Political tolerance in the Netherlands: in
decline? The role of the libertarianauthoritarian dimension.
Bachelor’s thesis
Jochem Rietveld
18-06-2012
Instructor: Rebekkah Tromble
The price of the democratic way of life is a growing appreciation of people's differences, not
merely as tolerable, but as the essence of a rich and rewarding human experience.
-Jerome Nathanson
Introduction
The Netherlands have long enjoyed a reputation for tolerance (Erk 2011, 110). The country
has been receiving immigrants and political and religious refugees for centuries (McKay et
all. 2008, 599). In the period of the Reformation, French Huguenots fled from religious
persecution to the Netherlands (McKay et all. 2008, 599). In the same time Jews found a safe
haven in Amsterdam, where they could freely engage in their commercial activities, whereas
they were prosecuted in large areas of Europe (McKay et all. 2008, 550). In the 20th century,
after the Second World War, the Netherlands maintained their excellent reputation as a
tolerant country: big groups of immigrants went to the Netherlands in the sixties and seventies
to find jobs in the booming postwar economy. However, things changed in the eighties: an
economic downturn as a result of the oil crisis of the seventies meant that the job market
soured (McKay et all. 2008, 1010-11). Immigrants (as well as Dutch workers) lost their jobs
and ended up in the Dutch welfare system. In the nineties, Bolkestein, a VVD-politician
questioned the immigration and integration problem for the first time in Dutch politics.1
In the early 2000s, Pim Fortuyn, a very charismatic, elite-challenging politician
popularized the immigration and integration issues. With his nonconformist, confrontational
style he proved to be hard to deal with for the political leaders of the governing parties. More
strikingly, however, was Fortuyn’s message: he declared the end of multicultural Holland and
he called Islam a ‘backward religion’.2 Surprisingly enough, Fortuyn attracted much support
in Dutch society: he appealed to a large group of voters that worried about the big influx of
Marc van Dijk, “De methode-Bolkestein en het eind van het integratiedebat,” Trouw, 28 september
2011.
2 Frank Poorthuis en Hans Wansink, “De Islam is een achterlijke cultuur,” De Volkskrant, 9 februari
2002.
1
2
immigrants.3 As quick as Fortuyn entered the political scene, so abrupt was the end of his
political career: on May 6, 2002, just a few days before the national elections, Pim Fortuyn
was killed by a animal rights activist.4
Several politicians, such as Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders fought over Fortuyn’s
heritage, with Geert Wilders’ PVV turning out to be the most successful. In 2006 the PVV
joined the Dutch parliament and in 2010 the party performed really well in the national
elections.5 After a long period of coalition formation, the PVV eventually provided the new
VVD-CDA with parliamentary support. The PVV stayed outside the government, so it did not
provide any cabinet ministers. On the other hand, the PVV managed to get many of their
election promises in the program of the new government. Strict proposals on immigration and
Islam were adopted by the new government of prime-minister Rutte. 6
These PVV-measures are in stark contrast with any notion of tolerance. How is it
possible that the PVV attracts so much support in Dutch society, if the Netherlands is still that
nice, tolerant country? Although this is a very relevant question, this paper will not be limited
to the role of the PVV in explaining levels of tolerance. It is an attempt to test a broader
hypothesis about political tolerance. First of all, an overview will be provided of what
political tolerance means, how it has been applied in earlier research and what the findings of
these studies were. Consequently, based on the works of Herbert Kitschelt of the 1990s it will
be argued that the libertarian-authoritarian dimension that he introduced could help explaining
variance in political tolerance. The specific characteristics of libertarian and authoritarian
parties give rise to the hypothesis that voters of right-authoritarian parties are less likely to be
tolerant than voters of left-libertarian parties.
Shervin Nekuee, “Egoïsme hielp opkomst Fortuyn,” Trouw, 3 mei 2003.
NRC redacteuren, “Fortuyn vermoord, dader ‘milieuactivist’,” NRC Handelsblad, 7 mei 2002.
5 Arne Hankel, “Feest bij PVV om ‘grandioze’ verkiezingswinst,” Elsevier, 9 juni 2010.
6 NRC redacteuren, “Karakteristieken van het kabinet-Rutte,” NRC Handelsblad, 14 oktober 2010.
3
4
3
The hypothesis will be put to the test by using the survey data that accompany this
research. Given the limits of the data that were collected, it will be hard to establish clear-cut
relations between the variables used in this research. Therefore, the results of the statistical
analyses will need to be interpreted with caution. Further research with larger and more
representative data sets is necessary in order to deal with the data problems that have
constrained this study.
Literature review
Although tolerance is a popularly used word, there is some conceptual confusion. When one
finds the word ‘tolerance’ in the Oxford Dictionary, it is defined as: “the ability or willingness
to tolerate the existence of opinions or behaviour that one dislikes or disagrees with” (Oxford
Dictionary 2012). On the other hand, the word ‘toleration’ is defined as: “the practice of
tolerating something, in particular differences of opinion or behavior” (Oxford Dictionary
2012). It is established that the word toleration preceded the word tolerance, however,
nowadays, almost anyone speaks about tolerance (Oxford Dictionary 2012). That is why in
this paper, I will speak of ‘tolerance’ as opposed to ‘toleration’. More specifically, this paper
will address the issue of ‘political tolerance’, which is already more specific than the broad
and vague term ‘tolerance’.
Political scientists have had difficulty in defining ‘political tolerance’: they have used
different definitions and different measurement techniques (Stouffer 1954; Sullivan et al.
1979). Sullivan et al. (1979) refer to Crick (1973) in their definition of political tolerance:
“Tolerance implies a willingness to "put up with" those things that one rejects (Crick 1973.
Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one
opposes” (see Crick, 1973, Ch. 3) (Sullivan et al. 1979, 784).
Sullivan et all. expanded on Samuel Stouffer’s foundational work “Communism,
Conformity and Civil Liberties: A Cross Section of the Nation Speaks its Mind.” In the
4
summer of 1954, Stouffer had carried out a national sample opinion survey of attitudes toward
communism and civil liberties (Stouffer 1954). He found that, contrary to public belief,
Americans were not as tolerant as assumed: many of them were unwilling to extend civil
rights to non-conformists in the US society, to communists, but also to socialists and atheists
(Stouffer 1954). Although Stouffer’s study was impressive for the time, it was not without
pitfalls: Stouffer’s sample was not completely representative for the American population, he
used pre-determined target groups and he drew many inferences that could be called
‘interpretative’ at best (Janowitz 1956, 350-53). Especially, the use of pre-determined target
groups (communists, atheists and socialists), which I will turn later to, turned out to a big
issue in Stouffer’s research (Sullivan et al. 1979).
The shortfalls of Stouffer’s study made his results not less important or less shocking:
substantial majorities in the American population were willing to curb the rights of
communists in many areas (Sullivan et all. 1979, 782). Communists should be restricted in
their freedom of speech, they should not be allowed to teach in high schools or colleges and
the government should be able to monitor them even if that would lead to privacy concerns
(Sullivan et all. 1979, 782). The respondents were more tolerant towards the other target
groups (socialists, suspected communists and atheists), but still, a considerable degree of
intolerance persisted across target groups (Sullivan et all. 1979, 782). The results conflicted
with the old assumption that there was a consensus in American society regarding procedural
norms that allow extremist groups access to political institutions (Sullivan et all. 1979, 782).
Sullivan et all. (1979) later criticized Stouffer for misinterpreting tolerance: Stouffer
had measured tolerance by asking respondents for their attitudes toward predominantly leftwing target groups (Stouffer 1954). Sullivan et all. improved Sullivan’s measure method, by
introducing a “content-controlled method”: this means that the researchers did not provide the
respondents with pre-determined target groups, but leave the choice of target groups to the
5
respondent (Sullivan et all. 1979). The modification by Sullivan et all. was of major
importance: now, researchers could be quite sure what they measured was actual tolerance,
and not an attitude towards a pre-determined supposedly unpopular group. Therefore, it was
decided to use Sullivan’s content-controlled method in the survey of this research.
Stouffer’s and Sullivan’s research show general attitudes of Americans toward groups
in society, but they do not establish linkages between partisanship and tolerance (Stouffer
1954, Sullivan et al. 1979). I hypothesize that party preference can help explain levels of
political tolerance, as people that vote for the same party share certain characteristics (Goren
2005, 881). For instance, in the US, “the closer one feels toward social groups typically seen
as Republican, such as business people or born again Christians, the more strongly one
identifies with the Republican Party and the warmer one regards fellow partisans” (Goren
2005, 882). The question is: do core political values- such as political tolerance- shape party
identification or the other way around? Goren has argued that party identification is more
stable and enduring in the minds of citizens than core political values (Goren 2005, 881) This
finding was consistent for the four core political values he looked at in the US: equal
opportunity, limited government, traditional family values and moral tolerance (Goren 2005,
883). Second, he found that party identification constrained beliefs about three of the four of
his core political values (traditional family values excepted) (Goren 2005, 881). Finally, core
political values did not turn out to constrain partisan identities (Goren 2005, 881). Although
Goren did not take political tolerance as one of his ‘core political values’, his results do
suggest “that partisanship shapes important long-term political predispositions as well”
(Goren 2005, 894). In effect, by applying this rationale, partisanship could shape an abstract
principle as political tolerance.
6
Dogmatism and tolerance
If partisanship could shape an abstract principle as political tolerance, what then could be one
of the determinants of partisanship? I hypothesize that personality traits and political
preferences are related: as personality traits differ, political preferences may vary along. For
the purposes of this research, it is helpful to make a distinction between dogmatic persons and
non-dogmatic persons. In 1960, Rokeach defined dogmatism as “a closed way of thinking
which can be associated with any ideology regardless of content, an authoritarian outlook of
life, an intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs and a sufferance of those with similar
beliefs” (Rokeach 1960, 4). Thus, it can be inferred that dogmatic people have difficulty with
allowing different viewpoints to their lives and they tend to see the world in black and white
terms. The Christian-right in the United States is an example of a group of people showing a
dogmatic tendency: according to Cochran (1989) religion leads people “to divide the world
into believers and non-believers, and often suggests the moral superiority of the former
(Cochran 1989, 56). In their research on political tolerance among evangelicals in the US,
Wilcox and Jelen (1990) signaled that Christian evangelicals were less tolerant of atheists,
homosexuals and communists than the general American population. One of the explanations
that is given for this intolerance by evangelicals is their “insistence on an infallible or inerrant
Bible” (Guth et al. 1988, 380). The dogmatism tendency to divide the world in ‘good’ and
‘evil’ is something that not only characterizes Christian evangelicals. In 2006, right-wing
PVV-leader Geert Wilders called Muslim immigration in the Netherlands ‘a tsunami of
Islamists’7 by which he implicitly divided the world in ‘the good’ (native Dutch people) and
‘the bad’ (Muslim immigrants).
Woodberry and Smith came up with similar findings about tolerance among
Conservative Protestants in the United States: they argued that, even if scale biases would be
7
Robbert de Witt, “Wilders wil ‘tsunami van islamisering’ stoppen,” Elsevier, 9 oktober 2006.
7
resolved, CPs would still be less tolerant than other Americans (Woodberry and Smith 1998,
41). Two findings stand out: first, most of the intolerance seemed to result from
fundamentalism rather than from religious orthodoxy (Green et al. 1994; Kirkpatrick 1993).
Second, tolerance was also influenced by how much a group felt marginalized and threatened
(Green et al. 1994; Sullivan et al. 1982, 251). The importance of these findings is that
fundamentalism and marginalization of groups are independent of religion: put differently,
secular groups can be fundamentalist and marginalized as well. The extreme policy platforms
that PVV-leader Wilders regularly campaigns on can be called fundamentalist: in September
2009, he proposed a tax on religious scarves and in February 2012, he introduced a hotline for
nuisance caused by East-European labor migrants.89 These proposals are clearly dogmatic:
they display a closed way of thinking- as if only East-European labor migrants could create
nuisance- and intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs (in this case probably Muslims
who prefer to wear a headscarf). Since PVV-voters in the Netherlands and Conservative
Protestants in the US seem to share a degree of dogmatism and fundamentalism, I hypothesize
that PVV-voters will express at least some sort of intolerance as well.
The trouble is that the PVV is only one party in Dutch politics, which could lead to a
too narrow hypothesis if one wants to assess the state of tolerance in the Netherlands on a
larger scale. Therefore it has to be found out if the PVV falls into a broader category of
political parties, so that a more general hypothesis can be formed. An answer to this question
can probably be found in Kitschelt’s influential works of the early 1990s. Kitschelt argued
that a new characterization of left-right orientations in Europe was needed, because of
“structural changes in mature democratic capitalism” (Kitschelt 1992, 13). Kitschelt signaled
that “sweeping social change had shifted the main axis of voter distribution from a simple
alternative between socialist (left) and capitalist (right) politics to a more complex
8
9
Redactie Politiek, “Wilders wil ‘kopvoddentaks’,” Trouw, 16 september 2009.
Jeroen Langelaar, “Ruim 46.000 klachten bij PVV-meldpunt Oost-Europeanen,” 18 februari 2012.
8
configuration opposing left-libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives” (Kitschelt, 1994:
30–1). Second, he argued that political parties associated with the political left increasingly
expressed stronger support for libertarian values than did political parties identifying with the
political right (Kitschelt, 1994: 30–2). “Conversely, respondents on the political right are
more likely to support authoritarian values” (Kitschelt, 1994: 30–2).
Some of the terms Kitschelt uses need further clarification. With left-libertarian
values, Kitschelt means the values that were primarily popularized by Inglehart, such as
autonomy and self-expression, personal liberty and quality of life (Inglehart 1977). ‘Rightauthoritarian alternatives’ is an indication for economic security, law and order and a more
hierarchical society (Kitschelt 1994). On this dimension, the PVV would score as a rightauthoritarian party as it promotes a dominant Dutch culture, it opposes immigration and it
supports law-and-order oriented measures, such as an increase in the number of police
officers with 10,000 (Party platform PVV 2010). Moreover, the dogmatism that is apparent in
many of the PVV proposals seems to be partly reflected in the values that Kitschelt’s rightauthoritarians held high. An emphasis on law and order and a hierarchical society seem to fit
in Rokeach’s definition of dogmatism in which the emphasis on law and order resembles “an
intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs” and the emphasis on a hierarchical society
stems from “an authoritarian outlook of life” (Rockeach 1960, 4). It is this dogmatic tendency
of right-wing authoritarian parties that creates the expectancy that voters for these parties will
express lower levels of tolerance. Therefore my hypothesis is: voters of right-authoritarian
parties are less likely to be tolerant than voters of left-libertarian parties. In this hypothesis,
political preferences (as a proxy of dogmatism) are thus expected to help explain political
tolerance.
9
Methods
For my research about political tolerance in the Netherlands, a survey has been conducted.
The survey consisted of questions about political tolerance, party preference and some
demographic control variables, such as age, gender and social class. The results of the survey
should show if there is a relationship of any kind between party preference and political
tolerance. Moreover, the results will put my hypothesis to the test: do the survey data confirm
my hypothesis hat right-authoritarian voters are less tolerant than left-libertarian voters?
With my study, I attempt to replicate Sullivan et all.’s (1979) research. Studies like
Sullivan’s and Stouffer’s (who laid the foundation in the field) have, as far as I know, never
been conducted in the Netherlands. The Netherlands form the ideal case for political tolerance
research: the Dutch have long been known for being tolerant, so in that way, the country
could be a ‘critical case’ (Erk 2011, 110). If people in the Netherlands fail to be tolerant,
where else could tolerance then be expected? The literature review established the main
hypothesis of this research: “People who vote for right-authoritarian parties are less likely to
be tolerant than voters of left-libertarian parties.”
The survey that formed the basis of my statistical analyses was created and published
on the website of uleidenss.eu.qualtrics.com. This website is specifically designed for students
and professors at Leiden University to assist them in their survey research. The survey was
launched on April 27 and it was closed on May 15. In this period of time, 196 persons
completed the survey. The group that completed the survey primarily consists of students,
friends, family and other relatives. I have put the survey link on my Facebook wall and
several friends of mine have shared the link on theirs. Besides, I have e-mailed all my contact
persons on Hotmail. Finally, I have asked people at the Faculty of Social Sciences and first
year Political Science students at the Kamerling Onnes building to fill in my survey. In total, I
have gathered 145 online respondents and 48 respondents in the different departments in
10
Leiden. It must be emphasized that my sample is not representative of the Dutch population:
the respondents are predominantly younger, because most of them were students. My
respondents are higher educated than average Dutch people, because, again, most of them
were students. Finally, since there were so many Political Science students in my dataset, it
can be held that my respondents were more politically interested than the average Dutchman.
As said before, the motivation to conduct a survey stems from earlier research in the
field: both Stouffer (1954) and Sullivan et all. (1979) conducted a survey in their political
tolerance studies in the United States. Stouffer conducted his study in the heydays of the Cold
War. He was interested in tolerance in US society, because it was assumed that there was
common agreement on giving political rights to all groups in society. To put this assumption
to the test, Stouffer gathered survey data asking people for their attitudes towards
communists, socialists and atheists. Stouffer assumed these groups were the most
nonconformist and least-liked groups in US society. The results of his study were rather
bleak: it turned out that tolerance was not widely celebrated in the US. Especially communists
were the targets of the respondents: a majority was not willing to provide them with basic
rights as the right to speak and participate in politics (Stouffer 1954). Sullivan et all. (1979)
built on Stouffer’s work a quarter of a century later. Many things had changed in US society
in the meantime: protest groups as the civil rights movement and the women’s right
movement had emerged. At the same time, the Ku Klux Klan had reappeared on the scene:
with political murders, they tried to defy the landmark Brown v. Board 1954 Supreme Court
decision (Ball 2004). In the sixties and seventies there was speak of a diversification of
possible target groups of intolerance: progressive people were abhorred by the extreme
violence of the Ku Klux Klan, while conservative people were still suspicious of communists.
Sullivan et all. (1979) recognized that these things had changed and they introduced the so
called “content-controlled method”: people were asked to pick their most objectionable group
11
as opposed to the researcher. This new method highly increased the validity of the tolerance
measure.
In this study, the content-controlled method that was introduced by Sullivan et all’s
(1979) has been used. The high validity of this measurement method can be illustrated with
the following example: a GroenLinks voter may pick a right-wing extremist as his target
group, while a PVV-voter might pick a Muslim as his group. In both cases, tolerance, as
opposed to agreeableness, will be measured. The survey starts by asking respondents to
choose or fill in their most objectionable group in Dutch society. Consequently, the
respondents have answered questions that measure their tolerance towards these targets (see
figure 1).
Figure 1: questions about political tolerance
Translated from Dutch to English
1. Which group in Dutch society do you consider most objectionable? (one can
think of any group, including but not limited to: political, religious, ethnical,
ideological groups)
 Right-wing extremists
 Animal rights activists
 Communists
 Immigrants
 Other (specify)
2. Should a (member of most objectionable group) be allowed the right to speak?
Yes/no
3. Should a (member of most objectionable group)be allowed to teach at schools?
Yes/no
12
4. Should a book of a (member of most objectionable group)be removed from the
libraries?
Yes/no
5. Should the (members of most objectionable group)be impeded from
participating in Dutch politics? (on all levels: local, provincial and national)
Yes/no
6. (Members of most objectionable group) should be allowed to participate in
public rallies in your municipality
Yes/no
7. The (members of most objectionable group) should be monitored by the
government (one can think of wiretapping or internet surveillance)
Yes/no
On May 15, the survey was closed and the outcomes were ready for statistical
analysis. So, first of all, a tolerance variable out of all the questions that tapped on tolerance
has been created. All tolerance questions could be answered with ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Sometimes the
‘yes’ stood for the ‘tolerant answer’, at other times ‘no’ resembled tolerance. To account for
these inconsistencies, 3 questions were recoded (about the possibility of political
participation, the removal of books from libraries and governmental monitoring of suspect
groups), so that the ‘no’ answer would be coded as one (as tolerant) and the ‘yes’ answer as
two (less tolerant). After the recoding, all the values of ‘1’ were a sign of tolerance and all the
values of ‘2’ marked intolerance. Finally, the 6 tolerant questions were combined, so that they
would form a(n) (in)tolerance scale. This new variable could have values ranging from ‘6’
(very tolerant) to ‘12’ (very intolerant). Besides, a libertarian-authoritarian party dimension
was created. As I was unable to track down an existing libertarian-authoritarian Dutch party
13
categorization, I created one myself. This obviously makes the scale arbitrary and any results
springing from this scale must therefore be interpreted with caution.
Figure 2: Libertarian-authoritarian scale Dutch political parties
1= most left-libertarian, 12= most righ-authoritarian
1= GroenLinks
2= Partij voor de Dieren
3= D66
4= PvdA
5= SP
6= VVD
7= CDA
8= ChristenUnie
9= SGP
10= Trots op Nederland
11= Onafhankelijke Burgerpartij (Hero Brinkman)
12= PVV
Finally, an ‘age category variable’ has been created out of the ‘age’ variable. I have made a 0
through 17 category for children, a 18 through 24 category for adolescents, a 25 through 44
for people in their early career, a 45 through 64 for people in their late career and 65+ for
retirees. Figure 3 shows the distribution of age over the categories.
14
Figure 3: Age categories
Age category
Frequency
Percent
________________________________________________
0-17
3
1,5
18-24
152
67,5
25-44
22
11,2
45-64
13
6,6
65+
2
1,0
Missing
4
2,0
196
100,0
Total
Results
Before any statistical tests will be conducted, it is helpful to take a quick look at the
distribution of respondents over the different political parties.
Figure 4: Which party would you vote for, if there were parliamentary elections
tomorrow?
Frequency
Valid
Percent
CDA
7
3,6
PvdA
20
10,4
VVD
36
18,8
GroenLinks
26
13,5
SP
11
5,7
D66
58
30,2
ChristenUnie
3
1,6
SGP
1
,5
Partij voor de Vrijheid (Geert
8
4,2
4
2,1
Wilders)
Partij voor de Dieren
15
Onafhankelijke Burger Partij
1
,5
1
,5
Weet niet (don’t know)
13
6,8
Geen stem (not vote)
3
1,6
192
100,0
(Hero Brinkman)
Andere partij (other party)
Total
As one can see, the results of my research are restrained by a relatively small and
unrepresentative dataset. Compared to the 2010 national election outcomes, there are far too
few CDA, PvdA, SP and PVV voters, while D66 and Groenlinks voters are heavily
overrepresented (Kiesraad 2010). With that being said, the actual statistical analyses can be
conducted.
To test the main hypothesis- right-authoritarian voters are less likely to be tolerant
than left-libertarian voters-, a linear regression has been conducted. In this regression analysis
the dependent variable was the tolerance score ranging from 6 (tolerant) to 12 (intolerant) and
the different independent variables were the libertarian-authoritarian scale, gender, age
categories and social class.
Figure 5: Model Summary
Adjusted R
Model
R
,190a
1
a.
R Square
,036
Square
,013
Predictors: (Constant), Social class, Age
categories, Liberarian-authoritarian scale. A
Figure 4 shows the model summary of the regression analysis. The R-square is only
.036 which means that the four independent variables- the libertarian-authoritarian scale,
gender, age categories and social class can only explain 3.6% of the variance in the dependent
16
variable ‘tolerance score’. Moreover, the ANOVA table (not displayed) indicates that the
amount of variance that can be explained with the regression model has an α=.192, which is
clearly not significant at a p<.05 level. Therefore, it can be said that the regression model is
not significantly better at predicting changes in political tolerance than having no model
(Field 2005, 213).
Figure 6: Coefficients of the political tolerance regression model
B
(Constant)
Sig.
7,038
,816
Libertarian-authoritarian
,055
,048
,090
,251
Age categories
,271
,203
,103
,185
-,236
,247
-,074
,341
,191
,163
,091
,240
Gender
Social class
a.
β
SE B
,000
Dependent Variable: Tolerance_score
The β-values of figure 5 indicate the change in standard deviations of political
tolerance when one of the predictors increases with one standard deviation. So, an increase in
standard deviations of one on the libertarian-authoritarian scale leads to a 0.09 increase in
standard deviations on the political tolerance variable. This means that when one supports a
more authoritarian party (moving up on the libertarian-authoritarian scale), one becomes more
intolerant (the 0.09 increase reflects increasing intolerance, as the tolerance variable was rated
from 6=tolerant to 12=intolerant). This coefficient is, however, insignificant (α=.251). The
other coefficients can be interpreted in a similar way: the coefficient of age is positive, which
means that when one increases in age category, political intolerance increases as well. The
coefficient of gender is negative, which means that when one moves up on the gender variable
(so from 1=male to 2= female), political intolerance decreases. Finally, when one moves to a
17
lower class (1= highest class and 5= lowest class), political intolerance increases with 0.163
standard deviations. However, since all beta coefficients are not significant at a p<0.05 level,
these changes in predictors do not significantly predict changes in levels of tolerance.
The simple linear regression model has shown that the libertarian-authoritarian scale,
the age category variable, gender and social class are not significant predictors of the
tolerance scale variable. However, it is possible that these predictors have a significant effect
on the separate tolerant variables, such as public speech and the removal of books from
libraries. With binary logistic regression models the effect of the predictors can be tested for
each tolerance question. Again, the variables ‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’, age categories,
gender and social class will be used as predictors.
Since showing all binary logistic regressions would result in overly lengthy analyses,
at this point it needs to be chosen which binary logistic regressions will be analyzed. I choose
for two tolerance questions on which an overwhelming majority picked one answer (the
‘public speech’ and the ‘removal of books from library’ variables) and for two tolerance
questions on which the respondents were most divided (the ‘public teaching’ and the
‘government monitoring’ variable). For the public speech question, 148 people indicate that a
member of their most objectionable group should be allowed to speak in public, whereas 27
people answer that a member should not be allowed to do this. When respondents are asked if
books written by members of their most objectionable group should be removed from
libraries, 28 people agree (14,7%) and 163 people disagree (85,3%). On the ‘public teach’
issue (“should members of your most objectionable group be allowed to teach?”), 105
respondents say ‘yes’ (54.6%) and 87 people say ‘no’ (45.3%). On the ‘government
monitoring’ issue (“should members of your most objectionable group be monitored by the
government?”) 101 people answer ‘yes’ (52.6%) and 91 people answer ‘no’ (47.7%).
18
When one conducts a binary logistic regression with the binary dependent variable
‘public speech’, the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients provide the likelihood that the
adding of the different variables- the ‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’, age categories, gender
and social class- to the model has not significantly increased the ability to predict the decision
made by the subjects (their ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to public speech). The table gives a Chi-Square value
of 12.339 with p=0.015. Since the likelihood that there has not been an increase in predictive
ability is smaller than α=0.05, it can be hold that the predictors have significantly increased
the ability to predict the decision made by the respondents.
Of the individual predictors, only the ‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’ (p=0.009) was
statistically significant on a α=0.05 level, with ‘sex’ being almost significant (p=0.058). The
odds ratio of the ‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’ is 1.224 which means that a one point
increase on the ‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’ is associated with the odds of saying ‘no’ to
the allowance of public speech increasing by a multiplicative factor of 1.224. Put differently,
as one’s support for authoritarian parties rises, the odds that the person in question will deny
objectionable groups their right to speak in public, increase as well.
The next binary dependent variable is the ‘removal of books from libraries’ question.
This time the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients give a Chi-Square value of 5.421 with a
p=.247. This means that the likelihood that the predictors have not increased the ability of the
model to predict the respondents’ answers is .247, which is much higher than the standard
significance level of α=0.05. So, it can be said that the predictors have failed to increase the
predictive ability of the model. This is reflected in the odds table, in which all individual
predictors fail to gain statistical significance. Only the ‘age categories’ variable comes close
with p=0.099.
A binary logistic regression on the ‘public teach’ variable with the same predictors as
mentioned earlier, results into Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients giving a Chi-Square
19
value of 2.773, df=4 and p=0.597. This means that the likelihood that the predictors have not
increased the predictive ability of the model is .597. Since this value is much higher than the
α=0.05 level, the predictors have, in this case, failed to increase the ability to predict the
decision made by the respondents on the ‘public teach’ variable. This is, again, also reflected
in the fact that none of the individual predictors’-‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’, age
categories, gender and social class- meets the conventional .05 standard for statistical
significance.
Finally, a binary logistic regression with ‘government monitoring’ as dependent
variable is conducted. This time the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients give a Chi-Square
value of 5.859, df=4 and p=0.210. This means that the likelihood that the predictors have not
increased the predictive ability of the model is .210. Since this value is again much higher
than the α=0.05 level, the predictors have failed to increase the ability to predict the decision
made by the respondents on the ‘government monitoring’ variable. Surprisingly enough, one
of the individual predictors does turn out to be statistically significant. The variable ‘age
category’ has an odds ratio of 0.571 and a p=0.048, which falls below the α=0.05 level.
Therefore, it can be said that for an increase of one on the ‘age category’ variable, the odds of
saying ‘no’ to the government monitoring question are almost cut by a half (.571) So, the
odds to disagree with government monitoring decrease, when one moves up on the age
category variable.
Discussion
With the regression analyses being conducted, one can proceed with the implications of the
test results. What do the test results tell about a relationship between political tolerance and
the ‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’ and what is the role of the control variables?
20
First of all, the independent variables- -‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’, age categories,
gender and social class- fail to help explain the political tolerance scale in the simple linear
regression model. The R-square of .036 is very low: only 3.6% in the variance of the political
tolerance scale could be explained by the different independent variables. However, these
results could change if a more rigorous ‘libertarian-authoritarian dimension’ of Dutch political
parties would be created. The creation of such a scale is clearly a topic for further research.
The coefficients in the linear regression model are in the expected directions, but all
fail statistical significance. The β-scores of the libertarian-authoritarian scale, age category
and social class are all positive, indicating that an increase in support of authoritarian parties,
ageing and a decrease in social class (social class was coded from 1=high to 5=low)
correspond with higher levels of intolerance. Gender is the only variable with a negative β,
indicating that a hypothetical change from male to female would correspond with lower levels
of intolerance. For establishing true relations, it would be interesting to see if the coefficients
could obtain significance, while maintaining their direction with larger and more
representative datasets.
The four binary logistic regressions have provided some statistically significant
results: first of all, for the ‘public speech’ variable, the predictors did increase the predictive
ability of the model. The libertarian-authoritarian scale was in this case the only individual
predictor that increased the predictive ability of the tolerance question at stake. This finding is
important, as it is the only one that directly confirms the main hypothesis of this research. The
odds ratio of the ‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’ was a positive 1.224, which means that a one
point increase on the ‘libertarian-authoritarian scale’ is associated with the odds of saying ‘no’
to the allowance of public speech increasing by a multiplicative factor of 1.224. To say it
more bluntly: when one’s support for authoritarian parties increases, one is more tempted to
deny allowance of public speech to objectionable groups. In this specific case of public
21
speech, the hypothesis that right-authoritarian voters are less likely to be tolerant than leftlibertarian voters, can thus be confirmed.
The other three binary logistic regressions- with ‘removal of books from library’,
‘public teach’ and ‘government monitoring’ as binary dependent variables- gave rise to more
mixed results: the combined predictors in these regressions failed to increase the predictive
ability of the models. So, the predictors did not succeed in showing which answer category
was most likely to be picked by the respondents. However, in the case of ‘government
monitoring’ the individual predictor ‘age-categories’ did gain statistical significance and with
an odds-ratio .571, meaning that when people move up one category on the age-ladder, the
odds that they support government monitoring of objectionable groups almost doubles.
The four binary regressions also show that the strength and significance of the
predictors are not related to the extent of division or agreement on a tolerance issue. One issue
on which people predominantly agreed provided statistical results (public speech) and one
issue on which people were divided showed a significant individual predictor (government
monitoring). This works the other way around as well, as the ‘removal of books from library’
(issue with high agreement) and the ‘public teach’ (issue with high division) binary
regressions both failed to achieve statistical significance.
To conclude, it can be hold that based on this dataset and these statistical analyses
there is only marginal support for the main hypothesis of this research. Only on the public
speech issue could the libertarian-authoritarian dimension significantly predict the outcome of
the tolerance question. This does not mean that the hypothesis can easily be discarded: the
right to speak in public is an important democratic right, and if the libertarian-authoritarian
dimension can help showing how people regard this issue of tolerance, then that is hopeful for
the main hypothesis (USinfo.org 2012). Also, as said before, a scientifically-based libertarianauthoritarian dimension of Dutch political parties needs to be established to make truly
22
meaningful statements about its relationship with political tolerance. Besides, a much larger
and more representative data set will be required to make causal inferences. Given the clear
limits in size and representativeness of this data set, the establishment of any causal inferences
here was quite cumbersome.
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Appendix A
Questionnaire survey
Translated from Dutch to English
1. Which group in Dutch society do you find most objectionable? (one can think
of any group, including but not limited to: political, religious, ethnical,
ideological groups)





Right-wing extremists
Animal rights activists
Communists
Immigrants
Other (specify)
2. Should a (member of most objectionable group) be allowed the right to speak?
Yes/no
3. Should a (member of most objectionable group)be allowed to teach at schools?
Yes/no
4. Should a book of a (member of most objectionable group)be removed from the
libraries?
Yes/no
5. Should the (members of most objectionable group)be impeded from
participating in Dutch politics? (on all levels: local, provincial and national)
Yes/no
25
6. (Members of most objectionable group) should be allowed to participate in
public rallies in your municipality
Yes/no
7. The (members of most objectionable group) should be monitored by the
government (one can think of wiretapping or internet surveillance)
Yes/no
8. If there were parliamentary elections tomorrow, which party would you vote
for?
















CDA
PvdA
VVD
GroenLinks
SP
D66
ChristenUnie
SGP
Partij voor de Vrijheid (Geert Wilders)
Partij voor de Dieren
Trots op Nederland (Rita Verdonk)
Onafhankelijke Burger Partij (Hero Brinkman)
Blanco (blank vote)
Andere partij(other party)
Weet niet (don’t know)
Geen stem (no vote)
9. What is your age? (Age in years)
10. Gender (male/female)
11. People sometimes speak of the existence of social classes. If you have to
choose, with which social class would you affiliate?





The upper class
The upper middle class
The middle class
The higher working class
The working class
26