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01 FILINVEST CREDIT CORP. VS. CA, SEPT. 27, 1995
FACTS
Private respondent spouses Edilberto and Marciana Tadiaman, residents of Cabanatuan City, purchased a 10-wheeler Isuzu
cargo truck from Jordan Enterprises, Inc., in Quezon City, in installments. Said spouses executed a promissory note for
P196,680.00 payable in 24 monthly installments in favor of Jordan Enterprises, Inc., and a Chattel Mortgage over the motor
vehicle purchased to secure the payment of the promissory note. Jordan Enterprises, Inc. assigned its rights and interests over
the said instruments to Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation, which in turn assigned them to Filinvest Credit Corporation.
The spouses Tadiaman defaulted in the payment of the installments due on the promissory note, and Filinvest Credit filed an
action for replevin and damages against them with the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga. A writ of replevin was issued, and the
truck was seized in the province of Isabela, by persons who represented themselves to be special sheriffs of the court, but
who turned out to be employees of Filinvest Credit. The truck was brought by such persons all the way back to Metro Manila.
The Tadiamans filed a counterbond, and the RTC ordered the return of the truck. However, this was not immediately returned
because it was met with delaying tactics by Filinvest Credit, and when they finally recovered the truck, they found the same
to be "cannibalized" and that were missing parts and that other parts of the truck were completely changed with worn-out
spare parts. Due to this fact, the Tadiamans filed a counterclaim for damages.
With respect to the main suit, the RTC ordered the spouses to pay: (a) The sum of P88,333.32 which is the balance of the
promissory note as of September 26, 1982, with interest thereon at 14% per annum from said date; (b) The sum equivalent to
25% of the amount sued upon, as and for attorney's fees, that is P88,333.32 plus the stipulated interest; and (c) The costs of
suit. On the counterclaim by the spouses for damages due to the “cannibalization” of the truck as well as the two week delay in
returning the truck, the RTC ordered Filinvest Credit to pay to the Tadiamans: (1) Actual damages representing lost spare parts
while in the custody of plaintiff in its garage being hidden from defendants, in the sum of P50,000.00; (2) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; (4) P20,000.00 as attorney's fee; and (5) Proportionate part of the costs.
Filinvest Credit appealed the award of abovementioned damages with the Court of Appeals since ”it was the [Tadiamans] who
violated their promissory note and chattel mortgage with [Filinvest Credit]” but the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling in toto.
ISSUE
Whether or not Filinvest Credit should be held liable for damages in relation to the action for replevin?
RULING
YES. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Filinvest is liable for damages not because it commenced an action for replevin to
recover possession of the truck prior to its foreclosure, but because of the manner it carried out the seizure of the vehicle.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court are very clear and direct as to the procedure for the seizure of property under a
writ of replevin, thus:
Sec. 3. Order. — Upon the filing of such affidavit and bond with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending, the judge of such court shall issue an order describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully
detained, and requiring the sheriff or other proper officer of the court forthwith to take such property into his
custody.
Sec. 4. Duty of the officer. — Upon receiving such order the officer must serve a copy thereof on the defendant
together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the
possession of the defendant or his agent, and retain it in his custody.
In this case, it was not the sheriff or any other proper officer of the trial court who implemented the writ of replevin.
Because it was aware that no other person can implement the writ, Filinvest asked the trial court to appoint a special
sheriff. Yet, it used its own employees who misrepresented themselves as deputy sheriffs to seize the truck without having
been authorized by the court to do so. Filinvest tried to justify its seizure by citing a statement in Bachrach Motor Co. vs.
Summers, to wit, "the only restriction on the mode by which the mortgagee shall secure possession of the mortgaged
property after breach of condition is that he must act in an orderly manner and without creating a breach of the peace,
subjecting himself to an action for trespass." But the Court found said justification as misplaced and misleading for Bachrach
itself had ruled that if a mortgagee cannot obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, it must
bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale or to obtain judicial foreclosure.
Replevin is the appropriate action to recover possession preliminary to the extrajudicial foreclosure of a chattel mortgage.
Filinvest did in fact institute such an action and obtained a writ of replevin. And, by filing it, Filinvest admitted that it cannot
acquire possession of the mortgaged vehicle in an orderly or peaceful manner. Accordingly, it should have left the
enforcement of the writ in accordance with Rule 60 of the Rules of Court which it had voluntarily invoked.
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Notes:
The Supreme Court likewise said that trial court erred in holding that the action for replevin was "not in order as [Filinvest]
is not the owner of the property (Sec, 2 par. (a) Rule 60)." 11 It is not only the owner who can institute a replevin suit. A
person "entitled to the possession" of the property also can institute a replevin suit.
For actual damages: Reduced by the Court to P33,222 since it was the amount supposedly spent to replace the lost spare
parts.
For moral and exemplary damages: The Court granted the claim for said damages based on the ‘abuse of right’ doctrine
under Arts. 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code for the former, and ‘for acting in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner’ for the latter.
For attorney’s fees: This was removed by the Court stating that ‘whatever physical suffering, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or any other similar injury they had
suffered, even if proven, were only such as are usually caused to parties haled into court as a defendant and which are not
compensable, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate’.
02 FERNANDEZ VS. THE INTERNATIONAL CORP. BANK, 316 SCRA 326
FACTS
o On or about October 26, 1993, petitioners purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a financing scheme of the private
respondent, and a chattel mortgage was also executed in favor of the financing institution.
o The cash purchase price was P492,000.00, minus the downpayment of P147,500.00, leaving the amount of P344,[5]00.00 to
be financed. The total amount to be paid for 48 monthly installments would amount to P553,944.00.
o Petitioners contends the ff:
 Respondent’s "greedy desire" to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of the petitioners, the former filed an unfounded
complaint for a sum of money with replevin (Case No. 983-96) before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 44, Pasay City.
 Considering that the principal amount involved was P553,944.00, petitioners filed an Answer mentioning in the special and
affirmative defenses a Motion to Dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, but this was denied.
 Aside from that, petitioners contested the venue considering that the principal office of the respondent bank [was] in
Makati, while their residence [was] in Quezon City.
 When the respondent bank filed its complaint with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Replevin on November 28, 1997,
the monthly installments were almost fully paid; [they] would have been fully paid on November 26, 1997. Furthermore,
the car's mileage at the time of illegal seizure was only 28,464 kilometers. They could not have been considered in default
at the time the complaint was filed, considering that: (a) they attempted many times to pay the bank their installments for
the months of August, September, October, 1996, and up to the time of the filing of the case, they ha[d] not received any
statement of delinquency as mandated by R.A. No. 3165, otherwise known as the Truth in Lending Act.
 They even tried consigning the P69,168.00 through a Manager's Check dated January 7, 1997 for the months of August to
February, 1997, or beyond the four months installment in advance but were similarly refused by the court for no valid
reason.
o MeTC LEVEL: Their petition for the outright dismissal of the complaint, as well as the lifting of the Writ of Replevin was
denied due to the ff reasons:
 the defendant has a period of 5 days from January 7, 1997 to post a re-delivery bond, in order to secure the return of the
subject vehicle and to post a counter bond double the amount of the chattel. In this respect, defendants failed to exercise
his right.
 As to the question of jurisdiction the complaint [shows] that the amount plaintiff seeks to recover is P190,635.00, which is
well within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.
 Likewise the attached Promissory Note in the Complaint also contains stipulation as to the venue agreed upon by the
parties in case an action is filed in court, in which case this court has jurisdiction.
o CA RULING:
 MTC of Pasay City had jurisdiction over civil cases in which the amount of the demand did not exceed P200,000 exclusive of
interest, damages and attorney's fees. The basic claim in the present case was P190,635.90; hence, the MTC had
jurisdiction.
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

The appellate court further held that the objection to the impropriety of the venue should have been raised in a motion to
dismiss before the filing of a responsive pleading. The said issue, however, was raised for the first time only in petitioners'
Answer.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals agreed with the MTC that the Writ of Replevin could be validly executed anywhere in Metro
Manila because Section 27, Chapter III of B.P. 129, authorized the establishment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila with eighty-two (82) branches. Therefore, any branch — in this case, Branch 44 which was stationed in Pasay —
could issue writs and processes that could validly be served and executed anywhere within Metro Manila.
ISSUES/RATIO/RULING
(1) May the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay City be enforced outside the city?  YES!
Territorial Enforcement of the Writ of Replevin
Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated January 11, 1983, providing for the interim rules and guidelines
relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin like the one issued in the present case may be served anywhere in
the Philippines. Specifically, the said Resolution states:
3. Writs and processes. —
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo, warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court
may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases,
without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.
Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously does not fall under item "a" of the above-cited Rule, may be
validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners confused the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on the
one hand with, on the other, its power to issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction.
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals reiterated the foregoing distinction between the jurisdiction of the trial court and the
administrative area in which it could enforce its orders and processes pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on it:
In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a
jurisdictional or territorial limit [to] its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules
expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and
there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in paragraph (b).
Objection to Venue Too Late
Petitioners object to the filing of the Complaint in Pasay City, pointing out that their residence is in Quezon City, while private
respondent's principal place of business is in Makati. Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments, an objection to an
improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived.
In the present case, petitioners' objection to the venue of the case was raised for the first time in the Answer itself. Not having
been raised on time, their objection is therefore deemed waived.
In any event, petitioners had agreed to a stipulation in the Promissory Note that a suit arising from their transaction may be filed
in the proper court anywhere in Metro Manila, at the sole option of respondent bank. Necessarily, Pasay City is deemed
included in the said stipulation.
(2) Did the MTC have jurisdiction over the Complaint?  YES!
The fundamental claim in the main action against petitioners, as shown in respondent bank's Complaint, is the collection of the
sum of P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Although the value of the vehicle seized
pursuant to the Writ of Replevin may have exceeded P200,000, that fact does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over
the case. After all, the vehicle was merely the subject of a chattel mortgage that had been used to secure petitioners' loan. In
any case, private respondents are entitled only to the amount owed them.
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(3) Were petitioners entitled to the redelivery of the subject vehicle?  NO!
Petitioners assail the MTC's refusal to release the seized vehicle despite a Manager's Check in the amount of P69,168 they
issued for the redelivery of the vehicle within five days from its seizure.
This argument is devoid of merit. As observed by the trial court, petitioners failed to comply with the requisites for the
redelivery of the vehicle seized:
Under the Rules of Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days from January 7, 1997 to post a re-delivery bond, in order to
secure the return of the subject vehicle and to post a counter bond double the amount of the chattel.
In this respect[,] defendants failed to exercise his right. Indeed, a careful perusal of the records shows that petitioners failed to
comply with the requirements prescribed by Rule 60 of the Rules of Court in effect at the time.
In their Petition for Review, petitioners plainly admit that they issued a check for only P69,168 for the purpose of covering the
advance payments plus the redelivery bond. Clearly, that amount was insufficient to cover even just the required redelivery
bond alone, which should be in an amount double that of the chattel.
03 UNIVERSAL MOTORS VS. VELASCO, 98 SCRA 545
FACTS
Velasco bought from Universal Motors a Mercedes-Benz truck, payable on installment bases. For the balance of P35K, he
executed a PN and a chattel mortgage over the truck. Eventually, he defaulted in his payments and as a consequence, Universal
Motor asked him to surrender the truck. When he refused, Universal Motor instituted an action to recover the truck preparatory
to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. As an alternative, in case the truck cannot be recovered, Universal Motors asked for
payment of P23K plus interests. The court issued a writ of replevin.
As to the action instituted by Universal Motors, Velasco was declared in default. But eventually, the default order was lifted. A
stipulation of facts was submitted by the parties, containing the following, among others, (relevant to topic) expenses incurred
by Universal Motors include a premium on replevin bond, sheriff’s expenses, costs of suit and mechanic’s lien paid by Universal
Motors.
Basing its decision on Art. 1484 of the Civil Code,1 the RTC ruled that Universal Motors has a right to repayment for the premium
on the replevin bond, the sheriff’s fees, costs of the suit and reasonable attorney’s fees, since these are expenses necessary by
Velasco’s refusal to surrender possession of the vehicle. However, the mechanic’s lien is not recoverable since nothing was said
about it in the complaint nor one of the reliefs sought.
ISSUE
Whether Universal Motors is entitled to recover the expenses and attorney’s fees—YES as to premium, sheriff’s expenses and
costs of suit, but only as to the value of the chattel
RULING
Article 1484 relied upon by the lower court is inapplicable, based on the following:
1. The action instituted was NOT foreclosure but for replevin.
2. The amounts adjudged in favor of Universal Motors were not part of the unpaid balance of the price or in the concept
of a deficiency judgment but were expenses of the suit.
Hence, Velasco was ordered to pay the amount adjudged in favor of Universal Motors of having the same satisfied out of the
proceeds of the auction sale on the motor vehicle.
04 PAAT VS. CA, 266 SCRA 167
1
Art 1484. In a contract of sale of property the price of which is payable in to, the vs may any of the following
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold if one has been constituted, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more
installment In this case, he shag have no further action against the purchase to recover any unpaid of the balance of the price Any agreement
to the contrary shall be void.
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FACTS
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on
its way to Bulacan from Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) personnel in
Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Cagayan, issued on
May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On
June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan’s action of confiscation
and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order
No. 277.
Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director
Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. Subsequently, the case was brought by the
petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents’ statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case
their letter for reconsideration would be denied then “this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.”
Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan
and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of
the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial
court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. Their motion for reconsideration having been
likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the
trial court’s order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.
Hence, this present petition, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution
dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.
ISSUE
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a
movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
HELD
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the
plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject
truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as
amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over
the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative
forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private
respondents’ right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds
the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. [39] “To
detain” is defined as to mean “to hold or keep in custody,”[40] and it has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there
is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or
right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. [41] Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin
proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property
is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment,
or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the
property.[42] Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in
the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products with
out the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A
of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his
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duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued
possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture
issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that
actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law
are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
05 VLASONS VS. CA, 155 SCRA 186
FACTS
Florencio Sosuan purchased two pieces of salvaged bronze propeller from Lo Bu. Thereafter, he filed a civil action in the CFI of
Manila for the recovery of possession of the same against Lo Bu and also against persons from whom Lo Bu purchased the same,
Alfonso Calixto and Ernesto Valenzuela; and alternatively against Vlasons Enterprises.
A few months before, the same propellers had been seized by virtue of a search warrant issued by another branch of the CFI of
Manila presided over by Judge Maceren. It was issued at the instance of Vlasons Enterprises who claimed that a certain Calixto
stole the propellers from their vessel that sunk in Bataan. The complaints for theft against Calixto and Valenzuela, as well as the
complaint for Anti-Fencing against Sosuan, were dismissed.
Upon Sosuan’s motion in the civil action for recovery, Judge Cruz authorized Sosuan to take possesson of the propellers pending
action. The order pointed out that no criminal action had been filed in connection with the seizure of the propellers in question.
ISSUES
Whether Judge Cruz erred in 1) authorizing the release of the propellers considering that it was under the custody of Judge
Maceren’s court; 2) in ordering the transfer of the propellers to Sosuan pending action?
HELD
1) NO. Where personalty has been seized under a search warrant, and it appears reasonably definite that the seizure will not be
followed by the filing of any criminal action for the prosecution of the offenses in connection with which the warrant was issued,
the public prosecutors having pronounced the absence of basis therefor, and there are, moreover, conflicting claims asserted
over the seized property, the appropriate remedy is the institution of an ordinary civil action by any interested party, or of a
special civil action of interpleader by the Government itself.
The ordinary action and the interpleader are cognizable not only by the court issuing the search warrant (in this case Judge
Maceren’s branch) but by any other competent court to which it may be assigned by raffle. In such a case, the seizing court shall
transfer custody of the seized articles to the court having jurisdiction of the civil action at any time, upon due application by an
interested party. Thus, it was proper for Judge Cruz to order the transfer of the propeller’s to his branch. There is no conflict of
jurisdiction because there was no pending criminal action and Judge Maceren’s court was merely acting as custodian of the
seized property.
This case is different from the Pagkalinawan case. In Pagkalinawan the same property was being seized at the same time by
different courts upon different writs: one by search warrant, the other by writ of seizure issued in a replevin action. There was
then a palpable and real conflict in jurisdiction. And the Pagkalinawan ruling was laid down precisely to avoid that conflict in
jurisdiction. In the instant case, however, since it was fairly certain that no criminal action could possibly ensue subsequent to or
in connection with the search warrant, no such conflict in jurisdiction or in the ultimate disposition of the seized property could
be expected to arise.
2) YES. The absence of any criminal prosecution in the Maceren Branch in relation to the propeller has no relevance whatever to
the question of whether or not in the civil suit before the Cruz Branch the plaintiff, who claims to be the owner of the propeller,
is entitled to its possession pending action as against defendant Vlasons, who also claims to be the owner thereof. Non sequitur.
It merely makes necessary the civil suit to precisely resolve that issue. It does not of itself furnish basis for or warrant the
transfer of possession from one party to the other in the civil action.
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Nothing in the record therefore justifies the Order of Judge Cruz transferring possession of the property in controversy to the
plaintiff pendente lite. That relief can be awarded only after trial, by final judgment declaring in whom the title to said property
rests. What may be done in the meantime, as already above pointed out, is simply the transfer by the Maceren Branch, upon
proper application, of custody over the property to the Cruz Branch, there to await the outcome of the suit.
06 PAGKALINAWAN VS. GOMEZ, 21 SCRA 1275
FACTS
Dayrit filed a complaint for replevin with the CFI of Cebu, assigned to Judge Gomez, against Pagkalinawan (NBI Supervising
Agent) for the recovery of possession of a vehicle alleging that it was wrongfully detained by Pagkalinawan. Judge Gomez issued
an order directing the Sheriff of Cebu to take the vehicle in Pagkalinawan’s custody and said order was implemented by the
Clerk of Court issuing a writ of replevin. Pagkalinawan, however, cannot comply with the writ because he was holding the same
in custodial egis for the CFI of Manila, which issued a search warrant under which the vehicle was seized and held in custody.
Judge Gomez, upon motion, issued an order directing Pagkalinawan to immediately comply with the order of the court and to
turn over the vehicle to the sheriff with a warning that failure to do so would subject him to full harshness of the court’s
coercive power. Pagkalinawan was then compelled to part with the vehicle to the Sheriff of Cebu, who took over possession and
immediately gave it to Dayrit. Such order of the court would place Pagkalinawan in imminent danger of being declared in
contempt by the CFI of Manila because he could not comply with its order regarding the proper disposition of the vehicle. MR
denied.
Pagkalinawan then filed with the SC a petition for prohibition to declare Judge Gomez to have committed GADLEJ and to issue a
preliminary mandatory injunction.
ISSUE
Whether CFI of Cebu in a replevin proceeding may ignore a search warrant issued by CFI of Manila—NO.
RULING
The moment a CFI has been informed through the filing of an appropriate pleading that a search warrant has been issued by
another CFI, it cannot yield a contrary impression, which demonstrated the good faith of Judge Gomez for acting as he did,
require a sheriff to take the property subject of replevin action if it came into the custody of another public officer by virtue of a
search warrant. Only the CFI which issued a search warrant may order its release. Any other view would be subversive of a
doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial
actuation and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with
each other’s lawful orders.
It is settled that the jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a CFI belongs solely to the very same branch which rendered the
judgment. Certiorari and prohibition would be proper to prevent the attempting branch of the court from proceeding to nullify a
final decision rendered by a co-equal and coordinate branch." In this case then, certiorari is likewise an appropriate remedy
when respondent Judge disregarded a search warrant issued by another CFI.
No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction.
The SC ruled in favor of Pagkalinawan and made mandatory preliminary injunction permanent.
07 BAGALIHOG VS. FERNANDEZ, 198 SCRA 614
FACTS
Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate Airport. Witnesses said one of the gunmen
fled on a motorcycle. On the same day, the Bagalihog’s house, which was near the airport, was searched with his consent to see
if the killers had sought refuge there. The search proved fruitless. Two days later, the police seized his motorcycle and took it to
the headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant. The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of
the vehicles used by the killers. After investigation, the petitioner and several others were charged with multiple murder and
frustrated murder. Bagalihog then filed a complaint for the recovery of the motorcycle with an application for a writ of replevin,
In dismissing the case, the respondent judge said he had no jurisdiction over the motorcycle because it was in custodia legis and
only the judge trying the criminal cases (Makati RTC) could order its release.
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ISSUE
Whether or not replevin is proper
HELD
We do not find that the importance of the motorcycle in the prosecution of the criminal cases excused its seizure without a
warrant. The crime was committed on March 17, 1989, and the motorcycle was seized only on March 19, 1989, or two days
later. During that period, the private respondent had all the opportunity to apply for a search warrant and establish probable
cause in accordance with the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court.
It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only where the property
is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions.
Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has
been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ." Only
when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. The
circumstance that Judge Fernandez ordered the motorcycle to be deposited with the clerk of court on motion of the petitioner
did not place the vehicle in custodia legis. The respondent judge had no authority over it because it had not been lawfully seized
nor had it been voluntarily surrendered to the court by the petitioner. The action to recover the motorcycle in the RTC of
Masbate will not constitute interference with the processes of the RTC of Makati and that, consequently, the complaint should
not have been dismissed by the respondent judge.
08 CHUA VS. CA, 222 SCRA 85
FACTS
Judge Lauro V. Francisco issued a search warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction and the
seizure of an Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-175. Respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid vehicle and took custody
thereof.
An action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump truck was filed by petitioner
against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu alleging among other things, petitioner's
lawful ownership and possession of the subject vehicle; that he has not sold the subject vehicle to anyone; that he has not
stolen nor carnapped it, and that he has never been charged of the crime of carnapping or any other crime for that matter.
Further, petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the subject vehicle on the
strength of the aforesaid search warrant.
Judge Cañares of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of
a bond in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). The writ of replevin was also issued on the same date, and
the subject vehicle was seized on 15 April 1986 by Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes.
On April 16, 1986, respondent Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and for the quashal of the writ of replevin.
The motion to dismiss and to quash the writ of replevin was denied. A motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order
was filed and was denied on reconsideration and directed the delivery of the subject vehicle to petitioner. Not satisfied, herein
private respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for the nullification of the
orders dated April 18, 1986 and May 19, 1986.
Meanwhile, a case for Carnapping docketed as I.S. No. 86-185, entitled "Alex De Leon, Complainant, vs. Romeo Chua,
Respondent" pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City was provisionally dismissed upon
motion of Romeo Chua with the following reservation: "without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is
resolved".
The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, and nullified the questioned orders. The
appellate court ordered the dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed that possession of the subject vehicle be restored to
Canoy. It applied the ruling in the case of Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez (21 SCRA 1275 [1967]) which held:
Once a Court of First Instance has been informed that a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it
cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer of the court to take the property subject of the replevin action, if theretofore it
came into custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued such a
search warrant may order its release.
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Furthermore, it was also pointed out in the same case that the validity of a search warrant may only be questioned in the same
court that issued it.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but the respondent court denied the same. Thus, petitioner filed this
appeal by certiorari. The parties submitted their respective memoranda, and thereafter the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the validity of a seizure made pursuant to a search warrant issued by a court can be questioned in another
branch of the same court, where the criminal action filed in connection with which the search warrant was issued, had been
dismissed provisionally.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the ruling made by the Office of the City Fiscal in the complaint for carnapping was
erroneous. It held: ". . . the preliminary investigation of that case is premature until such time that the issue of ownership will be
resolved by the Court of Appeals, so that the instant case is hereby dismissed provisionally without prejudice to its reopening
once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor of complainant." (emphasis supplied).
A criminal prosecution for carnapping need not establish the fact that complainant therein is the absolute owner of the motor
vehicle. What is material is the existence of evidence which would show that respondent took the motor vehicle belonging to
another. The Anti-Carnapping Law or Republic Act No. 6539 punishes as carnapping the taking with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another person, without the latter's consent or by means of violence or intimidation of person or by using
force upon things.
Another aspect which needs to be stressed is the fact that since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial, the dismissal
of a case by the fiscal will not constitute double jeopardy and hence there is no bar to the filing of another complaint for the
same offense (People vs. Medted, 68 Phil. 435).
RULING
We find no merit in the main issue presented before Us. Petitioner seeks a reversal of a decision of the Court of Appeals which
relied on the decision in Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez (supra).
The principle followed among courts in the dispensation of justice is that a judge who presides in a branch of a court cannot
modify or annul the orders issued by another branch of the same court, since the two (2) courts are of the same rank, and act
independently but coordinately (Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Co., 92 Phil. 25 [1952]).
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is
shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a
legal writ (Bagalihog vs. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 [1991]). The reason posited for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there
would be interference with the possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the process under which the
property was taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an officer
under a valid process, although after the levy is discharged, an action to recover possession will lie (Francisco, Revised Rules of
Court in the Philippines: Provisional Remedies, p. 402 [1985]).
Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons case, we rule that where personal property is seized under a
search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal and there
are conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or an interpleader filed
by the Government in the proper court, not necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant; however, where there is
still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for
carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor of
complainant" (emphasis supplied), or the criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed, and actually prosecuted,
and there are conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in
the same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of the property seized to
petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional
dismissal", of the carnapping case there is still a probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in jurisdiction
could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who presides in one court cannot annul or modify the orders issued by another
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branch of the same court because they are co-equal and independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be
adhered to.
09 NANTZ VS. HUGO, 77 PHIL 517
FACTS
On July 12, 1946, petitioners, applied for a writ of seizure and filed a bond of P20,000. The order prayed for was issued by Judge
Fernando Jugo and was carried out by the sheriff on July 14. On the 17th, the private respondent filed an ex parte motion for the
return of the truck and filed a counterbond of P20,000. Simultaneously, this attorney gave a copy of the counterbond to the
sheriff to be served on the plaintiffs or their attorney.
According to respondents' answer in the present proceeding, on the aforesaid date the deputy sheriff, prepared the necessary
papers for the return of the property to Felipe F. Cruz. At the time, the petitioners' counsel, Attorney Benedicto C. Balderrama,
happened to be in the sheriff's office and was informed by the sheriff of the filing of the counterbond and asked if he had any
objection to its sufficiency, to which attorney Balderrama answered no, as the counterbond had been executed by a surety
company. It is also alleged that the sheriff was not able to deliver a copy of the counterbond to Attorney Balderrama because
the latter left the sheriff's office before the other necessary papers and the "diligencia" were completed. It is alleged that on the
following day, July 18th, the sheriff fell ill with the result that copy of the counterbond was not furnished to the petitioners or
their attorney until he recoverred from his illness a few days later. Attorney Balderrama then refused to receive the copy on the
ground that the five-days period had already elapsed.
These allegations are denied by the petitioners. It was nevertheless admitted by Attorney Balderrama in the course of the
argument before this court that he was really present on the occasion and on the date above stated in the sheriff's office.
The SC held that he at least learned of the filing of the counterbond by the defendant there and then.
SEC. 5. Return of property. — If the defendant objects to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon, he cannot require the return of the property as in this section provided; but if he does not so object, he may, at any
time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff, require the return thereof, by filing with the clerk or judge of the court a
bond executed to the plaintiff, in double the value of the a bond executed to the plaintiff, in double the value of the property as
stated in the plaintiff's affidavit, for the delivery of the property to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the
payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the defendant, and by serving a copy of such bond on the plaintiff or
his attorney.
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by officer. — If within five days after the taking of the property by the officer, the defendant does
not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the property as provided
in the last preceding section; or if the defendant so objects, and the plaintiffs first or new bond is approved; or if the defendant
so requires, and his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property
shall be delivered to the plaintiff. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the plaintiff, the officer must return it to the
defendant.
According to these provisions, if the defendant in a case of replevin wants to have the property returned to him, he must put up
a bond in double the amount of the chattel and furnish the plaintiff with a copy of the undertaking within five days from the
date the sheriff took possession of the property. Both requirements are mandatory. The furnishing of a copy of the
counterbond has to be accomplished within the prescribed period if the plaintiff is to have an opportunity to contest the
redelivery of the property sought by the defendant.
However, there was substantial compliance with the last requirement. Since the sole purpose of furnishing a copy of the
counterbond is to enable the plaintiff to see if the bond is in the prescribed form and for the right amount and to resist the
return of the property to the defendant if it is not, that opportunity was afforded was shown in the sheriff's office the
defendants' counterbond, service of a copy thereof on him became a purposeless, unnecessary formality.
The defendant took adequate steps to comply with the above-quoted provisions of the Rules of Court. He or his attorney was
not expected personally to serve a copy of the counterbond on the plaintiffs of their attorney.
The circumstance that the plaintiffs' attorney from all appearances purposely avoided service of a copy of the defendant's
counterbond by leaving the sheriff's office while the sheriff was preparing the papers which were to be handed to him, deserves
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special attention. This allegation was not specifically denied by the plaintiff. Such conduct of the plaintiffs' attorney in itself
affords sufficient ground for denying the petition. The plaintiffs have not come with very clean hands.
The outstanding truth is that the defendant's counterbond was unassailable. The amount was ample and the surety thereon
solvent. A loophole had to be sought somewhere else and the plaintiffs found an ally in the sheriff's illness.
But we refuse to come to the said of an unmeritorous cause. Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be
overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident, when they
have not prejudiced the adverse party and have not deprived the court of its authority. This should be the case especially where,
as here, the ommission or fault complained of could have been prevented by the petitioners if they had adopted the norm of
practice expected of men of good intentions.
The petition is denied with costs against the petitioners.
10 LA TONDENA DISTILLERS VS. CA, 209 SCRA 553
FACTS
La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. (La Tondena) manufactures and sells a gin popularly known as "Ginebra San Miguel," which is
contained in 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the marks of ownership "LA TONDEÑA, INC." and "GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL" stamped
or blown-in to the bottles which . . . (it [La Tondeña]) specially ordered from the bottle manufactures for its exclusive use. The
bottles were registered with the Philippine Patent Office and use of the registered bottles by any one without written
permission of the owner is declared unlawful by Section 2 of R.A. 623. It was likewise alleged that the sale of the gin in the
registered white flint, bottles does not include the sale of the bottles themselves. By virtue of these facts, La Tondena prayed to
the Regional Trial Court of Manila to 1) “issue an order directing the, Sheriff or other proper officer . . . to take into his custody
all the 350 c.c. bottles of the plaintiff in the possession of the defendant . . . and to dispose of the same in accordance with the
rules of court”, 2) to be adjudged the lawful owner possessor of the said bottles, and 3) for private respondent Tee Chin Ho to
be made to pay, actual, nominal and temperate and exemplary damages in specific stated amounts (aggregating P75,400.00), as
well as attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
Judge Santillan of the Manila RTC issued the writ of delivery prayed for upon La Tondeña's posting of a bond in the amount of
P40,000.00. In implementation of the writ, Deputy Sheriff Regio Ruefa seized 20,250 bottles with the blown-in marks, "La
Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel". The sheriff Mr. Ruefa executed a handwritten "Receipt" and among others, was signed
by Tee Chin Ho as witness. Sheriff Ruefa's return attests that prior to seizing the bottles, he served summons, copy of the
complaint and its annexes, copy of the bond, and the writ of seizure personally on one “Te Tien Ho” (it was La Tondena’s
position the Te Tien Ho and Tee Chin Ho were one and the same person). The five-day period within which the sufficiency of the
replevin bond might be objected to or the return of the property seized expired without any person objecting to the bond or
seeking the return of the bottles, instead an individual identifying himself as "Tee Chin Ho" filed on a pleading denominated
"ANSWER” alleging 1) all purchases of La Tondeña's gin necessarily included the bottles containing the gin; hence ownership of
the bottles did not remain in La Tondeña but was transferred to the purchasers; 2) it was from him, Tee Chin Ho, and not from
Te Tien Ho, that the bottles in question had been taken by Sheriff Ruefa, and it was taken from a different numbered address on
the same street (1105 instead of 1005 Estrada Street, Manila); 3) La Tondeña had "masterminded and caused two instances of
seizure against intervenor, first through and by the Manila City, police, and second through the Court's sheriff.
The sheriff delivered the bottles to La Tondena, however, a TRO was issued to maintain the status quo and prevent La Tondena
from seizing bottles at 1105 Estrada St. La Tondena reiterated its position that Te Tien Ho and Tee Chin Ho were one and the
same person. Judge Santillan ruled in favor of Tee Chin Ho, issuing writs of preliminary mandatory injunction and preliminary
prohibitory injunction, stating “that the seizure authorized by the Court's writ of replevin is only against the person whose name
and address is pleaded in the complaint namely TE TIEN HO at No. 1005 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila; the two truckloads empty
bottles seized by the Manila Police (Exhibit "4") and by the Sheriff of Manila (Exhibit "5") from intervenor Tee Chin Ho, is
improper and unlawful” and “ordering plaintiff La Tondeña Distillers, Inc., its agents, duly authorized representatives or other
persons acting for and in its behalf to return and restore unto intervenor Tee Chin Ho at his address at 1105 Estrada St…” La
Tondena raised the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus but was dismissed for
not being the proper subject of a petition for CPM.
ISSUE (in relation to Replevin):
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Whether or not Judge Santillan violated a rule on Replevin that the disposition of a property seized under a replevin order upon
the defendant shall be done only within 5 days from date of seizure?
RULING
YES. A defendant or other party in a replevin proceeding against whom a writ of seizure has the following alternative remedies
set forth in Section 5, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
SEC. 5. Return, of property. — If the defendant objects to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, or of the
surety or sureties thereon, he cannot require the return of the property as in this section provided; but if
he does not so object may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff require the
return thereof, by filing with the clerk or judge of the court a bond executed to the plaintiff in double the
value of the property as stated in the plaintiff affidavit, for the delivery of the property to the plaintiff, if
such delivery be adjudged, for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the
defendant, and by serving a copy of such bond on the plaintiff or his attorney.
The defendant may avail of these alternative options only within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer. This
was made plain albeit impliedly by Section 6 of the same Rule, providing as follows:
SEC. 6 Disposition of property by officer. — If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the
officer, the defendant does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon,
or require the return of the property as provided in the last preceding section; or if the defendant so
objects, and the plaintiff's first or new bond is approved; or if the defendant so requires, and his bond is
objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall
be delivered to the plaintiff. If for any reason, the property is not delivered to the plaintiff, the officer
must return it to the defendant.
Thus if a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within five
days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof
both requirements — as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned — being mandatory.
Alternatively, "the defendant may object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon;" but if he
does so, "he cannot require the return of the property" by posting a counter-bond pursuant to Sections 5 and 6.
In other words, the law does not allow the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ of seizure (or delivery) —
on the ground of insufficiency of the complaint or of the grounds relied upon therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary
attachment or injunction and thereby put at issue the matter of the title or right, of possession over the specific chattel being
replevied, the policy apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined only at the trial on the merits.
On the other hand, a stranger to the action, i.e., a person not a party to the action, or as the law puts it, "any other person than
the defendant or his agent," whose property is seized pursuant to the writ of delivery, is accorded the remedy known as
terceria, a third party claim, to wit:
SEC. 7. Third-party claim. — If the property taken be claimed by any other person then the defendant or
his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer while he has possession of
the property, and a copy thereof upon the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff or his agent, on demand of the
officer, indemnifies him against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the
property, and in case disagreement as to such value the same shall be decided by the court issuing the
order. The officer is not liable for damages for taking or keeping of such property, to any other person
than the defendant or his agent, unless such claim is so made and the action upon the bond brought
within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of filing of the said bond. But nothing herein
contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
action. However, when the plaintiff, or the person in whose behalf the order of delivery was issued, is
the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of bond shall not be
required, and in case the sheriff or the officer executing the order is sued for damages as a result of such
execution, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual
damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of the funds to be
appropriated for the purpose.
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The remedy is identical to that granted to strangers in a proceeding on preliminary attachment or execution of judgments.
In lieu of, or in addition to the filing of a terceria, the third party may, as Section 7 points out, vindicate "his claim to the
property by any proper action." This effort at vindication may take the form of a separate action for recovery of the property, or
intervention in the replevin action itself.
It was thus imperative for the Trial Judge, before ultimately resolving the motion for leave to intervene as party defendant of the
person identifying himself as "Tee Chin Ho," to determine the precise status of said "Tee Chin Ho:" whether he was indeed a
stranger to the action, as he claims, and could therefore avail of the remedy of intervention as a party defendant, or he was in
truth a proper party defendant, who had been mistakenly and inadvertently referred to as "Te Tien Ho", and who therefore only
had the alternative remedies aforementioned of either (a) objecting to the replevin bond or the surety or sureties thereof or (b)
posting a counter-bond to compel return of the property.
There were thus circumstances of record, of which Her Honor was charged with knowledge, that tended to show that La
Tondeña's proffered thesis was not entirely far-fetched: that the real target of its replevin suit was a junk dealer at Estrada
Street, Singalong, Manila, who was in unlawful possession of a large number of its empty bottles, whose name and address had
been mistakenly stated in the original complaint but could nonetheless be ascertained. At the very least, therefore, it was a
matter of preferential priority for the Judge to determine whether "Tee Chin Ho" is in fact "Te Tien Ho," and thus enable her to
know in turn, whether or not the remedy of intervention was proper in the premises, instead of that provided in Section 5 of
Rule 60, supra. In other words, unless there were a prior determination by Her Honor of whether or not "Tee Chin Ho" was a
proper party defendant or a stranger to the action, she was in no position to adjudge that this intervention as party defendant
was correct. But this is what respondent Judge did. Without first making that prior determination, she proceeded to pass upon
the motion for intervention; she just simply assumed and declared that Tee Chin Ho was not Te Tien Ho. She thus appears to
have acted without foundation, rashly, whimsically, oppressively.
11 CITIBANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 304 SCRA 679
12 TILLSON VS. CA, G.R. NO. 89870 MAY 28, 1991
FACTS
Tillson entered into a contract with La Pierre for the construction of a yacht, named "Creala 40," at a cost of U.S. $65,000.00, to
be delivered to Tillson in Manila in July, 1986. But it was Seacraft International Corporation that actually undertook the
construction of the boat, advances on the price being made by Tillson. The money thus advanced was, however, used by La
Pierre and Seacraft for the construction, not of the "Creala 40," but of another vessel, "Creala 36." Tillson then filed a complaint
for specific performance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and restraining order. La Pierre was declared in
default and the court held him liable to Tillson. The judgment became final and executory, no appeal having been taken by La
Pierre. The action however continued as regards his co-defendant, Seacraft. At Tillson's instance, the RTC authorized execution
of the default judgment against La Pierre. The Sheriff levied on, and subsequently took possession of, the two yachts. Seacraft
filed a third-party claim in respect of both vessels contending that the yachts belonged to it, and not to La Pierre. Tillson
thereupon posted a bond to indemnify the Sheriff against such third-party claim insofar as it was asserted against "Creala 40."
The execution sale of the "Creala 40" was then scheduled and held resulting in the boat's being struck off to Tillson as the
highest bidder.
The "Creala 36" was somehow delivered by the Sheriff to Tillson's counsel. But a claim for that same vessel was being put forth
by a certain John M. Cooney. Indeed, there was then pending in another branch of the same RTC an action commenced by
Cooney against La Pierre. Said Branch directed the sheriff to take immediate possession of "Creala 36" and deliver it to Cooney
after the expiration of five days. Tillson promptly instituted a certiorari action in the CA, praying for nullification of that order.
The CA dismissed Tillson's action, finding that no valid levy on attachment had been effected of the "Creala 36" in Civil Case No.
54587; that, on the other hand, the vessel had been properly attached by the Sheriff in Case No. 55152 but subsequently had
been "forcibly taken from the latter's custody by petitioner Tillson and his men who did not issue a receipt and showed no
written order from any lawful authority." The Appellate Court consequently upheld the order for the seizure and retaking from
Tillson of the "Creala 36," but prohibited release thereof to Cooney "pending the final disposition of his case.
Cooney next turned his attention to the "Creala 40". Cooney filed an action against Tillson for annulment of the sale and for
delivery thereof to him by way of replevin. He alleged that by a deed of sale executed by Seacraft, he had become owner of the
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"Creala 40;" that in conspiracy with the Sheriff and other persons, Tillson had illegally acquired possession of the vessel; that as
owner, he was entitled to a "preliminary order for the immediate delivery" upon "a bond in a reasonable amount," and, "after
trial of the issues," to be declared owner and recover damages from the defendants. The "writ of replevin" issued on the same
day but custody of the vessel was not taken by the Sheriff until three days later. Cooney filed a "Manifestation/Motion" stating
that when the Sheriff went to the place where the vessel was moored, he discovered that the number of the boat had been
deliberately tampered with, and prayed that the Court order a governmental agency to aid the sheriff to seize and take
possession of the vessel under the existing writ of replevin.
Tillson's counsel filed an Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion. He alleged that he had no objection to the boat remaining
temporarily with the Coast Guard and/or the Sheriff; that Tillson had valid defenses to traverse the complaint of Cooney. Then
Tillson filed thru counsel an "Urgent Motion for Approval of Bond (and) Surrender of Creala 40," submitting a bond in the
amount of P800,000.00 and praying that the boat seized from him by the sheriff "be ordered returned/surrendered/released to
Tillson. However, the Trial Court refused to order re-delivery of the boat to Tillson. It held that the provision for the return of
seized property on a counterbond in Rule 60 is not exactly applicable to the situation because said provision presupposes that
possession is to be given to the plaintiff. However, the writ precisely ordered that the possession and control of Creala 40 be put
under the Coast Guard which is a disinterested third person; and to transfer possession of the boat to either party would render
the case moot and academic.
Once again, Tillson went to the CA. He filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to nullify the Order of May 5,
1989 and compel re-delivery of the "Creala 40" to him. The CA denied his petition on two grounds: first, that since the trial court
ordered the boat to be custodia legis under the temporary physical control of the Coast Guard, the provisions of Rule 60 on
replevin find no application. As the boat was not delivered to plaintiff John M. Cooney, the replevin bond filed by him does not
serve the purpose for which the said bond was filed. Consequently, as there is no obligation on the part of John M. Cooney to
return the boat which was not placed in his possession, the filing of the counterbond for the redelivery of the boat to petitioner
becomes of no virtue whatsoever. In fine, as there is no replevin in legal contemplation, there is no replevin bond and redelivery
bond to speak of and second, even if the case be considered one of replevin, Tillson had failed to furnish a copy of his redelivery
bond to the plaintiff within the time set therefor, in violation of the relevant requirements of Rule 60.
ISSUE
1.
2.
Whether or not the counter-bond may prosper
Whether or not Tillson, as defendant in the replevin action, had properly complied with the requisites of Rule 60 for the
return to him of the seized vessel
HELD
1. YES. The case is not removed from the operation of Rule 60 by the fact that after the property was taken from the defendant
it was not turned over to the plaintiff Cooney (but) to the Coast Guard, on instructions of the Trial Court. For one thing, it does
not alter the reality of the defendant's loss of possession; it is unreasonable to approve of the taking of the boat from his
possession pursuant to Rule 60, and then deny him the remedies prescribed by that self same rule; and if the seizure was not
effected in accordance with Rule 60, then the seizure was unjustified.For another, property seized under a writ of replevin is not
supposed to be turned over to the plaintiff until after the lapse of five (5) days. Hence, whether the property remained with the
sheriff, or was given over to another officer designated by the Court is of no significance, and certainly should not be taken as
disabling the defendant from moving for the return of the property to him by either of the modes set out in Section 5 of Rule 60:
(1) by objecting to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's replevin bond, or (2) if he does not so object, by filing a counter-bond "in
double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff's affidavit."
2. YES. The SC rules that Tillson had substantially complied with the requirements of Section 5, Rule 60 for the return to him of
the vessel in question. The amount of the bond, P800,000.00, was adequate. It was more than double the sum of P300,000.00,
which was the value stated by Cooney. The counter-bond was posted within the period prescribed by Rule 60, i.e., "within five
(5) days after the taking of the property by the officer," and "before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff."
A copy of the counter-bond was sent to Cooney on the fifth day after the taking of the property by the officer. The copy having
been sent by registered mail, it was received after said fifth day. Cooney does not deny that the copy of the bond was indeed
sent to him on the fifth day, and that he actually received it afterwards; and it is a fact that on the day on which the Trial Court
re-scheduled the hearing on the motion for approval of the bond and for return-of the property, May 5, 1989, Cooney had
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already received the copy of the bond. What he postulates is that his receipt of the counter-bond after the fifth day, was a fatal
defect prescribing return of the vessel to Tillson. The proposition is unacceptable to the Court. It accords unwarranted
importance to technicality. If technicality were indeed to be the order of the day, Tillson could also claim timeliness of Cooney's
receipt of a copy of the bond since, as the record shows, Cooney did receive the copy within the time stated by Section 5 of Rule
60, i.e,. "before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff." He could also claim that the requirement of service of the counterbond on the plaintiff cannot be all that important since there is no provision in Rule 60 imposing that requirement, which
appears to have been derived simply from the general prerequisite laid down for pleadings, motions, notices, orders and other
papers filed with the court.
13 MANINGO VS. IAC, 183 SCRA 691
(Case 1)
Neville Lamis, filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against Santiago Maningo docketed as Civil Case No.
35199, to enforce a Memorandum Agreement entered into by them.
(Case 2)
During the pendency of the case, Maningo instituted a complaint against Lamis for collection of a sum of money with
preliminary attachment docketed as Civil Case No. 1395. The court issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon a bond of
P100,000.00 issued by Paramount Insurance Corporation. Thus he Deputy Provincial Sheriff levied upon certain personal
properties of Lamis. The latter filed an ex-parte manifestation with the Provincial Sheriff for the suspension of the levy on the
ground that Civil Case No. Case 2 was merely a duplicity of Case 1. Lamis further moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2
based on lis pendens and for improper venue. The court denied the motion.
(Case 3)
Lamis went on certiorari to this Court docketed as G.R. No. 57250. On October 30,1981, We rendered a decision granting the
petition and ordering the dismissal of Case 2. Said decision became final.
(Case 4)
Four months later, Lamis filed an urgent ex-parte motion in Case 2 for the confiscation of Maningo's attachment bond damages
suffered by Lamis, both the surety, Paramount Insurance Corp. and Maningo objected to the setting of hearing.
Maningo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 62733, alleging that Lamis failed
apply for damages before entry of judgment, that Lamis' claim for damages could not by law, exceed the attachment bond; and
that in Case 3, Lamis is not entitled to the possession of the tractor unit, which is one of properties attached. The petition was
dismissed by this Court and became final.
In view of the dismissal, Lamis filed a motion for the execution of this Court's resolution in Case 4 and a motion in Case 2 to be
allowed to present evidence for the confiscation of Maningo's attachment bond and for damages.
In the meantime, the court issued an order requiring the sheriffs to take into custody in favor of Lamis all attached properties
still unreleased by Maningo.
(Case 5).
During the intestate proceedings of the late Santiago Maningo (He died after Case 4), the court ordered the surety to pay Lamis
for damages for reason for unlawful attachment.
Hence the heirs of Manigno filed with CA, a petition for certiorari, mandamus, with preliminary injunction dockected was ACG.R. SP No. 03725, seeking to set aside all the orders of th lower court. Upon dismissal thereof, the present petition was filed by
the heirs of Santiago Manigno.
(Case 6)
The heirs filed with the RTC a complaint for Foreclosure of Chattel Mortgage, interest, damages and attorney's fees with prayer
for attachment against Neville Lamis docketed as Civil Case No. 147.
The court issued an order for the seizure of a bulldozer, upon a replevin bond of P340,000 by Paramount Insurance Corporation.
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Lamis moved for the dismissal of Case 6 and to cite Maningo for contempt on the ground of litis pendencia or multiplicity of
suits; that the said case is barred by the pendency of Case 1 then pending with RTC and also by the prior judgment of this Court
of Case 3 dismissing Civil Case
(Case 7)
Lamis filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 61419, to dismiss Civil Case 6.
One and a half years later, Lamis filed a motion in Case 6 for the reception of evidence on the damages he sustained by reason
of the issuance of the writ of replevin. Despite objections by the surety, Paramount Insurance Corporation, the lower court
granted the said motion, and it required the Estate of Maningo to pay to Lamis, compensatory damages by reason of the
unlawful issuance of replevin.
(Case 8)
The Administratrix of Maningo's estate filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with this Court seeking the
dismissal of Lamis' action for damages in the lower court docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 04480.
Meanwhile the RTC of Case 6 awarded Lamis, et al. the amount of P7,677,177.00 as compensatory damages by reason of the
issuance of the writ of replevin.
The surety, also filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction to prevent it from paying Lamis.
ISSUES
(1) Whether Case 4 bars Case 5 under res judicata. YES
(2) Whether the CA erred in granting damages to respondent even if the case is already final and executor. YES
HELD
Petitioners contend that Case 2 was ordered dismissed by Us in Case 3 upon petition of private respondent Lamis; and that said
decision became final long before the latter applied for damages sustained by reason of the unlawful attachment.
The SC agrees with the CA on the ground of res judicata.
We find that Our Resolution in Case 4 is a bar to Case 5 subject of this petition for review. Case 4 is a petition for certiorari filed
by Maningo questioning the order of the lower court granting the application for damages of Lamis that he failed to apply for
damages before entry of judgment in the subject case;.
It is worthy to note that Case 4 was dismissed with finality. While contained in a minute resolution, the dismissal was an
adjudication on the merits of the case and constituted a bar to a relitigation of the issues raised therein under the rules of
resjudicata.
With respect to Case 8, petitioners allege that Case 6 was also ordered dismissed by this Court upon petition of private
respondent Lamis in Case 7; and that the said dismissal became final long before Lamis applied for damages sustained by reason
of unlawful replevin.
The SC ruled that the CA is incorrect with respect to the award of damages.
As may be gathered from Section 20, Rule 57, the claim for damages resulting from wrongful seizure of personalty property
must be filed in the same action in which the writ attachment or the writ of replevin was issued; otherwise, it is barred. Hence, if
the application for damages is not made in compliance with the procedure laid down in the rules, even the surety on the bond is
relieved from liability therefor. The remedy provided by law is exclusive and by failing to file a motion for the determination of
the damages on time and while judment is still under the control of the court, the claimant loses his right to damages.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent Lamis had timely filed his claim for damages arising from the wrongful
issuance of the writ of replevin. Thus, the judgment of the y trial court awarding damages against the estate of Maningo in the
amount of P7,677,177.00 in the replevin case is null and void.
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