1NC
1NC DA
Obama’s using capital to persuade Congress to avoid sanctions but
opponents are nearing a veto-proof majority
Riechmann, 12-29—Deb, AP writer, “Obama doesn't rule out opening US embassy in
Iran; Congress planning January vote on sanctions,” MN Star Tribune,
http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/286993011.html --BR
While President Barack Obama hasn't ruled out the possibility of reopening a U.S. Embassy
in Iran, Republicans say the Senate will vote within weeks on a bill to impose more
sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear program. Obama was asked in an NPR interview
broadcast on Monday whether he could envision opening an embassy there during his final
two years in office. "I never say never," Obama said, adding that U.S. ties with Tehran must
be restored in steps. Washington and its partners are hoping to clinch a deal with Iran by
July that would set long-term limits on Iran's enrichment of uranium and other activity that
could produce material for use in nuclear weapons. Iran says its program is solely for
energy production and medical research purposes. It has agreed to some restrictions in
exchange for billions of dollars in relief from U.S. economic sanctions. On a visit to Israel on
Saturday, Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said the new Republican-controlled Senate will vote
on an Iran sanctions bill in January. He said the bipartisan sanction legislation says: "If Iran
walks away from the table, sanctions will be re-imposed. If Iran cheats regarding any deal
that we enter to the Iranians, sanctions will be re-imposed." Graham also is sponsoring
legislation that would require any deal with Iran to be approved by Congress before
sanctions could be lifted. Standing alongside Graham, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu called Iran a "dangerous regime" that should be prevented from having nuclear
weapons. "I believe that what is required are more sanctions, and stronger sanctions,"
Netanyahu said. The Obama administration has been telling members of Congress that it
has won significant concessions from Iran for recently extending nuclear talks, including
promises by the Islamic republic to allow snap inspections of its facilities and to neutralize
much of its remaining uranium stockpile. Administration officials have been presenting the
Iranian concessions to lawmakers in the hopes of convincing them to support the
extension and hold off on new economic sanctions that could derail the diplomatic effort.
Obama has threatened to veto any new sanctions legislation while American diplomats
continue their push for an accord that would set multiyear limits on Iran's nuclear progress
in exchange for an easing of the international sanctions that have crippled the Iranian
economy. Senate hawks are still trying to build a veto-proof majority of 67 votes with
Republicans set to assume the majority next month. Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., told Fox News
Sunday that Senate Republicans might have enough backing from Democrats to pass vetoproof legislation that would impose more sanctions on Iran. "The good thing about those
votes, they will be really bipartisan votes," he said. "I have 17 Democrats with me. . We
have a shot at even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate."
The plan’s a political landmine and a waste of political capital
Sullivan, 12—Andrew, one of the most widely syndicated columnists in the USA, “The
Silent Stoner President, Ctd,” The Dish, http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2012/11/27/thesilent-stoner-president-ctd/ -- BR
That old footage you showed of Obama speaking in favor of decriminalization in 2004 reminded me of one
of the weirdest Obama videos I've ever seen. It's from the summer of 2007 when he was running
for president and in it someone on a rope line in New Hampshire asked what his stance was regarding
medical marijuana. You can tell right away from Obama's body language that he really
doesn't want to answer this question, presumably because he thinks it's a political
landmine. Then the oddest thing happens, and I had to watch it a few times to make sure
that I was seeing what I thought I was seeing. You can see Reggie Love in the background
apparently listening to an earpiece, which I'm assuming must be radioed directly to
somebody like Gibbs or Axelrod or some other adviser. Reggie hears something in the
earpiece and suddenly has to get Obama's attention in the middle of this guy's question and
not-so-smoothly transfers the ear piece to Obama, who then pauses, and after a few beats
apparently parrots back the stock answer coming to him in his ear. Obama's response was that
the Feds cracking down on state medical marijuana operations wouldn't be a worthwhile use of federal resources.
it was one of those rare times where
you see the politically calculated side rather than the casual authenticity that usually comes
across in him, and the sense I got was that whatever Obama's actual position on marijuana
is, he's not about to let that be the issue that he wastes political capital on. That's not going
But never mind the answer, which didn't seem like his own. To me,
to be the issue that prevents him from becoming president and fixing everything else that he cares more about.
As a big Obama supporter back in the summer of '07, I wouldn't have dared point out this video before Obama won
the Democratic primaries, the election in 2008, or the recent reelection, but now that we're on the other side of all
three, I couldn't help but pass along the footage. Above is some footage closer to the real Obama.
Obama’s capital is do or die—failure triggers war
Winsor, 14 (Ben, “A Coalition Is Working Furiously Behind The Scenes To Support
Obama's Iran Talks,” Oct 2, http://www.businessinsider.com/rag-tag-iran-coalition-backingdiplomacy-2014-10)
Since November 2013, the Obama administration has engaged with Iran in tense, drawnout nuclear negotiations which optimists hope could bring an end to decades of hostility and
mistrust. Throughout it all, Congress has threatened to play the spoiler, with a tough
sanctions bill passing the House and looming in the Senate which would almost certainly
scuttle the fragile talks over the Iranian nuclear program. Now, as the deadline for the end
of the talks approaches, a coalition of legislators, advocacy groups, and White House
officials are working to hold Congress back from the brink of thwarting what they see
as a historic window of opportunity. They're fighting against legislators and
conservative groups like The Heritage Foundation and The Free Enterprise Institute who
are pushing for the US to take a hawkish stance. Legislators, led by Minnesota
Congressman Keith Ellison, have been maneuvering quietly behind the scenes in Congress
to keep the talks alive. At the same time, officials from the White House have been
leaning heavily on Senate Democrats to refrain from bringing a sanctions bill to
the floor. On the outside, a diverse range of pro-diplomacy groups, led by organisations
like the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and the liberal Jewish organization J
Street, have found a common cause and rallied together to lobby for restraint. Even the
Quakers are energized. “This is a do-or-die moment, either we succeed, or we go in a much
more negative direction,” said NIAC co-founder Trita Parsi at the group’s annual conference
last weekend. Parsi sees the negotiations as a historic moment during a narrow window
of opportunity. Presidents on both sides have sunk significant time and energy
into the talks and Parsi believes the current leadership in both countries is more likely to
make a deal than those who came before — or might come after. “The next president,
whatever political party they’re in, is not going to spend precious political capital
battling Congress… [Obama] is the guy,” Parsi said. Supporters fear that failure of the
talks could trigger increased sanctions, the rise of hardliners in Iran, and relations
spiraling toward military confrontation.
Goes nuclear—tons of different actors and scenarios for extinction
Avery, 13 -- Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen (11/6/2013, John Scales
Avery, “An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War,”
http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm)
Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable
concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an
attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with
catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should
remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be
a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a largescale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in
problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary
Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear
weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into
a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such
a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic
effects on the global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result
from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either
intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides
making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive
contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a
global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the
ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the
biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future
of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.
1NC CP
The United States should propose amendments to all necessary
international drug control treaties to allow the legalization of marijuana.
The United States should reverse all laws that legalize marijuana. The
United States should halt all efforts to legalize marijuana while
international drug control treaties prohibit the legalization of marijuana.
The Drug Enforcement Agency should reschedule marihuana into Schedule
V of the CSA. The United States should employ a cooperative federalism
framework to environmental issues involving both state and federal
jurisdiction, modeled off the framework established in the Clean Air Act.
The amendment passes and results in eventual legalization—inter se
agreements avoid consensus issues
Don 14
[2014, Allison Don is a University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015, “Lighten
Up: Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 213, Hein
Online]
In light of the newly passed legislation within the United States concerning recreational
marijuana and proposed legislation in the international community, the best means of
aligning the Single Convention with evolving norms is to amend the treaty. n153
Amendments allow for formal changes to be made to a treaty while maintaining the treaty's
existence. n154 This allows for adjustment as "parties' understanding of the issue" n155
change or circumstances surrounding the issue change without requiring the drafting of a
new treaty or termination of an existing one. By amending the Single Convention to allow
for the recreational use of marijuana, the United States and other countries considering
such legislation would be able to continue the legislative process without any
international obligations impeding the progression towards marijuana legalization.
Article 47 within the Single Convention provides instructions for amending the treaty,
stating that "any party may propose an amendment to this Convention." n156 In order to
make such a proposal, the amendment itself and the reasons behind the amendment must
be transferred to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in writing who will then
disseminate the proposed amendment to the other parties of the treaty and the
Commission. At this point, the Commission has the power to decide if a conference should
be held to discuss the proposal or if the parties should simply be asked if they are willing to
accept. n157 If there is no objection within 18 months, the amendment becomes fully
adopted; if there is an objection, the Commission may then choose to hold a conference to
review the proposal. n158 With 153 current parties to the Single Convention, arriving at a
consensus may prove difficult. This does not preclude the option to amend as "amendments
require agreement between treaty parties, but not necessarily between all parties." Once an
[*237] amendment has been proposed and adopted, parties are free to decide if they will
become a party to the amendment. n159 Those who opt not to join the amendment remain
bound by the treaty's original obligations. n160 By proposing an amendment that would
permit the use of marijuana for recreational purposes, those countries who wish to
pursue such legislation would be permitted to do so and those countries who remain
in opposition would be able to remain parties to the original treaty preventing the use of
recreational marijuana. n161 C. Support for Legalization Within the United States from a Policy Standpoint The need for amendment is evident as
numerous countries move towards marijuana legalization. n162 Within the United States, a movement towards federal legalization is desirable for numerous reasons. Particularly,
legalization would increase tax revenues, lower drug use rates while also lowering the rate of international violence. 1. Marijuana is Costing Taxpayers Money The United States has one
of the busiest criminal justice systems in the world, resulting in and estimated 12.2 million arrests in 2012 alone. n163 Of these arrests, 1,552,432 were for drug abuse violations with
almost half for marijuana related crimes. n164 The money spent, on a national level, for this level of [*238] enforcement of marijuana laws alone is up to $ 7.7 billion a year. n165 The
excessive spending for the enforcement of marijuana prohibition is not only costing taxpayers, but it's also taking away from potential tax revenue. "If it were taxed similarly to alcohol
and tobacco, marijuana would provide $ 6.2 billion in additional revenue each year ... ." n166 The potential for generated revenue, coupled with savings gained by no longer having the
necessity for strict enforcement of marijuana prohibition could potentially amount to an "annual budget increase of nearly $ 14 billion." n167 In order to identify where some of these
saving would be coming from, it's important to take a closer look at spending within the federal prison system. There are well over 200,000 inmates incarcerated at the federal level;
51% of those inmates' most serious charge is a drug offense. n168 Depending on the level of security they're housed in, each inmate costs the federal government between $ 21,000
and $ 33,000 a year. This kind of expenditure led to the Obama administration having ""to request $ 6.9 billion for the Bureau of Prisons in fiscal [year] 2013.'" n169 The expensive
reality doesn't stop there, "federal prison costs are expected to rise to 30 percent of the Department of Justice's budget by 2020." n170 The potential savings to not only taxpayers but
also to the [*239] criminal justice system by essentially eliminating the prohibition on marijuana n171 can be better illustrated through comparisons to the Netherlands, where
marijuana has been decriminalized since the 1970s. For instance, in 2009, the United States incarcerated 743 people for every 100,000. In 2010, the Netherlands incarcerated 94
people for every 100,000. n172 While prison populations fluctuate from year to year and are impacted by numerous factors n173, the stark difference in incarceration rates between the
Netherlands and the United States is hard to ignore. On the expense side of things, the Netherlands spends approximately $ 307 per capita on their criminal justice system while the
United States spends approximately $ 552. n174 By adopting federal legislation similar to that of Washington and Colorado, the federal government would be lightening the current load
on the prison system while simultaneously generating revenue. 2. The Status of Marijuana as an Illegal Substance Has No Deterrent Effect Proponents of maintaining marijuana as an
illegal substance claim that social stigmas associated with breaking the law will prevent individuals from experimenting with and using marijuana. n175 However, there is no empirical
evidence to [*240] support this claim. Recent figures show that in the United States, despite marijuana legislation, high school aged children who view smoking marijuana as risky
behavior has steadily declined since the early 90's. n176 Although marijuana laws have been in effect for over 70 years, there is further evidence of increasing acceptance of the
substance with fifty-eight percent of the population believing marijuana should be legal. n177 Marijuana usage among the population as a whole also shows that marijuana laws have no
deterrent effect within the United States. In 2012, 7.6 million people over the age of 12 reported using marijuana 20 or more days a month, up from 4.8 million in 2002. n178 There
has also been a rise in the number of individuals who use marijuana 300 or more days a year from 3.1 million in 2002 to 5.4 million in 2012. n179 These figures continue to rise despite
an increase in marijuana enforcement. Between 1996 and 2006, there were nine million arrests for marijuana violations. Despite these arrests and their alleged deterrent effect, 25
million people used marijuana in 2007. n180 Growing public acceptance of marijuana in the United States is evident beyond the realm of private use. In 1987, Judge Douglas Ginsburg
was nominated for a seat on the United States Supreme Court by then President Ronald Reagan. Nine days after his nomination, Judge Ginsburg withdrew his name after receiving
backlash for his prior marijuana use. n181 Four years later, then President George H. W. Bush nominated Judge Clarence Thomas. When it became public that Judge Thomas had
previously smoked marijuana, President Bush stated that it was not an issue that warranted [*241] disqualification. n182 Shortly after, Senator Bill Clinton admitted to marijuana
experimentation and was later elected as the successor to George H. W. Bush as President of the United States. n183 Public acceptance of marijuana in the United States has become
so widespread that for the last 16 years the public has chosen as its President an admitted prior marijuana user. n184 3. Legalization May Decrease Overall Drug Use There is a great
deal of speculation as to the effects marijuana legalization would have, but the best indication is to look to the Netherlands where marijuana has been decriminalized since 1976. n185
Following the adoption of decriminalization, marijuana use in the Netherlands actually declined and has since stabilized with no tangible increase or decrease in use. n186 More
importantly, by providing an alternative means of obtaining marijuana, the Netherlands has successfully isolated casual marijuana users to the "coffee shops' found throughout the
country ""where it is as absurd to ask for hard drugs as it is at an average butcher's [shop] to ask for a zebra-steak." n187 By preventing exposure to drug dealers [*242] peddling
"hard drugs,' n188 decriminalization successfully decreased the demand for harder drugs, particularly heroin, because users were no longer being introduced to "hard drugs' by the
dealers they previously had to associate with in order to purchase marijuana. n189 4. U.S. Legalization Would Reduce Violence on an International Level The black market for marijuana
in the United States has led to the formation of drug cartels in Mexico. The cartels smuggle marijuana into the United States and the proceeds from the sale are then smuggled back
into Mexico where they account for over sixty percent of the cartels overall revenue. n190 Without any legal avenues for settling disputes among rival cartels, they are ultimately pitted
against each other in a violent fight for control over territory, smuggling routes and cities along the border between the United States and Mexico. n191 The resulting violence has
caused approximately "60,000 drug-related murders since ... 2006." n192 In 2011, Mexico's former President, Vicente Fox, explained that ""the drug consumer in the U.S. yields billions
of dollars, money that goes back to Mexico to bribe police and money that buys guns ... . So when you question yourselves about what is going on in Mexico, it depends very much on
what happens in this nation.'" n193 By not forcing marijuana producers underground, the United States could substantially alleviate the violence in Mexico. n194 [*243] CONCLUSION
. The United States
signaled a potential shift in its perspective by publicly condoning the new legislation.
The United States is not alone; the international community has shown an increased
approval, and in some instances outright support, of recreational marijuana. This
growing international support warrants an amendment to the Single Convention in order to
allow states to legislate recreational marijuana as they see fit without the constraints of
international obligations. Amending the Single Convention would allow the United
States to pursue federal legislation similar to that of Colorado and Washington. By
legalizing marijuana on the federal level, the United States would see positive gains both
domestically and internationally. The United States would stand to gain significant revenue
while simultaneously decreasing its prison population and international violence. Such
potentially significant ramifications warrant an amendment to the Single Convention in order
to permit states to weigh these benefits in their own territories without being held
hostage by an international treaty that's no longer in line with popular opinion.
Colorado and Washington took a leap of faith in approving the use of marijuana for recreational purposes despite conflicting federal law
The counterplan solves the case but avoids the disads – rescheduling
ensures that legalization happens down the line after treaty amendment
and creates domestic and international momentum
Sullum 14, Senior editor at Reason magazine (Jacob, 2/10, Why Reschedule Marijuana?,
reason.com/archives/2014/02/10/why-reschedule-marijuana)
In light of President Obama's recent observation that marijuana is safer than alcohol, CNN's Jake Tapper wondered
if he was open to reconsidering marijuana's status as a Schedule I drug. When Tapper asked him that in an
interview that aired last week, Obama derailed the conversation by denying that the executive branch has the
the CSA gives the attorney general the
authority to move drugs between schedules. The attorney general has delegated that
authority to the DEA (a division of the Justice Department), which is why that agency has been the recipient
power to reclassify marijuana. That clearly is not true, since
of petitions urging it to put marijuana in a less restrictive category. Because Obama incorrectly insisted that
rescheduling marijuana would require an act of Congress, he never addressed the merits of doing it
administratively. From the perspective of people who believe marijuana should be legalized for medical or general
use, the advantages of such a move are not as substantial as you might think. But neither are they, as UCLA drug
Moving marijuana to a less restrictive legal
category would have some significant practical effects, perhaps the most important of
which would be to advance a more honest discussion of marijuana's hazards and
benefits. As Kleiman points out, removing marijuana from Schedule I would not automatically
make it legal for medical use, since any cannabis product still would have to be approved by the Food and Drug
policy expert Mark Kleiman claims, "identically zero."
Administration (FDA). "For a doctor to prescribe it," notes Aaron Houston, a Marijuana Majority board member and
WeedMaps lobbyist, "there would have to be an FDA-approved formulation of it." Since marijuana itself cannot be
patented, a pharmaceutical company would not have much incentive to go through the arduous, time-consuming,
and expensive process required to gain FDA approval. Furthermore, drug regulators tend to look askance at herbal
medicine, preferring isolated chemicals. "They're never going to approve a whole-plant organic product," says Dan
Riffle, director of federal policies at the Marijuana Policy Project. Rick Doblin, executive director of the
Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, which for years has been trying to jump through the hoops
required to get marijuana approved as a medicine, disagrees. "FDA,
like most regulatory agencies, wants
to expand the areas it regulates," he says. "FDA does want to regulate botanical drugs and
would be willing to approve whole-plant organic products if Phase 3 studies demonstrate safety and
efficacy." In any case, rescheduling marijuana might make it easier to conduct research on the
plant's medical utility, which could lead to cannabis-derived medications that would pass
muster with the FDA. "The biggest obstacle, at least historically, to doing research on
marijuana to prove its medical benefit is that it's in Schedule I," Riffle says. "So you had that
Catch-22, where marijuana is a Schedule I drug because there's no evidence, and there's no
evidence because marijuana is a Schedule I drug." Harvard psychiatrist Lester Grinspoon, co-author of
Marihuana: The Forbidden Medicine and a leading expert on cannabis, agrees that marijuana's Schedule I
status has impeded research. "Since 1970," he says, "it has been the major reason why the
kinds of large double-blind studies which have been the basis for FDA approval of medicines
since the mid-1960s have been impossible to pursue in this country." Dale Gieringer, who runs the
California chapter of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, notes that " there are very
burdensome registration requirements and regulations regarding Schedule I substances."
Although "most of them also apply to Schedule II," he says, they do not apply to substances in
Schedules III through V, which are deemed to have progressively lower potential for abuse.
There are other research obstacles, unique to marijuana. In 1999, responding to the legalization of
medical marijuana in California, the Clinton administration imposed an additional layer of review
on research involving cannabis, requiring approval by the Public Health Service as well as
the FDA, the DEA, and the relevant institutional review board. And even after they get all
the other necessary approvals, researchers have to obtain marijuana from the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which has a monopoly on the legal supply—something that is not
true of other Schedule I drugs. NIDA, an agency whose mission focuses on marijuana's hazards, has not been keen
these requirements is a necessary
consequence of marijuana's Schedule I status, they would be harder to defend if marijuana were
reclassified, which would mean acknowledging that it has medical value and can be used
safely. Rescheduling marijuana would not affect the legal status of state-licensed cannabusinesses in states such
to assist research aimed at measuring its benefits. Although neither of
as Colorado and Washington, which would still be criminal enterprises in the eyes of the federal government. But
rescheduling could remove one of the major financial challenges
facing state-legal marijuana suppliers: Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code
prohibits the deduction of business expenses related to "trafficking in controlled
substances," but only for drugs on Schedule I or II. If marijuana were moved to, say,
Schedule III, that prohibition would no longer apply. Schedule III, which is supposed to be for
Gieringer notes that
medically useful drugs that can be taken safely and have a lower abuse potential than drugs on Schedules I and II,
arguably is appropriate for marijuana because that is where the DEA put Marinol (a.k.a. dronabinol), a synthetic
version of THC, marijuana's main active ingredient. The DEA also has said naturally occurring THC used in generic
versions of Marinol belongs on Schedule III. But depending on how you define abuse potential, marijuana could go
on a lower schedule. "When you look at the Schedule IV drugs," says SUNY at Albany psychologist Mitch
Earleywine, author of Understanding Marijuana, "you've got the opiate Tramadol, the stimulant Modafinil, lethal
sedatives like phenobarbital and chloral hydrate, and the 'date rape' drug rohypnol. Surely cannabis is safer than
these." Grinspoon believes "none of the schedules is truly appropriate for marijuana." But if it he had to pick, he
says, "based on a realistic appraisal of the drug, I would put it in Schedule V." That category, which includes
codeine and opium preparations, is for prescription drugs with the lowest abuse potential. Rick Doblin notes that
the DEA could move cannabis to a lower schedule only if it changed its definition of "currently accepted medical
use," which demands the sort of large-scale, multi-site, double-blind studies that the FDA requires to approve a
new drug. "Assuming that marijuana has been approved as a prescription medicine by the FDA," Doblin says,
"Schedule II seems too high, since Marinol is in Schedule III. Due to its actual abuse potential, marijuana for
medical use should be in Schedule V." Alex Kreit, a professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego who
the CSA leaves undefined phrases on which scheduling hinges. The
DEA therefore "has enjoyed incredibly broad discretion to interpret and define 'potential for
abuse' and other scheduling criteria," Kreit writes on the Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform blog. Just as it could
studies drug policy, notes that
adopt a less demanding definition of "accepted medical use," the DEA could take a narrower view of "abuse," which
it equates with any nonmedical use. By that standard, marijuana, by far the most popular illegal drug, does indeed
have a high potential for abuse. But that judgment seems peculiar if abuse is defined as problematic use, in which
case potential for abuse might be measured by the percentage of users who become addicted or suffer serious
harm. In truth, as Lester Grinspoon observes, marijuana does not fit any of the schedules very well. It is not the
sort of medicine the FDA is used to approving. But it clearly can be used safely, as Obama conceded when he noted
that it is less dangerous than alcohol. Back in 1988, when he urged the DEA to reschedule marijuana,
Administrative Law Judge Francis Young called it "one of the safest therapeutically active substances known to
man." And while marijuana surely can be abused (what can't?), its potential for abuse seems lower than that of
many pharmaceuticals, not to mention alcohol and tobacco, which the CSA specifically excludes from its schedules.
In light of these inconsistencies, could the DEA take marijuana off of the CSA's schedules altogether? Probably not.
"I think it is very unlikely that the attorney general could remove marijuana from the schedules entirely," Kreit
the CSA gives the attorney general the power to "remove a drug or other substance entirely from
says that "if control is required by United States obligations under
international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on October 27, 1970, the Attorney General
shall issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most appropriate."
says. Although
the schedules," it also
Since the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires its signatories (which include the United States) to
treaty
obligations seems to bar the DEA from descheduling, as opposed to rescheduling,
marijuana. Cannabis "requires a lot of control" under the Single Convention, notes Eric Sterling, president of the
criminalize production, possession, and distribution of cannabis for nonmedical purposes, this reference to
Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, who helped write federal drug legislation in the 1980s as counsel to the House
Judiciary Committee. "Cannabis is supposed to be controlled like opium and opiates." Then again, Kreit notes,
other CSA provisions "seem to contemplate situations where the U.S. does not accept international scheduling
determinations." Riffle, who is also a lawyer, sums it up this way: "I could make some arguments in a court that
[the reference to drug treaties] doesn't bind the executive, but I'd probably lose." The consequences of
administratively descheduling marijuana are difficult to tease out, given that some provisions of federal law refer to
marijuana specifically, while others talk about "controlled substances" or drugs on certain schedules. Aaron
Houston notes one salutary result of descheduling marijuana: Its consumers would no longer be barred from
owning firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968, which purports to carve out an exception to the Second
Amendment for "unlawful user[s] of…any controlled substance." Even if the CSA permitted the Obama
even moving
marijuana down one level, from Schedule I to Schedule II, could have an important
impact on the drug policy debate. For one thing, it would free the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP), which is required by law to oppose the legalization of any Schedule
I substance, to talk about the hazards of marijuana a little more honestly. Such freedom is
desperately needed, to judge by the effort required to extract the concession that marijuana is safer than
administration to deschedule marijuana, such a step would be politically inconceivable. But
alcohol from ONDCP Deputy Director Michael Botticelli at a congressional hearing this week. "You have Obama
saying that marijuana is less harmful than alcohol, that it's important for Colorado and Washington to move
forward," says Riffle, "but nonetheless you have the ONDCP saying, 'We remain steadfastly opposed to
If it weren't a Schedule I drug, they wouldn't have to say that. The ONDCP would be
free to take a new position on legalization or put out more honest statements about the
harms associated with marijuana." Rescheduling marijuana also might affect the level of
cannabis candor at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which is barred
legalization.'
from using any of its funds to promote the legalization of Schedule I substances. Riffle
thinks lifting that restriction might even make NIDA, which is part of HHS, more willing to
let researchers use its marijuana. Beyond such statutory implications, acknowledging that
marijuana is more beneficial and less hazardous than the government has been saying all
these years is apt to influence the conversation about how to handle this much-maligned
plant. When the president conceded, in an interview with The New Yorker, that alcohol is more
dangerous than marijuana, it set off weeks of high-profile discussion about whether pot
prohibition is sensible or fair. If he followed up on that observation by asking whether
marijuana meets the criteria for Schedule I, it would call further attention to the
arbitrary distinctions drawn by our drug laws. The resulting discussion could help
pave the way for more ambitious moves, such as legislation lifting the federal ban
on marijuana in the 20 states that have legalized it for medical or recreational use. Bill Piper, director of
national affairs at the Drug Policy Alliance, says rescheduling is not his top priority, but it would be "a
significant victory for commonsense drug policy," because it "would acknowledge the weight
of scientific evidence and popular support for medical marijuana, and it could boost state
legislative efforts." Sterling thinks that acknowledgment could help people who get into legal
trouble for growing medical marijuana. "Moving marijuana to any other schedule would be a
recognition by the government that it has medical value," he says, which "makes a difference
in terms of what can be said to a jury." Gieringer agrees. "Rescheduling would send a
powerful message around the U.S. that marijuana does have medical uses," he says, "even in
states like Alabama that don't allow it. This would help put to rest the common argument of cops and DAs
that marijuana isn't medicine." Regardless of the practical consequences, there is something to be said for telling
the truth. "When Obama took office," Riffle notes, "he said that decisions in his administration would be guided by
science, not by politics and ideology. It's very clear that marijuana's continued classification as a Schedule I drug
Since Congress banned marijuana in 1937, says Houston, "we have seen
extremely cynical efforts to overblow the danger of marijuana and to demonize it. A move
to reschedule or unschedule would be the first time since 1937 that our government started to roll back
some of that reefer madness."
violates that mandate."
1NC DA
The plan violates drug treaties creates a precedent for a pick and choose
approach to international law which spills over across all treaty areas
Hasse 13
[10/14/13, Heather Hasse is a New York consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium
and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The 2016 Drugs UNGASS: What does it mean for drug
reform?”
http://drogasenmovimiento.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/13-10-14-the-2016-drugsungass-e28093what-does-it-mean-for-drug-reform_.pdf]
But why? With all of the progress made in reform around the world lately, many – especially
in the US – are asking if the UN is even relevant to domestic drug reform at this point. With
the recent marijuana laws passed in Colorado and Washington and the proposed legislation
in Uruguay – not to mention decriminalization measures enacted in Portugal and a growing
number of other countries – reform seems inevitable. At some point, the argument goes,
the UN system will simply be overtaken by “real world” reform on the ground. Why
even bother with advocacy at the UN? This is not an easy question to answer; however, I
truly believe that to be effective, reform efforts must be made at every level – locally,
nationally, and globally. It may be true that reform efforts in the US and around the world
have made significant progress in the last 10 years. But there is still a long way to go –
marijuana is still not completely legal anywhere in the world (despite state laws to the
contrary, marijuana still remains illegal under federal law throughout the US), and many
human rights abuses continue to be carried out against drug users throughout the
world in the name of drug control. Meanwhile, the international drug control treaties – the
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its progeny – remain in place and, in fact,
enjoy nearly universal adherence by 184 member states. That so many countries
comply – at least technically, if not in “spirit” – with the international drug treaty system,
shows just how highly the international community regards the system. As well it
should – the UN system is invaluable and even vital in many areas, including climate
change, HIV/AIDS reduction, and, most recently, the Syrian chemical weapons crisis (and
don’t forget that the international drug treaty system also governs the flow of licit
medication). While it is not unheard of for a country to disregard a treaty, a system in which
countries pick and choose which treaty provisions suit them and ignore the rest is, shall we
say, less than ideal. But beyond the idea of simple respect for international law, there are
practical aspects of reform to consider. The drug problem is a global one, involving not only
consuming countries but producing and transit countries as well. Without global
cooperation, any changes will at best be limited (marijuana reform in Washington and
Colorado hardly affects the issue of human rights abuses in Singapore or the limitations on
harm reduction measures in Russia). At worst, reform efforts enacted ad hoc around the
world could be contradictory and incompatible - as might be the result if, for example,
Colombia and the US opted for a regulated market without the cooperation of Costa Rica or
Honduras, both transit countries. Finally, no matter what you think about the treaties
and the UN drug control system, or how significant you believe them to be in the
grand scheme of things, they are here for the time being, and are necessary to any
discussion about drug reform.
Marijuana is a stress test for the broader treaty regime—the plan’s
unilateral legalization ahead of any treaty reforms destroys I-Law which is
key to prevent a host of existential risks—ISIS, Ukraine, warming and
terrorism
Bennett and Walsh 14
[10/15/14, Wells Bennett & John Walsh are scholars at the Brookings Institute, Marijuana
Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15%20marijuana%20le
galization%20modernize%20drug%20treaties%20bennett%20walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.
pdf]
In making the case for the United States to proactively open the door to future change in
the drug treaties, we have emphasized, so far, the negative value of avoiding conflict and
instability. We would be remiss not to end on an equally important positive note. The
political changes and incentives in play in the marijuana-policy debate open a real
opportunity to demonstrate and improve the adaptability of the international legal
system—a system on which the United States relies more and more. No treaty can survive
the collapse of a political consensus supporting it. And no treaty system can endure if it
cannot cope with changing political conditions. Sustainability in international law depends
not only on commitment but also on resilience and adaptability. At this writing, one or
two more U.S. states may be about to adopt a version of marijuana legalization. If states
continue to legalize, and if the federal government continues to allow their reforms to
proceed, the short run for treaty reform may come quite soon. This is why we refer to
the challenge of marijuana legalization as a “stress test” for the adaptability of
international law. Should legalization prove politically popular or socially successful, it will
spread to more states and nations; should it spread, then one way or another both domestic
and international politics will find ways to accommodate it—either by adapting formal legal
commitments or by cutting new, informal channels around those commitments. The
latter would weaken international law; the former would strengthen it. Marijuanarelated reform to the drug treaties offers, in several respects, good odds of achieving
constructive adaptation. Reform need not entail any wholesale reconsideration of
international drug policy, nor need any brand new treaty be negotiated. Modest
incrementalism can do the job. In the United States, moreover, a growing political
constituency, embracing members of both political parties, favors reform, so the issue is
less partisan than many. Persuading the Senate to make more room for U.S.
experimentation by revising an existing treaty is a lighter lift than persuading it to
undertake entirely new treaty obligations. And, if the United States plays its cards right
(with, as we have suggested, suitably narrow and hedged legal changes), we believe a
consensus abroad for modest change could become within reach. In any case, broaching the
subject relatively early on—by ruling treaty change in, now, as a possibility, instead of
ruling it out as a non-starter—may itself open the door to a new international conversation
about modernizing and adapting drug treaties. In other words, marijuana offers as good
a chance as we are likely to see of setting a precedent for creative, consensual,
and gradual adaptation of a well-established international treaty structure. The
international legal system, however suspicious of it many Americans may be, has always
mattered and has never mattered more than now. For example, the campaign against ISIS
and the Ukraine crisis underscore all too dramatically the continuing importance of
multilateral security commitments. If anything, international law’s remit is growing as
environmental, social, economic, and security problems transcend national
borders. From global warming to sanctions on Iran and Russia to the campaign against
terrorism and military intervention in a host of theaters, the United States and its allies
increasingly rely on international agreements and commitments to legitimize and
amplify joint action against common threats. Of course, marijuana and the
international narcotics treaties are only one small piece of that puzzle. But they are a
highly visible piece, and they offer a real opportunity to demonstrate adaptation
through international legal channels, rather than around them. Laying groundwork
for manageably incremental changes—by beginning conversations with treaty partners and
other constituencies about where flexibility might lie—would reaffirm American
commitment to constructive adaptation, and to building consensus. Conversely,
pushing the outer boundaries of the drug treaties’ flexibility could weaken the
international order and damage American interests. To put the point another way:
Marijuana policy reform is a stress test that the United States and the
international order should, and realistically can, pass.
That triggers great power nuclear war
Harald Müller 2K, Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of
International Relations at Goethe University, Summer 2000, “Compliance Politics: A Critical
Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement,” The Nonproliferation Review,
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf
A third very crucial condition is a sufficient commonality of interest and commitment among the
major powers with regard to both the treaty in general and the compliance issue in question in
particular. The great powers act on the basis of a multiplicity of interests, commitments, and orientations. If the
major powers' broader political, economic, and security concerns turn out to be contradictory or even antagonistic,
action outside the
multilateral context will affect the great power relationship and, in turn, the prospects for
continued institutionalized cooperation. In short, power relations do not develop in an ahistorical and
context-free way, following quasi-natural laws. They depend rather on habits, conventions, and
perceptions that are shaped by experience. The constraints and relations in the international system are
thus not immutable, but rather malleable.12 When a treaty regime creates expectations of
multilateral compliance policies, unilateralist behavior can thus cause one of two difficulties: • It
may push other powers (and possibly their followers, proxies, allies, and partners) to rally around the accused
a non-multilateral compliance action by one or more of them becomes more likely. Such
party. This may occur either because the accused party is a close ally, or to deter the power(s) acting unilaterally
from further unilateral actions out of fear that such actions may lead to an adverse change in the balance of power.
diminish the chances for pursuing further the road towards
a world order based on cooperative security,13 rather than balance of power principles.
Moreover, such confrontations include a risk of escalation, which could lead to another
confrontation like the Cuban missile crisis, by far the most dangerous event so far in the
nuclear age. • Alternatively, the aggrieved powers may abstain from a direct confrontation out of concern for
Such a course of events would seriously
these risks, but freeze their cooperation in the arms control field as a sort of reprisal. Such a development, while
less dangerous on the surface, would risk the erosion of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation in the long
run. Would-be rule-breakers could be tempted to play off great powers against each other, making it possible for
them to pursue their rule-breaking activities with less risk and a greater likelihood of getting away unscathed with
the prospects of cooperative
security policy as an ordering principle of world politics decline, and the risk of a major
confrontation among great powers increases. This trajectory is a reflection of the pivotal
role of treaty community cohesion. Because of the particular importance of major
powers within that community—the presumption of legal equality notwithstanding—antagonisms
their deviant course of action. In either mode, arms agreements suffer,
among them are particularly likely to sunder that community and prevent it from
maintaining and strengthening the treaty when it is challenged by deviant behavior.
1NC Coop
There’s no spillover – their Schwartz ev says marijuana is a crisis OF
cooperative federalism, not a crisis FOR cooperative federalism – their
Doremus says the Clean Water Act includes a built-in legal framework to
mandate cooperative federalism and no piece of aff evidence says the plan
spills over to wreck that, it’s a legal requirement
There’s also no brink – Grabarsky and Schwartz say it’s been an issue since
the 1996 passage of the CUA—it’s old enough to buy cigarettes
The Feds won’t crack down – their ev is from 2013, our’s is predictive –
Feds will respect the most important parts of cooperative federalism
Schoenherr, 14—citing Gregory P. Magarian, JD, professor of law at Washington
University in St. Louis.
Neil, “Wash U Expert: States should have some power over criminal laws of marijuana,”
Wash U News, http://news.wustl.edu/news/Pages/27165.aspx
Role of the states “If the federal government decriminalizes or legalizes marijuana possession at the federal level,
it could do so in a way that left the states free to criminalize marijuana, or it could do so in a way that stripped the
states of that power,” Magarian said. “The relevant constitutional doctrine is called federal preemption.
The
federal government, where it has power to regulate, always has power to bar the states from regulating.
“Often the federal government doesn’t do this, in what are often called ‘cooperative
federalism’ arrangements, such as Medicaid. If the federal government really wanted to
federalize all marijuana law, it could most directly do so by enacting a comprehensive set of marijuana
regulations — taxing sales, imposing standards for medical marijuana, etc.” The federal government “As a
predictive matter, I don’t think the federal government will do that with marijuana,” Magarian
said. “At a minimum, the feds would be very unlikely to step on core areas of state
regulation — schools, traffic, etc. — as they relate to marijuana. “Beyond that, I think for both
political and policy reasons the feds will leave states with substantial power to
criminalize marijuana possession and sale. The feds may preempt state regulation in specific policy
areas, like insurance coverage rules for medical marijuana.”
Alt causes swamp federalism –
A – EPA navigable waters ruling
Bakst, 8-19 – Research Fellow in Agricultural Policy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for
Economic Policy Studies, of the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, at The
Heritage Foundation.
Daren, “Reining in the EPA Through the Power of the Purse,” Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/08/reining-in-the-epa-through-the-powerof-the-purse
In April, the EPA and the Corps published a proposed rule that would define what waters are covered.[14] The
CWA covers “navigable waters.” This term is further defined as “the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas.”[15] In defining “waters of the United States,” the EPA is going well beyond
the existing regulations. For example, the new rule would regulate all ditches—including man-made ditches—
except in narrow circumstances and cover tributaries that have ephemeral flow, such as depressions in land that
are dry most of the year except when there is heavy rain. This water (and land) grab is an attack on property
rights. Private property owners would need to obtain permits from the federal government far more often than they
already do now when seeking to use and enjoy their land. There has been widespread opposition to the rule from
everyone from farmers to counties, which are concerned that the rule will impose costly new requirements on
them.
The proposed rule also undermines the principle of cooperative federalism that is
supposed to govern the CWA.[16] States play a central role in the implementation of the CWA. Through
this proposed rule, the EPA and the Corps would be usurping state and local power . States,
local governments, and private property owners are better positioned to address their unique clean water needs
than the federal government. Recommendation: Congress should prohibit funding for the implementation of this
proposed rule. The House Interior and Environment appropriations bill that passed out of the Appropriations
Committee includes a provision that would prohibit funding for the rule.[17]
B – Obamacare
Moffit 10, Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow in Domestic and Economic Policy
Studies at The Heritage Foundation, Revitalizing Federalism: The High Road Back to Health
Care Independence, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/revitalizingfederalism-the-high-road-back-to-health-care-independence
Americans face a direct and historic challenge to their personal liberty and to their unique
citizenship in a federal republic. Though its enactment of the massive Patient Protection and
A ffordable C are A ct (PPACA), official Washington is not merely engi-neering a federal
takeover of health care, but is also radically altering the relationships between
individ-uals and the government as well as the national gov-ernment and the
states.
In other words, the PPACA is a direct threat to federalism itself . As Jonathan
Turley, professor of law at George Washington University, has argued, “ Federalism was
already on life support before the individual mandate. Make no mistake about
it, this plan might provide a bill of good health for the pub-lic, but it could amount to a
‘ do not resuscitate’ order for federalism .”[1]
Never before has Congress exercised its power under Article I, Section 8 of
the Federal Constitu-tion to force American citizens to purchase a pri-vate
good or a service, such as a health insurance policy.[2] Congress is also intruding
deeply into the internal affairs of the states , commandeering their
officers, specifying in minute detail how they are to arrange health
insurance markets within their bor-ders, and determining the products that
will be sold to their citizens.
If allowed to stand, this unprecedented concen-tration of political power in
Washington will result in the states being reduced to mere instruments of
federal health policy rather than “distinct and inde­pendent sovereigns,”
as James Madison described them in Federalist No. 40.[3]
C – Political Polarization
Pickerill and Bowling 6-23, J. Mitchell Pickerill is an Associate Professor in the
Northern Illinois University Department of Political Science, Cynthia Bowling is an Assistant
Professor of Political Science at Auburn University, Polarized Parties, Politics, and Policies:
Fragmented Federalism in 2013–2014,
http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/05/22/publius.pju026.full
Polarized parties, politics, and policies at the federal and state levels of
government continue to affect the nature of federalism and
intergovernmental relations in the United States. Although polarization and
fragmentation are prevalent, there are important instances of cooperation and collaboration.
But bottom-up state activism has yielded polarized policies across the states
in important issue areas such as same-sex marriage and marijuana policy.
And even as states collaborate on implementation of the Common Core
standards for K-12 education, the rhetoric remains politicized . The effects of
polarization have also been significant for fiscal policies and budgeting. We conclude that,
even as states push forward their agendas in light of a gridlocked national
government , federalism faces continued challenges, remaining
fragmented in both theory and practice.
Marijuana not key – federalism victories won’t spill over and other issues
swamp
Natelson, 14 (Rob, Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence, Independence
Institute & Montana Policy Institute, and Professor of Law (ret.), at the University of
Montana, 1/4 ,
http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/01/lessons_for_federalism_from_colorados_pot_l
egalization.html)
authorities in Washington, D.C. have done many dreadful things while
acting in excess of their constitutional powers. They have locked up American citizens
without trial. They have executed American citizens without habeas corpus. They have
quashed the career hopes of millions. They have sent soldiers to fight and die in undeclared
wars. They have established surveillance systems to monitor the personal lives of innocent citizens. They
have adopted social policies that largely destroyed inner-city families. They have inflicted
severe damage on our health care system and our monetary system, and have burdened our country
Now here's the irony: Since 1940,
with unimaginable debt. Yet none of these has provoked push-back so successfully as Washington's ban on a totally unnecessary
recreational drug. And -- even more ironically -- a drug that, unlike the targets of so many other regulations, really can be harmful.
Perhaps the only comparable success against federal encroachment was repeal of federal Prohibition, another ban on a potentially
From Colorado's marijuana "legalization" some federalism advocates draw a
conclusion that is both (1) obvious and (2) wrong. The conclusion is that the only way to restore
constitutional limits is for constitutionalists to form alliances with hard core "progressives" in areas of
common concern. After all, wasn't it a right-and-left-wing coalition that successfully repealed Colorado's marijuana ban?
There are, however, at least two problems with this approach. First, the few areas of common
concern are mostly very small and of limited importance. "Progressives" very rarely take a
genuine pro-federalism position, and when they do, the issue is usually narrow. By any
objective measure, marijuana legalization is small POT-atoes compared to massive
programs like Obamacare. Secondly -- and more importantly -- victories won by
coalitions so disparate are not stable. Today's "progressive" movement is not controlled by the reasonable liberals
harmful recreational drug.
of your granddaddy's generation. Today's "progressivism" is increasingly a totalitarian movement. In other words, a critical mass of
its adherents genuinely believe that there are no limits to what they can make government do to the rest of us.* As is true of other
believe the battle for
federalism can still be won -- and that, indeed, that it will be won. But it has to be won with a
coalition that will preserve the victory. History teaches that coalitions between democrats and totalitarians do not
last long: If the totalitarians remain in the coalition, they will quickly take over (cf. Czechoslovakia, 1948). Conservatives
and libertarians should, therefore, seek their allies from the broad center -- the Main Street political
moderates -- by convincing them of the need to return to constitutional restrictions on federal
authority. In the short term, that may be a tougher victory. But once won, it will be a far
broader and more ensuring one.
totalitarians, they see any victory won for "freedom" as merely opening the door for more coercion. I
Cooperative federalism’s counter-productive for warming---reversing it
causes state leadership and federal follow-on
Vivian E. Thomson 11, Associate Professor in the Departments of Politics and
Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia; and Vicki Arroyo, Executive Director of
Georgetown's Climate Center at Georgetown Law, where she is a Visiting Professor, 2011,
“ARTICLE: UPSIDE-DOWN COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: CLIMATE CHANGE POLICYMAKING
AND THE STATES,” Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 29 Va. Envtl. L.J. 1
When it comes to fixing the broken politics of global warming, all eyes tend to focus on the global
stage and on national policies. After all, climate change is a global phenomenon and emissions in one part of
the world contribute to warming everywhere. But in the United States, sub-national governments are
responsible for most of the progress in the climate change arena, despite the lack of an obvious
rationale for them to reduce emissions whose benefits will spread well beyond their borders. Thirty-five states
have stepped in to fill the void left by federal inaction, adopting plans to curb emissions even though
the benefits of those reductions will be shared widely.¶ These state-level actions are important for a variety of
reasons. First, they bring real and meaningful reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Perhaps
more significantly, they have several key implications for national climate policymaking . These
actions point to a rationale for national action and to policy solutions that can attract
political support . Further, in the United States, state lawmakers and administrators implement and enforce
national air pollution control programs. Thus, state-federal cooperation is crucial for successful program
implementation. Finally, the Clean Air Act amendments have passed only when lawmakers accommodated state
and regional economic and political considerations.¶ Understanding why states have or have not acted and
The very fact of state
leadership in the climate change arena also means that the customary mode of cooperative
federalism will not work . In air pollution control, the "customary" mode is a center-dominant
model in which the national government establishes an overall framework that the states
implement. Climate change policymaking demands a new, "upside-down " cooperative federalism
model .
illuminating their policy approaches can inform the federal policymaking process.
Destroys the effectiveness of every environmental program
Reisinger et al 10 - Staff Attorney for the Ohio Environmental Council [Will,
Trent A Dougherty, Nolan Moser, “ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE LIMITS OF
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: WILL COURTS ALLOW CITIZEN SUITS TO PICK UP THE
SLACK?” Duke Environmental Law and Policy Reform Vol 20.1, Winter 2010]
The primary goal of federal environmental statutes was to empower states to enforce national
standards. With the passage of the CWA, for example, Congress’ intent was to “recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.”86 Each of the other
The theory was that, by outsourcing federal
programs to state agencies, national laws could be carried out without bankrupting the federal
government, while at the same time allowing states the autonomy to implement their own plans.88
Consequently, the decentralized enforcement model places a great deal of power and trust in state
governments. Unfortunately, there are fundamental flaws with the cooperative approach that
hamper regulation and enforcement. At the same time that states have taken on more
responsibility, their own regulatory agencies have been simultaneously hindered by political
resistance to increased regulation and fewer dollars for enforcement. Furthermore, in cases where state
regulation has failed, the federal backup enforcement has been lacking. When combined, these
complicating factors create the potential for a “perfect storm” that threatens the
effectiveness of every major environmental program.
environmental statutes envisions a similar state function.87
Decentralization’s vital to effective bioterror response
Paul Posner 3, Ph.D., a recognized national expert on U.S. federalism, is the Managing
Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues for the General Accounting Office, 3/24/3,
“The Federalism Challenge: The Challenge for State and Local Government,” p. 20
For example, in public health, let’s examine what a local government faces to prepare for
bioterrorism. It has to improve the capacity of its local health departments, the human capital
that has been woefully neglected in recent years reportedly. It has to update its technology so that it at least can
achieve agreements with
hospitals to develop surge capacity and support from doctors and other medical personnel. It has to develop
laboratory infrastructure to at least know where the labs are and reach some kind of agreements on how to
process samples of suspicious materials. And most importantly, what we’re finding increasingly in the local
health departments, it has to develop surveillance systems to produce real-time data on day-today incidences, to help get early warning of suspicious health trends and incidents to facilitate an expeditious
communicate problems to the CDC in Atlanta over the Internet. It has to
response to health problems where time is such a critical variable influencing potential health outcomes for those
exposed.
Baltimore is one of the pioneers . They can show daily the numbers of admittances to emergency rooms,
the veterinarians’ reports, daily school absences. They are trying to get pharmacies to report daily on medications
prescribed. The point is they can monitor these things and look for variations and look for puzzles and, fortunately,
the kind of surveillance system that is under development in some
illustrates the political challenges in gaining the cooperation of numerous
independent actors at the local level.
they haven’t found any. That’s
communities and
Framing the Problem
The way the problem is framed determines the framework and the modality or the process that we use to address
if we define the homeland security problem as a response problem, as a first
responder’s problem, then the model will have a local orientation . City managers have told
me that when you’re dealing with the response to an incident , the most effective thing for
the effective management of response is for the federal government to stay out of our way .
These managers feel they know their communities best. As one said, “Give us money but let us
control the action .”
it. For example,
Cooperative federalism kills adaptation
Christina E. Wells 7, Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of MissouriColumbia School of Law, 2006/2007, “ARTICLE: Katrina and the Rhetoric of Federalism,”
Mississippi College Law Review, 26 Miss. C. L. Rev. 127
The Bush administration's response to Hurricane Katrina does, however, highlight some of the
potential perils of cooperative federalism programs . On the one hand, having multiple levels of
government provide disaster relief and response services may be both necessary and beneficial in that it provides a
protective redundancy. n95 But such benefits do not always occur. Critics of cooperative federalism programs
their format of "shared political responsibility" make it increasingly difficult for
citizens to "finger the culprits for government ... train-wrecks ." n96 In a sense, when everyone is
responsible, no one is responsible, and it becomes difficult to know which government officials are
at fault for problems that result from cooperative federalism programs. As a result, officials
can more easily shift blame - a phenomenon that was reflected in the federal government's
response to Katrina.
The cooperative federalism at the core of disaster relief and response efforts allowed the federal
government to focus blame elsewhere rather than on its own failings. Although ultimately
argue that
unsuccessful on many levels, the White House succeeded in convincing the House and Senate to pass legislation
giving the President authority over the National Guard in certain circumstances involving natural disasters. n97
There is little evidence that such a law is necessary or justified by the events that unfolded during Katrina. In fact,
most of the investigatory findings suggest the opposite. But the Bush administration was able to point to Governor
Blanco's refusal to voluntarily allow federal military officials to command Louisiana National Guard troops to bolster
its claim that federalism hindered the federal government's response. n98 Despite the fact that myriad other
problems [*144] led to the ineffective military response, including poor preparation and execution by federal
officials, the ability to legitimately claim that federalism was at fault eased the bill's passage through Congress.
Katrina may also reflect the concerns of those who fear that cooperative
federalism programs will concentrate authority in the federal government . n99 There is little
question that state and local governments implement national policy regarding disaster
response and rescue. In fact, the federal government makes clear the importance of having a national policy,
The events of Hurricane
n100 especially via such tools as the NRP. To be sure, states and localities have some discretion to implement that
conditional funding grants require fairly rigid adherence to federal standards . n101
state and local authorities had little input into the original development of the
NRP. n102 As the federal government increasingly focused disaster response on terrorism
after 9/11, n103 coupled with its enlarged law enforcement and surveillance powers generally, one could
rightfully wonder whether concerns regarding federal concentration of power had merit.
plan, but
Furthermore,
1NC Cartels
Mexico is stable now
Bates 14 (Theunis, "A Mexican drug cartel's rise to dominance," The Week, January 25,
theweek.com/article/index/255503/a-mexican-drug-cartels-rise-to-dominance)
The Mexican crime syndicate is the world's most powerful drug trafficking organization, and
the biggest supplier of illegal narcotics in the U.S. About half of the estimated $65 billion worth of cocaine,
heroin, and other illegal drugs that American users buy each year enters the U.S. via Mexico. Sinaloa — which is named after its
home state in western Mexico — controls more than half of that cross-border trade, from which
it earns at least $3 billion a year. U.S. law--enforcement officials say the group has a
presence in all major American cities, and a near monopoly on the wholesale distribution of heroin and cocaine in
Chicago. The city's Crime Commission has branded Sinaloa's elusive leader, Joaquín Guzmán, also known as El Chapo (or Shorty),
Public Enemy No. 1 — a title last held by Al Capone.
"What Al Capone was to beer and whiskey," said
commission member Arthur Bilek, " Guzmán is to narcotics."¶ How did the cartel get started?¶ Mexican smugglers
have long trafficked homegrown heroin and marijuana to the U.S. But in the 1980s, Mexico also became the primary route for
Colombian cocaine bound for the U.S. At the time, U.S. law enforcement was cracking down on the Colombian drug producers'
attempts to ship the lucrative drug into Florida by boats and planes. So the Colombians hired Mexico's Guadalajara cartel to
smuggle drugs across the border, and paid them in cocaine, which allowed the Mexicans to build their own drug networks in the
U.S. Before long, the Mexicans were the senior partners in the relationship. When Guadalajara's leader was arrested in 1989, the
group's remaining capos, including a young Guzmán, divided up its trafficking routes, creating the Sinaloa, Juárez, and Tijuana
cartels. These gangs soon became locked in a series of turf wars that have killed more than 60,000 people. But throughout the
bloodshed, El Chapo's organization has continued to grow.¶ Why has Sinaloa succeeded?¶ The 5-foot-6 Guzmán may be a grade
school dropout, but he's also "a logistical genius," said Jack Riley, the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Chicago
division. He's trafficked cocaine from Colombia to Mexico in small private planes, in the luggage of airline passengers, and on the
cartel's own 747s. Sinaloa has also moved cocaine on custom-built $1 million submarines. El Chapo, 56, has shown similar
ingenuity moving drugs from Mexico to the U.S. He's built scores of tunnels under the border, some of which are air-conditioned
and boast half-mile-long trolley lines. He's sent drugs through U.S. checkpoints in hidden car compartments, in cans of jalapeños,
and in the bellies of frozen shark carcasses. Once in the U.S., the drugs are ferried to warehouses in Chicago — which Guzmán has
called his "home port" — before being divided up and distributed across the nation.¶ Why Chicago?¶ It's the transportation hub of
America. The city is located within a day's drive of 70 percent of the nation's population, and is crisscrossed by major interstate
highways and railway lines. Chicago is also a huge drug market in its own right. Some 86 percent of people arrested in Cook County
in 2012 tested positive for at least one illegal narcotic — the highest percentage of any big U.S. city. With his monopoly in the city,
Guzmán doubled wholesale heroin prices, thus cutting profit margins for street dealers. That fueled greater competition for turf and
exacerbated Chicago's epidemic of gang violence. "It used to be honor among thieves," said Harold Ward, a former gang member
turned anti-violence campaigner. "Now, it's by any means necessary."¶ How violent is the cartel?¶ Sinaloa can be exceedingly
brutal — it left 14 severed heads in iceboxes outside a mayor's office in the northern Mexican city of Nuevo Laredo in 2012. But
compared with other cartel leaders, El Chapo is a practical businessman who prefers "bribe over bullet." He invests millions in
corrupting police and government officials in Mexico rather than intimidating them with violence. "There is a level-headedness
about [Sinaloa's] leadership that the other groups lack," said Malcolm Beith, author of a book on Guzmán titled The Last Narco.
A
2010 National Public Radio investigation of Mexican arrest records noted that Sinaloa had
suffered notably fewer arrests than other cartels. U.S. court documents also show that top Sinaloa
officials regularly met with DEA agents between 2006 and 2012 and fed them intelligence
about rival cartels, helping law enforcement crush their competitors. U.S. and Mexican officials
Some observers claim that this fact has led both Mexican and U.S. authorities to go easy on Sinaloa.¶ Is that allegation true?¶
have denied showing any favoritism toward Sinaloa, and the DEA has arrested several high-ranking cartel members in recent years,
including Jesús Vicente Zambada Niebla, the son of the organization's No. 2 leader, Ismael Zambada. In a rare 2010 interview,
the senior Zambada said that such arrests had no effect on the cartel , and that its drugs
would keep flowing north even if El Chapo were brought down . "When it comes to the capos, jailed, dead,
or extradited," he said, "their replacements are ready."
Legalization causes cartels to compete over new revenue streams
Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and
Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is an expert on international
and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized
crime, urban violence and illicit economies, “Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces
Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America,” September ‘11
Often, criminal groups function as security providers (suboptimal as they are), regulating and
punishing theft, robberies, extortions, rapes and murders and dispensing their rules and
punishments for transgressions. The removal of the criminal gangs often results in a rise of
street crime that can become a critical nuisance to the community and discredit the presence
of the State and its law enforcement. That has in fact been the case in both Medellín in the postDon Berna order as well as in the pacified favelas of Rio.14 Especially in areas where police have
been trained as light counterinsurgency forces (in Latin America, unlike South Asia, this is more often a
problem in rural areas rather than in urban spaces) they may be undertrained, under-resourced, and
not focused on addressing street crime. Even community-policing forces may have little
capacity to undertake criminal investigations that lead to meaningful prosecution , yet police
units specialized in criminal investigations may continue to be too far away and have limited access to a pacified
urban space to conduct investigations that reduce street crime. Providing training to community police forces for
tackling at least some street crime and streamlining and facilitating the presence of specialized criminal
investigation units, such as homicide squads and prosecutors, are of critical importance for improving public safety
law
enforcement actions against the governing criminal entity may give rise to intense turf
warfare among other criminal groups over the spoils of the criminal market. After Don Berna
was extradited to the United States, for example, many criminal gangs in and around Medellín,
including two large ones led by Sebastian and Valenciano, began fighting each other over smuggling
routes, local drug distribution, prostitution enterprises, and protection rackets. The turf war
triggered extensive violence, including homicide rates in over 100per 100,000 in the late 2000s and on
par with those before the FARC was defeated in the city, and Don Berna established his
“narco-peace”.15 Similarly in Mexico, law enforcement actions against established DTOs triggered
intense violence among splinter groups and new gangs, such as in the Mexican state of Michoacán
where interdiction operations against La Familia Michoacana have given rise to Los Templarios. That criminal
gang has since been battling with Los Zetas, another of Mexican DTOs originating as splinter
group, over control of criminal markets in the state. Such turf wars can compromise the
physical and economic security of local communities far more than even the
previous criminal order. In some circumstances, an urban area to which State presence has
been extended may even suffer a peace deficit. Along with or instead of the hoped-for peace dividend
of legal businesses moving into the urban space and providing legal jobs and income, the new areas may be
attractive as a source of new land to be taken over by nefarious land developers. Such
demands for land in the newly “pacified” urban areas may generate new forced land
displacement, instead of benevolent gentrification. In rural spaces, the cause of such new illegal
displacement may be the presence of profitable resources, such as gold, coal, and others, or the
agricultural potential of the land, such as for African oil palm plantations. In urban spaces, housing
development and real estate speculation may well drive such illegal displacement.
Competition over State resources inserted to “pacified” areas, such as for socio-economic
development, may generate new temptations of illegal behavior. Militias or new criminal
groups seeking to set up new protection rackets and usurp the inserted State resources may
well emerge. Many urban spaces in Colombia suffer from such old-new criminality today, as they have
historically. Local community forces, even while effective at keeping the old criminals out, may not have
the capacity to prevent such nefarious activities cloaked as legal development. At the same
time, criminal units specializing in white-collar organized crime and asset expropriation are
often located in the city center of a State capital far away from the “pacified” slums and may be
paying little attention to such phenomena in the newly-liberated spaces. Moreover, since such land takeover
and asset expropriation may well be linked to legal and politically-powerful developers,
municipal authorities may lack the motivation to pay close attention to such criminal
developments in the “pacified” urban areas. Yet without diligent and concerted law enforcement
actions against such new crime, the benefits of the complex and costly State interventions in the
marginalized urban areas may be altogether lost. Instead of addressing the causes of
illegal economies and violent organized crime by strengthening effective and accountable State
for the community and for anchoring State presence in the pacified areas. Under some circumstances,
State intervention may ultimately only alter the manifestation of illegality
and displace existing problems to other areas. Not only criminality and criminal gangs, but also
the marginalized residents of the urban shantytowns themselves may merely be forced out to other
slums.
presence, the
They’ll switch to legal marijuana markets
Gorman 14
[02/21/14, Tom Gorman, director of the Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, part of the federal
Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Marijuana Legalization Raises Fears Of Drug Cartels”,
http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2014/02/21/marijuana-drug-cartels]
How foreign cartels could get involved with legal marijuana sales “This is the perfect storm,
because from the Mexican cartel standpoint, you have a quasi-legal business operating in the
United States, which is illegal in other places, so there’s a real high demand for
Colorado marijuana throughout the United States. One of the primary weapons of a cartel they
use to make money is, one, selling drugs, and the other one is extortion. So it’s real easy for them to
come in and look at these retail stores that are making hundreds of thousands of dollars
and say, ‘We want a piece of the action.’ That’s one concern. The other one is using some of these
organizations to take marijuana. Well, you don’t have to worry about crossing the border, but sending east, where
most of our marijuana goes to — using these as a vehicle for doing that. So that’s our big concern.”
That causes violence to spread
Charles D. “Cully” Stimson 10 is a Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military
prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor. “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No” Legal
Memorandum #56 on Legal Issues September 13, 2010. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/legalizing-marijuanawhy-citizens-should-just-say-no ac 6-18
Violent, brutal, and ruthless, Mexican DTOs will work to maintain their black-market profits at the expense of
American citizens’ safety. Every week, there are news articles cataloguing the murders, kidnappings, robberies, and other thuggish
brutality employed by Mexican drug gangs along the border .
It is nonsensical to argue that these gangs will
simply give up producing marijuana when it is legalized; indeed, their profits might soar,
depending on the actual tax in California and the economics of the interstate trade. While such
profits might not be possible if marijuana was legalized at the national level and these gangs were undercut by mass production,
that is unlikely ever to happen. Nor does anyone really believe that the gangs will subject themselves to state and local regulation,
including taxation. And since the California ballot does nothing to eliminate the black market for marijuana—quite the opposite, in
fact—legalizing
marijuana will only incentivize Mexican DTOs to grow more marijuana to
feed the demand and exploit the black market. Furthermore, should California legalize
marijuana, other entrepreneurs will inevitably attempt to enter the marketplace and game
the system. In doing so, they will compete with Mexican DTOs and other criminal
organizations. Inevitably, violence will follow, and unlike now, that violence will not be
confined to the border as large-scale growers seek to protect their turf—turf that
will necessarily include anywhere they grow, harvest, process, or sell marijuana. While this
may sound far-fetched, Californians in Alameda County are already experiencing the reality
of cartel-run marijuana farms on sometimes stolen land,[54] protected by “guys [who] are
pretty heavily armed and willing to protect their merchandise.”[55] It is not uncommon for
drugs with large illegal markets to be controlled by cartels despite attempts to roll them into
the normal medical control scheme. For instance, cocaine has a medical purpose and can be
prescribed by doctors as Erythroxylum coca, yet its true production and distribution are controlled
by drug cartels and organized crime.[56] As competition from growers and dispensaries
authorized by the RCTCA cuts further into the Mexican DTOs’ business, Californians will face
a real possibility of bloodshed on their own soil as the cartels’ profit-protection measures
turn from defensive to offensive. Thus, marijuana legalization will increase crime, drug use,
and social dislocation across the state of California—the exact opposite of what pro-legalization advocates promise.
Vulnerability doesn’t = probable
No bioterror impact
CACNP 10 1/26, *CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION: SCIENTISTS WORKING GROUP ON
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, “BIOLOGICAL THREATS: A MATTER OF BALANCE,”
http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/biochem/articles/Biological%20Threats%20%20A%20Matter%20of%20Balance.pdf, AJ
The bioterrorist threat has been greatly exaggerated. New bioweapons assessments
are needed that take into account the complex set of social and technical issues that shape
bioweapons development and use by state and non-state actors, and that focus on more
plausible threats than the worst-case scenarios that have largely driven discussion to date.
Offensive, including terrorist, use of biological agents presents major technical problems.
This is why the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom and others needed to spend vast
sums for decades in order to research and develop biological weapons. Even then the
results were considered an unreliable form of warfare, and there was little opposition to their
elimination by international agreement (indeed the US unilaterally eliminated its biological weapons stockpiles).
The effects of using biological materials, whether on a large scale or a smaller terrorist
scale, are highly uncertain. Although the 2001 anthrax letters created panic and had a significant
economic impact, the number of deaths and serious illnesses was very small. Existing
bioweapons assessments focus on a narrow set of assumptions about potential adversaries
and their technical capabilities. New bioweapons threat assessments are needed that take
into account the more complex set of social and technical issues that shape
bioweapons capabilities of state and non-state actors and that critically examine existing assumptions.
No bioweapons use---barriers overwhelm
Ouagrham-Gormley 12 Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is Assistant Professor in the Biodefense Program at
George Mason University, “Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation,” International Security,
Volume 36, Number 4, Spring 2012, pp. 80-114, pdf, AJ
bioweapons program
also depends on “intangible factors,” such as work organization, program management,
structural organization, and social environment, that affect the acquisition and efacient use
of scientiac knowledge. In-depth studies of past weapons programs, including the former Soviet and U.S.
bioweapons programs described in this article, reveal that intangible factors can either advance or
degrade a program’s progress. In addition, the impact of these factors is felt more strongly within
This article challenges the conventional wisdom by showing that the success of a
clandestine programs, because their covertness imposes additional restrictions on the use and transfer of
knowledge, which more often than not frustrates progress. Therefore, focusing only on tangible determinants of
proliferation can lead to government policies that respond inadequately to the threat. To more accurately identify
the nature and evaluate the pace and scope of future proliferation threats, and consequently develop more efacient
nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies, scholars and policymakers must include the intangible dimension
of proliferation in their assessments. They must also understand the factors that determine the mechanisms and
the conditions under which scientiac data and knowledge can be efaciently exploited. In 2008 the World at Risk, an
inouential report written by a bipartisan commis- sion chartered by Congress to assess U.S. efforts in preventing
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism, predicted that a bioterrorism event would likely
take place by 2013.4 Without downplaying the nu- clear threat, the report concluded that a bioweapons attack was
more likely than a nuclear event given the availability of material, equipment, and know- how required to produce
bioweapons. Since 2001 a number of scientiac feats seem to illustrate the growing ease with which potentially
harmful biomaterial can be produced. These include the inadvertent creation of a lethal mousepox virus by
Australian scientists in 2001;5 the synthesis of the poliovirus in 2002 by a team of scientists at the State University
of New York at Stonybrook;6 the construction in 2003 of a bacteriophage (phiX) using synthetic oligonucleotides by
the Venter Institute, located in Rockville, Maryland; and the synthesis of the arst self-replicating cell called
Mycoplasma mycoides JCVI-syn1.0 in May 2010.7 Further pushing the scientiac envelop, work begun in 2003 by
the synthetic bi- ology scientiac community to produce standardized short pieces of DNA may promise a future in
which biological agents can be assembled much like Lego pieces for various purposes; in addition, synthetic DNA
sequences are now commercially available, and the cost and time required to produce biomaterial have decreased
sharply in recent years. Finally, with the automation of various processes, new technologies have the potential to
Another challenge in using others’
scientiac data is that tacit knowledge does not transfer easily. It requires proximity to the
original source(s) and an extended master-apprentice relationship.19 Scientiac and technical knowledge is
also highly local: it is developed within a speciac infrastructure, using a speciac knowled ge
simplify scientiac work and reduce the need for skilled personnel.8
base, and at a speciac location. Some studies have shown that the use of data and technology in a new
environment frequently requires adaption to the new site.20 Successful adaptation often requires the involvement
of the original scientiac author(s) to guide the adjustment. For instance, some of the problems encountered during
the production of the Soviet anthrax weapon were solved only after the authors of the weapon in Russia traveled to
Kazakhstan to assist their colleagues. These individuals trained their colleagues, transferring their tacit knowledge
in the process, and helped adjust the technical protocols to the Kazakh infrastructure, which was substantially
different from that of the Russian facility. Even with the presence of these original authors, ave years were needed
to complete the process of successful transfer and use of bioweapons technology.21 A further complication is that
tacit knowledge can decay over time and may disappear if not used or transferred. Studies have shown that trying
to re-create lost knowledge can be difacult, if not impossible.22 Finally, knowledge and technology development,
particularly in complex technological projects, is rarely the work of one expert. Instead it requires the cumulative
and cooperative work of teams of individuals with speciac skills. This is particularly true in weapons programs,
which pose a variety of problems spanning many disciplines. For example, biological weapons development can
involve mechanical and electrical engineering, chemistry, statistics, aerobiology, and microbiology, demanding
large interdisciplinary teams of scientists, engineers, and technicians. A successful weapon, therefore, is not the
product of an individual scientist working alone, but that of the collective work of those involved in the research,
design, and testing of the weapon.23 In this context, the efacient use of written technical data would require
access to or re-creation of the collective explicit and tacit knowledge of those involved in its development, making
the reproducibility of an experiment or object particularly challenging.
External factors can also interfere
with the use and transfer of knowledge. In the biological sciences, the properties of reagents and other
materials used in scientiac experiments may differ from one location to another and may vary seasonally. An
experiment conducted successfully in one location may not be reproducible in another because of the varying
Other external
factors that cannot be easily identiaed or quantiaed can also interfere with an experiment,
even when the task is performed by an experienced scientist or technician who has had
previous successes in performing the task.25 For exam- ple, within the U.S. bioweapons program, the
production and scaling up of bi- ological material were routinely subject to unexplained
failures whenever production was interrupted to service or decontaminate the
equipment. On these occasions, plant technicians at Fort Detrick—the main facility of the U.S. bioweapons
properties of the material used, even when the same individual conducts the experiment.24
program—experienced, on average, three weeks of unsuitable production. The scientiac staff could not identify the
causes of such routine failures and could only assume that either a contaminant had been introduced during the
service or cleanup, or that the technicians changed the way they were doing things and unconsciously corrected
the problem only after several weeks.26 The case of the Soviet bioweapons program demonstrates that covertness
im- poses huge constraints on knowledge management and has important impli- cations for the evaluation of state
and terrorist clandestine efforts to produce bioweapons. One may wonder, however, whether the lessons learned
from the historical analysis of the U.S. and Soviet programs apply to current covert pro- grams.
No collapse
Neil Couch 12, Brigadier in the British Army, July 2012, “’Mexico in Danger of Rapid
Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?”
http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seafordhouse-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf/view
A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests
‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16
Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing
like those earlier European states seems
implausible for a country that currently has the
world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted
growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA;
that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one
constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the
‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature
common amongst failed states.17,18¶ A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have
Crime and
corruption tend to be described not as causes but
as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development
suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse.
Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the
in failed states, ‘corruption
flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates
assume control of the streets’, but again as effect
rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States
Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’
indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that
numerous states suffer high levels of organised
crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail.
Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian
Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for
centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled
out as potential collapsed or failed states in the
Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were
killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew
principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that
¶
or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of
dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22
Organised crime and
corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police
forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither the violence
nor the corruption led to state failure.
2NC
CP
2NC Rescheduling
Solve every advantage – creates an industry bc cough syrup and also
provides flexibility to states
even if there are solvency deficits to rescheduling on its own the
counterplan still solves 100% of the case because it leads to legalization –
that’s conceded
Rescheduling will lead to legalization for three reasons:
1) Honest communication – Government agencies like the Office of
National Drug Control Policy are unable to speak freely about the minimal
harms of marijuana and the potential benefits because they are required
by law to oppose legalization of any Schedule I substance. Acknowledging
that the panic over marijuana is overblown will significantly affect the
conversation by drawing attention to unfair drug laws. This will “pave the
way” for legalization at both the federal and state level. That’s all in our
1NC Sullum evidence
2) Research – Rescheduling marijuana allows new research that
contradicts the official narrative – pro legalization forces will effectively
capitalize
Murray 14, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute (David, Hard to Study: The Difficulty in
Measuring Marijuana’s Value, www.hudson.org/research/10604-hard-to-study-the-difficultyin-measuring-marijuana-s-value)
Second, if marijuana were placed in Schedule II, the increased access might abet agendadriven research and publications by advocacy organizations that conduct “science by press
release.” Those seeking to sway public opinion in favor of marijuana’s supposed benefits
would likely capitalize on the opportunity, generating careless studies that would not withstand
rigorous scientific review but would suffice to create positive headlines, softening up public
opinion in favor of legalization.
3) States – rescheduling would increase support for legalization even in
hard sell states like Alabama, that’s in our 1NC Sullum evidence.
Increased state legalization leads to federal legalization
Somin 14, Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, (Ilya, 29,
Prospects for marijuana legalization in 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/02/09/prospects-for-marijuana-legalization-in-2014/)
Not all of these laws are likely to pass. But if a large number do, it could greatly accelerate the trend
towards marijuana legalization. This is especially true if legalization hits large states such as
California, where a legalization ballot initiative narrowly failed in 2010; public opinion in both California and the
nation as a whole has become more favorable to legalization since then. Even many conservatives have begun to
rethink the War on Drugs. Even if numerous states legalize marijuana, the drug will still be illegal under federal
law. In its badly misguided decision in Gonzales v. Raich (2005), the Supreme Court ruled that Congress’ power to
regulate interstate commerce allows it to ban the possession of marijuana even in cases where the marijuana in
Obama administration has
taken a very equivocal position on the question of whether federal prosecutions for marijuana
distributors will continue in states that legalize marijuana under their own laws. However, widespread
legalization at the state level will put pressure on the federal government to
question has never crossed state lines or been sold in an market anywhere. The
repeal the federal ban. Even if it does not, federal law enforcement resources are
extremely limited, and it will be difficult or impossible for the feds to enforce a marijuana
ban without state cooperation. If marijuana legalization does sweep the nation over the next
few years, perhaps it will also lead more people to reconsider the War on Drugs as a whole .
2NC Amendment
The CP results in an amended treaty—there’s a global surge in support for
an alternative to cannabis prohibition that the CP capitalizes on—that’s
Don
Framing issues—
a. Threshold low—none of their evidence assumes inter se agreements—
amendments can be passed between parties where only the parties that
want to legalize marijuana sign on to the amended version of the treaty—
this is enabled by the single convention and means only one country has to
approve the amendment before the US can legalize without violating the
treaty—that’s Don
Full consensus isn’t necessary for an amendment
Jelsma 14
[10/17/14, Martin Jelsma is the Director, Drugs and Democracy Program Transnational
Institute, “The Brookings Institution International Impacts Of the U.S. Trend Towards Legal
“ Marijuana,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/17%20international%20impacts%20m
arijuana/20141017_legal_marijuana_transcript.pdf]
there are also options for adaptation in the regime that do not require a full
consensus of all the parties. Now, the WHO review is already one example, because if the WHO
would recommend a de-scheduling of cannabis, it is -- a decision like that is taken by a
simple majority, not consensus. There is also the possibility of countries individually or in group to
And secondly,
withdraw from the treaties and re-adhere with certain reservations. That’s a path that Bolivia has taken in the case
And there is the possibility also, that a group of countries can sign an
inter se agreement, where they you know, agree among themselves that the treaty
is applied in a different way, while they still maintain their full obligations to all the treaty
parties that are not part of the inter se agreement.
of in (Inaudible).
b. US influence—US support for prohibition is what sustains an oppositional
bloc—US influence the other way ensures amendment passage
Kumah-Abiwu 14
[Felix Kumah-Abiwu is a Professor of Africana Studies @ Eastern Illinois UniversityDr. Felix
Kumah-Abiwu received his PhD in Political Science (International Relations,
Comparative/African Politics and Public Policy) from West Virginia University. He also
studied at Ohio University and the Legon Center for International Affairs and Diplomacy,
University of Ghana, “The Quest for Global Narcotics Policy Change: Does the United States
Matter?” International Journal of Public Administration, 37: (2014) pg. 53–64]
the US has a strong influence in many issue
areas, including narcotics within the global system. Bullington (2004, p. 690) captures this assumption
by noting that: The United States had been the prime mover of this early anti-drug legislation,
relying on diplomatic pressure and arm twisting to forge a shaky consensus among
nations that were generally much less convinced of the need for international controls. This
US NARCOTICS POLICY TOOLS OF INFLUENCE Clearly,
American triumph signaled the beginning of nearly a century during which America literally dominated the direction
of drug control and drug policy in the international arena. For Levine (2003, p. 148),
the global narcotics
regime has been sustained for many years because the “US has used the UN as the
international agency to create, spread, and supervise world-wide prohibition.” In a
similar argument, Bewley-Taylor (1999a) observes that the US employs key policy tools of influence in
its effort to globalize the prohibition approach to narcotics control. As previously noted, this article
argues that the US to some extent shapes the global narcotics policy through four major policy tools of influence.
the US employs diplomacy (bilateral and multilateral)
as a key policy tool of influence in shaping the global narcotics regime (Bullington, 2004; Levine,
2003). For Bewley-Taylor (1999a), the US employs its diplomatic strength within the UN to
pressure other countries in supporting its preferred prohibition approach to narcotics
control. In fact, Bewley-Taylor’s (1999a) classic example is worth reiterating in support of my argument.
Table 3 provides a summary of the policy tools. First,
According to him, an independent research on the usefulness of drugs (legal and non-legal) was conducted
between 1992 and 1994 by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Program on Substance Abuse (PSA) in
conjunction with the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). Surprisingly, the findings of
the study show greater health problems associated with the use of legal drugs than with occasional use of some
narcotic drugs Fearing that the findings might undermine the existing prohibition approach, the UN was pressured
by the US to issue a disclaimer on the report (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a, p. 169; Kumah-Abiwu, 2012). In fact, one of
The US plays very dominant
role and has provided an enormous amount of funding to UN anti-drug efforts. At one point
the experts interviewed for this study shares a similar view by indicating that:
when the World Health Organization (WHO) was planning to issue a report on the lack of dangerousness of
cannabis, the US pressured the WHO to kill the report . . . . At another point when the Liberal government of
Canada under Prime Minister Chretien proposed to decriminalize marijuana, the Bush Administration’s drug czar,
John Walters, threatened trade retaliation against Canada regarding timber, fish, and other issues. (An official
interviewed at the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation. Also see Kumah-Abiwu, 2012) In the words of another policy
Latin American lawmakers, for instance, have moved intellectually and also policy wise
toward decriminalization in recent years, but have feared going far because of their
northern neighbor. In recent years, the US has also pressured Canada and the UK from
moving ahead with radical policy changes that would shift away from criminalization . The US
expert:
fears that a radical drug policy change would compromise the UN conventions. (An official interviewed at the Drug
Derivative control is another policy tool of influence at
the disposal of the US. One of the ways the US employs this policy tool is to link nonnarcotic issues with narcotic ones at the UN. Explaining the policy, Bewley-Taylor (1999b, p. 151)
observes that: By tying the acquiescence of other nations in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
to American economic aid and political support in other areas , the US was able to dominate
the decision-making process and play a central role in the instigation and design of
anti-narcotics legislation. The third policy instrument is the certification policy. The policy
Policy Alliance. Also see Kumah-Abiwu, 2012)
mandates every US president to present a yearly report to Congress on the status of drug-producing countries. Any
country, especially in the Andean region, that falls within the decertified category could face serious sanctions from
These sanctions
range from the withdrawal of US foreign aid, which may or not be directly linked to counternarcotics policy issues (Bouley, 2001; Falcon, 1996). The US could also employ its influence to
prevent loans from multilateral development agencies to the so-called countries that fall
within the decertified category (Spencer, 1998). The final policy tool of influence is the financial
leverage of the US on many UN agencies, including the UNODC. Essentially, the US is one of the
top financial contributors to the operations of many agencies within the UN system (Bewleythe US (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Chepesiuk, 1999, p. 34; Hinojosa, 2007; Kumah-Abiwu, 2012).
Taylor, 1999a). The Better World Campaign (BWC) notes that the financial contribution of the US to major UN
activities in 2011 alone was substantial as compared to others. For instance, the US contributed about $1.884
billion toward peacekeeping operations, $516 million for UN regular budgets, and $354 million (Kumah-Abiwu,
2012) toward other agencies including the UNODC (Bruun, Lynn, & Ingemar, 1975; BWC, 2012). Another
interesting example that supports US dominance over the UNODC is worth mentioning as well. According to
Bewley-Taylor (2005, p. 429), the former Executive Director of the UNODC, Mr. Antonio Costa, met with Mr. Robert
Charles, head of the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in 2004 to discuss the
Fearing a possible threat to its
preferred prohibition approach, the head of the US Narcotics Bureau threatened to
possibility of a public health approach to global narcotics control.
drastically reduce the US financial support to the UNODC , unless Mr. Costa withdraws support of the
UNODC for any public health approach to global narcotics control. Mindful of a drastic cut in funding from
the US, the head of the UNODC was said to have succumbed to the US demands (BewleyTaylor, 2005, p. 429; Kumah-Abiwu, 2012). This case provides another good example of how
the US continues to employ its policy tools of influence in shaping the global
narcotics regime (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Bullington, 2004). Pg. 59-60
Federalism
EPA Fights
EPA fights now trigger the link—also Medicaid expansion
Peacock 8-25, Bill Peacock is vice president for research and director of the Center for
Economic Freedom at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, The EPA’s Power Grab,
http://www.texaspolicy.com/center/economic-freedom/opinions/epas-power-grab
The assault on the dual sovereignty of the states — the federalism enshrined in our Tenth
Amendment — is nothing new. Much of the battle over Obamacare turned on the attempt to
force Medicaid expansion on the states, which the Supreme Court deemed a violation of the
Tenth Amendment. However, with the CPP, the EPA is attempting to take federal control
of states to a whole new level
— perhaps hoping that the states will meekly comply rather than calling its bluff by challenging a rule based on very questionable statutory authority. Writing in The Atlantic, Mario Loyola and
Richard Epstein describe the federal takeover of the states through “cooperative federalism” programs as an effort to “turn states into mere field offices of the federal government.” Already today, they point out, federal officials exert enormous influence over state budgets and state regulators, often behind
the scenes. The new federalism replaces the “laboratories of democracy” with heavy-handed, once-size-fits-all solutions. Uniformity wins but diversity loses, along with innovation, local choice, and the Constitution’s necessary lim its on government power. One such scheme is the Clean Air Act, which “allows
the states to issue federal permits — but only under federally approved state implementation plans.” The states can’t be forced to take on this role, but Loyola and Epstein note that the EPA coerces states to do so by telling them, “Implement our regulations for us, or we’ll do it ourselves, and your
constituents will be sorry.” This is the hammer behind the CPP. Much of the management of the electricity market in the United States is under the purview of the states. Either individually or collectively, states manage the market with the goal that citizens get a generally reliable — though not always
affordable — supply of electricity. Public-utility commissions and, more recently, regional transmission organizations have been the means by which this is accomplished . States set retail prices, implement green-energy policies, and manage capacity as best they can to accomplish their policy goals. Of
course, the federal government managed to force its way into the mix. Under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has used the interstate transmission of electricity to claim jurisdiction over wholesale operations of this major sector of the U.S. economy. So while states
generally have a free hand in the retail market, management of the wholesale market is a mishmash of state and federal oversight. In recent years, the Obama administration has tried to extend FERC’s reach under the guise of maintaining reliability and promoting renewable energy. But in Electric Power
Supply Association v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reminded the administration that there are limits on what it can do under the law. The states’ lead role in electricity was clearly on display in the 1990s when many of them tried to introduce competition into the electricity market. At the time,
utilities’ revenue usually came through rates set by regulators that reimbursed them for whatever approved expenses they had incurred — plus a reasonable profit. Even liberals at the time realized that this inefficient rate-of-return regulation couldn’t turn the cheap natural gas available then into cheap
electricity. Many states ultimately failed, partly because, like California, they just couldn’t bring themselves to actually allow competition. But in many cases, the problem was closely linked to FERC’s regulation of the wholesale market. Only Texas, which uniquely was able to regulate the entire market on its
own, fully succeeded in creating a competitive electricity market. Over the years Texas had largely freed itself from significant FERC regulation by carefully isolating its electrical grid from the rest of the country, thereby eliminating the basis for federal “interstate commerce” jurisdiction. When it adopted its
competitive reforms, the results were astounding. Texas now has the most competitive, successful electricity market in the U.S., if not the world. These reforms have allowed Texas to keep up with a massive increase in demand for electricity. Since competition started in 2002, demand for electricity in Texas
has increased 80 percent faster than in the rest of the country. But Texas electricity prices have actually decreased by 14 percent in real dollars and by 57 percent relative to national prices. This tremendous benefit to Texas consumers has been accomplished solely at the risk of investors and generators,
who were allowed to invest more than $36 billion in new generation capacity to meet this demand. In every other state, much of the risk of investing in new generation is placed on consumers — they pay for the generation whether they need it or not. This success was possible only because Texas’s
wholesale electricity market is not subject to FERC oversight. But if the CPP survives the many legal challenges it will face, Texas’s electricity market will not be independent for long. At aworkshop conducted by the Public Utility Commission of Texas on July 15, I joined a long list of witnesses in testifying
that the CPP will result in the federal takeover of the Texas electricity market — and that of every other state as well. The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that the federal government cannot require the states to regulate. Schemes such as the Clean Air Act therefore give states a “choice” between
implementing EPA programs, through a State Implementation Plan (SIP), or letting EPA do the implementing itself, through a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). The choice is coercive, because in a real “contractual” or “cooperative” setting among equals, you can’t be forced to choose the lesser of two evils.
But the Court has looked the other way, on the theory that so long as an FIP doesn’t dragoon state agencies into federal service, there is no commandeering problem. But there is a commandeering problem with the CPP. In New York v. United States (1992), the Supreme Court struck down a law requiring
states to “take title” to low-level nuclear waste within their borders or dispose of it according to federal instructions. The Court ruled that states cannot be forced to choose between two schemes neither of which the federal government would be able to impose on them as a free-standing requirement. The
CPP has a lot in common with the law that was struck down in New York, because whatever the state chooses to do, its agencies will be required to regulate in accordance with federal instructions. If states decide to comply with the CPP by developing an SIP, they would have to restructure the jurisdictional
relationships of their environmental and electrical regulating entities and make substantive changes to their electricity markets. Environmental regulators would become utility regulators, and vice versa. Renewable-energy and energy-efficiency mandates would have to be greatly expanded. The dispatch of
electricity would be required to take into account environmental considerations — perhaps through the imposition of a carbon tax. Many of these changes would have to be made in the retail market, despite the D.C. Circuit Court’s finding that Congress has specifically confined federal “jurisdiction over the
sale of electricity . . . to the wholesale market.” The states can’t be forced to do this in an SIP. If states choose not to participate in the CPP, the EPA will implement it through an FIP. But since the federal government can’t regulate the retail market, the EPA would have t o require state regulators to
implement the federal regulations — again stepping beyond the authority that Congress has granted to FERC. In either case, the states really have no choices at all — either by SIP or by FIP, the states are forced to implement the provisions of the CPP that neither FERC nor the EPA has the authority to
demand individually. It is quite likely that the EPA knows it has overstepped its bounds. But the EPA is taking this step because it knows that it has little hope of achieving its desired CO2-emission-reduction goals if it is forced to regulate on its own the only entities it actually has authority to regulate — the
generators. So the EPA’s greatest hope is that the states will voluntarily turn their utility regulators into an extension of the federal government, fearing that if they fail to comply, the EPA would turn up the heat on the industry in a recalcitr ant state by making impossible demands, threatening huge fines,
and essentially shutting down the permitting of existing generation. Either states comply or the feds may turn out the lights. While the potential of rolling blackouts is not an attractive op tion, the alternative is to take one more step down the road to a unified national bureaucracy. It might not be too long
until state legislatures are no longer needed, except perhaps to tax their citizens to pay the state agency staff that will then regulate the economy under the direction of the federal government. The Founders reserved to the states — and to the people — those powers not explicitly delegated to the federal
states should force the
EPA to show its hand in order to halt the creeping federal takeover of state
governments, which continues to encroach on one of the most important
protections in our Constitution — federalism, and the liberties it was meant to
guarantee.
government in order to protect the people from tyranny. While the CPP is purportedly about saving the world from the horrors of CO2 emissions, it will accomplish virtually nothing in that regard. Though the stakes are high, the
FERC wrecks cooperative federalism on the environment
Peacock, 8-25 – columnist @ National Review Online
Bill, “The EPA’s Power Grab,” NRO, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/386185/epaspower-grab-bill-peacock
Writing in The Atlantic, Mario Loyola and Richard Epstein describe the federal takeover of the states
through “cooperative federalism” programs as an effort to “turn states into mere field offices of the federal
government.” Already today, they point out, federal officials exert enormous influence over state budgets and state
regulators, often behind the scenes. The new federalism replaces the “laboratories of democracy” with heavyhanded, once-size-fits-all solutions. Uniformity wins but diversity loses, along with innovation, local choice, and the
One such scheme is the Clean Air Act, which
“allows the states to issue federal permits — but only under federally approved state
implementation plans.” The states can’t be forced to take on this role, but Loyola and Epstein note that the
Constitution’s necessary limits on government power.
EPA coerces states to do so by telling them, “Implement our regulations for us, or we’ll do it ourselves, and your
constituents will be sorry.” This is the hammer behind the CPP. Much of the management of the electricity market
in the United States is under the purview of the states. Either individually or collectively, states manage the market
with the goal that citizens get a generally reliable — though not always affordable — supply of electricity. Publicutility commissions and, more recently, regional transmission organizations have been the means by which this is
accomplished. States set retail prices, implement green-energy policies, and manage capacity as best they can to
accomplish their policy goals. Of course, the federal government managed to force its way into the mix. Under the
Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
has used the interstate
transmission of electricity to claim jurisdiction over wholesale operations of this major sector of
the U.S. economy. So while states generally have a free hand in the retail market, management
of the wholesale market is a mishmash of state and federal oversight. In recent years, the
Obama administration has tried to extend FERC’s reach under the guise of maintaining
reliability and promoting renewable energy. But in Electric Power Supply Association v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals reminded the administration that there are limits on what it can do under the law.
Decentralization’s vital to effective bioterror response---mandated
cooperation hamstrings operations
Paul Posner 3, Ph.D., a recognized national expert on U.S. federalism, is the Managing
Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues for the General Accounting Office, 3/24/3,
“The Federalism Challenge: The Challenge for State and Local Government,” p. 20
For example, in public health, let’s examine what a local government faces to prepare for
bioterrorism. It has to improve the capacity of its local health departments, the human capital
that has been woefully neglected in recent years reportedly. It has to update its technology so that it at least can
achieve agreements with
hospitals to develop surge capacity and support from doctors and other medical personnel. It has to develop
laboratory infrastructure to at least know where the labs are and reach some kind of agreements on how to
process samples of suspicious materials. And most importantly, what we’re finding increasingly in the local
health departments, it has to develop surveillance systems to produce real-time data on day-today incidences, to help get early warning of suspicious health trends and incidents to facilitate an expeditious
communicate problems to the CDC in Atlanta over the Internet. It has to
response to health problems where time is such a critical variable influencing potential health outcomes for those
exposed.
Baltimore is one of the pioneers . They can show daily the numbers of admittances to emergency rooms,
the veterinarians’ reports, daily school absences. They are trying to get pharmacies to report daily on medications
prescribed. The point is they can monitor these things and look for variations and look for puzzles and, fortunately,
the kind of surveillance system that is under development in some
communities and illustrates the political challenges in gaining the cooperation of numerous
independent actors at the local level.
they haven’t found any. That’s
Framing the Problem
The way the problem is framed determines the framework and the modality or the process that we use to address
if we define the homeland security problem as a response problem, as a first
responder’s problem, then the model will have a local orientation . City managers have told
me that when you’re dealing with the response to an incident , the most effective thing for
the effective management of response is for the federal government to stay out of our way .
These managers feel they know their communities best. As one said, “Give us money but let us
control the action .”
it. For example,
Cartels
2NC UQ
Stabilizing now – their ev is all rhetoric
stats
Z News 9/2/14 ("Mexico Touts Progress Against Drug Violence")
Mexico City: Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto touted Monday a sharp drop in drugrelated murders, fewer kidnappings and a tougher crackdown on money laundering in his
second state of the nation report.¶ Pena Nieto, who vowed to combat everyday violence
plaguing Mexicans when he took office in December 2012, said homicides linked to
organized crime dropped by 36 percent between September 2013 and July this year.¶ The
number of kidnappings, which had soared to record numbers in the past year, fell by 6.8
percent in the first seven months of this year compared to the same period in 2013. More
than 80,000 people are estimated to have been killed in drug turf wars and battles with
security forces since Pena Nieto`s predecessor Felipe Calderon deployed tens of thousands
of troops to combat drug cartels in 2006.
2NC Link Turn
Competition
Legalization causes cartels to shift North – they move into the United
States and challenge legal business operations
Heft 5/21/14 (Peter, Student of Philosophy and Political Science, "The Case Against The
Legalization of Marijuana")
The legalization of marijuana will have two effects on drug cartels. First, it will create an
incentive for some to move further into the continental United States and second, it will
force others to stop growing marijuana in favor of other, more dangerous substances.¶ The
legalization of marijuana, specifically in Colorado, raises interesting questions of what drug
cartels that cannot shift to other substances will do and where they will go. Sadly, the
evidence indicates that they will migrate north into the United States and set up shop
among American civilians. Just last year, Colorado saw raids on businesses with evidence
connecting them to Colombian cartels operating both abroad and in Colorado itself. This
issue arose because Colorado businesses were legally allowed to sell marijuana but didn’t
automatically have the growing power or knowledge needed and thus teamed up with
cartels. This fact is further bolstered by statements made by Tom Gorman, director of the
Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, when he indicated that the legalization
of marijuana provided the perfect incentive for Colombian cartels to move north. In answer
to an interviewer’s question of “[w]hat, if anything, are you seeing happening in Colorado?”,
Gorman responded with¶ …there is a real high demand for Colorado marijuana throughout
the United States. One of the primary weapons of a cartel they use to make money is, one,
selling drugs, and the other one is extortion. So it’s real easy for them to come in and look
at these retail stores that are making hundreds of thousands of dollars and say we want a
piece of the action.(x)¶ Gorman indicates that currently there is a “perfect storm” scenario
wherein cartels can easily set up shop in states where marijuana is legal and then expand
outward within the United States. What’s more, Gorman has indicated that due to the
ruthlessness of cartels, there is the very real worry of violence and intimidation against legal
businesses. Interestingly enough, it’s not just Colorado that is affected. Executives from the
Chicago Crime Commission have indicated that there is an increased cartel presence both in
Illinois and other non-border states. The officials warn that, if left unchecked, the situation
will just get worse and the cartels in the United States will expand operations.
1NR
2NC Impact—O/V
DA O/W—they have conceded the Bennet and Walsh and Mueller ev that
international law creates a cooperative framework—no impact defense
Short term nuke war—uncertainty, creates some degree of dialogue
Prefer our impact—system instability constantly creates the risk of new
crises that we can’t anticipate—international law is key insurance against
burgeoning threats
It’s a controlling and magnifying impact—all threats are more likely and
more dangerous absent international cooperation—treaty system contains
the worst of their impacts through constant cooperation
2NC UQ
CP solves by reversing status quo legalization efforts and halting all efforts
pending new reforms—status quo efforts were sustainable in the short
term and the CP prevents any long term damage to US cred—that’s Walsh
States not bound by treaties
Humphreys 13 – prof @ stanford
(Keith, “Can the United Nations Block U.S. Marijuana Legalization?” 11/15,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-humphreys/can-the-united-nationsbl_b_3977683.html)
1. Is the U.S. currently in violation of the UN treaties it signed agreeing to make marijuana
illegal? No. The U.S. federal government is a signatory to the treaty, but the States of
Washington and Colorado are not. Countries with federated systems of government like the
U.S. and Germany can only make international commitments regarding their national-level
policies. Constitutionally, U.S. states are simply not required to make marijuana illegal as it
is in federal law. Hence, the U.S. made no such commitment on behalf of the 50 states in
signing the UN drug control treaties.¶ Some UN officials believe that the spirit of the
international treaties requires the U.S. federal government to attempt to override statelevel marijuana legalization. But in terms of the letter of the treaties, Attorney General
Holder's refusal to challenge Washington and Colorado's marijuana policies is within bounds.
2NC Thumpers
The link is distinct from their other examples—the US may not have ratified
or ratified with reservations in other areas, but the plan is a unilateral
unambiguous violation of a treaty the US ratified without reservation
This distinction matters—outright violations of treaties have been limited,
but put us on the brink—only magnifies the link
Koplow 13
[Winter 2013, David Koplow is a Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied
Legal Studies at Georgetown University Law Center. He was Special Counsel for Arms
Control to the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, from 2009 to
2011, “Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously
Breaches a Treaty?,” http://www.fletcherforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37(1)]
Why does it matter that the United States
violates treaties, and occasionally does so without a shred of legal cover ? Perhaps that is the
IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPEATED VIOLATIONS So what?
realpolitik privilege of the global hegemon: to be able to sustain hypocrisy, asserting that its unique international
responsibilities and its “exceptional” position in the world enable the United States explicitly to welch on its debts,
there
is a cost when the world’s strongest state behaves this way. One potential danger is that
other countries may mimic this disregard for legal commitments and justify their own
cavalier attitudes toward international law by citing U.S. precedents. Reciprocity and
mutuality are fundamental tenets of international practice; it is foolhardy to suppose
that other parties will indefinitely continue with treaty compliance if they feel that the United
States is taking advantage of them by unilateral avoidance of shared legal obligations . So far,
there has not been significant erosion of the treaties discussed in the three
examples. The United States and Russia will fall years short of compliance with the CWC destruction
obligations, but other parties, with the notable exception of Iran, have reacted with aplomb,
comfortable with the two giants’ unequivocal commitment to eventual compliance . Likewise,
the VCCR is not unraveling, even if other states lament the asymmetry in consular access to
detained foreigners. And while many states pay their UN dues late and build up substantial
arrearages, that recalcitrance seems to stem more from penury than from a deliberate
choice to follow the U.S. lead. But that persistent touting undermines the treaties—
and by extension, it jeopardizes the entire fabric of international law. Chronic
noncompliance— especially ostentatious, unexcused, unjustified noncompliance— also
sullies the nation’s reputation and degrades U.S. diplomats’ ability to drive other states to
better conform with their obligations under the full array of treaties and other international
law commitments from trade to human rights to the Law of the Sea . The United States
depends upon the international legal structure more than anyone else: Americans have the
biggest interest in promoting a stable, robust, reliable system for international exchange . It
fudge on its obligations, and adopt a “do as we say, not as we do” approach with other countries. However,
is shortsighted and self-defeating to publicly and unblushingly undercut the system that offers the United States so
It is especially damaging when, following an indisputable violation, the
United States acknowledges its default, participates in an international dispute
resolution procedure, and apologizes—but then continues to violate the treaty. The
many benefits.
CWC implementation bodies, the International Court of Justice, and even the UN General Assembly and Security
Council are unable to effectively do much to sanction or penalize the mighty United States, but it is still terrible for
U.S. interests to disregard those mechanisms.
Marijuana is key—the growing consensus away from cannabis prohibition
means it’s a stress test for the ability of the global regime to adapt to
changing times—that’s Bennett and Walsh
Not a violation
Carafano 13
[08/26/13, James Jay Carafano, “Say What You Want About Drones—They're Perfectly Legal”,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/say-what-you-want-about-drones-theyre-perfectlylegal/278740/]
I hate Obama's drone war--but, under the law, he has a perfect right to fight one. Armed
drones in war may be new, but their use introduces no new ethical or legal issues. In the Western
world, the laws of war are built on the foundation of the Just War tradition . The principles for
employing force are fairly simple and realistic. The use of force has to be under a competent
sovereign authority. And it has to be proportional --that is, the level of force used must be appropriate
to the military mission, with appropriate care taken to avoid harming innocents. Those rules apply regardless of the
As I said, nothing new here. Our laws
and treaty obligations place a legal framework around the principles of the Just War
tradition. At times, the United States has modified these legal instruments to account for the unusual destructive
weaponry involved, be it hand grenades, nukes... or armed drones.
power of certain weapons -- their ability to inflict intentional and unnecessary cruelty or to pose an indiscriminate
threat to innocents. For example, the U.S. helped pen conventions on poison gas and biological weapons, as well as
Drones, however, present none of these
issues. There is nothing novel or unusual about the destructive potential of a drone
strike. Pretty much every weapon in the U.S. arsenal may be used in war, provided the
users (1) have the legal authority to use them, (2) aim them at that legitimate targets, and
(3) use them according to the rules of engagement laid out by their commanders. All those
bases are covered when it comes to drones. Congress has given the commander-inchief an Authorization to Use Military Force--AUMF in Washington-speak--and that's all the legal
treaties to help stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
authority he needs. And, as Mark Bowden's article in this month's The Atlantic illustrates well, the administration
has plenty of rules for running armed drone operations. Here is the brutal reality of war: It always requires
targeting enemies with lethal force. It is an operational necessity. And it is legal. The problem some people have
with killer drones in combat has little to do with the technology of flying weapons. As my colleague at Heritage,
Cully Stimson testified before Congress, "Much criticism of drone warfare is actually criticism of broader policies,
such as the application of the law of armed conflict to the present conflict, geographical limitations on such conflict,
and targeting decisions. Whether a strike is carried out by a drone or an airplane (with the pilot in the vehicle
itself) has little or no bearing on these broader policy issues." Turning drone strikes into a battle of legal briefs is
more an act "lawfare" than warfare--an attempt to hamstring U.S. military operations by clothing complaints in
legal-sounding arguments. Amnesty International declared in its 2012 report that U.S. operations do not "recognize
the applicability of international human rights law," an assertion the report conclusively fails to document.
Christof Heyns, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings and summary or arbitrary
executions, stated at a conference in Geneva that some U.S. operations might constitute
"war crimes." Though he has been on the job for many months, he has yet to prove that
allegation. To recapitulate: President Obama has the right to drone on as long as the authority of the AUMF
remains in force and as long as he operates within that authority (or operates under some other legal authorization
for the use force).
Syria is legal
Cole 14
[juan cole 9/4/14, “Would a US/ NATO war in Syria be Legal in International Law?”,
http://www.juancole.com/2014/09/syria-legal-international.html]
Obama administration could use lethal force in Syria on the basis of two legal
claims. One would be that ISIL is transnational and is threatening the US embassy in
Baghdad, has killed US citizens and is threatening to kill more, and has openly menaced the
‘I suppose the
United States in general, and that the US has the right of self-defense, extending into strikes on ISIL in
Syria. It seems to me like awfully thin broth, but as I said, I think President Obama’s rhetoric suggests that this
The other would be that ISIL is genocidal and it is
necessary to intervene against it to protect millions of Shiites, Yazidis, Shabak, Alawites, Christians
approach may be the one his lawyers favor.
and other groups hated by the Salafi Jihadi ISIL fanatics. It seems to me that the [pdf] 2005 UN statement on the
responsibility to protect still insists that member states go through the UN Security Council for authorization, and
that they cannot just cowboy it, though maybe this is ambiguous.
Perceived violations aren’t cut and dry if it’s still possible to remain in
technical compliance – and as long as the US has a legal case, it doesn’t
harm diplomacy
Koplow 13—David, is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied Legal Studies
at Georgetown University Law Center. He was Special Counsel for Arms Control to the
General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, from 2009 to
2011.“Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously
Breaches a Treaty?,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37(1):
http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf
Debates about putative treaty violations are also often inconclusive because international
law, like domestic U.S. law, is frequently contestable. For example, the rules for demarcating a disputed
land or maritime boundary or the interpretation of a World Trade Organization obligation about improper barriers
Often, the United States (or any other
adopts a certain interpretation of the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre,
the United States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter
is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree, there may not be much
embarrassment for a country that has in good faith advanced what subsequently turns out
to be only a minority position.
to international trade can be obscure, ambiguous, and debatable.
country)
2NC Link—O/V
Legalization destroys and renders ineffective the treaty system—three
distinct link args
a. Pick and choose—by unambiguously violating a tenet of a treaty the US
signed onto without reservation, the plan creates a precedent for treaty
parties unilaterally determining which parts of a treaty they want to
comply with—that’s Hasse
That outweighs—the plan’s pick and choose approach violates “pacta sunt
servanda” which is the most fundamental principle of international law
Lopez 14
(German, “How much of the war on drugs is tied to international treaties?”
http://www.vox.com/cards/war-on-drugs-marijuana-cocaine-heroin-meth/war-on-drugsinternational-treaties)
There is a lot of disagreement among drug policy experts, enforcers, and reformers about the stringency of the
treaties. Several sections of the conventions allow countries some flexibility so they don't violate their
own constitutional protections. The US, for example, has never enforced penalties on inciting illicit drug use on the
basis that it would violate rights to freedom of speech.¶ Many argue that
any move toward legalization
of use, possession, and sales is in violation of international treaties. Under this argument, Colorado,
Washington, and Uruguay are technically in violation of the treaties because they legalized marijuana for personal
possession and sales.¶ Others say that countries have a lot of flexibility due to the constitutional exemptions in the
conventions. Countries could claim, for instance, that their protections for right to privacy and health allow them to
legalize drugs despite the conventions. When it comes to individual states in the US, the federal government can
America's federalist system allows states some flexibility as long as the federal
government keeps drugs illegal .¶ "It's pretty clear that the war on drugs was waged for political reasons
also argue that
and some countries have used the treaties as an excuse to pursue draconian policies," said Kasia MalinowskaSempruch, director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program. "Nevertheless, we've seen a number of
countries drop criminal penalties for minor possession of all drugs. We've seen others put drugs into a
pharmaceutical model, including the prescription of heroin to people with serious addictions. This seems completely
possible within the treaties."¶ Even if a country decided to dismantle prohibition and violate the treaties, it's unclear
how the international community would respond. If the US, for example, ended prohibition, there's little other
countries could do to interfere; there's no international drug court, and sanctions would be very unlikely for a
country as powerful as America.¶ Still, Martin Jelsma, an international drug policy expert at the Transnational
ignoring or pulling out of the international drug conventions could
seriously damage America's standing around the world. "Pacta sunt servanda
('agreements must be kept') is the most fundamental principle of international law
and it would be very undermining if countries start to take an 'a-la-carte' approach
to treaties they have signed; they cannot simply comply with some provisions and
ignore others without losing the moral authority to ask other countries to oblige to
other treaties," Jelsma wrote in an email. "So our preference is to acknowledge legal tensions with the
Institute, argued that
treaties and try to resolve them."¶ To resolve such issues, many critics of the war on drugs hope to reform
international drug laws in 2016 during the next General Assembly Special Session on drugs.¶ "There is tension with
the tax-and-regulate approach to marijuana in some jurisdictions," Malinowska-Sempruch said. "But it's all part of
a process and that's why we hope the UN debate in 2016 is as open as possible, so that we can settle some of
these questions and, if necessary, modernize the system."
That starts a cycle of treaty violations that wrecks the whole system
Harold Hongju Koh 3, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law,
Yale Law School, May 2003, “FOREWORD: On American Exceptionalism,” Stanford Law
Review, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479
Similarly, the oxymoronic concept of "imposed democracy" authorizes top-down regime change in the name of
democracy. Yet the United States has always argued that genuine democracy must flow from the will of the people,
not from military occupation. n67 Finally, a policy of strategic unilateralism seems unsustainable in an
the United States has become party not just to a
few treaties, but to a global network of closely interconnected treaties enmeshed in
multiple frameworks of international institutions. Unilateral administration decisions to break or
bend one treaty commitment thus rarely end the matter, but more usually trigger vicious cycles
of treaty violation. In an interdependent world, [*1501] the United States simply cannot afford
to ignore its treaty obligations while at the same time expecting its treaty partners to help it
solve the myriad global problems that extend far beyond any one nation's control: the global AIDS
and SARS crises, climate change, international debt, drug smuggling, trade imbalances,
currency coordination, and trafficking in human beings, to name just a few. Repeated incidents of
American treaty-breaking create the damaging impression of a United States contemptuous of
both its treaty obligations and treaty partners. That impression undermines American soft
power at the exact moment that the United States is trying to use that soft power to mobilize
those same partners to help it solve problems it simply cannot solve alone: most obviously, the war against
global terrorism, but also the postwar construction of Iraq, the Middle East crisis, or the
renewed nuclear militarization of North Korea.
interdependent world. For over the past two centuries,
b. Treaty Adaptability—Marijuana is a stress test for whether an old treaty
can adapt itself to a changing consensus—legalization in the US signals
that the treaty system can’t incorporate changing views and undermines
its resiliency by setting a precedent of ignoring rather than adapting
treaties that are out of touch—that’s Bennett and Walsh
2NC Link—AT LT/Aff Causes Reform
The links outweigh the turn—even if they win that the plan causes treaty
reform, the process of a unilateral treaty violation still undermines the
treaty and renders the whole system ineffective
Plan makes treaty amendment impossible—drug reforms requires global
integration—ad hoc measures in advance of treaty reforms fail and prevent
a unified change—also means the aff’s legalization will fail—that’s Hasse
The US won’t use the plan to leverage treaty reform—the official US
position and Brownfield doctrine mean it will try to claim treaty flexibility
and maintain compliance—that’s Bennett and Walsh
Unilateral action fails at resulting in treaty reform
Rolles 9 [2009, Stephen Rolles is a Senior Policy Analyst for Transform Drug Policy
Foundatio, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation”,
http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/after-war-drugs-blueprint-regulation]
Given the near impossibility for substantial or meaningful reform to be achieved by
unilateral action, using the established administrative routes outlined in the various
articles of the drug treaties and related UN legal structures, the most credible and likely way
that the current treaty restrictions on exploring legal regulatory models for certain
substances will be loosened is clearly through some form of collective action, by a
coalition of reform minded states. This coalition would likely consist predominantly of an EU
bloc (presumably minus Sweden), a South and Central American bloc, possibly along with
New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and various others.
The plan can’t be withdrawal and reacession—the aff’s immediate and
unilateral legalization means it results in action that violates a treaty
before any change in our status to that treaty can be made—treaty
withdrawal is a legal procedure that takes time and before that finishes
completely the US is considered under legal obligation to the treaty—even
if the US does withdraw it still decks our cred
Don 14 [2014, Allison Don is a University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015,
“Lighten Up: Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 213,
Hein Online]
Another option is to withdraw from the Single Convention altogether, thus leaving the treaty
intact but removing any legal obligations formed on behalf of the United States. n146 The
[*235] process of withdraw, referred to as denunciation in the Single Convention, simply
calls for a written statement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. n147
The withdrawing party will then be relieved of all obligations no later than six months
following receipt of the statement by the Secretary-General. n148 Withdraw, or
denunciation, is always an option but does not "affect any right, obligation or legal
situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its
termination." n149 Thus, the United States would remain responsible for the current
breach emanating from Washington and Colorado despite a potential decision to withdraw.
n150 Withdraw also carries with it certain negative consequences, such as international
isolation, trade sanctions, removal of financial assistance and a damaged reputation. n151
By recently withdrawing from, or failing to ratify, at least 10 treaties, the United States has
already "cast doubt on its commitment to multilateral cooperation." n152 As withdraw is
not a feasible means to circumvent accountability for the current violation, the
potential ramifications of withdraw from the Single Convention outweigh any
benefits.
Treaty withdrawal is the least defensible—destroys the treaty
Jelsma 14 [2014, Martin Jelsma is the co-coordinator of the TNI's Drugs & Democracy
Programme with Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition the History of
cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,”
http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf]
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that historical “error” and
“fundamental change of circumstances” (rebus sic stantibus, literally “things thus standing”)
can be grounds for invalidating a state’s consent to a treaty.34 According to Leinwand, “[I]f
the fundamental situation underlying treaty provisions becomes so changed that continued
performance of the treaty will not fulfil the objective that was originally intended, the
performance of those obligations may be excused.” In an early attempt to legally
accommodate cannabis reforms beyond the treaty latitude, he argued in 1971 for the
applicability of those clauses to justify “selective denunciation” from the cannabis provisions
under the 1961 Single Convention. The inclusion of cannabis, he wrote, “was a mistake,
based on the erroneous scientific and medical information generally available to the
delegates when the treaty was drafted”.35 The highly politicized and scientifically dubious
history of how cannabis ended up in the 1961 treaty would definitely support Leinwand’s
conclusion. The use of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine and the option of “selective
denunciation”, however, are rarities in international law. The Beckley Foundation’s Global
Cannabis Commission report, therefore, concluded in 2008 that “taking this path might
be less legally defensible than denunciation and reaccession with reservations”,
which would have the same end result.36 Withdrawing from the UN drug control
conventions completely is likely to trigger even stronger condemnations than seen in
the case of Bolivia, and may have serious political, economic and reputational
repercussions.37 For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential
trade agreements, sanctions from the U.S. and the European Union would probably be
unavoidable. Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit
condition in several other agreements, not only in the sphere of trade and development but
it is also a sine qua non for accession to the European Union, for example. Very few
countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most countries now
struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change want to keep
significant parts of the international drug-control regime intact, not least its control system
for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes.
The single convention prohibits new reservations after initial ratification—
reacceeding to the treaty would still violate
Don 14 [2014, Allison Don is a University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015,
“Lighten Up: Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 213,
Hein Online]
When becoming party to a treaty, there exists an option to make "a unilateral statement ...
whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty
in their application to that state." n141 This option is known as a reservation which allows a
state to "fine-tune or adjust the way in which a multilateral treaty will apply to it." n142 In
relation to the Single Convention, at least three countries entered into reservations stating
that the use of marijuana would be permitted within their territories for non-medical or
scientific purposes; the United States was not one of them. n143 Initial logic would hold
that the United States could simply enter into a reservation now permitting the use of
marijuana for recreational purposes. However, the Single Convention expressly prohibits
the statement of reservations following initial accession to the treaty, stating that
reservations may be made "at the time of signature, ratification or accession." n144 By not
stating a reservation pertaining to marijuana at the time of accession, the United States was
barred from doing so in the future. n145 Thus, a reservation permitting the use of
recreational marijuana is not a feasible means of avoiding the obligations under
the Single Convention.
Reacession trades off with long term reforms and undermines the treaty
system
Jelsma 14 [2014, Martin Jelsma is the co-coordinator of the TNI's Drugs & Democracy
Programme with Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition the History of
cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,”
http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf]
A downside to this approach, besides the already mentioned risk of creating precedents for
weakening other UN treaty regimes, is that it applies only to the reserving nation and that
unilateral escape mechanisms could reduce pressure on the treaty system to
undergo a multilateral and more fundamental process of reform and
modernization. It is in effect a one-off fix for an individual state and could not be
applied regularly. Nonetheless, the procedure is worthy of consideration under specific
circumstances, especially after other avenues for creating more flexibility on a particular
topic have been explored and failed.
2NR
Mexico is stable now –
Zeta power is low now –
Reed 13 (Tristian, Mexico Security Analyst, "Mexico's Drug War: Los Zetas Lose Their
Leaders and Community Police Proliferate")
Mexican authorities arrested Los Zetas' top leader, Miguel "Z-40" Trevino Morales, roughly
27 kilometers (17 miles) southwest of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, on July 15.
Trevino's is the most significant capture in Mexico's drug war in recent years. The fate of
Los Zetas and the response of Los Zetas' rivals has accordingly become uncertain moving
into the third quarter. Indicators will emerge during the third quarter providing clarity on
what to expect for security and cartel operations throughout Mexico.¶ Beyond the Trevino
arrest, the second quarter also saw continued expansion of community-organized militias,
commonly referred to as self-defense groups or community police, a trend we identified in
the 2013 first quarter update. In Michoacan state, militia activity was so pronounced that
Mexico City deployed the military and federal police to reassert government authority. The
proliferation of these groups increasingly affects not just the Mexican government's strategy
for combatting crime and violence, but also the strategies of Mexico's transnational criminal
organizations.
a. Centralization of power - Sinaloa collusion with government
eliminated rivals– that’s Bates
b. Statistics – numbers prove kidnappings and murders are down
Z News 9/2/14 ("Mexico Touts Progress Against Drug Violence")
Mexico City: Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto touted Monday a sharp drop in drugrelated murders, fewer kidnappings and a tougher crackdown on money laundering in his
second state of the nation report.¶ Pena Nieto, who vowed to combat everyday violence
plaguing Mexicans when he took office in December 2012, said homicides linked to
organized crime dropped by 36 percent between September 2013 and July this year.¶ The
number of kidnappings, which had soared to record numbers in the past year, fell by 6.8
percent in the first seven months of this year compared to the same period in 2013. More
than 80,000 people are estimated to have been killed in drug turf wars and battles with
security forces since Pena Nieto`s predecessor Felipe Calderon deployed tens of thousands
of troops to combat drug cartels in 2006.
c. Momentum – violence is steadly declining under Nieto
Weinberg 10/16/2014 (Bill “Mexican cartel wars winding down?”
http://ww4report.com/node/13631)
Mexican authorities on Oct. 1 claimed another coup against the cartels, announcing the
arrest of Héctor Beltran Leyva, last remaining kingpin of the Beltran Leyva Organization—
the declining crime machine that once controlled much of the west and central parts of the
country. Beltran Leyva was taken into custody by army troops "without a shot fired" as he
dined in a seafood restaurant in the tourist town of San Miguel de Allende, Guanajuato
state. (LAT, Oct. 1) The capture follows that earlier this year of the Sinaloa Cartel's longfugitive jefe máximo Joaquin Guzmán Loera AKA "El Chapo"—marking another score for
President Enrique Peña Nieto, and his supposed new and more sophisticated policy against
the cartels. The government has other reasons to claim a measure of success. Mexico's
murder rate tripled between 2007 and 2012, a period that saw 121,613 murders by official
statistics. This period also coincided with President Felipe Calderón's term of office—and
aggressive use of the military against the cartels. Since Peña Nieto took office in 2012, the
murder rate has steadily declined, dropping below 2010 levels last year. The frequency
of the cruel "narco-messages"—taunting or threatening notes left with mutilated corpses—
has drastically decreased as well, falling from an average of 52 instances a month to just
eight. (DW, Sept. 7) The number of deaths attributable to drug violence over the past years
has been estimated as high as 80,000.
Violence from the drug war is on the decline now – crime rate statistics
prove that Nieto’s reforms are working
Zabludovsky 7/23/14 (Karla Zabludovsky covers Latin America for Newsweek. “Murders in Mexico Down From Height
of the Drug War, But Violence Persists” Filed: 7/23/ 14 at 6:42 PM http://www.newsweek.com/murders-mexico-down-heightdrug-war-violence-persists-260990
Some of the Mexican states where drug war–related violence has been most intense, like
Coahuila, Guerrero and Tamaulipas, showed a decreased homicide rate. In Durango, part
of the Mexican “golden triangle,” an area notorious for drug trafficking, homicides
decreased by nearly half in 2013 as compared to the previous year.¶ ADVERTISEMENT¶ It is
unclear what percentage of recorded homicides are related to organized crime since the government modified the classification in
Aware of the
war weariness felt among many in Mexico, Pena Nieto ran on the promise that, if elected,
his government would shift the focus from capturing drug kingpins, like Calderon had, to
making daily life for ordinary Mexicans safer.¶ "With this new strategy, I commit myself to significantly lowering
October, doing away with a separate category for drug war–related deaths, instead lumping them all together.¶
the homicide rate, the number of kidnappings in the country, the extortions and the human trafficking," wrote Pena Nieto in a
Since taking office in December 2012, Pena Nieto has largely
eliminated talk of security from his agenda except when large outbreaks of violence have
forced him otherwise, focusing instead on the economy and his legislative reforms,
including sweeping overhauls to education and energy. And while the country appears to be less violent now than during Calderon’s
newspaper editorial during his presidential campaign.¶
war on drugs, the climate of press freedom, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, remains “perilous.”