Seminar Presentation on
Conflict
Ayse Kudat
Social Assessment
2002
SUMMARY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE TEAM
EFFORT ON CONFLICT ANALYSES
 Knowledge Management
for SSN







Web-site search and links
Bank-wide web search/links
Mining sector conflicts
Water sector conflicts
Original publications
Summaries/Overheads
Training seminars
 Analytical implications
for SU




SA focus on benefits sharing
Social risk analyses for
targeting poverty
interventions
Dynamic analyses of
stakeholder groups
Re-focus on social
mobilization/social capital and
social identity
A slide presentation by Ayse Kudat,
with support of Bulent Ozbilgin and
Cem Gelgin
Global Trends in Violent Conflict 1946-1999
Gurr, et al. Peace and Conflict, 2001
Trends in Violent Political and Ethnic Conflict 1946-1999
The extend of
warfare among
and within states
lessened by nearly
half in the first
decade after the
Cold War, but
intrastate conflict
has hugely risen
in 50 years
Regional Trends in Magnitudes of Violent Societal Conflict
Western Democracies and Japan
Few Western states
had violent societal
conflicts during the
second half of the
20th century.
Socialist Bloc and Successor States
Ethnic wars that began
in the post-Communist
states in the early 1990s
were contained by 2000,
except in Chechnya.
Regional Trends in Magnitudes of Violent Societal Conflict
Asia has experienced
greater magnitudes
of societal conflict
than
any other world
region.
East, South, and Central Asia
The experience of
the Middle East
and North Africa
tracks closely the
long-term global
trends in societal
conflict.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Regional Trends in Magnitudes of Violent Societal Conflict
North Africa and the Middle East
The most serious
political conflict in the
MNA region is a
terrorist war being
fought by Islamic
militants .
Violent ethnic and political rivalries
erupted in Africa south of the
Sahara while colonial rule was
ending in the 1960s.
Africa South of the Sahara
The global evidence shows that societal warfare has declined
for much of the last decade. The end of the Cold War
eliminated the superpower rivalry that fueled many societal
conflicts. It also opened up opportunities for peacemaking by
the UN, regional organizations, and political activists in war-torn
societies. But the African experience shows that there have
been limits to the effectiveness of post-Cold War policies for
managing internal conflict.
Relatively little international effort has been given to promoting
the solution of African conflicts by comparison to the political
and material resources devoted to conflict management in the
Poor and non-democratic states are expected to experience serious
warfare in the future.
Global Warfare by Level of Societal Capacity, 1946-1999
Peace and Conflict
Western
Democracies
and Japan
Peace-Building Capacity : The indicator of peace-building capacity
summarizes the six specific indicators which is used to rank countries within
each region. Red and yellow icons on the six specific indicators are evidence
of problems whereas green icons signal a capacity for managing conflict.
Armed Conflict Indicator: The icons are based on
information on armed conflicts being fought in 1999-2000.
A red icon highlights countries with a medium to high
magnitude of armed political or ethnic conflict; a yellow
icon identifies countries with either a low level of armed
conflict in 1999-2000 or an armed conflict that ended
between 1996 and 1999. A green icon flags countries that
have had no armed conflict between 1996 and 2000.
Peace and Conflict
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
Self-Determination: The icons take into account the success or failure of governments in settling
conflicts from 1980 through 2000.Red icons signify countries challenged by armed conflicts over
self-determination in 2000. Yellow icons flag countries with one of these two patterns: either (a)
non-violent self-determination movements in 2000 but no track record of accommodating such
movements in the past 20 years; or (b) violent self-determination movements in 2000 and a track
record of accommodating other such movements in the past 20 years. Green icons signify
countries that have successfully managed one or more self-determination conflicts since 1980.
Democracy, Transitional Regimes,
and Autocracy. The icons show the nature
of a country’s political institutions in 2000.
Red icons represent autocratic regimes.
Yellow icons are countries with
governments in the transitional zone
between autocracy and democracy. Green
icons are full democracies.
Peace and Conflict
East, South,
and Central
Asia
Capacity for Peace-Building: The Durability of Political Institutions
The icons take into account the maturity of a country’s system of
government. Red icons highlight countries whose political institutions in
2000 were established between 1995 and 1999. Yellow icons register
countries whose polities were established during the 1985-94 decade.
Green icons are used for countries
whose polities were established before 1985.
Capacity for Peace-Building: Societal Resources
The governments of rich societies are better able to
maintain peace and security than are governments of
poor societies. An indicator of societal energy
consumption per capita (averaged over the last halfcentury) is used to rank countries on this indicator. Red
icons signify countries in the lowest quintile. Yellow
icons flag countries in the second and third quintiles,
green icons identify countries in the top 40% in energy
consumption.
Peace and Conflict
North Africa
and Middle
East
Good and Bad Neighborhoods: Ten politically relevant “neighborhoods” are defined: West Africa, North Africa, East Africa, South
Africa, Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, South America, Central America, and Europe/North America. Countries with green icons
are in regions with relatively low armed conflict and mostly democratic governments. Countries with red icons are in “neighborhoods”
with high armed conflict and many transitional regimes. Countries with yellow icons are in regions with middling armed conflict and
mostly autocratic regimes.
Peace and Conflict
Socialist Bloc
and Successor
State
Peace and Conflict – 2001 Gurr, Marshall, Khosla.
What is conflict?
When does it escalate into armed conflict?
Definitions of social conflict



Social conflict is a struggle over values or claims to
status, power, and scarce resources
The aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain the
desired values, but also to neutralize, injure, or
eliminate rivals.
Social conflict encompasses a broad range of social
phenomena: class, racial, religious, and communal
conflicts; riots, rebellions, revolutions; strikes and civil
disorders; marches, demonstrations, protest
gatherings.
Source: Anthony Oberschall. Theories of Social Conflict. Annual Reviews Sociology, 1978, 4:291-315.
Theory of Social Conflict
 A comprehensive theory of social conflict encompasses:
 The structural sources of social conflict, relying on stratification,
social change, and macro-sociological theories.
 Conflict-group formation and the mobilization for collective
action of challenging groups and their targets. For this topic,
theories of collective action, social capital, recruitment,
participation, commitment, and internal structure are useful.
 The dynamics of conflict: processes of interaction between
conflict groups; the forms of conflict; its magnitude, scope, and
duration; escalation and de-escalation; conflict regulation and
resolution; conflict outcomes.
There are numerous causes of conflict at all levels
 Communication failure
 Lack of cooperation
 Leadership Personality
 External support
 Value differences

Cultural differences

Ethnic differences

Civilization
 Group cohesion
 Goal differences
 Technology Differences
 Military built-up

Economic competition

Military competition

Competition over natural
resources such as water, forests,
oil, gems etc.
Conditions that encourage/discourage conflict
 Periods of rapidly expanding
opportunities followed by
slowdown (e.g. US civil rights)
 Ambiguity about relative
power (Vietnam war)
 Status inconsistency or rank
dis-equilibrium
 Weakening normative
consensus
 Zero-sum thinking
 Close communication
 Leader perception of
deprivation
 Consensus about norms
 Lack of information about
Others’ attainment
 Physical and psychological
segregation
 Existence of strict status
systems
 Reality or myth of social
mobility
 Physical and social barriers to
communication
 Removal of actual or potential
leadership from the dissident
groups
Conflict and Change
 Conflict inherent/latent
 Situations that it turns into armed conflict are
rare
 Conflict is not always and necessarily
destructive:

Rather, it promotes
 Change
 Unity
 Reconciliation,
Levels of Conflict/Strategies for Resolution






Interpersonal
Inter-group
Inter-organizational
Inter-State
Two party
Multi-party




Contending/Imposing
Yielding
Problem Solving
Combination
LESSONS LEARNED FROM SOCIAL
SCIENCE LITERATURE
 Social and political factors have greater value in predicting interstate conflict (Huntington 1993)
 Social mobilization, social capital, social cohesiveness and collective
action are among the most important factors in armed conflict onset
and escalation (Benson and Kugler 1998)
 It is not static situations or even long lasting poverty that cause
conflicts to escalate but rather changes in the distribution systems



Changes in power parity
Changes in access to resources
Changes in internal and external alliances
 External interventions (“assistance”) appear to have adverse
impacts on escalation (Brecher 1982; superpower involvement -, UN
+)
 Resource scarcity and benefits stream sharing are key issues
LESSONS LEARNED FROM SOCIAL
SCIENCE LITERATURE
 Strong positive relationship between economic inequality and political
conflict is challenged (Lichback 1989)



Extreme inequality of land distribution leads to political instability only under
specific extreme conditions (Russett 1989)
Political implications of inequality varies from impoverished to affluent nations
(Sigelman and Simpson, 1989)
Inequality and conflict relationship is curvilinear (Zimmerman 1989)
 Understanding conflict escalation requires a multi-disciplinary approach
(Singer and Small 1994)
 Social and cultural variables better predict internal conflicts than economic
variables
 Group perceptions matter; relative deprivation is an important element of
conflict. Such deprivation is felt more acutely with respect to political power
and social prestige than income
What new activities can the ECA/Social Unit focus on?
 Initiation of country watch based on dynamic social
risks/conflict propensity analyses
 Systematic incorporation of social risk analyses into
PRSP; considering conflict reduction strategies (CRS)
for countries with high propensity for conflict
 Complement/strengthen DEC’s work for ECA countries
 Develop special capacity within ECA for conflict
escalation and prolongation issues
 Provide broader learning opportunities for SU staff to
strengthen their analytical capacity for conflict analyses
What new activities can the ECA/Social Unit focus on?
(cont’d)
 Concentrate emphasis on local capacity building for conflict analyses
(SSN) and theory of conflict prevention practice
 Give CA water conflicts renewed operational focus; help integrate
conflict analyses to country water sector strategy work
 For guarantee operations dealing with renewable energy, a new
emphasis on benefits sharing
 Complement analyses of “vulnerable groups” with “opposition”
(rebellion groups); introduce less static concepts to social group
analyses to include social mobilization of opposition, of
cultural,ethnic and other cohesive groups;
 Strengthen emphasis on accountability with “effective democracy”
building
 Better bridge social stability, inter-group trust and locally negotiated
outcomes (trust building with user associations, etc.,)
What new activities can the ECA/Social Unit focus on?
(cont’d)
 Re-evaluate social dynamics of “border” issues and
ethnicity and follow up on earlier work carried out
by the SU for the Balkans and Central Asia
 Re-assess role of cultural factors, especially
religion, in social realities of ECA/CA countries for
PRSP and CAS work
 Start a new generation of SAs that better focus
on building social capital, trust, social conflict
(Follow up on Kosova work, engage in proposed Tadjikistan
agr, Azerbaijan water sector)
Conflict Prevention
 Benefits Stream Sharing

Better analyses of benefits sharing: Who gets the rents, how equitable?
How likely to increase conflict?

Better understanding of external interference

Current private sector practice: share benefits from natural resource
extraction

Local focus: omni-present government as assumed by WB versus local

Ensure local ownership and trust
 World Bank involvement possible through MIGA guarantees

Analyses

Social risk reduction does not mean poverty reduction

Stagnant versus dynamic factors needs analysis

Effective democracies

Social capital and social mobilization

CAS/PRSP: Culture, power, social dynamics, implications of these
There is Substantial Social Capital in the System
1
There is trust in
local governments and
low level of informal
payments
70
15
2
60
50
14
3
40
30
13
4
20
1
0
0
No Trust
12
5
11
6
10
Source: Karshi SA, 2001
7
9
8
1.1.W
Weehave
haveno
nocclear
learuunderstanding
nderstandingofoflaws
lawson
onland
land;2.
;2.One
Onecannot
cannotearn
earnmoney
moneyhhone
onestly;
stly;3.3.OOne
neccann
annototget
get
rich
h
one
stly;
4.
Influential
people
always
get
more
than
their
share
of
water
;
5.
It
is
connec
tions
that
get
rich
h
one
stly;
4.
Influential
people
always
get
more
than
their
share
of
water
;
5.
It
is
connec
tions
that
get
things
thingsdone,
done,not
notthe
thelaws;
laws;6.6.No
Noon
oneetrusts
truststhe
theoffic
officials
ialsanymore
anymorefor
forallocating
allocatingwater
waterininaafair
fairway;
way;7.7.EEven
venifif
new
lands
are
open
ed
to
irrigation
only
th
e
influential
pe
ople
would
get
it;
8.
Peop
le
do
not
tru
st
eac
h
other
new lands are open ed to irrigation only th e influential pe ople would get it; 8. Peop le do not tru st eac h other
and
andddoonot
notgeget ttoge
together
thertotohelp
helpsolve
solvewater
waterand
anddrainage
drainagepr
problems;
oblems;9.9.Sh
Shirk
irkatatfar
farmer
mers sdo
donot
nottru
truststprivate
private
farmers;
10.
All
associat
ions
are
set
up
to
take
money
away
from
ord
inary
workin
g
people
;
11.
farmers; 10. All associat ions are set up to take money away from ord inary workin g people ; 11.No
Nobribes
bribesand
and
connec
connections
tionsare
arennecessary;
ecessary;12.
12.People
Peoplehave
havetotomake
makehigh
highunofficial
unofficialpayme
payments
ntstotoget
getirrigation
irrigationwate
water;r;13.
13.
Local
Localau
author
thorities
itieswor
workkvery
veryhard
hardtotohelp
helppeople*;
people*;14.
14.People
Peopleare
areable
abletotomeet
meettheir
theirwater
waternneeds
eedsonly
onlythrough
through
informal
paymen
ts
an
d
contacts;
15.
Everyone
tr
ust
s
the
shirkats
for
deliver
ing
water
in
a
fair
and
informal paymen ts an d contacts; 15. Everyone tr ust s the shirkats for deliver ing water in a fair andequitable
equitable
way*
way*
**The
Thearea
areainside
insidethe
therred
edlin
lineeshows
showslack
lackofoftrtrust
usttotodifferent
differentstake
stakeholder
holders s
Social capital is especially high in rural areas; rural people work
with each other significantly more often than in urban areas
Buy a pump
70
Land improvement
60
Livestock herding
50
40
30
Clean and repair canals
20
Buy inputs
10
0
Rural
Urban
Establish water control system
Market produce
Establish water supply order
Share mac hinery
Share water with others
**The
Thearea
areainside
insidethe
thelines
linesshow
showcooperation
cooperationwith
withneighb
neighbors
orsinineach
eachactivity
activity
Conflict Over Water Resources Occurs among Many
Stakeholders*
1
90%
10
80%
2
70%
60%
50%
40%
9
3
30%
20%
1 0%
0%
Eth nic gr oup s
have little
8
conflict
4
7
5
Source: Karshi SA, 2001
There is
substantial
conflict
over water
6
1.1.People
Peopledo
donot
notshare
shareirr
irrigation
igationwater;
water;2.2.Man
Manyydownstream
downstreamcommunit
communities
ieshave
havedisagree
disagreeme
mentntwit
withh
the
upstream
one
for
water;3.
Ther
e
is
a
lot
of
c
onflict
be
twe
en
ne
ighbors
for
water;
4.
Peop
le
trust
the upstream one for water;3. Ther e is a lot of c onflict be twe en ne ighbors for water; 4. Peop le trust
one
oneanother,
another,even
evenwh
when
enthe
theyyare
arenot
notne
neighbors;5.
ighbors;5.Shirkat
Shirkatfarmers
farmershhave
aveaamuch
mucheasier
easiertime
timethan
than
deh
kan
or
private
farmers;
6.
Cultivators
ar
e
favored
over
cattle
and
shee
p
bre
eders;
7.
deh kan or private farmers; 6. Cultivators ar e favored over cattle and shee p bre eders; 7.Being
Beingofof
differen
different tethn
ethnicicororigin
iginaggravates
aggravateswater
watercconf
onflicts;
licts;8.8.LLand
andand
andwater
waterare
aredistribute
distributeddun
unfairly
fairlyamong
among
people
of
d
iffer
ent
e
thnic
groups;
9.
Private
far
mer
s
do
not
trust
shirkat
farmers;
10.
S
hir
people of d iffer ent e thnic groups; 9. Private far mer s do not trust shirkat farmers; 10. S hirkat
kats shave
have
competition
competitionover
overwater
waterresour
resources
ces
**The
Thearea
areainside
insidethe
therred
edlin
lineepoin
pointststotoscscope
opeofofpotential
potentialcon
conflict
flict
Water User Associations Are Supported by Everyone
1
100%
80%
9
2
60%
40%
20%
8
3
0%
There is Need for WUA
7
Source: Karshi SA, 2001
4
6
5
1.1.W
Wate
aterruser
userassociations
associationscould
couldththemselves
emselvesfix
fix amounts
amountsofofpayment
paymentfor
forwater;
water;2.2.Water
Wateruser
userassociations
associations
could
be
useful
for
re
solving
wate
r
conflict
s;3.
Water
u
ser
associations
c
ould
protect
inter
est
could
be
useful
for
re
solving
wate
r
conflict
s;3.
Water
u
ser
associations
c
ould
protect
inter
ests sofof
ordinar
ordinaryyfar
farmer
mers s;4.
;4.Information
Informationabout
aboutwater
waterdistribution
distributionwill
willbe
beavailab
availablelefor
forevery
everymember
memberofof
wat
watereruser
userassoc
associations;
iations;5.5.Water
Wateruuser
serassociation
associations scan
cannot
notbe
beuusef
seful,
ul,unless
unlessthey
theymanage
managesup
supply
plyofof
wat
er
from
the
main
c
anal
to
inter-farm
c
anals;
6.
Sep
arate
spe
cial
association
s
should
k
eep
c
wat er from the main c anal to inter-farm c anals; 6. Sep arate spe cial association s should k eep contr
ontrolol
ove
r
drainage
networ
k
mainte
nan
ce
and
repair;
7.
Members
of
water
u
ser
associations
cou
ld
easily
ove r drainage networ k mainte nan ce and repair; 7. Members of water u ser associations cou ld easily
ree
reelect
lecttheir
theirmanager
managers;s;8.8.Members
Membersofofwater
wateruse
userrassociation
associations scou
couldldexercise
exercisecontrol
controlover
overmanagers
managers
ofofwater
user
assoc
iations;
9.
If
Water
use
r
associations
we
re
established,
this
could
be
water user assoc iations; 9. If Water use r associations we re established, this could bean
anothe
otherrreason
reason
for
forwater
watercconf
onflicts
lictsas
asthey
theycould
couldnot
notddistribute
istributewater
waterininaafair
fairway*
way*
**The
Theneed
needfor
forthe
theestablishme
establishmentntofofW
WUAs
UAsisisfelt
feltby
bynearly
nearlyeveryon
everyoneeas
asind
indicated
icatedby
bythe
theararea
eaininside
side
the
thered
redline
line
Modern sociological theory identifies two broad
categories of conflict
 Endogeneous Conflict: Sources of change are from within a
society





Inherent possibilities of change (Sorokin)
Conflict over the distribution of desirables-- wealth, power and prestige
within a society (Marx, Mosca, Mills)
Conflict of Values (cumulative effects of innovation, technological
revolution, sexual revolution, environmental crisis)
Conflict of authority between order givers and takers (Dahrendorf)
Conflict between the individual and society (Thomas)
 Exogeneous Conflict: Sources of change are between systems



Wars (no comprehensive theory of war as a social phenomena)
Cultural invasion (westernization, modernization, media)
Conflict of Ideology (fundamentalism, capitalism)
APPROACHES TO CONFLICT ANALYSES

There are two distinct traditions of conflict theory
in the classical works:
• The power relations tradition of political philosophy
• The tradition of competitive struggle in classical
economics.
Sociological conflict theory is largely a synthesis of
these traditions with primary focus on the unequal
distribution of rewards in society (Marx, Mills, Dahrendorf,
Coser)
Major Proposition of Conflict Theories
 Society is not a system in equilibrium but a nebulous structure of
imperfectly coordinated elements
 Change and conflict are continuous and normal; inherent
predilections to change vary in scope, nature, intensity and degree
 Every society experiences at every moment social conflict
 Every element in a society contributes to its change
 Every society rests on constrain of some of its members by others
 Social universe is the setting within which the conflict of life are
acted out
VIOLENCE
 Direct violence --killing and beating--happens in interpersonal and
inter-group situation
 The capacity for violence is institutionalized in prison systems,
concentration camps, military forces and militia
 Structural violence--poverty, hunger,repression and social
alienation--is associated with uneven life chances and is built into
most society
 Oppression and discrimination are symptoms of structural violence
 Absence of direct violence is no guarantee for lack of structural
violence; not all forms of structural violence leads of direct violence
PEACE RESEARCH
 Peace research searches for knowledge to end violence and
domination. It is trans-disciplinary.
 Normative goals of peace research are different from those of
national security or war studies.
 Scientific approaches may focus on mathematical equations for
predicting arms race (Richardson), simulations and cognitive
analyses to understand crisis decision making , statistical analyses
correlating outbreak of war with other factors. The aim is to
establish causal relationships between all factors involved to project
future trends.
 Interpretive analyses the meaning of peace is investigated in the
context of wider social and cultural structures, relations and
processes (Avruch, Foucault). Focus also on the meaning of peace
from the perspective of the people who are affected by violence.
VIOLENCE
 Cultural violence can be a source of other types of
violence
 Symbols and events are used to create barriers among
peoples
 Certain cultural elements are linked to direct and
structural violence through their value justification and
legitimization
 In the hierarchical social values of “modern” society
some people are more valued than others
EMPIRICALLY TESTED INDICATORS OF
INTERNAL CONFLICT








Power parity of state and the opposition (+)
Level of democracy (tradition and institutions) (-)
Tradition of violent conflict, social mobilization (+)
Ideology differences (+)
Inequity in the distribution of power and authority (+)
Unequal access to renewable and non-renewable differences
Duration of conflict and access to arms (+)
Ethnic nature of disputes (+ likelihood of recurrence)
EMPRICALLY TESTED INDICATORS OF
EXTERNAL CONFLICT







Cultural/civilization differences
Economic “regionalism” (consolidating “civilization blocks”)
Demographic factors ---population density (-), population growth (+)
Military expenditures (+)
Power parity (+)
Alliances between states (-)
Alliances between opposition and support to opposition from external
group (+)
 Economic interdependence and terms of trade (-), high debt rate (-)
 Effective resource (natural resources, energy) utilization (-)
 Multiple border relationships (+)
Interstate Conflict
Time & Magnitude of War
Based on 315 wars that ended between 1820-1952, containing some 780 pairs of
opposed belligerents, several key findings emerged.





Low probability for most conflicts leading to war
All the wars ongoing in any year, 24 percent will end in that year.
High death rate tends to shorten wars and accelerate peacemaking.
Smaller wars are very much more common than larger ones.
Wars appear to arise independently, but to spread contagiously,
through alliance structures, to neighbors, and otherwise.
David Wilkinson ‘Deadly Quarrels – Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of War’
INTERSTATE CONFLICT
- Wars tend to be simple rather than complex
• Wars with more participants are less frequent
 Wars with more belligerent pairs are less frequent than
wars with few belligerent pairs
 The least complex war (one to one) is the most common
type
 There are nonetheless a few wars that involve many
fighting pairs which tend to be unusually long and
unusually bloody.
INTERSTATE CONFLICT
- Economic causes of war are frequent but of many types
 War today may be the price of the transition to
prosperity and peace tomorrow
 “Militant ideology” is a cause of war.
 ‘Ideological disarmament’ is tied to peacemaking
 The propensity of any two groups to fight increases as
social differences between them (in language, religion,
race, and cultural style) increase
Conflict Management: Long and Short Term
Issues
 Major issue: Should one focus on short term negotiations to end conflict
or remove deeper causes (Ross and Rothman 1999)
 Short term negotiations= problem-solving exercise to end conflict sooner
than later. Assume deeper causes cannot be addressed in the presence of
violence (Starr 1999)
 “Dialoguists”=building understanding, finding deep-rooted causes and
developing paradigmatic shifts (Tidwell 1998; Saunders 1999)
 Certain defined patterns of escalation are more supportive of mediation
than others (Simon 1999)
 Theories of practice of ethnic conflict resolution differ in the link that
they conceptualize between an initiative’s specific activities and the
settlement of the wider conflict (Bloomfield 1997)
Conflict Management: Long and Short Term Issues
 Both short term solutions and long term dialogue can fail as was the case
in Tadjikistan (Zartman 2001)
 “Numberless” efforts in Middle East Peace process also fell victim to
inability to transfer official efforts onto the popular level (Saunders
1999)
 Dialogue and negotiation success depends on process which is difficult
to transfer downward to civil society; the process is an individual
experience and not transferable
 Continued conflict makes the impact of both negotiation and dialogue
more difficult (outside impacts the inside when the expectation is for the
inside to affect the outside)
“The Clash of Civilizations?”
 Huntington argues that “... the fundamental source of conflict in
this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic.
The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of
conflict will be cultural.”
 A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethic groups,
nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different
levels of cultural heterogeneity.
 A civilization is the highest cultural grouping of people and the
broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which
distinguishes humans from other species.
 Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall, they divide and merge.
In the future, the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among
major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Islamic, Japanese, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox,
Latin American and possibly African.
Source: Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993.
Reasons why conflict will occur along fault lines
separating civilizations
 Differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic
 Interactions between people of several civilizations are increasing as
does awareness of difference among civilizations
 The process of economic modernization and social change throughout
the world are separating people from longstanding local identities.
 The growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of
the West. On one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same
time, however and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon
is occurring among the non-Western civilizations.
 Cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less
easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones.
Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively
among people.
 Economic regionalism is increasing and reinforcing civilization
consciousness.
Source: Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993.
What will happen????????????





Conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of
conflict as the dominant global form of conflict
International relations, historically a game played out within Western
civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which
non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects
Successful political, security and economic international institutions are more
likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations
Conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more
sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same
civilization
Violent conflict between groups in different civilizations are the most likely
and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars.
Source: Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993.
What can be done ????????????
 In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater
cooperation and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its
European and North American components
 To incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America
whose cultures are close to those of the West
 To promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan
 To prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major intercivilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of
Confucian and Islamic states
 To moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain
military superiority in East and Southwest Asia
 To exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states
and to support other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and
interests
 To strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western
interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states
in those institutions.
Source: Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993.
Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of
Internal Violence
 Relative parity of resources between the government and the
opposition lead to higher levels of violence
 Democratic countries with highly competitive and
participatory institutions are able to mitigate violent conflict
within their borders
 With domestic politics, as with international politics, the
escalation of conflict to violent conflict is rare
 The severity of violence decreases as the level of political
efficiency of the government rises.
 Faced with violent opposition, an effective government
responds in kind
 As the capabilities of potential rebels increase compared
to those of the government, the severity of violence
increases
Source: Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler. Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42 No. 2, April 1998.
Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal
Violence
 External aid is most useful in societies with weak political
systems (eg Haiti), where limited interventions are
successful, but it will have little effect in conflicts within
organized societies (e.g. Vietnam, Afghanistan), where the
combatants are fully mobilized
 Democracy by itself is not significant in decreasing conflict
 Super-democracies can reduce the levels of internal
domestic violence
 Democracies that are not fully institutionalized fare no
better than autocratic regimes
Power Parity, Democracy, and the
Severity of Internal Violence
 Politically efficient governments are more likely to avert internal challenges
 Early, effective interventions is an effective means to avoid internal
violence
 This option is not available to ineffective governments that can most
easily be challenged even by inefficient opponents
 Ineffective democracies struggling for reform are only as likely as
authoritarian governments of equivalent levels of efficiency to repulse
challenges by opponents
 Interventions in support of inefficient democratic systems might be a viable
option (Haiti)
 Interventions to alter political structures that are already efficient
(Tienanmen Square) might be counterproductive
Source: Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler. Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42 No. 2, April 1998.
Empirical Factors and Their Effects in
Determining Severity of Internal Violence
 Severity of violence within a nation at a certain time (+)
 Relative political extraction (-)
 Relative political extraction of the opposition (+)
 Time Index (+): Level of violence increases as weapons improve
 Level of democracy (not significant, by itself)
 High level of democracy (-)
 Joint effect of relative political extraction and democracy (-)
Source: Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler. Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42 No. 2, April 1998.
Empirical variables used in determining conflict
escalation
1.
Power parity (-)
1.
Relative power of the weaker state divided by the relative power of
the stronger state
2. Status quo evaluations in terms of alliance similarity to the
dominant power (-)
3. Joint democracy (-)
4. Alliance of the state (-)
5. Economic interdependence calculated relative to national
income (-)
6. Economic development (-)
Source: William Reed. A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 1. January 2000.
Empirical factors used in determining major power
intervention in international conflicts










Military Balance of Target versus Attacker (+)
Level of Security Threat for Target of Threat (+)
Military Balance of Major Power and Target versus Attacker
Major Power Armed Conflict with Other States (-)
Armed Conflict within Major Power (-)
Military Ties between Major Power and Target of Threat (+)
Common Adversary between Major Power and Target of Threat (+)
Strategic Location of Target (+)
Similarity of Regime between Major Power and Target of Threat (+)
Prospects for Victory in Upcoming Election (-)
Source: Paul K. Huth. Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42 No. 6, December 1998. Sage
Conflict is a natural and typical
phenomenon in every type of human
relationships, at every level
Intra-personal, local,
intra-state, inter-state,
global
 Conflicts at every level have significant common characteristics and
dynamics; it makes sense to examine them together and comparatively.
 People get involved in conflicts because their interests or their values are
challenged, or because their needs are not met.
 There are several basic human needs that are especially pertinent to
conflict and conflict resolution:






Recognition
Development (and self-actualization)
Security
Identity
Bonding, and finally
Targets to project hate.
Conflict resolution is a truly multidisciplinary field. It is an amalgam of
psychology, philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology, law etc.
Ethnic conflicts, especially those
between ethnic minorities and
majorities tend to be intractable.
They can be settled for a certain
period of time, but they can
rarely be resolved.
 Parties in such conflicts often block the satisfaction of each other's basic
human needs.
 Minorities believe that their identity is not recognized, that they are
given less opportunities for development, and that their culture (and
sometimes their existence) is under threat.
 Majorities may also perceive minorities as a threat to their security,
especially if the minority leaders cooperate with enemy countries.
 The leadership/ elites of both minorities and majorities, tend to be more
fanatical, more biased than the average minority or majority member.
It is difficult to help deal constructively with polarized ethnic conflicts
through external mediation. Outside support to groups prolong conflict.
Forms of Ethnic Conflict Termination
Methods for eliminating differences
 Genocide
 Forced mass-population transfers
 Partition/Secession
 Integration/Assimilation
Methods for managing differences
 Hegemonic control
 Arbitration
 Cantonization/federalization
 Consociationalism (powersharing)
6 different typologies of conflicts
According to issues in contention
According to adversary characteristics
Beliefs
 Religious
 Ideological
 political
 Cultural
Interests and values
 Material resources
 Social resources
Self-perception
Clarity of social boundary markers
Number of adversaries
According to relationship of adversaries
Integration and interdependence
Domination
6 ways in which conflicts vary (cont’d)
According to the social system or context of which they are a part
According to the means by which they
are conducted
Degree of regulation
Level of severity
Who wins the struggle
According to outcomes
More integrated or more separated
Renewed struggle or resolution
Paths to Conflict Termination
Non-Negotiated Path
Negotiated Path
 Externally imposed settlement
 One-sided maximization approach
 One-sided capitulation/suppression
 Problem-solving approaches
 Convergence
 Settlement by implicit bargaining
 Withdrawal
 Extermination/expulsion
Negotiation Characteristics may Vary

Institutionalization of negotiation procedures

Scale of negotiations (number of parties)

Scope of negotiations (significance and number of issues considered)

Isolation of negotiation sessions (which negotiation channels)

Privacy (degree of confidentiality)

Conflict Setting
 Issues in contention
 Relative importance of interests and values
 Timing
Conflict is more likely when there are demographic pressures,
although this is unlikely to be the main reason for conflict
 Population growth pressures have a significant impact on the likelihood
that the state could become involved in military conflict.
 Significant military capability might be necessary for population
pressures to lead to conflict, and low technology countries are more
subject to population pressures and conflict involvement than their more
advanced peers.
 Advanced technology may mitigate some deleterious effects of high
population growth.

There is little or no evidence that such growth makes a state more likely
to be the initiator of that conflict or make that conflict more likely to
escalate to war.
 Overcrowding has a significant impact on state decision making.
However, states do not engage in conflict in order to acquire new
land to support the burgeoning population. Thus, there are substantial
limits to the validity of extending overcrowding arguments to the context
of interstate relations.
Source: Jaroslav Tir & Paul F. Diehl. Demographic Pressure and Interstate Conflict: Linking Population Growth and Density to Militarized Disputes and Wars, 1930-89.
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35, no. 3, 1998. Sage Publications.
Empirical variables used in determining the relationship
between population movements and conflict




Population growth percentage change (+)
Population density (+)
Military expenditures (+)
The level of development and resource usage as measured by energy
consumption figures (-)
 Geographic opportunity as determined by the number of states who
share international borders (+)
 Major or minor power status of countries (+)
Source: Jaroslav Tir & Paul F. Diehl. Demographic Pressure and Interstate Conflict: Linking Population Growth and Density to Militarized Disputes and Wars, 1930-89.
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35, no. 3, 1998. Sage Publications.
Humanitarian emergencies are characterized by warfare,
displacement, hunger, and disease
 Most literature uses geopolitical and ethnic approaches to explain the recent
increase in complex humanitarian emergencies.
 Although relevant, these are incomplete in analyzing the factors that are
pivotal in shaping and triggering conflicts in developing countries.
 Sources of emergencies are multiple:





Stagnation and decline in real GDP
A high ratio of military expenditures to national income
A tradition of violent conflict
High income inequality, and
Slow growth in average food production
 Relative deprivation is crucial in escalation of humanitarian emergencies.
 People feel deprived of something they had but subsequently lost or when
others have gained relative to them. Consequently, a short-term income
reduction is more important than protracted income decline or stagnation.
 Relative deprivation spurs social discontent and sometimes anger, which
provides motivation for potential collective violence.
Source: Juha Auvinen, E. Wayne Nafziger. The Sources of Humanitarian Emergencies. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43 No. 3, June 1999. Sage Publications.
Empirical Variables Used in Determining Sources of Human
Emergencies*









A composite indicator made up of battle deaths and refugees per population (+)
Number of deaths from domestic violence (+)
Inflation (+)
Annual real GDP growth (-)
GNP per capita (-)
Annual growth of food production per capita (-)
Gini index of income concentration (+)
Military expenditures per GNP (+)
Use of IMF credit as a percentage of GNP (-)
*Data from 124 countries
Source: Juha Auvinen, E. Wayne Nafziger. The Sources of Humanitarian Emergencies. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43 No. 3, June 1999. Sage Publications.
Conditions under which major powers intervene in conflicts
determine the outcome of the conflict
 Military intervention of major powers can have a decisive impact on the outcome of
international crises involving other states
 The probability of military intervention by a major power will decrease:
 As the capacity of a threatened state to defend itself militarily increases
 As the severity of the threat of military attack against a target state increases
 If leaders of the major power are about to or have already committed large-scale
military forces to another international dispute
 If leaders of the major power are about to or have already committed large-scale
military forces to the suppression of domestic political opposition
 If the incumbent regime’s chances of victory in upcoming elections are quite
favorable
 The probability of military intervention by a major power will increase:
 As the relative military strength of the coalition supporting the threatened state
increases
 If the threatened state is of military-strategic value to the major power
 If the major power and threatened state share the same type of political system
that differs from the regime of the challenger state
Source: Paul K. Huth. Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42 No. 6, December 1998. Sage
Different Approaches to Understanding Conflict:
Why Men Rebel
 People’s sense of their value plays a central role in the birth of violent conflict.
The urge to rebel is strongly linked to a society’s perceived stock of values.
 If groups view economic, social or political value as a fixed sum, violent
conflict can occur very easily.
 Although many values that determine a group or individual’s welfare (respect,
wealth, attention from others) are inherently flexible and easily created, values
such as political power exist in limited quantities.
 Values such as status can exert a powerful influence on value capability
depending on whether groups in a society perceive them as a fixed sum or as
the product of relationship.
 Economic value plays a critical role in determining people’s value capability.
Men can be deprived of political influence and social status, but the lack
minimum economic resources threatens their very existence.
 Ideological coherence, or a group’s belief and adherence to common norms
governing social interaction, is a powerful factor in conflict.
Source: Ted Robert Gurr. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, 1970.
A Causal Model of Determinants of Conflict
Secondary
Variables
Intensity of
Relative
Deprivation
+
Intensity of
Normative
Justifications
for Political
violence
Intensity of
Utilitarian
Justifications
for Political
Violence
+
Primary
Variables
POTENTIAL
FOR
COLLECTIVE
VIOLENCE
(discontent)
+
+
POTENTIAL
FOR
POLITICAL
VIOLENCE
(political
discontent)
+
Balance of
Dissident to
Coercive
Regime Control
+MAGNITUDE
OF
POLITICAL
VIOLENCE
+-
+
Secondary
Variables
Scope of
Relative
Deprivation
Source: Ted Robert Gurr. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, 1970.
+
Scope of
Justifications
for Political
violence
Balance of
dissident to
Regime
Institutional
Support
Societal
Variables
DEC (World Bank) Research on Conflict Propensity
 Develop a set of analytical indicators that will facilitate the
incorporation of conflict analysis in decision-making in allocation
of World Bank funds
 Four sets of conflict indicators identified to measure the
propensity of a country with respect to conflict:




Identification of conflict-prone countries
Conflict intensity indicators to assess the extent and escalation potential of
ongoing conflicts
Performance indicators to measure the likelihood of post-conflict
countries’ successful peace-building and economic development
Impact assessment tools to ensure that Bank programs do not exacerbate
conflict
 These correspond to two broad categories of conflict determinants


Underlying root causes such as historical and structural determinants
Conflict-induced risks that pertain to post-conflict countries
Source: Conflict Analysis & Conflict Indicators: A PCU-DECRG Collaborative Policy Research Project. August 2000.
DEC Research and Simulation Model is Limited to
countries outside ECA
 Use a set of quantifiable indicators to estimate


The probability of civil-war outbreak; and
The probability of war recurrence for each country
 There is no simple approach to combine qualitative and
quantitative methods



Historical data not available for qualitative methods
Integration of non-existing historical data into the dataset for
simulation is not possible
If Bank country teams code these, they may be largely influenced by
the quantitative indicators in the dataset, creating problems in
analysis
 Some indicators (degree of ethnic fragmentation, level of
democracy, extent of national reconciliation) are reflections
of qualitative variables
Source: Conflict Analysis & Conflict Indicators: A PCU-DECRG Collaborative Policy Research Project. August 2000.
Core Set of Conflict Indicators
Regional Comparisons, 1960-1998
1.2
Frequency of 5year periods with
war
Democracy score
Index Value
1
0.8
Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization
0.6
PPP-adjusted per
capita index
0.4
0.2
0
Sub-Saharan
Africa
LAC
MENA
Asia
Europe/North
America
Source: Conflict Analysis & Conflict Indicators: A PCU-DECRG Collaborative Policy Research Project. August 2000
Poverty/GDP Growth.
Country Classification by “At-Risk” Indicators
Risk Category 0
Negligible Risk
Risk Category 1
Low Risk
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Barbados
Botswana
Cyprus
Denmark
Finland
Gabon
Germany
Greece
Grenada
Guyana
Hong Kong
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Kitts and Nevis
Korea
Luxembourg
Mauritius
Norway
Portugal
Seychelles
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Argentina
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Brazil
C. A. R.
Canada
Cape Verde
Chile
Comoros
Congo
Dominican Rep.
Egypt
Fiji
France
Georgia
Hungary
Laos
Lesotho
Netherlands
New Zealand
Panama
Senegal
Singapore
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Tunisia
U.S.A.
United Arab Emir.
United Kingdom
Vanuatu
Risk Category 2
Medium Risk
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Burkina Fasso
Cameroon
Costa Rica
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Lebanon
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Mongolia
Namibia
Nepal
Paraguay
Poland
Qatar
South Africa
Swaziland
Togo
Uganda
Venezuela
Zambia
Countries at War:
1997-1999
Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Burundi
Colombia
Congo (Braz.)
Iraq
Liberia
Russia
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Turkey
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Source: Conflict Analysis & Conflict Indicators: A PCU-DECRG Collaborative Policy Research Project. August 2000.
Most Central Asian and
Balkan countries not
included in analysis
There is potential for
collaboration between
Social Unit and DEC
Core Indicators for Conflict Analysis
AREAS
AT RISK
Security
Size and support of ethnic
diasporas
Arms trade
Human rights violations
Length of time since last
war
Social
Cohesion
Economic
Performance
Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization
Geographic concentration
of population
Population size
CONFLICT
INTENSITY
Unilateral foreign
military interventions
Arms control
Human rights violations;
Per capita death and
displacement
Area covered by
landmines
Changes in conscription
rates or military
spending
Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization
Number of factions
PERFORMANCE
Social inequality
Programs for war-affected
population
Social programs: health and
education
Trust and association*
Economic growth
Income per capita
Trade policy and safe environment
for investment
Dependency on natural resources
& primary commodities
Ethnic dominance
Ethnic dominance
Trust and association*
Economic growth
Income per capita
Secondary education
Trust and association*
Economic growth
Income per capita
Area affected by conflict
Dependency of primary
commodities and natural
resources
Dependency on natural
resources & primary
commodities
Peace agreement; Multilateral
peace enforcement operations
Policing, arms control, demining
Crime rate (especially changes
from pre-war levels)
Demobilization, disarmament and
reintegration
Type of war (was war over identity
issues?)
Reconciliation efforts between the
parties to the war
Number of factions
External debt management
Governance
Democracy level
Corruption
Legal and institutional
framework
Democracy level
Corruption
Legal and institutional
framework
Democracy level
Corruption
Legal and institutional framework
Reconstruction efforts
Assistance from International
Multilateral Institutions
Source: Conflict Analysis & Conflict Indicators: A PCU-DECRG Collaborative Policy Research Project. August 2000.
Type of Analysis, Indicators, and Bank’s Instruments
TYPE OF
ANALYSES
Countries at Risk
Potential outbreak of
violent conflict in a
country or parts of it.
Countries in Conflict
Extended periods of
violent conflict in a
country or parts of it.
Countries in
Transition from War
to Peace and
Reconstruction
Negotiated settlement
has been agreed.
Formal end to
hostilities.
All Countries
Portfolio analysis
BANK’S OBJECTIVES
To assess the country’s
proneness to conflict and to
design conflict-sensitive
portfolios that can help
mitigate and/or address root
causes of conflict.
To design conflict-sensitive
portfolio in those countries
where the Bank is active to
mitigate conflict, and/or
support activities toward
conflict resolution.
To identify proneness to the
re-emergence of conflict and
to design a portfolio that can
help address underlying
causes and mitigate possible
outbreaks of conflict.
To address the legacy of
violent conflict e.g.
displacement, militarization,
weak governance, etc.
To assess the country’s
transition to peace following
peace settlements or political
agreements.
To ensure that Banks’
programs do not exacerbate
conflict, and address and
mitigate potential root causes
of conflict.
TOOLS1
BANK’S
INSTRUMENTS
At Risk
Indicators
CAS/CPPR
CDF/PRSP*
Conflict
Intensity
Indicators
Inactive
Portfolio
Watching
Brief
Performance
Indicators
Peace and
Conflict
Impact
Assessment
Source: Conflict Analysis & Conflict Indicators: A PCU-DECRG Collaborative Policy Research Project. August 2000.
Active
Portfolio
CAS/CPPR
CDF/PRSP*
TSS
CPIA/IDA allocation
CDF/PRSP*
CAS/CPPR
CDF/PRSP*
Uses of DEC Simulation in Practice
 Analysis can be used to estimate the likelihood of conflict in
a country, given variations in policy decisions and likely
results
 Analysis can also be used in post-conflict reconstruction
environment to assess the likelihood of the country falling
back into conflict
 Majority of Central Asia, Eastern Europe and Baltic countries
are not included in the research

Need to adopt the research to specific conditions in these countries
 How can we decrease propensity for conflict?



Pre-conflict policy
Pre-conflict lending
Include non-economic factors in PRSP
Source: Conflict Analysis & Conflict Indicators: A PCU-DECRG Collaborative Policy Research Project. August 2000.
World Bank has been active in Post-Conflict Reconstruction
 The World Bank has increased its lending to post-conflict countries by
more than 800 percent since 1980, with operations in every region and
sector
 The Bank’s working presence can be critical in the early stages of
post-conflict reconstruction, especially in external aid coordination
 Bank reconstruction has provided effective macroeconomic
stabilization
 Bank has also provided strong and effective support for rebuilding
physical infrastructure

Although the Bank does not have a comparative advantage in demining
 Bank experience in restoring human and social capital has been
mixed.


In Bosnia, social sector work was supported but that seems to be an
exception
There is recent expansion of work into support for de-mobilization and the
reintegration of ex-combatants into the society
 Effectiveness of Bank monitoring has been varied
Source: Operations Evaluation Department (OED). World Bank. 1998.
OED recommended a number of steps to
clarify Bank involvement in conflict
 Clarify Bank Policy

Transform existing framework into a firm policy
 Build on and Develop Comparative Strengths



Leverage advantage in aid coordination and advisory services
Pursue essential policies with greater balance and develop cost-effective strategies
for education and health
Use early ESW to improve social project design
 Refine Bank Practices


Staffing of post-conflict country teams
Allocate budget for monitoring and evaluation
 Move Toward Greater Flexibility in Programming and Design


More “fluid” design than “blueprint”
Rely more on APLs
 Promote Equitable Development

Address emerging distributional imbalances BEFORE they turn into conflict
Source: Operations Evaluation Department (OED). World Bank. 1998.
What else can the Bank do in Peace-building?
Play a vital role by fostering conditions
conducive to successful negotiations
Promote trust and be sensitive
to timing issues
Bank staff could advise
in negotiations
Offer advice on development dimensions
of peace accord options
Bank staff could draw on previous
peace-building experiences-KM
Rehabilitation in Ethiopia,
needs assessment and organizational
response in Bosnia
Bank activities could be politically
realistic
Recognize the importance of other facets
of the post-conflict development such as
reform of governance, justice etc.
Include strengthening civil institutions
in peace-building goals.
Allocate adequate resources to ensure
complete recovery especially for
vulnerable groups
Source: The Transition from War to Peace. Chapter 3: Peacebuilding Strategies. World Bank.
Environmental scarcity may create conflicts
 Environmental scarcities are plausible causes of violent conflict






Depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies
Degradation and removal of forests
Depletion of fisheries
Degradation and loss of good agricultural land
Greenhouse-induced climate change
Stratospheric ozone depletion
 Populations in developing countries are already suffering from
shortages of water, agricultural land, forests and fish
 Population growth and unequal distribution of resources
also contribute to environmental conflict
 Frequency of this kind of conflict will probably jump sharply
in the next decade as scarcities rapidly worsen.
Source: Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1. Summer 1994.
Interaction of Sources of Environmental Scarcity
Resource Capture
Resource depletion and population
growth cause unequal resource access
Decrease in quality
and quantity of
renewable resources
Population growth
Increased
environmental scarcity
Unequal resource
access
Ecological Marginalization
Unequal resource access and population
growth cause resource degredation and depletion.
Decrease in quality
and quantity of
renewable resources
Population growth
Increased
environmental scarcity
Unequal resource
access
Source: Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1. Summer 1994.
Inter-state versus Internal Conflicts due to
Environmental Scarcity
 Environmental scarcity causes large population movements, which in turn
may cause group identity conflicts



Contextual factors important in defining reasons of population movements
Both “push” and “pull” factors are important in migration
Migrants often need backing of a state before they can cause conflict
 Scarcities of renewable resources such as forests and croplands do not often
cause resource wars between states
 States have fought more over non-renewable than renewable resources
for two reasons


Petroleum and mineral resources can be more directly converted into state power
The countries that are most dependent on renewable resources also tend to be
poor, lessening their capability for aggression
 The renewable resource most likely to stimulate inter-state resource war is
WATER


Riparian problems
Huge dams are especially disruptive: relocation, clashes with local groups,
ethnic minorities and vulnerable groups affected are commonplace
Source: Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1. Summer 1994.
Environmental scarcity increases economic
deprivation and disrupts key social institutions
 Resource degradation and depletion often affect economic productivity
in poor countries and contribute to deprivation
 Environmental scarcity, large population movements and economic
decline appear to sharply weaken the capacity and legitimacy of state
 Environmental scarcity increases financial and political demands on
governments


Revenues to local and national governments decline
Challengers to governments will have greater power if their grievances are
articulated and actions are coordinated
 Factors that can influence both grievance and opportunity include the
leadership and ideology of challenger groups

Rapid growth of poor urban areas may have a double effect: People can
communicate more easily; this may reinforce grievances and increase the
power of challenger groups
Source: Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1. Summer 1994.
Water and resource scarcity in Central Asia is
already causing conflict
 The Unit is in a unique position to provide assistance in resource-based
conflict in Central Asian countries


There is already a conflict on the use of water between Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan is dependent on Turkmen water for a recent project (Karshi
Pumping Cascade)
 Natural gas and oil extraction in Central Asian countries has been
increasing

Benefits sharing is likely to become more important as more resources are
exploited
Creating Conditions for Peacemaking
 Two hypothesis are at work:


1) until key conditions are met, competing groups are unlikely to make
effective progress towards and agreements; and
2) the development of cooperation between small groups in local settings
can produce changes which spill over and produce a shift in the larger
conflict.
Third party involvement
in conflicts
Mediators, intermediaries, and
third parties are not really
conflict resolvers.
It is the conflicting parties, the people or groups of people
directly involved in a conflict, who are the true conflict resolvers.
 Yet, some conflicts cannot be resolved without the help of an intermediary, a
third party.
 Parties' perceptions of each other and of the issues of the conflict are so biased,
so limiting, that they cannot see mutually satisfactory, mutually beneficial, or
integrative options, even when they have the desire to settle their differences.
 In such cases third parties can be most helpful. By bringing to the conflict their
own knowledge and experience, their own perspective, and, of course, their own
power and leverage, they make previously unconsidered options visible and
feasible.
 Mediators may help the parties understand what makes them the enemy of each
other: What social-economic-political conditions, what dynamics, what ideas
and ideologies, what misperceptions...
‘Conflict resolution’
A peaceful and mutually
satisfactory way to end or significantly
de-escalate a conflict.
 A conflict can be ended:

Through violence or war and by destroying the opponent;

By surrender and capitulation;

Through temporary de-intensification by deceiving the opponent.
 Yet, these are not regarded as conflict resolution. The conflict remains; it just
loses its intensity.
 It is relatively easy to help resolve a conflict stemming from a clash of interests.
 It is more difficult to deal with a conflict that emanates from a clash of values.
And it is even more difficult to handle a conflict in which at least one party's
basic human needs are not satisfied.
 It is extremely difficult for the parties to the conflict, even with outside
assistance, to find a way, a solution that would satisfy all of the above needs for
both/all of them.
The need for enemies is usually satisfied through the intensification
of conflict, not through its resolution
PEACE STRATEGY

Peace through morality. Peace (local and global) can be brought about by a moral appeal,
through world public opinion, to leaders and peoples not to condone or practice violence,
aggression, or war, but to shun and to denounce them.

Peace through law. Peace can be made by signing international treaties and creating
international laws that will regulate conduct and by resorting to international courts to
solve disputes.

Peace through negotiation. Peace can be maintain by frank discussion of differences, by
open diplomacy, by international conferences and assemblies that will air grievances and,
through candor and goodwill, arrive at a harmonious consensus.

Peace through political reform. Peace can be established by setting up regimes of a
nonaggressive type throughout the world: republics rather than monarchies.

Peace through national liberation. Peace can be instituted only through the worldwide
triumph of nationalism.
David Wilkinson ‘Deadly Quarrels – Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of War’
PEACE STRATEGY

Peace through national liberation. Peace can be instituted only through the worldwide
triumph of nationalism.

Peace through prosperity. Peace requires the worldwide triumph of an economic order
that will produce universal prosperity and thereby remove the incentive to fight.

Peace through disarmament. Peace can be established by reducing and eventually
eliminating weapons, bases, and armies.

Peace through international organization. Peace can be established by creating a world
political organization, perhaps even a constitutional world government resembling national
governments to enforce order and promote progress throughout the world.

Peace through power. Peace can be maintained by the peaceable accumulation of forces.
David Wilkinson ‘Deadly Quarrels – Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of War’