Type of Review: Annual Review
Project Title: STRENGTHENING THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR IN
AFGHANISTAN (SASA) 203474
Date started: Dec 2011
Date review undertaken: Nov/Dec 2013
Introduction and Context
What support is the UK providing?
The UK is providing £12.93 million over a period of three years from 2012 to 2015 to increase agricultural
productivity and strengthen public institutions. However, an important component of the intervention
(Output 2/3 below), budgeted at £3.7 million, was terminated for poor performance by DFID in mid-2013
owing to poor performance and inability by the contract holder to meet basic contractual requirements.
What are the expected results?
The intended Impact of the programme is ‘increased productivity and value of agricultural products in
Afghanistan’. The intended Outcome is ‘evidence base of best practice and capable institutions
established for increasing productivity and value of agriculture in Afghanistan.’, This was to be
addressed through the strengthening of the relevant public institutions supporting agricultural activities
initially these two provinces, namely the Departments of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (DAILs). In
addition the programme intended to provide institutional support and capacity development to the
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) in Kabul, specifically modalities for strengthening
linkages and coordination between MAIL and these two provincial DAIL offices.
Output 1 – Increased productivity and value of agriculture for participating communities in
Bamyan and Helmand.
Agricultural Support Programme (ASP), Bamyan: DFID is providing £3 million over three years to a
programme led by the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID). Expected results
are increased productivity and value of agriculture, food security and increased household incomes in
Bamyan for participating communities. Progress is measured against increased potato and wheat
yields; regenerated area of rangeland, and increased co-operative incomes. (B)ASP is being
implemented by Prime Consulting International Ltd. (hereafter just ‘Prime’) from 8th December 2011 to
31st December 2014.
The Helmand Agricultural Support Programme (HASP) which also fits under this component is focussing
on building up and enhancing four value chains in Helmand province (meat, certified seeds, fruit and
vegetables and electric supply) thereby increasing productivity. In addition HASP seeks to stimulate the
involvement of DAIL in providing the support and the necessary regulatory control (monitoring) of these
four value chains; capacity development and support to the Helmand DAIL is therefore a strong subcomponent of HASP. HASP is being implemented by the NGO Mercy Corps from 1st October 2012 to
30th September 2014.
Output 2a – Change Management and institutional capacity strengthened and MAIL better able to
deliver NPPs.
DFID committed £3.7 million to a service contract to deliver this Output. The main expectation/thrust of
this component was to capacitate MAIL to better deliver the National Priority Programmes (NPPs).
Progress was to be measured against increased budget execution rates, structural reform of provincial
DAIL offices and the increased pace of policy development. It should be noted that the contract for this
output, which became known as the Institutional Reform and Delivery Capacity (IRDC) project, was
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terminated by DFID at the end of the inception due to poor performance. There is a contingency plan
which is currently being considered by DFID and MAIL.
Output 2b – Support to the DAILs.
DFID was to provide £750,000 over three years with an aim to improve technical capacity and
responsiveness to farmers established in Bamyan and Helmand DAILs. Progress measures included
increasing the number of university graduates hired by Bamyan DAIL offices and increasing the number
of projects implemented in coordination with NGOs in Bamyan and with the private sector in Helmand. It
should be noted that as per the original Commercial case this output was to be covered by the same
organisation awarded the contract for Output 2a which as outlined above was subsequently terminated –
however given the cross-cutting nature of the SASA programme design, this output has certainly not
been lost completely, and degrees of actual field-level implementation are certainly being achieved
under (B)ASP and HASP components (Output 1).
Output 3 – Building Environmental Resilience into Agriculture and Environmental Management
This component of the programme is being implemented by UNEP and was added on as a SASA
component at the beginning of 2013. The current situation sees this component slightly detached from
the main goals of SASA per se (increased productivity and institutional reform of M/DAILs). However,
the current UNEP indicators do broadly advocate for environmental mainstreaming in agricultural and
rural development policy and implementation (as per one of the National Environmental Protection
Agency (NEPA)’s own mandates and therefore are compatible with SASA in terms of providing the
necessary environmental safeguards for the programme’s implementation.
Output 4 – Scalable evidence base of best agricultural practice to increase household incomes.
DFID committed £180,000 over three years to produce a scalable evidence base of best agricultural
practice established to increase household incomes. Progress will be measured against the number of
examples of best practice from ASP disseminated in Bamyan, and the number of examples of best
practice from change management and institutional reform between MAIL and Helmand and Bamyan
DAILs. This component was always to be implemented by DFID ‘in house’, but there are certainly
opportunities for cross pollination of approaches between the BASP and the HASP.
Output 5 – Appropriate policies in place and enacted.
This is a new output that picks out key aspects of the terminated contract for delivery of the IRDC project
and places them into a new output specifically looking at the critical area of policy and regulation
development.
What is the context in which UK support is provided?
The context remains as per the original Strategic case in the intervention summary, which recognizes
the vital importance of the agricultural sector to economic growth and improving living standards in
Afghanistan –and the sector’s potential to pull Afghanistan up from its current position as ‘one of the
poorest and most food insecure countries in the world’ (p. 1 Intervention summary) – but also identifies
various limiting factors to realising this potential.
The key limiting factors identified in the Strategic case provide the basis to the support proposed under
SASA through two main thrusts:
i.
A technical intervention to address the deficiencies at the farmer/household level of
achieving optimal productivity levels.
ii.
Strong support to the institutional functionality of the public sector bodies responsible both
provincially (DAILs) and centrally (MAIL) for governance and implementation of agricultural
interventions on the ground.
These two main thrusts are addressing what are described in the Appraisal Case (p.5) as the ‘biggest
challenges facing the agriculture sector in Afghanistan’, namely; ‘under-productivity and weak
governmental ability to regulate, coordinate, and facilitate improvements in agriculture output and
growth’.
SASA is operating in three geographical contexts (Kabul, Bamyan and Helmand) and three main
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institutional contexts (MAIL, DAIL Bamyan, DAIL Helmand),and it important to carefully consider each
of these contexts, given that it is upon which that the assumptions in the SASA Theory of Change
model (as per the Strategic case) are based. There have been some changes in these contextual
environments, particularly the closure of the New Zealand run Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in
Bamyan, meaning the protective blanket the PRT offered locally to ASP was withdrawn leaving the
implementing company (Prime) more exposed. Further, the situation in Helmand remains of particular
concern, but there are also indications that Bamyan is no longer fully secure, whilst daily operations in
Kabul require careful logistics and security management. The biggest concern of SASA implementers
remains risk of collateral damage, being in the wrong place at the wrong time, and slower rates of
delivery due to heightened security concerns.
The institutional context of MAIL has changed since the project’s inception as well. Noteworthy in this
regard are the impact and changing dynamics caused by two donor-led/fed interventions concerned
with institutional development and capacity building in MAIL:
i)
the US$ 250 million USAID funded ‘Irrigation and Watershed Management Program
(IWMP)’ which came on-stream during early-mid 2013; and
ii)
the European Union Delegation’s EUR 14 million ‘Support to capacitate MAIL in transition
for sustainable public services delivery’ which will be starting implementation in January
2014.
In addition USAID’s Capacity Building and Change Management Program (CBCMP), being
implemented by Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA) since November 2011, is coming to
an end in June 2014. As has been seen before, the addition of new high budget programmes can
fundamentally shift the underlying sands of change in MAIL and, given the aforementioned cancellation
of its IRDC programme, DFID would be wise to keep abreast of these changing dynamics of power and
influence in MAIL. Given DFID’s past successes and reputation as the only donor having ‘the technical
capacity to engage in a leadership role’ (SASA Strategic case), this is achievable as long as firm
engagement with the necessary actors in MAIL is undertaken in 2014 and a decision on alternative
support to IRDC or reallocation of funds across the programme.
In recent discussions between DFID and the Minister of MAIL on Technical Assistance to MAIL The
Minister stated that if the new World Bank programme of Capacity Building by Results came onstream, of which he was confident, that he would not require further off-budget Technical Assistance to
support capacity building in Kabul.
Overall SASA seems to have been designed flexibly and sensitively in respect of the contextual
situations within which the programme operates; engagement with all stakeholders has been good and
implementation at the local level under BASP and HASP appears to have been handled with
considerable sensitivity and due diligence by the contracted implementers (Prime and Mercy Corps
and UNEP). The main aim of SASA of increasing agricultural productivity is a strong and pressing
need which local people understand; SASA is therefore (broadly) a politically and culturally neutral
intervention well accepted on the ground in both Bamyan and Helmand.
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Section A: Detailed Output Scoring
As explained below, the SASA logframe includes a number of indicators for which there are no 2013
milestones – this is intentional, and so only specific indicators are marked, but the recommendations
below also consider whether such a design for the logframe is suitable going forward.
Output 1: Increased productivity and value of agriculture for participating communities
In Bamyan and Helmand.
SCORE: A+: Outputs moderately exceeded expectation
There are currently 14 indicators under this output, most of these have first progress milestones in
2014 and are therefore not commented on below under progress against the expected results. It is not
possible or fair to compare progress made in Helmand (under Mercy Corps) with progress made in
Bamyan (under Prime) due to the different project start dates as well as contrasting starting baselines,
project outputs and operational contexts. That said, broadly speaking, progress in Bamyan has been
excellent;720 family farms under the 40 cooperatives (from 53 village communities) with which Prime
Consulting has been working seeing huge increases in their annual productivity. Under the Prime
project there has been a significant focus on value chain efficiencies and improved marketing of
agricultural produce, particularly focusing on the potato value chain, where under the project a US$ 1
million potato ‘packhouse’ has been constructed and will shortly be operational.
Much of the progress in Helmand has been on preliminary manoeuvring, laying some cornerstones of
the intervention to come e.g. signing of MoUs, developing a feed standards document, conducting
wider market analysis (e.g. in Dubai), and developing a business plan for the proposed biomass
electricity plant; there is no tangible progress in terms of increased agricultural productivity on the
ground since the start of the programme (October 2012) but at the same time there is no reason to
assume that they are not on track; and Mercy Corps’ capacity building programme for their
associations is certainly adding value to agricultural produce; ongoing mentoring support under HASP
to the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable (FFV) traders association for example in sorting and grading fruit and
vegetables according to their quality enables them to charge a higher price for the better quality fruit
and vegetables. Given the heightened security risk in Helmand, quick implementation on the ground is
certainly more constrained and quick eye-catching results comparable to what has been seen under
ASP in Bamyan perhaps less likely. Mercy Corps’ exceptional experience in the region is a definite
positive (they have been continuously active there since 1986 and implementing successive DFID
agricultural programmes in Helmand since 2007); in that time they have developed a rapport with and
been accepted by local communities, as well as having strong and important linkages through their
other projects in the region (e.g. their EU funded Animal Health Programme).
The modality of using cooperatives for agricultural extension appears to be a successful one in
Bamyan; however in Helmand there appears to be something of an aversion to cooperatives in favour
of associations, the critical difference being that associations are deemed (more) independent of the
GoA, but also functionally they transcend social, political and vocational groupings upon which a
cooperative is founded. It seems the choice of Cooperatives vis-à-vis Associations is very much down
to the contextual situation on the ground, and whilst there are additional implications of this decision
(e.g. Associations are registered under Ministry of Justice whilst cooperatives are registered directly
with MAIL), the general premise, wholly in line with the SASA projects objectives (increasing local
autonomy, economies of scale etc.) are met through either local institutional entity.
Progress against expected results:
Indicator 1 (BASP, Prime): Bamyan Productivity: Wheat yield / Potato yield / Livestock mortalities.
[2013 milestone: Wheat 1.5 MT/HA, Potatoes 8 MT/HA, Livestock mortalities 9%]
Progress against 2013 milestone: Accepting the (justifiable) seasonal lag time in reporting, yields of
wheat and potatoes (produced under the 40 cooperatives supported by the project) are derived from
actual 2012 season yields and estimates from field level assessments during 2013 harvest. Indications
are that milestones for both wheat and potato production have been far exceeded with average figures
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(triangulated against other sources) of 5.5 MT/HA for wheat and 21.4 MT/HA for potatoes. The same
fast improvement is also reflected in livestock mortality rates, owing to the implementation of a rigorous
blood sampling and vaccination scheme (25,175 sheep/goats vaccinated against Brucellosis and 8,548
blood serum samples collected); livestock mortalities from ASP's annual survey (completed in May
2013) are recorded at 6.5%. Whilst these improved figures (for wheat, potato and livestock) may
seem excessive (indeed it should be noted that for wheat and potatoes the 2015 target has already
been surpassed and for livestock mortalities, the 2014 milestone already reached), ASP points out that
such impressive improvements in productivity are the immediate results of their project interventions
including the use of tractors and the appropriate application of fertilizer and fungicide and the law of
diminishing returns will mean that 2014 results are unlikely to show such a pronounced improvement
again.
Indicator 2 (BASP, Prime): Regeneration of rangeland vegetation.
[2013 milestone: 600 hectares planted]
Progress against 2013 milestone: A total 383 hectares successfully germinated from the 2012
cultivation. An estimated additional 270 hectares was sown down by 30thNovember 2013, thus the total
land area to be rehabilitated could be as much as 653 hectares.
Indicator 3 (BASP, Prime): Co-operative household incomes.
[2013 milestone: AFN 213,684 per household]
Progress against 2013 milestone: Average household income (cash and non-cash) under the
programmes 40 cooperatives has been calculated as AFN 285,343 (as confirmed by the ASP annual
survey, May 2013). One of ASP’s project objectives is the development of ‘valued added
microenterprises’ and under this objective ASP has established a beekeeping project, sub-contracting
implementation to a local NGO (COAM). Beekeeping is not only an activity where women’s
participation is culturally accepted but it can also be immensely profitable; honey in Bamyan is currently
sold at about US$ 8 per kilo of honey, a conservative estimate projects that an apiary (5-6 beehives)
will make a net profit of over US$ 600 by the end of Year 1 and, following the natural multiplication in
the number of beehives, around US$ 2500 by the end of Year 3. The project is also currently looking
at improved marketing which will add value to honey-based products. Therefore through this initiative
ASP is not only contributing to enhanced household income levels but also to women’s empowerment
(not to mention health/medicinal benefits).
Indicator 4 (HASP, Mercy Corps): Purchase of farming inputs.
[2013 milestone: 4 partners (input suppliers, Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Traders, Famers Association,
Meat Dealers) signed MoU with Mercy Corps and maintain register of members]
Progress against 2013 milestone: One of the 4 partners (the input suppliers) has signed an MoU with
Mercy Corps and members are registered with DAIL. The other 3 MoUs are being reviewed by the
Associations and will be signed on 15th January 2014.
Indicator 9 (HASP, Mercy Corps): Purchase of livestock inputs.
[2013 milestone: Feed standards document ratified by MAIL]
Progress against 2013 milestone: Mercy Corps facilitated the development by private sector
stakeholders of the first draft of the feed standards document and it was then put forward to DAIL for
review. DAIL responded by proposing their recommendations and changes to the draft. Further work
between Mercy Corps, the private sector stakeholders and DAIL to produce a document for final
approval (by MAIL) is ongoing.
Indicator 14 (HASP, Mercy Corps): Well researched business plan for provision of commercially
available electricity to agri-business.
[2013 milestone: Business Plan that is compelling and presentable to investors / donor forums
encouraging investment commitment]
Progress against 2013 milestone: Mercy Corps commenced, in August 2013, the business plan
process for developing the commercial case for a private sector owned, operated and maintained
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electricity plant of 1 MW capacity, in Helmand. This business plan builds off the preliminary feasibility
study undertaken by G4i in 2012 for establishing a biomass electricity plant for the Bost Industrial Park.
As the industrial park is delayed, Mercy Corps proposed using the same idea but establishing the plant
closer to businesses that are diesel generator dependent and collaborating with De Afghanistan
Breshna Sherkat (DABS) on how to distribute this electricity to these commercial customers.
Recommendations:
It is recommended that the total number of indicators under this output is reduced through a process of
merging and consolidating indicators. An independent evaluation of SASA, which is currently
underway, is addressing this matter already, a review and suggested revision of the log frame being a
key objective of the evaluation.
Impact Weighting (%):40%
Revised since last Annual Review? No
Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? No
Output 2: Change Management and institutional capacity strengthened and MAIL better
able to deliver NPPs.
SCORE: C: Outputs substantially did not meet expectation
Overall there are 8 indicators under this output – only 5 of which have 2013 milestones which can be
reported against. Overall performance under this indicator has been weak and below expectations,
almost entirely due to the termination of the IRDC contract at the inception phase. It should be noted
that UNEP’s support to NEPA contributed to the complete acceptance of all relevant NPPs at the Joint
Coordination and Monitoring Board (Ministry of Finance) in 2013.
Progress against expected results:
Indicator 1 (UNEP): National mechanisms established for integrating environmental management and
restoration at landscape-scale by government and non-governmental actors, including community
networks for forests, protected areas, watersheds, and rangeland projects.
[2013 milestone: Landscape based ecosystem restoration programmes have completed master plans
and strategic planning]
Progress against 2013 milestone: NEPA has been fully involved within the Agriculture and Rural
Development (ARD) government-donor cluster to mainstream environmental management in all the
ARD NPPs. It has closely worked with other ARD cluster members in developing the NPP-1: National
Water and Natural Resource Development. In addition, NEPA is drafting an Environment
Mainstreaming Guidelines document (first draft to be finalized imminently) to assist other ministries in
mainstreaming environment into their planning and implementation of programs and projects. In
addition NEPA has been formulating and conceptualising (actual implementation to start mid
December 2013 through the formulation of a Policy Council) Strategic Environment Assessments
(SEAs) in addition to what are more compliance-focussed and reactive Environmental Impact
Assessments (EIAs) – for all development and infrastructure with risk of environmental and social
impact in Afghanistan, as per the 2007 Environmental Law, and the National Constitution. This
process is being supported by UNEP and can be considered a vitally important mechanism for
integrating environmental management into national level policy implementation.
Indicator 2 (IRDC - now void): MAIL development budget execution rate.
[2013 milestone: 45%]
Progress against 2013 milestone: This indicator belongs primarily to IRDC programme, the contract for
which was terminated for poor performance in mid-2013. Notwithstanding this fact, this milestone is
seen as unrealistically ambitious and should be revised if IRDC is supported in the future.
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Indicator 3 (IRDC – now void, however some coverage from (B)ASP and HASP): Structural reform of
provincial DAIL offices.
[2013 milestone: Agreement 4 DAIL receive support]
Progress against 2013 milestone: Whilst again this indicator falls primarily under the auspices of the
IRDC project, both the BASP and HASP have contributed significantly to this indicator. Under HASP
Mercy Corps have been working with DAIL in Helmand on improving their engagement with and
regulatory oversight of the private sector, mainly through carefully tailored training, coordinated with the
overall PRT-led DAIL self-assessment and maturity measurement. To date 5 trainings have been
conducted covering 20 key DAIL staff in the Helmand office. All the work under the BASP has been
carried out through a highly collaborative partnership with the Bamyan DAIL office, capacity building of
and technical support to the Bamyan DAIL has been at the forefront of Prime’s approach.
Indicator 4 (BASP, Prime): University agriculture graduates hired by Bamyan DAIL offices.
[2013 milestone: 8 (University agriculture graduates hired by Bamyan DAIL offices)]
Progress against 2013 milestone: 8 interns are currently undergoing a 3-year intensive training
programme under ASP with the objective that once they have completed it, they will automatically be
absorbed into the MAIL/DAIL tashkeel (civil service) staff. However currently these 8 individuals are on
Prime's own payroll; and their uptake by M/DAIL is dependent on an official agreement, which was
signed by the previous Deputy Minister for Technical Affairs in MAIL, actually being honoured.
Indicator 5 (UNEP): Institutional capacity within Ministry of Mines, NEPA, MRRD, and MAIL to
understand, instruct, and command use of environmental sustainability principles and approaches in
planning for country programmes on water, agriculture, and forestry.
[2013 milestone: Afghanistan's National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) is approved by parliament
and integrated into new Ten Year Plan].
Progress against 2013 milestone: The NEAP has been developed in English, Dari and Pashto and
shared with all other relevant Ministries by NEPA, yet they report that to date no information on
progress against NEAP has been received.
Indicator 8 (BASP, Prime): Projects implemented in partnership with DAIL and Private sector in
Bamyan ASP.
[2013 milestone: Up to 12 projects (implemented in partnership with DAIL and the Private sector in
Bamyan ASP)]
Progress against 2013 milestone: DAIL has delivered a number of projects on behalf of the ASP.
These include two separate tractor operator training workshops, Cooperative finance and business
training workshops, rangeland management workshops and DAIL coordinated a Provincial Agricultural
Field Day in September 2013. DAIL is also actively partnering with DAIL on the implementation of
Bamyan's first ever potato packhouse. DAIL assisted seven Bamyan Centre farmer cooperatives to
establish Hojat Nawin, a secondary (or 'super') cooperative which will own and run the potato
packhouse business. All construction projects (packhouse, farm mechanisation, and alfalfa seed
stores) were publically tendered and awarded to privately owned construction companies.
Recommendations:
Merge and reduce down indicators to maximum of three. UNEP indicators in particular need to be
honed down into simpler, more tangible and understandable outputs/milestones. Revise IRDC
logframe outputs to be absorbed by existing BASP, HASP and UNEP components of SASA. Follow up
with MAIL required if DFID wishes to maintain a strategic position on capacity building and institutional
strengthening.
Impact Weighting (%): 20%
Revised since last Annual Review? Yes. In the original logical framework this was 35% but elements
have been moved to new Outputs 3 and 5 reflecting the Accountable Grant with UNEP and a new
policy output.
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Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? No
Output 3: Building Environmental Resilience into Agriculture and Environmental
Management
SCORE: A: Outputs met expectation
This output is mainly at the national planning and strategic level and mainly led by NEPA. Overall there
are 4 indicators under this output but only 1 of which has a 2013 milestone which can be reported
against.
Progress against expected results:
Indicator 4 (UNEP – but some overlap from BASP & HASP): The contribution of ecosystem services
(water, rangeland and agricultural productivity) to rural livelihoods and disaster resilience.
[2013 milestone: Partnerships in place with local organisations and communities]
Progress against 2013 milestone: UNEP inaugurated a working group with national decision makers for
the incorporation of eco-Distaster Risk Reduction (DRR) into national plans in June 2013, and held an
eco-DRR national committee workshop and annual general meeting in October 2013. UNEP has also
established community based livelihoods, climate change and eco-Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) pilot
projects in the Bamyan, Badakhshan and Balkh areas – this has included various training initiatives
including on landscape planning, environmental management, community based natural resources
management and disaster preparedness. Cooperatives and associations with the local community
have been established under both ASP and HASP.
NEPA/MAIL/MRRD has received US$ 2 million from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) under its
Small Grant Programme (SGP) which is being implemented by NEPA though civil society organizations
in 4 target provinces (Kabul, Bamyan, Balkh and Badakhshan); however NEPA has expressed a view
that they will certainly consider any good proposals from local partners from other provinces.
In addition on 1st May 2013, NEPA, Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA,
MAIL & Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD received US$ 5.4 million from the
GEF for implementing an Ecosystem Approach to Livelihoods and Climate Change Adaptation, the first
full-sized GEF project for Afghanistan.
Recommendations:
Consolidate of indicators under Output 3 and linking them better with SASA programme objectives.
Impact Weighting (%): 20%
Revised since last Annual Review? Yes. This was a new output introduced in early 2012 to reflect
the UNEP Accountable Grant.
Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? No
Output 4: Scalable evidence base of best agricultural practice to increase household
incomes
SCORE: A: Met
Groundwork and progress under other outputs.
Progress against expected results:
Indicator 3 (DFID): Examples of best practice from change management and institutional reform
shared between MAIL and Helmand and Bamyan DAILs.
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[2013 milestone: No specific milestone this review]
Recommendations:
Prime believes that there are a large number of lessons learned from Bamyan DAIL (at a practical
level) that can readily be shared with Helmand DAIL. However, at this point there is no formal
mechanism in place for this. Therefore Prime suggests a best practices workshop is convened in 2014
between BASP and HASP to achieve this milestone. More pronounced cross-pollination between
BASP and HASP is actively encouraged by DFID. UNEP, on behalf of DFID, should facilitate a
national evidence-based policy workshop at national level (“Scalable evidence of best agricultural and
environmental management practices”) during first half of 2014.
Impact Weighting (%): 10%
Revised since last Annual Review? No
Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? No
Output 5: Appropriate policies in place and enacted
SCORE: B: Outputs moderately did not meet expectation
No practical progress has been made under SASA with regards to Policy Analysis and Legal Advisory
Department (PALAD (Indicator 1) – a useful internal memorandum by IRDC on PALAD entitled
‘Examination of PALAD and the policy and legislative development processes within MAIL’ was
conducted in June 2013. Some progress has been made under the UNEP component in terms of the
Country Position Paper on Sustainable Development (with agricultural priorities) and ongoing progress
within the NEPA ARD cluster on national disaster planning, biodiversity, climate change, degraded
land, fertilisers and pesticides.
Progress against expected results:
Indicator 1 (UNEP): Number of relevant environmental policies, strategies, laws, rules and regulations
being developed by Law and Policy Unit in NEPA and discussed as part of national planning processes
and approvals, in partner line ministries, Ministry of Mines (MoM), MAIL, MRRD, Ministry of Energy and
Water (MEW), Ministry of Finance.
[2013 milestone: At least 1 framework document on biodiversity, climate change and disaster
management with law, strategies, regulations, standards, and impact assessments (EIA/SEAs) being
developed by Afghan counterparts, and including international environmental benefit targets]
Progress against 2013 milestone: EIA/SEA action plans were developed by NEPA in November 2013
after a 6 month consultative process which included UNEP and the World Bank and culminated in a 4
day workshop towards the endorsement of a national framework document (SESAEIA). Further
detailed standards and emissions guidelines for air, water, ozone, mercury, pesticides, brick kilns and
chemicals were prepared and submitted by NEPA to the National Standards Authority throughout the
year. The Afghanistan National Climate Change strategy is in progress and the Initial National
Communication (INC) has been submitted to the UNFCCC. The National Biodiversity Strategy and
Action Plan (NBSAP) document was finalised in May 2013 and submitted to the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity, and the Cartagena Protocol was ratified by Afghanistan in February 2013. A
National Waste Management strategy is being developed. The NEPA Montreal Protocol project
submitted the Afghanistan National SAARC compliance regulations in June 2013, and SAARC formally
ratified this important document on CFC/Ozone Depleting substances in November 2013
Indicator 2 (IRDC – now void): Policy or law undergoing PALAD review to point of completion. [2013
milestone: 6 months (passage of policy or law undergoing PALAD review to point of completion)]
Progress against 2013 milestone: This indicator belongs primarily to IRDC programme the contract for
which was terminated in early 2013. An assessment of PALAD carried out by the consultancy team
during the inception period, as well as recent corroboration by the UNEP evaluation team, would
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suggest that PALAD, without the support of their previous cadre of skilled contracted staff and
international consultants (employed under the first phase of the Change Management programme cofunded by DFID), is at the time of writing (Nov 2013) grossly understaffed as the latest donor project to
support this critical core function of MAIL winds down – given the high level of technical (specifically
legal) skills required in this department. A key undermining force which plagues PALAD, is the salary
differential between civil servants and contract staff – any future support to PALAD needs to make a
more concerted effort to address this key conundrum of achieving some sustainable level of
interdependence from donor support. As a result of the aforementioned problems, there remains a
large backlog of policy and law awaiting review, and this backlog will only grow the longer PALAD
remains in its current dysfunctional state – severely impacting on progress in MAIL.
Recommendations:
Indicators 1 and 2 concerning agricultural and environmental policy should be merged. The
development of policy and regulations is critical to progress in the sector/s and should be prioritised
under SASA. There is evidence that the Law and Policy Unit at NEPA (current GoA tashkeel of 10) is
a more sustainable model than PALAD (current GoA tashkeel of zero/ two contracted employees’
contracts expiring in April 2014). There would be clear benefits of establishing close ties between
these two units, given the importance of instilling environmental safeguards into agricultural policy and
practice – something that UNEP is a strong advocate for – it should be noted that at a recent meeting
with the NEPA Deputy Director General he indicated that NEPA was open to a more formalised
relationship (and note that NEPA is mandated under the National Constitution and the Environment,
Water and other laws to oversee policy development for environmental management and plans in
Afghanistan and can play a stronger neutral role with MAIL, MRRD, MEW and ANDMA in 2014).
Impact Weighting (%): 10%
Revised since last Annual Review? Yes. This is a new output to reflect the addition of a UNEP
component and to provide clarity on the policy support of SASA.
Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? No
Section B: Results and Value for Money.
1. Progress and results
1.1 Has the logframe been updated since last review? Yes
Yes – there has been revision of the logframe, the main changes due to the termination of the IRDC
project component (Output 2/3) and attempts to consolidate and absorb some of the outputs of the
IRDC project into other components under SASA, as well as the addition of new components, mainly
pertaining to the introduction of UNEP into the remodelled SASA framework.
1.2 Overall Output Score and Description:
A: Outputs met expectation. Taken individually the components of SASA show marked variation in
annual outputs towards this overall score.
1.3 Direct feedback from beneficiaries
Beneficiaries under BASP and HASP are unanimously positive about these two components of the
programme (Output 1). Stakeholder meetings were conducted with all key parties in Bamyan,
including representatives of 25 cooperatives (from 2 districts) and the praise for the work of ASP was
unequivocally positive. Given the failure of IRDC to deliver, the same cannot be said of MAIL (output
2). Senior management in the NEPA who coordinate work on the EIA/SEA processes and the NEPA
are positive about the overall aims of the SASA programme, but want to be more integrated in future.
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1.4 Summary of overall progress
The general premise as outlined in the appraisal case for SASA would suggest that the SASA
programme outputs should be run as a ‘cohesive whole’ (page 6 Appraisal case) to maximise the
impact of the project. Accordingly, the contracts which have been awarded under SASA are generally
cross-cutting, with elements of all 4 of the original outputs covered in the design of each project (e.g.
ASP, HASP). However due to the termination of the IRDC programme that was to integrate the
components few existing linkages are currently apparent between the various components of the
programme. Current implementation of the various programmes now loosely assembled under SASA
does not demonstrate ‘cohesive whole’ which the Appraisal case aspired to. Nevertheless, there is
clearly scope for better linkages and more coordination across the programme between the various
components; an ongoing evaluation of SASA will attempt to align and harmonize the component parts
better – and will advocate that sharing lessons learned and best practice between implementation in
Bamyan and implementation in Helmand, as well as linkages between both provincial DAIL with the
centre (MAIL), is definitely workable and would be beneficial to the programme per se. As the
programme continues on into future years, it is suggested that it looks to create actual practical
opportunities for such knowledge and experience sharing to take place, especially between the BASP
and HASP programmes.
As per the strategic case for SASA, Output 1 aimed to support the role of women in enhancing
household food security through home-based activities. Such an approach has been implemented
under ASP with COAM, a local NGO, being sub-contracted to carry out a beekeeping project. Beekeeping is an activity, in Bamyan province at least, where women’s participation is wholly accepted and
can lead to their empowerment. Whilst this project is in its fledgling stages, indications are that it is
going very well and that the COAM-Prime implementation axis is working efficiently. The bee-keeping
activity under ASP also contributes directly to Output 4 in that a preliminary survey by COAM/Prime
showed that it can be a very profitable activity (as mentioned previously).
1.5 Key challenges
Another gender aspect under ASP implementation has not been so successful – the recruitment of 8
agriculture graduates into DAIL under Output 3 was supposed to include 4 (50%) female graduates (p.
4 Strategic case), however, despite the initial list of applicants being huge (50+ candidates) not one of
them was female. According to Prime, ASP did all they could to encourage females to apply, but to no
avail – and hence the first batch of 8 graduates being provided with training for eventual absorption into
the DAIL tashkeel are all male. Currently out of a tashkeel of 61 in the Bamyan DAIL there are only
three women.
Another challenge critical in addressing the SASA programme’s intended outcomes, is the conundrum
of how effective implementation on the ground can be achieved at the same time as trying to work with
(and improve) the cumbersome and centralised institutional structure of MAIL-DAIL linkages. This
includes financial control mechanisms and systems of moving funds to where they are needed for
implementation in the field. As things stand linkages between DAIL and MAIL are tenuous and
cumbersome administratively via two main conduits:
i)
through the Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG); and
ii)
through the related Directorates within MAIL (from IRDC mission report).
A relevant anecdote here concerns Prime’s implementation of the rangelands rehabilitation project subcomponent under ASP. Following a transparent procurement process, the work was sub-contracted
directly to DAIL Bamyan, as Prime points out, effectively killing two birds with one stone as they could
fulfil the additional goal of providing institutional capacity building to DAIL at the same time. However
after a year of implementation by DAIL, Prime was forced by the Directorate of Economy with support
from the Bamyan Governor’s office, to stop sub-contracting DAIL to implement the ASP’s rangeland
rehabilitation project. Prime contested this decision, but following a further 3 months of discussions,
the issue was in the end decided on a technicality; nowhere in the ASP Financing Agreement did it
mention that sub-contracting directly to DAIL was permissible.
It has to be said that this whole drawn out episode seems to be borne more out of local political
infighting between different government entities in Bamyan than anything else; to Prime it seemed no
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coincidence that as soon as the PRT closed down the Director of Economy was knocking on the door
of ASP to say there was a problem; and the Director of Economy’s overwhelming compulsion to
undermine and ultimately bring down the ASP rangeland component seemed to be based primarily on
his personal animosity towards the Bamyan DAIL and its Director; this was perhaps plainly revealed
when he asked the UNEP evaluator whether it was really necessary for the Agricultural Support
Programme to work with the Department of Agriculture at all. It should also be noted that when asked
further by the evaluator regarding the specific reasons why the rangeland project was cancelled the
Director changed his story from the originally cited contractual technicality (which he claimed was
actually not the issue at all) to DAIL’s alleged gross corruption in managing the project as well as the
project allegedly being a 95% failure.
As things stand, Prime has taken back implementation of the rangeland rehabilitation component ‘in
house’. This is proving onerous on Prime’s time in terms of management (they had always intended to
sub-contract out this component of ASP). DAIL remains fully involved but now as the cooperating GoA
partner rather than implementing directly themselves. Operationally not much has actually changed; it
is down to subtleties of approach. It should be noted that the DAIL staff who were working on the ASP
rangelands rehabilitation project were never actually part of the tashkeel and Prime was paying their
salaries directly anyway. After subsequent discussions with DFID, Prime is now looking to possibly
hand over the rangelands rehabilitation work to UNEP for the remaining duration of the programme.
It is suggested that this whole incident needs to be carefully reviewed, not least for what it reveals, and
the questions it raises, about grassroots implementation through the DAILs. Workable options need to
be explored for what at first glance appears a good delivery mechanism. Another area to explore in
this respect is the possible role of NGOs. The DFID programme officer has specifically asked the
evaluation team to have a close look at this area.
It must be noted here that separate national level projects are on-going with the Independent
Directorate of Local Government, the Governor’s Performance Fund project, and through the Ministry
of Finance Sub-National Governance project to address contradictions in approach between Ministries
in contracting, procurement and sub-contracting services and activities at provincial and district level.
The Afghanistan Sub-National Governance National Priority Programme (NPP) is likely to significantly
alter and clarify the situation with regards to sub-national contracting from 2014 onwards.
1.6 Annual Outcome Assessment
The programme outcome (purpose) is; ‘Evidence base of best practice and capable institutions
established for increasing productivity and value of agriculture in Afghanistan’. Taken individually the
components of SASA show marked variation in annual outputs towards this overall outcome. As a sum
of its constituent parts SASA is probably at this stage failing to achieve the overall impact it set out to,
however this is almost entirely down to the failure and ultimate termination of one key component
(IRDC). Disaggregating individual component parts from the existing SASA programme and two of
them, BASP and HASP, are performing well and in line with, if not exceeding, expectations. There can
be seen as much future potential if SASA continues the process of recovering from the IRDC
termination and further consolidating and streamlining its outputs. The current ongoing evaluation
process can be used to good effect to this end and moreover some environmental safeguards, which
were missing from the programme previously, can be infused into the programme framework through
the involvement of UNEP.
2. Costs and timescale
2.1 Is the project on-track against financial forecasts:
Due to the termination of the IRDC component, budgeted at £3.7 million the programme is currently
under spending. However, financial forecasts have been adjusted since the beginning of the financial
year to reflect this. Remedial measures are in place that are to be considered by DFID-A in 2014 as
part of the Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic. An alternative mechanism has been identified to
implement IRDC if there continues to be a demand is in place.
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2.2 Key cost drivers
Cost drivers remain as per the Business case.
2.3 Is the project on-track against original timescale: No
There were delays in initial implementation of this programme and it is likely a no-cost extension will be
requested by some of the partners.
3. Evidence and Evaluation
3.1 Assess any changes in evidence and implications for the project
The Theory of Change behind SASA remains robust despite some changes in the various contexts
within which the project operates (geographical contexts of Kabul, Bamyan and Helmand, and
institutional contexts of MAIL and the Bamyan and Helmand DAILs), as well as changes to the
programme’s outputs (as described previously). All the assumptions remain true and pertinent.
Disaggregating gender reveals that there still remains a challenge, however various component parts
of the SASA, especially the BASP, are addressing, within the limitations and realities of the
aforementioned contextual environments. Certainly the gender perspective needs to forever be
pushed to the front of the agenda under SASA, given the palpable practical realities on the ground.
Without repeated and constant pressure the gender dimension could to drift backwards.
3.2 Where an evaluation is planned what progress has been made?
An independent mission is ongoing and the first draft of an evaluation and strategic paper looking at
the future of the SASA programme is scheduled by end of January 2014 following feedback from key
stakeholders and selected reviewers. The evaluation will include field visits to both Bamyan
(completed Week 48, 2013) and Helmand (scheduled Week 50, 2013).
4. Risk
4.1 Output Risk Rating: Medium
4.2 Assessment of the risk level
All assumptions under the existing SASA logframe remain current however:
 General insecurity and instability in the country persists; the security situation across the country is
likely to deteriorate further due to increased insurgent activity, coupled with the transition from
ISAF to ANA and the upcoming elections, all of which may hamper significantly programme
implementation going forward.
 The level of armed conflict between anti-government elements and military forces is a major
concern and threat to people’s livelihoods. This may result in negative impacts for local agricultural
systems, practices and infrastructure, ultimately reducing agricultural production. Insecurity and
conflict also limits or restricts access to markets and other services and therefore will also impact
on the value of agriculture products.
 There remain capacity constraints within MAIL; no coherent strategy exists for delivering NPPs,
and different units are working in isolation and often at cross-purposes. The termination of the
IRDC programme certainly has compounded this risk. The current situation in MAIL with regards to
capacity building and institutional support is uncertain (USAID’s CBCMP programme being
implemented by VEGA is coming to an end in mid-2014, the new USAID IWMP programme is,
according to one senior staff member, struggling at the implementation stage, and the EU’s new
programme doesn’t start until January 2014).
 In recent discussions between DFID and the Minister of MAIL on Technical Assistance to MAIL the
Minister stated that if the new World Bank programme of Capacity Building by Results came onstream, of which he was confident, that he would not require further off-budget Technical
Assistance for capacity building in MAIL.
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4.3 Risk of funds not being used as intended
Afghanistan continues to experience major challenges with regards to the diversion of resources as a
result of fraud and corruption, which impacts on the security, governance and development sectors.
There is a risk that with the troop draw-down and the closure of the PRTs, corruption previously
focused on the very large volume of military expenditure and large infrastructure projects might be
diverted to the resources contributed by aid agencies and smaller community development
interventions. The use of reputable project partners under SASA for the implementation of all
components, and DFID’s own tight financial controls, including a mandatory annual external audit of
each output, should however ensure that such a risk is minimalised under SASA.
4.4 Climate and Environment Risk
Afghanistan is a country prone to natural disasters including drought, flash flooding, periods of extreme
cold, agricultural pests and diseases, and other negative climate-driven impacts on agriculture
production. As outlined in the Appraisal case for SASA, despite some contribution to carbon emissions
through air travel, the programme can be deemed to have an overall positive impact on the
environment; the reseeding of 600 ha of rangelands under BASP (Output 1) as a means of
sequestering carbon, completion of 30 Community Based Natural Resource management projects
arguably off-setting to a degree the aforementioned carbon emissions. At the same time the field
components of the project are providing vital ecosystem services of re-vegetation of critical upland
watersheds, reducing soil erosion (and thereby the sediment load entering watercourses), and
attenuate flood peaks through increased infiltration.
Under the 2014 UNEP component of SASA environmental safeguards are being introduced to the
programme, reducing the environmental risk of SASA, and addressing the key concern of enhancing
local community resilience (to environmental shocks and climate change) primarily through the preemptive approach of eco-Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), and Climate Change Adaptation which will
be incorporated as keystones underpinning the entire SASA programme.
5. Value for Money
5.1 Performance on VfM measures
The partners implementing the programme and the results being achieved represent good value for
money. Termination of the IRDC component of SASA (Output 2 and elements of Output 5) due to poor
performance and inability to deliver contracted commitments demonstrates a real commitment of DFIDA in seeking VfM.
This termination has affected the overall scoring during this review period but contingency plans are in
place to remedy this situation and reallocate funds to good performing partners and elements of the
programme showing good potential for expansion.
5.2 Commercial Improvement and Value for Money
Prime has tendered all major construction work and any purchase over US$100 requires three
quotations to be obtained. As a successful commercial agribusiness consulting business Prime are
firm subscribers to the continuous improvement process; as part of which they operate an internal
review process to ensure they operate at the forefront of commercial business practice in all regards –
not just in terms of procurement.
Mercy Corps have been subject to due diligence assessments and were found to have sound financial
management systems providing excellent accountability of DFID funds.
UNEP Afghanistan is extremely cost-effective in context of Afghanistan. It operates from a small, high
performance office in Kabul, with one regional hub in Central Highlands. It uses national experts and
creates national partnerships and vendor agreements as much as possible. UNEP operates a buy-local
policy that adds significant value to the local economy.
5.3 Role of project partners
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Prime claims not to make any profit at all from the ASP as it is forbidden under the terms of their
contract with NZAID. Furthermore, Prime has taken out a loan facility in order to provide the cash flow
for the programme at their own cost; the interest charges are not claimed back. Accordingly, Prime is
continuously reviewing their internal cost structure in order to ensure that nothing is spent unless it
absolutely must be and only then after they are satisfied themselves that the quotes provided offer
VfM. Furthermore, Prime runs a very lean local team; all local staff salaries are benchmarked to
ensure that they are not paying any more than is reasonable for each specific position.
Whilst claiming to have sound financial management systems Mercy Corps do acknowledge a current
weakness in accurate forecasting due to a combination of: i) staff capacity and ii) on the ground
constraints on implementation in Helmand. Mercy Corps claim to be addressing both these issues
through a strong and comprehensive internal capacity building programme and establishing the best
modus operandi on the ground in Helmand (VfM being a primary factor) with regards to subsidies vis-àvis beneficiary contributions/cost share arrangements. In this light, the compatibility, contradictory or
duplicative nature of DFID’s two main agricultural programmes, CARD-F and SASA, needs to be
carefully examined (this is a projected aim of the ongoing evaluation of SASA). DFID will need to
monitor this situation carefully into 2014.
The UNEP component of SASA, albeit in its fledgling stages of integration with the rest of SASA, can
be seen to represent good VfM given that UNEP have a pre-existing operational structure,
effectiveness with a small UN-mandated team in Afghanistan, well-functioning field office in Bamyan
and goals wholly compatible with DFID’s own under SASA.
5.4 Does the project still represent Value for Money : Yes
Output 1 represents good value for money against all criteria including results, evidence, the SASA
Theory of Change and risk mitigation.
Termination of the IRDC component of SASA (Output 2 and elements of Output 5), whilst recognised
as potentially significantly negatively effecting the overall progress of the programme (in the short term
– this annual review), was undertaken due to poor performance by the contractor. This demonstrates a
real commitment of DFID-A in seeking VfM.
Outputs 3 (as well as elements of Output 5) under UNEP, although in early stages of implementation
can be seen to offer good VfM. UNEP exercises strong controls over the quality and quantity of
outputs. It does so through having set up a tightly managed small operations team, backstopping the
science, technical and projects staff. In programme terms UNEP applies environmental economics,
valuation of ecosystem services and programmes, and political-economic ecology concepts. This work
will add significant value to the overall conceptual strength of SASA, and its policy functions in driving
the addition of environmental sustainability to all Afghan government plans in the development decade.
5.5 If not, what action will you take?
Value for money on SASA is currently assessed in terms of the existing SASA project partners’
performance. UNEP, Mercy Corps and Prime are functioning well. A decision needs to be taken on the
IRDC component to ensure these ear-marked funds are re-allocated or accounted for outside of the
logframe and the logframe is amended accordingly.
6. Conditionality
6.1 Update on specific conditions
N/A
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7. Conclusions and actions
The SASA logframe was revised to reflect the termination of the IRDC component; these changes now
need to be consolidated into a more robust and strategically sound framework which supports the
Theory of Change upon which the SASA programme was founded. The inclusion of the UNEP
component needs to be better amalgamated and brought into line with the goals of increased
productivity and institutional reform in M/DAILs as per the main outcomes/purposes of the SASA
programme. Given the failure of the IRDC programme, it is now important to engage quickly and
resolutely with MAIL so as not to lose DFID’s previous momentum and strong reputation for providing
sound and focused technical support to MAIL. One particular area where the programme might like to
inject support in this respect would be in the policy and regulatory functions of MAIL, namely PALAD,
which was originally established under DFID funding but with no real heed being given to the
sustainability of the department it was creating.
Greater efforts need to be made to engender the programme’s metamorphose into a ‘cohesive whole’
through encouraging better ‘cross-learning’ partnerships between programme stakeholders, especially
between Helmand and Bamyan. The programme could look to focus renewed efforts into streamlining
the linkages between MAIL and its provincial satellite offices (DAILs). Given the programme is working
in the centre and in two provinces, it is well positioned to investigate and pilot different modalities of
achieving optimal distribution of financial resources to where they are needed at the grassroots, looking
at the specific areas of sub-contracting mechanisms, transparency and accountability. The apparent
success and efficiencies of the working relationship between a hard-nosed commercial approach (as
exemplified in Prime’s implementation of BASP) and a local NGO approach (as per their subcontracting to COAM for the beekeeping project) might be one modus operandi which is worth
exploring further.
It was originally intended that the programme would be rolled out across the country to initially three
new provinces (Ghor, Samangan and Saripul), but given the current enforced consolidation of the
programme it is suggested that this is postponed. This strategic alignment needs to be as much within
SASA (for example the diffusion of elements of the IRDC component to BASP, and the rangelands
component of BASP to UNEP), as with external programmes, institutions and policies – including for
example DFID’s other agricultural programme CARD-F, other bi-lateral and multi-lateral donor
interventions in MAIL, and with other ARD Cluster Ministries/Government bodies, especially NEPA
(through UNEP) to instil the necessary environmental safeguards into all components of the
programme.
8. Review Process
The review was conducted by DFID-A with support from a externally contracted review team
assembled especially for the purpose of evaluating and reviewing the SASA programme. This
evaluation/review has included a desk review of all available literature (e.g. project reports, DFID
guidelines and original SASA programme documentation etc.). Field trips were carried out to project
provinces (Bamyan and Helmand) and interviews/meetings with key stakeholders including MAIL,
NEPA, DAIL Bamyan, Directorate of Economy in Bamyan, DAIL Helmand (on-going), Prime Consulting
International Ltd., COAM, Bamyan University Agricultural Department, Mercy Corps, UNEP, local
beneficiaries including representatives of associations and cooperatives.
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