1NC 1NC DA Obama’s using capital to persuade Congress to avoid sanctions but opponents are nearing a veto-proof majority Riechmann, 12-29—Deb, AP writer, “Obama doesn't rule out opening US embassy in Iran; Congress planning January vote on sanctions,” MN Star Tribune, http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/286993011.html --BR While President Barack Obama hasn't ruled out the possibility of reopening a U.S. Embassy in Iran, Republicans say the Senate will vote within weeks on a bill to impose more sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear program. Obama was asked in an NPR interview broadcast on Monday whether he could envision opening an embassy there during his final two years in office. "I never say never," Obama said, adding that U.S. ties with Tehran must be restored in steps. Washington and its partners are hoping to clinch a deal with Iran by July that would set long-term limits on Iran's enrichment of uranium and other activity that could produce material for use in nuclear weapons. Iran says its program is solely for energy production and medical research purposes. It has agreed to some restrictions in exchange for billions of dollars in relief from U.S. economic sanctions. On a visit to Israel on Saturday, Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said the new Republican-controlled Senate will vote on an Iran sanctions bill in January. He said the bipartisan sanction legislation says: "If Iran walks away from the table, sanctions will be re-imposed. If Iran cheats regarding any deal that we enter to the Iranians, sanctions will be re-imposed." Graham also is sponsoring legislation that would require any deal with Iran to be approved by Congress before sanctions could be lifted. Standing alongside Graham, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Iran a "dangerous regime" that should be prevented from having nuclear weapons. "I believe that what is required are more sanctions, and stronger sanctions," Netanyahu said. The Obama administration has been telling members of Congress that it has won significant concessions from Iran for recently extending nuclear talks, including promises by the Islamic republic to allow snap inspections of its facilities and to neutralize much of its remaining uranium stockpile. Administration officials have been presenting the Iranian concessions to lawmakers in the hopes of convincing them to support the extension and hold off on new economic sanctions that could derail the diplomatic effort. Obama has threatened to veto any new sanctions legislation while American diplomats continue their push for an accord that would set multiyear limits on Iran's nuclear progress in exchange for an easing of the international sanctions that have crippled the Iranian economy. Senate hawks are still trying to build a veto-proof majority of 67 votes with Republicans set to assume the majority next month. Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., told Fox News Sunday that Senate Republicans might have enough backing from Democrats to pass vetoproof legislation that would impose more sanctions on Iran. "The good thing about those votes, they will be really bipartisan votes," he said. "I have 17 Democrats with me. . We have a shot at even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate." The plan’s a political landmine and a waste of political capital Sullivan, 12—Andrew, one of the most widely syndicated columnists in the USA, “The Silent Stoner President, Ctd,” The Dish, http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2012/11/27/thesilent-stoner-president-ctd/ -- BR That old footage you showed of Obama speaking in favor of decriminalization in 2004 reminded me of one of the weirdest Obama videos I've ever seen. It's from the summer of 2007 when he was running for president and in it someone on a rope line in New Hampshire asked what his stance was regarding medical marijuana. You can tell right away from Obama's body language that he really doesn't want to answer this question, presumably because he thinks it's a political landmine. Then the oddest thing happens, and I had to watch it a few times to make sure that I was seeing what I thought I was seeing. You can see Reggie Love in the background apparently listening to an earpiece, which I'm assuming must be radioed directly to somebody like Gibbs or Axelrod or some other adviser. Reggie hears something in the earpiece and suddenly has to get Obama's attention in the middle of this guy's question and not-so-smoothly transfers the ear piece to Obama, who then pauses, and after a few beats apparently parrots back the stock answer coming to him in his ear. Obama's response was that the Feds cracking down on state medical marijuana operations wouldn't be a worthwhile use of federal resources. it was one of those rare times where you see the politically calculated side rather than the casual authenticity that usually comes across in him, and the sense I got was that whatever Obama's actual position on marijuana is, he's not about to let that be the issue that he wastes political capital on. That's not going But never mind the answer, which didn't seem like his own. To me, to be the issue that prevents him from becoming president and fixing everything else that he cares more about. As a big Obama supporter back in the summer of '07, I wouldn't have dared point out this video before Obama won the Democratic primaries, the election in 2008, or the recent reelection, but now that we're on the other side of all three, I couldn't help but pass along the footage. Above is some footage closer to the real Obama. Obama’s capital is do or die—failure triggers war Winsor, 14 (Ben, “A Coalition Is Working Furiously Behind The Scenes To Support Obama's Iran Talks,” Oct 2, http://www.businessinsider.com/rag-tag-iran-coalition-backingdiplomacy-2014-10) Since November 2013, the Obama administration has engaged with Iran in tense, drawnout nuclear negotiations which optimists hope could bring an end to decades of hostility and mistrust. Throughout it all, Congress has threatened to play the spoiler, with a tough sanctions bill passing the House and looming in the Senate which would almost certainly scuttle the fragile talks over the Iranian nuclear program. Now, as the deadline for the end of the talks approaches, a coalition of legislators, advocacy groups, and White House officials are working to hold Congress back from the brink of thwarting what they see as a historic window of opportunity. They're fighting against legislators and conservative groups like The Heritage Foundation and The Free Enterprise Institute who are pushing for the US to take a hawkish stance. Legislators, led by Minnesota Congressman Keith Ellison, have been maneuvering quietly behind the scenes in Congress to keep the talks alive. At the same time, officials from the White House have been leaning heavily on Senate Democrats to refrain from bringing a sanctions bill to the floor. On the outside, a diverse range of pro-diplomacy groups, led by organisations like the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and the liberal Jewish organization J Street, have found a common cause and rallied together to lobby for restraint. Even the Quakers are energized. “This is a do-or-die moment, either we succeed, or we go in a much more negative direction,” said NIAC co-founder Trita Parsi at the group’s annual conference last weekend. Parsi sees the negotiations as a historic moment during a narrow window of opportunity. Presidents on both sides have sunk significant time and energy into the talks and Parsi believes the current leadership in both countries is more likely to make a deal than those who came before — or might come after. “The next president, whatever political party they’re in, is not going to spend precious political capital battling Congress… [Obama] is the guy,” Parsi said. Supporters fear that failure of the talks could trigger increased sanctions, the rise of hardliners in Iran, and relations spiraling toward military confrontation. Goes nuclear—tons of different actors and scenarios for extinction Avery, 13 -- Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen (11/6/2013, John Scales Avery, “An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War,” http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm) Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a largescale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included. 1NC CP The United States should propose amendments to all necessary international drug control treaties to allow the legalization of marijuana. The United States should reverse all laws that legalize marijuana. The United States should halt all efforts to legalize marijuana while international drug control treaties prohibit the legalization of marijuana. The Drug Enforcement Agency should reschedule marihuana into Schedule V of the CSA. The United States should employ a cooperative federalism framework to environmental issues involving both state and federal jurisdiction, modeled off the framework established in the Clean Air Act. The amendment passes and results in eventual legalization—inter se agreements avoid consensus issues Don 14 [2014, Allison Don is a University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015, “Lighten Up: Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 213, Hein Online] In light of the newly passed legislation within the United States concerning recreational marijuana and proposed legislation in the international community, the best means of aligning the Single Convention with evolving norms is to amend the treaty. n153 Amendments allow for formal changes to be made to a treaty while maintaining the treaty's existence. n154 This allows for adjustment as "parties' understanding of the issue" n155 change or circumstances surrounding the issue change without requiring the drafting of a new treaty or termination of an existing one. By amending the Single Convention to allow for the recreational use of marijuana, the United States and other countries considering such legislation would be able to continue the legislative process without any international obligations impeding the progression towards marijuana legalization. Article 47 within the Single Convention provides instructions for amending the treaty, stating that "any party may propose an amendment to this Convention." n156 In order to make such a proposal, the amendment itself and the reasons behind the amendment must be transferred to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in writing who will then disseminate the proposed amendment to the other parties of the treaty and the Commission. At this point, the Commission has the power to decide if a conference should be held to discuss the proposal or if the parties should simply be asked if they are willing to accept. n157 If there is no objection within 18 months, the amendment becomes fully adopted; if there is an objection, the Commission may then choose to hold a conference to review the proposal. n158 With 153 current parties to the Single Convention, arriving at a consensus may prove difficult. This does not preclude the option to amend as "amendments require agreement between treaty parties, but not necessarily between all parties." Once an [*237] amendment has been proposed and adopted, parties are free to decide if they will become a party to the amendment. n159 Those who opt not to join the amendment remain bound by the treaty's original obligations. n160 By proposing an amendment that would permit the use of marijuana for recreational purposes, those countries who wish to pursue such legislation would be permitted to do so and those countries who remain in opposition would be able to remain parties to the original treaty preventing the use of recreational marijuana. n161 C. Support for Legalization Within the United States from a Policy Standpoint The need for amendment is evident as numerous countries move towards marijuana legalization. n162 Within the United States, a movement towards federal legalization is desirable for numerous reasons. Particularly, legalization would increase tax revenues, lower drug use rates while also lowering the rate of international violence. 1. Marijuana is Costing Taxpayers Money The United States has one of the busiest criminal justice systems in the world, resulting in and estimated 12.2 million arrests in 2012 alone. n163 Of these arrests, 1,552,432 were for drug abuse violations with almost half for marijuana related crimes. n164 The money spent, on a national level, for this level of [*238] enforcement of marijuana laws alone is up to $ 7.7 billion a year. n165 The excessive spending for the enforcement of marijuana prohibition is not only costing taxpayers, but it's also taking away from potential tax revenue. "If it were taxed similarly to alcohol and tobacco, marijuana would provide $ 6.2 billion in additional revenue each year ... ." n166 The potential for generated revenue, coupled with savings gained by no longer having the necessity for strict enforcement of marijuana prohibition could potentially amount to an "annual budget increase of nearly $ 14 billion." n167 In order to identify where some of these saving would be coming from, it's important to take a closer look at spending within the federal prison system. There are well over 200,000 inmates incarcerated at the federal level; 51% of those inmates' most serious charge is a drug offense. n168 Depending on the level of security they're housed in, each inmate costs the federal government between $ 21,000 and $ 33,000 a year. This kind of expenditure led to the Obama administration having ""to request $ 6.9 billion for the Bureau of Prisons in fiscal [year] 2013.'" n169 The expensive reality doesn't stop there, "federal prison costs are expected to rise to 30 percent of the Department of Justice's budget by 2020." n170 The potential savings to not only taxpayers but also to the [*239] criminal justice system by essentially eliminating the prohibition on marijuana n171 can be better illustrated through comparisons to the Netherlands, where marijuana has been decriminalized since the 1970s. For instance, in 2009, the United States incarcerated 743 people for every 100,000. In 2010, the Netherlands incarcerated 94 people for every 100,000. n172 While prison populations fluctuate from year to year and are impacted by numerous factors n173, the stark difference in incarceration rates between the Netherlands and the United States is hard to ignore. On the expense side of things, the Netherlands spends approximately $ 307 per capita on their criminal justice system while the United States spends approximately $ 552. n174 By adopting federal legislation similar to that of Washington and Colorado, the federal government would be lightening the current load on the prison system while simultaneously generating revenue. 2. The Status of Marijuana as an Illegal Substance Has No Deterrent Effect Proponents of maintaining marijuana as an illegal substance claim that social stigmas associated with breaking the law will prevent individuals from experimenting with and using marijuana. n175 However, there is no empirical evidence to [*240] support this claim. Recent figures show that in the United States, despite marijuana legislation, high school aged children who view smoking marijuana as risky behavior has steadily declined since the early 90's. n176 Although marijuana laws have been in effect for over 70 years, there is further evidence of increasing acceptance of the substance with fifty-eight percent of the population believing marijuana should be legal. n177 Marijuana usage among the population as a whole also shows that marijuana laws have no deterrent effect within the United States. In 2012, 7.6 million people over the age of 12 reported using marijuana 20 or more days a month, up from 4.8 million in 2002. n178 There has also been a rise in the number of individuals who use marijuana 300 or more days a year from 3.1 million in 2002 to 5.4 million in 2012. n179 These figures continue to rise despite an increase in marijuana enforcement. Between 1996 and 2006, there were nine million arrests for marijuana violations. Despite these arrests and their alleged deterrent effect, 25 million people used marijuana in 2007. n180 Growing public acceptance of marijuana in the United States is evident beyond the realm of private use. In 1987, Judge Douglas Ginsburg was nominated for a seat on the United States Supreme Court by then President Ronald Reagan. Nine days after his nomination, Judge Ginsburg withdrew his name after receiving backlash for his prior marijuana use. n181 Four years later, then President George H. W. Bush nominated Judge Clarence Thomas. When it became public that Judge Thomas had previously smoked marijuana, President Bush stated that it was not an issue that warranted [*241] disqualification. n182 Shortly after, Senator Bill Clinton admitted to marijuana experimentation and was later elected as the successor to George H. W. Bush as President of the United States. n183 Public acceptance of marijuana in the United States has become so widespread that for the last 16 years the public has chosen as its President an admitted prior marijuana user. n184 3. Legalization May Decrease Overall Drug Use There is a great deal of speculation as to the effects marijuana legalization would have, but the best indication is to look to the Netherlands where marijuana has been decriminalized since 1976. n185 Following the adoption of decriminalization, marijuana use in the Netherlands actually declined and has since stabilized with no tangible increase or decrease in use. n186 More importantly, by providing an alternative means of obtaining marijuana, the Netherlands has successfully isolated casual marijuana users to the "coffee shops' found throughout the country ""where it is as absurd to ask for hard drugs as it is at an average butcher's [shop] to ask for a zebra-steak." n187 By preventing exposure to drug dealers [*242] peddling "hard drugs,' n188 decriminalization successfully decreased the demand for harder drugs, particularly heroin, because users were no longer being introduced to "hard drugs' by the dealers they previously had to associate with in order to purchase marijuana. n189 4. U.S. Legalization Would Reduce Violence on an International Level The black market for marijuana in the United States has led to the formation of drug cartels in Mexico. The cartels smuggle marijuana into the United States and the proceeds from the sale are then smuggled back into Mexico where they account for over sixty percent of the cartels overall revenue. n190 Without any legal avenues for settling disputes among rival cartels, they are ultimately pitted against each other in a violent fight for control over territory, smuggling routes and cities along the border between the United States and Mexico. n191 The resulting violence has caused approximately "60,000 drug-related murders since ... 2006." n192 In 2011, Mexico's former President, Vicente Fox, explained that ""the drug consumer in the U.S. yields billions of dollars, money that goes back to Mexico to bribe police and money that buys guns ... . So when you question yourselves about what is going on in Mexico, it depends very much on what happens in this nation.'" n193 By not forcing marijuana producers underground, the United States could substantially alleviate the violence in Mexico. n194 [*243] CONCLUSION . The United States signaled a potential shift in its perspective by publicly condoning the new legislation. The United States is not alone; the international community has shown an increased approval, and in some instances outright support, of recreational marijuana. This growing international support warrants an amendment to the Single Convention in order to allow states to legislate recreational marijuana as they see fit without the constraints of international obligations. Amending the Single Convention would allow the United States to pursue federal legislation similar to that of Colorado and Washington. By legalizing marijuana on the federal level, the United States would see positive gains both domestically and internationally. The United States would stand to gain significant revenue while simultaneously decreasing its prison population and international violence. Such potentially significant ramifications warrant an amendment to the Single Convention in order to permit states to weigh these benefits in their own territories without being held hostage by an international treaty that's no longer in line with popular opinion. Colorado and Washington took a leap of faith in approving the use of marijuana for recreational purposes despite conflicting federal law The counterplan solves the case but avoids the disads – rescheduling ensures that legalization happens down the line after treaty amendment and creates domestic and international momentum Sullum 14, Senior editor at Reason magazine (Jacob, 2/10, Why Reschedule Marijuana?, reason.com/archives/2014/02/10/why-reschedule-marijuana) In light of President Obama's recent observation that marijuana is safer than alcohol, CNN's Jake Tapper wondered if he was open to reconsidering marijuana's status as a Schedule I drug. When Tapper asked him that in an interview that aired last week, Obama derailed the conversation by denying that the executive branch has the the CSA gives the attorney general the authority to move drugs between schedules. The attorney general has delegated that authority to the DEA (a division of the Justice Department), which is why that agency has been the recipient power to reclassify marijuana. That clearly is not true, since of petitions urging it to put marijuana in a less restrictive category. Because Obama incorrectly insisted that rescheduling marijuana would require an act of Congress, he never addressed the merits of doing it administratively. From the perspective of people who believe marijuana should be legalized for medical or general use, the advantages of such a move are not as substantial as you might think. But neither are they, as UCLA drug Moving marijuana to a less restrictive legal category would have some significant practical effects, perhaps the most important of which would be to advance a more honest discussion of marijuana's hazards and benefits. As Kleiman points out, removing marijuana from Schedule I would not automatically make it legal for medical use, since any cannabis product still would have to be approved by the Food and Drug policy expert Mark Kleiman claims, "identically zero." Administration (FDA). "For a doctor to prescribe it," notes Aaron Houston, a Marijuana Majority board member and WeedMaps lobbyist, "there would have to be an FDA-approved formulation of it." Since marijuana itself cannot be patented, a pharmaceutical company would not have much incentive to go through the arduous, time-consuming, and expensive process required to gain FDA approval. Furthermore, drug regulators tend to look askance at herbal medicine, preferring isolated chemicals. "They're never going to approve a whole-plant organic product," says Dan Riffle, director of federal policies at the Marijuana Policy Project. Rick Doblin, executive director of the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, which for years has been trying to jump through the hoops required to get marijuana approved as a medicine, disagrees. "FDA, like most regulatory agencies, wants to expand the areas it regulates," he says. "FDA does want to regulate botanical drugs and would be willing to approve whole-plant organic products if Phase 3 studies demonstrate safety and efficacy." In any case, rescheduling marijuana might make it easier to conduct research on the plant's medical utility, which could lead to cannabis-derived medications that would pass muster with the FDA. "The biggest obstacle, at least historically, to doing research on marijuana to prove its medical benefit is that it's in Schedule I," Riffle says. "So you had that Catch-22, where marijuana is a Schedule I drug because there's no evidence, and there's no evidence because marijuana is a Schedule I drug." Harvard psychiatrist Lester Grinspoon, co-author of Marihuana: The Forbidden Medicine and a leading expert on cannabis, agrees that marijuana's Schedule I status has impeded research. "Since 1970," he says, "it has been the major reason why the kinds of large double-blind studies which have been the basis for FDA approval of medicines since the mid-1960s have been impossible to pursue in this country." Dale Gieringer, who runs the California chapter of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, notes that " there are very burdensome registration requirements and regulations regarding Schedule I substances." Although "most of them also apply to Schedule II," he says, they do not apply to substances in Schedules III through V, which are deemed to have progressively lower potential for abuse. There are other research obstacles, unique to marijuana. In 1999, responding to the legalization of medical marijuana in California, the Clinton administration imposed an additional layer of review on research involving cannabis, requiring approval by the Public Health Service as well as the FDA, the DEA, and the relevant institutional review board. And even after they get all the other necessary approvals, researchers have to obtain marijuana from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which has a monopoly on the legal supply—something that is not true of other Schedule I drugs. NIDA, an agency whose mission focuses on marijuana's hazards, has not been keen these requirements is a necessary consequence of marijuana's Schedule I status, they would be harder to defend if marijuana were reclassified, which would mean acknowledging that it has medical value and can be used safely. Rescheduling marijuana would not affect the legal status of state-licensed cannabusinesses in states such to assist research aimed at measuring its benefits. Although neither of as Colorado and Washington, which would still be criminal enterprises in the eyes of the federal government. But rescheduling could remove one of the major financial challenges facing state-legal marijuana suppliers: Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits the deduction of business expenses related to "trafficking in controlled substances," but only for drugs on Schedule I or II. If marijuana were moved to, say, Schedule III, that prohibition would no longer apply. Schedule III, which is supposed to be for Gieringer notes that medically useful drugs that can be taken safely and have a lower abuse potential than drugs on Schedules I and II, arguably is appropriate for marijuana because that is where the DEA put Marinol (a.k.a. dronabinol), a synthetic version of THC, marijuana's main active ingredient. The DEA also has said naturally occurring THC used in generic versions of Marinol belongs on Schedule III. But depending on how you define abuse potential, marijuana could go on a lower schedule. "When you look at the Schedule IV drugs," says SUNY at Albany psychologist Mitch Earleywine, author of Understanding Marijuana, "you've got the opiate Tramadol, the stimulant Modafinil, lethal sedatives like phenobarbital and chloral hydrate, and the 'date rape' drug rohypnol. Surely cannabis is safer than these." Grinspoon believes "none of the schedules is truly appropriate for marijuana." But if it he had to pick, he says, "based on a realistic appraisal of the drug, I would put it in Schedule V." That category, which includes codeine and opium preparations, is for prescription drugs with the lowest abuse potential. Rick Doblin notes that the DEA could move cannabis to a lower schedule only if it changed its definition of "currently accepted medical use," which demands the sort of large-scale, multi-site, double-blind studies that the FDA requires to approve a new drug. "Assuming that marijuana has been approved as a prescription medicine by the FDA," Doblin says, "Schedule II seems too high, since Marinol is in Schedule III. Due to its actual abuse potential, marijuana for medical use should be in Schedule V." Alex Kreit, a professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego who the CSA leaves undefined phrases on which scheduling hinges. The DEA therefore "has enjoyed incredibly broad discretion to interpret and define 'potential for abuse' and other scheduling criteria," Kreit writes on the Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform blog. Just as it could studies drug policy, notes that adopt a less demanding definition of "accepted medical use," the DEA could take a narrower view of "abuse," which it equates with any nonmedical use. By that standard, marijuana, by far the most popular illegal drug, does indeed have a high potential for abuse. But that judgment seems peculiar if abuse is defined as problematic use, in which case potential for abuse might be measured by the percentage of users who become addicted or suffer serious harm. In truth, as Lester Grinspoon observes, marijuana does not fit any of the schedules very well. It is not the sort of medicine the FDA is used to approving. But it clearly can be used safely, as Obama conceded when he noted that it is less dangerous than alcohol. Back in 1988, when he urged the DEA to reschedule marijuana, Administrative Law Judge Francis Young called it "one of the safest therapeutically active substances known to man." And while marijuana surely can be abused (what can't?), its potential for abuse seems lower than that of many pharmaceuticals, not to mention alcohol and tobacco, which the CSA specifically excludes from its schedules. In light of these inconsistencies, could the DEA take marijuana off of the CSA's schedules altogether? Probably not. "I think it is very unlikely that the attorney general could remove marijuana from the schedules entirely," Kreit the CSA gives the attorney general the power to "remove a drug or other substance entirely from says that "if control is required by United States obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on October 27, 1970, the Attorney General shall issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most appropriate." says. Although the schedules," it also Since the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires its signatories (which include the United States) to treaty obligations seems to bar the DEA from descheduling, as opposed to rescheduling, marijuana. Cannabis "requires a lot of control" under the Single Convention, notes Eric Sterling, president of the criminalize production, possession, and distribution of cannabis for nonmedical purposes, this reference to Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, who helped write federal drug legislation in the 1980s as counsel to the House Judiciary Committee. "Cannabis is supposed to be controlled like opium and opiates." Then again, Kreit notes, other CSA provisions "seem to contemplate situations where the U.S. does not accept international scheduling determinations." Riffle, who is also a lawyer, sums it up this way: "I could make some arguments in a court that [the reference to drug treaties] doesn't bind the executive, but I'd probably lose." The consequences of administratively descheduling marijuana are difficult to tease out, given that some provisions of federal law refer to marijuana specifically, while others talk about "controlled substances" or drugs on certain schedules. Aaron Houston notes one salutary result of descheduling marijuana: Its consumers would no longer be barred from owning firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968, which purports to carve out an exception to the Second Amendment for "unlawful user[s] of…any controlled substance." Even if the CSA permitted the Obama even moving marijuana down one level, from Schedule I to Schedule II, could have an important impact on the drug policy debate. For one thing, it would free the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which is required by law to oppose the legalization of any Schedule I substance, to talk about the hazards of marijuana a little more honestly. Such freedom is desperately needed, to judge by the effort required to extract the concession that marijuana is safer than administration to deschedule marijuana, such a step would be politically inconceivable. But alcohol from ONDCP Deputy Director Michael Botticelli at a congressional hearing this week. "You have Obama saying that marijuana is less harmful than alcohol, that it's important for Colorado and Washington to move forward," says Riffle, "but nonetheless you have the ONDCP saying, 'We remain steadfastly opposed to If it weren't a Schedule I drug, they wouldn't have to say that. The ONDCP would be free to take a new position on legalization or put out more honest statements about the harms associated with marijuana." Rescheduling marijuana also might affect the level of cannabis candor at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which is barred legalization.' from using any of its funds to promote the legalization of Schedule I substances. Riffle thinks lifting that restriction might even make NIDA, which is part of HHS, more willing to let researchers use its marijuana. Beyond such statutory implications, acknowledging that marijuana is more beneficial and less hazardous than the government has been saying all these years is apt to influence the conversation about how to handle this much-maligned plant. When the president conceded, in an interview with The New Yorker, that alcohol is more dangerous than marijuana, it set off weeks of high-profile discussion about whether pot prohibition is sensible or fair. If he followed up on that observation by asking whether marijuana meets the criteria for Schedule I, it would call further attention to the arbitrary distinctions drawn by our drug laws. The resulting discussion could help pave the way for more ambitious moves, such as legislation lifting the federal ban on marijuana in the 20 states that have legalized it for medical or recreational use. Bill Piper, director of national affairs at the Drug Policy Alliance, says rescheduling is not his top priority, but it would be "a significant victory for commonsense drug policy," because it "would acknowledge the weight of scientific evidence and popular support for medical marijuana, and it could boost state legislative efforts." Sterling thinks that acknowledgment could help people who get into legal trouble for growing medical marijuana. "Moving marijuana to any other schedule would be a recognition by the government that it has medical value," he says, which "makes a difference in terms of what can be said to a jury." Gieringer agrees. "Rescheduling would send a powerful message around the U.S. that marijuana does have medical uses," he says, "even in states like Alabama that don't allow it. This would help put to rest the common argument of cops and DAs that marijuana isn't medicine." Regardless of the practical consequences, there is something to be said for telling the truth. "When Obama took office," Riffle notes, "he said that decisions in his administration would be guided by science, not by politics and ideology. It's very clear that marijuana's continued classification as a Schedule I drug Since Congress banned marijuana in 1937, says Houston, "we have seen extremely cynical efforts to overblow the danger of marijuana and to demonize it. A move to reschedule or unschedule would be the first time since 1937 that our government started to roll back some of that reefer madness." violates that mandate." 1NC DA The plan violates drug treaties creates a precedent for a pick and choose approach to international law which spills over across all treaty areas Hasse 13 [10/14/13, Heather Hasse is a New York consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The 2016 Drugs UNGASS: What does it mean for drug reform?” http://drogasenmovimiento.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/13-10-14-the-2016-drugsungass-e28093what-does-it-mean-for-drug-reform_.pdf] But why? With all of the progress made in reform around the world lately, many – especially in the US – are asking if the UN is even relevant to domestic drug reform at this point. With the recent marijuana laws passed in Colorado and Washington and the proposed legislation in Uruguay – not to mention decriminalization measures enacted in Portugal and a growing number of other countries – reform seems inevitable. At some point, the argument goes, the UN system will simply be overtaken by “real world” reform on the ground. Why even bother with advocacy at the UN? This is not an easy question to answer; however, I truly believe that to be effective, reform efforts must be made at every level – locally, nationally, and globally. It may be true that reform efforts in the US and around the world have made significant progress in the last 10 years. But there is still a long way to go – marijuana is still not completely legal anywhere in the world (despite state laws to the contrary, marijuana still remains illegal under federal law throughout the US), and many human rights abuses continue to be carried out against drug users throughout the world in the name of drug control. Meanwhile, the international drug control treaties – the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its progeny – remain in place and, in fact, enjoy nearly universal adherence by 184 member states. That so many countries comply – at least technically, if not in “spirit” – with the international drug treaty system, shows just how highly the international community regards the system. As well it should – the UN system is invaluable and even vital in many areas, including climate change, HIV/AIDS reduction, and, most recently, the Syrian chemical weapons crisis (and don’t forget that the international drug treaty system also governs the flow of licit medication). While it is not unheard of for a country to disregard a treaty, a system in which countries pick and choose which treaty provisions suit them and ignore the rest is, shall we say, less than ideal. But beyond the idea of simple respect for international law, there are practical aspects of reform to consider. The drug problem is a global one, involving not only consuming countries but producing and transit countries as well. Without global cooperation, any changes will at best be limited (marijuana reform in Washington and Colorado hardly affects the issue of human rights abuses in Singapore or the limitations on harm reduction measures in Russia). At worst, reform efforts enacted ad hoc around the world could be contradictory and incompatible - as might be the result if, for example, Colombia and the US opted for a regulated market without the cooperation of Costa Rica or Honduras, both transit countries. Finally, no matter what you think about the treaties and the UN drug control system, or how significant you believe them to be in the grand scheme of things, they are here for the time being, and are necessary to any discussion about drug reform. Marijuana is a stress test for the broader treaty regime—the plan’s unilateral legalization ahead of any treaty reforms destroys I-Law which is key to prevent a host of existential risks—ISIS, Ukraine, warming and terrorism Bennett and Walsh 14 [10/15/14, Wells Bennett & John Walsh are scholars at the Brookings Institute, Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15%20marijuana%20le galization%20modernize%20drug%20treaties%20bennett%20walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4. pdf] In making the case for the United States to proactively open the door to future change in the drug treaties, we have emphasized, so far, the negative value of avoiding conflict and instability. We would be remiss not to end on an equally important positive note. The political changes and incentives in play in the marijuana-policy debate open a real opportunity to demonstrate and improve the adaptability of the international legal system—a system on which the United States relies more and more. No treaty can survive the collapse of a political consensus supporting it. And no treaty system can endure if it cannot cope with changing political conditions. Sustainability in international law depends not only on commitment but also on resilience and adaptability. At this writing, one or two more U.S. states may be about to adopt a version of marijuana legalization. If states continue to legalize, and if the federal government continues to allow their reforms to proceed, the short run for treaty reform may come quite soon. This is why we refer to the challenge of marijuana legalization as a “stress test” for the adaptability of international law. Should legalization prove politically popular or socially successful, it will spread to more states and nations; should it spread, then one way or another both domestic and international politics will find ways to accommodate it—either by adapting formal legal commitments or by cutting new, informal channels around those commitments. The latter would weaken international law; the former would strengthen it. Marijuanarelated reform to the drug treaties offers, in several respects, good odds of achieving constructive adaptation. Reform need not entail any wholesale reconsideration of international drug policy, nor need any brand new treaty be negotiated. Modest incrementalism can do the job. In the United States, moreover, a growing political constituency, embracing members of both political parties, favors reform, so the issue is less partisan than many. Persuading the Senate to make more room for U.S. experimentation by revising an existing treaty is a lighter lift than persuading it to undertake entirely new treaty obligations. And, if the United States plays its cards right (with, as we have suggested, suitably narrow and hedged legal changes), we believe a consensus abroad for modest change could become within reach. In any case, broaching the subject relatively early on—by ruling treaty change in, now, as a possibility, instead of ruling it out as a non-starter—may itself open the door to a new international conversation about modernizing and adapting drug treaties. In other words, marijuana offers as good a chance as we are likely to see of setting a precedent for creative, consensual, and gradual adaptation of a well-established international treaty structure. The international legal system, however suspicious of it many Americans may be, has always mattered and has never mattered more than now. For example, the campaign against ISIS and the Ukraine crisis underscore all too dramatically the continuing importance of multilateral security commitments. If anything, international law’s remit is growing as environmental, social, economic, and security problems transcend national borders. From global warming to sanctions on Iran and Russia to the campaign against terrorism and military intervention in a host of theaters, the United States and its allies increasingly rely on international agreements and commitments to legitimize and amplify joint action against common threats. Of course, marijuana and the international narcotics treaties are only one small piece of that puzzle. But they are a highly visible piece, and they offer a real opportunity to demonstrate adaptation through international legal channels, rather than around them. Laying groundwork for manageably incremental changes—by beginning conversations with treaty partners and other constituencies about where flexibility might lie—would reaffirm American commitment to constructive adaptation, and to building consensus. Conversely, pushing the outer boundaries of the drug treaties’ flexibility could weaken the international order and damage American interests. To put the point another way: Marijuana policy reform is a stress test that the United States and the international order should, and realistically can, pass. That triggers great power nuclear war Harald Müller 2K, Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University, Summer 2000, “Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement,” The Nonproliferation Review, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf A third very crucial condition is a sufficient commonality of interest and commitment among the major powers with regard to both the treaty in general and the compliance issue in question in particular. The great powers act on the basis of a multiplicity of interests, commitments, and orientations. If the major powers' broader political, economic, and security concerns turn out to be contradictory or even antagonistic, action outside the multilateral context will affect the great power relationship and, in turn, the prospects for continued institutionalized cooperation. In short, power relations do not develop in an ahistorical and context-free way, following quasi-natural laws. They depend rather on habits, conventions, and perceptions that are shaped by experience. The constraints and relations in the international system are thus not immutable, but rather malleable.12 When a treaty regime creates expectations of multilateral compliance policies, unilateralist behavior can thus cause one of two difficulties: • It may push other powers (and possibly their followers, proxies, allies, and partners) to rally around the accused a non-multilateral compliance action by one or more of them becomes more likely. Such party. This may occur either because the accused party is a close ally, or to deter the power(s) acting unilaterally from further unilateral actions out of fear that such actions may lead to an adverse change in the balance of power. diminish the chances for pursuing further the road towards a world order based on cooperative security,13 rather than balance of power principles. Moreover, such confrontations include a risk of escalation, which could lead to another confrontation like the Cuban missile crisis, by far the most dangerous event so far in the nuclear age. • Alternatively, the aggrieved powers may abstain from a direct confrontation out of concern for Such a course of events would seriously these risks, but freeze their cooperation in the arms control field as a sort of reprisal. Such a development, while less dangerous on the surface, would risk the erosion of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation in the long run. Would-be rule-breakers could be tempted to play off great powers against each other, making it possible for them to pursue their rule-breaking activities with less risk and a greater likelihood of getting away unscathed with the prospects of cooperative security policy as an ordering principle of world politics decline, and the risk of a major confrontation among great powers increases. This trajectory is a reflection of the pivotal role of treaty community cohesion. Because of the particular importance of major powers within that community—the presumption of legal equality notwithstanding—antagonisms their deviant course of action. In either mode, arms agreements suffer, among them are particularly likely to sunder that community and prevent it from maintaining and strengthening the treaty when it is challenged by deviant behavior. 1NC Coop There’s no spillover – their Schwartz ev says marijuana is a crisis OF cooperative federalism, not a crisis FOR cooperative federalism – their Doremus says the Clean Water Act includes a built-in legal framework to mandate cooperative federalism and no piece of aff evidence says the plan spills over to wreck that, it’s a legal requirement There’s also no brink – Grabarsky and Schwartz say it’s been an issue since the 1996 passage of the CUA—it’s old enough to buy cigarettes The Feds won’t crack down – their ev is from 2013, our’s is predictive – Feds will respect the most important parts of cooperative federalism Schoenherr, 14—citing Gregory P. Magarian, JD, professor of law at Washington University in St. Louis. Neil, “Wash U Expert: States should have some power over criminal laws of marijuana,” Wash U News, http://news.wustl.edu/news/Pages/27165.aspx Role of the states “If the federal government decriminalizes or legalizes marijuana possession at the federal level, it could do so in a way that left the states free to criminalize marijuana, or it could do so in a way that stripped the states of that power,” Magarian said. “The relevant constitutional doctrine is called federal preemption. The federal government, where it has power to regulate, always has power to bar the states from regulating. “Often the federal government doesn’t do this, in what are often called ‘cooperative federalism’ arrangements, such as Medicaid. If the federal government really wanted to federalize all marijuana law, it could most directly do so by enacting a comprehensive set of marijuana regulations — taxing sales, imposing standards for medical marijuana, etc.” The federal government “As a predictive matter, I don’t think the federal government will do that with marijuana,” Magarian said. “At a minimum, the feds would be very unlikely to step on core areas of state regulation — schools, traffic, etc. — as they relate to marijuana. “Beyond that, I think for both political and policy reasons the feds will leave states with substantial power to criminalize marijuana possession and sale. The feds may preempt state regulation in specific policy areas, like insurance coverage rules for medical marijuana.” Alt causes swamp federalism – A – EPA navigable waters ruling Bakst, 8-19 – Research Fellow in Agricultural Policy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, of the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation. Daren, “Reining in the EPA Through the Power of the Purse,” Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/08/reining-in-the-epa-through-the-powerof-the-purse In April, the EPA and the Corps published a proposed rule that would define what waters are covered.[14] The CWA covers “navigable waters.” This term is further defined as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”[15] In defining “waters of the United States,” the EPA is going well beyond the existing regulations. For example, the new rule would regulate all ditches—including man-made ditches— except in narrow circumstances and cover tributaries that have ephemeral flow, such as depressions in land that are dry most of the year except when there is heavy rain. This water (and land) grab is an attack on property rights. Private property owners would need to obtain permits from the federal government far more often than they already do now when seeking to use and enjoy their land. There has been widespread opposition to the rule from everyone from farmers to counties, which are concerned that the rule will impose costly new requirements on them. The proposed rule also undermines the principle of cooperative federalism that is supposed to govern the CWA.[16] States play a central role in the implementation of the CWA. Through this proposed rule, the EPA and the Corps would be usurping state and local power . States, local governments, and private property owners are better positioned to address their unique clean water needs than the federal government. Recommendation: Congress should prohibit funding for the implementation of this proposed rule. The House Interior and Environment appropriations bill that passed out of the Appropriations Committee includes a provision that would prohibit funding for the rule.[17] B – Obamacare Moffit 10, Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow in Domestic and Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, Revitalizing Federalism: The High Road Back to Health Care Independence, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/revitalizingfederalism-the-high-road-back-to-health-care-independence Americans face a direct and historic challenge to their personal liberty and to their unique citizenship in a federal republic. Though its enactment of the massive Patient Protection and A ffordable C are A ct (PPACA), official Washington is not merely engi-neering a federal takeover of health care, but is also radically altering the relationships between individ-uals and the government as well as the national gov-ernment and the states. In other words, the PPACA is a direct threat to federalism itself . As Jonathan Turley, professor of law at George Washington University, has argued, “ Federalism was already on life support before the individual mandate. Make no mistake about it, this plan might provide a bill of good health for the pub-lic, but it could amount to a ‘ do not resuscitate’ order for federalism .”[1] Never before has Congress exercised its power under Article I, Section 8 of the Federal Constitu-tion to force American citizens to purchase a pri-vate good or a service, such as a health insurance policy.[2] Congress is also intruding deeply into the internal affairs of the states , commandeering their officers, specifying in minute detail how they are to arrange health insurance markets within their bor-ders, and determining the products that will be sold to their citizens. If allowed to stand, this unprecedented concen-tration of political power in Washington will result in the states being reduced to mere instruments of federal health policy rather than “distinct and inde­pendent sovereigns,” as James Madison described them in Federalist No. 40.[3] C – Political Polarization Pickerill and Bowling 6-23, J. Mitchell Pickerill is an Associate Professor in the Northern Illinois University Department of Political Science, Cynthia Bowling is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Auburn University, Polarized Parties, Politics, and Policies: Fragmented Federalism in 2013–2014, http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/05/22/publius.pju026.full Polarized parties, politics, and policies at the federal and state levels of government continue to affect the nature of federalism and intergovernmental relations in the United States. Although polarization and fragmentation are prevalent, there are important instances of cooperation and collaboration. But bottom-up state activism has yielded polarized policies across the states in important issue areas such as same-sex marriage and marijuana policy. And even as states collaborate on implementation of the Common Core standards for K-12 education, the rhetoric remains politicized . The effects of polarization have also been significant for fiscal policies and budgeting. We conclude that, even as states push forward their agendas in light of a gridlocked national government , federalism faces continued challenges, remaining fragmented in both theory and practice. Marijuana not key – federalism victories won’t spill over and other issues swamp Natelson, 14 (Rob, Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence, Independence Institute & Montana Policy Institute, and Professor of Law (ret.), at the University of Montana, 1/4 , http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/01/lessons_for_federalism_from_colorados_pot_l egalization.html) authorities in Washington, D.C. have done many dreadful things while acting in excess of their constitutional powers. They have locked up American citizens without trial. They have executed American citizens without habeas corpus. They have quashed the career hopes of millions. They have sent soldiers to fight and die in undeclared wars. They have established surveillance systems to monitor the personal lives of innocent citizens. They have adopted social policies that largely destroyed inner-city families. They have inflicted severe damage on our health care system and our monetary system, and have burdened our country Now here's the irony: Since 1940, with unimaginable debt. Yet none of these has provoked push-back so successfully as Washington's ban on a totally unnecessary recreational drug. And -- even more ironically -- a drug that, unlike the targets of so many other regulations, really can be harmful. Perhaps the only comparable success against federal encroachment was repeal of federal Prohibition, another ban on a potentially From Colorado's marijuana "legalization" some federalism advocates draw a conclusion that is both (1) obvious and (2) wrong. The conclusion is that the only way to restore constitutional limits is for constitutionalists to form alliances with hard core "progressives" in areas of common concern. After all, wasn't it a right-and-left-wing coalition that successfully repealed Colorado's marijuana ban? There are, however, at least two problems with this approach. First, the few areas of common concern are mostly very small and of limited importance. "Progressives" very rarely take a genuine pro-federalism position, and when they do, the issue is usually narrow. By any objective measure, marijuana legalization is small POT-atoes compared to massive programs like Obamacare. Secondly -- and more importantly -- victories won by coalitions so disparate are not stable. Today's "progressive" movement is not controlled by the reasonable liberals harmful recreational drug. of your granddaddy's generation. Today's "progressivism" is increasingly a totalitarian movement. In other words, a critical mass of its adherents genuinely believe that there are no limits to what they can make government do to the rest of us.* As is true of other believe the battle for federalism can still be won -- and that, indeed, that it will be won. But it has to be won with a coalition that will preserve the victory. History teaches that coalitions between democrats and totalitarians do not last long: If the totalitarians remain in the coalition, they will quickly take over (cf. Czechoslovakia, 1948). Conservatives and libertarians should, therefore, seek their allies from the broad center -- the Main Street political moderates -- by convincing them of the need to return to constitutional restrictions on federal authority. In the short term, that may be a tougher victory. But once won, it will be a far broader and more ensuring one. totalitarians, they see any victory won for "freedom" as merely opening the door for more coercion. I Cooperative federalism’s counter-productive for warming---reversing it causes state leadership and federal follow-on Vivian E. Thomson 11, Associate Professor in the Departments of Politics and Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia; and Vicki Arroyo, Executive Director of Georgetown's Climate Center at Georgetown Law, where she is a Visiting Professor, 2011, “ARTICLE: UPSIDE-DOWN COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: CLIMATE CHANGE POLICYMAKING AND THE STATES,” Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 29 Va. Envtl. L.J. 1 When it comes to fixing the broken politics of global warming, all eyes tend to focus on the global stage and on national policies. After all, climate change is a global phenomenon and emissions in one part of the world contribute to warming everywhere. But in the United States, sub-national governments are responsible for most of the progress in the climate change arena, despite the lack of an obvious rationale for them to reduce emissions whose benefits will spread well beyond their borders. Thirty-five states have stepped in to fill the void left by federal inaction, adopting plans to curb emissions even though the benefits of those reductions will be shared widely.¶ These state-level actions are important for a variety of reasons. First, they bring real and meaningful reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Perhaps more significantly, they have several key implications for national climate policymaking . These actions point to a rationale for national action and to policy solutions that can attract political support . Further, in the United States, state lawmakers and administrators implement and enforce national air pollution control programs. Thus, state-federal cooperation is crucial for successful program implementation. Finally, the Clean Air Act amendments have passed only when lawmakers accommodated state and regional economic and political considerations.¶ Understanding why states have or have not acted and The very fact of state leadership in the climate change arena also means that the customary mode of cooperative federalism will not work . In air pollution control, the "customary" mode is a center-dominant model in which the national government establishes an overall framework that the states implement. Climate change policymaking demands a new, "upside-down " cooperative federalism model . illuminating their policy approaches can inform the federal policymaking process. Destroys the effectiveness of every environmental program Reisinger et al 10 - Staff Attorney for the Ohio Environmental Council [Will, Trent A Dougherty, Nolan Moser, “ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE LIMITS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: WILL COURTS ALLOW CITIZEN SUITS TO PICK UP THE SLACK?” Duke Environmental Law and Policy Reform Vol 20.1, Winter 2010] The primary goal of federal environmental statutes was to empower states to enforce national standards. With the passage of the CWA, for example, Congress’ intent was to “recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.”86 Each of the other The theory was that, by outsourcing federal programs to state agencies, national laws could be carried out without bankrupting the federal government, while at the same time allowing states the autonomy to implement their own plans.88 Consequently, the decentralized enforcement model places a great deal of power and trust in state governments. Unfortunately, there are fundamental flaws with the cooperative approach that hamper regulation and enforcement. At the same time that states have taken on more responsibility, their own regulatory agencies have been simultaneously hindered by political resistance to increased regulation and fewer dollars for enforcement. Furthermore, in cases where state regulation has failed, the federal backup enforcement has been lacking. When combined, these complicating factors create the potential for a “perfect storm” that threatens the effectiveness of every major environmental program. environmental statutes envisions a similar state function.87 Decentralization’s vital to effective bioterror response Paul Posner 3, Ph.D., a recognized national expert on U.S. federalism, is the Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues for the General Accounting Office, 3/24/3, “The Federalism Challenge: The Challenge for State and Local Government,” p. 20 For example, in public health, let’s examine what a local government faces to prepare for bioterrorism. It has to improve the capacity of its local health departments, the human capital that has been woefully neglected in recent years reportedly. It has to update its technology so that it at least can achieve agreements with hospitals to develop surge capacity and support from doctors and other medical personnel. It has to develop laboratory infrastructure to at least know where the labs are and reach some kind of agreements on how to process samples of suspicious materials. And most importantly, what we’re finding increasingly in the local health departments, it has to develop surveillance systems to produce real-time data on day-today incidences, to help get early warning of suspicious health trends and incidents to facilitate an expeditious communicate problems to the CDC in Atlanta over the Internet. It has to response to health problems where time is such a critical variable influencing potential health outcomes for those exposed. Baltimore is one of the pioneers . They can show daily the numbers of admittances to emergency rooms, the veterinarians’ reports, daily school absences. They are trying to get pharmacies to report daily on medications prescribed. The point is they can monitor these things and look for variations and look for puzzles and, fortunately, the kind of surveillance system that is under development in some illustrates the political challenges in gaining the cooperation of numerous independent actors at the local level. they haven’t found any. That’s communities and Framing the Problem The way the problem is framed determines the framework and the modality or the process that we use to address if we define the homeland security problem as a response problem, as a first responder’s problem, then the model will have a local orientation . City managers have told me that when you’re dealing with the response to an incident , the most effective thing for the effective management of response is for the federal government to stay out of our way . These managers feel they know their communities best. As one said, “Give us money but let us control the action .” it. For example, Cooperative federalism kills adaptation Christina E. Wells 7, Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of MissouriColumbia School of Law, 2006/2007, “ARTICLE: Katrina and the Rhetoric of Federalism,” Mississippi College Law Review, 26 Miss. C. L. Rev. 127 The Bush administration's response to Hurricane Katrina does, however, highlight some of the potential perils of cooperative federalism programs . On the one hand, having multiple levels of government provide disaster relief and response services may be both necessary and beneficial in that it provides a protective redundancy. n95 But such benefits do not always occur. Critics of cooperative federalism programs their format of "shared political responsibility" make it increasingly difficult for citizens to "finger the culprits for government ... train-wrecks ." n96 In a sense, when everyone is responsible, no one is responsible, and it becomes difficult to know which government officials are at fault for problems that result from cooperative federalism programs. As a result, officials can more easily shift blame - a phenomenon that was reflected in the federal government's response to Katrina. The cooperative federalism at the core of disaster relief and response efforts allowed the federal government to focus blame elsewhere rather than on its own failings. Although ultimately argue that unsuccessful on many levels, the White House succeeded in convincing the House and Senate to pass legislation giving the President authority over the National Guard in certain circumstances involving natural disasters. n97 There is little evidence that such a law is necessary or justified by the events that unfolded during Katrina. In fact, most of the investigatory findings suggest the opposite. But the Bush administration was able to point to Governor Blanco's refusal to voluntarily allow federal military officials to command Louisiana National Guard troops to bolster its claim that federalism hindered the federal government's response. n98 Despite the fact that myriad other problems [*144] led to the ineffective military response, including poor preparation and execution by federal officials, the ability to legitimately claim that federalism was at fault eased the bill's passage through Congress. Katrina may also reflect the concerns of those who fear that cooperative federalism programs will concentrate authority in the federal government . n99 There is little question that state and local governments implement national policy regarding disaster response and rescue. In fact, the federal government makes clear the importance of having a national policy, The events of Hurricane n100 especially via such tools as the NRP. To be sure, states and localities have some discretion to implement that conditional funding grants require fairly rigid adherence to federal standards . n101 state and local authorities had little input into the original development of the NRP. n102 As the federal government increasingly focused disaster response on terrorism after 9/11, n103 coupled with its enlarged law enforcement and surveillance powers generally, one could rightfully wonder whether concerns regarding federal concentration of power had merit. plan, but Furthermore, 1NC Cartels Mexico is stable now Bates 14 (Theunis, "A Mexican drug cartel's rise to dominance," The Week, January 25, theweek.com/article/index/255503/a-mexican-drug-cartels-rise-to-dominance) The Mexican crime syndicate is the world's most powerful drug trafficking organization, and the biggest supplier of illegal narcotics in the U.S. About half of the estimated $65 billion worth of cocaine, heroin, and other illegal drugs that American users buy each year enters the U.S. via Mexico. Sinaloa — which is named after its home state in western Mexico — controls more than half of that cross-border trade, from which it earns at least $3 billion a year. U.S. law--enforcement officials say the group has a presence in all major American cities, and a near monopoly on the wholesale distribution of heroin and cocaine in Chicago. The city's Crime Commission has branded Sinaloa's elusive leader, Joaquín Guzmán, also known as El Chapo (or Shorty), Public Enemy No. 1 — a title last held by Al Capone. "What Al Capone was to beer and whiskey," said commission member Arthur Bilek, " Guzmán is to narcotics."¶ How did the cartel get started?¶ Mexican smugglers have long trafficked homegrown heroin and marijuana to the U.S. But in the 1980s, Mexico also became the primary route for Colombian cocaine bound for the U.S. At the time, U.S. law enforcement was cracking down on the Colombian drug producers' attempts to ship the lucrative drug into Florida by boats and planes. So the Colombians hired Mexico's Guadalajara cartel to smuggle drugs across the border, and paid them in cocaine, which allowed the Mexicans to build their own drug networks in the U.S. Before long, the Mexicans were the senior partners in the relationship. When Guadalajara's leader was arrested in 1989, the group's remaining capos, including a young Guzmán, divided up its trafficking routes, creating the Sinaloa, Juárez, and Tijuana cartels. These gangs soon became locked in a series of turf wars that have killed more than 60,000 people. But throughout the bloodshed, El Chapo's organization has continued to grow.¶ Why has Sinaloa succeeded?¶ The 5-foot-6 Guzmán may be a grade school dropout, but he's also "a logistical genius," said Jack Riley, the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Chicago division. He's trafficked cocaine from Colombia to Mexico in small private planes, in the luggage of airline passengers, and on the cartel's own 747s. Sinaloa has also moved cocaine on custom-built $1 million submarines. El Chapo, 56, has shown similar ingenuity moving drugs from Mexico to the U.S. He's built scores of tunnels under the border, some of which are air-conditioned and boast half-mile-long trolley lines. He's sent drugs through U.S. checkpoints in hidden car compartments, in cans of jalapeños, and in the bellies of frozen shark carcasses. Once in the U.S., the drugs are ferried to warehouses in Chicago — which Guzmán has called his "home port" — before being divided up and distributed across the nation.¶ Why Chicago?¶ It's the transportation hub of America. The city is located within a day's drive of 70 percent of the nation's population, and is crisscrossed by major interstate highways and railway lines. Chicago is also a huge drug market in its own right. Some 86 percent of people arrested in Cook County in 2012 tested positive for at least one illegal narcotic — the highest percentage of any big U.S. city. With his monopoly in the city, Guzmán doubled wholesale heroin prices, thus cutting profit margins for street dealers. That fueled greater competition for turf and exacerbated Chicago's epidemic of gang violence. "It used to be honor among thieves," said Harold Ward, a former gang member turned anti-violence campaigner. "Now, it's by any means necessary."¶ How violent is the cartel?¶ Sinaloa can be exceedingly brutal — it left 14 severed heads in iceboxes outside a mayor's office in the northern Mexican city of Nuevo Laredo in 2012. But compared with other cartel leaders, El Chapo is a practical businessman who prefers "bribe over bullet." He invests millions in corrupting police and government officials in Mexico rather than intimidating them with violence. "There is a level-headedness about [Sinaloa's] leadership that the other groups lack," said Malcolm Beith, author of a book on Guzmán titled The Last Narco. A 2010 National Public Radio investigation of Mexican arrest records noted that Sinaloa had suffered notably fewer arrests than other cartels. U.S. court documents also show that top Sinaloa officials regularly met with DEA agents between 2006 and 2012 and fed them intelligence about rival cartels, helping law enforcement crush their competitors. U.S. and Mexican officials Some observers claim that this fact has led both Mexican and U.S. authorities to go easy on Sinaloa.¶ Is that allegation true?¶ have denied showing any favoritism toward Sinaloa, and the DEA has arrested several high-ranking cartel members in recent years, including Jesús Vicente Zambada Niebla, the son of the organization's No. 2 leader, Ismael Zambada. In a rare 2010 interview, the senior Zambada said that such arrests had no effect on the cartel , and that its drugs would keep flowing north even if El Chapo were brought down . "When it comes to the capos, jailed, dead, or extradited," he said, "their replacements are ready." Legalization causes cartels to compete over new revenue streams Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is an expert on international and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence and illicit economies, “Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America,” September ‘11 Often, criminal groups function as security providers (suboptimal as they are), regulating and punishing theft, robberies, extortions, rapes and murders and dispensing their rules and punishments for transgressions. The removal of the criminal gangs often results in a rise of street crime that can become a critical nuisance to the community and discredit the presence of the State and its law enforcement. That has in fact been the case in both Medellín in the postDon Berna order as well as in the pacified favelas of Rio.14 Especially in areas where police have been trained as light counterinsurgency forces (in Latin America, unlike South Asia, this is more often a problem in rural areas rather than in urban spaces) they may be undertrained, under-resourced, and not focused on addressing street crime. Even community-policing forces may have little capacity to undertake criminal investigations that lead to meaningful prosecution , yet police units specialized in criminal investigations may continue to be too far away and have limited access to a pacified urban space to conduct investigations that reduce street crime. Providing training to community police forces for tackling at least some street crime and streamlining and facilitating the presence of specialized criminal investigation units, such as homicide squads and prosecutors, are of critical importance for improving public safety law enforcement actions against the governing criminal entity may give rise to intense turf warfare among other criminal groups over the spoils of the criminal market. After Don Berna was extradited to the United States, for example, many criminal gangs in and around Medellín, including two large ones led by Sebastian and Valenciano, began fighting each other over smuggling routes, local drug distribution, prostitution enterprises, and protection rackets. The turf war triggered extensive violence, including homicide rates in over 100per 100,000 in the late 2000s and on par with those before the FARC was defeated in the city, and Don Berna established his “narco-peace”.15 Similarly in Mexico, law enforcement actions against established DTOs triggered intense violence among splinter groups and new gangs, such as in the Mexican state of Michoacán where interdiction operations against La Familia Michoacana have given rise to Los Templarios. That criminal gang has since been battling with Los Zetas, another of Mexican DTOs originating as splinter group, over control of criminal markets in the state. Such turf wars can compromise the physical and economic security of local communities far more than even the previous criminal order. In some circumstances, an urban area to which State presence has been extended may even suffer a peace deficit. Along with or instead of the hoped-for peace dividend of legal businesses moving into the urban space and providing legal jobs and income, the new areas may be attractive as a source of new land to be taken over by nefarious land developers. Such demands for land in the newly “pacified” urban areas may generate new forced land displacement, instead of benevolent gentrification. In rural spaces, the cause of such new illegal displacement may be the presence of profitable resources, such as gold, coal, and others, or the agricultural potential of the land, such as for African oil palm plantations. In urban spaces, housing development and real estate speculation may well drive such illegal displacement. Competition over State resources inserted to “pacified” areas, such as for socio-economic development, may generate new temptations of illegal behavior. Militias or new criminal groups seeking to set up new protection rackets and usurp the inserted State resources may well emerge. Many urban spaces in Colombia suffer from such old-new criminality today, as they have historically. Local community forces, even while effective at keeping the old criminals out, may not have the capacity to prevent such nefarious activities cloaked as legal development. At the same time, criminal units specializing in white-collar organized crime and asset expropriation are often located in the city center of a State capital far away from the “pacified” slums and may be paying little attention to such phenomena in the newly-liberated spaces. Moreover, since such land takeover and asset expropriation may well be linked to legal and politically-powerful developers, municipal authorities may lack the motivation to pay close attention to such criminal developments in the “pacified” urban areas. Yet without diligent and concerted law enforcement actions against such new crime, the benefits of the complex and costly State interventions in the marginalized urban areas may be altogether lost. Instead of addressing the causes of illegal economies and violent organized crime by strengthening effective and accountable State for the community and for anchoring State presence in the pacified areas. Under some circumstances, State intervention may ultimately only alter the manifestation of illegality and displace existing problems to other areas. Not only criminality and criminal gangs, but also the marginalized residents of the urban shantytowns themselves may merely be forced out to other slums. presence, the They’ll switch to legal marijuana markets Gorman 14 [02/21/14, Tom Gorman, director of the Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, part of the federal Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Marijuana Legalization Raises Fears Of Drug Cartels”, http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2014/02/21/marijuana-drug-cartels] How foreign cartels could get involved with legal marijuana sales “This is the perfect storm, because from the Mexican cartel standpoint, you have a quasi-legal business operating in the United States, which is illegal in other places, so there’s a real high demand for Colorado marijuana throughout the United States. One of the primary weapons of a cartel they use to make money is, one, selling drugs, and the other one is extortion. So it’s real easy for them to come in and look at these retail stores that are making hundreds of thousands of dollars and say, ‘We want a piece of the action.’ That’s one concern. The other one is using some of these organizations to take marijuana. Well, you don’t have to worry about crossing the border, but sending east, where most of our marijuana goes to — using these as a vehicle for doing that. So that’s our big concern.” That causes violence to spread Charles D. “Cully” Stimson 10 is a Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor. “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No” Legal Memorandum #56 on Legal Issues September 13, 2010. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/legalizing-marijuanawhy-citizens-should-just-say-no ac 6-18 Violent, brutal, and ruthless, Mexican DTOs will work to maintain their black-market profits at the expense of American citizens’ safety. Every week, there are news articles cataloguing the murders, kidnappings, robberies, and other thuggish brutality employed by Mexican drug gangs along the border . It is nonsensical to argue that these gangs will simply give up producing marijuana when it is legalized; indeed, their profits might soar, depending on the actual tax in California and the economics of the interstate trade. While such profits might not be possible if marijuana was legalized at the national level and these gangs were undercut by mass production, that is unlikely ever to happen. Nor does anyone really believe that the gangs will subject themselves to state and local regulation, including taxation. And since the California ballot does nothing to eliminate the black market for marijuana—quite the opposite, in fact—legalizing marijuana will only incentivize Mexican DTOs to grow more marijuana to feed the demand and exploit the black market. Furthermore, should California legalize marijuana, other entrepreneurs will inevitably attempt to enter the marketplace and game the system. In doing so, they will compete with Mexican DTOs and other criminal organizations. Inevitably, violence will follow, and unlike now, that violence will not be confined to the border as large-scale growers seek to protect their turf—turf that will necessarily include anywhere they grow, harvest, process, or sell marijuana. While this may sound far-fetched, Californians in Alameda County are already experiencing the reality of cartel-run marijuana farms on sometimes stolen land,[54] protected by “guys [who] are pretty heavily armed and willing to protect their merchandise.”[55] It is not uncommon for drugs with large illegal markets to be controlled by cartels despite attempts to roll them into the normal medical control scheme. For instance, cocaine has a medical purpose and can be prescribed by doctors as Erythroxylum coca, yet its true production and distribution are controlled by drug cartels and organized crime.[56] As competition from growers and dispensaries authorized by the RCTCA cuts further into the Mexican DTOs’ business, Californians will face a real possibility of bloodshed on their own soil as the cartels’ profit-protection measures turn from defensive to offensive. Thus, marijuana legalization will increase crime, drug use, and social dislocation across the state of California—the exact opposite of what pro-legalization advocates promise. Vulnerability doesn’t = probable No bioterror impact CACNP 10 1/26, *CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION: SCIENTISTS WORKING GROUP ON BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, “BIOLOGICAL THREATS: A MATTER OF BALANCE,” http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/biochem/articles/Biological%20Threats%20%20A%20Matter%20of%20Balance.pdf, AJ The bioterrorist threat has been greatly exaggerated. New bioweapons assessments are needed that take into account the complex set of social and technical issues that shape bioweapons development and use by state and non-state actors, and that focus on more plausible threats than the worst-case scenarios that have largely driven discussion to date. Offensive, including terrorist, use of biological agents presents major technical problems. This is why the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom and others needed to spend vast sums for decades in order to research and develop biological weapons. Even then the results were considered an unreliable form of warfare, and there was little opposition to their elimination by international agreement (indeed the US unilaterally eliminated its biological weapons stockpiles). The effects of using biological materials, whether on a large scale or a smaller terrorist scale, are highly uncertain. Although the 2001 anthrax letters created panic and had a significant economic impact, the number of deaths and serious illnesses was very small. Existing bioweapons assessments focus on a narrow set of assumptions about potential adversaries and their technical capabilities. New bioweapons threat assessments are needed that take into account the more complex set of social and technical issues that shape bioweapons capabilities of state and non-state actors and that critically examine existing assumptions. No bioweapons use---barriers overwhelm Ouagrham-Gormley 12 Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is Assistant Professor in the Biodefense Program at George Mason University, “Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation,” International Security, Volume 36, Number 4, Spring 2012, pp. 80-114, pdf, AJ bioweapons program also depends on “intangible factors,” such as work organization, program management, structural organization, and social environment, that affect the acquisition and efacient use of scientiac knowledge. In-depth studies of past weapons programs, including the former Soviet and U.S. bioweapons programs described in this article, reveal that intangible factors can either advance or degrade a program’s progress. In addition, the impact of these factors is felt more strongly within This article challenges the conventional wisdom by showing that the success of a clandestine programs, because their covertness imposes additional restrictions on the use and transfer of knowledge, which more often than not frustrates progress. Therefore, focusing only on tangible determinants of proliferation can lead to government policies that respond inadequately to the threat. To more accurately identify the nature and evaluate the pace and scope of future proliferation threats, and consequently develop more efacient nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies, scholars and policymakers must include the intangible dimension of proliferation in their assessments. They must also understand the factors that determine the mechanisms and the conditions under which scientiac data and knowledge can be efaciently exploited. In 2008 the World at Risk, an inouential report written by a bipartisan commis- sion chartered by Congress to assess U.S. efforts in preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism, predicted that a bioterrorism event would likely take place by 2013.4 Without downplaying the nu- clear threat, the report concluded that a bioweapons attack was more likely than a nuclear event given the availability of material, equipment, and know- how required to produce bioweapons. Since 2001 a number of scientiac feats seem to illustrate the growing ease with which potentially harmful biomaterial can be produced. These include the inadvertent creation of a lethal mousepox virus by Australian scientists in 2001;5 the synthesis of the poliovirus in 2002 by a team of scientists at the State University of New York at Stonybrook;6 the construction in 2003 of a bacteriophage (phiX) using synthetic oligonucleotides by the Venter Institute, located in Rockville, Maryland; and the synthesis of the arst self-replicating cell called Mycoplasma mycoides JCVI-syn1.0 in May 2010.7 Further pushing the scientiac envelop, work begun in 2003 by the synthetic bi- ology scientiac community to produce standardized short pieces of DNA may promise a future in which biological agents can be assembled much like Lego pieces for various purposes; in addition, synthetic DNA sequences are now commercially available, and the cost and time required to produce biomaterial have decreased sharply in recent years. Finally, with the automation of various processes, new technologies have the potential to Another challenge in using others’ scientiac data is that tacit knowledge does not transfer easily. It requires proximity to the original source(s) and an extended master-apprentice relationship.19 Scientiac and technical knowledge is also highly local: it is developed within a speciac infrastructure, using a speciac knowled ge simplify scientiac work and reduce the need for skilled personnel.8 base, and at a speciac location. Some studies have shown that the use of data and technology in a new environment frequently requires adaption to the new site.20 Successful adaptation often requires the involvement of the original scientiac author(s) to guide the adjustment. For instance, some of the problems encountered during the production of the Soviet anthrax weapon were solved only after the authors of the weapon in Russia traveled to Kazakhstan to assist their colleagues. These individuals trained their colleagues, transferring their tacit knowledge in the process, and helped adjust the technical protocols to the Kazakh infrastructure, which was substantially different from that of the Russian facility. Even with the presence of these original authors, ave years were needed to complete the process of successful transfer and use of bioweapons technology.21 A further complication is that tacit knowledge can decay over time and may disappear if not used or transferred. Studies have shown that trying to re-create lost knowledge can be difacult, if not impossible.22 Finally, knowledge and technology development, particularly in complex technological projects, is rarely the work of one expert. Instead it requires the cumulative and cooperative work of teams of individuals with speciac skills. This is particularly true in weapons programs, which pose a variety of problems spanning many disciplines. For example, biological weapons development can involve mechanical and electrical engineering, chemistry, statistics, aerobiology, and microbiology, demanding large interdisciplinary teams of scientists, engineers, and technicians. A successful weapon, therefore, is not the product of an individual scientist working alone, but that of the collective work of those involved in the research, design, and testing of the weapon.23 In this context, the efacient use of written technical data would require access to or re-creation of the collective explicit and tacit knowledge of those involved in its development, making the reproducibility of an experiment or object particularly challenging. External factors can also interfere with the use and transfer of knowledge. In the biological sciences, the properties of reagents and other materials used in scientiac experiments may differ from one location to another and may vary seasonally. An experiment conducted successfully in one location may not be reproducible in another because of the varying Other external factors that cannot be easily identiaed or quantiaed can also interfere with an experiment, even when the task is performed by an experienced scientist or technician who has had previous successes in performing the task.25 For exam- ple, within the U.S. bioweapons program, the production and scaling up of bi- ological material were routinely subject to unexplained failures whenever production was interrupted to service or decontaminate the equipment. On these occasions, plant technicians at Fort Detrick—the main facility of the U.S. bioweapons properties of the material used, even when the same individual conducts the experiment.24 program—experienced, on average, three weeks of unsuitable production. The scientiac staff could not identify the causes of such routine failures and could only assume that either a contaminant had been introduced during the service or cleanup, or that the technicians changed the way they were doing things and unconsciously corrected the problem only after several weeks.26 The case of the Soviet bioweapons program demonstrates that covertness im- poses huge constraints on knowledge management and has important impli- cations for the evaluation of state and terrorist clandestine efforts to produce bioweapons. One may wonder, however, whether the lessons learned from the historical analysis of the U.S. and Soviet programs apply to current covert pro- grams. No collapse Neil Couch 12, Brigadier in the British Army, July 2012, “’Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seafordhouse-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf/view A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18¶ A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that ¶ or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure. 2NC CP 2NC Rescheduling Solve every advantage – creates an industry bc cough syrup and also provides flexibility to states even if there are solvency deficits to rescheduling on its own the counterplan still solves 100% of the case because it leads to legalization – that’s conceded Rescheduling will lead to legalization for three reasons: 1) Honest communication – Government agencies like the Office of National Drug Control Policy are unable to speak freely about the minimal harms of marijuana and the potential benefits because they are required by law to oppose legalization of any Schedule I substance. Acknowledging that the panic over marijuana is overblown will significantly affect the conversation by drawing attention to unfair drug laws. This will “pave the way” for legalization at both the federal and state level. That’s all in our 1NC Sullum evidence 2) Research – Rescheduling marijuana allows new research that contradicts the official narrative – pro legalization forces will effectively capitalize Murray 14, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute (David, Hard to Study: The Difficulty in Measuring Marijuana’s Value, www.hudson.org/research/10604-hard-to-study-the-difficultyin-measuring-marijuana-s-value) Second, if marijuana were placed in Schedule II, the increased access might abet agendadriven research and publications by advocacy organizations that conduct “science by press release.” Those seeking to sway public opinion in favor of marijuana’s supposed benefits would likely capitalize on the opportunity, generating careless studies that would not withstand rigorous scientific review but would suffice to create positive headlines, softening up public opinion in favor of legalization. 3) States – rescheduling would increase support for legalization even in hard sell states like Alabama, that’s in our 1NC Sullum evidence. Increased state legalization leads to federal legalization Somin 14, Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, (Ilya, 29, Prospects for marijuana legalization in 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/02/09/prospects-for-marijuana-legalization-in-2014/) Not all of these laws are likely to pass. But if a large number do, it could greatly accelerate the trend towards marijuana legalization. This is especially true if legalization hits large states such as California, where a legalization ballot initiative narrowly failed in 2010; public opinion in both California and the nation as a whole has become more favorable to legalization since then. Even many conservatives have begun to rethink the War on Drugs. Even if numerous states legalize marijuana, the drug will still be illegal under federal law. In its badly misguided decision in Gonzales v. Raich (2005), the Supreme Court ruled that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce allows it to ban the possession of marijuana even in cases where the marijuana in Obama administration has taken a very equivocal position on the question of whether federal prosecutions for marijuana distributors will continue in states that legalize marijuana under their own laws. However, widespread legalization at the state level will put pressure on the federal government to question has never crossed state lines or been sold in an market anywhere. The repeal the federal ban. Even if it does not, federal law enforcement resources are extremely limited, and it will be difficult or impossible for the feds to enforce a marijuana ban without state cooperation. If marijuana legalization does sweep the nation over the next few years, perhaps it will also lead more people to reconsider the War on Drugs as a whole . 2NC Amendment The CP results in an amended treaty—there’s a global surge in support for an alternative to cannabis prohibition that the CP capitalizes on—that’s Don Framing issues— a. Threshold low—none of their evidence assumes inter se agreements— amendments can be passed between parties where only the parties that want to legalize marijuana sign on to the amended version of the treaty— this is enabled by the single convention and means only one country has to approve the amendment before the US can legalize without violating the treaty—that’s Don Full consensus isn’t necessary for an amendment Jelsma 14 [10/17/14, Martin Jelsma is the Director, Drugs and Democracy Program Transnational Institute, “The Brookings Institution International Impacts Of the U.S. Trend Towards Legal “ Marijuana, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/17%20international%20impacts%20m arijuana/20141017_legal_marijuana_transcript.pdf] there are also options for adaptation in the regime that do not require a full consensus of all the parties. Now, the WHO review is already one example, because if the WHO would recommend a de-scheduling of cannabis, it is -- a decision like that is taken by a simple majority, not consensus. There is also the possibility of countries individually or in group to And secondly, withdraw from the treaties and re-adhere with certain reservations. That’s a path that Bolivia has taken in the case And there is the possibility also, that a group of countries can sign an inter se agreement, where they you know, agree among themselves that the treaty is applied in a different way, while they still maintain their full obligations to all the treaty parties that are not part of the inter se agreement. of in (Inaudible). b. US influence—US support for prohibition is what sustains an oppositional bloc—US influence the other way ensures amendment passage Kumah-Abiwu 14 [Felix Kumah-Abiwu is a Professor of Africana Studies @ Eastern Illinois UniversityDr. Felix Kumah-Abiwu received his PhD in Political Science (International Relations, Comparative/African Politics and Public Policy) from West Virginia University. He also studied at Ohio University and the Legon Center for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana, “The Quest for Global Narcotics Policy Change: Does the United States Matter?” International Journal of Public Administration, 37: (2014) pg. 53–64] the US has a strong influence in many issue areas, including narcotics within the global system. Bullington (2004, p. 690) captures this assumption by noting that: The United States had been the prime mover of this early anti-drug legislation, relying on diplomatic pressure and arm twisting to forge a shaky consensus among nations that were generally much less convinced of the need for international controls. This US NARCOTICS POLICY TOOLS OF INFLUENCE Clearly, American triumph signaled the beginning of nearly a century during which America literally dominated the direction of drug control and drug policy in the international arena. For Levine (2003, p. 148), the global narcotics regime has been sustained for many years because the “US has used the UN as the international agency to create, spread, and supervise world-wide prohibition.” In a similar argument, Bewley-Taylor (1999a) observes that the US employs key policy tools of influence in its effort to globalize the prohibition approach to narcotics control. As previously noted, this article argues that the US to some extent shapes the global narcotics policy through four major policy tools of influence. the US employs diplomacy (bilateral and multilateral) as a key policy tool of influence in shaping the global narcotics regime (Bullington, 2004; Levine, 2003). For Bewley-Taylor (1999a), the US employs its diplomatic strength within the UN to pressure other countries in supporting its preferred prohibition approach to narcotics control. In fact, Bewley-Taylor’s (1999a) classic example is worth reiterating in support of my argument. Table 3 provides a summary of the policy tools. First, According to him, an independent research on the usefulness of drugs (legal and non-legal) was conducted between 1992 and 1994 by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Program on Substance Abuse (PSA) in conjunction with the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). Surprisingly, the findings of the study show greater health problems associated with the use of legal drugs than with occasional use of some narcotic drugs Fearing that the findings might undermine the existing prohibition approach, the UN was pressured by the US to issue a disclaimer on the report (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a, p. 169; Kumah-Abiwu, 2012). In fact, one of The US plays very dominant role and has provided an enormous amount of funding to UN anti-drug efforts. At one point the experts interviewed for this study shares a similar view by indicating that: when the World Health Organization (WHO) was planning to issue a report on the lack of dangerousness of cannabis, the US pressured the WHO to kill the report . . . . At another point when the Liberal government of Canada under Prime Minister Chretien proposed to decriminalize marijuana, the Bush Administration’s drug czar, John Walters, threatened trade retaliation against Canada regarding timber, fish, and other issues. (An official interviewed at the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation. Also see Kumah-Abiwu, 2012) In the words of another policy Latin American lawmakers, for instance, have moved intellectually and also policy wise toward decriminalization in recent years, but have feared going far because of their northern neighbor. In recent years, the US has also pressured Canada and the UK from moving ahead with radical policy changes that would shift away from criminalization . The US expert: fears that a radical drug policy change would compromise the UN conventions. (An official interviewed at the Drug Derivative control is another policy tool of influence at the disposal of the US. One of the ways the US employs this policy tool is to link nonnarcotic issues with narcotic ones at the UN. Explaining the policy, Bewley-Taylor (1999b, p. 151) observes that: By tying the acquiescence of other nations in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to American economic aid and political support in other areas , the US was able to dominate the decision-making process and play a central role in the instigation and design of anti-narcotics legislation. The third policy instrument is the certification policy. The policy Policy Alliance. Also see Kumah-Abiwu, 2012) mandates every US president to present a yearly report to Congress on the status of drug-producing countries. Any country, especially in the Andean region, that falls within the decertified category could face serious sanctions from These sanctions range from the withdrawal of US foreign aid, which may or not be directly linked to counternarcotics policy issues (Bouley, 2001; Falcon, 1996). The US could also employ its influence to prevent loans from multilateral development agencies to the so-called countries that fall within the decertified category (Spencer, 1998). The final policy tool of influence is the financial leverage of the US on many UN agencies, including the UNODC. Essentially, the US is one of the top financial contributors to the operations of many agencies within the UN system (Bewleythe US (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Chepesiuk, 1999, p. 34; Hinojosa, 2007; Kumah-Abiwu, 2012). Taylor, 1999a). The Better World Campaign (BWC) notes that the financial contribution of the US to major UN activities in 2011 alone was substantial as compared to others. For instance, the US contributed about $1.884 billion toward peacekeeping operations, $516 million for UN regular budgets, and $354 million (Kumah-Abiwu, 2012) toward other agencies including the UNODC (Bruun, Lynn, & Ingemar, 1975; BWC, 2012). Another interesting example that supports US dominance over the UNODC is worth mentioning as well. According to Bewley-Taylor (2005, p. 429), the former Executive Director of the UNODC, Mr. Antonio Costa, met with Mr. Robert Charles, head of the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in 2004 to discuss the Fearing a possible threat to its preferred prohibition approach, the head of the US Narcotics Bureau threatened to possibility of a public health approach to global narcotics control. drastically reduce the US financial support to the UNODC , unless Mr. Costa withdraws support of the UNODC for any public health approach to global narcotics control. Mindful of a drastic cut in funding from the US, the head of the UNODC was said to have succumbed to the US demands (BewleyTaylor, 2005, p. 429; Kumah-Abiwu, 2012). This case provides another good example of how the US continues to employ its policy tools of influence in shaping the global narcotics regime (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Bullington, 2004). Pg. 59-60 Federalism EPA Fights EPA fights now trigger the link—also Medicaid expansion Peacock 8-25, Bill Peacock is vice president for research and director of the Center for Economic Freedom at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, The EPA’s Power Grab, http://www.texaspolicy.com/center/economic-freedom/opinions/epas-power-grab The assault on the dual sovereignty of the states — the federalism enshrined in our Tenth Amendment — is nothing new. Much of the battle over Obamacare turned on the attempt to force Medicaid expansion on the states, which the Supreme Court deemed a violation of the Tenth Amendment. However, with the CPP, the EPA is attempting to take federal control of states to a whole new level — perhaps hoping that the states will meekly comply rather than calling its bluff by challenging a rule based on very questionable statutory authority. Writing in The Atlantic, Mario Loyola and Richard Epstein describe the federal takeover of the states through “cooperative federalism” programs as an effort to “turn states into mere field offices of the federal government.” Already today, they point out, federal officials exert enormous influence over state budgets and state regulators, often behind the scenes. The new federalism replaces the “laboratories of democracy” with heavy-handed, once-size-fits-all solutions. Uniformity wins but diversity loses, along with innovation, local choice, and the Constitution’s necessary lim its on government power. One such scheme is the Clean Air Act, which “allows the states to issue federal permits — but only under federally approved state implementation plans.” The states can’t be forced to take on this role, but Loyola and Epstein note that the EPA coerces states to do so by telling them, “Implement our regulations for us, or we’ll do it ourselves, and your constituents will be sorry.” This is the hammer behind the CPP. Much of the management of the electricity market in the United States is under the purview of the states. Either individually or collectively, states manage the market with the goal that citizens get a generally reliable — though not always affordable — supply of electricity. Public-utility commissions and, more recently, regional transmission organizations have been the means by which this is accomplished . States set retail prices, implement green-energy policies, and manage capacity as best they can to accomplish their policy goals. Of course, the federal government managed to force its way into the mix. Under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has used the interstate transmission of electricity to claim jurisdiction over wholesale operations of this major sector of the U.S. economy. So while states generally have a free hand in the retail market, management of the wholesale market is a mishmash of state and federal oversight. In recent years, the Obama administration has tried to extend FERC’s reach under the guise of maintaining reliability and promoting renewable energy. But in Electric Power Supply Association v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reminded the administration that there are limits on what it can do under the law. The states’ lead role in electricity was clearly on display in the 1990s when many of them tried to introduce competition into the electricity market. At the time, utilities’ revenue usually came through rates set by regulators that reimbursed them for whatever approved expenses they had incurred — plus a reasonable profit. Even liberals at the time realized that this inefficient rate-of-return regulation couldn’t turn the cheap natural gas available then into cheap electricity. Many states ultimately failed, partly because, like California, they just couldn’t bring themselves to actually allow competition. But in many cases, the problem was closely linked to FERC’s regulation of the wholesale market. Only Texas, which uniquely was able to regulate the entire market on its own, fully succeeded in creating a competitive electricity market. Over the years Texas had largely freed itself from significant FERC regulation by carefully isolating its electrical grid from the rest of the country, thereby eliminating the basis for federal “interstate commerce” jurisdiction. When it adopted its competitive reforms, the results were astounding. Texas now has the most competitive, successful electricity market in the U.S., if not the world. These reforms have allowed Texas to keep up with a massive increase in demand for electricity. Since competition started in 2002, demand for electricity in Texas has increased 80 percent faster than in the rest of the country. But Texas electricity prices have actually decreased by 14 percent in real dollars and by 57 percent relative to national prices. This tremendous benefit to Texas consumers has been accomplished solely at the risk of investors and generators, who were allowed to invest more than $36 billion in new generation capacity to meet this demand. In every other state, much of the risk of investing in new generation is placed on consumers — they pay for the generation whether they need it or not. This success was possible only because Texas’s wholesale electricity market is not subject to FERC oversight. But if the CPP survives the many legal challenges it will face, Texas’s electricity market will not be independent for long. At aworkshop conducted by the Public Utility Commission of Texas on July 15, I joined a long list of witnesses in testifying that the CPP will result in the federal takeover of the Texas electricity market — and that of every other state as well. The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that the federal government cannot require the states to regulate. Schemes such as the Clean Air Act therefore give states a “choice” between implementing EPA programs, through a State Implementation Plan (SIP), or letting EPA do the implementing itself, through a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). The choice is coercive, because in a real “contractual” or “cooperative” setting among equals, you can’t be forced to choose the lesser of two evils. But the Court has looked the other way, on the theory that so long as an FIP doesn’t dragoon state agencies into federal service, there is no commandeering problem. But there is a commandeering problem with the CPP. In New York v. United States (1992), the Supreme Court struck down a law requiring states to “take title” to low-level nuclear waste within their borders or dispose of it according to federal instructions. The Court ruled that states cannot be forced to choose between two schemes neither of which the federal government would be able to impose on them as a free-standing requirement. The CPP has a lot in common with the law that was struck down in New York, because whatever the state chooses to do, its agencies will be required to regulate in accordance with federal instructions. If states decide to comply with the CPP by developing an SIP, they would have to restructure the jurisdictional relationships of their environmental and electrical regulating entities and make substantive changes to their electricity markets. Environmental regulators would become utility regulators, and vice versa. Renewable-energy and energy-efficiency mandates would have to be greatly expanded. The dispatch of electricity would be required to take into account environmental considerations — perhaps through the imposition of a carbon tax. Many of these changes would have to be made in the retail market, despite the D.C. Circuit Court’s finding that Congress has specifically confined federal “jurisdiction over the sale of electricity . . . to the wholesale market.” The states can’t be forced to do this in an SIP. If states choose not to participate in the CPP, the EPA will implement it through an FIP. But since the federal government can’t regulate the retail market, the EPA would have t o require state regulators to implement the federal regulations — again stepping beyond the authority that Congress has granted to FERC. In either case, the states really have no choices at all — either by SIP or by FIP, the states are forced to implement the provisions of the CPP that neither FERC nor the EPA has the authority to demand individually. It is quite likely that the EPA knows it has overstepped its bounds. But the EPA is taking this step because it knows that it has little hope of achieving its desired CO2-emission-reduction goals if it is forced to regulate on its own the only entities it actually has authority to regulate — the generators. So the EPA’s greatest hope is that the states will voluntarily turn their utility regulators into an extension of the federal government, fearing that if they fail to comply, the EPA would turn up the heat on the industry in a recalcitr ant state by making impossible demands, threatening huge fines, and essentially shutting down the permitting of existing generation. Either states comply or the feds may turn out the lights. While the potential of rolling blackouts is not an attractive op tion, the alternative is to take one more step down the road to a unified national bureaucracy. It might not be too long until state legislatures are no longer needed, except perhaps to tax their citizens to pay the state agency staff that will then regulate the economy under the direction of the federal government. The Founders reserved to the states — and to the people — those powers not explicitly delegated to the federal states should force the EPA to show its hand in order to halt the creeping federal takeover of state governments, which continues to encroach on one of the most important protections in our Constitution — federalism, and the liberties it was meant to guarantee. government in order to protect the people from tyranny. While the CPP is purportedly about saving the world from the horrors of CO2 emissions, it will accomplish virtually nothing in that regard. Though the stakes are high, the FERC wrecks cooperative federalism on the environment Peacock, 8-25 – columnist @ National Review Online Bill, “The EPA’s Power Grab,” NRO, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/386185/epaspower-grab-bill-peacock Writing in The Atlantic, Mario Loyola and Richard Epstein describe the federal takeover of the states through “cooperative federalism” programs as an effort to “turn states into mere field offices of the federal government.” Already today, they point out, federal officials exert enormous influence over state budgets and state regulators, often behind the scenes. The new federalism replaces the “laboratories of democracy” with heavyhanded, once-size-fits-all solutions. Uniformity wins but diversity loses, along with innovation, local choice, and the One such scheme is the Clean Air Act, which “allows the states to issue federal permits — but only under federally approved state implementation plans.” The states can’t be forced to take on this role, but Loyola and Epstein note that the Constitution’s necessary limits on government power. EPA coerces states to do so by telling them, “Implement our regulations for us, or we’ll do it ourselves, and your constituents will be sorry.” This is the hammer behind the CPP. Much of the management of the electricity market in the United States is under the purview of the states. Either individually or collectively, states manage the market with the goal that citizens get a generally reliable — though not always affordable — supply of electricity. Publicutility commissions and, more recently, regional transmission organizations have been the means by which this is accomplished. States set retail prices, implement green-energy policies, and manage capacity as best they can to accomplish their policy goals. Of course, the federal government managed to force its way into the mix. Under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has used the interstate transmission of electricity to claim jurisdiction over wholesale operations of this major sector of the U.S. economy. So while states generally have a free hand in the retail market, management of the wholesale market is a mishmash of state and federal oversight. In recent years, the Obama administration has tried to extend FERC’s reach under the guise of maintaining reliability and promoting renewable energy. But in Electric Power Supply Association v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reminded the administration that there are limits on what it can do under the law. Decentralization’s vital to effective bioterror response---mandated cooperation hamstrings operations Paul Posner 3, Ph.D., a recognized national expert on U.S. federalism, is the Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues for the General Accounting Office, 3/24/3, “The Federalism Challenge: The Challenge for State and Local Government,” p. 20 For example, in public health, let’s examine what a local government faces to prepare for bioterrorism. It has to improve the capacity of its local health departments, the human capital that has been woefully neglected in recent years reportedly. It has to update its technology so that it at least can achieve agreements with hospitals to develop surge capacity and support from doctors and other medical personnel. It has to develop laboratory infrastructure to at least know where the labs are and reach some kind of agreements on how to process samples of suspicious materials. And most importantly, what we’re finding increasingly in the local health departments, it has to develop surveillance systems to produce real-time data on day-today incidences, to help get early warning of suspicious health trends and incidents to facilitate an expeditious communicate problems to the CDC in Atlanta over the Internet. It has to response to health problems where time is such a critical variable influencing potential health outcomes for those exposed. Baltimore is one of the pioneers . They can show daily the numbers of admittances to emergency rooms, the veterinarians’ reports, daily school absences. They are trying to get pharmacies to report daily on medications prescribed. The point is they can monitor these things and look for variations and look for puzzles and, fortunately, the kind of surveillance system that is under development in some communities and illustrates the political challenges in gaining the cooperation of numerous independent actors at the local level. they haven’t found any. That’s Framing the Problem The way the problem is framed determines the framework and the modality or the process that we use to address if we define the homeland security problem as a response problem, as a first responder’s problem, then the model will have a local orientation . City managers have told me that when you’re dealing with the response to an incident , the most effective thing for the effective management of response is for the federal government to stay out of our way . These managers feel they know their communities best. As one said, “Give us money but let us control the action .” it. For example, Cartels 2NC UQ Stabilizing now – their ev is all rhetoric stats Z News 9/2/14 ("Mexico Touts Progress Against Drug Violence") Mexico City: Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto touted Monday a sharp drop in drugrelated murders, fewer kidnappings and a tougher crackdown on money laundering in his second state of the nation report.¶ Pena Nieto, who vowed to combat everyday violence plaguing Mexicans when he took office in December 2012, said homicides linked to organized crime dropped by 36 percent between September 2013 and July this year.¶ The number of kidnappings, which had soared to record numbers in the past year, fell by 6.8 percent in the first seven months of this year compared to the same period in 2013. More than 80,000 people are estimated to have been killed in drug turf wars and battles with security forces since Pena Nieto`s predecessor Felipe Calderon deployed tens of thousands of troops to combat drug cartels in 2006. 2NC Link Turn Competition Legalization causes cartels to shift North – they move into the United States and challenge legal business operations Heft 5/21/14 (Peter, Student of Philosophy and Political Science, "The Case Against The Legalization of Marijuana") The legalization of marijuana will have two effects on drug cartels. First, it will create an incentive for some to move further into the continental United States and second, it will force others to stop growing marijuana in favor of other, more dangerous substances.¶ The legalization of marijuana, specifically in Colorado, raises interesting questions of what drug cartels that cannot shift to other substances will do and where they will go. Sadly, the evidence indicates that they will migrate north into the United States and set up shop among American civilians. Just last year, Colorado saw raids on businesses with evidence connecting them to Colombian cartels operating both abroad and in Colorado itself. This issue arose because Colorado businesses were legally allowed to sell marijuana but didn’t automatically have the growing power or knowledge needed and thus teamed up with cartels. This fact is further bolstered by statements made by Tom Gorman, director of the Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, when he indicated that the legalization of marijuana provided the perfect incentive for Colombian cartels to move north. In answer to an interviewer’s question of “[w]hat, if anything, are you seeing happening in Colorado?”, Gorman responded with¶ …there is a real high demand for Colorado marijuana throughout the United States. One of the primary weapons of a cartel they use to make money is, one, selling drugs, and the other one is extortion. So it’s real easy for them to come in and look at these retail stores that are making hundreds of thousands of dollars and say we want a piece of the action.(x)¶ Gorman indicates that currently there is a “perfect storm” scenario wherein cartels can easily set up shop in states where marijuana is legal and then expand outward within the United States. What’s more, Gorman has indicated that due to the ruthlessness of cartels, there is the very real worry of violence and intimidation against legal businesses. Interestingly enough, it’s not just Colorado that is affected. Executives from the Chicago Crime Commission have indicated that there is an increased cartel presence both in Illinois and other non-border states. The officials warn that, if left unchecked, the situation will just get worse and the cartels in the United States will expand operations. 1NR 2NC Impact—O/V DA O/W—they have conceded the Bennet and Walsh and Mueller ev that international law creates a cooperative framework—no impact defense Short term nuke war—uncertainty, creates some degree of dialogue Prefer our impact—system instability constantly creates the risk of new crises that we can’t anticipate—international law is key insurance against burgeoning threats It’s a controlling and magnifying impact—all threats are more likely and more dangerous absent international cooperation—treaty system contains the worst of their impacts through constant cooperation 2NC UQ CP solves by reversing status quo legalization efforts and halting all efforts pending new reforms—status quo efforts were sustainable in the short term and the CP prevents any long term damage to US cred—that’s Walsh States not bound by treaties Humphreys 13 – prof @ stanford (Keith, “Can the United Nations Block U.S. Marijuana Legalization?” 11/15, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-humphreys/can-the-united-nationsbl_b_3977683.html) 1. Is the U.S. currently in violation of the UN treaties it signed agreeing to make marijuana illegal? No. The U.S. federal government is a signatory to the treaty, but the States of Washington and Colorado are not. Countries with federated systems of government like the U.S. and Germany can only make international commitments regarding their national-level policies. Constitutionally, U.S. states are simply not required to make marijuana illegal as it is in federal law. Hence, the U.S. made no such commitment on behalf of the 50 states in signing the UN drug control treaties.¶ Some UN officials believe that the spirit of the international treaties requires the U.S. federal government to attempt to override statelevel marijuana legalization. But in terms of the letter of the treaties, Attorney General Holder's refusal to challenge Washington and Colorado's marijuana policies is within bounds. 2NC Thumpers The link is distinct from their other examples—the US may not have ratified or ratified with reservations in other areas, but the plan is a unilateral unambiguous violation of a treaty the US ratified without reservation This distinction matters—outright violations of treaties have been limited, but put us on the brink—only magnifies the link Koplow 13 [Winter 2013, David Koplow is a Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied Legal Studies at Georgetown University Law Center. He was Special Counsel for Arms Control to the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, from 2009 to 2011, “Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?,” http://www.fletcherforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37(1)] Why does it matter that the United States violates treaties, and occasionally does so without a shred of legal cover ? Perhaps that is the IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPEATED VIOLATIONS So what? realpolitik privilege of the global hegemon: to be able to sustain hypocrisy, asserting that its unique international responsibilities and its “exceptional” position in the world enable the United States explicitly to welch on its debts, there is a cost when the world’s strongest state behaves this way. One potential danger is that other countries may mimic this disregard for legal commitments and justify their own cavalier attitudes toward international law by citing U.S. precedents. Reciprocity and mutuality are fundamental tenets of international practice; it is foolhardy to suppose that other parties will indefinitely continue with treaty compliance if they feel that the United States is taking advantage of them by unilateral avoidance of shared legal obligations . So far, there has not been significant erosion of the treaties discussed in the three examples. The United States and Russia will fall years short of compliance with the CWC destruction obligations, but other parties, with the notable exception of Iran, have reacted with aplomb, comfortable with the two giants’ unequivocal commitment to eventual compliance . Likewise, the VCCR is not unraveling, even if other states lament the asymmetry in consular access to detained foreigners. And while many states pay their UN dues late and build up substantial arrearages, that recalcitrance seems to stem more from penury than from a deliberate choice to follow the U.S. lead. But that persistent touting undermines the treaties— and by extension, it jeopardizes the entire fabric of international law. Chronic noncompliance— especially ostentatious, unexcused, unjustified noncompliance— also sullies the nation’s reputation and degrades U.S. diplomats’ ability to drive other states to better conform with their obligations under the full array of treaties and other international law commitments from trade to human rights to the Law of the Sea . The United States depends upon the international legal structure more than anyone else: Americans have the biggest interest in promoting a stable, robust, reliable system for international exchange . It fudge on its obligations, and adopt a “do as we say, not as we do” approach with other countries. However, is shortsighted and self-defeating to publicly and unblushingly undercut the system that offers the United States so It is especially damaging when, following an indisputable violation, the United States acknowledges its default, participates in an international dispute resolution procedure, and apologizes—but then continues to violate the treaty. The many benefits. CWC implementation bodies, the International Court of Justice, and even the UN General Assembly and Security Council are unable to effectively do much to sanction or penalize the mighty United States, but it is still terrible for U.S. interests to disregard those mechanisms. Marijuana is key—the growing consensus away from cannabis prohibition means it’s a stress test for the ability of the global regime to adapt to changing times—that’s Bennett and Walsh Not a violation Carafano 13 [08/26/13, James Jay Carafano, “Say What You Want About Drones—They're Perfectly Legal”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/say-what-you-want-about-drones-theyre-perfectlylegal/278740/] I hate Obama's drone war--but, under the law, he has a perfect right to fight one. Armed drones in war may be new, but their use introduces no new ethical or legal issues. In the Western world, the laws of war are built on the foundation of the Just War tradition . The principles for employing force are fairly simple and realistic. The use of force has to be under a competent sovereign authority. And it has to be proportional --that is, the level of force used must be appropriate to the military mission, with appropriate care taken to avoid harming innocents. Those rules apply regardless of the As I said, nothing new here. Our laws and treaty obligations place a legal framework around the principles of the Just War tradition. At times, the United States has modified these legal instruments to account for the unusual destructive weaponry involved, be it hand grenades, nukes... or armed drones. power of certain weapons -- their ability to inflict intentional and unnecessary cruelty or to pose an indiscriminate threat to innocents. For example, the U.S. helped pen conventions on poison gas and biological weapons, as well as Drones, however, present none of these issues. There is nothing novel or unusual about the destructive potential of a drone strike. Pretty much every weapon in the U.S. arsenal may be used in war, provided the users (1) have the legal authority to use them, (2) aim them at that legitimate targets, and (3) use them according to the rules of engagement laid out by their commanders. All those bases are covered when it comes to drones. Congress has given the commander-inchief an Authorization to Use Military Force--AUMF in Washington-speak--and that's all the legal treaties to help stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. authority he needs. And, as Mark Bowden's article in this month's The Atlantic illustrates well, the administration has plenty of rules for running armed drone operations. Here is the brutal reality of war: It always requires targeting enemies with lethal force. It is an operational necessity. And it is legal. The problem some people have with killer drones in combat has little to do with the technology of flying weapons. As my colleague at Heritage, Cully Stimson testified before Congress, "Much criticism of drone warfare is actually criticism of broader policies, such as the application of the law of armed conflict to the present conflict, geographical limitations on such conflict, and targeting decisions. Whether a strike is carried out by a drone or an airplane (with the pilot in the vehicle itself) has little or no bearing on these broader policy issues." Turning drone strikes into a battle of legal briefs is more an act "lawfare" than warfare--an attempt to hamstring U.S. military operations by clothing complaints in legal-sounding arguments. Amnesty International declared in its 2012 report that U.S. operations do not "recognize the applicability of international human rights law," an assertion the report conclusively fails to document. Christof Heyns, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings and summary or arbitrary executions, stated at a conference in Geneva that some U.S. operations might constitute "war crimes." Though he has been on the job for many months, he has yet to prove that allegation. To recapitulate: President Obama has the right to drone on as long as the authority of the AUMF remains in force and as long as he operates within that authority (or operates under some other legal authorization for the use force). Syria is legal Cole 14 [juan cole 9/4/14, “Would a US/ NATO war in Syria be Legal in International Law?”, http://www.juancole.com/2014/09/syria-legal-international.html] Obama administration could use lethal force in Syria on the basis of two legal claims. One would be that ISIL is transnational and is threatening the US embassy in Baghdad, has killed US citizens and is threatening to kill more, and has openly menaced the ‘I suppose the United States in general, and that the US has the right of self-defense, extending into strikes on ISIL in Syria. It seems to me like awfully thin broth, but as I said, I think President Obama’s rhetoric suggests that this The other would be that ISIL is genocidal and it is necessary to intervene against it to protect millions of Shiites, Yazidis, Shabak, Alawites, Christians approach may be the one his lawyers favor. and other groups hated by the Salafi Jihadi ISIL fanatics. It seems to me that the [pdf] 2005 UN statement on the responsibility to protect still insists that member states go through the UN Security Council for authorization, and that they cannot just cowboy it, though maybe this is ambiguous. Perceived violations aren’t cut and dry if it’s still possible to remain in technical compliance – and as long as the US has a legal case, it doesn’t harm diplomacy Koplow 13—David, is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied Legal Studies at Georgetown University Law Center. He was Special Counsel for Arms Control to the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, from 2009 to 2011.“Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37(1): http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf Debates about putative treaty violations are also often inconclusive because international law, like domestic U.S. law, is frequently contestable. For example, the rules for demarcating a disputed land or maritime boundary or the interpretation of a World Trade Organization obligation about improper barriers Often, the United States (or any other adopts a certain interpretation of the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre, the United States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree, there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has in good faith advanced what subsequently turns out to be only a minority position. to international trade can be obscure, ambiguous, and debatable. country) 2NC Link—O/V Legalization destroys and renders ineffective the treaty system—three distinct link args a. Pick and choose—by unambiguously violating a tenet of a treaty the US signed onto without reservation, the plan creates a precedent for treaty parties unilaterally determining which parts of a treaty they want to comply with—that’s Hasse That outweighs—the plan’s pick and choose approach violates “pacta sunt servanda” which is the most fundamental principle of international law Lopez 14 (German, “How much of the war on drugs is tied to international treaties?” http://www.vox.com/cards/war-on-drugs-marijuana-cocaine-heroin-meth/war-on-drugsinternational-treaties) There is a lot of disagreement among drug policy experts, enforcers, and reformers about the stringency of the treaties. Several sections of the conventions allow countries some flexibility so they don't violate their own constitutional protections. The US, for example, has never enforced penalties on inciting illicit drug use on the basis that it would violate rights to freedom of speech.¶ Many argue that any move toward legalization of use, possession, and sales is in violation of international treaties. Under this argument, Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay are technically in violation of the treaties because they legalized marijuana for personal possession and sales.¶ Others say that countries have a lot of flexibility due to the constitutional exemptions in the conventions. Countries could claim, for instance, that their protections for right to privacy and health allow them to legalize drugs despite the conventions. When it comes to individual states in the US, the federal government can America's federalist system allows states some flexibility as long as the federal government keeps drugs illegal .¶ "It's pretty clear that the war on drugs was waged for political reasons also argue that and some countries have used the treaties as an excuse to pursue draconian policies," said Kasia MalinowskaSempruch, director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program. "Nevertheless, we've seen a number of countries drop criminal penalties for minor possession of all drugs. We've seen others put drugs into a pharmaceutical model, including the prescription of heroin to people with serious addictions. This seems completely possible within the treaties."¶ Even if a country decided to dismantle prohibition and violate the treaties, it's unclear how the international community would respond. If the US, for example, ended prohibition, there's little other countries could do to interfere; there's no international drug court, and sanctions would be very unlikely for a country as powerful as America.¶ Still, Martin Jelsma, an international drug policy expert at the Transnational ignoring or pulling out of the international drug conventions could seriously damage America's standing around the world. "Pacta sunt servanda ('agreements must be kept') is the most fundamental principle of international law and it would be very undermining if countries start to take an 'a-la-carte' approach to treaties they have signed; they cannot simply comply with some provisions and ignore others without losing the moral authority to ask other countries to oblige to other treaties," Jelsma wrote in an email. "So our preference is to acknowledge legal tensions with the Institute, argued that treaties and try to resolve them."¶ To resolve such issues, many critics of the war on drugs hope to reform international drug laws in 2016 during the next General Assembly Special Session on drugs.¶ "There is tension with the tax-and-regulate approach to marijuana in some jurisdictions," Malinowska-Sempruch said. "But it's all part of a process and that's why we hope the UN debate in 2016 is as open as possible, so that we can settle some of these questions and, if necessary, modernize the system." That starts a cycle of treaty violations that wrecks the whole system Harold Hongju Koh 3, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School, May 2003, “FOREWORD: On American Exceptionalism,” Stanford Law Review, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479 Similarly, the oxymoronic concept of "imposed democracy" authorizes top-down regime change in the name of democracy. Yet the United States has always argued that genuine democracy must flow from the will of the people, not from military occupation. n67 Finally, a policy of strategic unilateralism seems unsustainable in an the United States has become party not just to a few treaties, but to a global network of closely interconnected treaties enmeshed in multiple frameworks of international institutions. Unilateral administration decisions to break or bend one treaty commitment thus rarely end the matter, but more usually trigger vicious cycles of treaty violation. In an interdependent world, [*1501] the United States simply cannot afford to ignore its treaty obligations while at the same time expecting its treaty partners to help it solve the myriad global problems that extend far beyond any one nation's control: the global AIDS and SARS crises, climate change, international debt, drug smuggling, trade imbalances, currency coordination, and trafficking in human beings, to name just a few. Repeated incidents of American treaty-breaking create the damaging impression of a United States contemptuous of both its treaty obligations and treaty partners. That impression undermines American soft power at the exact moment that the United States is trying to use that soft power to mobilize those same partners to help it solve problems it simply cannot solve alone: most obviously, the war against global terrorism, but also the postwar construction of Iraq, the Middle East crisis, or the renewed nuclear militarization of North Korea. interdependent world. For over the past two centuries, b. Treaty Adaptability—Marijuana is a stress test for whether an old treaty can adapt itself to a changing consensus—legalization in the US signals that the treaty system can’t incorporate changing views and undermines its resiliency by setting a precedent of ignoring rather than adapting treaties that are out of touch—that’s Bennett and Walsh 2NC Link—AT LT/Aff Causes Reform The links outweigh the turn—even if they win that the plan causes treaty reform, the process of a unilateral treaty violation still undermines the treaty and renders the whole system ineffective Plan makes treaty amendment impossible—drug reforms requires global integration—ad hoc measures in advance of treaty reforms fail and prevent a unified change—also means the aff’s legalization will fail—that’s Hasse The US won’t use the plan to leverage treaty reform—the official US position and Brownfield doctrine mean it will try to claim treaty flexibility and maintain compliance—that’s Bennett and Walsh Unilateral action fails at resulting in treaty reform Rolles 9 [2009, Stephen Rolles is a Senior Policy Analyst for Transform Drug Policy Foundatio, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation”, http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/after-war-drugs-blueprint-regulation] Given the near impossibility for substantial or meaningful reform to be achieved by unilateral action, using the established administrative routes outlined in the various articles of the drug treaties and related UN legal structures, the most credible and likely way that the current treaty restrictions on exploring legal regulatory models for certain substances will be loosened is clearly through some form of collective action, by a coalition of reform minded states. This coalition would likely consist predominantly of an EU bloc (presumably minus Sweden), a South and Central American bloc, possibly along with New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and various others. The plan can’t be withdrawal and reacession—the aff’s immediate and unilateral legalization means it results in action that violates a treaty before any change in our status to that treaty can be made—treaty withdrawal is a legal procedure that takes time and before that finishes completely the US is considered under legal obligation to the treaty—even if the US does withdraw it still decks our cred Don 14 [2014, Allison Don is a University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015, “Lighten Up: Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 213, Hein Online] Another option is to withdraw from the Single Convention altogether, thus leaving the treaty intact but removing any legal obligations formed on behalf of the United States. n146 The [*235] process of withdraw, referred to as denunciation in the Single Convention, simply calls for a written statement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. n147 The withdrawing party will then be relieved of all obligations no later than six months following receipt of the statement by the Secretary-General. n148 Withdraw, or denunciation, is always an option but does not "affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination." n149 Thus, the United States would remain responsible for the current breach emanating from Washington and Colorado despite a potential decision to withdraw. n150 Withdraw also carries with it certain negative consequences, such as international isolation, trade sanctions, removal of financial assistance and a damaged reputation. n151 By recently withdrawing from, or failing to ratify, at least 10 treaties, the United States has already "cast doubt on its commitment to multilateral cooperation." n152 As withdraw is not a feasible means to circumvent accountability for the current violation, the potential ramifications of withdraw from the Single Convention outweigh any benefits. Treaty withdrawal is the least defensible—destroys the treaty Jelsma 14 [2014, Martin Jelsma is the co-coordinator of the TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme with Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf] The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that historical “error” and “fundamental change of circumstances” (rebus sic stantibus, literally “things thus standing”) can be grounds for invalidating a state’s consent to a treaty.34 According to Leinwand, “[I]f the fundamental situation underlying treaty provisions becomes so changed that continued performance of the treaty will not fulfil the objective that was originally intended, the performance of those obligations may be excused.” In an early attempt to legally accommodate cannabis reforms beyond the treaty latitude, he argued in 1971 for the applicability of those clauses to justify “selective denunciation” from the cannabis provisions under the 1961 Single Convention. The inclusion of cannabis, he wrote, “was a mistake, based on the erroneous scientific and medical information generally available to the delegates when the treaty was drafted”.35 The highly politicized and scientifically dubious history of how cannabis ended up in the 1961 treaty would definitely support Leinwand’s conclusion. The use of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine and the option of “selective denunciation”, however, are rarities in international law. The Beckley Foundation’s Global Cannabis Commission report, therefore, concluded in 2008 that “taking this path might be less legally defensible than denunciation and reaccession with reservations”, which would have the same end result.36 Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger even stronger condemnations than seen in the case of Bolivia, and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions.37 For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions from the U.S. and the European Union would probably be unavoidable. Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in several other agreements, not only in the sphere of trade and development but it is also a sine qua non for accession to the European Union, for example. Very few countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most countries now struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change want to keep significant parts of the international drug-control regime intact, not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes. The single convention prohibits new reservations after initial ratification— reacceeding to the treaty would still violate Don 14 [2014, Allison Don is a University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015, “Lighten Up: Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 213, Hein Online] When becoming party to a treaty, there exists an option to make "a unilateral statement ... whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state." n141 This option is known as a reservation which allows a state to "fine-tune or adjust the way in which a multilateral treaty will apply to it." n142 In relation to the Single Convention, at least three countries entered into reservations stating that the use of marijuana would be permitted within their territories for non-medical or scientific purposes; the United States was not one of them. n143 Initial logic would hold that the United States could simply enter into a reservation now permitting the use of marijuana for recreational purposes. However, the Single Convention expressly prohibits the statement of reservations following initial accession to the treaty, stating that reservations may be made "at the time of signature, ratification or accession." n144 By not stating a reservation pertaining to marijuana at the time of accession, the United States was barred from doing so in the future. n145 Thus, a reservation permitting the use of recreational marijuana is not a feasible means of avoiding the obligations under the Single Convention. Reacession trades off with long term reforms and undermines the treaty system Jelsma 14 [2014, Martin Jelsma is the co-coordinator of the TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme with Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf] A downside to this approach, besides the already mentioned risk of creating precedents for weakening other UN treaty regimes, is that it applies only to the reserving nation and that unilateral escape mechanisms could reduce pressure on the treaty system to undergo a multilateral and more fundamental process of reform and modernization. It is in effect a one-off fix for an individual state and could not be applied regularly. Nonetheless, the procedure is worthy of consideration under specific circumstances, especially after other avenues for creating more flexibility on a particular topic have been explored and failed. 2NR Mexico is stable now – Zeta power is low now – Reed 13 (Tristian, Mexico Security Analyst, "Mexico's Drug War: Los Zetas Lose Their Leaders and Community Police Proliferate") Mexican authorities arrested Los Zetas' top leader, Miguel "Z-40" Trevino Morales, roughly 27 kilometers (17 miles) southwest of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, on July 15. Trevino's is the most significant capture in Mexico's drug war in recent years. The fate of Los Zetas and the response of Los Zetas' rivals has accordingly become uncertain moving into the third quarter. Indicators will emerge during the third quarter providing clarity on what to expect for security and cartel operations throughout Mexico.¶ Beyond the Trevino arrest, the second quarter also saw continued expansion of community-organized militias, commonly referred to as self-defense groups or community police, a trend we identified in the 2013 first quarter update. In Michoacan state, militia activity was so pronounced that Mexico City deployed the military and federal police to reassert government authority. The proliferation of these groups increasingly affects not just the Mexican government's strategy for combatting crime and violence, but also the strategies of Mexico's transnational criminal organizations. a. Centralization of power - Sinaloa collusion with government eliminated rivals– that’s Bates b. Statistics – numbers prove kidnappings and murders are down Z News 9/2/14 ("Mexico Touts Progress Against Drug Violence") Mexico City: Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto touted Monday a sharp drop in drugrelated murders, fewer kidnappings and a tougher crackdown on money laundering in his second state of the nation report.¶ Pena Nieto, who vowed to combat everyday violence plaguing Mexicans when he took office in December 2012, said homicides linked to organized crime dropped by 36 percent between September 2013 and July this year.¶ The number of kidnappings, which had soared to record numbers in the past year, fell by 6.8 percent in the first seven months of this year compared to the same period in 2013. More than 80,000 people are estimated to have been killed in drug turf wars and battles with security forces since Pena Nieto`s predecessor Felipe Calderon deployed tens of thousands of troops to combat drug cartels in 2006. c. Momentum – violence is steadly declining under Nieto Weinberg 10/16/2014 (Bill “Mexican cartel wars winding down?” http://ww4report.com/node/13631) Mexican authorities on Oct. 1 claimed another coup against the cartels, announcing the arrest of Héctor Beltran Leyva, last remaining kingpin of the Beltran Leyva Organization— the declining crime machine that once controlled much of the west and central parts of the country. Beltran Leyva was taken into custody by army troops "without a shot fired" as he dined in a seafood restaurant in the tourist town of San Miguel de Allende, Guanajuato state. (LAT, Oct. 1) The capture follows that earlier this year of the Sinaloa Cartel's longfugitive jefe máximo Joaquin Guzmán Loera AKA "El Chapo"—marking another score for President Enrique Peña Nieto, and his supposed new and more sophisticated policy against the cartels. The government has other reasons to claim a measure of success. Mexico's murder rate tripled between 2007 and 2012, a period that saw 121,613 murders by official statistics. This period also coincided with President Felipe Calderón's term of office—and aggressive use of the military against the cartels. Since Peña Nieto took office in 2012, the murder rate has steadily declined, dropping below 2010 levels last year. The frequency of the cruel "narco-messages"—taunting or threatening notes left with mutilated corpses— has drastically decreased as well, falling from an average of 52 instances a month to just eight. (DW, Sept. 7) The number of deaths attributable to drug violence over the past years has been estimated as high as 80,000. Violence from the drug war is on the decline now – crime rate statistics prove that Nieto’s reforms are working Zabludovsky 7/23/14 (Karla Zabludovsky covers Latin America for Newsweek. “Murders in Mexico Down From Height of the Drug War, But Violence Persists” Filed: 7/23/ 14 at 6:42 PM http://www.newsweek.com/murders-mexico-down-heightdrug-war-violence-persists-260990 Some of the Mexican states where drug war–related violence has been most intense, like Coahuila, Guerrero and Tamaulipas, showed a decreased homicide rate. In Durango, part of the Mexican “golden triangle,” an area notorious for drug trafficking, homicides decreased by nearly half in 2013 as compared to the previous year.¶ ADVERTISEMENT¶ It is unclear what percentage of recorded homicides are related to organized crime since the government modified the classification in Aware of the war weariness felt among many in Mexico, Pena Nieto ran on the promise that, if elected, his government would shift the focus from capturing drug kingpins, like Calderon had, to making daily life for ordinary Mexicans safer.¶ "With this new strategy, I commit myself to significantly lowering October, doing away with a separate category for drug war–related deaths, instead lumping them all together.¶ the homicide rate, the number of kidnappings in the country, the extortions and the human trafficking," wrote Pena Nieto in a Since taking office in December 2012, Pena Nieto has largely eliminated talk of security from his agenda except when large outbreaks of violence have forced him otherwise, focusing instead on the economy and his legislative reforms, including sweeping overhauls to education and energy. And while the country appears to be less violent now than during Calderon’s newspaper editorial during his presidential campaign.¶ war on drugs, the climate of press freedom, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, remains “perilous.”