Federation of European Explosives
Manufacturers
155th Meeting
of the
Executive Committee
on
17 October 2014
in Palma, Hotel Melia Victoria
1
Opening of the Meeting by the President
Bertrand Pougny
2
List of Participants
Mr. Bertrand Pougny, EPC Group, France – President
Mr. Ulf Sjöblom, Forcit Group, Finland - Vice President
Mr. Daniel Antille, SSE Group, Switzerland – Past President
Mr. Jeff Court, Orica Group, Norway
Mr. Gianni Facchinetti, Pravisani, Italy
Mr. Otta Greben, Austin Detonator Group, Czech Rep.
Mr. Vicente Huelamo, Maxam Group, Spain
In attendance: Hans Meyer, FEEM, Belgium
3
2.) Compliance with European Competition Law
As an Association, FEEM operates in strict compliance with
European competition laws. Respect for these laws is a core value
applying to all FEEM activities. All members of this Committee
have been informed by the Secretary General about prohibited
discussion topics which apply not only during meetings but also to
social gatherings before and after meetings. By signing the
participation form, the delegates declare their adherence to the
Competition Compliance Programme and agree to comply with
Competition Law.
4
Compliance with European Competition Law
(cont.)
Very clearly: You are not allowed to discuss or exchange information
which is not in conformity with competition legislation, including
e.g. on:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Prices
Production details
Transportation rates
Market procedures
5
155th Meeting of the Executive Committee
3. AGENDA
1. Opening of the Meeting by the President
2. Compliance with the European and National Competition Laws
and Regulations
3. Agenda and Approval of the Agenda
4. Secretary General’s Report with in particular
a) Latest developments with European Explosives Legislation
i.
New Directive 2014/28/EU
i. CLP Up – Date
ii. Globally harmonized standard for explosives security
markings
6
155th Meeting of the Executive Committee
3. AGENDA (cont.)
4. Secretary General’s Report with in particular
a) Latest developments with European Explosives Legislation
iii.
Lead tetroxide/lead monoxide, situation as per
September 2014
iv.
The Color-Coding of Explosives
v.
Obligation of End-Users
b) Explosives Incidents
5. Any other business
a) “Membership application” by Hervé de Saint-Pierre to the Executive
Committee
6. Date, place and time of the next meeting
7
Meeting of the Executive Committee
Item 3: Approval of the Agenda
Do I find your agreement to this Agenda?
8
Item 4:
Secretary General’s Report
9
Item 4
Secretary General’s Report
4.a.1: DIRECTIVE 2014/28/EU OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
of
26 February 2014
DIRECTIVE 2014/28/EU – CIVIL EXPLOSIVES DIRECTIVE
This Directive incorporates a number of other
Directives and Regulations such as:
1.
93/15,
2. 2008/43,
3. 2004/57,
4. 765/2008,
5. 768/2008,
6. 96/82,
7. 2013/29,
8. 91/477
and others, dealing with explosives and pyrotechnical
articles.
11
Directive 2014/28
This is the new “Bible” for the Explosives Industry!
What is covered by the new Directive?
All explosives according to the definitions based
on the definition of such products as set out in
the United Nations recommendations on the
transport of dangerous goods (Orange Book,
Chap. 2.0).
12
Directive 2014/28
What is not covered?
(a) Explosives in accordance with national law by
the armed forces or the police
(a) Pyrotechnic articles
(a) Ammunition
13
Directive 2014/28
Major emphasis is focused on:
Obligations of manufacturers, such as
1.
–
When placing their explosives on the market or when using
them for their own purposes, manufacturers shall ensure that
they have been designed and manufactured in accordance
with the essential safety requirements.
–
Where compliance of an explosive with the applicable
requirements has been demonstrated by that procedure,
manufacturers shall draw up an EU declaration of
conformity and affix the CE marking.
14
Directive 2014/28
Manufacturers shall keep the technical documentation
and the EU declaration of conformity for 10 years after
the explosive has been placed on the market.
15
Directive 2014/28
Manufacturers shall ensure that explosives which they have
placed on the market are accompanied by instructions and
safety information in a language which can be easily
understood by end-users, as determined by the Member
State concerned. Such instructions and safety information,
as well as any labelling, shall be clear, understandable and
intelligible.
16
Directive 2014/28
The other articles regulate the obligations of
• Authorized representatives
• Importers
• Distributors
This group shall be considered like a manufacturer for
the purposes of this Directive and they shall be subject
to the obligations of the manufacturer, where he places
an explosive on the market under his name or trade mark
or modifies an explosive already placed on the market in
such a way that compliance with this Directive may be
affected.
17
Directive 2014/28
The Directive also deals with the qualification of the
conformity assessment body (NB such as LOM, Ineris,
BAM etc.) in Chap. 4, Art. 2, e.g.
1. their personnel shall carry out the conformity
assessment activities with the highest degree of
professional integrity and requisite technical
competence.
2. a conformity assessment body shall have at its disposal
the necessary personnel with technical knowledge and
sufficient and appropriate experience to perform the
conformity assessment tasks.
18
Directive 2014/28
3. The personnel responsible for carrying out the
conformity assessment tasks shall have the
following:
(a) sound technical and vocational training
covering all the conformity assessment
activities in relation to which the
conformity assessment body has been
notified;
(b) satisfactory knowledge of the requirements of
the assessments they carry out and adequate
authority to carry out those assessments.
19
Directive 2014/28
Conformity assessments shall be carried out in a
proportionate manner, avoiding unnecessary
burdens for economic operators. Conformity
assessment bodies shall perform their activities
taking due account of the size of an undertaking,
the sector in which it operates, its structure, the
degree of complexity of the product technology
in question and the mass or serial nature of the
production process.
20
Directive 2014/28
Union market surveillance and control of
explosives entering the Union market
Member States shall take all appropriate measures to
ensure that explosives may be placed on the market only
if, when properly stored and used for their intended
purpose, they do not endanger the health or safety of
persons.
21
Directive 2014/28
MARKET SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITIES
Where the market surveillance authorities of
one Member State have sufficient reason to
believe that an explosive presents a risk to the
health or safety of persons, or to property or the
environment, they shall carry out an evaluation
in relation to the explosive concerned covering
all relevant requirements laid down in this
Directive. The relevant economic operators shall
cooperate as necessary with the market
surveillance authorities for that purpose.
22
Directive 2014/28
MARKET SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITIES
Where the relevant economic operator does not
take adequate corrective action, the market
surveillance authorities shall take all appropriate
provisional measures to prohibit or restrict the
explosive’s being made available on their
national market, to withdraw the explosive from
that market or to recall it.
23
Directive 2014/28
You can find the complete text of the Directive on our
home-page or down-load it from the EU web-side:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content
Directive 2014/28
Any Questions and/or comments?
4.a.2: CLP (GHS) - UPDATE
(The classification, labelling and packaging of chemical substances and mixtures)
(Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals)
26
New Pictograms
27
CLP UP-DATE
The new compliance deadline for explosive
mixtures will be 1 June 2015.
The CLP Regulation will ultimately replace
the current rules on classification, labelling
and packaging of substances (Directive
67/548/EEC) and preparations (Directive
1999/45/EC).
28
CLP Background
The production and use of chemicals is fundamental to all
economies all over the world. However, it is also recognized that
chemicals pose risks that should be indicated throughout the
supply chain. Many countries have developed systems for
providing information on hazardous properties and control
measures of chemicals aimed at ensuring their safe production,
transport, use and disposal. Yet, those systems are currently not
always compatible with each other and often require multiple
labels and Safety Data Sheets for the same product.
29
CLP BACKGROUND
Consequently, companies involved in international trade
need to follow multiple, sometimes differing regulations
regarding hazard classification and labelling depending
on where they do business and users may see
inconsistent label warnings and Safety Data Sheets for
the same chemical.
30
CLP
The CLASSIFICATION and LABELLING of
explosive mixtures are changing on 1 June 2015!
New PICTOGRAMS with a white background are
replacing the ORANGE ONES in the EU. From 1
June 2015 companies are required to classify and
label both substances and mixtures according to
the CLP Regulation.
Information on the CLP pictograms and on the
label is available on the European Chemical
Agency website (ECHA).
31
CLP - GHS - Overview (I)
– The European Union has adopted the UN-developed system „GHS“, which
stands for „Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of
Chemicals“.
– With GHS, globally harmonized criteria have been created for the classification
and labelling of chemicals. GHS wants to ensure internationally comparable high
standards for health and consumer protection, occupational health and safety,
and environmental protection.
– GHS regulates ...
• criteria for the classification of physical, toxicological and
environmental relevant properties ...
• classification and labeling ...
• harmonized hazard communication ...
(e.g. harmonized label statements and harmonized safety data sheets)
... of chemicals.
32
GHS - Overview (II)
– GHS affects manufacturers, suppliers, and users of chemicals
– The global implementation of GHS started during 2008.
The registration phase of REACH, the uniform chemical law
applicable within the EU, also began in 2008.
– Because of the numerous interconnections between GHS and
REACH (CLP), the European Commission has scheduled the
implementation of the two regulations to follow each another in
quick succession.
– The implementation of GHS is progressing at different places
around the world. In many Asian countries, for example, GHS has
already been introduced.
33
Geographical Limits of GHS
34
GHS - Current Status (September 2014)
Implementation by the national authorities
Argentina Czech Republic
Japan
Nigeria
Slovenia
Australia
Denmark
Norway
South Africa
Austria
Ecuador Latvia
Paraguay
Spain
Belgium
Estonia
Liechtenstein Peru
Bolivia
Finland
Lithuania
Brazil
France
Luxembourg Poland
Brunei, Darussalam Gambia
Sweden
Philippines Switzerland
Thailand
Madagascar
Transport of dangerous goods planned,
Other sectors planned
Transport of dangerous goods implemented, Other sectors planned
Transport of dangerous goods implemented, Other sectors implemented
35
GHS - Current Status (September 2014)
Implementation by the national authorities
Portugal United Kingdom
Bulgaria
United States of America
Republic of Korea
Laos
Cambodia Greece
Romania
Canada
Germany Malaysia
Malta
Hungary Mauritius
Uruguay
Russian Federation
Viet Nam
Chile
Iceland
Mexico
China
Indonesia Myanmar
Senegal
Serbia
Colombia Ireland
Netherlands
Cyprus
New Zealand Slovakia
Italy
Zambia
Singapore
Transport of dangerous goods planned,
Other sectors planned
Transport of dangerous goods implemented, Other sectors planned
Transport of dangerous goods implemented, Other sectors implemented
36
REACH / GHS - Timeline
01.06.2007 01.12.2008 01.12.2010
*) Also:
Pre-registration
Transition period
Registration process
Substance:
Classification in SDS
Labeling
01.06.2013 01.06.2015
01.06.2018
CMR-Substances ≥ 1 t/a/LE, R50/53-Substances ≥ 100 t/a/LE
> 1000 t/a/LE*)
100 – 1000 t/a/LE
1 – 100 t/a/LE
Substance Directive
REACH
GHS
← GHS-regulation
Substance Directive← GHS-regulation
Mixture:
Classification in SDS
Dangerous preparations Directive
Labeling
Dangerous preparations Directive
←GHS-regulation
← GHS-regulation
← means: former use of GHS possible
37
GHS - What essential changes does GHS involve?
1. GHS introduces globally harmonized criteria for the classification of physical,
toxicological, and environmental relevant properties.
2. GHS establishes globally harmonized criteria for hazard communication. In the
overview, this relates to the introduction of new or modified:
• HAZARD CLASSES,
• HAZARD CATEGORIES,
• HAZARD PICTOGRAMS,
• SIGNAL WORDS,
• HAZARD STATEMENTS,
• PRECAUTIONARY STATEMENTS
3. GHS offers the opportunity to bring product safety to a high level all over the
world. GHS will thus contribute to improving measures for protecting human
health and the environment on a global scale.
38
GHS EXAMPLES - NEW LABELLING ELEMENTS
SIGNAL WORD
The signal word on the label gives
information about the relative hazard level
of a substance or mixture and alerts the
reader to a potential hazard.
HAZARD PICTOGRAM
• Square set on a point,
• Red border,
• White background,
• Black symbols.
39
GHS – Hazard pictograms
Before: Hazard symbols according to directive 67/548/EEC, Annex II
Gases
no own
Symbol
CMR
no own
Symbol
Now: Hazard pictograms according to directive EC No. 127272008, Annex V
40
GHS - Hazard statement
64 R-Phrases  62 Hazard Statements (H)
24 European Hazard Statements (EUH)
A hazard statement is a phrase, assigned to a hazard class and category
that describes the nature / intrinsic property of a hazardous product as
well as the hazard level.
Hazard statement group
2 Physical hazards
3 hazards
4 all hazards
e.g. Hazard
statement
H200 – Unstable Explosive
Sequence in the group
41
GHS - Precaution statement
54 S-Phrases  136 Precaution statements (P)
A precautionary statement is a phrase (and/or pictogram) that describes the
recommended measures that should be taken to prevent / minimize adverse
effects resulting from exposure to a hazardous product.
Precaution statement group
1
2
3
4
5
e.g. Precaution
statement
General
Prevention
Response
Storage
Disposal
P201 – Obtain special instructions before use.
Sequence in the group
42
Sample Label
43
GHS – Statements for Explosives
The statements for explosives can be taken from this list:
44
TYPICAL SAMPLE FOR SMALL DIAMETER NG - EXPLOSIVE
45
CLP Up-date
SAFETY DATA SHEETS
Safety data sheets are the main tool for ensuring that
manufacturers and importers communicate enough
information along the supply chain to allow safe use of
their substances and mixtures.
NOTE: THERE IS A NEW FORMAT NOW!
46
CLP - Update
Any Questions and/or comments?
4.a.3) GLOBALLY HARMONIZED
STANDARD FOR EXPLOSIVES’
SECURITY MARKING
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
At our previous meeting you have been informed that the
Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) is going to
transmitted a proposal to “GLOBALLY HARMONIZE
THE STANDARD FOR EXPLOSIVES SECURITY
MARKINGS” to the “Committee of Experts on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally
Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of
Chemicals Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods” (in short: UN-ECE* WP15) at the fortysixth session in Geneva on 1 – 9 December 2014
*Economic Commission for Europe
49
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
SUMMARY
In their paper, for certain explosive devices
and substances, IME seeks to establish a
globally harmonized format for explosives
security markings by adding a new Section
1.4.4 to Chapter 1.4 of the Model
Regulations (Orange Book / ADR).
50
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
Chapter 1.4 Security provisions (Orange Book,
page 41)
–
–
–
1.4.1 General provisions
1.4.2 Security training
1.4.3 Provisions for high consequence
dangerous goods
–
1.4.4 Globally harmonized format for
explosives security markings
51
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
INTRODUCTION:
At the July 2013 session of the Sub-Committee IME
discussed that there is a critical need for successful
tracing of recovered explosives, and that the placement
of marks on articles and substances of Class 1 based on a
globally harmonized marking format would be a critical
component of successful tracing globally.
52
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
The Working Group on Explosives (EWG)
agreed that a globally harmonized format for
marking, most likely based on the European
Union format, might be worthwhile. The
Sub-Committee agreed with the EWG and
encouraged IME to submit a formal
proposal.
53
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
At the forty-fifth session in May 2014 of the SubCommittee, a formal proposal was submitted by IME
(working paper ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2014/5 (2014/5).
Several EWG-experts supported the proposal; however,
several questions of principle were raised, that IME
had not addressed in 2013/4.
It was suggested that IME further investigate those
questions of principle and address them in an
improved proposal at the next session of the SubCommittee, which will be in December 2014.
54
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
DISCUSSION
It is well known that many countries and law
enforcement agencies desire to have explosives
uniquely identified to facilitate their traceability in the
event of loss or theft, or for security purposes. When
present, such security markings would assist law
enforcement and government officials to determine
from where confiscated, discovered, and/or recovered
explosives were acquired. Establishing from where in
the chain of custody such explosives were acquired
may assist these officials in identifying those who may
have illicitly obtained such explosives and may aid in
reducing the availability of such explosives, thus
increasing the overall security of the world from
attacks using explosive articles and/or substances. 55
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
Indeed, within the European Union, Directive
2008/43/EC mandates such a marking system.
Other countries have also mandated, or have under
consideration, requirements for marking, serialization
and/or traceability of explosives.
These include: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, India, Kazakhstan, Peru, Russia, and the USA.
56
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
The result is a proliferation of disparate systems
utilizing differing formats of marking for traceability.
These disparate systems create unintended
consequences. Such disparate systems undermine the
ability of countries to trace products that illegally cross
national boundaries, needlessly complicate efforts of
manufacturers to identify, maintain inventories and
record individual lots that are destined for the different
countries, and mean that the same marking could have
different meanings in different countries defeating the
purpose for the marks.
57
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
IME proposes to globally standardize such security
markings into a harmonized format so that, when
marks are used, interpretation of those markings can
be done quickly and efficiently, enabling law
enforcement officials to advance their investigations
without undue delays. Since almost all Class 1 articles
and substances must at some time be transported, the
United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods, in the form of the Model
Regulations, appears to be the most appropriate
instrument to enable such harmonized identification
58
information to be adopted universally.
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
The structure proposed by IME recognizes that
the key information for traceability is the name
and location of the manufacturer of the product
and a code that can be used to uniquely identify
the individual explosive item. This proposal only
deals with the format of such a marking and
does not advocate any physical or chemical
modification of the explosive material contained
in the product (chemical or microscopic
identifiers or taggants).
59
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
The IME’s proposal is based on the harmonized system of
the European Commission Directive 2008/43/EC (as
amended by Directive 2012/4/EU), which is believed to be
the most commonly used marking format. Much of global
industry has already adopted this format for transport to,
within, and through the European Union. Since the
proposed marking format simply extends the country
identifier beyond that of the EU (e.g. acc. to ISO3166(2)
code: US for USA; AU for Australia; IN for India etc., it is
believed that such a format would have no impact on
60
markings already being used within the European Union.
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
The US explosives’ industry hopes, that those countries
outside of the European Union that have already
mandated security marking requirements will
authorize the proposed format as an acceptable
alternative to that which they have already mandated.
Additionally, it is hoped that those countries planning
to mandate such marking will accept the proposed
format as their mandated format or at least as an
acceptable alternative. The USA’s Bureau Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has already
accepted the EU-based format as an alternative for use
in that country. Additionally, Brazil has accepted the
format on a case-by-case basis.
61
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
PROPOSAL TO THE NEXT WP 15 MEETING:
The Sub-Committee is requested to add a note to Table 1.4.1
in Chapter 1.4 of the Model Regulations directing the reader
to the provisions of a new Section 1.4.4 to be added to Chapter
1.4. The proposed note is shown in “Amendment 1” in Annex
1. Further, the Sub-Committee is requested to a add a new
section 1.4.4 to Chapter 1.4 of the Model regulations
describing the globally harmonized explosives security
marking format as shown in “Amendment 2” in Annex 1.
62
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOSIVES SECURITY MARKINGS
Any Questions and/or comments?
4.a.4: LEAD AZIDE SITUATION
AS PER SEPTEMBER 2014
64
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
There has been numerous correspondence in the past years
between FEEM, ECHA, ILA, national NB and the Commission
concerning the handling of lead and its derivates in the detonator
industry. However, for formal reasons there was no way to avoid
that these substances appeared on the Candidate List.
During the REACH registration and evaluation process more than
100.000 chemicals in use in the EU have been registered. Of these
only 3.000 have been tested and over 800 are known to be
carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic to reproduction and are classified
as SVHC, because of their potential negative impacts on human
health or the environment . All of the Lead Derivates are in the last
category. Therefore, these are listed in the Annex 1 of the
Dangerous Substances Directive = Candidate List (now Annex
VI of the CLP Regulation).
65
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
21 lead compounds were included on the candidate list at the end
of 2012 in addition to the six lead compounds that were already
listed, 27 in total.
The Member State Committee will soon be debating the proposals
by ECHA for compounds to be included in the 6th Annex XIV
Recommendation.
Although volumes of some lead compounds manufactured in the
EU are relatively high (automotive, glass, paint) the use in
Explosives and Pyrotechnics is very small (<50t/a). FEEM believe
that REACH Authorisation would not be the most efficient Risk
Management Option for reasons of effectiveness and
proportionality.
66
REACH - PUBLIC CONSULTATION
The PUBLIC CONSULTATION on the 21 substances proposed by
ECHA to be placed on the 6th priority list will be delayed until 1
September 2014. The PUBLIC CONSULTATION WILL LAST FOR
THREE MONTHS AND WILL END 30 NOVEMBER 2014.
The consultation will focus on two aspects:
1. Information on USES AND RESPONSE TO PRIORITISATION,
which will be assessed by ECHA for their recommendation, and
2. additional SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION which will be
transmitted to the Commission.
The latter, will help the Commission gain more information on the
impacts of authorisation on the European economy before making
any final decisions on which substances will be added to Annex XIV
67
(authorisation list).
Who will be affected?
Businesses may be affected in a number of ways when a
substance is placed on Annex XIV. Those businesses who
use a substance (or a mixture containing a substance) that
is listed on Annex XIV will no longer be allowed to use it
after the sunset date unless they are covered by an
authorization (or the uses are exempt from authorization).
Some businesses may choose to discontinue manufacture
and/or use rather than apply for authorization and those
that do apply may have their applications rejected. This
could mean that a substance or mixture you use is no
longer available.
68
STANDARD FEES FOR APPLICATIONS FOR AN
AUTHORISATION UNDER ARTICLE 62 OF REGULATION EC
1907/2006
Base fee
Additional fee per substance
Additional fee per use
Additional fee per applicant
EUR 53.300
EUR 10.660
EUR 10.660
EUR 39.975
69
Lead Azide Situation as per
September 2014
71
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
FEEM thinks that the restriction of use of LeadTetroxide is approaching (at least in Europe) and
we have to send our comments to ECHA in order
to show the joint position of FEEM members. At
the WG meeting in Lisbon in October 2014 we
discussed this topic. We are preparing a Guidance
to ECHA for the Public Consulation before 30
November based on the following guidelines:
1. We insist on the formal reasons (low tonnage, well
controlled manufacturing processes, good H&S
results etc) already communicated to ECHA in
June 2013.
2. We will explain the socio-economic importance of
detonators and delay elements in the developments
of other European industrial sectors (mining,
quarrying, civil works etc).
72
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
3. As an alternative to conventional detonators
(i.e. delays with Pb) we will high lighten
Electronic Detonators. (Cost/benefit ratio?)
4. It is convenient to say something about the
alternative substances to Lead-tetroxide in
delay elements. Are there really alternative
substances at industrial scale? (e.g. Mercury
fulminate, Silver azide etc.) Answer: NO!
5. FEEM will send comments to ECHA amd
Commission before 30 November.
73
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
Our main arguments are:
1. Prioritizing a chemical prior to the communication of
an RMO* is inappropriate
- All 27 lead compounds on the candidate list have been subject to
an RMO completed by ECHA and provided to the Commission.
Including them now on the Priority List seems inappropriate
especially since there are serious concerns about the effectiveness
of REACH authorization as the most effective RMM* for lead
compounds.
•
•
Risk Management Option
Risk Management Measures
74
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
2. Lead compounds are already regulated by the
EU
– The manufacturing and use of lead compounds
is already regulated by long-standing lead
specific risk management measures (e.g. Chem.
Legislation, REACH, CLP, Occupational
Health Regulations etc.). This consideration
must be taken forward in the approach to
scoring and assessment of regulatory
effectiveness, as the value and effectiveness of
additional measures will be disproportionate.
75
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
3.
Priority scoring concerns
If priority scoring relies only on information submitted in the
2010 Registration dossiers we are concerned that it will produce
an incorrect score. Regrettably the dossiers included out-dated
information in some exposure scenarios. New information has
already been provided to ECHA and dossiers are currently being
updated to reflect this. Industry has recently completed a priority
scoring exercise using the latest ECHA methodology and current
use information and this highlighted that Lead Tetroxide
(Orange Lead) would have the highest priority score.
76
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
4. The compounds have industrial uses only
– THERE ARE NO CONSUMER USES!
77
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
5. WORKERS ARE ALREADY PROTECTED BY
EXISTING EU LEGISLATION
All applications of the relevant lead compounds
industrial. Industrial use of lead is already
regulated by legal requirements to protect
workers in the form of a Binding Limit Value in
the Chemicals Agents Directive that establishes
EU-wide minimum standards.
78
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
6. INTERMEDIATE
ARGUMENTS NEED TO BE
CONSIDERED IN PRIORITY SCORING
Use of Lead Dinitrate and Lead Monoxide in explosives has
been demonstrated to be an “intermediate” use as the
substances are integral to detonators. Fortunately, both Lead
Dinitrate and Lead Monoxide are used by FEEM members as
intermediate substances (see article 3 (15) of REACH). In other
words, these substances are used for chemical production of
other substances. According to information received by member
companies, Lead Dinitrate is used as raw material in the
manufacture of Lead Azide, Lead Styphnate and other primary
explosives. Similarly, Lead Monoxide is used as raw material in
the production of other lead compounds that are used in the
production of the above mentioned primary explosives.
Intermediate substances are exempted for Authorisation (see
article 2(8) of REACH) so these substances are not in the scope
of this threat of jumping to the Annex XIV at least for FEEM
79
members.
Lead Oxides – Latest Developments
Then, the only substance that could be included in the future in
the Authorisation List is the ORANGE LEAD.
That is why FEEM took the initiative in order to avoid the
inclusion of Orange-lead in the Authorisation List and send a
relevant letter to the ECHA Directorate on 19 June 2013 with a
subsequent Guidance before Nov. 2014.
The reasons for supporting the low priority for Orange Lead
(regarding priority for jumping from the Candidate List to the
Annex XIV) are quite similar to the reasons that were compiled by
FEEM for the lead primary explosive compounds (lead azide and
lead styphnate) according to our letter to ECHA of 3 October 80
2011.
Lead monoxide EC# 215-267-0
ES number
ES 6
Linked to Identified Use
Use of orange
lead in
explosive
manufacture
Note
Orange-Lead (lead tetroxide, Pb3O4) is a
substance used as a raw material for
detonator manufacturing. This substance
has no explosive properties and it is used
as an oxidizer to obtain a controlled
chemical reaction within the detonator
structure to obtain a chemical delay in the
blasting applications. Orange Lead
(Pb3O4) and silicon (or other reducing
agents) totally react during use of delay
elements and the chemical reaction is
complete and irreversible. After
detonation, the chemicals inside the delay
system react and the final products are
silica (SiO2), metallic lead (Pb), and
unreacted silicon (Si).
81
LEAD OXIDES
Any Questions and/or comments?
4.a.5: COLOR-CODING OF
EXPLOSIVES
In July 2014 FEEM has distributed to their
members the I.R.E. (ISTITUTO
RICERCHE ESPLOSIVISTICHE) Report
with recommendations to the EU
Commission (Directorate – General Home
Affairs) toward setting standards and
regulating the colour-coding of explosives
and blasting accessories such as igniters,
detonators and detonating cords.
83
Color-Coding of Explosives
These recommendations were developed by AID
– Stabilimento Militare Ripristini e Recuperi del
Munizionamento (Ammunition Refurbishing and
Recovery Plant) in collaboration with I.R.E. –
Istituto Ricerche Esplosivistiche (Explosive
Research Institute) and ECA Italia (European
Consulting Agency Srl). The work was funded
with the financial support from the Prevention of
and Fight against Crime Programme of the
European Union – European Commission –
Directorate – General Home Affairs.
84
Color-Coding of Explosives
Although this project is obviously ongoing for some years
already, this is the first time the EXPLOSIVES
INDUSTRY is being informed about such a research
called: “ICEA – Identification Colors of Explosives and
Blasting Accessories” submitted under the call for
proposal “ISEC 2010 ACTION GRANT” of the
“Prevention and Fight against Crime” Program. The goal
of the ICEA project is to provide help Governments and
Police forces in simplifying counter-terroristic and crime
investigation measures and in simplifying the recognition
and identification procedure of cables and detonating
cords.
85
Color-Coding of Explosives
Some of the arguments:
At present, there are almost 50 manufacturers of
explosives and similar materials. Due to the absence of
standardisation or unified norms, explosive devices often
present sheaths of different colours within the same
geographic area or can also be confused with products
destined to other uses. The nature of certain devices is
hard to be identified even by experts, if they are located at
a distance. Such an uncertainty causes inevitable
consequences concerning security, protection and crime
investigations.
86
Color-Coding of Explosives
Detonating cord still appears as an object
totally harmless, like so many others, such
as wire for hanging wet clothes. Few years
ago, a member of the Camorra in one
district of Naples hung his clothes on some
detonating cords. The concealment was
discovered only thanks to the K9 police dog
units.
87
Color-Coding of Explosives
They strongly recommend that a
dedicated and unique coloring for
cords and detonators wires should be
imposed. To reach this goal, the ICEA
research team has identified 30
different color combinations.
Starting from these color
combinations, a standardization of
products could be easily achieved.
88
Color-Coding of Explosives
An example could be:
a color combination for instantaneous
electric detonators
a color combination for electric delay
detonators plus a color combination
for micro delay electric detonators (!?)
a color combination for low, medium
and high intensity detonators;
89
Color-Coding of Explosives
A color combination for 3-6-10-12-15-20-40-40-80
and 100 grams of PETN per meter detonating
cords. The experts worked on two sets of 10
different color combinations in order to
distinguish items for civilian and items for
military use.
They propose that color combinations with
stripes (which could be embossed in order to be
distinguished just by touching them) could be
dedicated to detonating cords intended for
military use, while the set of 10 color
combinations with dots may be dedicated to the
civilian sector.
90
Color-Coding of Explosives
91
Color-Coding of Explosives
92
Color-Coding of Explosives
93
Color-Coding of Explosives
94
Color-Coding of Explosives
?
95
Colour Coding
Any Questions and/or comments?
4.a.6: Obligation of End-Users
It was reported by some members that there might be
disparate systems applied in the EU.
In some member states end-users are exempted from the
duty to read data, whereas in others they have to fulfill
their full obligations according to Article 13 of the
Directive:
97
Any other business
THE DIRECTIVE IS VERY CLEAR IN THIS POINT!
Data collection:
1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings in the
explosives sector put in place a system for collecting data in
relation to explosives including their unique identification
throughout the supply chain and life cycle.
2. The data collection system shall allow the undertakings to
keep track of the explosives in such a way that those holding
the explosives can be identified at any time
98
Obligation of End-Users
Who are involved?
All the supply chain from the manufacturer
/ importer /distributor to the end user,
including transport in terms of movement
of explosives.
99
Obligation of End-Users
Definitions
1. WHAT IS AN END USER?
The end user would be the last undertaking to take possession or
custody and to use the explosive, for example operating blasting
on site. In certain cases this could be the subcontracting company
undertaking the blasting. In other words, those responsible for the
last place of storage on a site prior to use should keep records
from the time they take possession or custody of the explosive
until it is used. It should not however normally be necessary for
records to be kept on the individual person, such as the individual
shot-firer, to whom the explosive is given to use.
100
Obligation of End-Users
What are the legal responsibilities of an end user?
Member States lay down rules on penalties applicable
to infringements of the provisions of national law
adopted pursuant to this Directive and ensure that
those rules are enforced. The penalties provided for
should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
Legal responsibilities of undertakings as end users are
affecting the whole chain from the CEO of the company
to the single worker with any relationship with the
explosives (Shotfirer, technical supervisor,
administrative responsible for the custody of the
explosive and products information, …)
101
Obligation of End-Users
It is highly recommended for end user
companies to clearly define an internal
procedure to identify the chain of control of
the explosive and related on-site information
including the names, job positions and
responsibilities along the supply chain.
102
Obligation of End-Users
What are the main obligations for an end user?
a. Put in place a system for collecting data in
relation to explosives including their unique
identification throughout the supply chain and
life cycle.
b. The system could be digital or manual.
c. Keeping a record of all identifications of
explosives – identification code, together with all
pertinent information including the type of
explosive, the company or person to the custody
of whom it was given.
103
Obligation of End-Users
The volume and the complexity of the collected data can
lead to the choice of an electronic system.
b. Record the location of each explosive while the explosive
is in their possession or custody until it is used.
c. Each end user has to define a procedure to grant that
there is no gap in the traceability and identification of
custody between the reception of the explosive and its
use in regards to the law.
d. In the activities of reception, use of the explosive,
and/or storage on-site, which can be coupled or
separated activities, the chosen procedures have to be
notified clearly for data process management to Track
and Trace suppliers.
104
Obligation of End-Users
c. At regular intervals test their data collection system in
order to ensure its effectiveness and the quality of the
data recorded.
d. Protect the data collected against accidental or malicious
damage or destruction.
e. Maintain the information for a 10 years period after the
end of the life cycle of the explosive even if the company
has ceased its activity.
f. Inform the competent authorities upon their request
(24/24 hours a day, 365 days a year, 10 years) concerning
the origin and location of each explosive.
g. Provide the responsible Member State authorities with
the name and contact details of a person able to provide
105
the information described.
Obligation of End-Users
What will happen if the system is not in place on my site in
due time?
Existing explosives in each site must be marked, identified
and controlled according with the provisions of the
Directive, to avoid any infringement to the laws and legal
responsibilities.
2. In case no system has been put in place to trace and
identify explosives, the competent authority could stop
the supply of explosives which would have an economic
impact on the development of the activities.
1.
106
Obligation of End-Users
IS THE T&T SYSTEM HANDLED
HOMOGENEOUSLY IN ALL EU
MEMBER STATES?
Meanwhile FEEM has contacted the
Commission (and UEPG) for clarification.
We realize that by implementing different
standards there might be a competitive
discrimination.
107
Obligations of End-Users
Any Questions and/or comments?
4 b: Incidents
TRUCK EXPLOSION ON THE MITCHELL
HIGHWAY, QUEENSLAND ON 5
SEPTEMBER 2014
109
110
Queensland Accident
A TRUCK carrying AN in outback Queensland exploded with such
force that residents more than 30km away thought an earthquake had
occurred.
Four firefighters and a policeman were among eight people injured
when a truck carrying 50 tonnes of ammonium nitrate exploded on the
Mitchell Highway, about 30km south of Charleville in southwest
Queensland.
The explosion occurred as emergency crews responded to reports of a
truck rollover.
The force of the blast destroyed a bridge, cutting off the main route
between Charleville and nearby Wyandra. It also severely damaged two
fire trucks at the scene.
111
Queensland Accident
Four firefighters were also injured, with two still recovering
in hospital, along with a police officer and another member
of the public. Charleville police officer-in-charge Senior
Sergeant Adrian Rieck said the Queensland Fire and
Emergency Service crews were able to remove the driver
from the wreck before the explosion.
"They were very close, within 30 metres of the wreckage,
and at that time there were two explosions within quick
succession," he said.
112
Queensland Accident
The truck belongs to Kalari Transport Ltd., which is one of
Australia’s specialist bulk logistics providers to the mining and
resources sector carrying AN from ORICA'S YARWUN plant at
GLADSTONE.
FIVE trucks a week depart Orica's Yarwun factory loaded with
ammonium nitrate, headed for all parts of the country.
One of those trucks overturned on the Mitchell Hwy near
Charleville on Friday, headed for South Australia.
Diesel spilling from the fuel tank came into contact with the load,
creating a massive explosion which seriously injured eight and
obliterated the highway and truck.
An attending fire truck was also destroyed.
In light of the explosion, Gladstone residents have expressed
concerns about living in the same town as an ammonium nitrate
plant.
(from the Australian “Observer”, 9.9.14)
113
2. VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
The 2014 Gorni Lom explosions were a series
of explosions that began on the afternoon of
1 October, 2014, at 16:59 pm local time at the
former Midzhur Ammo Plant belonging to
Videx Explosives Ltd. in the village of Gorni
Lom, in Bulgaria's northwestern Vidin
Province. The series of blasts completely
destroyed the factory, killing 13 men and 2
women who were inside and injuring 3 others
who were some distance away.
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
VIDEX produces civil explosives like:
various types of Ammonites (AN + TNT)
ANFO & Mixtures with demil. explosives
Cast TNT BOOSTERS
& they deal with
All sorts of demil. explosives
(TNT/RDX/PETN/HMX)
Detonators
Det. Cords
They also offer blast & drilling services
121
VIDEX Explosives, Bulgaria
The main explosion took place at 16:59 pm local
time, with a large secondary blast taking place at
21:45 pm. The approximately 15 people who were
working inside the factory at the time of the first
explosion are presumed to have died instantly,
while 3 female workers in the vicinity of the
complex suffered injuries from flying glass and
shrapnel. Authorities estimated around 10 tonnes
of highly explosive chemicals were stored at the
site, in addition to the weapons being dismantled.
122
VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
According to Nikola Nikolov, the head of the
interior ministry's civil defense force, the blasts
were powerful enough to completely destroy the
main buildings in the plant, leaving huge craters
the size of football fields behind and sending
debris flying up to a kilometer away. The workers
were reportedly dismantling old Greek mines at
the time of the accident in Gorni Lom,
approximately 145 km northwest of Bulgaria's
capital Sofia.
123
VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
The same plant had received several urgent citations by
authorities just two months prior to the accident, notifying the
owners of outdated equipment, improperly stored explosives
and a larger amount of munitions at the site than it could
safely handle.
The same plant suffered two blasts in 2007 and 2010 that
injured a total of 6 people and flattened two separate
buildings. In the aftermath of the disaster labour minister
Yordan Hristoskov vowed to never allow the factory to reopen,
placing the future of around 150 jobs in question and
prompting condemnation from local residents.
124
VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
This was Bulgaria's tenth such accident
since 1979 and the second one in just two
months, after a blast at a similar plant in
Kostenets injured 10 people on August 8. An
explosion at another facility near Sliven
killed 3 people in 2012, and in 2008 a series
of huge blasts at an arms depot near Sofia
injured 3, forced the closure of Sofia Airport
and registered as a 3.2 tremor on
seismographs.
125
VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
In response to the disaster, authorities dispatched
Army units equipped with drones and thermal
cameras to search for survivors and assess the
damage. After a period of 24 hours since the last
explosion had passed, investigators were allowed
access to the scene and began their work, making the
initial trip in a Bulgarian Army Sand Cat vehicle as a
safety precaution. One of the members of that initial
team, Valentin Radev, said that "the plant and the
people seem to have just vanished" and described the
scene as a "moonscape".
126
VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
The experts think the most likely reasons behind the tragedy
are a human error or non-observance of technological
discipline and probable violation of workplace safety rules.
Asked to comment on what a human error meant, one official
said: “For instance, I hold a particular opinion. At the
workshop, there was a machine at one of its ends that broke
trinitrotoluene taken out of the mines to powder. That
trinitrotoluene is of lower sensitivity and can be processed in
that manner but in the American-made mines – M16 there are
explosive charges of a more sensitive explosive substance.
When one has not taken it out and it comes to be in the blocks
containing trinitrotoluene, it is highly sensitive and this may
have caused the blast.“
127
VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA
“Major responsibility falls upon company’s
management. They used to show criminal
negligence towards the recommendations of
the Labour Inspectorate and the dangerous
substances control service (KOS),” said
Bulgarian interim Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Labour and Social Policies,
Yordan Hristoskov.
128
AOB
Further Subjects?
129
7. Date & Place of the next meeting:
On
Thursday, 26 February 2015 from 9 to 12h30
With a
Dinner on 25 February 2015 at 19h00
At
Manos Conférence & Business Centre
135, Chaussée de Charleroi
B-1060 Bruxelles
Tel: +32.2.541.17.87
Fax: +32.2.541.17.97
130
Executive Committee Meeting Mallorca 2014
Thank you for your attention and a
good meeting.
Lunch will be served now in the
Restaurant.
131