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Sacrifice of the mass and the Sacrifice of Christ. Thomas Aquinas against later
Thomist theology
Harm Goris
An old and until recently very common name for the Eucharistic celebration among
Catholics is ‘sacrifice of the mass’. For centuries, the priest celebrating mass at the
altar was the dominant picture of the Eucharist. Until a few decades ago, the
decisive part in the ordination ceremony of a priest was the so-called rite of handing
over the sacrificial instruments, viz. the chalice and paten, to the ordinand, and the
pronunciation of the formula ‘receive the power of offering sacrifice for the living and
the dead’ (Denzinger 1991, 1326). This rite was changed only in 1947 by pope Pius
XII (Denzinger 1991, 3858-3860). The consecrated bread is called ‘host’, from the
Latin hostia, which means ‘sacrificed animal’ or ‘victim’. During mass, the host is
divided into parts and it is ritually consumed in a communal meal by the faithful. And,
finally, it is still a widespread devotional custom in the Catholic Church to offer
masses for special intentions, in particular for deceased family members. Together
with the actual participants, they are thought to share in the expiatory effects of the
sacrifice of the mass.
With the liturgical reforms in the wake of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), the
ecumenical overtures, and the rehabilitation of the role of the laity in the Church, the
idea and the experience of the mass as a sacrifice have become less popular
(Levering 2005, 11-26). However, recent magisterial teaching stresses again its
sacrificial character (John Paul II 1980, 9; John Paul II 2003, 12-13). Moreover, the
ecumenical consensus documents that have been produced in the past years on the
Eucharist as sacrifice may have helped to clear misunderstandings and historical
misrepresentations, and to rediscover the overall Trinitarian framework of
sacramental theory and practice, they also tended to bypass a thorough reflection on
the concept of ‘sacrifice’ and the real differences between the various churches
(Hönig 1989, 255-257, 274-277).
The traditional language and practices surrounding the Eucharist, like the (male)
priest, altar, host, dismemberment of the victim, communal meal and expiatory
effects, show that Catholicism somehow acknowledges the permanent validity of
cultic sacrifice. It recognizes the religious meaning not only of historical sacrifices in
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Judaism and the one of Jesus Christ on the cross, but also of cultic sacrifices today.
In this, the Catholic Church is unique within the Abrahamic religions, differing from
Judaism, from almost all Protestant churches and also from Islam, where the
slaughtering of an animal during the Feast of the Sacrifice (Id al-Adha), is generally
understood more as a commemoration or almsgiving than as cultic sacrifice
(Henninger 2005, 8006).
However, it is not an easy task to spell out exactly what it means to call the mass a
sacrifice. It might even prove to be impossible to determine exactly the theological
meaning of the sacrificial character of the mass. There are three main conceptual
reasons for its elusiveness. The first one is the problem of giving a general definition
of ‘sacrifice’ from a religious studies perspective. Can we come up through
anthropological research or philosophical speculation with a neutral, universally valid
definition of ‘sacrifice’, univocally applicable to all instances of ‘sacrifice’ across times
and religions (Carter 2003, 1-9; McClymond 2008, 1-24)? Second, even if we
manage to construct such a universal definition, there is the theological question
about the meaning of the specifically Christian – maybe also Jewish – sacrifices, in
particular of Christ’s sacrifice. Are these sacrifices just particular exemplifications of
a general, anthropological idea of sacrifice, or do they in fact question and criticize
human all too human ideas about what a real, genuine sacrifice is? Does the term
‘sacrifice’ have exactly the same meaning when predicated of pagan sacrifices and
of Jewish and Christian sacrifices, or is the term used analogically? In short, should
a theologian work from an outsider perspective and etic approach to sacrifice, or
should he/she adopt an insider perspective, using an emic view on sacrifice (Daly
2009, 1-5)? Third, with regard to the mass itself, there is the internal theological
question about the relation between Christ’s historical death on Calvary, interpreted
as a sacrifice, and the celebration of the mass. Are they related or not, and if so in
what sense? Here, a specific methodological question arises: by what evidence and
arguments can we determine theologically the relation between the mass and Christ
in terms of ‘sacrifice’? The sacrificial interpretation of Christ’s passion and death has
been criticized because of the image of a bloodthirsty God it suggests, in particular
against the background of the so-called satisfaction theory of atonement developed
by Anselm in the eleventh century Anselm of Canterbury: by dying Christ gave
satisfaction to God whose honour was robbed by sin and so placated God’s anger
(Daly 2009, 107-113). Be that as it may, we can discuss such an interpretation on
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the basis of Holy Scripture, because the gospels, Paul’s letters, the Letter to the
Hebrews and the Book of Revelation use sacrificial language to express the salvific
meaning of Christ’s passion and death. But we cannot have a similar discussion
about the mass. Scripture never talks about the mass as a sacrifice, if it talks about
the mass at all. The theological evidence about the mass as a sacrifice is not to be
found directly in biblical texts, but rather in great variety of ecclesial practices of
worship. Hence, speculative, theological reflection on the Eucharist is rooted in and
remains dependent upon traditions of celebrations and devotions in the Church. This
methodological approach, which focuses on the lex orandi as a locus theologicus, is
nowadays labelled as ‘liturgical theology.’
There are already traces in very early Christian, post-biblical texts that suggest some
kind of connection between sacrifice and the gathering of the faithful on the Day of
the Lord. Later, fourth-century Eucharistic Prayers show an increase in sacrificial
language and imagery (Bradshaw & Johnson 2012, 129-132). However, the texts do
not always bear clear testimony as to what the sacrificial practice exactly was. And
when they do, they show a great variety of liturgical forms. Nevertheless, already in
Antiquity there was a fundamentally different perspective between the East and the
West regarding the interpretation of the sacrificial character of the Eucharist. The
Greek Fathers tended to see it based on the liturgical commemoration (anamnesis)
of Jesus’s historical sacrifice on the cross. In contrast, Latin Fathers like Cyprian of
Carthage (ca. 200-258) and Ambrose (ca. 340-397) tended to break the unity of
Christ’s historical death and the Eucharistic celebration so that the latter was seen as
a sacrifice in its own right: Christ is sacrificed again in the Eucharist, as Pope
Gregory the Great (ca. 540-604) stated (Mazza 1999, 10-23).
The Latin West also had a particular liturgical reason for developing its own
understanding of the Eucharistic sacrifice. Typical of Western Eucharistic prayers is
the great number of supplications to God that He will accept the gifts offered to Him
(Stevenson 1986, 74-99). This is also evident in the so-called Roman Canon, which
during the early Middle Ages was to become dominant in the Western church. The
supplicatory character of the text and the fact that praying the canon became more
and more a solitary activity of the priest, done in silence (Spinks 2005), promote a
sacrificial interpretation.
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After the common cultural context of the Antiquity with its ubiquitous sacrificial rites
had disappeared, more explicit theological discussions on the sacrifice of the mass
began to develop in scholastic theology. However, the debate focused on the dogma
of Christ’s real presence (praesentia realis) in the Eucharist, not on its sacrificial
character. The disputes between Paschasius and Ratramnus in the ninth and
between Lanfranc and Berengar in the eleventh century stimulated theological
creativity, leading to Aquinas’s doctrine of transubstantiation and subsequent
discussions (McCord Adams 2010).
Serious ecclesial controversy over the mass as sacrifice did not occur till the
sixteenth century when Reformers seriously questioned certain mass practices in the
Catholic Church. Their criticisms provoked explicit magisterial teaching on the
subject by the Council of Trent (1545-1563) and subsequent development of
elaborate theological theories on the sacrifice of the mass, which have been
determinative of Catholic theology, spirituality, and magisterial teaching regarding
the Eucharist until the present day (Lepin 1926, 414-415; Daly 2000, 256-257).
In this paper, I shall contrast the view on the mass as sacrifice of Thomas Aquinas
(c. 1225-1274) with the theories of later sixteenth century Thomists, I shall focus on
one key issue, the relation between the mass and the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.
As the Reformers pointed out, It is a basic tenet of the Christian faith that Christ’s
sacrifice was absolutely decisive, once-and-for-all. How then can there be any later
Christian sacrifice?
First, I shall give an overview of the main theories that were developed in the
sixteenth century. Next, I shall contrast the later Thomist positions with Aquinas’ own
view, as reconstructed on the basis of his main work, the Summa Theologiae,
followed by a short conclusion.
1. Discussions in the sixteenth century
The Reformers of the sixteenth century reacted against concrete practices that also
in the eyes of Catholics were considered abuses of the mass: commercial trade in
masses, the accumulation of stipends by priests, the ordination of poorly trained
priests just for reading as many masses as possible etc. But they also raised more
fundamental objections against the very idea of ‘sacrifice of the mass’.
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Most Reformers did not question the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist,
although they did not accept the theory of transubstantiation. Also, they accepted the
interpretation of Christ’s saving work as an expiatory or propitiatory ‘sacrifice’ to God,
as set out in an Anselmian theory of satisfaction. But they had serious
ecclesiological, soteriological and Christological objections to the mass as a sacrifice
(Hunsinger 2008, 95-110).
Luther denounces the mass as a sacrifice insofar as it is thought to be a good work,
having expiatory efficacy prior to and independent from subjective, conscious
devotion or act of faith. That is, he objects to the ex opere operato efficacy of the
mass. Luther allows only two things in the mass, viz. God’s promise or proclamation
of forgiveness and salvation and, on the other hand, human faith, accepting that
divine promise and proclamation. Only by personal commitment of faith, sola fide,
not by good works, are we saved. Also the example of Christ, Luther says, shows
that the mass is not a sacrifice. We read in the gospel that at the Last Supper, when
he instituted the mass, Christ did not offer himself as a sacrifice to the Father
standing at an altar, but he sat at a table and gave his verbal testament or promise
and a sign thereof to the disciples (Luther 1888, 523). The most decisive argument
for Luther is that Christ’s sacrifice on the cross was definitive, once-and-for all, and
totally sufficient. Christ is the sole priest and the sole sacrifice (Hunsinger 2008, 101102).
Philip Melanchthon also rejects any human expiatory sacrifice and accepts to talk
about Eucharistic sacrifices only in the sense of sacrifice of praise, that is, of the
preaching of the Gospel, faith, prayer, thanksgiving, confession, the trouble of saints,
yes all good works of saints’ (McCain 2006, 224).
Zwingli adds the argument that by definition sacrifice implies death and bloodshed
and Christ died and shed his blood only once, on the cross (Zwingli 1905, 585).
Calvin uses both the theological argument against human expiatory sacrifices and
Zwingli’s logical argument: an unbloody expiatory sacrifice is unbiblical and illogical
(Institutes IV c. 18 s. 5, 1434). Like Melanchthon, he only accepts speaking about
sacrifices of praise and of thanksgiving (ibid. s. 16,1443-1444).
In reaction, Catholic theologians emphasized that the mass is really a propitiatory
sacrifice, but not different from Christ’s. They focused on three topics: (1) the relation
between the Last Supper, the sacrifice of the cross, the mass, and Christ’s heavenly
high priesthood; (2) the exact definition of ‘sacrifice’; and (3) the identification of a
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specific ritual element that would represent Christ’s immolation. Most of the
apologetic theologians assumed a real identity of the sacrifice of the mass and the
sacrifice of Christ. In the mass the event of Christ’s sacrifice becomes really present:
not of course in its physical or historical mode, but in a sacrificial manner. It was
presumed that for a true and propitiatory sacrifice, the immolation of a victim was a
necessary condition. As a consequence, the central question was how and at what
moment Christ’s immolation is sacramentally enacted during the celebration of the
mass (Lepin 1926, 252-291).
It was also in this time that Aquinas became the most influential authority in Catholic
theology. The Dominicans and the newly established Jesuit order endorsed his
thought and began to replace Peter Lombard’s Sentences by the Summa Theologiae
as the theological textbook at the university. All Catholic theologians tried to find
support for their theories in Aquinas, also with regard to interpreting the mass. The
most extensive and mature theories on this topic were developed after the decisions
of the Council of Trent.
In 1562 the Council of Trent promulgated the official teaching on the sacrifice of the
mass. The council sanctioned speaking about an ‘unbloody immolation’:
Because in this sacrifice, which is performed in the mass, Christ himself is contained and is
immolated in an unbloody manner (incruente immolatur), who on the altar of the cross offered
himself once in a bloody manner (cruente ... obtulit), [therefore] the holy council teaches that it
is a truly propitiatory sacrifice ... It is one and the same host (hostia), the same one who offers
himself now through the ministry of the priests, offered himself then on the cross, while only
the mode of offering (offerendi ratio) differs. The fruits of that offering (that is, the bloody
offering) are most fully received through this unbloody one (Denzinger 1991, 1743).
And it emphasized the propitiatory character of the mass:
If anyone says that the sacrifice of the mass is one only of praise and thanksgiving; or a mere
commemoration of the sacrifice performed on the cross but not a propitiatory one ... let him be
anathema (Denzinger 1991, 1753).
The council did not solve all questions and did not settle all disputes among Catholic
theologians (Power 1987, 157-161). In the aftermath of Trent, the paths that had
been set out by the pre-Tridentine theologians continued to determine the debate on
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the sacrifice of the mass. One continued to oppose Protestantism, but also the intra
Catholic debate became more heated, with advocates of divergent positions referring
to Aquinas. Marius Lepin put together a large collection of texts dealing with these
discussions (Lepin 1922, 335-415). His findings have been summarized by Robert
Daly (Daly 2000). According to Lepin, most post-Tridentine theologians started to
make more stringent demands on the ritual representation of Christ’s sacrifice. While
he thinks that Trent did not suggest that ‘the mass should contain any reality of
immolation’, but only an image or a memorial of the real immolation on the cross,
later theories began to require some kind of real change of the host, to the point of
an actual, physical destruction and one tried to identify a ritual element where that
change or destruction would occur. Some related what happens on the altar not only
with Christ’s historical sacrifice on the cross, but rather with Christ’s heavenly
sacrifice as eternal high priest. John Hesselius (1522–1596) states: ‘The New Law
(…) contains an image of what takes place in heaven where Christ, in exercising his
priesthood, stands before God and intercedes for us in representing his passion to
his Father and in consummating the sacrifice of the cross (…). On the altar Christ
does what he is doing in heaven’ (Daly 2000, 251). Most influential were the views of
Gaspard Casal (1510-1585), who thought the destructive change of Christ happened
by the (double) consecration, and of Bellarmine (1542-1621), who saw it
accomplished in the communion (of the priest). The latter view evoked Gabriel
Vasquez’s (c. 1550-1604) sharp criticism that, in that case, the sacrifice would not be
accomplished on the altar, but in the stomach of the priest (Daly 2000, 255).
However, besides this group of ‘hyper-realistic’ theologians, others remained more
traditional and denied any real change of Christ himself in the mass. These
theologians acknowledged there was only an image (figura) of Christ’s immolation.
Melchior Cano (c. 1509-1560), for example, saw the fraction of the Host and the
distribution of the Blood during communion as such images, which do not involve a
real destruction or change of Christ himself: the ritual actions are only performed on
the sacramental species, not on the Body or Blood of Christ (Lepin 1922, 346-349).
Others, like Gabriel Vasquez and Leonard Lessius (1554-1623), regarded the
consecration as such a mere symbol. This did not prevent them from using highly
expressive language. ‘The words of consecration,’ Lessius writes, ‘are a kind of
sword. The Body of Christ which is now living in heaven, is to be slaughtered here
instead of a living victim. The Body, placed under the species of bread, and the
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Blood under the species of wine, are like the body and blood of a lamb now
immolated’ (Daly 2000, 256). However, also the more traditional group held on to a
general definition of ‘sacrifice’ that implies a real change or destruction of the victim.
Therefore, one had to admit that the sacrifice of the mass constitutes an exception to
the general rule. This raises then the question whether the mass is a genuine,
expiatory sacrifice.
Both groups, the hyper-realist and the more traditional theologians, referred to
Thomas Aquinas for support of their views. Were their appeals justified?
2. Thomas Aquinas
Thomas Aquinas himself did not elaborate a systematic doctrine about the Eucharist
as sacrifice (Lucien 1998). This fact may account for the many and divergent
interpretations of later Thomists. In what follows, I shall interpret texts and basic
ideas of Aquinas that deal with the topic and that were to become very significant in
later discussioins. I shall limit myself to the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas’s mature
and, as of the sixteenth century, most authoritative work.1
A thorny problem in interpreting the texts concerns the meaning and (English)
translation of Latin terms. First, sacramentum can be used in a wider sense as
‘sacred sign’, including the ‘sacraments of the Old Law’, or in a stricter sense of the
seven, grace bestowing sacraments of Church (Yocum 2004, 160-164). Next, the
meaning of words like repraesentare seems ambiguous: does it mean ‘to make
present again’ or ‘to represent’? Finally, different Latin expressions like sacrificium,
hostia, victima, immolatio, and oblatio can all be translated by ‘sacrifice’, but then
important differences in meaning are lost.
Aquinas distinguishes two aspects of the mass: the sacrament and the sacrifice. The
mass has the character (ratio) of a sacrament insofar as something is received; it
has the character of a sacrifice insofar as something is offered (S.Th. III q. 79 a. 5
and a. 7; q. 83 a. 4). In other words, ‘sacrament’ indicates a movement or act from
God to humans, ‘sacrifice’ from humans to God. It is important to keep the two
distinct without, however, separating them.
1
I use the Latin text of the Latin-English Blackfriars edition, but all English
translations are my own. Citations are according to the standard system of reference
for the Summa.
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Aquinas also distinguishes between external and internal sacrifices (S.Th. II-II q. 85
a. 2 and a. 4). He thinks the internal sacrifice is primary. It is signified by the former
and consists in offering a devout mind to God. However, we must not forget that
because the Eucharist is an external, sensible sign, it is (also) the external sacrifice
that matters here. We should resist the temptation of a premature spiritualization and
take the material and sensory performance of the sacrament seriously.
‘Offering’ (oblatio) to God is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for sacrifice.
Also some special action is needed with regard to the things offered. Aquinas gives
two examples: animals are killed or bread is broken, eaten, and blessed. The latter
obviously refers to the Eucharist. This, he says, is consistent with the etymology of
sacrum facere, ‘to make holy.’ If nothing is done with the gifts, they are offerings, but
not sacrifices, as e.g. the wave loaves or the first-fruits (S.Th. II-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 3).
The condition that something must be done with the gif offered played in important
role in sixteenth-century discussions. It was usually interpreted as a destruction of
the gift. Bellarmine, for example, emphasized Aquinas’s words about the Eucharistic
bread being eaten (by the priest, Bellarmine adds), and he compares this not with
the sacrificial eating (comestio) of a victim, but with the combustion, the destruction,
of a burnt-offering (Lepin 1926, 386). However, Aquinas does not suggest that the
sacrificial gift must be killed, consumed or destroyed. He only says that something
special must be done with it, without specifying the act. Breaking, eating, and
blessing the bread do not mean the same as destroying it.
How does Aquinas conceive of the relation between the mass as a sacrifice and the
sacrifice of Christ? In line with the patristic tradition, Aquinas holds that offering the
sacrifice of the mass is not an autonomous, independent, and isolated activity of the
presiding priest or of the local community. It is related to the self-offering of Christ on
the cross, in which He is both the priest and the victim according to his humanity
(S.Th. III q. 22 a. 2).
Aquinas characterizes the relation between the sacrifice of the mass and Christ’s
historical sacrifice with two, apparently equivalent terms, which he takes from the
standard theological textbook of the Middle Ages, the Sentences of Peter Lombard
(IV Sent. d. 12 c. 5; Petrus Lombardus 1981, 308-309). The terms are:
‘representation’ (repraesentatio: S.Th. III q. 79 a. 7; cf. q. 73 a. 4 co. and ad 3; q. 76
a. 2 ad 1; q. 79 a. 1; q. 83 a. 3 and a. 5) and ‘commemoration’ (commemoratio,
memoriale: S.Th. III q. 22 a. 3 ad 2; q. 73 a. 4 co. and ad 3; q. 74 a. 1; q. 76 a. 2 ad
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2; q. 83 a. 4 ad 7). The sacrifice of the mass is not another, different, or new sacrifice
compared to Christ’s sacrifice, because it ‘represents’ or ‘commemorates’ the latter.
But what does this mean?
The ‘hyper-realist’ group of post-Tridentine Thomists, but also many later and
present-day commentators interpret ‘representation’ as some kind of ‘objective’ reactualisation, making present again, thereby linking or identifying the presence of the
sacrifice with the presence of the Body and Blood of Christ. Such are the readings of
Odo Casel (Casel 1926, 194-196), Anscar Vonier (summarized in Kilmartin 1998,
252-254), and, more recently, Thierry-Dominique Humbrecht (Humbrecht 1998) and
Matthew Levering (Levering 2004, 191-192; Levering 2005, 88-93, 160-164).
However, others, for example Ferdinand Pratzner, have argued on textual evidence
that repraesentatio and commemoratio are to be understood in the sense of
‘depiction’ (bildhafte Darstellung) and ‘subjective recollection’ (Pratzner 1970, 70-76;
and, less convincing, Mazza 1999, 210-214). Pratzner refers to the comparison
Aquinas makes between the paschal lamb, ‘the chief sacrament’ in the Old
Testament – where ‘sacrament’ has the wider meaning of ‘sacred sign’ – and the
Eucharist. As the former prefigured Christ’s future passion, the latter reminds of
Christ’s historical passion (S.Th. III q. 73 a. 5). Pratzner also discusses the separate
consecration of the bread and the wine, of which Aquinas says that it represents or
commemorates Christ’s passion (S.Th. III q. 74 a. 1; 76 a. 2 ad 1). He points out that
Aquinas says that the double consecration ‘serves to represent Christ’s passion, in
which the blood was (fuit) separate from the body’ (S.Th. III q. 76 a. 1 ad 2), but that
‘now the blood of Christ is not separated from his body, as it was at the time of the
passion and death’ (ibid. in co.). In other words, during the mass, the body and blood
of Christ are not separated as they were at the time of the crucifixion.
However, there is more evidence to corroborate Pratzner’s interpretation. One text in
Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences (also known as Scriptum) brings out the
contrast between ‘real identity’ and ‘representational identity’ unequivocally (Script.
super Sent. IV 4 d. 8 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 4 ad 4, 336):
This sacrament is directly representative of the Lord’s passion, by which Christ as
priest and host offered himself on the altar of the cross. However, the host that the
priest offers, is one with that host which Christ offered in reality (secundum rem),
because it really contains Christ. But the offering priest is not really the same (idem
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realiter). Therefore, he must be the same by representation (idem repraesentatione).
And therefore, the consecrating priest, as impersonating Christ, utters the words of
the consecration by reciting them in the person of Christ, so that the victim (hostia)
may not seem to be a different one.
What Aquinas here says about the priest being not really identical with Christ, but
only ‘by representation’, should also be applied to Christ’s sacrifice as represented in
the mass. While Christ’s body is really present in the mass, his passion is not.
Aquinas also contrasts the term ‘to represent’ with ‘to contain.’ The Eucharist
‘represents’ the passion but ‘contains’ Christ: ‘the Eucharist is called a sacrifice,
insofar as it represents the passion itself of Christ, but it is called ‘host’ (hostia)
insofar as it contains (continet) Christ himself, who is the host of sweetness, as is
said in Eph. 5’ (S.Th. III q. 73 a. 4 ad 3).
Next, unlike the transubstantiation, which Aquinas locates exclusively in the
utterance of the words of institution, the representation of Christ’s sacrifice is not
limited to one element in the celebration, but happens by the whole rite (Fitzpatrick
1991, 139-140). Apart from the double consecration, Aquinas mentions many other
gestures and objects during the mass that refer to Christ’s historical passion: the
altar representing the cross (S.Th. III q. 83 a. 1 ad 2), the signs of the cross made by
the priest during mass (S.Th. III q. 83 a. 5 ad 3), the stretching out of the arms by the
priest after the consecration signifying the stretching of the arms by Christ on the
cross (ibid. ad 5), the linen corporal representing the shroud in which Christ’s body
was wrapped (S.Th. III q. 83 a. 7). Aquinas also mentions the breaking of the bread
as a ‘sacrament [again in the meaning of ‘sign’] of the Lord’s passion, which was in
Christ’s true body.’ However, he states that ‘we cannot say that when the
consecrated bread is broken, Christ’s true body itself is broken’ (S.Th. III q. 77 a. 7)
for two reasons. The first one is that Christ’s body cannot perish (incorruptibile) or
suffer (impassibile). The bread has been converted into Christ’s risen body, which is
now in the state of glory (Script. super Sent. IV d. 12 q. 1 a. 1 qa. 2, 500). The
second reason is that, in accordance with Aquinas’s doctrine of transubstantiation,
the size and, hence the fraction, of the consecrated bread belongs to the accident of
quantitative dimension, not to the substance, which is Christ’s body.
On the other hand, the Eucharistic rite does not only refer to the passion. There are
even elements that are less expressive of the passion, for example, the use of bread
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instead of animal flesh (S.Th. III q. 74 a. 1 ad 1). Moreover, the ritual acts and
objects that commemorate the passion, signify more than just that. The consecrated
bread and wine also signify the unity of the Church, and they are spiritual food, the
bread protecting the body and the wine protecting the soul (S.Th. III q. 74 a. 1). The
linen corporal also signifies the purity of conscience (S.Th. III q. 83 a. 7). The fraction
of the bread also signifies the differentiation of the mystical body (that is, the Church)
according to the various states and it signifies the distribution of graces, which come
from Christ’s passion (S.Th. III q. 83 a. 5 ad 7), etc. The elements have a semantic
richness that is not exhausted by their reference to Christ’s historical sacrifice.
Next, all seven sacraments have a threefold signification according to temporal
dimensions: as a ‘commemorative’ sign each sacrament signifies something in the
past, viz. the passion of Christ, which is the cause of our sanctification, as a
‘demonstrative’ sign it signifies something in the present, viz. our sanctification by
grace, and as a ‘prognostic’ sign it refers to the future, eschatological reality (S.Th. III
q. 60 a. 3). The same goes for the Eucharist. Insofar as it signifies the past, it
commemorates the Lord’s passion, the true sacrifice. And Aquinas states: in this
respect it receives the name of ‘sacrifice’ (S.Th. III q. 73 a.4). It is clearly as
signifying something in the past, not something present, that the Eucharist is called a
sacrifice. Moreover, unlike some later Thomist theologians like Hesselius, Aquinas
relates the sacrifice of the mass only to Christ’s historical sacrifice, not to the idea of
an eternal sacrifice to the Father in heaven.
The topic that figured most prominently in sixteenth-century discussions was the
sacrificial killing or immolation of Christ. It is only once that Aquinas addresses this
question within the context of the Eucharist. In S.Th. III q. 83 a. 1, he quotes the then
standard phrase: ‘once Christ was sacrificially slaughtered (immolatus est) in
himself, and yet he is daily sacrificially slaughtered in the sacrament’ (S.Th. III q. 83
a. 1 s.c.).2 Aquinas attributes the words to Augustine, though they have rather
Lanfranc as author, were later adapted, incorporated into the Decretum Gratiani, and
found their way into the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Lepin 1922, 50-52). However,
Aquinas reinterprets the authoritative statement in such a way that there is no
question of a real, actual immolation during the mass. There are two reasons, he
says, why the celebration of the mass is called ‘the immolation of Christ.’ The first
The Blackfriars edition has the translation ‘sacrifice’ for the Latin immolatio, which
blurs the distinction with the Latin sacrificium.
2
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reason is that the mass is a ‘certain image representing the passion of Christ, which
is his true (vera) immolation,’ and Aquinas corroborates this reading with Augustine’s
own words that ‘images are usually called by the names of those things of which
they are the images; looking at a picture or wall painting, we say “that is Cicero” or
“that is Sallust”.’ And he adds that likewise we could say that Christ was sacrificially
killed in ‘the signs of the Old Testament.’ This is wholly in line with Pratzner’s
interpretation: just as Christ was not actually sacrificed in the Old Testament signs,
but his death was prefigured, likewise he is not actually killed in the Eucharist, but his
death is commemorated.
The other reason Aquinas gives is in view of the effects of the mass, because ‘by
this sacrament we come to participate in the fruits of the Lord’s Passion’ (S.Th. III q.
83 a. 13; cf. also a. 2 co. and ad 2). This second reason does not apply to the Old
Testament prefigurations like the paschal lamb, but is proper to the Christian
sacrament. The fruits of Christ’s Passion consist in sanctifying grace by which we
are liberated from sin, reconciled with God, and start a new way of living (cf. S.Th. III
q. 49; q. 62 a. 5). However, elsewhere Aquinas makes clear that we come to enjoy
these fruits through the Eucharist, not insofar as it is a sacrifice, but insofar as it is a
sacrament (also Lepin 1926, 190): ‘For insofar as in this sacrament Christ’s passion
is represented4, by which Christ offered himself as victim to God, as is said in Eph. 5,
it has the character of ‘sacrifice’, but insofar as in this sacrament grace is invisibly
given under a visible species, it has the character of ‘sacrament’ (S.Th. III q. 79 a. 7).
More specifically, we come to share in the fruits of Christ’s passion by actually
receiving together the sacrament of Body and Blood of Christ in the communion (cf.
S.Th. III q. 62 a. 5 and 6). To this effect, Aquinas quotes John of Damascus: the
Eucharist ‘is called “communion” because through it we are joined to Christ; and
because we participate in his flesh and godhead; and because we are joined and
united to each other through it’ (S.Th. III q. 73 a. 4).
In other words, according to Aquinas we can speak about Christ’s immolation during
the mass only in a derivative and improper sense: by pictorial reference and in its
effect. It is not that Christ himself is really, actually immolated.
3
The Latin text is incomplete in the Blackfriars edition.
The translation in the Blackfriars edition of repraesentatur as ‘makes present’ is
misleading.
4
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What is more, it seems that Aquinas thinks that Christ is not even symbolically
immolated in the mass. The act or event of being immolated is not ritually
symbolized by a specific gesture like the breaking or eating of the bread or the
double consecration. As mentioned earlier, the breaking and eating of the bread
need not to signify a kind of destruction. Also the (double) consecration need not be
understood as a symbolic re-enactment of the event of Christ’s immolation. It can
also be understood as representing the result of the act of immolation, as
representation of Christ having been killed, not of his being killed. In fact, Aquinas
speaks about the body and blood – or the bread and the wine – as in the state of
being apart (seorsum: S.Th. III q. 74 a. 1; 76 a. 2 ad 1; q. 78 a. 3 ad 1 and ad 2) from
each other in the Eucharist, not as in the act or process of being separated (also
Lepin 1926, 187). If the event of Christ being sacrificed is not ritually signified, then it
cannot belong to the sacrament in the strict sense of the word, that is, a sign that
causes and makes present what it signifies. For the sign is ‘the only door’ (Vonier) to
what is signified and sacramentally made present. As Vonier says: ‘[the sacrament of
the Eucharist] does not contain more than it signifies, because if it did contain more
that it signifies, it would not be a sacrament, but an absolute act of God’s
omnipotence, an act of which we would know nothing’ (quoted in Humbrecht 1998,
377).
3. Conclusion
According to Aquinas, Christ’s body and blood are really present in the Eucharist, his
historical sacrifice on the cross is not. The latter is said to be ‘represented’ in the
Eucharist, but the expression does not mean that it is made present in the way
Christ’s body and blood are. Christ’s passion and sacrifice are to be remembered by
the faithful as a historical event of the past. This is in contrast with the ‘hyper-realist’
Thomist interpretation of Bellarmine. But, unlike the more moderate theories of Cano
and others, Aquinas also does not seem to think that the act of Christ being
immolated is ritually re-enacted in the mass by some specific ritual gestures.
Many questions remain to be discussed. Does Aquinas think the Eucharist is only an
actual (external) sacrifice insofar as we offer and bless bread and wine? How can
people who do not participate in the celebration, for example the dead, benefit from
it? Can Aquinas’s position, as interpreted here, be reconciled with the statements of
Trent about the propitiatory character of the Eucharistic sacrifice? If these questions
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can be answered in a satisfying way, Aquinas could offer a fruitful contribution and a
creative impulse to rethinking the sacrifice of the Eucharist.
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