Jeff Smith
Comm 459
Huntington Broadcast Co. v. Monsos
November 21, 2013
In the case of Huntington Broadcasting Co. v. Monsos, my partner, Cody Zimmerman, and I are
representing the side of Huntington Broadcasting. In this legal brief I will be arguing for the
reversal of the case through establishing that the news report was in fact of legitimate concern to
the public. I will also be examining the issues pertaining to Monsos complaints following the
broadcast in line with the private university at which she was attending as class president. My
partner will be arguing that since Monsos is a public figure, she is to be held to a different
standard of privacy, similar to the standards of public figures when dealing in libel law.
In the case of Huntington Broadcasting Co. v. Monsos, it is a clear privacy case as Monsos
claims public disclosure of private facts. I am going to discuss the legal standings in order to
successfully claim a public disclosure of private facts case, and how Monsos is unable to do
such. Through examination from the Supreme Court to our state of Indiana, it will be clear that
the original ruling is to be reversed in favor of Huntington Broadcasting. The primary issue to
move the case in favor of Huntington Broadcasting is the news report was that of legitimate
public concern.
Privacy: Public Disclosure of Private Facts
As stated in the Second Restatement of Torts, invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private
facts claim must have proof of: public disclosure of private information concerning plaintiff that
would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, to
persons that have no legitimate interest in the information, in a manner that is coercive and
oppressive. These are the standards in Indiana which are to be followed. The second part of the
restatement is critical in this case. Publication of information that is of legitimate public concern
is a privilege under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. As each element
must be proved in order for a successful private facts case, the third element of coercive and
oppressive is to be examined as well. In the 1964 case Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, the
court mentioned the “right of action for invasion of privacy must give way to the interest of the
public to be informed.
Disclosure of Private Facts in Indiana
It is highly important to note Indiana’s stance and history in regards to the disclosure of private
facts tort. In the 1997 case of Doe v. Methodist Hospital, the Indiana Supreme Court made a
decision on the privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts. The decision, which was again
made clear in the recent August 7, 2013 case Westminster Presbyterian Church of Muncie v.
Yonghong Cheng, states “public disclosure of private facts is not a state-recognized cause of
action as sub-tort under invasion of privacy.” In the conclusion of the Doe v. Methodist Hosp.
case, it was said the version of these torts involving disclosure of truthful but private facts
encounters a considerable obstacle in the truth-in-defense provisions of the Indiana
Constitution.” Doe v. Methodist Hosp. had other important statements regarding disclosure of
private facts and their outcomes. It was said that even in states that recognize the disclosure tort,
the success rate of plaintiffs are extremely low. Similarly, the court noted defendants in three of
the four reported Indiana decisions pertaining to discloser were exonerated. The fourth case the
court “merely held that the plaintiff’s claim against one of two defendants survived a motion for
summary judgment.”
Legitimate Interest
In the 1995 Indiana Court of Appeals case of Nobles v. Cartwright the court said, “Indiana cases
have yet to discuss in any significant detail the “legitimate public interest” element of the public
disclosure tort.” The court determined that in most public disclosure of private facts cases, courts
must determine whether the First Amendment gives a privilege which protects. If the court
determines that matter is of legitimate public interest, publication or disclosure of the private
information at the issue is privileged under the First Amendment. As stated, per the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, disclosure of information pertaining to the interest
of the public is a protected right. This is certainly the situation in this case. Huntington
Broadcasting was within their constitutional rights to broadcast the story regarding Monsos’s sex
change. Monsos, who prior to the broadcast, gained a level of regional notoriety by becoming
Huntington University’s first Islamic student-body president, is a figure of public interest.
News Value
In Melvin v. Reid (1931), it was stated, the right of privacy “does not exist in the dissemination
of news and news events, nor in the discussion of events of the life of a person in whom the
public has a rightful interest, nor where the information would be of public benefit.” In this
particular case, the public to benefit are those of Huntington University, including students, staff,
as well as alumni. They have a vested interest in maintaining a high level of authenticity towards
their Christian beliefs. Student and alumni have spent a large sum of money to receive a higher
education at a private Christian university, where the bible is strictly adhered to. While Monsos
does may not have a national notoriety, she can still be viewed as a public figure based on
geographic boundaries as in the Supreme Court ruling in Steere v. Cupp (1979). Also, the news
report was broadcasted in the geographical boundary in which Monsos is a public figure. This is
a scenario in which Barber v. Time (1942) is appropriate in that a distinction can be made in
favor of news items. Huntington Broadcasting Co., has the right to inform decision makers about
information to allow for an informed judgment. This was discussed in the 1978 U.S. Court of
Appeals case Tureen v. Equifax. “It is necessary for decision maker to have information which
normally would be considered private, and information is legitimately related to legitimate
purpose of decision maker, public interest provides a defendant with a shield, similar in principle
to qualified privilege in libel, for invasion of privacy purposes.” Had the information been made
available prior to the student-body election in which Monsos won, it is obvious Monsos would
not have won. As such, it is still important the decisions makers become informed of the truth.
Again, continuing on this as stated in the famous article by Warren and Brandeis which served as
the origination of privacy law, they stated that the right of privacy does not prohibit any
publication of matter which is of public or general interest. In Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp, the
court stated “Everyone will agree that at some point the public interest in obtaining information
becomes dominant over the individual’s desire for privacy.” Monsos certainly had a desire for
her privacy, but the University and those associated with it have a strong interest in maintaining
the authenticity of their expensive Christian college experience. It was the right, as well as the
duty of Huntington Broadcast to broadcast the information. Also, Indiana has a history of
recognizing an issue of being of legitimate concern, and thus exonerating the defendant. In the
Indiana case Near East Side Community Organization v. Hair, the court ruled that the claim that
a statement and actions were offensive would fail because the information is a legitimate concern
to the public. Again in Near East Side Community Organization v. Hair, the court looked to an
outside case. In Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) the U.S. Supreme Court stated that publication of
truthful information, which was lawfully obtained, is only punishable “when tailored to a state
interest of the highest order.” Huntington Broadcast obtained the information of Monsos’s sex
change legally, and the issue is certainly not of “state interest of the highest order.”
Levels of Privacy
In the Restatement, “they are subject to the privileges which publishers have to satisfy the
curiosity of the public as to their leaders.” Monsos certainly is a leader as a student-body
president, a position which she sought out, a position that puts her into the public eye,
voluntarily. Thus, Monsos can be classified as a voluntary public figure by becoming studentbody president. As a voluntary public figure as stated in the Restatement, retain less privacy than
others with regard to legitimate recording of facts reasonably relevant to their public activities,
this was brought up into the 1995 Indiana case of Nobles v. Cartwright. In the case of Near East
Side Comm. Org. v. Hair, the court pointed to the 1982 Connecticut Supreme Court case of
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican American, Inc. stating “the plaintiff voluntarily injected
himself into the public eye by engaging in an enterprise which affected the public welfare.”
Monsos, as student-body president has the potential to affect the Huntington University student
body, as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the University. As student-body president,
Monsos does not have the same level of privacy as that of her class peers. Her class peers have
not thrust themselves into the public light, and such have their privacy protected. The broadcast
certainly reported on a “legitimate recording of facts”. It is accepted that Monsos did in fact
undergo a sex change. The last part of the Restatement account, “reasonably relevant to their
public activities.” As Monsos achieved her status as a public figure by becoming student-body
president, her public activity is that of student-body president. The revelation of her sex change
certainly possess a level that is “reasonably relevant” to her public activity. As stated, the
Christian school strictly adheres to the bible, and such a sex change is frowned upon in their
eyes. A religion that condemns homosexuality, is not accepting of a sex change, as can be seen in
scripture from Deuteronomy 22:5, “a woman shall not wear a man's garment, nor shall a man put
on a woman's cloak, for whoever does these things is an abomination to the Lord your God.
Huntington Broadcast certainly was within the range of reporting in ‘regard to legitimate
recording of facts reasonably relevant to their public activities’, which is the standard in limited
privacy of Monsos.
Evidence of Legitimate Interest
As this case hinges on the legitimate interest of the public, there is solid evidence that supports
that the public did in fact have a legitimate interest in the revelation of Monsos’s true identity. It
is clearly evident that the report was of the public’s concern, because upon the arrival of
knowledge regarding the truthful identity of Monsos, Huntington University took appropriate
action to uphold the standards by which the private institute chooses to abide by. Monsos was
removed as student-body president, and expelled from the University for moral turpitude and
violation of the university code of conduct. The grounds for her expulsion are well within the
reasonable actions of the private University.
Protected Interests
In the foreseeable need to respond to Monsos’s claims of harm, it is important to examine and
understand the law. The law shows to be in favor of Huntington Broadcast Company. In Doe v.
Methodist Hospital , a very important Indiana case regarding disclosure of facts, the court
identified two areas that would be protected by recognizing disclosure of private facts. The first
area was that of a person’s interest in their reputation. The second interest was a personal
emotional well-being.
Reputation
The court said that “under one view, the primary harm that can result from a public disclosure of
private facts is an injury to a person’s reputation.” Part of Monsos’s suit was the claim of a
permanent ruined reputation. It is accepted that even truthful disclosures can detrimental to one’s
reputation. Monsos’s claim of a permanently ruined reputation is a defamation claim. However,
as per Indiana’s Constitution Article I Section 10, defamation rules only apply to those
statements that are false. Again, it is confirmed that the statements made by Huntington
Broadcast Co. regarding Monsos’s sex change, were completely truthful.
Emotional Well-being
Another one of the areas which the public disclosure tort attempts to protect is an individual’s
emotional health. The court said, “Indiana law, however, already provides protection for
emotional injuries with a civil action of international infliction of emotional distress, also known
as ‘outrage.’” The court sited Cullison v. Medley (1991), and Indiana cases concerning outrage.
If one is attempting to establish an outrage case, they must prove that the defendant engaged in
“extreme and outrageous” conduct that intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional
distress. Monsos did not file for outrage, and it would be very difficult to prove Huntington
Broadcast’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous”.
Monsos’s Claims
Besides Monsos’s claims of defamation and psychological harm, which have been proven
inaccurate by Indiana law, she made other claims as a result of the news report. She claims the
inability to complete her student prisdency, as well as complete her degree at Huntington. It has
already been discussed that as a private Christian institution, they reserve the right to maintain
their social standards as they desire. Had this information been divulged earlier, it is clear she
would not have been allowed to serve as student president, nor attend the university. Monsos
also makes the claim that the report will harm her efforts of employment following graduation.
This is merely speculation, and there are no forms of evidence to prove this as true. It could be
similarly speculated that this news attention may open doors to her that otherwise would not
have.
Summary
My partner and I set out to prove that Huntington Broadcasting Co., was well within their legal
rights to broadcast the private facts of Monsos. This has been successfully and logically argued
in this brief. It has been made clear that the news report was of legitimate interest. Also, Monsos
is identifiable as a voluntary public figure, which opens the Pandora box of exposure, and places
limits on her levels of privacy. Had Monsos simply remained an ordinary student at Huntington
it perhaps would be a different case; however, as the student-body president of a Christian school
her actions are of legitimate interest to people. Again, it is important to mention Monsos has a
regional notoriety, and the broadcast was aired in the same region in which she is well-known.
My partner and I, in representation of Huntington Broadcasting Co., request reversal of the lower
court’s decision in favor of Monsos.