale, supply,
transfer and export of equipment which might be used for internal
repression has been introduced in order to enable the
authorization of certain equipment, where appropriate, for the
purposes of civilian use in mining or infrastructure projects,
following the adoption of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/202. By
way of derogation from Article 3, the competent authority, as
listed in Annex II, of the Member State where the exporter is
established or, in the case that the exporter is not established
within the Union, the Member State from which the equipment
may be sold, supplied, transferred or exported, may authorize,
under such conditions as it deems appropriate, the sale, supply,
transfer or export of equipment as listed in point 4 of Annex I,
where the equipment is solely for civilian use in mining or
infrastructure projects.
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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIES
These derogations are subject to authorization on a case by
case basis by the exporting Member State. Where the
equipment is purportedly for civilian use the exporting state
must inform other Member States and the Commission of its
intention to authorize at least one week in advance of doing so,
and no more than two weeks after authorization where the
equipment is for maintenance of public order.
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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIES
The other restricted countries on the sanctions’ list
will hopefully follow in due course with identical
derogations! The next priorities are Zimbabwe
and Myanmar.
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5aII):
POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED” EXPLOSIVES
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POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED”
EXPLOSIVES
FEEM IT and T&T experts asked the Secretariat on the occasions
of their meetings in Brussels and Prague in July and November
2014 to propose to the Commission a transition period for labeled
but not traced products from April 2015 to 2016.
The legal department of the Commission has been contacted by
the SG in July and November 2014 and again in February 2015 and
they are working on it. Chances are considered as very low
because of long EU and National legislation processes!
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POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED”
EXPLOSIVES
FEEM has proposed to the Commission to investigate if there is a
possibility for a transition period of one or more years after April 2015 for
the integration of these “interim products” into the traceability
managing systems. Concerning the transition period, the explosives
industry suggested to propose two differing times because of the
relevant shelf-lives of the products:
A) ONE YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD (i.e. until 5 April 2016) for:
1. Cartridged explosives and explosives in sacks
2. Two-component explosives
B) TWO YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (i.e. until 5 April 2017) for
1. Plain detonators
2. Electric, non-electric and electronic detonators
3. Primers and boosters
4. Detonating cords and safety fuses
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POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED”
EXPLOSIVES
Although the explosives industry is now fully ready for the implementation
of phase 2 by 5 April 2015, due to different interpretations of the Directive
many explosives manufacturers have been unable to forward details of
uniquely numbered items to downstream users (dealers, distributors, endusers in mining, quarrying and construction) in sufficient time for the
whole supply chain to record all movements of explosives items from 5th
April 2015. Many downstream users will be ready to receive the electronic
documentation only as of 5th April 2015, which leaves them in a situation
of non compliance of quantities of explosives stocks throughout Europe.
Some of the national Authorities recognise the issue faced but from a
regulatory perspective they would need further guidance from the
European Commission to enable a common pragmatic approach to be
taken.
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POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED”
EXPLOSIVES
SHE ASPECTS
The explosives industry has also emphasised the safety
implications concerning this "remaining" stock if
approval is not granted. The industry including their
downstream users would be required to
unpack/scan/repack all this product in each of its
locations where it may not be feasible or licensed to do so,
complications will be around the ability to move this
products, having competent and trained personnel
available throughout the supply chain and the impact of
magazine capacity due to stock not being able to physically
move.
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POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED”
EXPLOSIVES
Since all FEEM members have made enormous efforts
to avoid stocks of “non-traceable” items in their
magazines this proposal is mainly to support our
customers and other business partners, like distributors
and end users. In case the proposal will be approved, we are
aware that there are products in the market which are traceable
and products which are not traceable. There it could be a natural
tendency to prefer non traceable ones, since it would be easier.
This would be detrimental not only to Security, but also to those
manufacturers who have managed to have their Track&Trace
system fully ready according to EU Directives 43/2008 and 4/2012.
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POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED”
EXPLOSIVES
Therefore, FEEM has also informed the Commission on the following
points to be considered in the case that a postponement was approved.
1. The obligation by all undertakings of the supply chain is to prioritize
those products which are 100% traceable.
2. In case this is not feasible, the Commission must clearly establish
regulations, limits, controls and conditions concerning the use of
products which are not 100% traceable.
3. Additionally it is absolutely necessary to make clear to the Commission
that, in case an incident would take place involving products which are
not 100% traceable, there is not any responsibility on the side of the
manufacturers.
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POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED”
EXPLOSIVES
It must be mentioned that this initiative is not unambiguous;
neither in our industry nor in the end-user associations.
There were complaints from some members that they have done
their “home-work” and that they are ready as of next month.
Also UEPG signaled that their members and end-users do not
understand the necessity for a postponement. Here I have the
feeling that they didn’t understand the background although the
explanations were structured and clear. E.g. they have been
confusing marked und un-marked products.
FEEM has only been considering products which are unable to be
broken down within the hierarchy (Pallet – Case – Item) because
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of the missing XML information.
Item 5 a, IV:
Results and résumés of XML file ring test
I received an information last week from Kimit,
Kiruna:
We are experiencing problems with the format from
different suppliers around Europe.
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Results and résumés of XML file ring test
At the last Track & Trace Workshop in
Prague, Czech Republic on Wednesday, 19
October 2014 the delegates agreed to
circulate “Test-Files” to each other in order
to test the readability of the file-content.
How did it work?
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Item 5 a, III:
Codes for non-EU manufacturing sites
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Codes for non-EU manufacturing sites
You remember that we had this discussion
before: Under the T&T Directive, multiple
codes for a single manufacturing site and an
identical article are presently necessary if
there are several importers (in a single
Member State or several Member States).
This could place an EU-based manufacturer
with overseas production sites or a third
country manufacturers at a competitive
disadvantage vis a vis EU manufacturers.
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Codes for non-EU manufacturing sites
For example, inventory production would have to shift to
batch production for a specific order and the quantities of
product at storage sites would increase. Marked products
will not be able to be diverted for other destinations and the
likelihood of products being incorrectly marked could
increase. All this will lead to greater costs, would be
confusing to customers and regulators and could
undermine the aim of improving security and traceability.
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Codes for non-EU manufacturing sites
Therefore FEEM has made a further proposal in November 2014
to the Commission:
SINGLE CODE FOR THE MANUFACTURING SITE TO BE
USED FOR ALL IMPORTS INTO THE EU!
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Codes for non-EU manufacturing sites
Proposal:
Clarification of COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC ,
CHAPTER 2, PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION, Article 3, Unique
Identification, Point 5, 2nd sub-paragraph, which reads:
Where the manufacturing site is located outside the Community and
the manufacturer is not established in the Community, the
IMPORTER of the explosives concerned shall contact a
NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE MEMBER STATE OF
IMPORT in order for the manufacturing site to be attributed a code.
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Codes for non-EU manufacturing sites
What is the procedure for attributing manufacturing site codes to
non-EU manufacturing sites under Commission Directive
2008/43/EC, as amended by Directive 2012/4/EU?
The “QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS” on CIRCABC
CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE
93/15/EEC are more specific: ………..
he (the importer) could contact the national authority of the
Member State in which he is established or of first import and
obtain a single code for the manufacturing site to be used for all
imports into the EU.
Codes for non-EU manufacturing sites
Summary:
The Explosives Industry feels, that there is the
potential to misconstrue the intent of the regulations
by inferring that each "importer" is required to contact
their National Authority for the attribution of a
manufacturing code for a Manufacturer not established
in the Community. If this is the case the manufacturer
would be required to produce identification uniquely
for each importer or distributor. This would not be
feasible as it would enforce a "made to order"
manufacturing strategy on non-EU sites where no
mandate exists.
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Codes for non-EU manufacturing sites
Proposal:
Where the manufacturing site is located outside
the Community and the manufacturer is not
established in the Community, the importer of
the explosives concerned shall contact a national
authority of the Member State in which he is
established or of first import and obtain a single
code for the manufacturing site to be used for all
imports into the EU.
6. Any other Business
COLOR-CODING OF EXPLOSIVES
In July 2014 FEEM has distributed to their
members the I.R.E. (ISTITUTO
RICERCHE ESPLOSIVISTICHE) Report
with recommendations to the EU
Commission (Directorate – General Home
Affairs) toward setting standards and
regulating the colour-coding of explosives
and blasting accessories such as igniters,
detonators and detonating cords.
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Color-Coding of Explosives
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Color-Coding of Explosives
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Color-Coding of Explosives
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Color-Coding of Explosives
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Color-Coding of Explosives
FEEM complaint to the Commission about
this abstruse proposal on the occasion of the
October 2014 EU-Experts’ meeting.
Consequently this issue will not be pursuit
any longer. It has been stopped. DG Home
and the Italian Research Centre have been
instructed accordingly.
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Recording the Location of each Explosive
Recording the Location of each Explosive
Background:
COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC of 4 April 2008 setting
up, pursuant to Council Directive 93/15/EEC, a system for the
identification and traceability of explosives for civil uses amended by
Commission Directive 2012/4/EU of 22 February 2012: Article 14
Obligations of undertakings
(a) keeping a record of all identifications of explosives, together with
all pertinent information including the type of explosive, the
company or person to the custody of whom it was given;
(b) recording the location of each explosive while the explosive is in
their possession or custody until it is either transferred to another
undertaking or used;
Recording the Location of each Explosive
Statement:: Article 14(b) states "recording the location of each
explosive" is ambiguous as there is no definition of "Location",
this can be deemed as a distinct physical location e.g. magazines
or warehouses OR a single location/Site inclusive of multiple
physical locations e.g. magazines or warehouse.
Request: FEEM seeks guidance, clarification or consensus, we
understand that "Location" is defined as a distinct physical
location where explosive material is stored and managed as
inventory e.g. individual magazine, warehouse etc., this
confirmation is required for our industry to standardise their
supply chain and also ensure that there is no impact between
industry members when reporting to/or dealing with regulators.
Recording the Location of each Explosive
The general consensus of our members is that it
is classed as Distinct Physical Location, but some
countries see this different. Therefore, official
guidance from the Commission would be
appreciated.
6.3) Date and Place of the next Meeting
You have the choice:
Either Monday/Tuesday, 21./22. September 2015 in Budapest or
alternatively Monday/Tuesday, 12./13. October in Barcelona
Transport / Storage Related Incidents
TRUCK EXPLOSION ON THE MITCHELL
HIGHWAY, QUEENSLAND ON 5
SEPTEMBER 2014
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58
Queensland Accident
A TRUCK carrying AN in outback Queensland exploded with such
force that residents more than 30km away thought an earthquake had
occurred.
Four firefighters and a policeman were among eight people injured
when a truck carrying 50 tonnes of ammonium nitrate exploded on the
Mitchell Highway, about 30km south of Charleville in southwest
Queensland.
The explosion occurred as emergency crews responded to reports of a
truck rollover.
The force of the blast destroyed a bridge, cutting off the main route
between Charleville and nearby Wyandra. It also severely damaged two
fire trucks at the scene.
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Queensland Accident
Four firefighters were also injured, with two still recovering
in hospital, along with a police officer and another member
of the public. Charleville police officer-in-charge Senior
Sergeant Adrian Rieck said the Queensland Fire and
Emergency Service crews were able to remove the driver
from the wreck before the explosion.
"They were very close, within 30 metres of the wreckage,
and at that time there were two explosions within quick
succession," he said.
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Queensland Accident
The truck belongs to Kalari Transport Ltd., which is one of
Australia’s specialist bulk logistics providers to the mining and
resources sector carrying AN from ORICA'S YARWUN plant at
GLADSTONE.
FIVE trucks a week depart Orica's Yarwun factory loaded with
ammonium nitrate, headed for all parts of the country.
One of those trucks overturned on the Mitchell Hwy near
Charleville on Friday, headed for South Australia.
Diesel spilling from the fuel tank came into contact with the load,
creating a massive explosion which seriously injured eight and
obliterated the highway and truck.
An attending fire truck was also destroyed.
In light of the explosion, Gladstone residents have expressed
concerns about living in the same town as an ammonium nitrate
plant.
(from the Australian “Observer”, 9.9.14)
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2. VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
The 2014 Gorni Lom explosions were a series
of explosions that began on the afternoon of
1 October, 2014, at 16:59 pm local time at the
former Midzhur Ammo Plant belonging to
Videx Explosives Ltd. in the village of Gorni
Lom, in Bulgaria's northwestern Vidin
Province. The series of blasts completely
destroyed the factory, killing 13 men and 2
women who were inside and injuring 3 others
who were some distance away.
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63
64
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67
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VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
VIDEX produces civil explosives like:
various types of Ammonites (AN + TNT)
ANFO & Mixtures with demil. explosives
Cast TNT BOOSTERS
& they deal with
All sorts of demil. explosives
(TNT/RDX/PETN/HMX)
Detonators
Det. Cords
They also offer blast & drilling services
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VIDEX Explosives, Bulgaria
The main explosion took place at 16:59 pm local
time, with a large secondary blast taking place at
21:45 pm. The approximately 15 people who were
working inside the factory at the time of the first
explosion are presumed to have died instantly,
while 3 female workers in the vicinity of the
complex suffered injuries from flying glass and
shrapnel. Authorities estimated around 10 tonnes
of highly explosive chemicals were stored at the
site, in addition to the weapons being dismantled.
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VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
According to Nikola Nikolov, the head of the
interior ministry's civil defense force, the blasts
were powerful enough to completely destroy the
main buildings in the plant, leaving huge craters
the size of football fields behind and sending
debris flying up to a kilometer away. The workers
were reportedly dismantling old Greek mines at
the time of the accident in Gorni Lom,
approximately 145 km northwest of Bulgaria's
capital Sofia.
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VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
The same plant had received several urgent citations by
authorities just two months prior to the accident, notifying the
owners of outdated equipment, improperly stored explosives
and a larger amount of munitions at the site than it could
safely handle.
The same plant suffered two blasts in 2007 and 2010 that
injured a total of 6 people and flattened two separate
buildings. In the aftermath of the disaster labour minister
Yordan Hristoskov vowed to never allow the factory to reopen,
placing the future of around 150 jobs in question and
prompting condemnation from local residents.
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VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
This was Bulgaria's tenth such accident
since 1979 and the second one in just two
months, after a blast at a similar plant in
Kostenets injured 10 people on August 8. An
explosion at another facility near Sliven
killed 3 people in 2012, and in 2008 a series
of huge blasts at an arms depot near Sofia
injured 3, forced the closure of Sofia Airport
and registered as a 3.2 tremor on
seismographs.
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VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
In response to the disaster, authorities dispatched
Army units equipped with drones and thermal
cameras to search for survivors and assess the
damage. After a period of 24 hours since the last
explosion had passed, investigators were allowed
access to the scene and began their work, making the
initial trip in a Bulgarian Army Sand Cat vehicle as a
safety precaution. One of the members of that initial
team, Valentin Radev, said that "the plant and the
people seem to have just vanished" and described the
scene as a "moonscape".
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VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
The experts think the most likely reasons behind the tragedy
are a human error or non-observance of technological
discipline and probable violation of workplace safety rules.
Asked to comment on what a human error meant, one official
said: “For instance, I hold a particular opinion. At the
workshop, there was a machine at one of its ends that broke
trinitrotoluene taken out of the mines to powder. That
trinitrotoluene is of lower sensitivity and can be processed in
that manner but in the American-made mines – M16 there are
explosive charges of a more sensitive explosive substance.
When one has not taken it out and it comes to be in the blocks
containing trinitrotoluene, it is highly sensitive and this may
have caused the blast.“
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VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
“Major responsibility falls upon company’s
management. They used to show criminal
negligence towards the recommendations of
the Labour Inspectorate and the dangerous
substances control service (KOS),” said
Bulgarian interim Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Labour and Social Policies,
Yordan Hristoskov.
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Fire on truck hauling 40 tonnes of AN solution closes highway near
Kamloops, Canada on 06 November 2014
A truck fire that began before 3 p.m. PT resulted in the closure of
Highway 1 at Six Mile Hill near Tobiano for over three hours
Thursday afternoon.
The situation was very serious due to the contents that were being
hauled.
"The tanker truck contains an explosive material, therefore the
highway has been closed in both directions until further notice,"
she told CBC News just before 3:30 p.m. PT. "Police are currently
assessing the situation and determining evacuation requirements
for residents in the area."
The driver was able to unhook the trailer from the burning cab.
Just before 6:30 p.m. the scene was clear and the highway had
reopened
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Fire on truck hauling 40 tonnes of AN solution closes highway near
Kamloops, Canada on 06 November 2014
Once the fire burnt down, the trailer that was
transporting the AN solution was inspected and deemed
fit for service. It was relocated to an Orica site for secure
storage.
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Fire on truck hauling 40 tonnes of AN solution closes highway near
Kamloops, Canada on 06 November 2014
79
AOB
New Chairlady / Chairman
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Thank you for your attention and a
good meeting.
Lunch will be served now in the
Restaurant.
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