Plato’s Academy, a
mosaic in the Museo
Nazionale, Naples,
(Photo: Giraudon)
The Philebus to 36C.
Philosophy 190: Plato
Fall, 2014
Prof. Peter Hadreas
Course website:
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas/cour
ses/Plato
Cosimo di Giovanni de' Medici (1389 –1464) was the first of the
Medici political dynasty. They were the de facto rulers of
Florence during much of the Italian Renaissance. He was known
"Cosimo Pater Patriae" (Latin: 'father of the nation'). His power
derived from his great wealth as a banker, and he was also a
great patron of learning, the arts and architecture.
The Death of Cosimo de Medici1
“As Cosimo lay on his deathbed in the late July we learn
from Ficino himself in a letter to Lorenzo that at last
Cosimo heard the Philebus: “So, as you yourself know since
you were there, he died not long after we had read him
Plato’s dialogues on the one principle of things [the
Parmenides] and on the highest good [the Philebus]. It was
as if he did not want to wait to enjoy fully the good which
had been the theme of the discussion. The “not long after”
was, in Ficino’s recollection, twelve days.
1. Marsilio Ficino: The Philebus Commentary, A critical edition and
translation by Michael J. B. Allen, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1975), p. 6:
“Once again, this is evidence for the felt connection between
the two dialogues, though, parenthetically, Ficino was to
postpone the commenting on the Parmenides until much
later. From the ensuing discussion on the Philebus and the
other nine dialogues which Ficino manages to complete
before Cosimo died, Marcel suggests the meetings of the
Academy as a religio-philosophical society were informally
inaugurated among Cosimo’s frends. Till then the Academy
had been simply an unrealized ideal.”1
1. Ibid.
Characters of the Philebus:
Socrates
Protarchus
Philebus
“Protarchus is a young man, son of Callias (19B), pupil
of Gorgias, the famous teacher of rhetoric and sophistic
philosopher (58Aff.). I see no reason to doubt that he is
the Protarchus mentioned by Aristotle at Physics 197B as
the author of an apparently sophistic argument.”
1. Robin A, H. Waterfield in the Penguin Edition to the Philebus (Plato,
Philebus, London: Penguin, 1986), p. 10,
The Character of Philebus
It is not certain whether Philebus was a real or fictional
person. But, since both Socrates and Protarchus are real
people, it would be odd for Philebus not to be so also. His
name is appropriate for his hedonism (Mr. Loveboy, as
one commentator has put it) is neither here nor there: a
better translation might be Youth-friend. The portrayal
of Philebus is just vivid enough to make it likely that
Plato has a real person in mind: he is sullenly stubborn
(12A-B), a bad loser (11C) and, of course a hedonist. He
might be an older man (16B), or of a similar age, to
Socrates.
1. Adapted from Robin A, H. Waterfield in the Penguin Edition to the
Philebus (Plato, Philebus, London: Penguin, 1986), p. 10.
Aristotle’s reference to Protarchus, Physics 197b1:
“Chance and what results from chance are appropriate
to agents that are capable of good fortune and of action
generally. Therefore necessarily chance is in the sphere
of actions. This is indicated by the fact that good fortune
is thought to be the same, or nearly the same, as
happiness, and happiness to be a kind of action, since it
is well-doing. . . . Thus an inanimate thing or a beast or a
child cannot do anything by chance, because it is
incapable of choice; nor can good fortune or ill fortune
be ascribed to them, except metaphorically, as
Protarchus, for example, said that the stones of which
altars are made are fortunate because they are held in
honour, while their fellows are trodden under foot.”
…In the opening sentence of the argumentum, Ficino in
his commentatary on the Philebus talks of “the
wonderful order” Plato employed in composing the
Philebus. All but the most recent editors of the Philebus
have had great reservations.1 Ficino’s twelve parts
presumably correspond to the following in the Stephanus
pagination:
Part I: 11A-11D
Part II: 11D-15C
Part III: 15C-20A
Part IV: 20B-23B
Part V: 23C-27C
Part VI: 27C-30A
Part VII: 30A-31B
Part VIII 31B-55C
Part IX: 55C-59C
Part X 59C-61C
Part XI: 61D-66A
Part XII: 66A-67B
1. Marsilio Ficino: The Philebus Commentary, A critical edition and translation by
Michael J. B. Allen, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)
I. Statement of the issue:
The Good for Man (11A-12B )
11B, p. 399: “Socrates: Philebus holds that what is good
for all creatures is to enjoy themselves to be pleased and
delighted and whatever else goes together with that kind
of thing. We contend that not these, but knowing,
understanding and remembering, and what belongs with
them, right opinion and true calculations, are better than
pleasure and more agreeable to all who can attain them;
those who can, get the maximum benefit possible from
having them, both those now alive and future
generations. Isn’t that how we represent our prospective
opinions, Philebus?”
II. 12B-13D Pleasure as a generic unity,
containing a variety of species.
Socrates: . . . “But as to pleasure, I know that it is
complex and, just as I said, we must make our starting
point and consider carefully what sort of nature it has. If
one just goes by the name it is one single thing, but in
fact it comes in many forms that are in some way even
quite unlike each other. Think about it: we say that a
debauched person gets pleasure, as well as a soberminded person takes pleasure in his very sobriety. Again,
we say that a fool, though full of foolish opinions and
hopes, gets pleasure, but likewise we say a wise man
takes pleasure in his wisdom. But surely anyone who said
in either case that these pleasures are like one another
would rightly be regarded a fool.” (p. 400, 12D)
III. 13E-15C: The Problem of the One and the
Many. Socrates States His Method
Beginnings of the explanation of dialectic:
14C, p. 402: “Socrates: It is this principle that has turned
up here, which somehow has an amazing nature. For
that the many are one and the one many are amazing
statement, and can easily be disputed, whichever side of
the two one may want to defend.”
Protarchus uses for an example of unity his own personal
identity. The issue of personal identity and the unity of
the self is a perennial problem in philosophy. It has
become elemental to distinguish different senses of
personal identity, for example the empirical ego, the
transcendental ego, the moral ego, etc.
But Socrates at this point dismisses the issue as a childish
question. “You, dear Protarchus, are speaking about
those puzzles about the one and many that have become
commonplace. [Socrates may be thinking of the puzzle of
the ship that was sent to Delos.] They are agreed by
everybody, so to speak, to be no longer even worth
touching; they are considered childish and trivial but a
serious impediment to argument if one takes them on.”
(p. 402,14E)
15A, 403: Socrates restricts the issue of the one and
many to those things which are not generated and perish.
“Protarchus: But what other kinds of such puzzles [such
as an object’s identity over time] with respect to the same
principle do you have in mind, Socrates, that have not
yet admittedly become commonplace?
Socrates: When, my young friend, the one is not taken
from the things that come to be or perish, as we have just
done in our example. For that is where the sort of one
belongs that we were just discussing, which we agreed is
not worthy of scrutiny. But when someone tries to posit
man as one, or ox as one, or the beautiful as one and the
good as one, zealous concern with division of these
unities and the like gives rise to controversy.”
Socrates is aware that pleasures differ qualitatively, not
only quantitatively a distinction in ‘modern’ philosophy
associated with Jeremy Bentham’s hedonism versus J. S.
Mill’s. Socrates even claims that pleasures may be
opposite to themselves.
12E: Socrates: “Just as color is most like color! Really
you surprise me: Colors certainly won’t differ insofar as
each of them is a color; but all know that black is not
only different from white but is in fact its very opposite.
And shape is most like shape in the same way.”
IV. The Manner that DialecticShpould
Proceed in Relation to the One-and-theMany (15D-17A)
The entrance of the dialectic
15D, p. 403: “Socrates: Quite so. Now, where should we
make our entry into that complex and wide-ranging battle
about this controversial issue? Is it best not to start here?
“Protarchus: Where?
“Socrates: By making the point that it is through discourse
that the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in
all sorts of ways, in whatever it may be that is said at any
time, both long ago and now. And this will never come to an
end, nor has it just begun, but it seems to me that this is an
“immortal and ageless” [customary epithet of the gods in
the Iliad, cf. Iliad viii.539] condition that comes to us with
discourse. Whoever among the young first get a taste of it is
as pleased as if he had found a treasure in. [continued on
next slide]
The entrance of the dialectic [continued]
15D, p. 403: Socrates: [continued] He is quite beside
himself with pleasure and revels in moving every
statement, now turning it to one side and rolling it all up
into one, then again unrolling it and dividing it up. He
thereby involves first and foremost himself in confusion,
but then also whatever happens to be nearby, be they
younger or older or of the same age, sparing neither his
father or his mother nor anyone else who might listen to
him. He would almost try it on other creatures, not only
humans being, since he would certainly not spare any
foreigner if only he could find an interpreter somewhere.”
cf. Aristophanes’ satire of Socratic method in
the Clouds (ll. 1400-1430 approx.):
Son: Please answer this question: did you ever
hit me when I was small?
Old Man: Yes, but only for your own good and
Aristophanes
because I was fond of you.
c. 446 – c. 386 BC
Son: Well then, isn’t it right for me to be equally fond of
you, and there hit you, if as you say being fond of a person
is the same as hitting him? If I used to get whacked such a
lot it wouldn’t be proper for you to go scot-free, would it?
I’m a free man just as much as you are, you know … I
expect you’ll say that it’s the custom only for children to be
beaten; but my answer to that is that old men are in their
second childhood and that they ought to be beaten more
than the young because they have less excuse for being
naughty.
cf. Aristophanes’ satire of Socratic method in the Clouds (ll.
1400-1430 approx.) [continued]:
O. M. But all over the world it’s against the law for a son to
beat his father.
Son: But wasn’t that law instituted by a man just like you
or me? And didn’t he have to win over out ancestors to get
it adopted? Why shouldn’t I be able to pass a new law, that
in future some should hit their fathers back? … Take
roosters and other creatures like that – look at the
punishing they give to their fathers. And they’re no
different from us, are they?...
O. M.: Well, if you want to model yourself on a rooster, why
don’t you go eat dirt or go and roost on a perch?
Son: Don’t be absurd. That’s got nothing to do with it;
Socrates wouldn’t think so anyway.
The “immortal and ageless” condition of the wandering –
flitting about -- “that comes with discourse.”
Some diverse philosophical complaints of this condition:
”Words impede me and I am nearly deceived by the terms of
ordinary language.”
Descartes Meditations, Second Meditation.
The “immortal and ageless” condition of the wandering –
flitting about -- “that comes with discourse.”
Some diverse philosophical complaints of this condition.
The Cambridge School of Analysis as led by Frege, Russell and
the early Wittgenstein
“The paradigm of analysis at this time was Russell’s theory of descriptions,
which (as we have seen in relation to Russell and Wittgenstein above)
opened up the whole project of rephrasing propositions into their ‘correct’
logical form, not only to avoid the problems generated by misleading surface
grammatical form, but also to reveal their ‘deep structure’. Embedded in
the metaphysics of logical atomism, this gave rise to the idea of analysis as
the process of uncovering the ultimate constituents of our propositions (or
the primitive elements of the ‘facts’ that our propositions represent).”1
1. Beaney, Michael, "Analysis", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/analysis/>.
Confucianism and the Rectification of Names1
Social and Political Ramifications of shifting meanings
“Here is a father – but look at what he does! he is a drunkard,
he allows his lodgings to fall into disrepair, he does not care
about his appearance. Yes, he may have a family – but everyone
in the village knows that he does not truly deserve the name of
father.
And so there is this concern in Confucianism for things to truly
correspond to the name given to them. Here is a quote from
The Analects:
Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius
replied, “There is government, when prince is prince, and the
minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is
son.” “Good”, said the duke, “if indeed; the prince be not
prince, the minister not minister, the father not father, and the
son not son, although I have my revenue, can I enjoy it?”
Confucius, Analects 12.11.
1. Dowloaded 11/16/2014 from http://andrewhong.net/2011/08/11/confucianism-and-
Confucianism and the Rectification of Names1
Social and Political Ramifications of shifting meanings
And so the Rectification of Names was a means by which
things were either to be called their correct names (that is,
the name corresponding to behaviour), or people are meant
to live up to the name that they have. Either the people go
about calling that government official a thief – or he
behaves like a government official should!
This was important for Confucius in the task of governing
the state. Unless this is done, “affairs cannot be carried on
to success.”
1. Ibid.
16A, p. 404” Protarchus rallies in defense of the young.
Protarchus points out that the crowd he’s speaking to is
young.
Protarchus: “ . . . And are you not afraid that we will gang
up against you with Philebus if you insult us? Still, we
know that you want to say, and if there are some ways and
means to remove this kind of disturbance from our
discussion in a peaceful way, and to show us a better
solution to the problem, then just go ahead, and we will
follow you as best we can. For the present question is no
mean thing, Socrates.”
Plato’s Revision of the method of Collection and Division,
as sketched in the Phaedrus, and the Method of Diaeresis
(Bifurcation) as used in the Sophist and Statesman
16C, p. 404:
“Protarchus: What is this way? Let us have it.
Socrates: It is not very difficult to describe it, but extremely
difficult to use. For everything in any field of art that has
ever been discovered has come to light because of this. See
what I have in mind
Protarchus: Please do tell us.”
Socrates: “It is the gift of the gods to men, or so it seems to
me, hurled down from heaven by some Prometheus along
with a most dazzling fire. And the people of old, superior to
us in living closer proximity to the gods, have bequeathed us
this tale, what whatever is said to be consists of one and
many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness.
Plato’s Revision of the method of Collection and Division,
as sketched in the Phaedrus, and the Method of Diaeresis
(Bifurcation) as used in the Sophist and Statesman
16C, p. 404. Since this is the structure of things, we have to
assume that there is in each case always one form, and for
every one of them, and we must search for it, as we will
indeed find it there. And once we have grasped it, we must
look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or
some number. And we must treat every one of these further
unities in the same way, until it is not only established of the
original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also
how many kinds it is. For we must not grant the form of the
unlimited to the plurality that lies between the unlimited
and the one. Only then is it permitted to release each kind
of unity into the unlimited and let it go.”
Plato’s Revision of the method of Collection and Division,
as sketched in the Phaedrus, and the Method of Diaeresis
(Bifurcation) as used in the Sophist and Statesman
What we calling the Method of Dialectic in the Philebus is a
refinement of the method of collection and division, in the
Phaedrus. It departs from the Method of Diaeresis in the
Sophist and Statesman, where the method of division
presumes successive bifurcations. In this final method there
is no termination at the sought after kind. One keeps on
dividing up until one gets to an unlimited.
Plato’s Revision of the method of Collection and Division,
as sketched in the Phaedrus, and the Method of Diaeresis
(Bifurcation) as used in the Sophist and Statesman
[continued from previous slide]This the doctrine that
Aristotle attributes to Plato in Metaphysics I, 987b23-29:
”But he [Plato] agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying
that the One is substance and not a predicate of something
else; and in saying that the numbers are the causes of the
substance of other things. He also agreed with them; but
positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of great
and small, instead of treating the infinite as a one, is
peculiar to him; and so is his view that the numbers exist
apart from the sensible things, while they say that the
things themselves are numbers, and do not place the objects
of mathematics between Form and sensible things.”
“ . . . hurled down from heaven by
some Prometheus along with a most
dazzling fire.” 404, 16D
Jan Cossiers,
17th century
V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and
Unlimited
17B, p. 405: Example #1: Articulated speech
“Socrates: What I mean is clear in the case of letters, and
you should take your clue from them, since they were part
of your own education.
Protarchus:? How so?
Socrates: The sound that comes out of the mouth is one for
each and every one of us, but then it is unlimited in number.
What’s the meaning of
“The sound that comes out of the mouth is
one for each and every one of us, but then it
is unlimited in number.”
1. ‘One’ in the sense of articulated speech a
type of sound?
2. ‘Unlimited’ in the sense of combinations
of articulate syllables into speech?
V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and Unlimited
18C, p. 406: Example #1, revisited through an Egyptian
myth.
“Socrates: . . . as the tradition in Egypt claims for a certain deity
called Theuth. He was the first to discover that the vowels in that
unlimited variety, are not one but several, and again that there
are others that are not voiced, but make some kind of noise, and
that they, too, have a number. As a third kind of letter he
established one without sounds we now call mute. After this he
further subdivided the ones without sound or mutes down to
every single unit. In same same fashion he also dealt with the
vowels and the intermediates, until he found out the number for
each of them, and then he gave all of them together the name
‘letter.’ As he realized that none of us could gain any knowledge
of a single one of them, taken by itself without understanding
them all, he considered that the one link that somehow unifies
them all and called it the art of literacy.
Current Phonetic Division as Established as the International
Phonetics Alphabets
There Seems To Be An Indeteminate Sound
Which Does not Fit into Socrates’ Scheme:
The Schwa-- Symbol: ə
The schwa (also spelled shwa) refers to the mid-central
vowel sound denoted by the International Phonetics
Alphabet symbol ə, or another vowel sound close to that
position. An example in English is the vowel sound in the
'a' of the word 'about'. Schwa in English is mainly found
in unstressed positions, but in some other languages it
occurs more frequently as a stressed vowel.
In some languages other than English, the name "schwa"
and the symbol ə is some other unstressed and toneless
neutral vowel, not necessarily mid-central.
V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and
Unlimited
17B, p. 405: Example #2: Musical Intervals
“Socrates: And the very same things leads to the knowledge
of music.
Protarchus: How is that?
Socrates: Sound is also the unit in this art, just as it was in
writing.
Protarchus: Yes, right.
Socrates: We should now posit low and high pitch in two
kinds, and equal pitch as a third kind. Or what would you
say?
Protarchus: Just that.
V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and
Unlimited
17B, p. 405: Example #2: Musical Intervals
[continued] “Socrates: But you could not yet claim
knowledge of music if you knew only this much, though if
you were ignorant even about that, you would be quite
incompetent in these matters, as one might say.
Protarchus: Certainly.
Socrates: But you will be competent, my friend, once you
have learned how many intervals there are in high and low
pitch, and what character they have, by what notes the
intervals are defined, and the kinds of combinations they
form – all of which our forebears have discovered and left
to us, their successors, together with the names of these
modes of harmony.
V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and
Unlimited
Digression on Example #2: Musical Intervals.
Schopenhauer’s Appropriation
Arthur Schopenhauer
(1788 -1860 )
“. . . all harmony of the notes
depends upon the coincidence of
their vibration…
So long as the vibrations of two
notes have a rational relation to
each other, which can be expressed
in small numbers, they can be
connected together in our
apprehension though their
constantly recurring coincidence.”
Schopenhauer, Arthur, “On the Metaphysics
of Music,” in The World as Will and Idea, Vol
III, (Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1887), pp.
235-6.
“If, on the other hand, that
relation is an irrational one, or
one which can only be
expressed in larger numbers,
then no coincidence of the
vibrations which can be
apprehended occurs
…. they resist being joined
together in our apprehension.”
Arthur Schopenhauer
(1788 -1860 )
Schopenhauer, Ibid, p. 236.
So we apprehend easily the musical
ratios of 1:2, 2:3, 3:4, 4:5, as in the
octave, perfect fifth, perfect fourth,
major third, etc. But what does this
have to do with ‘the Will’?
Arthur Schopenhauer
(1788 -1860 )
“Now the connection of the
metaphysical significance of music
with this its physical and arithmetical
basis depends upon the fact that
what resists our apprehension, the
irrational relation, or the dissonance,
becomes the natural type of what
resists our will;
and, conversely, the consequence, or
the rational relation, which easily
adapts itself to our apprehension
becomes the type of the satisfaction
of the will.”
Schopenhauer, Ibid, p. 236.
Arthur Schopenhauer
(1788 -1860 )
“And further, since that rational and
irrational element in the numerical
ratios of the vibrations admits of
innumerable degrees, shades of
difference, sequence, and variations,
by means of it music becomes the
material in which all the movements
of the human heart, i. e., of the will,
whose essential nature is always
satisfaction and dissatisfaction,
although in innumerable degrees,
can be faithfully portrayed…”
1. Schopenhauer, Ibid, p. 236.
“Therefore the affections of the
will itself, thus actual pain and
actual pleasure, must not be
excited, but only their
substitutes, … as a picture of
the satisfaction of the will1,
and that which is more or less
repugnant to it, as a picture of
greater or less pain.”
Arthur Schopenhauer
(1788 -1860 )
1. …als Bild der Befriedigung des Willens…
Schopenhauer, Ibid, p. 237.
An Extremely Developed Contemporary Taxonomy Which
Would Concur With Plato’s Method in the Philebus
The hierarchy of biological classification's major eight taxonomic
ranks. A domain contains one or more kingdoms. In biological
taxonomy, a kingdom or regnum is a taxonomic rank in either
(historically) the highest rank, or (in the new three-domain
system) the rank below domain. Each kingdom is divided into
smaller groups called phyla (or in some contexts these are called
"divisions"). Currently, many textbooks from the United States
use a system of six kingdoms (Animalia, Plantae, Fungi, Protista,
Archaea, and Eubacteria), while British and Australian
textbooks describe five kingdoms (Animalia, Plantae, Fungi,
Protista, and Prokaryota or Monera). The classifications of
taxonomy are life, domain, kingdom, phylum, class, order,
family, genus, and species.
Change in Planets in the Solar System: How did Pluto lose
its status a Planet?
As of August 2006, Pluto was denied planetary status:
For an object to be a planet, it needs to meet these three
conditions defined by the International Astronomical
Union:
1. It needs to be in orbit around the Sun – Pluto, passes.
2. It needs to have enough gravity to pull itself into a
spherical shape – Pluto passes.
3. It needs to have "cleared the neighborhood" of its orbit –
Pluto does not pass.
Question: Consider the ‘dialectical conversation’ that led to
Pluto’s removal from the planets in the solar system.
VII. 20C-22C Strategy of Determining the Good Life: The
good life cannot consist exclusively either of Pleasure or of
Intelligence
A. Preliminary Delineation of the Problem -- Neither
Pleasure nor Thought alone is the Good for Man (20C-22C)
20E, p. 408: Socrates proposes to look at pleasure and
knowledge separately.
21D, p. 409: Concludes that the life of only pleasure is
unacceptable: “You would thus not live a human life but
the life of a mollusk or one of those creatures in shells that
live in the sea.”
VII. 20C-22C Strategy of Determining the Good Life: The
good life cannot consist exclusively either of Pleasure or of
Intelligence
20B-C, p. 408:
“Socrates: It is a doctrine that once upon a time I heard in a
dream -- or perhaps I was awake -- that I remember now
concerning pleasure and knowledge, that neither of the two
is the good, but that there is some third thing which is
different from and superior to both of them. But if we can
clearly conceive now that this is the case, then pleasure has
lost its bid for victory. For the good could no longer turn out
to be identical with it. Right?
VII. 20C-22C Strategy of Determining the Good Life: The
good life cannot consist exclusively either of Pleasure or of
Intelligence [further continued]
“Thus neither of the two would be the good, but it could be
assumed that that one or the other of them is its cause. But I
would be even more ready to contend against Philebus that,
whatever the ingredient in the mixed life that makes it
choiceworthy and good, reason is more closely related to
that thing and more like it than pleasure; and if this can be
upheld, neither first nor second prize could really ever be
claimed for pleasure. She will not even get as much as third
prize, if we can put some trust in my insight for now.” (22E,
p. 410 )
VII. 20C-22C Strategy of Determining the Good Life: The
good life cannot consist exclusively either of Pleasure or of
Intelligence [continued]
21E, p. 409: Socrates: . . . Let us inspect the life of reason .
..
Protarchus: What kind of life do you have in mind?
Socrates: Whether any one of us would choose to live in
possession of every kind of intelligence, reason, knowledge,
and memory of all things, while having no part, neither
large nor small, of pleasure or pain, living in total
insensitivity of anything of that kind.”
Protarchus: To me at least either of these two forms of life
seems worthy of choice, nor would it to anyone else, I
presume.”
VIII . (23C-26D) The Relative Significance and Place of
Pleasure and Thought in the Good for Man: The Fourfold
Classification of All Existents.
The need for a fourth kind, in explanation
23D, p. 411:
“Socrates: Let us now take these as two kinds, while
treating the one that results from the mixture of these two
as our third kind. But I must look like a fool with my
distinction into kinds and enumerations!
Protarchus: What are you driving at?
Socrates: That we seem to be in need of yet a fourth kind.
Protarchus: Tell us what it is.
Socrates: Look at the cause of this combination of those two
together, and posit it as my fourth kind in addition to those
three.
27D, p. 415 Socrates: “ . . . We declared the life that
combines pleasure and knowledge the winner. Didn’t we?” .
. . We will, I think assign it to the third kind, for it is not a
mixture of just two elements but of the sort where all that is
unlimited is tied down by a limit. It would seem right, then,
to make our victorious form of life part of that kind.”
The best life is of the third kind, combines pleasure and
knowledge. We should distinguish between a combination
and mixture, cf. salt and pepper, versus a compound, Na
and Cl. Chlorine as a gas in poisonous but in the exact
measure a compound ration a 1:1 ratio we have table salt.
Or consider beneficence for life of the ratio of 2:1 in
hydrogen and oxygen.
VIII. Pleasure and pain do not have a limit
27E, p. 416: (Philebus reenters the conversation)
Socrates: That is settled, then. But how about your kind of
life, Philebus, which is pleasant an unmixed? To which of
the established kinds should it by right be assigned? But
before you make your pronouncement, answer me the
following question.
Philebus: Just tell me!
Socrates: Do pleasure and pain have a limit, or are they of
the sort that admit of the more and less?
Philebus: Certainly the sort that admit the more, Socrates!
For how could pleasure be all that is good if it were not by
nature boundless in plenty and increase.
IX. 26E-31B The affinity of Intelligence to the Cosmic
Cause, and to the cause of goodness in the Mixed Life.
29C, p. 417:
Socrates: “. . . There is something called fire that belongs to
us, and then again there is fire in the universe.
Protarchus: No doubt.
Socrates: And is not the fire that belongs to us small
amount, feeble and poor, while the fire in the universe
overwhelms us by its size and beauty and by the display of
all its power?
Protarchus: What you say is true.
Socrates: But what about this? Is the fire in the universe
generated, nourished and ruled by the fire that belongs to
us, or is it not quite the reverse, that your heat ad mine, and
that every animal, owe all this to the cosmic fire?
The role of ‘the cause’ in organizing even pleasure and pain
p. 418, 29E Same is true for body of universe and our
sustenance.
[continued]” Protarchus: It is not even worth answering
the question.
Socrates: Right. And I guess you will give the same answer
about the earth here in the animals when it is compared to
earth in the universe, and likewise about the other elements
I mentioed a little earlier. Is that your answer?
Protarchus: Who could answer differently without seeming
insane?
“Socrates: No one at all. But now see what follows. To the
combination of all these elements taken as a unit we give the
name ‘body,’ don’t we?
The role of ‘the cause’ in organizing even pleasure and pain
p. 418, 29E Same is true for body of universe and our
sustenance.
[continued] “But what about the following, it this also a
question not worth asking?
Protarchus: Tell me what the question is.
Socrates: Of the body that belongs to us, will we not say
that it has a soul?
Protarchus: Quite obviously that is what we will say.
Socrates: But where does it come from, unless the body of
the universe which has the same properties as ours, but
more beautiful in all respects, happens to posses a soul.
Protarchus: Clearly from nowhere else.
The role of ‘the cause’ in the organization of our souls (30B,
p. 418)
Socrates: We surely cannot maintain this assumption, with
respect to our four classes (limit, the unlimited, their
mixture and their cause – which is present in everything):
that this cause is recognized as all-encompassing wisdom,
since among us it imports the soul and provides training for
the body and medicine for its ailments and in other cases
order and restitution, but that it should fail to be
responsible for the same things on a large scale in the whole
universe (things that are, in addition, beautiful, pure), for
the contrivance of what was so fair and wonderful in
nature.”
Protarchus: That would make no sense aty all.
30C, p. 418
“Socrates: But if that is inconceivable, we had better pursue
the alternative account and affirm, as we have said often,
that there is plenty of the unlimited in the universe as well
as sufficient limit, and that there is, above them. a certain
cause, of no small significance, that order are coordinates
the years, seasons and months, and which has every right to
the title of wisdom and reasons.
Protarchus: The greatest right.
Note: This is not an argument by ‘intelligent design’
argument for God. Rather it is a macro-microcosmic
argument by analogy. As the bodily aspect of ourselves and
world is a part in kind of the universe, so similarly is the
soul, or self-moving part of ourselves to the soul of the
universe.
X. The Psychology of Pleasure and Pain (31A-53C)
XA: 31b-32B Pleasure as replenishment of wastage
31E Pleasure as restoration of a bodily balance harmony.
XB: 32B-36C Pleasures of anticipation; the part played in
them by sensation, memory and desire. First, memory is
added it in replenishment, with sense of being empty.
In p. 423, 35B-C there is shift to desire which is analyzed as
the need for physical replenishment which is understood
along with hope of attaining replenishment.
35B, p. 423: “Socrates: He does, then not have a desire for
what in fact he experiences. For he is thirsty, and this is a
process of emptying. His desire is rather for filling.”
Practicing the ‘Dialectic’ described in the Philebus.
Consider one of the following types and determine
1) what might be the genus under which it falls
2) what might be logically distinct divisions of the type in
question.
3) if applicable, further consider those divisions, or subtypes into a further level or levels of divisions.
Possible types or kinds:
soups
texts
SJSU students
comedies
democracies
a posteriori knowledge
the ego
pleasure
meaning
beings
Slide #2; portrait of Cosimo de Medici:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosimo_de'_Medici#mediaviewer/File:Cosimo_di_M
edici_(Bronzino).jpg,
slide #18, bust of Aristophanes: http://www.imagination.com/moonstruck/clsc13.htm
slide #33, table of phonetic alphabet: http://www.esllounge.com/student/extra/phonetic-chart.php
slide #35: picture of tongue positions for vowels:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Phonetic_Alphabet#mediaviewer/File:C
ardinal_vowel_tongue_position-front.svg