LARGE-SCALE LAND ACQUISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED
DISPLACEMENT IN ZAMBIA: LESSONS FROM CIVIL SOCIETY
[PRELIMINARY VERSION: DO NOT CITE]
DIMUNA PHIRI, JESSICA CHU, AND KATHLEEN YUNG
Research, Advocacy and Policy Officer, Zambia Land Alliance, Zambia
dimunaphiri@gmail.com
Paper prepared for presentation at the
“2015 WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON LAND AND POVERTY”
The World Bank - Washington DC, March 23-27, 2015
Copyright 2015 by author(s). All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice
appears on all such copies.
Abstract
Since undertaking economic liberalization in the early 1990s, the Zambian government has emphasized
economic development as the main driver for poverty reduction. In particular, Zambia has opened its
doors to foreign investment in mining, agriculture, and tourism. Due to Zambia’s relatively low
population density, land has been recognized as a valuable commodity by both the government and
foreign investors. This paper presents the results of a research project by the Zambia Land Alliance
entitled ‘Evidence-Based Policy Advocacy on Large-Scale Land Acquisitions’, which examines four
cases of large-scale land acquisitions and their subsequent incidences of displacement and resettlement.
Research, conducted in 2013 using participatory research methods, revealed that land tenure insecurity
forms the biggest determinant for negative outcomes of incidences of displacement and resettlement in
large-scale land acquisitions. While common responses by the Zambian government to address largescale land acquisitions has framed impacts as ‘development-induced displacement’, this paper instead
argues that responses to such land deals, particularly policy responses, must address the underlying issue
of land tenure insecurity in order to produce a pro-poor outcome for affected communities. This discusses
policy lessons for Zambia, as well as for the international community, in considering the efficacy of
international guidelines.
Key Words: Displacement, land rights, land tenure security, large-scale land acquisitions, Zambia.
2
1.
2.
3.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 4
1.1.
Project Background........................................................................................................................ 6
1.2.
Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 7
BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................. 7
2.1.
Zambia’s Land Administration and Investment Climate ................................................................ 8
2.2.
The Scope of ‘Land Grabs’ in Zambia Today ................................................................................ 9
LARGE-SCALE
LAND
ACQUISITIONS
AS
DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED
DISPLACEMENT .................................................................................................................................... 11
4.
3.1.
Case 1: Amatheon Agri, Mumbwa District (Agriculture) ............................................................ 12
3.2.
Case 2: Kalumbila Minerals Limited, Solwezi District (Mining)................................................. 14
3.3.
Case 3: Chiansi Irrigation Project, Kafue District (Agriculture) ................................................ 15
3.4.
Case 4: Lusaka South Multi-Facility Economic Zone (Infrastructure)........................................ 16
3.5.
Processes of Displacement ........................................................................................................... 18
RE-EXAMINING DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT ......................................... 19
4.1.
5.
The Impacts of Development-Induced Displacement ................................................................... 19
4.1.1.
Resettlement and Compensation Packages ........................................................................... 21
4.1.2.
Increased Land Tenure Insecurity ......................................................................................... 22
4.2.
Moving from Development-Induced Displacement to Land Tenure Security .............................. 23
4.3.
The Limitations of Draft National Resettlement Policy and Regulatory Mechanisms ................. 24
4.4.
Reforming Land Administration for Tenure Security against LSLA ............................................ 26
4.5.
Looking Towards the International Community .......................................................................... 27
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 28
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1. INTRODUCTION
Zambia is not exempt from the recent trend of large-scale land acquisitions throughout sub-Saharan
Africa. Since economic liberalization in 1991, the Zambian government has pursued a path of investment
promotion in order to boost economic development and to create employment. Many of these
opportunities rely on the notion of Zambia as a country with abundant land. As a result, Zambia has seen
a rise in large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) in recent years (Oakland Institute, 2011; Chu, 2013;
German, 2013; Nolte, 2014). A number of these acquisitions have taken place in the form of land-based
foreign investments, which are purported to bring economic development to the country through the form
of land and natural resource based projects in the mining, agriculture, and tourism sectors. In addition to
contributing investment into the national economy, they are to bring infrastructure development and
employment opportunities. In this sense, these projects are often considered under the wide rubric of
contributing to the development of Zambia. Yet, despite this recent economic growth, Zambia continues
to struggle with food security and chronic poverty; with a young and growing population, these struggles
will only exacerbate land pressures over time.
Although many of the recent land deals are legal and are facilitated by the Zambian government, they can
still threaten the rights of local communities. With the rise of LSLA, worries have emerged about
increased incidences of displacements, which can be the final straw in removing the last safety net for
poor and vulnerable communities. Literature from across the African continent has highlighted the
problem of displacement and dispossession as the main issue resulting from such ‘land grabs’ in largescale land deals (Moyo & Patnaik, 2011; Oxfam, 2012; Pearce, 2012; Magdoff, 2013), and this is true of
Zambia as well (Oakland Institute, 2011).
Incidences of displacement are not new in Zambia; displacement continues to be seen as an unfortunate,
but inevitable side effect of large-scale development projects. This is also the perspective adopted by the
Zambian government (GRZ), who has responded to large-scale land deals by interpreting incidences of
displacement as ‘development-induced displacement’ (GRZ, 2013), and has focused on a process of
implementing a National Resettlement Policy in response to concerns from civil society over
displacements. The process for drafting a National Resettlement Policy is still in progress, and are meant
to help develop stronger regulations for resettlement guidelines to help mitigate the impacts of
displacement, and represent an important step in creating a set of minimum standards for resettlement
plans, in order to bring Zambia on par with international standards.
4
However, there has been less effort to adopt preventative measures to help protect communities against
displacements in the first place. As a civil society organization (CSO) that advocates for land rights on
behalf of poor and vulnerable communities, the Zambia Land Alliance (ZLA) has come across a number
of cases where local communities are displaced in the name of land-based ‘development’ projects. Often,
communities are displaced not because of the illegal seizure of land, but because of their tenure insecurity
to land that is then acquired by investors in the name of development. Research conducted by ZLA on
four cases of land deals explores the connections between land tenure security, displacement and
resettlement. Simply addressing the issues through resettlement policy in each of the case studies has not
adequately addressed the underlying land conflicts that underscore the ability of communities to engage in
negotiations in land deals.
This paper first provides a brief background on large-scale land projects in order to contextualize the
question of ‘land grabs’ in Zambia. It then provides an introduction to the concept of developmentinduced displacement as it applies to Zambia and the ways in which the Government of Zambia have
utilized resettlement as a means to address large-scale land deals; four case studies conducted by ZLA
will be used to demonstrate the applications of DID in Zambia. The cases examine a large-scale mining
project, two recent agricultural investments, and the development of a special economic zone. The
location of the projects varies and in sum, these projects cover 67,912ha and could result in the
displacement of 880 households. The cases are also analyzed on the basis of the political and legal
enablers that facilitated the land investments, and created or justified the displacement of a number of
households. Each of the cases demonstrates the ways in which, while incidences of displacement are
present in many of the land deals, land tenure security provides an even more crucial component to
protecting the livelihoods of communities and ensuring their participation in and consent of land deals.
Our research findings highlight the crucial role of land tenure security as determining factor of the
outcome of large-scale land acquisitions for the poor. This applies not only to the cases of statutory land
transfer, but also in cases of customary land tenure. This research has found that the security of land
tenure, both in terms of statutory and customary land, is a strong determinant for the outcomes of
resettlement processes and decisions, as well as in a community’s ability to participate in land allocation
decisions. In many cases, without the leverage of land tenure security, the communities are not able to
access the negotiation process, often taking place between the investors, traditional leaders, and
government officials, and thus were displaced in the name of ‘development’. In our cases, displaced
populations were offered compensation packages, but these were found to be inadequate and seldom take
into account the perspectives of those displaced in deciding what constituted fair and adequate
5
compensation. In addition to losing land or being relocated, local communities lost access to communal
resources and livelihood opportunities.
The paper then asks if Zambia’s current legal and policy frameworks, as well as applicable international
guidelines, are enough to protect the country’s poor and vulnerable communities from the negative
impacts of displacement and LSLA? In order to address this question, the frameworks in which such landbased investments are made, and under which communities are to be protected, must be assessed. When
DID occurs and communities cannot exert their claim to the lands on which they live and from which they
derive their livelihoods, they cannot use their land as leverage to participate in the decisions for land
allocations and investment. Such free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) can allow for communities to
realize their right to control their lives and exert self-determination to their lands.
It is anticipated that, in Zambia, as large-scale land acquisitions continue and the pressure on land rises,
more incidences of displacement will occur. Thus, this remains a unique opportunity in time in which
civil society can encourage greater mechanisms for participation for local communities and campaign on
behalf of more pro-poor land policies in order to ensure that the scope for future displacements is limited.
It is hoped that this paper can help reveal the lessons learned from Zambia to not only help provide
evidence to Zambian policy makers for further policy reform, but also to provide examples to the
international community to demonstrate the efficacy of international guidelines.
1.1. Project Background
This paper brings together the recent research conducted by the ZLA. ZLA was found in 1997 and is a
network of non-government organizations that works toward just land policies and laws that take into
account the interests of the poor. ZLA is witness to cases on a regular basis in which people’s land rights
have not been realized and is active in campaigning for land rights on behalf of local communities in the
face of large-scale land acquisitions. This paper builds on ZLA’s recent project on ‘Evidence-Based
Policy Advocacy on Large-Scale Land Acquisitions’, which examined four case studies throughout
Zambia to understand two main research questions:


What are the processes involved in the allocation of large-scale land investments and what scope
has there been for consultation and participation by different stakeholders?
What are the short and long-term socio-economic impacts of large-scale land investments to local
communities, and in what ways can participation and consultation serve to mitigate negative
impacts?
The research for this project was made possible with grants from the Zambia Governance Foundation
(ZGF) and the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS).
6
1.2. Methodology
This chapter relies on comprehensive literature review and policy and legal analysis, as well as on
fieldwork conducted by ZLA on four case studies between June and July 2013. For each case study, key
stakeholder interviews were conducted with local government officers, local CSOs, and importantly, with
representatives from the investing companies themselves. In addition, 111 questionnaires were
administered to 44 men and 67 women from local communities at all four sites, averaging almost 28
questionnaires per site. Local partners facilitated community visits in which questionnaires were
administered to groups that were identified as impacted (displaced or to be displaced), or non-impacted
(adjacent to investment site, but not displaced). Sampling was selected at random from groups of affected
community members. Questionnaires explored basic demographic information, as well as attitudes
towards investors and investment, and land-holding profiles. As the sampling size is relatively small and
methods of sampling and administration not exhaustive, these questionnaires are taken only as indicators
of trends, and no statistical significance is taken from them. Mixed gender focus groups were conducted
with each community group to provide opportunities for introductions, basic fact checking, and
community grievances and concerns to be aired. Although not all of the information and analysis from
each case study will be provided in this chapter, further information and reports can be obtained from
ZLA. Follow up meetings and information dissemination were also conducted, but the results are not
included here.
2. BACKGROUND
Zambia is a country that faces considerable development challenges, particularly to do with continued
rural poverty and increasing inequality, but the country has experienced positive economic growth in
recent years. Since 2003, Zambia has experienced positive growth due to a resurgence in copper prices,
which has resulted in its graduation to Lower Middle-Income Country status in 2011 (World Bank, 2010).
The Zambian economy has, for most of its recent history, been tied to the fate its mining sector. Its recent
economic booms and busts have been tied to the rise and fall of international copper prices. Its recent
growth and high copper prices has also encouraged further foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in
the mining, manufacturing, and construction sectors (ZDA, 2012). The Zambian economy has always
been dependent on high levels of FDI for economic growth (FAO, 2013), but recent investments have
often taken the form of large-scale, land-based investments. These include investments into the mining,
commercial agriculture, forestry, and tourism sectors in rural areas, which involve extensive land
7
acquisitions, as well as the designation of land for industrial development in urban areas, which although
involve smaller areas of land, have great repercussions for adjacent, densely populated communities.
Thus, Zambia is not new to large-scale, land-based investments, whose implementation has been justified
in the name of greater economic development. This holds true not just for mining projects, but associated
infrastructure development, such as the construction of the Kariba dam in the 1950s to create a source of
energy for the mining sector in the Copperbelt province. The construction of the Kariba dam resulted in
the displacement and resettlement of approximately 57,000 Tonga people on both sides of the Zambezi
River. Communities were resettled throughout the nearby Gwembe Valley, but to this day continue to
struggle for food security and livelihoods (Colson, 1971; Cliggett, 2005). Although such a magnitude of
displacement is less frequent these days, large-scale development projects are still given priority over the
settlements of communities, and there has been little attention given to ameliorate to the long-term
impacts of such events.
2.1. Zambia’s Land Administration and Investment Climate
Many of Zambia’s recent investment interests have been encouraged through Zambia’s open investment
climate. Zambia underwent a series of economic liberalization reforms beginning in 1991, with success of
the first multi-party democratic elections in decades, and the election of Frederick Chiluba of the
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy party in the 1991 Presidential elections. Following their election,
the MMD pursued a plan of privatization of state-owned industries, in order to complete the plans of
structural adjustment initiated in the mid-1980s (Fraser, 2007). It was in this period that the MMD passed
the 1995 Lands Act. Arguing against the ‘socialist-style’ Land (Conversion of Titles) Act passed by the
previous UNIP government in 1975, the MMD implemented the 1995 Lands Act in an attempt to
liberalise the land tenure system in order to boost investor confidence in the protection of private lands,
through the re-emergence of a private land market. Although the 1995 Lands Act recognized both
statutory and customary land tenure systems, the lands designated as customary land still retained the
same boundaries as those set forth in earlier colonial land laws, and thus, any reform of boundaries was
limited (Hansungule, 2001). However, the Lands Act did allow, for the first time since Independence,
foreigners to hold land. In addition, it created provisions for land to be converted from customary to
statutory, but not the reverse, and it put in place a number of important legal protections for statutory
land, gave monetary value to statutory land, and allowed for land to have value even if undeveloped.
Critically, the Lands Act also centralized all legal land matters in the hands of the central government,
and in particular, vested all land under the President, setting the precedent for a cumbersome bureaucratic
land administration system. Importantly, the Lands Act also includes a clause that states, ‘All land in
8
Zambia shall, subject to this Act, or any other law be administered and controlled by the President for the
use or common benefit, direct or indirect, of the people of Zambia’ (GRZ, 1995, Part II 3(5)).
No cap is set on the amount of land that can be transferred through private hands; meanwhile, large-scale
land holdings persist from colonial periods, as no land redistribution has taken place. However, provisions
within the Administrative Circular No.1, 1985 (GRZ, 1985) stipulate that land conversions of over 250ha
must contain the approval of the Lands Commissioner, and land conversions of over 1000ha must have
approval of the President. Thus, while this provision mostly prevents the large-scale conversion and
accumulation of land by individuals from customary areas, it also leaves open land transfers of this size to
the whims of government. Meanwhile, administration and guidance for customary land remained vague
and undefined, and continues to be so today. The 1995 Lands Act did little to clarify the existing
customary land tenure issues, many of which pervade today’s continuing issues in land tenure insecurity.
The Zambian Constitution, through Part III, the Bill of Rights, provides justiciable and guaranteed
protection of rights. While the Constitution recognizes customary law and enshrines the right to own
property including land under the Bill of Rights, it does not comprehensively protect access, control and
ownership of land for all Zambians, as it does not adequately define the processes and procedures relating
to land administration. The 1965 Chiefs Act, Section 10 (1) provides Chiefs with the power to administer
customary land in accordance with customary norms prevailing in the Chiefs locality. However, at the
moment, both the Constitution and land administrative policies are currently under review, particularly
with regards to the potential formation of a Lands Policy and a Customary Land Bill. These measures by
the government to try to address the shortcomings of the Lands Act remain incomplete, and set the ground
for much of the policy activism of ZLA today.
2.2. The Scope of ‘Land Grabs’ in Zambia Today
The roots of LSLA may lie in the 1995 Lands Act and the incomplete measures undertaken by the GRZ to
create a private land market that is attractive to, and favors private investors, but without mechanisms to
protect small land holders, who primarily hold customary land. Following global trends, Zambia has been
seen as a place with a high ‘yield gap’ (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011), and has attracted the attention of
investors of a variety of sectors. This paper builds on work by others that have examined foreign
investment and land acquisitions (Mujenja and Wonani, 2012; FAO, 2013a; FAO, 2013b; Action Aid,
2013; German et al, 2013; Nolte, 2014), which have largely examined the agricultural sector and the
means by which land has been acquired or transferred. Other approaches (Oakland Institute, 2011; FAO,
2013a) have looked more closely at the investment processes in foreign land acquisitions. This paper
instead focuses on the means by which communities are displaced and resettled resulting from a variety of
9
land-based investments. It is difficult to be able to quantify the amount of land acquired by foreign
investors for large-scale land projects, or the number of people affected by such projects, as land
investments sizes are not aggregated by any government agencies or regulatory bodies. Consequently,
data are scarce and are difficult to compile, in order to create a larger picture.
ZLA is often presented with case studies of land disputes and displacements by local partner
organizations from cases reported by the media or by local communities. Table 1 provides a brief
summary of some of the case studies on which ZLA has conducted field research in recent years.
Table 1: Summary of Known Displacements from ZLA Case Studies
Case
Date of project
inception (date
of research)
Size
Number of people
affected
Land status
Mpika District,
Muchinga Province
2009* (2011)
302,749ha
50 households to be
displaced
Conversion of
customary to statutory
Nland
Choma District,
Southern Province
2009 (2011)
26,894ha
0 displaced
Pre-existing statutory
land
Mpika District,
Muchinga Province
2008 (2011)
20,101ha
45 households
displaced and resettled
Conversion of
customary to statutory
land
Mazabuka District,
Southern Province
2006* (2011)
1,100ha
81 households
displaced (132
households affected)
Conversion of
customary to statutory
land
Serenje District,
Central Province
n/a*
105,000ha
44 households to be
displaced from core
venture (17,500ha)
Conversion of
customary to statutory
land
(2012)
Choma Distrct,
Southern Province
2005 (2010)
3,003ha
222 households
Contested land
affected; 216 displaced
Mumbwa District,
Central Province
2012 (2013)
14,237ha
43 households
displaced and
resettled
Pre-existing statutory
land
10
Solwezi District,
Northwestern
Province
2012 (2013)
50,000ha
570 households to be
displaced and
resettled
Conversion of
customary to statutory
land
Kafue District,
Lusaka Province
2002 (2013)
1,575ha
20 households
displaced and
resettled
Pre-existing statutory
land (pooled from local
landowners)
Kafue District,
Lusaka Province
2012 (2013)
2,100ha
247 households to be
displaced and
resettled
Pre-existing statutory
land
Totals:
528,759ha 1,322 households
Source: ZLA case files, authors’ compilation. Figures are accurate to the study date listed in the table.
* Indicates projects that have been stalled, or whose status is unknown following the study date.
Table 1 does not present a comprehensive list of LSLA in Zambia, nor are the figures definitive.
However, the table provides a glimpse into a growing trend throughout Zambia of investor interest in
land, and land acquisitions facilitated by the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ). While ZLA
research shows that the levels of displacement for each case remains relatively low thus far, there is a
growing total of impacted households that must be taken into account. There are also a variety of different
land tenure scenarios under which displacements take place, such as in both the acquisition of customary
and statutory land.
The last for cases listed in Table 1 are of ZLA’s most recent case studies, conducted in 2013. In each of
these cases, communities were, or are to be, displaced – as well as resettled. These therefore provide cases
of DID where resettlement also occurs; while these present more ideal scenarios of displacement, there
are still a number of remaining, unresolved questions that emerge even under such cases of best practice.
First, are there opportunities for communities to participate in and consent to the decisions regarding their
displacement and resettlement? And second, are there safeguards that can ensure that the experience of
displacement does not negatively impact the long-term wellbeing of these communities? These questions
are explored in the next section of this paper.
3. LARGE-SCALE LAND ACQUISITIONS AS DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT
The previous section provided the context with which Zambia has seen a rise in LSLA. This section seeks
to provide some explanation of not only the outcomes of the cases of LSLA, but also the government
11
responses. The previous section demonstrated that the rise of large-scale land investments are permitted
under Zambian land law, and are indeed permitted by the government. A number of government
initiatives have promoted land-based investment, including the creation of a land bank by the Zambia
Development Agency (ZDA) (Oakland Institute, 2011; German et al, 2013; Nolte, 2014); however, much
of the land pursued by investors remain outside of these government efforts. As the 1995 Lands Act
permits the acquisition of land under a variety of circumstances that favors the greater good of Zambia.
This creates the backdrop for ‘development-induced displacement’ (DID), that is, the alienation of land
from individuals, households, or communities, in favor of the larger greater benefit of the country.
Therefore, the Lands Act allows large-scale land investments to take place in the name of development, if
supported by the government. The government itself of course has facilitated an environment of attracting
FDI in a number of land-based sectors, including agriculture and tourism. This section introduces the four
case studies conducted by ZLA and the experiences of displacement, resettlement and compensation at
each site. The four projects demonstrate various types of large-scale land acquisition, primarily through
the promotion of foreign investment. These cases represent a spectrum of sectors and regions of Zambia,
in addition to a variety of key stakeholders, decision makers, and processes involved. The discussion of
each case study will be relatively brief; more details can be found by contacting the ZLA directly for
upcoming published reports on each case study. This section will present some important facts and
context to each LSLA case, as well as present a discussion about some of the socio-economic impacts that
have resulted from the LSLA, ahead of a discussion about the ways that regulatory frameworks for DID
do, and do not, help address these negative impacts.
3.1. Case 1: Amatheon Agri, Mumbwa District (Agriculture)
ZLA’s first case study concerns the acquisition of 14,237ha of designated farmland in Mumbwa District,
by Amatheon Agri Zambia Ltd (Amatheon). Amatheon is 100 percent owned by Amatheon Agri N.V., a
German agribusiness company investing in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus far, Amatheon has amassed over 46
individual, but mostly contiguous plots of statutory land in the historical Big Concession farm block,
under a willing-buyer-willing-seller agreements, over two phases. Phase 1 involved the acquisition of a
first farm (1,200ha) and the development of 250ha of irrigated farmland for wheat, maize, soya and barley
(Amatheon, 2012b). With its successful completion, Amatheon proceeded to Phase 2 (which includes a
further 13,037ha over 45 titles), for which in August 2013 it submitted an EIA and RAP to the ZEMA
(2013b).
The Big Concession farming block, found under the British colonial government as a settlement scheme
for British war veterans, is the home of a number of ‘squatters’; however, the scenario is much more
12
complex. The area is home to a number of absentee landlords; meanwhile the wider district faces
increasing land pressures from growing populations, an influx of migrants, and increasing land alienation
from mining, conservation, and tourism projects. Thus, the land within the farm block has been offered by
traditional leaders to both old and new households in an effort to ensure that everyone can access land;
however, it is not always clear whether the allocating traditional leader is aware of the boundaries
between statutory and customary lands in the areas, and if the land allocated falls under the traditional
leaders administration.
As part of Phase 1 of the project, Amatheon displaced and resettled 4 households. Legally, Amatheon was
not required to resettle the households found living on their land; the households were legally classified as
‘squatters’ and according to the Lands Act, and liable for eviction. However, Amatheon has made
resettlement, and minimal displacement, a core part of their operational engagement and corporate social
responsibility (CSR) strategy with the local communities and Mumbwa area, and have adopted the World
Bank’s Operational Policy 4.12 (WB OP 4.12) and the IFC’s Guidance Note 5 to formulate their own
internal resettlement policy (Amatheon 2012a; Amatheon, 2013a). Amatheon’s resettlement policy has
importantly thus far included the resettlement of households onto state land with the provision of titles, at
Amatheon’s own expense. The compensation package valuations are conducted with the cooperation of
the local Ministry of Agriculture office, as well as the Mumbwa District Works Department. Amatheon
has used these valuations for fields and dwellings as minimum guidelines, from which they exceed in
their compensation packages for housing and lost possessions, as well as provide CSR-related livelihoods
programs (Amatheon, 2012a).
Such lessons learned from Phase 1 will be crucial to Phase 2 of
Amatheon’s operations, which include the resettlement of an additional 39 households (Amatheon,
2013a). While the numbers of displaced and resettled remain small thus far, this may be a testament to
Amatheon’s voiced commitment to limit the development of inhabited land.
While Amatheon has been purchasing land from voluntary sellers, a number of local community members
and wider commentators have voiced concern that Amatheon’s land acquisition will exacerbate land
issues in Mumbwa district. They have only acquired approximately one quarter of their total target of
60,000ha. It is questionable if Amatheon’s resettlement and CSR strategies will be willing to financially
support incidences of larger displacement and land conflicts with the surrounding community, and with
Amatheon’s arrival in the farm block, undoubtedly there will be greater attraction of migration to the area.
Their continuous engagement with local communities and recognition that resettlement must also provide
security and livelihoods options will help mitigate negative impacts.
13
3.2. Case 2: Kalumbila Minerals Limited, Solwezi District (Mining)
Kalumbila Minerals Ltd (KML) is a subsidiary of First Quantum Minerals (FQM), a Canadian mining
company, who also has a stake in a number of other mining projects in Zambia, including the nearby
Kansanshi mines. In the interest of expanding mining operations in Solwezi, FQM has initiated the
Trident mine project through KML, which encompasses three mineral deposits (the Sentinel, Enterprise,
and Intrepid deposits) under five mining licenses, encompassing over 50,000ha (CES, 2011; CES, 2012).
Sentinel will be the first deposit to be developed, under which there will be approximately 570
households displaced and resettled, at the cost of a reported $11 million (Times of Zambia, 2013c). The
sum of KML’s acquired land with regards to use by local communities, according to KML’s enumeration,
is 5,356 fields under 1,250 individual farmers, totaling 2,820ha of farmland used by local communities
(Yung, 2012).
Several controversies have emerged about the project. Although initial EIAs had been approved by
ZEMA (CES, 2011; CES, 2012), a number of subsequent additional changes and addendums, including
the RAP for the 570 households, failed to gain approval by ZEMA in a timely manner. This prompted a
number of project delays, including in the resettlement process for the communities. Another
inconsistency emerged over the means by which KML acquired the land. In the initial acquisition, KML
received the surface rights to the land, under customary administration through an agreement with the
local Chief, Chief Musele, in return for an agreed sum of compensation. However, further rights to the
land were assumed by KML, without any formal process of land conversion; this did not follow the
proper legal procedure for land acquisitions under Zambian law, and raised another red flag for
government ministries in charge of the administration and approvals for this project.
KML provided a comprehensive resettlement action plan (RAP), using the IFC Guidance Notes and the
WB OP 4.12, and has devoted funds towards it. Within the RAP, KML has devised two resettlement
options, the Northern Resettlement Scheme (adjacent to the planned Kalumbila town), and the Southern
Resettlement scheme, located in Shinengene town, a traditional village. Both schemes fall under the
disputed project land. These options take into account the livelihoods options for the local area and aim to
address the different resettlement options desired by the communities themselves. The land available for
resettlement includes approximately 2,000ha of farmland, almost equivalent to the land displaced,
adjacent to existing farming areas (Yung, 2012). As with the Amatheon project, KML depended on the
Ministry of Agriculture for valuation; however, discrepancies between the reported figures and figures
from resettlement for those displaced by Kansanshi mine 150km away, have created distrust and
uncertainty among the community against KML. However, the process of resettlement was stalled during
the period of RAP approval by ZEMA, creating a number of corollary problems. Communities ceased to
14
farm in anticipation of displacement and resettlement, which meant that the stalling resulted in the loss of
at least one whole year of maize and cassava production. Miscommunication and misunderstanding
between KML and the communities emerged with regards to exclusion zones and relocation dates.
Further delays put increased strain on the communities, which are not taken into account in resettlement
packages. This has created additional community discontent, which has fuelled the disagreement between
the Chief and the investor over the allocation and acquisition of land.
While KML was able to use FQM’s considerable economic power and sway to push the government into
action on EIA approval through the threat of layoffs (Times of Zambia, 2013a), several greater, structural
problems have become clear. Firstly, ZEMA’s ability to enforce their own regulations appears limited,
with the government able to push ZEMA into approving projects; secondly, ZEMA’s capacity to process
the increasing number of EIAs submitted, particularly with increasingly large projects such as the Trident
project, appears limited as well. Lastly, it is also clear that although KML should have enlisted greater
legal support in the process of acquiring land through the correct channels, it is also clear that the lack of
coherent land policy and procedures has created confusion, and worse yet, loopholes for investors to
exploit to acquire land at the expense of the communities.
3.3. Case 3: Chiansi Irrigation Project, Kafue District (Agriculture)
The Chiansi Irrigation Project (CIP) provides a contrasting example of foreign investment in a
commercial agriculture project on land derived from the community. The project involves the Chanyanya
Smallholder Cooperatives Society (CSCS), a group of 126 community members. The community had
been plagued by floods and drought and became dependent of food aid. They organized themselves to
pool their land rights into a block land title, which they have used to attract an investing partner to provide
irrigation assistance in exchange for land rental. The project is being developed by the UK-based InfraCo,
a private infrastructure development company. With a 25-year lease on the block-titled land, InfraCo has
provided the upfront capital to start the development of a large-scale commercial farming project and
accompanying irrigation infrastructure for both the commercial venture and the smallholder farmers. The
profits from this enterprise will be used to pay back the costs of the development, in addition to providing
dividends to their investors, which includes the CSCS. In return for their land, the community now has
access to irrigated garden plots, quarterly dividends from the profits of the project, and close engagement
with InfraCo’s support team. The project is divided into phases. The project has successfully completed
Phase 1, the pilot scheme, which developed 148ha of commercial farmland in addition to approximately
8ha of garden plots for CSCS. It is now in the process to expand into Phase 2, which will development a
greater amount of commercial farmland.
15
Phase 1 saw the displacement and resettlement of 20 CSCS member households for the construction of
the first portion of the commercial farming project. CSCS members were closely involved in the decisionmaking process for displacement and resettlement. One household opted out of resettlement, and thus the
project was planned around their home (Interview with InfraCo representatives, 2013). The resettlement
plan, following IFC Guidance Note 5, included the provision of housing of equivalent size, the allocation
of approximately 0.5ha of land, and associated amenities such as latrines, boreholes, and fruit trees. The
affected people selected the land for resettlement from a list of options using the criteria of location and
availability. InfraCo provided a loan to the CSCS to purchase the title to the land selected, which was land
not originally used in the scheme. Although this might not be categorized as involuntary resettlement, the
displaced had buy-in as members of the CSCS and also had the space to provide consent to the
displacement.
On the whole, the resettlement process proceeded smoothly due to the containable numbers of displaced,
and the participation and consent of the community members. However, a number of members expressed
that they were not satisfied with the development of the project, and not all of the resettled households felt
that they were adequately compensated. Phase 2 intends to expand the project with additional commercial
farmland, and with the options of incorporating neighboring communities. However, despite the relative
success of the initial resettlement, InfraCo have reported that they intend to follow a principle of
displacement-prevention, where further developments will planned around communities, as the original
process provided to expensive and time-consuming. This perhaps provides a lesson to other projects, such
as Amatheon, who further intend to resettle displaced communities.
3.4. Case 4: Lusaka South Multi-Facility Economic Zone (Infrastructure)
The Lusaka South Multi-Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ) is a ZDA guided project with foreign donors,
which seeks to delineate and designate a 2,100ha area for investment in the industrial sector. The area
selected for this project is a former forest reserve (Forest 26) on the edge of Lusaka. While the land
selected for the project had been former state land, it was found that the area has also become home to
approximately 247 households (approximately 1,221 people), who, as with the Amatheon case, were
dubbed ‘squatters’, despite residing in the area for over three decades. However, it was decided by the
GRZ that while these communities would be displaced in favor of the project development, they would
also be resettled and compensated. This would be carried out under the direction of the DMMU. A census
was conducted in 2012 to enumerate the potential displaced, with eviction and resettlement scheduled for
July 2013; however, the deadline had passed without much progress on the issue. While community
members reported that they believed the government would resettle them, they expressed that they did not
feel adequately informed of any of the plans.
16
There is currently no resettlement action plan for this process, although the DMMU has said that they
intend to use the draft NRP to guide the process. Thus far, the only development on the land has been the
construction of infrastructure (roads and power lines), and the fencing in of the area. While the roads and
power lines required the writing of EIAs, the fencing of the area has been the activity that has prompted
displacement, but has not required an EIA, which has been the logic for the omission of the conduction of
a RAP.
There has been very little transparency in the resettlement process, which has contributed to the
discontent amongst the communities. Communities have recognized the precarious nature of their
presence on the Forest 26 land, and thus many of the community members appear to support resettlement
actions. However, at the heart of the issue has been attempts to define adequate and appropriate
compensation and resettlement packages, which address the needs of the communities being displaced
and are conceived of in a transparent and participatory manner. This includes the location of resettlement
and not only the value of the compensation package, but also the acknowledgement and support of
livelihoods compensation. In addition, as those found living in Forest 26 have already have precarious
residences and livelihoods, they emphasized that they required the provision of basic social infrastructure
as part of the resettlement package, including access to roads, water, health centers, and schools. The
timing of the compensation and resettlement is also at stake, as communities who largely rely on
agricultural livelihoods are unwilling to plant and invest in a new agricultural season if they anticipate
relocating before they are able to harvest.
The DMMU reported that they aim to provide community members with two settlement options
(Interview, DMMU representative, 2013). The exact nature of the compensation packages is not officially
known, but ZLA has been told that the compensation packages would consist of either access to a
resettlement scheme (2,900ZMW and plot in resettlement scheme) or a cash option (2,900ZMW plus
4,900ZMW compensation). The government had conveyed a list of possible resettlement areas to the
community members; however, the suggested sites are on average 698.5km away from Lusaka, posing a
serious question about the ability for the OVP to offer both adequate and appropriate compensation. The
resettlement schemes offered were in locations where re-settlers may not speak the local language or be
privy to local customs, meaning that the ability for displaced community members to adapt and form a
new life for their family and new livelihoods is suggested to be limited. Both of the proposed solutions
have been found inadequate by the communities and civil society advocates. The experience of
displacement and resettlement in this case demonstrates that a large number of confusions arise in this
process when there is no clear division and mandate for action for each key stakeholder; while the
17
DMMU has undertaken the displacement process, they have relied upon the Ministry of Agriculture for
valuating the compensation packages, and the Department of Resettlement for finding resettlement areas.
3.5. Processes of Displacement
Currently, incidences of displacement and resettlement are mandated through the Zambia Environmental
Management Agency (ZEMA), who are responsible for auditing the conduction of environmental impact
assessments (EIAs) and RAPs, while processes of resettlement are often facilitated through the Office of
the Vice President (OVP), through two of its offices: the Department of Resettlement and the Disaster
Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU). At the moment, there is very little coordination or regulation
of displacement and resettlement processes. The GRZ has made recent efforts to coordinate and regulate
the resettlement process, through the drafting of a National Resettlement Policy (NRP) and accompanying
guidelines by the OVP, both initiated by Zambia’s signatory status to, and domestication efforts for, the
African Union’s Kampala Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons
in Africa. The first draft of the NRP was made available in 2013. It lays the foundation for the legal and
regulatory framework for a resettlement policy, as well as defines the roles of the government
departments responsible for resettlement, namely the Department of Resettlement.
In addition to the Kampala Convention, a number of international guidelines exist to address issues
specific to DID and resettlement, such as the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC’s) Guidance Note
5, the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.12 (WB OP 4.12) and the United Nations’ Food and
Agriculture Organization’s (FAO’s) Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure
(VGGT). In the four case studies below that involve private investors, the IFC Guidance Note 5 and/or
WB OP 4.12 were used to guide investors through the process of DID and subsequently resettlement.
While the WB OP 4.12 specifically targets DID, the IFC Guidance Note 5 can apply to both DID and
other cases of involuntary resettlement. Both these sets of guidelines place the onus on the investor for
safeguarding the wellbeing of those being displaced, with the IFC Guidance Note 5 having special
emphasis on the impacts to differentiated livelihoods resulting from displacement. Lastly, the newest
contribution to international guidelines, the VGGT, seek to secure tenure rights as a means for preventing
incidences of DID and are targeted towards all levels of stakeholders, from governments, judicial
authorities, investors, and civil society.
It is clear from these cases that efforts to prevent displacement were entirely avoided. In following models
such as Cernea’s (2000) ‘Impoverishment, Risks, and Reconstruction’ model (IRR), those using
guidelines such as the IFC’s Guidance Note 5 have gone through great efforts to focus on the
18
‘reconstruction’ aspects of resettlement efforts. However, these case studies demonstrate that an important
component of the IRR model, and indeed in the IFC’s Guidance Note 5, that is, the avoidance of
resettlement at almost all costs, has been completely neglected.
4. RE-EXAMINING DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT
4.1. The Impacts of Development-Induced Displacement
In each of the cases, there have been a number of direct and indirect socio-economic impacts that have
resulted from the processes of displacement and resettlement. This section seeks to outline a number of
concluded impacts from the cases, which are then assessed with regards to Zambia’s legal and policy
framework, in order to provide a number of recommendations on how such impacts can mitigated through
policy. Table 2 (below) provides a summary and comparison of a number of important facets of the
displacement and resettlement processes across the four projects.
Table 2: Comparison of Resettlement and Compensation Packages
Amatheon Agri
Kalumbila
Minerals Ltd
Chiansi
Irrigation
Project
Lusaka South
Multi-Facility
Economic Zone
Approximate
number of
affected people:
43 households
total (182
people) over 2
phases.
570 households
(FQM reported).
20 households
247 households;
total over 2
1221 people.
phases. Phase 2
has no anticipated
displacement.
Amount of land
acquired:
14,237ha
50,000ha
1,575ha
2,100ha
Incidences of
displacement?
Yes – nonholders of title.
Yes – from
customary land.
Yes – holders of
title.
Yes – nonholders of title.
Status of
resettlement
plans:
Phase 1:
Resettled; Phase
2: Planning
underway.
Some resettled;
most awaiting
displacement.
Phase 1:
Resettled;
Awaiting
displacement.
Phase 2: Planning
underway.
19
Investor-led Investor-led Initiators of
resettlement and Private company. Private company.
compensation:
Investor-led Private company.
Government-led
– DMMU.
Phase 1: ZEMA
approved (2012).
Publically
available. Phase
2: under review
(2013).
Initial and
addendum
approved. Publicly
available. Further
EIAs for other
developments
within the area to
be submitted.
Phase 1: ZEMA
approved, 2011.
Unavailable.
Phase 2:
submitted.
EIA submitted
for roads
construction,
either under
review or not
available. Further
EIAs to be
submitted for
individual
developments.
Phase 1: Yes ZEMA
approved.
Yes – awaiting
ZEMA approval.
Submitted 2011;
incurred at least
21 month delay.
Phase 1: Yes, part
of the EMMSP,
2010. Phase 2:
Preliminary
conducted in
2012. Decided
against
displacement.
No – nothing
made available.
Census
conducted by
DMMU and
CFHH but no
report made
available.
EIA conducted?
RAP initiated?
Phase 2: Yes –
submitted to
ZEMA (with
EIA).
International
guidelines used
in RAP:
IFC Guidance
Note 5; WB OP
4.12; InterAmerican Bank
IFC Guidance
Note 5; WB OP
4.12
IFC Guidance
Note 5
N/A
Total funds
designated:
Phase 2: $94,440
USD
$11 million USD
$80,148 USD
N/A
Details of
resettlement and
compensation
packages:
Resettled on
state land with
title;
Discouragement
of cash options,
but option is
available.
Housing fully
paid.
Either
resettlement in 1
of 2 resettlement
zones or full cash
option. No titles.
Housing fully
paid.
Land and
construction of
new houses,
latrines,
boreholes and the
planting of fruit
trees. Titles
included in block
title under CSCS.
Either cash and
plot in
resettlement
scheme, or cash +
4,900ZMW.
Temporary
shelters (tents)
provided.
Provision of
livelihoods
support?
Yes – as part of
wider Amatheon
CSR schemes.
Yes – as part of
FQM CSR
schemes.
Yes – through
CSCS
membership,
access to garden
Some – access to
government
extension service.
20
plots.
Speed of
resettlement
process:
Within 12
months.
Delayed by
ZEMA RAP
process. At least
21 months.
Within planned
time frame.
Delayed.
Sources: Authors compilation from field research and interviews; Amatheon Agri Zambia Ltd (2012a);
(2013a); Times of Zambia (2013c); interviews with Amatheon staff, Zambia (2013); Times of Zambia
(2013a; b); interviews with representatives of CIC; CSCS (2013); interviews with DMMU (2013); CHFF
(2013); Shantumbu Community Representative (2013).
4.1.1. Resettlement and Compensation Packages
The most directly pressing issue for the affected communities appeared to be the contents and
management of resettlement and compensation packages. This was the case across the four case studies
because they demonstrated incidences of DID, rather than outright forced eviction. To a certain degree,
displacement and resettlement received degrees of support, either through consensus in the case of CIP, or
due to awareness of the precarious of land claims, as in the cases of the Lusaka South MFEZ and
Amatheon.
In the Amatheon, KML and Lusaka South MFEZ cases, government departments were relied upon to
provide valuations for agricultural land, crops, and dwellings and structures. Both Amatheon and KML
appeared to acknowledge that the valuations provided by the government did not provide adequate
compensation, and they were actively augmented. While cash compensation was generally considered to
not be an appropriate form of compensation under most international guidelines (and thus in Amatheon,
KML, and CIP cases), the Lusaka South MFEZ case demonstrated that relying on the OVP to manage
resettlement meant there was little ability to provide much more. Finally, there was a growing recognition
and demand that livelihood support be a critical element of the compensation packages.
Eligibility formed another area of discontent in the KML and Lusaka South MFEZ scenarios. In both
cases, censuses were conducted in order to determine the number of households actually residing in the
cut off areas for displacement and resettlement. Enumeration was also conducted to prevent further
households from encroaching on the cut-off areas for the sole purpose of seeking compensation packages.
In both cases, it appeared that even with enumeration, many people contested the findings, and indeed,
there were encroachers. However, there is a large contention between those who resided on the land (and
were therefore eligible for compensation), and those whose agricultural lands fell in the cut off zones,
whose claim to the land and impact of displacement was harder to verify. Timing was an incredibly
important issue that emerged from the FQM and Lusaka South MFEZ case studies. This pertains not only
21
to the speed of displacement and resettlement, but also the time of year in which the communities, who
largely rely on agricultural livelihoods, would be displaced. Poor timing results in the loss of a year or
more worth of income earnings from agriculture, and worse yet, contributes to food insecurity for the
households in question. In addition, in considering the impacts on livelihoods, compensation must also
take into account the amount of time it would require to clear and start new farms. Lastly, the Amatheon
and CIP cases demonstrated that the provision of land titles to resettled communities was a much-desired
facet to resettlement. Although the Department of Resettlement provides the options for the acquisition of
title of land allocated within a resettlement scheme, often re-settlers are unable to afford the costly prices
of formally obtaining the title, which contributed to their precariousness of land tenure security in the first
place.
Even with monetarily adequate compensation packages, there are remaining issues that may not be
addressed. Displacement and resettlement can result in higher risks of vulnerability, food insecurity and
access to financial or social resources that households have built over time (Cernea, 2000). Furthermore,
these vulnerabilities can be indirectly exacerbated after resettlement. In the Amatheon case, there are
existing pressures on the availability of land in the Mumbwa district from other industries. This could
mean overpopulation or overextension of services in the region with the new influx of workers looking
for settlement, as well as other migrants that may come in search for employment. If there is not proper
planning around the growth and development of the area, many local communities will be forced to move
or be subjected to increased hardships with increased prices of goods and services, as well as limited land
and natural resources, such as food gathering or fishing, on which their livelihoods depend.
Additionally, proper coordination between traditional leadership and the statutory land systems is critical
to ensure that vulnerable groups that have tenuous land rights are not exposed to further insecurity and
fragmentation. There is often an oversight by the private investors that the traditional leadership
represents the views of the community. In reality, tribal relations and existing social assets are
overlooked. Situations where the aggregate communities’ views are not part of a participatory decision
making process and prior consent by the community is not achieved, such as the KML case, can often end
in community fragmentation and with tension between involved community members, traditional
leadership and other stakeholders. Compensation will likely not be able to resolve or mitigate the negative
impacts from such social fragmentation.
4.1.2. Increased Land Tenure Insecurity
Within these cases, displacement occurred under all manners of land acquisition. In two of the cases
(Amatheon, Lusaka South MFEZ), the displaced communities were communities found to be settled on
22
titled land, and deemed to be squatters. Because the communities did not hold the title to their land, they
could be legally evicted with no specific requirement for resettlement under the Lands Act (1995). This is
in spite of their clear claims to the land with regards to habitation and livelihoods, as well as amount of
time they have used the land. Communities settled in these titled lands did so due to existing land
pressures in the area; in one scenario, it appeared that the communities were aware of their precarious
situation (Lusaka South MFEZ), while in the other (Amatheon), unaware. In the case of KML, a
community was displaced after the chief gave consent for the land to be used by the investor. While the
process in which the investor has come to acquire the land remains controversial, it seems likely that they
will be able to gain full access and title, either directly, or through the acquisition of land by the
government, through the Lands Act (1995) or the Lands Acquisition Act (1970). Although the Lands Act
(1995) calls for the requirement of consultation with ‘any other person or body whose interested might be
affected by the grant’, and the Lands Acquisition Act (1970) puts forth the requirement of compensation,
for instance with the grant of land. It does pose the question as to what would be the result of these
particular DID scenarios had it been another private investor who did not feel the need compensate and
resettle those being displaced. The implications could lead those considered as ‘squatters’ to loss of
shelter, loss of assets or access to assets and loss of income sources or means of livelihoods.
All three of these scenarios show clear cases of where land tenure insecurity results in the fact that
communities had little or no say in their displacement and resettlement. In contrast, the CIP case
demonstrates a scenario in which the displaced households had land tenure security, were active parties in
the decision to attract an investor, and took part in the resettlement process. Under such conditions,
displacement and resettlement can be considered much more of a success. Yet, despite this, in the
project’s further development, incidences of displacement will be avoided as, even with the proper
safeguards, displacement and resettlement proves to be more complicated and laborious than having no
displacement. The precarious nature of these communities’ future livelihoods and economic stability is
further exacerbated by displacement. If the resettlement area does not take into account the communities’
social ties, their shared assets, business networks, and trust, relationships will be severed.
4.2. Moving from Development-Induced Displacement to Land Tenure Security
While a number of impacts emerged from the four cases of DID and resettlement, there are still a number
of policy recommendations that can be implemented to help address and mitigate such impacts for
affected communities. This section seeks to connect the noted issues and impacts of DID and resettlement
with the current applicable frameworks in place in Zambia. Improved land administration, through
increasing participatory mechanisms in land allocations and improving customary land tenure security can
help provide preventative mechanisms for displacement, while assessing the draft NRP and resettlement
23
regulatory mechanisms can help provide further security for communities who undergo resettlement
processes. Not only does this have applicable lessons to Zambian policy makers, but it is hoped that these
can provide lessons learned for the international community, with regards to understanding how
international guidelines apply to national scenarios, and how understandings of national frameworks can
also help address impacts of LSLA.
4.3. The Limitations of Draft National Resettlement Policy and Regulatory Mechanisms
The four case studies have also demonstrated that there are incidences, or small numbers of community
members, who do desire resettlement. In some of these cases, resettlement can provide a means to
leverage their access to certain portions of land for certain benefits, such as new plots of land with tenure
security, as in the case of Amatheon or Lusaka South MFEZ), or access to different or expanded
livelihood options, as in the KML and CIP cases. Under such circumstances, Cernea’s IRR model of
reconstruction should be considered, and a minimum set of guidelines is needed to assess the success (or
lack of) in the resettlement process.
With regards to the monitoring and evaluation of resettlement plans, the majority of this process is left to
the EIA process run by ZEMA. Projects that require resettlement are required to submit an EIA; however,
these are often submitted after decisions have been made about the process of displacement. While
projects with international funding are often internally required to draft RAPs, these are only enforced ad
hoc by ZEMA. Government projects, particularly those without international funding, appear to be less
forthcoming about presenting a RAP or written guidance to resettlement processes. Instead, government
projects rely on the DMMU and Resettlement Department to organize resettlement. Yet, with poor crossdepartmental interaction and cooperation, particularly with regards to the developing ministry (for
instance, ZDA, or in other cases whichever department leads the project development) and the OVP, often
resettlement processes are disorganized. Even when RAPs are put in place by the investor, the provision
of actual standards of resettlement and compensation in the Zambian laws is missing. Frequent
monitoring and evaluation of such RAPs by the government through ZEMA is also limited.
Many private investors have employed international guidelines, such as WB OP 4.12 and IFC Guidance
Note 5 to help guide cases of DID and resettlement. These two international guidelines have been updated
to reflect previous lessons learned and are based on decades of involuntary resettlement research.
However, two gaps emerge in the reliance on international guidelines. First, unless the investor has donor
funding from the World Bank or IFC, the guidelines are implemented on a voluntary basis, as the case of
the KML, Amatheon, and CIP cases. In each of these cases, adherence and successful implementation is
often left to the goodwill of the investor. Second, the guidelines remain general in order to be applicable
24
to a variety of regional contexts, and do not address issues specific to the local context. Without efforts to
domesticate such international guidelines, actions remain at higher levels and do no reflect communitylevel social and economic contexts.
The GRZ’s draft NRP has made strides to address many of the issues relating to resettlement. While the
draft NRP acknowledges DID as a source of involuntary displacement, alongside natural disasters and
armed conflict, it must also place more emphasis on the prevention of arbitrary and unnecessary
displacement at all times possible as the first point of action. The CIP case demonstrates clearly that even
when resettlement is conducted along participatory and effective means, resettlement can be an expensive
and damaging option for households and investors.
As identified previously, land tenure insecurity has been a important facet of DID and resettlement, either
through preventing displacement, the use of land tenure security as leverage for participation in
resettlement, or improved land tenure security as an outcome in resettlement. There needs to be greater
efforts to recognize the role played by current failures of land administration and land policy in land
tenure insecurity, through efforts to harmonize the draft NRP with policies such as the draft Customary
Land Bill. The draft NRP acknowledges several key issues that contribute to DID, such as the lack of
high-level government coordination mechanisms for land allocation, disputes between the GRZ and
traditional rulers, the out-datedness of the Lands Act in providing services to resettlement schemes, and
the lack of formal mechanisms to resolve land disputes in settlements, outside of the Lands Tribunal Act.
Finally, in an attempt to address the provision of ‘just and fair compensation’, the draft NRP proposes for
the government to provide certificates of title for land for those being resettled.
There is also a need to enshrine the upholding of human rights in displacement and resettlement. There is
a lack of recognition of the hardships displaced communities often face after resettlement, such as food
insecurity and the lack of access to resources, such as water, land, and traditional foods. Although the
draft NRP indicates that the Department of Resettlement will be the lead government department
responsible for resettlement, it still begs the question as to whether the Department of Resettlement has
the capacity to manage the increasing number of DID cases. Most DID cases are complex in nature and
vary across sectors as shown in the case studies. Capacity building and funding remain incredibly
important in the implementation of the draft NRP and other domestic guidelines; this remains an area of
great concern as it has already been demonstrated that there is a lack of capacity to enforce current, albeit
limited, regulations. The domestication of international frameworks will and guidelines will further
require capacity building from the host institutions that have provided these guidelines, such as the FAO.
25
4.4. Reforming Land Administration for Tenure Security against LSLA
Addressing land tenure insecurity is the first step in addressing DID. As the four case studies show, land
tenure insecurity on both customary and statutory land can result in displacement; furthermore, land
tenure insecurity can also be the reason for which communities are not able to participate in the decisions
in both displacement and resettlement. While consultations are required as part of the EIA process, they
are not specified to have to pertain resettlement or displacement, nor does ‘consultation’ necessarily
specify that it must involve the project-affected peoples.
The 1995 Lands Act provides for the conversion of customary to statutory tenure (but not the reverse),
and has provided the means for investors to acquire customary land through the conversion to titled
statutory land. However, in order for such conversion to take place, the Act asserts that no land held under
customary tenure may be converted without consulting the Chief and the local authority in the area (or in
the case of a game management area, the Director of National Parks and Wildlife Service), as well as the
consulting of “any other person or body whose interested might be affected by the grant”. While in the
case of KML, consultation did occur at various stages, as evidenced in the EIA reports, it is questionable
as to whether these events can be considered consultation, rather than information meetings, as it does not
seem likely that such events factored into the Chief’s decision to allocate surface rights. The KML case is
further complicated by the fact that the Chief disputes that he consented to anything more than surface
rights, and it is questionable if the Chief consented to the conversion of land. Such a situation arises
because the specific functions of the Chief are undefined in the Chiefs Act and they are merely expected
to act in accordance with their own customs and general application. A standard on their functions should
be clarified to serve as a guide in exercising their powers; such loopholes instigate challenges such as the
tenure insecurity and displacement of the poor communities.
However, under the Lands Act, the conversion of such land also requires the consent of the President.
Little is mentioned about what constitutes meaningful and effective consultation and how participation by
communities, including the expression of grievances, can occur. There needs to be greater consideration
of the ways that communities can provide greater input into decisions made by the chief, or alternatively,
consultative mechanisms should find means to incorporate the feedback of community members
themselves, rather than relying solely on the chief.
Those residing on statutory land, either as tenants or ‘squatters’, were also found to have almost no ability
to participate in discussions about land allocation and displacement, even when they had resided or
utilized the land for up to a number of decades. This is true of the Amatheon case, where under different
circumstances, resettlement might not have occurred. The Lands Act makes no recognition of any sort of
26
‘squatters rights’, or the provision of usufruct rights in the case of absentee owners. In this case, the Lands
Act explicitly states that such land users are liable for eviction, despite the lack of clear boundaries
between statutory and customary land in this area. While landowners ought to be protected against
squatters, there is equally an argument to be made that this should only be exerted if land boundaries have
been made clear. This is the case in the Lusaka South MFEZ case, but this also hints at a wider issue of
the lack of customary land available to vulnerable communities.
However, these cases do not necessarily demonstrates the greater security provided by statutory land, but
rather, provides another demonstration of the ways in which the Lands Act favors tenure security in
statutory land over customary land. Customary land can provide a number of other important benefits to
communities that should not be discounted. Customary land provides affordable access to individual and
communal use of land, where communities are able to benefit from natural resources and are not limited
to use over a period of time. Instead, land can be held and passed down generations. Access to customary
land also allows for poor rural communities to bypass expensive titling processes and does not require the
remittance of ground rents to authorities. However, unidentifiable boundaries, inadequate management of
land information, and the inability for customary land to act as collateral provides a sense of insecurity
that is surpassed by statutory titles. The precariousness of land tenure insecurity is further reinforced by
the fact that land tenure security, particularly through the provision of titled land, appears to be a high
priority for compensation for displaced communities.
Rather than prioritizing the conversion of land to statutory title, there needs to be a greater recognition
that customary land tenure requires strengthening. The Lands Act states that for the President to approve
of such conversion, the appellant should have “the right of use and occupation under customary law”. As
customary land law is not codified, there is no stated resolution to providing customary land tenure
security or how to resolve potential customary land tenure conflicts between communities and investors.
Addressing participation in lands allocation and improving customary land tenure security all falls within
continued advocacy and attention to lobby for the implementation of a Lands Policy in Zambia. Recent
efforts to reassess customary land administration through a Customary Land Bill are a positive direction
on this front, if they can take into account these lessons learned about preventative measures for
displacement.
4.5. Looking Towards the International Community
International frameworks play a role in informing potential Zambian policy, particularly with regards to
the draft NRP; however, in the efforts to domesticate such guidelines, there are lessons that can be learned
for the international community as well from such efforts. International frameworks, such as the
27
international human rights framework, can provide guidelines and standard principles from which
countries such as Zambia must act. A human rights-based approach is particularly important in the
reduction of poverty, the security of livelihoods and the attainment of sustainable development for all, in
the face of LSLA and DID. As a member of the United Nations, Zambia has signed and ratified a number
of international and regional instruments, such as the Universal Declaration on Human and Peoples
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These instruments advocate the rights to
self-determination, property (and not being arbitrarily deprived of said property), adequate standard of
living (including food, clothing and housing) and the continuous improvement of living conditions, and to
express free consent, and to be free from hunger. Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is an important
component of the international human rights standard that is based on the collective rights of local
communities to self-determination and to their lands (FAO, 2013c). FPIC is designed to work in
conjunction with all decisions that may affect local people’s rights and includes the right to participate in
processes and documentation that are legally binding. Private investors benefit from the adoption of FPIC
as it can minimize the risk of disputes that can turn into conflict.
The FAO’s VGGT are the latest set of guidelines that seek to ensure the protection of human rights, and
consolidates a number of principles relating to land rights and land administration. As with a number of
international instruments, these provisions have not been domesticated into national law. This provides
the challenge the GRZ to take up such international guidelines and domesticate them. Although the
VGGT provide a set of guidelines that the GRZ can implement to further protect the land rights of
Zambian communities, there are a number of standing land administration issues that require address
before the VGGT can be effective. There first must be political will to correct existing gaps in the
Zambian legal and policy framework in order for the use of the VGGT to be realized. These include the
fine-tuning of the draft NRP and the Customary Land Bill, in addition to the implementation of a national
Land Policy. However, the VGGT can also assist in processes of formulating such national policies that
help redress existing land administrative deficiencies, through the guidance on participatory and
consultative mechanisms.
5. CONCLUSION
A devastating impact of LSLA can be displacement, both physical displacement and displacement of
livelihoods. Such displacements can take place under a number of different conditions of LSLA, which
28
includes through foreign private investment and through government-led development projects. Although
such LSLA is purported to contribute to wider economic development (the validity of such a claim
requires another study in itself), it is clear that it is having negative impacts to local communities.
This paper uses four cases of LSLA to assess the means in which the negative impacts of LSLA, which
occurs primarily through DID, can be mitigated. This includes both a need to understand the means under
which displacement is permitted, and finding mechanisms to prevent displacement in the first place
through land tenure security. The four case studies demonstrate that primarily, investors work in
conjunction with the government, and within the boundaries of the law. These are the most common and
frequent scenarios; but these cases still demonstrate that under these more ideal circumstances, there are
still negative impacts that can occur. The greatest areas of concern lay in increased land tenure insecurity
and in the resettlement process. Not only does land tenure insecurity contribute to the initial displacement,
but it can also result in the lack of participation and a less ‘fair deal’ of compensation.
However, the case of Zambia shows that there are policy solutions that can help mitigate the negative
impacts of DID from LSLA. These policy solutions can help address existing weaknesses in the
administration of customary land tenure, improve customary land tenure security, and increase
community participation in land allocations. Such policies can also contribute to the monitoring and
regulation of land administration, and help prevent involuntary displacement. For the cases in which
displacement is consented, a set of regulations and minimum guidelines are needed to ensure that
resettlement has a productive, developmental function, and to monitor and evaluate the resettlement
process.
Zambia is not yet ready for the wave of investment interest that it has received. But attention to how such
LSLA impact poor and vulnerable communities can help address not only underlying issues such as
customary land tenure insecurity, but also improves Zambia’s ability to benefit from future investment
prospects. Land deals must continue to be monitored, with the participation and views of impacted
communities heard and recorded. It is only with this that civil society can ensure that land-based
investment brings positive impacts and mitigates as many negative impacts as possible. International
guidelines such as the FAO’s VGGT can help prompt political will through international support to begin
to address the underlying customary land tenure security issues that undermine land-based investment.
29
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