Read the
Following
Oyez Cases
• Dred Scott v. Sandford
• Decided: Friday, March 6, 1857
• Categories: international law, federal courts, federalism, jurisdiction, race
discrimination
• Facts of the Case:
• Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois
(a free state) and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was
forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri,
Scott sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming
that his residence in free territory made him a free man. Scott then brought a
new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no pure-blooded
Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in
the sense of Article III of the Constitution.
• Question:
• Was Dred Scott free or slave?
• Conclusion:
• Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a
citizen of the United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only
Congress could confer national citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion
that no person descended from an American slave had ever been a citizen
for Article III purposes. The Court then held the Missouri Compromise
unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery question once and for all.
• Plessy v. Ferguson
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Decided: Monday, May 18, 1896
Categories: slavery, segregation, race, equal protection, race discrimination,
discrimination
Facts of the Case:
The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for
blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths
Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused
to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested.
Question:
Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an
unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an
opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial
segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal
doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate but equal" was
not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment
intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. But Brown
noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either."
In short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.
• Brown v. Board of Education (I)
• Decided: Monday, May 17, 1954
• Issues: Civil Rights, Desegregation, Schools
• Categories: federalism, segregation, race, education, race discrimination,
discrimination 
• Facts of the Case:
• Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white
children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the
races. The white and black schools approached equality in terms of
buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. This case was
decided together with Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County.
• Question:
• Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race
deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the 14th Amendment?
• Conclusion:
• Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors, intangible
issues foster and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education
has a detrimental effect on minority children because it is interpreted as a
sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were
permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but equal is
inherently unequal in the context of public education. The unanimous
opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial
separation.
• Korematsu v. United States
• Decided: Monday, December 18, 1944
• Categories: discrimination based on national origin, commander in
chief, war powers, presidency, race, criminal, race discrimination,
discrimination 
• Facts of the Case:
• During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and
congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens
of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense
and potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San
Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of
the U.S. Army.
• Question:
• Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by
implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of
Japanese descent?
• Conclusion:
• The Court sided with the government and held that the need to
protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice
Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally
suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril."
• Reed v. Reed
• Decided: Monday, November 22, 1971
• Issues: Civil Rights, Sex Discrimination
• Categories: sex discrimination, fourteenth amendment, equal protection,
discrimination 
• Facts of the Case:
• The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to
females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their
adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the
administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According
to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally
challenged the law in court.
• Question:
• Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
• Conclusion:
• In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar
treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued
that "to give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings
on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
. .The choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the
basis of sex."
• Craig v. Boren
• Decided: Monday, December 20, 1976
• Issues: Civil Rights, Sex Discrimination; Judicial Power, Mootness; Judicial
Power, Mootness; Judicial Power, Standing to Sue, Personal Injury
• Categories: standing, justiciability, fourteenth amendment, equal protection
Facts of the Case:
• An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to
males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig,
a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and a licensed vendor
challenged the law as discriminatory.
• Question:
• Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and
women?
• Conclusion:
• In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional
gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the
state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship
between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the
drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that
the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal
Protection Clause in the case.
• Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
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Decided: Monday, June 26, 1978
Issues: Civil Rights, Affirmative Action
Categories: affirmative action, race, education, race discrimination, discrimination 
Facts of the Case:
Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the
University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school
reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities,
as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress
longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's
qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority
students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended,
first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from
admission solely on the basis of race.
Question:
Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that
resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical
school?
Conclusion:
No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that
any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical
school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial
quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in
admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell
joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of
several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the
goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through
affirmative action.
• Adarand Constructors v. Pena
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Decided: Monday, June 12, 1995
Issues: Civil Rights, Affirmative Action
Categories: affirmative action, race, fifth amendment, race discrimination, discrimination
Facts of the Case:
Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid
as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of
Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would
receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall
presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other
minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency
contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the
work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor
would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring
Gonzales.
Question:
Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of
favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle
embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial
classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict
scrutiny review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and
must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation
programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated
under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition
for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based
classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof
of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The
Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's
program satisfied strict scrutiny.
• Frontiero v. Richardson
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Decided: Monday, May 14, 1973
Issues: Civil Rights, Sex Discrimination
Categories: marriage, sex discrimination, discrimination 
Facts of the Case:
Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a
dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives
of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of
female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents
unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support.
Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down.
Question:
Did a federal law, requiring different qualification criteria for male and female
military spousal dependency, unconstitutionally discriminate against women
thereby violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded
"dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated,"
violating the Due Process Clause. Applying a strict standard of review to the
sex-based classification, the Court found that the government's interest in
administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices. The
Court held that statutes that drew lines between the sexes on those grounds
alone necessarily involved "the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Constitution.'"
Court Cases
by Facts
Facts of the Case:
? was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he
resided in Illinois (a free state) and in an area of the
Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by
the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning
to Missouri, ? sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri
courts for his freedom, claiming that his residence
in free territory made him a free man. ? then
brought a new suit in federal court. ?'s master
maintained that no pure-blooded Negro of African
descent and the descendant of slaves could be a
citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution.
Dred Scott v. Sandford
Decided: Friday, March 6, 1857
Facts of the Case:
The state of Louisiana enacted a law
that required separate railway cars for
blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer
Adolph ?--who was seven-eighths
Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites
only" car of a Louisiana train. He
refused to move to the car reserved for
blacks and was arrested.
Plessy v. Ferguson
Decided: Monday, May 18, 1896
Facts of the Case:
Black children were denied admission
to public schools attended by white
children under laws requiring or
permitting segregation according to the
races. The white and black schools
approached equality in terms of
buildings, curricula, qualifications, and
teacher salaries. This case was decided
together with Briggs v. Elliott and Davis
v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County.
Brown v. Board of Education (I)
Decided: Monday, May 17, 1954
Facts of the Case:
During World War II, Presidential
Executive Order 9066 and congressional
statutes gave the military authority to
exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry
from areas deemed critical to national
defense and potentially vulnerable to
espionage. ? remained in San Leandro,
California and violated Civilian Exclusion
Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army.
Korematsu v. United States
Decided: Monday, December 18,
1944
Facts of the Case:
The Idaho Probate Code specified that
"males must be preferred to females" in
appointing administrators of estates. After
the death of their adopted son, both Sally
and Cecil ? sought to be named the
administrator of their son's estate (the ?s
were separated). According to the Probate
Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and
Sally challenged the law in court.
Reed v. Reed
Decided: Monday, November 22,
1971
Facts of the Case:
An Oklahoma law prohibited the
sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent
beer to males under the age of 21
and to females under the age of 18.
Curtis ?, a male then between the
ages of 18 and 21, and a licensed
vendor challenged the law as
discriminatory.
Craig v. Boren
Decided: Monday, December 20,
1976
Facts of the Case:
?, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work,
submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a
project funded by the United States Department of
Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the
prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it
hired small businesses controlled by "socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause
declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals include Black
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian
Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law
requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal
agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales
Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was
certified as a minority business; ? was not. The prime
contractor would have accepted ?'s bid had it not been for
the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.
Adarand Constructors v. Pena
Decided: Monday, June 12, 1995
Facts of the Case:
Sharron ?, a lieutenant in the United States
Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance
for her husband. Federal law provided that
the wives of members of the military
automatically became dependents;
husbands of female members of the military,
however, were not accepted as dependents
unless they were dependent on their wives
for over one-half of their support. ?'s request
for dependent status for her husband was
turned down.
Frontiero v. Richardson
Decided: Monday, May 14, 1973
Facts of the Case:
Allan ?, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice
applied for admission to the University of California
Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both
times. The school reserved sixteen places in each
entering class of one hundred for "qualified"
minorities, as part of the university's affirmative
action program, in an effort to redress
longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the
medical profession. ?'s qualifications (college GPA
and test scores) exceeded those of any of the
minority students admitted in the two years ?'s
applications were rejected. ? contended, first in the
California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that
he was excluded from admission solely on the
basis of race.
Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke
Decided: Monday, June 26, 1978
Court Cases by
Question and
Conclusion
Question:
Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by
establishing different drinking ages for men and
women?
Conclusion:
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute
made unconstitutional gender classifications. The
Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of
Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial
relationship between the law and the maintenance of
traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits
of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also
found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter
the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the
case.
Craig v. Boren
Decided: Monday, December 20,
1976
Question:
Did a federal law, requiring different qualification criteria
for male and female military spousal dependency,
unconstitutionally discriminate against women thereby
violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Court held that the statute in question clearly
commanded "dissimilar treatment for men and women
who are similarly situated," violating the Due Process
Clause. Applying a strict standard of review to the sexbased classification, the Court found that the
government's interest in administrative convenience could
not justify discriminatory practices. The Court held that
statutes that drew lines between the sexes on those
grounds alone necessarily involved "the 'very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution.'"
Frontiero v. Richardson
Decided: Monday, May 14, 1973
Question:
Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and
consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory
practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held
that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state,
or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other
words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and
must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court
added that compensation programs which are truly based on
disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower
equal protection standards. However, since race is not a
sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the
award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must
be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even
proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of
present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination
of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied
strict scrutiny.
Adarand Constructors v. Pena
Decided: Monday, June 12, 1995
Question:
Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in
the repeated rejection of ?'s application for admission to its
medical school?
Conclusion:
No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the
justices contended that any racial quota system supported by
government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the
medical school to admit ?. However, in his opinion, Powell
argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the
school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of
race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education
was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as
well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of
several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize
white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for ?) while
extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.
Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke
Decided: Monday, June 26, 1978
Question:
Did the President and Congress go beyond
their war powers by implementing exclusion
and restricting the rights of Americans of
Japanese descent?
Conclusion:
The Court sided with the government and held
that the need to protect against espionage
outweighed ?'s rights. Justice Black argued
that compulsory exclusion, though
constitutionally suspect, is justified during
circumstances of "emergency and peril."
Korematsu v. United States
Decided: Monday, December 18,
1944
Question:
Does the segregation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race deprive the minority
children of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by
"objective" factors, intangible issues foster and
maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public
education has a detrimental effect on minority
children because it is interpreted as a sign of
inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate
facilities were permissible provided they were equal
was rejected. Separate but equal is inherently
unequal in the context of public education. The
unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all
forms of state-maintained racial separation.
Brown v. Board of Education (I)
Decided: Monday, May 17, 1954
Question:
Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's
dissimilar treatment of men and women was
unconstitutional. The Court argued that "to give a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the
elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. . .The choice in this context may not
lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."
Reed v. Reed
Decided: Monday, November 22,
1971
Question:
Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains
an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and
immunities and the equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The
majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings
Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices
based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that
separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the
Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The
phrase, "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.)
Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended
to establish absolute equality for the races before the law.
But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color,
or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality,
or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In
short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful
discrimination.
Plessy v. Ferguson
Decided: Monday, May 18, 1896
Question:
Was ? free or slave?
Conclusion:
? was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued
Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States
could be a citizen of a state, and that only
Congress could confer national citizenship.
Taney reached the conclusion that no person
descended from an American slave had ever
been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court
then held the Missouri Compromise
unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery
question once and for all.
Dred Scott v. Sandford
Decided: Friday, March 6, 1857
Court Cases by
Category and
Issues
(difficult)
Issues:
Civil Rights, Sex Discrimination; Judicial
Power, Mootness; Judicial Power,
Mootness; Judicial Power, Standing to
Sue, Personal Injury
Categories:
standing, justiciability, fourteenth
amendment, equal protection 
Craig v. Boren
Decided: Monday, December 20,
1976
Issues:
Civil Rights, Affirmative Action
Categories:
affirmative action, race,
education, race discrimination,
discrimination
Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke
Decided: Monday, June 26, 1978
Issues:
Civil Rights, Affirmative Action
Categories:
affirmative action, race, fifth
amendment, race discrimination,
discrimination
Adarand Constructors v. Pena
Decided: Monday, June 12, 1995
Issues:
Civil Rights, Sex Discrimination
Categories:
marriage, sex discrimination,
discrimination
Frontiero v. Richardson
Decided: Monday, May 14, 1973
Categories:
international law, federal courts,
federalism, jurisdiction, race
discrimination
Dred Scott v. Sandford
Decided: Friday, March 6, 1857
Categories:
slavery, segregation, race,
equal protection, race
discrimination,
discrimination
Plessy v. Ferguson
Decided: Monday, May 18, 1896
Issues:
Civil Rights, Desegregation,
Schools
Categories:
federalism, segregation, race,
education, race discrimination,
discrimination
Brown v. Board of Education (I)
Decided: Monday, May 17, 1954
Categories:
discrimination based on
national origin, commander in
chief, war powers,
presidency, race, criminal,
race discrimination,
discrimination
Korematsu v. United States
Decided: Monday, December 18,
1944
Issues:
Civil Rights, Sex Discrimination
Categories:
sex discrimination, fourteenth
amendment, equal protection,
discrimination
Reed v. Reed
Decided: Monday, November 22,
1971