Philosophy 190: Plato
Fall, 2014
Prof. Peter Hadreas
Course website:
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas
/courses/Plato
PLATO:
PROTAGORAS
Time: The dramatic date of the dialogue is
shortly before the outbreak of the First
Peloponnesian War, probably about 433,
Socrates is about 37, Alcibiades is about 17.
Place: Socrates relates the conversations that
took place earlier in the morning to an
unnamed friend. It interchanges between
famous sophists took place at the house of
Callias, characterized as the wealthiest man in
Athens.
Who is Protagoras?
Protagoras
“Protagoras was a native of Abdera, the city in the remote
north-east of Greece, which also gave birth to Democritus.
Since for our purposes relative dates are more important that
absolute, we may note that Plato makes him say, before a
company which included Socrates, Prodicus and Hippias, that
he is old enough to be the father of any one of them (Prot.
317C). In the Hippias Major (282E), too, Hippias describes
himself as a much younger man than Protagoras. This
suggests a date of not later than 490 for Protagoras’ birth
(which would make him about twenty years older than
Socrates, probably the eldest of his auditors), in the Meno
(91E) he is said to have died at the age of about seventy-four
after forty years as a practicing sophist.”1
1. Guthrie, W. K. C., The Sophists, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1971), p. 262.
Who is Protagoras?
“Protagoras was the most famous, and perhaps
the earliest, of all the professional Sophists, who
trained others for the profession as well as for
public life.”1
Protagoras
“The theoretical foundation for all these
statements [claims made about Protagoras’
doctrine that truth and values are relative] lies in
the thesis which which he opened his work on
Truth:2
“Man is the measure of all things, of the
things that are that they are, and of the
things that are not that they are not.”
1. Guthrie, op. cit., p. 263.
I. Introductory conversation between Socrates and an
unnamed friend. Socrates tells that friend that he had visited
Protagoras in the morning. Socrates begins to recount
happenings: (pp. 747-748; 309a1-310a7)
Opening Conversation:
FRIEND: Where have you just come from, Socrates? No don’t tell me. It’s
pretty obvious that you’ve been hunting the ripe and ready Alcibiades.
Well, I saw him just the other day, and he is certainly a beautiful man –
and just between the two of us, ‘man’ is the proper word, Socrates: his
beard is already filling out.
SOCRATES: Well, what of it? I thought you were an admirer of Homer,
who says that youth is most charming when the beard is first blooming –
which is just the stage Alcibiades is at.
Is this gossip?
Opening Conversation continued:
FRIEND: So what’s up? Were you just bwith him? And how is the young
man disposed towards you?
SOCRATES: Pretty well, I think, especially today, since he rallied to my
side and said a great many things to support me. You’re right, of course: I
was just with him. But there’s something really strangte I want to tell you
about. Although we were together, I didn’t pay him any mind; in find I
forgot all about him most of the time.
FRIEND: How could anything like that have happened to the two of you?
You surely haven’t met someone else more beautiful, at least not in this
city.
SOCRATES: Much more beautiful
FRIEND: What are you saying? A citizen or a foreigner?
SOCRATES: A foreigner.
FRIEND: From where?
SOCRATES: Abdera [Socrates refers to Progaoras as beautiful because of
his wisdom.]
Greek (Athenian and some other, but not all, Greek citystates of the 5th and 4th century BCE) Homosexuality
Between men: The Greeks of the classical period did not
identify people according to their sexual orientation. There
is no term for ‘homosexual’ in Attic (classical Athenian)
Greek. Behavior was distinguished by the role that each
participant played in the sex act. It was understood as active
or passive. This active/passive polarization corresponded
with dominant and submissive social roles: the active role
was associated with masculinity, higher social status, and
adulthood, while the passive role was associated with
femininity, lower social status, and youth.1
1. Oxford Classical Dictionary entry on homosexuality, pp.720–723; entry by David M.
Halperin.
Greek (Athenian of the 5th and 4th century BCE)
Homosexuality
Between women: Sexual relations between women can be
conjectured from the prominence and eminent status of
Sappho, a poet from the island of Lesbos. Sappho wrote many
love poems addressed to women and girls. The love in these
poems is sometimes requited, and sometimes not. Sappho is
thought to have written close to 12,000 lines of poetry on her
love for other women. Among the writers that were most
revered in antiquity Sappho’s writing have particularly
suffered from a lack of preservation through the Dark Ages.
Of her 12,000 lines of poetry that were judged frequently as
the finest lyric poetry in Greek, only about 600 lines have
survived.
Protagoras introduces himself
p. 754 (317B-C)
PROTAGAROS: “I admit that I am a sophist and that I
educate men, and I consider this admission to be a better
precaution than denial. And I have given thought to other
precautions as well, so as to avoid, God willing, suffering any
ill from admitting I am a sophist. I have been in the
profession for many years now, and I’m old enough to be the
father of any of you here. So if you do have a request, it would
give me the greatest pleasure by far to deliver my lecture in
the presence of everyone in the house.”
Protagoras explains what he can teach
p. 755 (319A)
PROTAGORAS: . . . “but if he [Socrates’ friend
Hippocrates] comes to me he will learn only
what he has come for. What I teach is sound
deliberation, both in domestic matters – how
best to manage one’s household, and in public
affairs – how to realize one’s own potential for
success in political debate and action.”
Socrates doubts that Protagoras can teach what he claims to
p. 755 (319A)
SOCRATES: . . . But when it is a matter of deliberating on
city management, anyone can stand up and advise them,
carpenter, blacksmith, shoemaker, merchant, ship-captain,
rich man, poor man, well-born low-born – it doesn’t matter –
and nobody blasts him for presuming to give counsel without
any proper training under a teacher. The reason is clear. They
do not think that this can be taught. . . . also in private life,
where the wisest and best of our citizens are unable to
transmit to to others the virtues that they possess. Look at
Pericles, the father of these young men here. He gave them a
superb education in everything that teachers can teach, but as
for what he himself is really wise in, he neither teaches them
that himself. nor has anyone else teach them either . . .
Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be
taught by a story
p. 756-62 (320A-328E)
1. Epimetheus [literally meaning "hindsight, hindthought"]
gave animals, tough hides and thick pelt capable of warding
off winter storms (p. 757) 321B. He shod some with hooves,
others with think pads of bloodless skin. He provided various
forms of nourishment. He gave some multiple births to ensure
species and others few births. . But he used up all the power
and abilities on the nonreasoning animals.
2. Prometheus [literally ‘thinking ahead’] trying to help the
human race, stole fire from Haephestus, and then from
Athena practical arts and wisdom.
Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be taught by a story
p. 756-62 (320A-328E)
mosaic of Epimetheus and Prometheus
Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be taught by a story
p. 756-62 (320A-328E)
3. But political wisdom was in keeping of Zeus. Zeus gave
humans justice and shame, (p. 758) 322C. Zeus insisted that
everyone or at least most have this:
“To all”, said Zeus, “and let all have a share. For cities would
never come to be if few possessed these, as is the case with the
other arts. And establish this law as coming from me: Death
to him who cannot partake of shame and justice, for he is a
pestilence to the city."
Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be
taught
p. 756-62 (320A-328E)
4. Reasonable punishment is established for
social benefits. “Among these evils are injustice
and impiety and in general everything opposed
to civic virtue." (p. 759 324A)
”Reasonable punishment is not a vengeance for
a past wrong -- but is undertaken with a view to
the future and to deter the wrong-doer and
whoever sees him being punished from
repeating the crime" (p. 759 324C).
Protagoras explains why virtue cannot be taught p. 756-62
(320A-328E)
5. As to question of why good men are notable to teach their
sons. There is one thing that is needed for a city to exist,
justice, temperance and piety. This is taught privately and
publicly collectively by all.
The answer why good men can't teach their children. (p. 761,
327C):
Suppose there could be no city unless all were flute-players.
Everybody to the best of their ability was teaching this art
and reprimanding those who couldn't do it. Yet, "When a son
happened to be naturally disposed to flute-playing, he would
progress and become famous; otherwise, he would remain
obscure obscure" (327c)Thus those great men are naturally
disposed.
How Protagoras Determines What His
Students Pay
p. 761, 328B-C
“I consider myself to be such a person,
uniquely qualified to assist other in become
noble and good and worth the fee that I
charge and even more, so much so that even
my students agree. That is why I charge
according to the following system: a student
pays the full price only if he wishes to;
otherwise, he goes to a temple, states under
oath how much he thinks my lessons are
worth, and pays that amount.”
Socrates Questions Protagoras on the Unity of Virtue
p 762 (329D-330A)
SOCRATES: Is virtue a single thing with justice and
temperance and piety its parts; or are the things I have listed
all names for a single entity: This is what still intrigues me?
“That is an easy question to answer, Socrates,” he replied.
“Virtue is a single entity, and the things you are asking about
are its parts.”
SOCRATES: Parts, as in the parts of a face: mouth, nose,
eyes, and ears? Or parts as in the parts of gold, where there is
no difference except for size, between parts or between parts
and the whole?”
“In the former sense . . . wisdom is the greatest part . . . each
of them is different from each other.”
Socrates’ first dialectical argument against the independence
of virtues: (p. 763ff., 330A3 - 331B8):
330A3
330A4
330A4-B6
to its power.
330C1-2
330C1-2
330C7-D1
330D2-5
330D5-E2
1. Each virtue is numerically distinct from each other.
2. Each virtue has its own specific power.
3. No virtue is like any other, either in itself or with respect
4. Justice is something.
5. Justice is something just.
6. Justice is such as to be just (from 5).
7. Holiness is something.
8. Holiness is such as to be holy.
Socrates’ first dialectical argument against the independence
of virtues (continued) (p. 763ff., 330A3 - 331B8):
331A7-8
(from 3 and 5).
331A8
331A8-9
331A9
331A9-B1
331B1-3
331B3-6
another (i. e., 3 is
9. Holiness is not such as to be something just
10. Justice is not such as to be holy (from 3 and 8).
11. Justice is such not to be not-holy.
12. Holiness is such as to be not-just (from 9).
13. Holiness is such as to be unjust (from 12).
14. Justice is such as to be unholy (from 11).
15. But justice is holy and holiness is just.
16. Therefore justice and holiness are like one
false, by reductio ad absurdum.
Socrates’ second dialectical argument against the
independence of virtues (continued) (p. 763ff., 330A3 331B8):
1. Wisdom is the opposite of folly (332a4; agreed without argument.)
2. Acting temperately is the opposite of folly (332e4-5; established by
argument in three stages, (i) 332A6-B4, (ii) B4-C2, (iii) D1-E5.
3. Each thing which is an opposite has only one opposite (332D7-8);
established by induction in 332D7).
4. Therefore, wisdom and temperance are one are thing (333B4-5).
But this argument won’t work. Does each thing have only one opposite?
Pleasure is the opposite of pain. But isn’t also painlessness?
Protagoras interrupts the Socrates relentless use of dialectic
with a short speech on the complexity and relational nature of
goodness.
PROTAGORAS: “. . . Or take olive oil, which is extremely
bad for all plants and is the worst enemy of the hair of all
animals except humans, for whose hair it is beneficial, as it is
for the rest of their bodies. But the good is such a
multifaceted and variable thing that, in the case of oil, it is
good for external parts of the human body but very bad very
internal parts . . .” p. 767; 334B
333B7-334A2) Socrates begins a dialectical argument to prove
the identity of justice and temperance.
Protagoras interrupts Socrates’ dialectical questioning.
Socrates gets ready to leave saying he just can’t keep up with
long speeches. Callias holds Socrates back. Hippias proposes
they make a compromise (p. 770; 338A Socrates must not
insist on an excessively brief form and Protagoras should not
have free reign to speeches. He suggests a referee, but it’s
decided that the group will all supervise together.
p. 768 335C
SOCRATES : “ . . . You are a wise man [Protagoras],
after all. But I don’t have the ability to make those
long speeches: I only wish I did.” . . .
But, Plato has framed the dialogue as Socrates’
recalling to Hippocrates the whole collection of
conversations that took place that morning with
Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus and many others. (p.
748; 310B) So if we accept the frame that Plato has
set up, Socrates obviously had the ability to recall
long speeches. He’s been doing it from the beginning
by recalling the the dialogue.
How is Plato playing on the reader’s involvement?
From, “Plato’s Way of Writing,”
by Mary Margaret McCabe.
Detachment1
“By contrast, when we are shocked, by devices in the
frame, into looking at what is going on, we do so from
a position of detachment, contemplating both points
of view from the outside. We both consider the sorts
of conditions that will come to bear on either point of
view, including the condition for argument as such,
and think about the subject in question from a
position of detached reflection. So, I suggest, the
active role of the reader is crucial to understanding
why the dialogue is so multiform.”
1. McCabe, Mary Margaret, “Plato’s Way of Writing,” in The Oxford
Handbook to Plato, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 106.
Bertold Brecht and
the Alienation Effect
Alienation effect, also called a-effect or
distancing effect, German
Verfremdungseffekt or V-effekt.1
1.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/15423/alienati
on-effect
Alienation effect, also called a-effect or distancing effect,
German Verfremdungseffekt or V-effekt, idea central to the
dramatic theory of the German dramatist-director Bertolt
Brecht. It involves the use of techniques designed to distance
the audience from emotional involvement in the play . . .
Examples of such techniques include explanatory captions or
illustrations projected on a screen; actors stepping out of
character to lecture, summarize, or sing songs; and stage
designs that do not represent any locality but that, by
exposing the lights and ropes, keep the spectators aware of
being in a theatre. The audience’s degree of identification
with characters and events is presumably thus controlled,
and it can more clearly perceive the “real” world reflected in
the drama.1
1.http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/15423/alienation-effect,
downloaded 9/15/2014.
Inspired by the philosophies of G.W.F. Hegel and Karl
Marx and by Viktor Shklovsky’s theory of ostranenie
(“making it strange,” or defamiliarization), Brecht
regarded his method as a way of helping spectators
understand the complex nexuses of historical
development and societal relationships. By creating
stage effects that were strange or unusual, Brecht
intended to assign the audience an active role in the
production by forcing them to ask questions about the
artificial environment and how each individual element
related to real-life events. In doing so, it was hoped that
viewers would distance themselves emotionally from
problems that demanded intellectual solutions.
A Neo-Fregean Analysis of Abstract Objects as
Essences1
“In each case, the abstract object is essentially the value of an
abstraction function for a certain class of arguments. This is not a
claim about the meanings of linguistic expressions. It is a claim
about the essences or natures of the objects themselves.2 So for
example, the Fregean number two (if there is such a thing) is,
essentially, by its very nature, the number that belongs to a
concept F if and only if there are exactly two Fs. More generally,
for each Fregean abstract object x, there is an abstraction function
f, such that x is essentially the value of f for every argument of a
certain kind.” [Emphasis added]
1. downloaded from Rosen, Gideon, "Abstract Objects", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2014/entries/abstract-objects/>.
2. For the relevant notion of essence, see Fine, Kit, 1994, “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical
Perspectives 8, 1–16.
A Neo-Fregean Analysis of Abstract Objects as
Essences1
“Abstraction functions have two key features. First, for each
abstraction function f there is an equivalence relation R such
that it lies in the nature of f that f(x) = f(y) iff Rxy.
Intuitively, we are to think that R is metaphysically prior to
f, and that the abstraction function f is defined (in whole or
in part) by this biconditional. Second, each abstraction
function is a generating function: its values are essentially
values of that function. Many functions are not generating
functions. Paris is the capital of France, but it is not
essentially a capital. The number of solar planets, by
contrast, is essentially a number.”
1. downloaded from Rosen, Gideon, "Abstract Objects", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/abstract-objects/>.
A Neo-Fregean Analysis of Abstract Objects as Essences1
The notion of an abstraction function may be defined in terms of
these two features:
f is an abstraction function iff
for some equivalence relation R, it lies in the nature of f that f(x)
= f(y) iff Rxy; and
for all x, if x is a value of f, then it lies in the nature of x that there
is (or could be) some object y such that x = f(y).
We may then say that
x is an abstraction if and only if, for some abstraction function f,
there is or could be an object y such that x = f(y)
And x is an abstract object if (and only if) x is an abstraction
1. downloaded from Rosen, Gideon, "Abstract Objects", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/abstract-objects/>.
So Socrates begins again. This time appealing
to the ‘truth’ of celebrated poetic to determine
if the virtues are unified.
Socrates’ opinion of investigating
philosophical questions through poetry
p. 778; 347C-E
“Discussing poetry strikes me no different
from the second-rate drinking parties of
the agora crowd. These people, largely
uneducated and unable to entertain
themselves over their wine by using their
own voice to generate conversation, pay
premium prices for flute-girls and rely on
the extraneous voice of the reed flute as
background music for their parties.”
Socrates return to dialectical questioning
pp. 779- 781 (349B-351B)
The guests agree to abandon criticism of
poetry and to resume the original
discussion. Socrates returns to questioning
Protagoras about the unity of the virtues,
in this case about the relation of wisdom to
courage.
Socrates breaks off the discussion to
propose a version of ethical hedonism.
p. 781 (351C)
“What Protagoras?” Surely you don’t, like
most people, call some pleasant things bad
and some painful thing good? I mean, isn’t
a pleasant thing good just insofar as it is
pleasant, that is, if it results in nothing
other than pleasure; and, on the other
hand, aren’t painful things bad in the same
way, just insofar as they are painful.”
NOTE: How Socrates belittles what ‘most people’ believe.
Socrates argues the most people not agree
with the truth of ethical hedonism because
of cases of ‘akrasia’ ‘weakness of the will,’
becoming overcome by passions.
p. 782; 352D
SOCRATES: “Right you are. You realize that most people
aren’t going to be convinced by us. They maintain that most
people are unwilling to do what is best, even though they
know what it is and are able to do it. And when I have asked
them the reason for this, they say that those who act that
way do so because they are overcome by pleasure or pain or
are being ruled by one of the things I referred to just now.”
[Socrates has mentioned: desire, love, often fear, but not
knowledge.]
But cases of ‘akrasia’ being overcome by
passions are due to a type of faulty
cognition – bad measurement.
p. 785; 356D
“The power of appearance often makes us wander all over
the place in confusion, often changing our minds about the
same things and regretting our actions and choice with
respect to thing large and small, the art of measurement in
contrast, would make appearances lose their power by
showing us the truth, would give us peace of mind firmly
rooted in the truth and would save our life.”
The capacity to measure correctly is a kind
of knowledge.
p. 786; 357D
“For you agreed with us that those who make mistakes with
regard to the choice of pleasure and pain, on other words,
with regard to good and bad, do so because of a lack of
knowledge but a lack of that knowledge you agreed was
measurement.”
Socrates connects courage with knowledge
and cowardice with ignorance
p. 788-9; 360B-361A
SOCRATES: “If a thing is noble and good it is also
pleasant?”
“That was definitely agreed upon.”
“So, the cowardly with full knowledge, are not
willing to go toward the more honorable, the
better, the more pleasant.”
....
“And aren’t cowards shown to be so through
ignorance of what is to be feared?”
Socrates connects courage with knowledge
and cowardice with ignorance
p. 788-9; 360B-361A continued
....
SOCRATES: So, can we conclude that cowardice is
ignorance of what is and what is not be feared?”
He nodded.
“Now, courage is the opposite of cowardice”
He said yes.
....
“So the wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is
courage and is the opposite of this ignorance?
Socrates connects courage with knowledge
and cowardice with ignorance
p. 788-9; 360B-361A continued
....
PROTAGORAS: He would not even nod at this. He
remained silent.
SOCRATES: And I said, “What’s this Protagoras? Will
you not say yes or no to my question?”
“Answer it yourself.”
“I have only one more question to ask you. Do you still
believe, as you did at first, that some men are very
ignorant and and yet still very courageous.”
“I think you just want to win the argument, Socrates, and
that is why you are forcing me to answer. . .
Socrates connects courage with knowledge
and cowardice with ignorance
p. 788-9; 360B-361A continued
....
PROTAGORAS: He would not even nod at this. He
remained silent.
SOCRATES: And I said, “What’s this Protagoras? Will
you not say yes or no to my question?”
“Answer it yourself.”
“I have only one more question to ask you. Do you still
believe, as you did at first, that some men are very
ignorant and and yet still very courageous.”
“I think you just want to win the argument, Socrates, and
that is why you are forcing me to answer. . .
Socrates’ apparent quandary at the end of
the Protagoras
361A-B 1
1. If X is an art or skill, then it is teachable.
2. Virtue is a kind of knowledge – that is, an art or skill.
3. Virtue is not teachable.
1. See Devereux Daniel, “Socrates Ethics and Moral Psychology, in The Oxford
Handbook to Plato, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),. pp. 142-3
Socrates’ implicit teaching as collected
from the Protagoras as a whole
361A-B 1
1. If X is an art or skill, then it is teachable
2. (Genuine) virtue is an art or skill and therefore
teachable.
3. (Sophistical) virtue is not teachable
1. See Devereux Daniel, “Socrates Ethics and Moral Psychology, in The Oxford
Handbook to Plato, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),. pp. 142-3
References to pictures used in this powerpoint
slide #2, bust of Plato: http://www.ancientgreece.com/s/People/Plato/
slide #10 and ff., bust of Pythagoras: http://www.quotecollection.com/imageview.php?img=protagoras-3.jpg
slide# 14, mosaic of Epimetheus and Prometheus:
http://bashapedia.pbworks.com/w/page/51086174/Prometheus%20and%20Epimetheushttp://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicias#mediaviewer/File:Nicias,_p_105_(World%27s_Famous_Orations_Vol_
1).jpg
Slide # 27, Picture of Bertold Brecht: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertolt_Brecht:
http://www.livius.org/a/greece/mantineia/mantinea_battlefield_jvv.JPG
slide #32 and ff., bust of Socrates:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socrates#mediaviewer/File:Socrates_Louvre.jpg