Epistemology
Tihamér Margitay – Péter Hartl
6. Reliabilism
Knowledge, truth, and belief
What is knowledge?
S knows that p (where p is a proposition), only if S believes that p
and p is true.
But having a true belief is not a sufficient condition of knowledge.
S may believe p, and p happens to be true, but S doesn't have
adequate (or any) reasons for believing p.
Example: S is a pathological optimistic person. Every week he
believes that he will win the lottery. And all of a sudden, on one
of the weeks, his numbers win. He has a true belief, but S didn't
know that his ticket will win.
Analysis of knowledge
„What is justification?” is an important question.
According to the traditional conception,
knowledge requires justification.
„What is knowledge?”
Traditional analysis:
Knowledge = justified true belief
S knows that p, if and only if...
1. Belief: S believes p.
2. True: p is true.
If it is incorrect then - no matter what else is good or useful
about it - it is not knowledge.
It can feel to the believer as if it is true, but it doesn't matter. If
the belief is mistaken, it would be knowledge, no matter
how much it might feel to the believer like knowledge.
3. Justification: p is justified.
p needs to be well supported, being based on evidence or
some other kind of rational justification. The belief, even if it
is true, may as well be a lucky guess.
Gettier-cases
Edmund Gettier challenged this
traditional account of
knowledge.
He used counterexamples.
He described possible situations
in which all of these conditions
obtain, but we wouldn't count it
as knowledge.
Therefore, knowledge is not
justified true belief.
Gettier's original example
Smith and Jones have applied for the same job.
Smith has been told by the company president that Jones will
win the job. Smith has observed that Jones has 10 coins in
his pocket.
He infers that whoever will get the job has ten coins in their
pocket.
But Smith who will get the job, and Smith himself has ten
coins in his pocket. Nevertheless, neither of those facts
was known by Smith.
Smith has a justified and true belief: „Who will get the job
has ten coins in his pocket.” But Smith doesn't have
knowledge.
Other examples
Chisholm's example: The sheep in the field.
You are standing outside a field. You see, within it, what
looks exactly like a sheep. You believe that there is a
sheep in the field. And in fact you are right, because
there is a sheep behind the hill in the middle of the
field. You cannot see that sheep, though, and you have
no direct evidence of its existence.
Moreover, what you are seeing is actually a dog,
disguised as a sheep. Hence, you have a well justified
and true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is
that belief knowledge?
Other examples
A modified version of Gettier's second example
Smith believes that one of his colleagues has a Ford. He
has good reasons for believing this: Jones always had a
Ford, and Smith has seen him recently in a Ford.
But Jones's Ford was stolen yesterday, and he drives a
rented car.
Nonetheless, one of Smith's other colleagues, Brown has a
Ford. But Smith doesn't know these facts.
He has a justified and true belief („One of my collegues has
a Ford”), but he doesn't have knowledge.
The structure of Gettier cases
Each Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well
justified without being knowledge.
Two important features of Gettier cases:
1. Fallibility: The justification is fallible (there can be
mistakes). It gives strong reasons to believe p, but
leaves open the possibility of the belief’s being false.
Justification indicates strongly that the belief is true,
without proving conclusively that it is.
2. Luck: The well (but fallibly) justified belief is true by
luck. There are odd circumstances in the case, which
make the existence of that justified and true belief
unexpected.
Possible solutions
1. Infallibility:
There is no fallible justification. In Gettier cases the subject doesn't
have a justified belief, because it is (and can be) mistaken.
Justified belief = If p belief is justified, then it is not possible
to be false.
Contradiction: justification can lead to false beliefs
We don't allow that one’s having fallible justification for a belief that
p could ever adequately satisfy JTB’s justification condition.
In Gettier cases the subjects don't have knowledge, since they
don't have a real (infallible) justification.
Problem with infallibility
It is a drastic and mistaken solution.
In „ordinary” situations we think that we have knowledge, yet
we rarely (if ever) possess infallible justification of a belief.
If we accept that infallible condition, then we can have
knowledge only if we cannot be mistaken.
But there are very few things (if any), which are infallible.
The infallibilist conception of justification leads to sceptical
conclusions: we don't know anything at all.
Possible solutions
2. Eliminating false evidence
The subject lacks knowledge, because he is relying upon false
evidence. He has luckily derived a true belief, p from a false
belief and this is because he doesn't have knowledge.
Smith includes in his evidence ('the president told me that..') the
false belief that Jones will get the job. If Smith had lacked that
evidence, he would not have inferred belief p.
If so, he wouldn't have had a justified and true belief, which failed
to be knowledge.
JTB must be modified: no belief is knowledge if the person’s
justificatory support for it includes something false.
Problems with eliminating false
evidence
A Gettier case can be formulated, when there is no false
belief at all.
Suppose: Smith has a belief: „The president of the
company told me that Jones would get the job.”
Suppose: Smith doesn't infer to: „Jones will get the job.”
His belief (together with „Jones has ten coins in his
pocket”) also supports this true belief that: „whoever
will get the job has ten coins in their pocket”.
Therefore this solution is not useful.
Problems with eliminating false
evidence
Probably, there is always some false evidence
being relied upon, at least implicitly.
If there is some falsity among the beliefs you use,
but if you do not wholly remove it or if you do not
isolate it from the other beliefs you are using,
then you don't have knowledge.
Therefore, we have again the threat of scepticism.
Possible solutions
G. examples demonstrated that, a subject can obtain true
beliefs with very solid grounds and yet the agent could still
easily have been wrong.
It is only by luck or coincidence that the agent’s source of
justification leads to true belief.
Epistemic luck: The justification leads to true belief by
coincidence.
To have a proper theory about knowledge, we have to
eliminate the epistemic luck.
Appropriate causality
3. Eliminating inappropriate causality
What is the connection between the justification, believing in the
proposition, the truth of proposition, and knowledge?
Goldman's response: Knowledge = true belief which is caused
in an appropriate way.
In Gettier cases, S doesn't have knowledge, because his true
belief is caused in an „abnormal way”.
Knowledge is constituted by two factors.
The true belief AND the way as it was formed by a causal
process constitute knowledge.
Causal theory of knowledge
Alvin Goldman's causal theory of
knowledge:
S knows p, if and only if: the
same fact which makes p true
causes S's belief p.
The fact what makes p true must
be included in the causal
process which produces the
belief p.
There is an appropriate causal
relation between the belief p and
fact which makes p true.
Gettier examples and causal theory
In Gettier cases, the subject doesn't have knowledge, because
the causal connection between the facts which make the belief true, and
his belief is missing.
Gettier I.: Smith believes that „the person who will get the job has 10
coins in his pocket”, not because the facts which make his belief
true: „Smith (will) get the job.” ; „Smith has 10 coins in his pocket.”
Why Smith does believe this? Because he believes that Jones will get
the job (because the president told that), and Jones has 10 coins in
his pocket.
He has evidences for these beliefs, but these facts are not relevant to the
truth of the original belief (the person who will get the job, has 10 coins
in his pocket.)
Gettier cases and the causal theory
Modified version of Gettier's second case:
„One of my collegues has a Ford.”
This proposition is true, because Brown has a Ford (but
Smith doesn't know this).
But this fact plays no role in his belief forming process.
Smith believes this, because he believes that Jones has
Ford.
There is no causal connection between the fact which
makes his belief true, and his belief.
Perception
By perception we can aquire knowledge by causal
processes.
If the perceived object (Stoczek building) causes my
belief that „It is the Stoczek building in front of me.”,
and my belief is true, then I know that it is the Stoczek
building.
In memory, there is a causal realition between my
present mental state (I can remember that..) and a past
experience.
I belive that 'I have seen the Stoczek building this
morning', beause I have actually seen the Stoczek
building.
Appropriate causal connection?
Problem: What is an appropriate causal connection?
Suppose: Smith believes that one of his colleagues owns a
Ford, because Mr. Black has told him that Jones has
bought a new Ford.
And Mr. Black usually doesn't lie. But in this case Mr. Black
remembers wrong, he has seen Brown buying a new Ford.
In this case: Smith's belief „One of my colleagues has a
Ford” has a certain kind of causal relation with the fact
which makes it true (Brown has Ford), but in this case
Smith doesn't have knowledge.
Reliabilist theory
Reliabilism: An improved version of causal theory.
Appropriate causal connection - > reliable cognitive
process
Causal theory: local theory of knowledge. It gives an answer
to the question: whether the specific cause of a true belief
is sufficient for knowledge.
Reliabilism: general theory of knowledge. Question: whether
the general belief-forming process by which S formed the
belief that p would produce a high ratio of true beliefs.
Whether a process is reliable in general or not?
Reliabilist theory
Justificational status of a belief must somehow
depend on the way the belief is caused.
Wishful thinking or guessing are not proper ways of
justification.
Suppose Smith justifiably believes p. And p logically
entails q. Does it follow that, if Smith believes q, then
he has a justified belief? Not necessarly.
If Smith doesn't notice that p entails q and believes it only
because he wishes it were true. Then her belief in q
isn't justified.
Having good reasons vs.
justification
There is a significant difference between merely having
good reasons for one’s belief that Brazil will win the
Football World Cup in 2014 and basing one’s belief
on those good reasons.
S may have excellent reasons for believing Brazil will
win: they have a fantastic forwards, they will play at
home, etc.
Nonetheless S may believe that Brazil will win based on
wishful thinking. (She would like it very much if it would
be so.) In this case her belief is not justified.
Reliable and unreliable processes
Wishful thinking, confused reasoning, guessing
and hasty generalisation.
Their common feature is unreliability: they tend
to produce false beliefs in a large proportion of
the cases.
Remembering, good inductive reasoning. What do
these processes have in common?
They all reliable: most of the beliefs that each
process produces are true.
Definition of justification
Goldman: the definition of an (ultimate) epistemic
term should rely upon only non-epistemic terms,
otherwise the definiton would be empty of
circular.
Epistemic terms: justified, knowledge, having
good reasons, having evidences,
demonstrated.
Non-epistemic terms: belief, truth, cause...
Reliabilism
A belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a
reliable cognitive process.
A cognitive process is reliable if and only if it causes
true beliefs frequently.
The degree of reliability consists in the proportion of
beliefs produced by the process that are true.
Cognitve process: there are input(s) and outputs. The
inputs may be beliefs or perceptual states
(experiences), or introspective states, etc. Outputs are
beliefs.
A reliable process makes (probably) true beliefs (as
outputs) from justified beliefs as inputs.
„History” of justification
A reliable inference process provides justification to an output
belief, if its input beliefs were themselves justified.
How could the justifiedness of the inputs have arisen? By having
been caused by earlier reliable processes.
This chain must end in reliable processes having only non-doxastic
inputs, such as perceptual inputs.
Thus, justifiedness is a matter of a history of personal cognitive
processes.
This historical nature of justifiedness implied by reliabilism, and
contrasts sharply with (internalist) foundationalism and
coherentism.
Relibilist theory of knowledge
What is knowledge? - > What is justified belief?
This theory in a sense requires 'justification', but this
justification differs from the former theories
(foundatonalism, and coherentism). (other versions deny
that knowledge requires justification.)
At least since Desacrtes, philosophers have traditionally
thought of justification internalistically, such that S’s belief
is justified only if S is in a position to produce reasons
or evidence to support her belief.
Opposed to these theories Goldman has an externalist
theory.
Internalist and externalist theories of
justification
The rise of internalist-externalist debate is due to
Gettier's article.
What are the relevant factors of justification?
Internalism: (1) Knowledge requires justification and (2)
the nature of this justification is completely determined
by a subject’s internal states or reasons.
Externalism: denies at least one of these commitments:
(1) either knowledge does not require justification or (2)
the nature of justification is not completely determined
by internal factors alone.
Internalism
Internalism: justification of a proposition is completely
determined by one’s internal states.
Internal states: one’s bodily states, one’s brain states, one’s
mental states (if these are different than brain states), or
one’s reflectively accessible states.
Foundationalism and coherentism are internalist theories. The
justification is in my „head”.
The justifiability of p depends only on my internal states
(my beliefs and non-propositional states, such as
experiences).
A p belief is justified, if the subject has good (sufficient)
evidences of p.
Internalism
Internal states as either reflectively accessible states or
mental states.
Therefore, according to internalism I need to have an
access to the factors which make my belief justified.
Crucial point: A person either does or can have a form of
access to the basis for knowledge or justified
belief. The subject is (is able to) aware of the ground,
basis of her knowledge or justified belief.
(And we can ask for justification: how do you know that...
)
Externalism
Externalism: Justification depends on additional
factors that are external to a person.
The facts that determine a belief’s justification
include external facts such as whether the belief
is caused by the state of affairs that makes the
belief true, whether the belief is counterfactually
dependent on the states of affairs that makes it
true, whether the belief is produced by a reliable
belief producing process.
(There are various versions of externalism.)
Justification without awareness
Causal origins of one’s beliefs are not, in general, reflectively
accessible. (causal theory of justificaton)
Externalists deny that one always can have (reflective) access to
the basis for one's knowledge and justified belief. I don't need
to know the basis of my knowledge or justified belief.
If my belief is produced by (for example) reliable process, then my
belief is justified, even if I'm not aware the facts which make
my belief justified.
(Example: Testimonial knowledge. I can't remember the
„evidences” on which my belief that 'Napoleon lost at Waterloo'.
But I don't need to remember, if my belief was proced by reliable
processes.)
Justifiably justified justified...
Externalism implies that there is no guarantee that someone
who justifiably believes P is also justified in believing that
she justifiably believes P.
We don't need a further (meta) justification of the
justifiability of my belief (or the reliablity of a cognitive
process.)
Therefore the problem of regress is not harmful for the
externalist.
Weaker condition: There must be no reliable process
available to the subject that, were it used by the subject in
addition to the process actually used, would result in her
not believing P.