Investment Planning Costs and the effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Susanto Basu and Miles S. Kimball Frontiers of Macroeconomics Conference, June 5-6, 2006, UQAM Motivation • Search for a model that can explain effect of monetary, fiscal and technology shocks • Sticky prices needed to explain monetary shocks • “Old Keynesian” literature: With sticky prices and investment, increased G has no effect on Y • We examine in New Keynesian model • Confirm puzzle; suggest a solution Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 2 Tobin (1955): The first DGE model of cycles? • • • • A “Solow” model Exogenously fixed nominal wage Result: Increase in G crowds out I one-for-one Has no effect on Y Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 3 Modern literature adds a lot • • • • Consumer optimization Natural rate property Rational expectations Sticky prices instead of wages We show: The upshot is now that Y falls if G rises Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 4 A new puzzle • Standard RBC/NK models predict that C should fall if G rises (a negative wealth shock) • Contrary to evidence in Blanchard-Perotti (2002) • Gali et al. (2006) confirm the puzzle • Their solution: Add rule of thumb (RoT) consumers • Motivated by Campbell-Mankiw (1989) • Do we need Old Keynesian consumption function to solve a New Keynesian puzzle? Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 5 Building blocks of the model • • • • • Consumer with King-Plosser-Rebelo (1988) prefs Calvo pricing Capital accumulation LM curve (exogenous money) G shocks financed with lump-sum taxes • Baseline model: No investment frictions • Extended model: Investment (higher-order) adjustment costs, similar to CEE Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 6 Why are “good” real shocks contractionary in the baseline model? Cobb-Douglas production: Y ZK N 1 F First-order condition: 1 Y F r (.) K where is the ex post markup Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 7 “Expansionary” real shocks raise • Price level a state variable • MC(Y,.) jumps down in response to “good” shocks • e.g., technology improvement, lower labor taxes, or fiscal expansion (lowers wages) • • • • Thus, markup rises Anticipate that will fall back to * as prices adjust Firms delay investment to avoid capital losses Collapse in investment demand lowers output Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 8 KE-LM diagram r r 1 YF (.) LM K KE KE’ Y Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 9 Monetary policy • Clear from diagram that prediction depends on monetary policy rule • Our rule is that the authority holds M fixed • Different policy rules might have different implications • But the basic lesson is still that “good” real shocks will lower output, unless the central bank takes action • Fiscal expansion is not an independent stimulus in the baseline model Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 10 Baseline model results FIGURE 1. BASELINE MODEL (cont'd) OUTPUT G 1.5 5 1 4 0.5 3 0 2 -0.5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 1 0 100 Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 11 Baseline model results, cont’d FIGURE 1. BASELINE MODEL OUTPUT HOURS 1.5 1.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 -0.5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 -0.5 0 100 INVESTMENT 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 CONSUMPTION 0 0 -1 -0.1 -2 -0.2 -3 -0.3 -4 -5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 -0.4 0 100 Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 12 Flex-price version has similar problems FIGURE 3. BASELINE FLEX-PRICE MODEL OUTPUT HOURS 1.5 1.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 -0.5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 -0.5 0 100 INVESTMENT 0 -1 -0.1 -2 -0.2 -3 -0.3 -4 -0.4 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 CONSUMPTION 0 -5 0 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 -0.5 0 100 Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 13 Ideas for a fix • If collapse of investment leads to output decline, what if investment is hard to change? • Paper argues that higher-order adjustment costs are also the key to hump-shaped IRFs from money, and necessary for the liquidity effect • What else is necessary to get a positive consumption response to a negative wealth shock? Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 14 Implications of KPR utility U e t 0 t 11 t C 1 1v Nt e 1 1 ln Ct rt 1 ln v Nt rt 1 ln Nt WN where 0.8 in U.S. data C Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 15 Will KPR + higher-order costs fix? ln Ct rt 1 ln Nt • Suppose is small, as in most estimates • Use 0.20, from estimating KPR model with aggregate U.S. data (Basu-Kimball, 2002) • Then a shock that requires higher N will tend to pull up C as well • Suppose I is a state variable • Since Y = C + I + G, equilibrium with low might call for higher Y, N, and C in response to increased G Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 16 Sticky-investment model with low IES FIGURE 4. STICKY-INVESTMENT MODEL WITH LOW IES (cont'd) OUTPUT G 5 2 1.5 4 1 3 0.5 2 0 -0.5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 1 0 100 Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 17 Sticky-investment model with low IES, cont’d FIGURE 4. STICKY-INVESTMENT MODEL WITH LOW IES OUTPUT HOURS 2 2 1.5 1.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 -0.5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 -0.5 0 100 INVESTMENT 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 CONSUMPTION 0 0.5 -1 -2 0 -3 -4 -5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 -0.5 0 100 Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 18 Need for cyclical markups (e.g., sticky prices) FIGURE 5. FLEX-PRICE STICKY-INVESTMENT MODEL WITH LOW IES OUTPUT HOURS 2 2 1.5 1.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 -0.5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 -0.5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year INVESTMENT CONSUMPTION 0 0 -1 -0.1 -2 -0.2 -3 -0.3 -4 -0.4 -5 0 100 500 200 300 400 100 periods=1year 500 -0.5 0 100 200 300 400 100 periods=1year Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 500 19 Why KPR and not RoT? ct rt 1 nt • Campbell-Mankiw (1989) essentially run this equation with y instead of n • Two variables are strongly positively correlated • Regressing c on r, n and y, find that y is never significant (Basu-Kimball, 2002) • Micro evidence leaves no doubt that PIH is violated by some people, some times • But are those violations big enough for us to assume 50% of disposable income goes to people who just spend what they get? Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 20 Conclusion • Need to use responses to multiple shocks to refine a single model of business cycles • Basic model can’t change with the type of shock • Sticky prices + real shocks = unexpected results • For policy purposes, need to understand what would happen without monetary intervention • KPR and sticky investment (useful on other grounds) can explain fiscal shock/consumption puzzle • Neither KPR nor RoT approach does a good job of explaining the extreme persistence of the positive C response (estimated at 20+ quarters by Gali et al.) Frontiers of Macro, June 2006 21