Outcome of the Yom Kippur War
US and USSR stand off
• Israel’s refusal to back down till it achieved
its aims infuriated her American allies and
led to the USSR threatening to unleash
nuclear warfare if the USA did not bring
Israel to heel. The USA responded by going
on full nuclear alert.
USSR backs down…
• The USSR at this point backed down saying
“we shall not unleash the Third World War”.
• UN Resolution 338 was finally implemented
on October 28th, calling for the
implementation of Resolution 242 “in all its
parts”.
• Kissinger was quite clear that Israel would
have to make substantial concessions to
restore stability in the region.
Major Outcomes
• ▪ It severely tested the detente between the
United States and the Soviet Union – The
result was the most dangerous moment of
the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis
in 1962
• ▪ Triggered the first energy shock
• ▪ Set off a chain of events culminating in the
1978 Camp David Accords, the landmark
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel
US response
• Highest priority was to preserve good relations with the
USSR and prevent the crisis escalating.
• They aimed to prevent an outright victory for either side in
order to pave the way for fruitful peace negotiations
• These negotiations themselves would draw attention away
from the Watergate Scandal
• However, Arab successes and Soviet support for Egypt
persuaded Nixon that the advantage had swung too far
their way so he agreed to supply arms to the Israelis, and
intelligence planes (the SR-71 Blackbird) which had an
immediate impact on the course of the war.
Consequences of the Yom Kippur War
USA
USSR
Egypt
Israel
Oil prices quadrupled. Ended the “long boom” of
economic growth that had existed since the 1950s. USA
made it clear during this crisis that its commitment to
Israel was unshakeable.
Lost support of Egypt, who looked towards USA in future
as the power most likely to broker a favourable
settlement in the region.
Sadat entered into diplomatic negotiations with Israel –
the “Sadat Initiative” - which led to him visiting the Israeli
Knesset in 1977 then signing the Camp David Accords of
1979. Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt, and in return
Egypt gave diplomatic recognition of Israel. Sadat was
assassinated in 1981 by Arab nationalists.
The war became known as “the earthquake”. Although
officially cleared of any negligence in the lead-up to the
war, both Dayan and Meir resigned within a year.
•
•
Benny Morris, PhD, Professor of
History at Ben-Gurion University, in
his 2001 book Righteous Victims,
:
wrote
"The war -- as intended by [Egyptian President] Sadat -- had loosened the political
logjam that had existed since 1967. For the Arabs it had paved the road to a
settlement. Their honor had been restored, enabling their leaders at last to
contemplate direct dialogue and peace with Israel, but not from a position of
humiliating inferiority. However, Israel's military prowess had once again been
demonstrated and had perhaps definitively persuaded the Arab leaders that their
foe could not be defeated, let alone destroyed, in battle: The return of their
territories could be achieved only through negotiations.
On the other hand, the war had given Israel a stinging slap in the face. The 1948,
1956, and 1967 wars had conditioned them to stunning victories over the Arabs and
to Arab military (and political) incompetence; 1973 proved to be something else
altogether. Many Israelis were now persuaded that the territories could not be held
indefinitely by force and that continued occupation would necessarily lead to
further bouts of painful warfare. At last, and for the first time since June 1967, most
people were willing to contemplate giving up large chunks of land for peace."
Ian J. Bickerton, PhD, Professor of Middle Eastern History at the University of
New South Wales, and Carla L. Klausner, PhD, Professor of the Modern
Middle East at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, in their 2002 book A
Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, wrote
:
• "The October 1973 war destroyed many myths. It
proved, for example, that the Arabs could cooperate
and that they could keep their intentions a secret. It
demonstrated that they were capable of sophisticated
intelligence gathering and analysis and of a brilliant
operational plan to cross the Suez Canal and demolish
the Bar-Lev line [established in the 1967 War]. It
showed that Arab soldiers could fight bravely and well
when properly trained and motivated and that they
could handle the most technologically advanced
weapons. It proved that Israel was not invincible."
Avi Shlaim, PhD, Professor of International Relations at St.
Antony's College, Oxford, in his 2001 book The Iron Wall, wrote:
"The October War was the third Syrian-Israeli war [1948, 1967] and the fifth EgyptianIsraeli war [1948, 1956, 1967, 1970]. In all previous wars political deadlock followed
the ending of hostilities. The October War was the first war to be followed by a political
settlement. Three reasons help explain how this war laid the foundations for the
conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel five years later...
[1.] the two armies [Egypt and Syria] demonstrated that Israel was not invincible, and
they cured themselves of the trauma of the June [1967] War. They restored Arab pride,
honor and self-confidence. After the war they did not face Israel from a position of
hopeless inferiority...
[2.] In 1967 the Israeli victory was so decisive and the Arab defeat so crushing that the
Arabs were reluctant to face Israel across the negotiating table. In 1973 the outcome
was much more balanced, not least at the psychological level...
[3.] The third reason that political negotiations became possible in the immediate
aftermath of the war was U.S. engagement. In Henry Kissinger's hands, U.S. policy
was largely reduced to support for Israel and for the status quo. Once the status quo
had been shaken up, however, Kissinger moved with remarkable speed to develop an
Arab dimension to American foreign policy. His aim was to use the fluid situation
created by the war in order to move the parties, step by step, toward a political
settlement. He himself became personally involved in the process by embarking on the
shuttle diplomacy that took him back and forth from Jerusalem to Cairo and
Damascus."