Explanations in Social Science I
‘The main task of the social sciences is to
explain social phenomena. It is not the
only task, but it is the most important one,
to which others are subordinated or which
they depend’ (Elster 2007: 20).
Outline of session
1. Explanations in social science
2. The ‘Covering Law’ model of Explanation
3. Causal explanation
4. An introduction to functionalism and
structuralism
1. Explanations in social science
The Hollis Matrix
Understanding
Explanation
Holism
Systems
'Games’
Atomism
Agents
Actors
4
The Hollis Matrix: Explanation
Understanding
Explanation
Holism
Functionalism /
Structuralism
Atomism
Rational
Choice /
Game
Theory
5
This week: Holist Explanation
Understanding
Explanation
Holism
Functionalism /
Structuralism
Atomism
6
Types of explanation
General Structure: Explanans > Explanandum
Types of Explanation
•
•
•
•
event >
fact >
event >
fact >
event explanations
event explanations
fact explanations
fact explanations
Types of explanation
• event > event explanations (the 2001 Gulf War is
explained by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait)
• fact > event explanations (the slippery road caused
the motorway crash)
• event > fact explanations (the motorway crash
explains why many people did not work on Monday)
• fact > fact explanations (record low mortgage rates in
the UK in 2014 explains why average house prices rose
10% in 2014)
Supporting an explanation
1. …from below (‘excess explanatory power’)
2. …from above (flows from more general theory)
3. …lateral support (rival explanations flawed)
‘In the long run it is the theory that is supported by the
successful explanations it generates, not the other way
around (Elster 2007: 20).
2. The ‘Covering Law’ model of
explanation
• Scientific explanation as “the idea that a given event or regularity can
be subsumed under one or more general laws” (Little: 3).
• A good explanation shows that a phenomenon (the explanandum)
follows from a combination of law-like generalizations and facts (the
explanans).
•
Works for particular facts/events (dead plant in dark study) and
processes (photosynthesis) which are deduced from still more
general (chemical and physical) laws.
• Three conditions for a good scientific explanation (Hempel 1965):
1. the premises entail the conclusion (deductively valid)
2. the premises are true
3. the premises contain at least one general law [L].
1+2+3= The ‘Covering Law Model’ of explanation
2. The ‘Covering Law’ model (cont.)
P1: Plants survive only if they can
photosynthesize [L].
P2: Plants cannot photosynthesize without
sunlight [L].
P3: Ed’s office is so dark that his plants do not
receive any sunlight [F].
P3: Ed’s office plants cannot photosynthesize [L].
C: Ed’s office plants are all dead.
Critique
1. Questioning symmetry
2. Explanation v irrelevant truth
3. Explanation v necessity
(1) Questioning symmetry
• P1: light hits the flagpole which is
15m high (F)
• P2: angle of elevation is 37o (F)
• P3: light travels in straight lines (L)
• P4: laws of trigonometry (L)
• C: flagpole will cast a shadow of
20m (tan 37o=15/20) (Okasha 2002)
It is true that we can deduce/predict the height of the flagpole
from the length of the shadow but this does not explain why the
flagpole has the height it does!
(2) Explanation v irrelevant truth
In the maternity ward…
P1: John is taking birth control pills (F)
P2: People who take birth control pills do not get pregnant (L)
C: John is not pregnant
This is not a good explanation, but it fits the covering law
model. A good explanation must contain information that is
relevant to the occurrence of the phenomenon being
explained!
(3) Questioning necessity
The Sherlock Holmes Objection…
(3) Questioning necessity
P1: Watson had chalk between his left finger and thumb when he returned
from the club last night [F]
P2: Watson puts chalk there when he plays billiards to steady the cue [L]
P3: Watson never plays billiards except with Thurston [F]
P4: Watson told Holmes 4 weeks ago that Thurston had an option on
some South African property that would expire in a month, and which he
desired Watson to share with him[F].
P5: Watson’s chequebook is locked in Holmes’s drawer and Watson has
not asked for the key [F].
C1: Watson does not propose to invest his money in South African
securities [Holmes’s preferred explanation]
C2: Watson proposes to invest his money in South African Securities
without using his chequebook [rival explanation equally well confirmed by
data]. [see Arthur Conan Doyle, ‘The Dancing Man’]
3. Causal explanation
• When establishing a causal relationship such that event/fact x
causes event/fact y (x→y), x must be a ‘substantial factor’ in y
coming about.
• What is this ‘substantial factor’?
• Common approach: y would not have occurred ‘but for’ x (causein-fact)
• It is not necessary for establishing causation that the presence of x
guarantees the occurrence of y (sufficient causation)
• Neither is it necessary that it was foreseeable (e.g. by the agent)
that x would bring about y (proximate cause) - though compare
with tort law
• Sometimes there may be multiple prior conditions (x1,x2,..xn)
separately capable of bringing about y (causal over-determination)
• Social scientists are interested in identifying instigating causes
(new causes in fact) as opposed to standing causes (permanent
causes in fact)
Causation in natural and social
science: four tests
• What is causal explanation?→y), four questions arise
(Kellstedt and Whitten 2008: Ch.4).
• Any causal explanation should be put through these
four ‘hurdles’ before it is established as a valid scientific
explanation that x causes, and thus explains the
occurrence of, y.
• An ideal causal explanation of x→y will result in a the
pattern of answers:
• 1:yes, 2:no, 3:yes, 4: no
• Any deviation from this pattern will a potential source of
critique/doubt as to the proposed causal relation.
1. Is there a credible mechanism underpinning the x→y
causal claim? [how are babies and shadows produced;
answer may be probabilistic].
2. Are there good reasons for thinking, on the contrary,
that y causes x (the assumption being that x cannot be
the cause of y if y is the cause of x)? [what is the
direction of causality between flagpoles and shadow]
3. Is there a measurable association between the
occurrence of x and y (ie do x and y co-vary)? [does the
frequency/size of flagpoles rise and/or fall with that of
shadows]
4. Is there a further, connected factor, z, rendering the
observed relationship between x and y spurious? [does
another factor, biology, explain why John is not pregnant
and hence the co-variance of his birth control and his
non-pregnancy]
Causal explanation (cont.)
(a) Flagpole height→Shadow length:
1: yes, 2: no, 3: yes, 4: no.
(b) Shadow length→Flagpole height:
1: no, 2: yes, 3: yes, 4: no.
(c) John’s tablets→John’s non-pregnancy:
1: no, 2: no, 3:yes, 4:yes.
4. Functionalist and structuralist
explanation
Functionalism: attributes purpose at the macro level
and from there draws inferences about the micro level
Structuralism: infers macro level outcomes from the
influence of social structures upon individual
behaviour
Functionalism
Particular social phenomena explained in terms of the
function they perform in the general social system.
Eg Durkheim: crime, religion, family, democracy
(‘social facts’) can be explained by their positive role
in securing social stability and the ‘systemic normalcy’
and ‘health’ (v pathology) of the social system
Model of explanation
• An institution, background pattern, or trait [T] persists in
Society [S]
• Why does this trait [T] persist?
A.
[T] has certain effects [E]
B.
These effects are functional/adaptive: their presence solves the
problem of designing a trait to assure that the needs of the society
are satisfied
C.
[T] persists in S because it has the disposition to produce [E].
Example 1: Durkheim
Why does crime [T] persist?
A. Punishing crime has effects including the entrenchment
of the values that crime offends
B. These effects are functional/adaptive: entrenching the
values that crime offends contributes social stability
C. T persists in society because it has the disposition to
produce social stability.
Durkheimian concepts: ‘social facts’, ‘systemic normality’,
‘pathology’, ‘health’, ‘manifest function’, ‘latent function’
Example 2: structural-functionalism
Why do the ceremonial weeping rites of the Andaman islands
[T] persist?
A. Burial and mourning rituals of the islands have
predictable effects including the entrenchment of a
collective cultural identity
B. These effects are functional/adaptive: entrenching a
collective identity contributes to social stability
C. T persists in society because it has the disposition to
produce social stability [Radcliffe Brown (1951) / Little
(1991: 94-5)].
‘To explain a social fact it is not
enough to show the cause on which it
depends; we must also, at least in
most cases, show its function in the
establishment of social order’
(Durkheim 1950: 97).
Critique
• ‘The mere fact an activity has beneficial consequences
is not sufficient to explain it’ (Elster 1986).
• How does a society arrange its institutions to meet its
needs (Little 1991)?
• Ignores individual-level intentions and moral agency
(not a problem in biology)
• The “lamppost” approach: is looking for any available
answer, even if it is not the one we need, better than
peering into the dark
• Why THIS and not ANOTHER activity? (E.g. burial
rites).
Structuralism
‘[Structural explanations] explain a
feature of society as the predictable
consequence of certain structural
characteristics of society’ (Little
1991:91)
Structuralism
Structuralism: existence of particular social
phenomena (social norms, beliefs, social institutions)
only understandable as necessary elements of a
larger social structure.
(1) social structures are prominent causes of social
phenomena (causal structuralism) and
(2) social phenomena are explained by how they fit
into abstract underlying structures (noncausal
structuralism).
Model of explanation
1: Causal
2. Non-causal
1. The existence of a particular
social phenomena (social
unrest, war)
2. Is brought about by
underlying structural features
of society (enduring,
independent & constraining
regulative systems: wagelabour capitalism, alliance
structures, bureaucratic
norms)
3. Which shape the environment
of choice of individual action
1. The existence of a particular
social phenomena (social
unrest, war)
2. Is explained by an underlying
‘grammar’ of abstract
underlying social structures
3. Because these phenomena
‘fit’ ‘underlying structures that
possess an abstract order
akin to a syntax in language
that can be decoded’ (Little
107-8)
Example: historical materialism
1. societies are complex systems made up of social
structures (eg economic systems) and social
phenomena (eg forms of government) can generally be
explained as the causal consequences of the particular
details of underlying structures.
a. The level of development of productive power explains
the nature of the economic structure (the sum of
productive relations)
b. The economic structure explains the nature of the
superstructure
c. The superstructure stabilizes the economic structure
d. The superstructure can be explained by the way it
advances productive power (See Cohen 1988).
“The mode of production of material life
conditions the social, political and intellectual
life process in general. It is not the
consciousness of men that determine their
being but, on the contrary, their social being
that determines their consciousness” (Marx
1859).
Critique
• If it’s causal….over-reliant on standing causes
(Little 2002: 104)? But what are the instigating
causes of social change?
• If it’s non-causal…what’s the added value of
knowing the ‘grammar’ when the puzzling
similarities/dissimilarities between societies
remain unexplained?
• The “purification” exercise distorts social reality.
It is rarely possible to disentangle social
phenomena from each other sufficiently to
establish neat variables.
Further Rading
•
Cohen, G.A. (1988) History, Labour and Freedom (Oxford: OUP).
•
Durkheim, (1950[1895]) The Rules of Sociological Method. Translated by S. A.
Solovay and J. H. Mueller. New York: The Free Press.
•
Elster, J. (1986) An Introduction to Karl Marx (Cambridge: CUP).
•
Elster, J. (1989) The Cement of Society: Studies in Rationality and Social Change
(Cambridge: CUP)
•
Elster, J. (2007) Explaining Social Behaviour: More Nuts and Bolts of the Social
Sciences(Cambridge: CUP).
•
Hollis, M. (1994) The Philosophy of Social Science (Colorado: Westview).
•
Kellstadt and Whitten (2008), ‘Evaluating causal relationships’, in The Fundamentals
of Political Science Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.45-66.
•
Little, D. (1991) Varieties of Social Explanation (Boulder: Westview).
•
Okasha, S. (2002) Philosophy of Science (Oxford: OUP).
•
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1952) Structure and Function in Primitive Society (New York:
Free Press), pp.133-211.
•
Root, M. (1993) Philosophy of Social Science (Oxford: Blackwell).
•
Rosenberg, A. (1995) Philosophy of Social Science (Boulder: Westview).