s
BACKGROUND
GUIDE 2013
Sri Lanka: 1989
Crisis Director: Priyanka Krishnamoorthy
Chairs: Ava Gurekian and Meeran Karim
FCMUN VI
Sri Lanka
Greetings, delegates, and welcome to FCMUN’s most interesting, challenging and energetic committee: the JVP
Insurgency!
My name is Priyanka Krishnamoorthy, and it is my pleasure to serve as your Crisis Director of this committee. I
am a sophomore at Mount Holyoke College where I study Economics and Politics. Hailing from the little island of Sri
Lanka and having lived in South Asia for a substantial part of my life, I enjoy learning about anything that has to do with
the region. Outside of Model UN, I enjoy supporting the best cricket team – the Sri Lankan cricket team, working at the
Art Museum, working with the Beyond Tolerance Project and watching bad TV series.
This committee examines a pivotal period of Sri Lankan history that is reminiscent of conflicts in many parts of
the world today. I believe that a lot can be learned about peace, conflict and reconciliation from the South Asian region,
especially when considering the growing importance of South Asia. Beyond the human toll, the conflict in Sri Lanka
illuminates the devastating effects of a country deeply divided by language, ethnicity and ideology. However, the conflict
is not as simple as good against evil. As delegates, you will be forced to grapple with the diversity of the Sri Lankan
populace, the scores of parties and militant groups involved in the situation, regional neighbors and your own personal
interests. This committee will begin on June 5, 1989.
Flanked by a remarkable staff, it is my pleasure to welcome you as members of the JVP rebels and the Sri Lankan
government to the two committees.
I look forward to meeting you and working with you on representing two sharply conflicting sides at a decisive
point of Sri Lanka’s history. Feel free to email me with any questions or comments at krish23p@mtholyoke.edu.
Until March,
Priyanka
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Role of the Committee
Date: mid-May 1989
The current situation in Sri Lanka can only be described as an all-consuming cesspool of violence. Villagers find castaway
bodies of young revolutionaries in rivers, canals and shores every day while the government vehemently denies any
involvement. Sri Lanka has become a police state where assassinations, cordon and search operations, and executions
have become the order of the day. The JVP has become very close to achieving state power.
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History of the Committee
Brief Background
The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (English: People’s Liberation Front) is the first Marxist oriented political party in Sri
Lanka. Unhappy with the Sri Lankan government market reforms and policies that seemed to only be benefitting only the
upper classes, the JVP generated an anti-state youth-led insurrection in April 1971. This movement was largely composed
of Sinhalese youths from the south of the country. The government quickly but brutally suppressed this insurrection, and
more than 10,000 young cadres were either killed or jailed (Venugopal). Despite the government’s ruthless repression, the
JVP survived as an organization and established itself as a parliamentary electoral party, which grew to become the third
largest political force in the country by the early 1980s.
In 1983, the JVP went underground again and in 1987 it resurfaced to launch a more violent insurrection aimed at
completely destabilizing the country. This wave became a “far more violent and protracted armed insurgency”
(Venugopal) that almost achieved its purpose. However, the government eventually launched a ruthless exterminationist
counter attack after June 1989, completely silencing the JVP. The reason for the JVP’s second insurrection lies in the
growth of Tamil militancy in the north of Sri Lanka which provided them an excuse to seize government power.
April 1971: The failed insurrection
The first JVP insurrection lasted five weeks, and albeit being less of a threat to the GoSL than the 1987 insurgency, it was
still violently repressed by the sitting United Front (UF) government led by Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. The
UF was a coalition party consisting of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and two Marxist parties: the Lanka Sama
Samaja Party (English: Ceylon Equal Society Party) and the Communist Party (CP) Moscow Wing. The UF coalition was
elected in 1970, and still enjoyed popular public support. Their elitist economic policies were yet to be implemented.
During this insurrection, the JVP were not successful in assassinating or injuring a member of the ruling coalition,
Parliamentarians, Cabinet Ministers or senior police officers. The first JVP insurgency failed because of two reasons.
Their lack of military strength as “the JVP cadre[s] did not have guns or sufficient explosives to counter the fire power of
the state; instead they carried wooden replicas of guns” (24, Gunasekara) coupled with the arrest of their charismatic
leader Rohana Wijeweera, meant that JVP was not in the position to unite and fight for state power. With the support of
the United National Party (UNP), the main opposition, the UF government unleashed a merciless, violent, and furious
repressive response to the JVP where 15,000-20,000 people were killed in five weeks. An average of 3,500 young adults
disappeared from their homes every week; it was the massacre of an entire generation. The government’s brutal response
is exemplified as such: perceived JVP insurgents (mainly any young adults in the rural South) were “frog marched to the
nearest cemetery or bridge over a river and shot in cold blood” (670, Gunasekara)
Growth of Tamil militancy
During the 1960s and 1970s, youth discontent spread throughout the country. The Sinhalese youth organized themselves
into the JVP in the 1960s while the Tamil youth organized themselves into separate militant organizations in the North
and East in the 1970s. The Tamil small anti-state militant groups established themselves by carrying out occasional
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attacks against Tamil government supporters and sympathizers. When the 1980s dawned, the small Tamil groups had
developed into separate bigger guerrilla organizations, varying in ideology, organization, and training. Nevertheless, all
organizations were fighting for an enlargement of Tamil rights in Sri Lankan civil society. In July 1983, the growing
tension between militant Tamil youth in the Northern and Eastern provinces and the government transformed into a fullfledged civil war after severe anti-Tamil rights spread throughout Sinhala dominated parts of the country. The sitting UNP
government (under President J.R. Jayawardene) mishandled these anti-Tamil riots and blamed the JVP for inciting and
carrying out the anti-Tamil violence. This coincided with the resurrection of the JVP from the shame of its 1971
insurrection, when it was attempting to settle into the political mainstream of Sri Lanka. Instead, J. R. Jayawardene’s
announcement pushed them out of the public and underground again.
As the civil war between the government and separatist guerrilla groups in the North officially began, the Liberation of
Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) became the main militant organization fighting against the Government of Sri Lanka
(GoSL). The government started dialogue with them for the first time on July 8, 1985, which ultimately failed. By May
1985, the GoSL decided to strengthen its fight and launched a major offensive against the LTTE in the North of the
country. They were able to capture a significant portion of the Jaffna peninsula. Meanwhile, pressured by Tamil political
parties in India, sitting Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, decided to take action against the GoSL, due to reports of
increased Tamil civilian casualties. Hope for a peaceful resolution to the conflict rosewhen India and Sri Lanka sign the
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord that allowed the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) into the Northern and Eastern provinces to
fight the LTTE.
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
This major treaty between Sri Lanka and India would bring in thousands of Indian troops to the Northern and Eastern
provinces of Sri Lanka to fight against the LTTE. It also included a clause promising that following the conflict; the
government would guarantee the implementation of a Tamil-dominated regional government in the Northern and
Eastern provinces. The idea was for Sri Lanka to become a federal state.
Under this treaty, the Tamil rebels would hand over arms to the IPKF and cease all hostilities. The government would
simultaneously withdraw security forces from the North and East, and would hold a referendum to unify the Northern
and Eastern provinces. The treaty also contained an annexure indicating India’s displeasure with Sri Lanka’s
increasing pro-Western tilt, and improved relations with the United States and Pakistan. Therefore, the annexure stated
that the strategically placed Trincomalee port should retain its “non-aligned character”, a very loud signal to the United
States to stay away from the port. The Indian intervention was also a clear signal to anybody contemplating a coup that
the Sri Lankan government was strengthened by India.
The Accord was not popular in the country.
The JVP, being a group organized by Sinhalese youth, considered India’s entry as a loss of Sri Lankan sovereignty. Being
deeply committed to Sinhalese ethnic chauvinism and thereby antagonistic to India, the JVP resurged as an
antigovernment radical group fighting to preserve the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Therefore, the JVP responded to the IndoLanka Accord with a violent campaign involving the assassination of high-ranking government officials, UNP party
officials and civilians using a large number of bombs killing many civilians. This was accompanied with rhetoric that
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moved away from leftist ideology of the 1971 insurrection to an emphasis on Sinhalese chauvinism. The JVP’s
chauvinistic attitude was emphasized to the extent that government dialogue with the LTTE was deemed ‘treason’.
Growth of JVP support
The JVP prepared to overthrow the sitting UNP government after they were pushed out of mainstream politics in 1983.
The prefect opportunity to seize state power presented itself when the Sri Lankan public expressed their opposition to the
Indo-Lanka Accord. The condition gave the JVP the opportunity to widen their cadres and recruit more numbers base by
appealing to the anti-government and neutral majority.
The JVP’s reign of terror was consolidated by the way they operated their military activities. They always took
responsibility for their assassinations and visited the funerals of the people they killed. They also distributed posters and
handbills at the funeral sites to justify their actions before the public, because every murder and assassination had a
purpose. This way, they also ensured that non-JVP elements (such as petty thieves) would not use the JVP name to
perform their actions; they maintained monopoly over their actions.
The Second Insurgency: 1987-1989
During the years from 1987 to the present day, the JVP has only been able to increase the intensity of their anti-India
campaign by banning women from wearing Indian (imported) sarees, shops from selling Indian merchandise and
pharmacies from selling imported Indian pharmaceutical products. Moreover, the Indian High Commissioner J. N. Dixit
was threatened with death by the DJV because of his pro-Black Cats stance. The Black Cats is the counter-terrorism wing
of the Indian Central Armed Forces.
The JVP also consolidated their popular support amongst the rural public by eliminating “social evils” such as drug
dealers, drug addicts, prostitutes, bucket shot owners, lottery vendors and etc. Concurrently, they also performed tasks of
“social goods” by helping funeral homes and flood victims, building and repairing roads, and etc. Non-UNP supporters
began to envelop themselves into the folds of the JVP for the survival of their own parties by gaining access to more
supporters.
The JVP established the Jathika Sisya Madyasthanaya during these years to facilitate the widespread anti-government
agitation performed by school and university students. The actual work for this organization is done through the
framework of the Socialist Students’ Union that existed on all university campuses. Student movements proved to be very
powerful as universities began to be closed for long periods of time – a process which paralyzed the university system
from 1987 to 1989.
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The JVP’s excellent propaganda and patriotic rhetoric drew hundreds of ambitious youth who had aspirations to become
leaders of Sri Lanka. By using slogans such as “Join the JVP to drew the Indians away” (Gunaratne), the JVP played on
the patriotic aspirations of the youth to help their cause.
From late 1987, the JVP was reported to have been in dialogue with the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
(PLOTE). The JVP helped PLOTE by giving its militants weapons’ training and explosives. Manikkadasan, the military
leader of PLOTE, is rumoured to be closely related to Upatissa Gamanayake.
1988
By mid-1988, government support in Sri Lanka was at an all time low due to increasing costs of living, the growing
number of Indian troops and the massacring of Sinhalese people in border villages in the North and East. The JVP
capitalized on public discontent by widening their support base and recruitment to include the Northwestern and Central
provinces.
By September 1988, the public began to fear the JVP. They were acknowledged throughout the country (except in Tamil
areas) as the “Kuda anduwa” (small government) and “Rathri anduwa” (night government).
1989
The year 1989 dawned with the election of President Ranasinghe Premadasa, who was the Prime Minister under President
J. R. Jayawardene. The JVP faced new problems with the change in leadership, as Premadasa was known as the “man of
the people”. Hailing from a modest family, he was the first to break the tradition of Presidency being in the hands of the
bourgeoisie or the high caste landed aristocracy. Therefore, the public invested a new lease of respect in his policies
because they offered solutions to the socio-economic issues (class divide, poverty, etc.) that the JVP was campaigning for.
Moreover, Premadasa was unsupportive of the Indo-Lanka Accord and called for the IPKF’s removal, which combined
with his socio-economic politics, were a real threat to the survival of the JVP.
Interested in dialogue and peace, Premadasa created spaces and opportunities for the JVP to enter mainstream politics
again. He freed political detainees and also lifted the prevailed emergency. However, his actions were to no avail as the
JVP remained adamantly outside politics and continued to terrorize the country.
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Timeline of significant events
Outlined below is a brief overview of the major moments of the insurgency, outlining the complexity of the insurrections.
December 15, 1986:
JVP activists kill Daya Pathirana, a university student leader. This murder was an attempt
of the JVP to take control over universities.
January – May 1987:
The JVP establishes cadre cells throughout the country (Gunaratna).
End of March 1987:
Undergraduates of the University of Ruhuna were arrested for holding a secret discussion
for the overthrow of the government. By now, the JVP had instructed students to hold
anti-government demonstrations demanding the release of soldiers, and etc. It was
realized that the more impossible a demand is, the longer a student-led anti-government
protest could be carried out.
April 1987:
The JVP began to identify their military wing as the Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya
(English: People’s Patriotic Movement; DJV).
May 1987:
Fearing that the JVP insurgents in the South could be linked to the LTTE rebellions in the
North, the Government launches a major offensive against the LTTE stronghold in late
May. The government successfully captures a large protion of the Jaffna Peninsula.
June 4, 1987:
India intervenes for the first time by trying to provide food and medicine to people in the
North and East. These amenities are brought by an Indian flotilla, which is blocked by Sri
Lankan vessels.
July 29, 1987:
The Indo-Lanka Accord is signed.
July 29 – August 4, 1987:
The JVP stards a week of anti-Accord demonstrations. They killed over 100 citizens,
steal 600 weapons (mostly shotguns), plastered “Kill JR” and “Chase the Indians away”
posters across the country and called for arms from the public. The public sympathized
with the JVP’s cause and helped them.
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July 31, 1987:
JVP militants kill Jinadasa Weerasinghe, a UNP stalwart and a Member of Parliament for
the Tangalle district. This is the UNP’s second killing in the 1980s.
August 11, 1987:
A JVP militant on a motorcycle fires and injures Police Inspector Godagama, the
OIC of the Aluthgama Police Station.
August 18, 1987:
The JVP hurls two grenades into the room where the Members of Parliament of
the government were meeting at the Sri Jayawadenapura Parliamentary complex.
The Prime Minister protects the President by pulling him behind a table. The
Matara Distric Minister and a parliamentary employee are killed. Several
Ministers and Parliamentarians are injured. This act gives the JVP a massive
moral boost and enables JVP groups in other parts of the country to begin
militarily competing against each other.
August 28, 1987:
The JVP newsletter “Deshapremi” (English: Patriot) is launched.
October 9, 1987:
The JVP attack a Counter Subversive Unit (CSU) operative for the first time.
They target and kill Police Commissioner.
October 11, 1987:
The militants throw a grenade into the office of the Polonnaruwa District
Minister.
October 25, 1987:
A bomb explodes at the Deputy Indian High Commission in Kandy.
November 1987:
Sri Lanka establishes a system of provincial councils (federal system). This was
mandatory under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. JVP attacks increase in frequency
and there is at least one major incident per day.
November 29, 1987:
The Green Tigers, a para-military group, is secretly formed by the government and
politicians to fight the JVP. They start by killing a few JVP activists everyday.
February 16, 1988:
Vijaya Kumaratunga, founder of the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party and husband of next
President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, is assassinated by the JVP.
December 1988:
The death toll increases to a hundred a day. The JVP establishes cells in villages
bordering the North and East. The GoSL fears a JVP attack on Indian convoys
would provoke a confrontation between Indian and Sri Lankan troops.
December 19, 1987:
The UNP holds a convention in Colombo where President Jayawardene vows to
crush Tamil militancy in the North and East, and the JVP in the South. In
retaliation, the JVP twists and reports Jayawardene’s words as “I am a military
leader, I am like Hilter … There is no doubt that there is a war on … We cannot
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win a war without killing the enemy … If they destroy me … avenge my murder”
and vows to destroy the UNP.
December 23, 1987:
UNP Party Chairman and 3 others are shot.
February 16, 1988:
Movie star and leader of the Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya, Vijaya Kumaratunga
is killed by militants. Half a million people attend his funeral.
March 1988:
The GoSL grows increasingly desperate due to increasing violence. K. C.
Senanayake, a conman, approaches the National Security Minister and says that
he has negotiated with the JVP and that they are ready to discuss an agreement
with the GoSL. The Minister, despite being advised against it by the National
Intelligence Bureau (NIB) gives KC a letter securing protection for KC.
April 1988:
Provincial Councils are elected in 6 of the 7 Sinhala majority provinces. The
ruling UNP wins all of them. The SLFP boycotts these elections while the JVP
enforces a curfew and a campaign of terror. Posters such as “Death awaits those
who vote” and “the first ten who vote and their families will be killed” appear
across the South.
May 1988:
The GoSL begins drafting an agreement and announces this at a press conference.
The signatories are National Security Advisor Lalith Athulathmudalali, Rohana
Wijeweera, Upatissa Gamanayake and KC Senanayake. The government pledges
to remove the proscription of the JVP and of related trade unions and student
organizations if the JVP ceased all violent activities and entered mainstream
politics. The government requested the JVP to surrender all arms by May 29,
1988.
The JVP responds with posters that the government was fooled by a conman.
However, the National Security Minister’s request to lift the proscription on the
JVP persisted, and the JVP was recognized as a legal political party.
Mid-May, 1988:
The DJV sends letters to all ministers, parliamentarians, party officials and senior
government officers to resign or face death.
July 29, 1988:
On the first anniversary of the signing of the Accord, T\the government imposes a
48-hour curfew to pre-empt the JVP’s call for an anti-Accord protest.
January 2, 1989:
Ranasinghe Premadasa, from the UNP is elected as the successor to President J.
R. Jayawardene.
February 4 & 25, 1989:
Premadasa makes a speech calling for consultation, consensus and compromise.
In his speech, he offered to “talk peace with anybody, any where, any time”
which he repeated in a speech at his Poverty Alleviation programme inaugural
address.
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February 15, 1989:
Parliamentary elections are held. The UNP wins 125 out of 225 seats and the
SLFP wins 67 seats. The elections are perceived to be conducted fairly except for
in the rural areas.
Early April, 1989:
President Premadasa appeals to the JVP and the LTTE to enter the political
mainstream. The appeal was made the ‘Yovunpura’ in Mahiyangana. Meanwhile,
the JVP commemorated the 18th anniversary of the 1971 insurgency with a Hartal
where shops, business establishments and government departments were not
allowed to be open, and transportation was banned.
April 20, 1989:
Four JVP landmines goes off across the country. Rumours spread that PLOTE
taught the JVP how to use landmines.
May 10, 1989:
Universities reopen. Minor staff are on strike demanding a wage increase to Rs.
2500, and students boycott lectures to commemorate the death of their fellow
students.
June 1, 1989:
Premadasa demands the removal of IPKF troops at a rally in Battaramulla.
June 4, 1989:
The JVP holds a “great patriotic rally” in Nugegoda where anti-Indianism was the
main topic of conversation. 60,000 people are reported to have attended this
flamboyant show of JVP support.
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Structure of the Committee
The committee will be run in a Joint Crisis Committee format, where the happenings of one committee will directly
impact the happenings of the other. The two committees will be the regime and the rebels. The regime will be convening
in Parliament in Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte, a suburb of Colombo and shall comprise a summit of the following top
government officials and affiliated international leaders. The rebels will be convening in a secret location.
This committee will be run as historical committee. When we convene, the date will be June
5, 1989 – shortly after extravagant Nugegoda rally.
This committee will decide the fate of an entire nation, which is the goal of the entire committee. It is important to
consider the numerous actors involved, including the LTTE, PLOTE, India’s stance, other political parties, personal
interests, and the government. Will the Sri Lankan Government cave into the demands of the JVP? Will the international
community intervene? What will be the fate of Indian troops? Will the JVP be clamped down on and completely erased?
Save Sri Lanka: but whose Sri Lanka, and for whom?
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Characters
The Sri Lankan Cabinet (Government)
1. Ranasinghe Premadasa
President
Premadasa was elected President in 1988 as successor to J. R. Jayawardene.
2. Dingiri Banda Wijetunge
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
D. B. Wijetunge became Prime Minister in February 1989. His is an unassuming former cooperative
inspector from Kandy.
3. Lalith Athulathmudalali
National Security Minister
A close contender in the UNP for the post of President, Lalith Athulathmudalali was a seasoned politician who
had a tense relationship with Premadasa. The hoax peace pact of 1988 was signed between Athulathmudali and
KC Senanayake.
4. Ravi Jayawardene
Security Advisor and head of the Special Task Force
The Special Task Force is the paramilitary wing of the Sri Lankan police force. Ravi Jayawardene is the
son of previous President Jayawardene, and was a strong supporter within the UNP party for Premadasa.
He and Premadasa are known to have seen eye-to-eye on the presence of Indian troops, and was the
main person supporting dialogue between the JVP, the LTTE and the GoSL.
5. Ranjan Wijeratne
Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Minister of Defense (Deputy Defense Minister)
Rajan Wijeratne is known for maintaining a hardline stance against the JVP while President Premadasa
attempted to start dialogue with them and allow them into public politics. Known as a man of action, he
is direct, straightforward and laconic in conversation. It was his defense responsibilities that bought the
Minister into direct action against the JVP and openly advocated “death to the JVP”.
6. Jyotindra Nath Dixit
Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka
H.E J. N. Dixit is a distinguished Indian diplomat who entered the Indian Foreign Service in 1958.
7. Major General Cecil Waidyeratne
Chief-of-staff of the Sri Lanka Army
Known as an unconventional strategist and tactician, he distinguished himself as an operations man. He
commands troops both in the North and the South of the country, and has the distinction of commanding four
regiments at crucial moments in Sri Lankan history: The Electrical and Mechanical engineers, the Raja Rata rifles,
the Sinha regiment and his own reconnaissance regiment.
8. Gamini Dissanayake
Lieutenant General
He is a respected general in the Sri Lankan Army. The May 1987 offensive was largely successful due
to his commitment. Ravi Jayawardene and he are known to have had many disagreements on how to
approach the JVP.
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9. Premadasa Udugampola
Deputy Director, Presidential Security Division
The only man the JVP feared, Udugampola s claimed to both be an officer and a gentleman. He is posted in the
South to fight JVP militancy and was a feared Police officer. His family and children were killed by the JVP,
instilling in him a determination to eradicate and try the JVP for all their wrongdoings.
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Rebels)
1. Patabendige Don Nandasiri Wijeweera alias Rohana Wijeweera
Leader of the JVP
Founded the JVP on May 14, 1965 in the Galle district of Sri Lanka. He has also been the “most wanted
man” in Sri Lanka for many years. A dropout of the Medical Faculty of Lumumba University in
Moscow, he was dissatisfied with Soviet Communism and was enamored by the Chinese version of it.
He is a native of Madilla, Tangalle, is married to Sirimathi Chitrani Fernando, the sister of Dr. Subhas
Chandra Fernando of Moratuwa and has six children.
2. Don Upatissa Gamanayake
General Secretary of the JVP
He is second in command of the JVP and was involved in the 1971 insurrection, but only as a
participant. He emerged as a leader when the party resumed political activity after 1977. He was arrested
in 1975 while trying to commit a highway robbery. Gamanayake is married to S. A. Karunawathi, who
was also imprisoned in 1971 for her involvement in the insurrection. They have three children.
3. Saman Piyasiri Fernando aka Keerthi Wijayabahu
Head of the Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV)
The DJV is the armed wing of the JVP. Wijayabahu was a graduate in commerce at the University of
Kelaniya. Prior to the proscription of the JVP in 1983, he was in charge of organizing school children in
Colombo, along with Sumith Athukorale. Is a native of Mathugama.
4. H. B. Herath
JVP politburo member
A native of Medawachchiya in the North Central Province, Herath graduated from the University of Sri
Jayawardenapura in 1980 where he was also the President of the Inter-University Students Federation
and the leader of the Socialist Students Union. He was praised to be a rising star and was coopted into
the Central Committee of the JVP in 1981. Noted to be a good orator and good organizer, he was made
one of Wijeweera’s campaign chiefs for the 1982 Presidential Elections.
5. Gunaratne Wanasinghe alias Gune Aiya
Chief of Propaganda, JVP politburo member
A senior member of the JVP, he was put in charge of propaganda work after 1977. Until his arrest for
involvement in the 1971 insurgency, he was employed as a public school teacher. After his release in
1977, he resumed teaching and was even promoted to the position of principal at a small school.
However, he left this job to focus as the Editor of the JVP magazine “Seenuwa”, until the proscription of
1983. Within the party, he is known to be an expert on dialectical materialism and is said to have
authored some chapters in Wijeweera’s 1986 book “what are the solutions to the Tamil Eelam
struggle?” He is known to despise party members with religious or aesthetic leanings.
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6. Udaya Jagath Shantha Bandara
JVP Politburo Member
A native of Kandy, he was an undergraduate of the Science Faculty of the University of Peradeniya,
until his suspension in 1977. He was suspended because he took part in a protest against a proposed rice
ration cut. Thereafter, he joined the JVP as a full-time activist. He entered the Central Committee by
1980 when he headed the JVP electoral list at the Colombo Municipal Council Elections. The
government captured him in mid 1988 at Hambantota, and was the GoSL’s first breakthrough in the
JVP’s organization. However, he was a able to convince Ravi Jayawardene, the then Security Advisor to
President Jayawardene, that he should be released to help begin dialogue between the GoSL and the
JVP. A few weeks after his release, he disappeared and resumed his party work. Ravi Jayawardene was
very impressed by Shantha Bandara, and called him a better orator and leader than Rohana Wijeweera.
7. P. Thangarajah
JVP Politburo Member
A native of Matale, Central Province, he was entrusted with the responsibility of organizing Tamil
Estate workers in the hill country.
8. Samarappulige Somasiri alias Ragama Some (prounounced So-may)
JVP Politburo Member
A trusted hit man of the JVP, Some is said to have led the first attack that the JVP launched against an
army detachment in Pallekle on April 15, 1987. Moreover, he was also said to have been involved in the
rescue operation of Nandana Marasinghe in 1971.
9. Ranjitham Gunaratnam alias Ranjith Gunaratne
JVP Politburo Member
A native of Kegalle, Gunaratne graduated from the Engineering Faculty of the University of Peradeniya
in 1985 while also serving as the President of the Inter-University Student Federation. He is a good
orator and a good organizer and was valued because of his Tamil ethnic origins. He appears to be a
Tamil who assimilated into Sinhala culture, as exemplified by his ‘Sinhalized’ name. He spoke Sinhala
without a Tamil aceent, and was instrumental in maintaining links between the JVP and the Tamil
militant movements in the North and East. His brother, Premkumar, albeit not being a member of the
Central Committee, was appointed District Secretary for Trincomalee to facilitate these contacts.
10. Somawansa Amarasinghe
JVP Politburo Member
In 1971, Amarasinghe was assigned the task of attacking Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s house in April 5.
After 1977, he was assigned to take care of the party’s finances. Moreover, he was in charge of logistics
and carried out legal assignments for the party because he was related by marriage to an important
member of the UNP. He is one of the main figures in the JVP campaigning against any form of Tamil
regional autonomy in the North and East.
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Bibliography and Further Reading
The 1971 Insurgency
1. Amnesty International’s reports
2. An article by Lord Avebury in the Manchester Guardian
3. An article by Rene Dumont and Jacques Decronoy in Le Monde
Chandraprema, C. A. Sri Lanka: the years of terror The JVP Insurrection 1987-1989. 1th ed. Colombo: Lake House
Bookshop, 1991. Print.
Gunaratna, Rohan. Sri Lanka, a lost revolution?: the inside story of the JVP. 2nd ed. Colombo: Gunaratna Offset, 1995.
Print.
Gunasekara, Tisaranee. "Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971
and 1987-1989." Rev. of Sri Lanka in Crisis: A Lost Generation - The Untold Story. Ethnic Studies Report XVII.1
(1999): 65-88. Print.
Matthews, Bruce. "Sri Lanka in 1989: Peril and Good Luck." Asian Survey 30.2 (1990): 144-49. Print.
Moore, Mick. "Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka." Modern Asian Studies 27.3 (1993): 593-642.
Print.
Oberst, Robert C. "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka." Publius 18.3 (1987): 175-93. JSTOR. Web. 14 Jan.
2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330279>.
Pfaffenberger, Bryan. "Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP." Asian Survey 28.2 (1988):
137-47. JSTOR. Web. 14 Jan. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644815>.
Premdas, Ralph R., and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe. "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord."
Asian Survey 28.6 (1988): 676-90. Print.
"Sri Lanka Province Map." Map. Maps of the World. Compare Infobase, n.d. Web. 13 Jan. 2013.
<http://www.mapsofworld.com/sri-lanka/province-map.html>.
Uyangoda, Jayadeva. "The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Split." Economic and Political Weekly 43.18 (2008): 8-10. Print.
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Venugopal, Rajesh. "Sectarian Socialism: The Politics of Sri Lanka's Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)." Modern Asian
Studies 44.3 (2010): 567-602. Print.
Wickramasinghe, Nira. Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities. Honolulu: University of Hawaii'i
Press, 2006. Print.
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