UGA FB Round 3 Harvard
1NC Round 3
Off 1
ISIS authorization will pass in the lame-duck – bipartisan support now
Martin 10/13/14 (Patrick, Foreign Affairs Contributor @ Southern Times of Africa, "The Mideast war
and the US election," http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/articles.php?id=10415&title=The-Mideastwar-and-the-US-election-&type=65#.VD2Z-vldWSp)
Few candidates for either the House or Senate have raised the issue of the Middle East. Those that,
for the most part, are Democrats who ran as “anti-war” candidates in 2006 or 2008 who are now running as
vehement supporters of the bombing of Iraq and Syria. A report on Politico.com, headlined, “Liberal doves run as war
hawks,” profiled three such Democrats: Senator Kay Hagan of North Carolina, Senator Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire, and
Congressman Bruce Braley, running for a Senate seat in Iowa. House Speaker John Boehner, the top congressional Republican, and
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, the top Democrat, have both indicated they would support congressional
authorisation for the use of military force in Iraq and Syria if the Obama administration formally requested it. The vote
would be held in the lame duck session of Congress set to begin in December. In other words, any vote on war would be
conducted after the congressional elections November 4, with the American people deprived of any influence on the decision.
Court decisions on assisted suicide trigger massive political backlash
Hassel 7 (Dianna, Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law, "SEX AND
DEATH: LAWRENCE'S LIBERTY AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE," 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L.
1003, lexis)
The parallels between the political debate about the criminalization of sodomy and gay rights
generally and the debate about the right to die are also remarkable. Both issues are obvious hot
zones in the nation's culture wars . This Article considers how the broad political turmoil arising out of
the current American zeitgeist may result in a similar legal framework for both issues. Lawrence was
decided in an atmosphere of growing tolerance and acceptance of gay rights, but has also spurred
anxiety and backlash on the issue of gay marriage. Restrictions on assisted suicide are, in some
spheres, currently loosening with the emergence of a broad belief that government should not interfere
with personal decisions in this area. In other political spheres, however, there is fear that this trend
undermines a "culture of life" that needs to be preserved and promoted. In both gay rights and
assisted suicide, Supreme Court rulings take place in a politically charged context certain to create
controversy.
PC is key—Obama will push in the lame duck and strong initiative is crucial
Goldsmith 10/7 (Jack – Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, “If Obama Wants Congress'
Approval to Attack ISIS, He'll Have to Ask—or Screw Up Badly,” 10/7/2014,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119731/congress-will-authorize-use-force-against-isis-only-if-obama-asks )
In modern times, in sum, AUMFs have materialized in two situations: (1) Presidents affirmatively seek
and make the case for congressional support, they propose terms, and they push hard for
enactment on the president’s terms; or (2) Presidents act unilaterally, something goes wrong, the
conflict becomes unpopular, and Congress pushes back with a conditional authorization and an
insistence on the applicability of the WPR.¶ If history is any guide, therefore, President Obama won’t get an AUMF
from Congress unless he formally asks Congress to act, proposes terms, and pushes for enactment ;
or unless the fight against Islamic State goes so badly that Congress intervenes in reaction. The White House is well aware of the first
point, and is very much hoping that the second does not come to pass. Perhaps the White House is (as
waiting until after the mid-term elections to ask for an AUMF . If that is so, it should at
that time propose a draft resolution, or commit to and push one of the proposals offered by
individual members of Congress (such as Representative’s Schiff’s). But the White House cannot seriously believe
that an authorization for the use of force against the Islamic State will emerge from Congress without a
strong presidential initiative of the type we have not yet seen.
some have suggested)
Congressional authorization is key to defeat ISIS
Goldsmith 14 (Jack – Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, “Why the President Should
Seek Congressional Authorization for the Use of Force Against The Islamic State [UPDATE on War
Powers Resolution]”, 8/22, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/08/the-case-for-seeking-congressionalauthorization-for-the-use-of-force-against-the-islamic-state/)
* Several stories this morning, picking up on hints in General Dempsey’s statements yesterday, suggest that the U nited S tates will eventually
need to use force in Syria, including S pecial O perations F orces on the ground , to defeat IS. Such
an expansion of the conflict by itself would enhance the case for congressional authorization . The
deployment of unilateral force in Syria would be especially hard for the President to explain in light of his
eloquent speech a year ago on why congressional authorization was necessary, as a prudential matter, for the deployment of force in Syria in response to Assad’s use
of chemical weapons. The
use of force in Syria against IS would be broader and take longer than the
pinprick strikes planned for Syria last year, and would likely require many S pecial O perations F orces on the
ground in Syria. The question thus becomes: Why does the President think he needs congressional authorization for limited humanitarian force in Syria but not for
longer-term and more dangerous uses of force in Syria in the national defense, force that entails broader strategic consequences and almost certainly a greater threat to
U.S. troops? That is a tricky question to answer, I think. (The answer cannot be that the President has independent constitutional power to use force now in Syria in
self-defense, for he claimed independent constitutional power to use force in Syria last year as well. The question is: Why was it prudent to seek congressional support
last year but not now?) * The
President must eventually educate the nation about why the U nited S tates is going
to be deploying significant treasure and possibly some blood in Iraq and probably Syria to defeat IS. As noted above, the case in theory is not hard to make.
But a mere speech from the Oval Office will not do the trick if the President wants the nation to understand the stakes and risks, and wants to get the American People
truly behind the effort. Only
an extended and informed and serious national debate can do that, and such a debate can only occur
if the President asks for Congress’s support. Raising the stakes in this way goes very much against the grain of White House efforts in
recent years to suggest that the threat is diminishing, that the war against Islamists is winding down, and the like. It will be especially hard for the White House since
the President has wanted to put Iraq behind him and to avoid military involvement in Syria. But events have now overtaken the White House’s wishful thinking (and
indeed, were likely exacerbated by it). The President would be wise to acknowledge this reality and prepare the nation. *
authorization
to use
Congressional
force will give the President’s military and related actions against IS enormous
political legitimacy , and will significantly spread the political risk when things go badly, as they invariably will.
will not stop some members of Congress from carping from the sidelines. But it will
force every member of Congress to take a stand, and it will diminish the rate and significance of
Congressional authorization
carping down the road . Congressional authorization will also protect the President politically to some
degree should IS succeed in a strike on the U.S. homeland (as many are now warning is possible). For it will
demonstrate in a high-profile manner that the President understood the stakes beforehand and did
everything he could to prepare the nation for the threat and address it. Recall that the most serious charge against the Bush administration after 9/11 was
that it failed to take seriously enough al Qaeda’s threat signals. President Obama has already been accused of this with respect to IS, and anything he can do now to
show how seriously he is taking the threat will help him later when things go badly. And again,
there is simply no better way to signal the
seriousness of the threat than through solicitation of congressional support.
ISIS causes great power war
Corre 14 (Addam Corre, Inquisitr writer, “World War 3: Forget Ukraine, Iraq Is The Most Likely Flash
Point”, Inquisitr, 06/17/2014, http://www.inquisitr.com/1303680/world-war-3-forget-ukraine-iraq-is-themost-likely-flash-point/)
Over the past few months speculation has been rife that the events in Ukraine could trigger the next World War. Numerous articles have proclaimed that to be the most likely scenario. But is it?
The actions of the Islamic militant group calling itself ” The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” – or
ISIS – has created a new situation on the ground
which has a far greater potential for setting off a world conflict than Ukraine could ever have. Despite
all the world posturing and tut-tutting about the Crimea, it is, after all, simply a piece of land whose ownership is disputed. Viewed objectively, given the demographic structure of the area, the
Russians have at least an arguable case to justify its annexation. Whether the fears of the local Russian speaking population were real or imagined, it’s now a fait-accompli, and no one is going to
do anything to change the situation any time soon. Even that the expansion of Russian interests in other parts of Ukraine have similar elements of justification, which might keep the diplomats
busy for a few months, but are unlikely to include any significant military dimension. But
the situation in the Middle East is completely
different. It is far more volatile and dangerous because it is not really a question of land. What the world is
witnessing, not for the first time – and certainly not for the last – is a clash of ideologies within Islam. Some may feel that while they are busy butchering and beheading each other at least they
are not a threat to the rest of the world. That is mistaken and shortsighted thinking. With every passing year, the theories of Samuel P. Huntington that people’s cultural and religious identities
will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world, gain even more credence. Huntington’s concept, which he aptly termed “The Clash of Civilizations” was first proposed in 1992.
Since then, the world has witnessed with growing horror the expansion of ever increasingly radical Islamic groups in almost every corner of the globe. Islamic militant groups are active in
Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Nigeria, Kenya, Lebanon, The Palestinian territories, and Gaza, just to list a few. Although Russia nominally crushed the Islamists of Chechnya, remnants
of them still manage the odd bombing atrocity in Russia. Islamic activity in China also appears to have been suppressed, but facts from there are almost impossible to verify. But Islamic
extremism and terrorism is not confined to countries with mainly Muslim populations. From the attack on the Twin Towers in New York to the London bus bombings to the Madrid train
bombings, Islam carried its war to the rest of the world. And the world cleaned up the sites, mourned – and moved on. Some might argue that the U.S., and one or two other countries, tried to do
something about those atrocities by invading Iraq, toppling Saddam Hussein, fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and (eventually) killing their leader, Osama bin-Laden. History will judge
actions of ISIS trigger a third world war ? It all
depends on which group, or groups, the major powers ally themselves with and support diplomatically, financially, or
whether those tactics succeeded or not; currently, the legacy is not looking too good. Why could the
militarily. We are today witnessing the truth of the adage that adversity makes strange bedfellows. Even a week ago, who could have envisaged a scenario in which the U.S. and Iran could share
a mutual interest, and possibly support each other in actions against ISIS?
Apart from the fact that Russia , and sometimes China , have an
almost knee-jerk reaction against any direction the U.S. might take in the international arena,
Israel is the wild card in the pack. If it senses that – for whatever reason – the U.S. and Iran will find
themselves allies, it will understand that the U.S. will be constrained in taking further action
against Iran regarding its efforts to manufacture a nuclear bomb . Facing such a situation, The Israeli
government may feel that the window of opportunity to take military action against Iran is rapidly
closing. Although, until now, the prevailing belief has been that Israel could not act alone – and succeed – it could be, and probably is the fact, that Israel will be left
with no alternative. Diplomatic efforts to stop the Iranian nuclear program have palpably failed. The
danger of such a course of action is that it would almost certainly result in the Islamist factions stopping their mutual
bloodletting in order to confront their joint enemy, Israel. From that point, it does not require too
much imagination to project what will be the effect of world and regional governments aligning themselves
with one side or the other. World War 3 starting in the Middle East as an indirect result of the
actions of ISIS is not such a fanciful prediction!
Off 2
Legalized PAS will result in non-voluntary forms of life-taking – will result in the
deaths of tens of thousands
Smith 1 (Wesley, Author, lawyer, + senior fellow at the Discovery Institute's Center on Human
Exceptionalism, National Review, "Culture of Death Angels,"
http://www.hoshuha.com/articles/deathangels.html)
The seeming increase in the number of medical professionals accused of killing their patients in recent years may be a mere coincidence. Then
again, it may be the beginning of a trend. This isn't idle speculation.
The sanctity of human life is under as intense attack
in this country as we have seen since those bad old days when the likes of Sen. John C. Calhoun promoted slavery as a positive good.
Indeed, our country is currently steeped in a "culture of death" in which dying — and even killing —
are promoted by bioethicists and assisted-suicide advocates as acceptable answers to the individual
difficulties associated with serious illness and disability, the emotional and financial hardships sometimes generated by family care-giving
responsibilities, and the "crisis" in health-care resources. We have actually gotten to the point where the predominate opinion in bioethics holds
that people with a "lower" quality of life have less moral value than "normal adults." These death-culture attitudes lead to actual medical policies
that hurt real people. Most famously, Oregon has legalized assisted suicide where studies show that most who swallow
prescribed poison do so in order not to "burden" their families. Meanwhile, beneath the media's radar, "futile care" protocols are being quietly
implemented in hospitals across the country that arrogantly give doctors and ethics committees the right to refuse wanted life-extending treatment
unilaterally if the doctor believes the patient's quality of life is insufficient to justify the cost of care. At the same time, cognitively disabled
patients — both conscious and unconscious — are made to die slow deaths by dehydration in all 50 states by having their tube-supplied food and
water withheld or withdrawn on the basis that their lives are no longer worth living. In such a cultural milieu, is it really surprising that some
medical professionals would take the extra step of "mercy" killing dying, elderly, and disabled patients or that a few evil psychopaths would use
"compassion" as a front for the fulfillment of their homicidal obsessions? We
need only look to the Netherlands for proof
that widespread acceptance of the culture of death leads inexorably to non-voluntary euthanasia .
The Netherlands has permitted doctors to kill patients who volunteer to die since a court decision essentially decriminalized the practice in 1973.
Since then, Dutch
doctors have skied down the steepest of slippery slopes, normalizing medicalized
killing in the process. Today, Dutch doctors lethally inject dying people who ask for it; chronically ill people who ask for it; disabled people
who ask for it; depressed people who ask for it; and, disabled babies whose parents ask for it. More to the point of this essay, killing by Dutch
doctors has not been limited to voluntary cases. Study after study of Dutch euthanasia have repeatedly demonstrated that more than one thousand
people who have not asked to be killed receive lethal injections by their doctors each year. The practice is so common that the ever-rational Dutch
The murders of tens of thousands of
Dutch patients killed in the last 30 years without request or consent (for that is what such killings are considered
have given non-voluntary killing a name: "termination without request or consent."
technically under Dutch law) have led to only a handful of prosecutions, and no doctors have been jailed for the practice. A case reported just last
week in the British Medical Journal News illustrates vividly the license that country has given Dutch doctors to kill catastrophically ill and
disabled patient — even if they have not asked for euthanasia. Dr. Wilfred van Oijen, a Dutch general practitioner, was recently found guilty of
murdering a dying 84-year-old patient despite her statements that she did not wish to die. The doctor said he killed the comatose woman because
she had bed sores and was soaked in urine. But bed sores can be mostly prevented through regular turning and a catheter will prevent an
incontinent patient from soiling her linens. Despite this, Oijen was not penalized, because the Amsterdam court ruled that he had merely made an
"error of judgment" while acting "honorably and according to his conscience" when he ended his patient's life. (So much for "choice.") We have
not yet become so accustomed to medicalized killing in the United States that we are willing to countenance murder in our hospital wards. But we
are moving in that general direction.
Unless we begin to reassert the sanctity and inherent value of all human
lives — most especially of those among us who are dying, disabled, and elderly — we may soon find that patients who need
our protection the most will find themselves increasingly in danger of being hustled into an early grave
by the very professionals they counted upon to do them no harm.
Rejecting assisted suicide is essential in protecting the right to life
Mendelson and Bagaric 13 (Danuta and Mirko, Profs of Law @ Deakin Univ (Australia), "Assisted
suicide through the prism of the right to life," International Journal of Law and Psychiatry,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160252713000666)
The most important interest at stake in the debate involving suicide and assisted suicide is the right to life. An
examination of the nature of this right and its proper bounds, establishes that suicide and assisted suicide do not come within
an exception to the right. Moreover, the weight of existing evidence supports the view that legalising
assisted suicide leads to adverse side-effects in the form of a greater incidence of suicide. It follows
that suicide and assisted suicide should be prohibited, unless there is a concrete countervailing interest that can trump the
right to life. This issue has not been explored at length in this paper, however, it is suggested that it is unlikely that any interest
(apart from life itself) can override the right to life . Advances in medical technology have enabled prolongation of life through
mechanical ventilators as well as artificial nutrition and hydration even in circumstances where there is no hope that the patient would return to
sapient life, or where the patient wished that these medical measures be abated or withheld. Common law courts and legislatures provided a
principled response to the physicians' concern about civil and criminal liability that may attach to abatement and withholding of life-sustaining
treatment if they act in accordance with the doctrine of patients' right to self-determination, including ‘the right to die’.131 They uphold the
principle of personal self-determination in the sense of the right to refuse medical treatment and provided legal immunity to physicians whose
adult patients died as a result of their request for non-treatment, as long as such requests did not amount to an aid in committing suicide.132
Hence, the insistence that (1) adults who refuse life-saving or life-sustaining treatment must be of ‘sound mind’, that is, free of psychiatric
conditions such as clinical depression or psychosis that would render them decisionally impaired; and (2) that medical practitioners do not cause
or aid and abet their patients' death.133 Thus, consistency of the law and such practical measures,134 as healthcare initiatives, suicide help lines
(telephone and online)135 and educational measures aimed at suicide prevention are necessary. Legalisation of assisted suicide changes this
paradigm. By
allowing physicians to prescribe lethal drugs in the form of ‘medical treatment’,136 the
State implicitly abandons its duty to protect the lives of its citizens from self-destruction. Legislation of
assisted suicide is inconsistent with principles that underlie criminal and civil immunity for those who act to prevent another person from selfdestruction. For, if
assisted suicide is good, why is ‘unassisted’ suicide bad? The outcome of both actions
is premature death: is assisted suicide good because it has the imprimatur of the State and/or its
Courts, whereas the ‘unassisted’ suicide is bad because, though tolerated, it lacks official approval? Yet, there is no intrinsic
difference between death caused by suicide and death caused by assisted suicide — both, in the majority of
cases, are committed by vulnerable persons suffering from depression and other health problems. If ‘unassisted’ suicide needs to
be discouraged so should ‘assisted’ suicide: this is the only coherent approach which pays sufficient
regard to the ultimate right—life .
Off 3
Our advocacy: The United States Supreme Court should legalize all physician
assisted suicide through overturning Vacco v Quill and Washington v Glucksberg if
and only if universal health care is guaranteed to all Americans.
Universal health care for all should be available for all citizens BEFORE making
the decision to legalize assisted suicide – absent that “floor” of rights, legalization
will disproportionately impact the disadvantaged and vulnerable in society,
undermining social justice
Jones and Masci 7 (Robert and David, holds a doctorate in religion from Emory University, is an
independent consultant on religion and progressive politics and an affiliated scholar at the Center for
American Progress + Senior Research Fellow @ Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, "A Progressive
Argument Against the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide," 10/3,
http://www.pewforum.org/2007/10/03/a-progressive-argument-against-the-legalization-of-physicianassisted-suicide/)
You say in your book that both liberals and progressives incorrectly view physician-assisted suicide as another “choice” issue, like abortion. Why
isn’t this issue about someone’s right to decide his or her fate at the end of life? My
argument is really a social-justice-oriented
argument against the legalization of assisted suicide in our current health care context. And those last
words are really important: in our current health care context. I think one important piece may be the number of
uninsured Americans that we have in the country. The recent numbers that came out from the U.S. Census Bureau saw the
number of Americans without health insurance rise to 15.8 percent – or 47 million people in our country. What that means – and what I argue – is
that legalizing
assisted suicide in the context where we have this kind of inequity in our health care
system actually puts those who are uninsured at risk for reaching for assisted suicide for a
financial necessity or out of some duress. So to put it starkly, if you’re faced with the choice at the end of life where one option
is between $50 and $150 for a lethal prescription of medication to end your life versus tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of dollars
for long-term care, that’s a pretty draconian choice to put in front of people. You can see this situation coming out if you look at the
demographics of people who are for and against assisted suicide. The country is fairly evenly divided if you look at Pew polling on this issue. But
I argue that if you start looking underneath the numbers and you look at the poor or at minorities, a different picture emerges. According to my
own analysis of the Pew data, you have 61 percent of whites with incomes over $100,000 supporting physician-assisted suicide, but you have 78
percent of minorities with incomes under $50,000 opposing assisted suicide. That picture, I think, ought to tell us something – specifically, that
those more vulnerable populations who are less likely to have health insurance and large financial
resources are also less likely to support physician-assisted suicide. We shouldn’t move too quickly
past those numbers. A group that has been very prominent in these debates is the disability-rights movement. In August 2007 there was
an article in the Los Angeles Times that cited opposition to assisted suicide coming from an unusual place – the disability-rights movement,
which is concerned about people with disabilities being very vulnerable in our current health care context. That movement is really worried that
financial incentives may push doctors to make certain decisions or push patients to make certain decisions that I think we couldn’t call a free and
non-coerced choice. So what you are saying, in essence, is that lack
of universal health care increases the risk that
legalizing physician-assisted suicide will ultimately lead to abuses? I think that’s right . You mentioned
earlier this analogy with abortion, that there’s a kind of pro-life/pro-choice thing. I think one of the mistakes that has been made around the
assisted suicide debate is to too easily try to fit that framework over this issue and say that if you’re pro-life, you should be against physicianassisted suicide, and if you’re pro-choice, you should be for it. But I think that obscures the real financial issues here, and what I’ve been arguing
is that a more appropriate analogy might be the capital punishment debate. That argument goes like this: Regardless of whether or not – in the
abstract – we could justify capital punishment for certain heinous crimes, in the current context of our society, which is shot through with racism
and shot through with financial problems of representation in the courts, we can’t justly implement it. And what I’m arguing is that a very similar
kind of argument ought to be made by progressives on the issue of assisted suicide – that regardless
of whether we can make an
argument that physician-assisted suicide in certain cases is a social good or is morally justifiable,
in our current health care context we can’t justly implement it in a way that doesn’t lead to
increased risk to the disadvantaged and the vulnerable in society . Let’s assume that in the next few years the
United States moves from its current health care system to a European-style universal care model and everyone has access to health care. That
takes out of play your big concern. At that point, should people still have qualms about physician-assisted suicide? Are there still issues that need
to be explored, or are we now ready to move on to that? My argument is that [ universal
health care] ought to be the floor
that is in place before we really have this debate . And at that point I think the argument is moving to a different space. I’m
arguing that at least the
justice claims of the poor, vulnerable and disabled ought to be met before we
open up this debate, and I think it’s a debate we ought to have. We ought to have it in the legislatures and in public, and it’s one that I
think is a healthy debate for the country. One of the most interesting comments I found was by Dr. Rob Jonquiere, head of the
Dutch Voluntary Euthanasia Society. He is a very strong advocate for these rights at the end of life in
the context of the Netherlands, but when asked about what the U.S. ought to do, he basically said
no. He said that in the U.S., where so many people are uninsured, you could not defend such a law .
And this is from someone who is a staunch advocate for the right to assisted suicide and euthanasia at the end
of life. And I think that really does set the floor below which we shouldn’t go in the U.S.
The perpetuation of social injustice renders such populations invisible and
disposable
Giroux 6 (Henry, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and
Cultural Studies Department. “Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of
Disposability,” http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/college_literature/v033/33.3giroux.html,
accessed on 7/19/11)
Soon after Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, the consequences of the long legacy of attacking big government and bleeding the
social and public service sectors of the state became glaringly evident as did a government that displayed a "staggering
indifference to human suffering" (Herbert 2005). Hurricane Katrina made it abundantly clear that only the government had the power, resources,
and authority to address complex undertakings such as dealing with the totality of the economic, environmental, cultural, [End Page 174] and
social destruction that impacted the Gulf Coast. Given the Bush administration's disdain for the legacy of the New Deal, important government
agencies were viewed scornfully as oversized entitlement programs, stripped of their power, and served up as a dumping ground to provide
lucrative administrative jobs for political hacks who were often unqualified to lead such agencies. Not only was FEMA downsized and placed
under the Department of Homeland Security but its role in disaster planning and preparation was subordinated to the all-inclusive goal of fighting
terrorists. While it was virtually impossible to miss the total failure of the government response in the aftermath of Katrina, what many people
saw as incompetence or failed national leadership was more than that. Something
more systemic and deep-rooted was
revealed in the wake of Katrina—namely, that the state no longer provided a safety net for the poor,
sick, elderly, and homeless. Instead, it had been transformed into a punishing institution intent on
dismantling the welfare state and treating the homeless, unemployed, illiterate, and disabled as
dispensable populations to be managed, criminalized, and made to disappear into prisons, ghettos, and the
black hole of despair. The Bush administration was not simply unprepared for Hurricane Katrina as it denied that the federal government alone
had the resources to address catastrophic events; it actually felt no responsibility for the lives of poor blacks and others marginalized by poverty
and relegated to the outskirts of society. Increasingly, the
role of the state seems to be about engendering the financial
rewards and privileges of only some members of society, while the welfare of those marginalized by
race and class is now viewed with criminal contempt . The coupling of the market state with the racial state under George W.
Bush means that policies are aggressively pursued to dismantle the welfare state, eliminate affirmative action, model urban public schools after
prisons, aggressively pursue anti-immigrant policies, and incarcerate with impunity Arabs, Muslims, and poor youth of color. The central
commitment of the new hyper-neoliberalism is now organized around the best way to remove or make invisible those individuals and groups who
are either seen as a drain or stand in the way of market freedoms, free trade, consumerism, and the neoconservative dream of an American
empire. This
is what I call the new biopolitics of disposability: the poor, especially people of color, not
only have to fend for themselves in the face of life's tragedies but are also supposed to do it without being
seen by the dominant society. Excommunicated from the sphere of human concern, they have been
rendered invisible, utterly disposable , and heir to that army of socially homeless that allegedly no longer existed in color-blind
America. How else to explain the cruel jokes and insults either implied or made explicit by Bush and his ideological allies in the aftermath of
such massive [End Page 175] destruction and suffering?
Paternalism
Evaluate consequences
Weiss, Prof Poli Sci – CUNY Grad Center, ‘99
(Thomas G, “Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action,” Ethics and International Affairs 13.1)
Scholars and practitioners frequently employ the term “dilemma” to describe painful decision making but “quandary” would be more apt.27A
dilemma involves two or more alternative courses of action with unintended but unavoidable and equally undesirable consequences. If
consequences are equally unpalatable, then remaining inactive on the sidelines is an option rather than entering the serum on the field. A
quandary, on the other hand, entails tough choices among unattractive options with better or worse possible
outcomes. While humanitarians are perplexed, they are not and should not be immobilized. The solution is not indifference or withdrawal but
rather appropriate engagement. The key lies in making a good faith effort to analyze the advantages and
disadvantages of different alloys of politics and humanitarianism, and then to choose what often amounts to the
lesser of evils.
Thoughtful humanitarianism is more appropriate than rigid ideological responses, for four reasons: goals of
humanitarian action often conflict, good intentions can have catastrophic consequences; there are
alternative ways to achieve ends; and even if none of the choices is ideal, victims still require decisions about
outside help. What Myron Wiener has called “instrumental humanitarianism” would resemble just war doctrine because contextual analyses
and not formulas are required. Rather than resorting to knee-jerk reactions to help, it is necessary to weigh options
and make decisions about choices that are far from optimal.
Many humanitarian decisions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda—and especially those involving economic or military sanctions—
required selecting least-bad options. Thomas Nagle advises that “given the limitations on human action, it is naive to suppose that there is a
solution to every moral problem. “29 Action-oriented institutions and staff are required in order to contextualized their work rather
than apply preconceived notions of what is right or wrong. Nonetheless, classicists continue to insist on Pictet’s “indivisible whole” because
humanitarian principles “are interlocking, overlapping and mutually supportive. . . . It is hard to accept the logic of one without also accepting the
others. “30
The process of making decisions in war zones could be compared to that pursued by “clinical ethical review teams” whose members are on call to
make painful decisions about life-and-death matters in hospitals.sl The sanctity of life is complicated by new technologies, but urgent
decisions cannot be finessed. It is impermissible to long for another era or to pretend that the bases for
decisions are unchanged. However emotionally wrenching, finding solutions is an operational imperative
that is challenging but intellectually doable. Humanitarians who cannot stand the heat generated by situational ethics
should stay out of the post-Cold War humanitarian kitchen.
Principles in an Unprincipled World
Why are humanitarians in such a state of moral and operational disrepair? In many ways Western liberal
values over the last few
centuries have been moving toward interpreting moral obligations as going beyond a family and intimate networks,
beyond a tribe, and beyond a nation. The impalpable moral ideal is concern about the fate of other people, no matter how far away.szThe
evaporation of distance with advances in technology and media coverage, along with a willingness to intervene in a variety of post–Cold War
crises, however, has produced situations in which humanitarians are damned if they do and if they don’t. Engagement by outsiders does not
necessarily make things better, and it may even create a “moral hazard by altering the payoffs to combatants in such a way as to encourage more
intensive fighting.“33
This new terrain requires analysts and practitioners to admit ignorance and question orthodoxies. There is
no comfortable theoretical framework or world vision to function as a compass to steer between integration and
fragmentation, globalization and insularity. Michael Ignatieff observes, “The world is not becoming more chaotic or violent, although our failure
to understand and act makes it seem so. “34Gwyn Prins has pointed to the “scary humility of admitting one’s ignorance” because “the new vogue
for ‘complex emergencies’ is too often a means of concealing from oneself that one does not know what is going on. “3sTo make matters more
frustrating, never before has there been such a bombardment of data and instant analysis; the challenge of
distilling such jumbled and seemingly contradictory information adds to the frustration of trying to do something
appropriate fast.
International discourse is not condemned to follow North American fashions and adapt sound bites and slogans. It is essential to struggle
with and even embrace the ambiguities that permeate international responses to wars, but without the
illusion of a one-size-fits-all solution. The trick is to grapple with complexities, to tease out the general without ignoring the
particular, and still to be inspired enough to engage actively in trying to make a difference.
Because more and more staff of aid agencies, their governing boards, and their financial backers have come to value reflection, an
earlier
policy prescription by Larry Minear and me no longer appears bizarre: “Don’t just do something, stand there!
“3sThis advice represented our conviction about the payoffs from thoughtful analyses and our growing distaste for the stereotypical, yet often
accurate, image of a bevy of humanitarian actors flitting from one emergency to the next.
Util is best – politics is organized according to interests.
Harries, 94 – Editor @ The National Interest
(Owen, Power and Civilization, The National Interest, Spring, lexis)
Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free
expression?”, Lee immediately answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather
crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in
politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. While
an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always
weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human
rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the
promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever
be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and
promoting them will always have to be considered.
Life always has value – even if its reduced, people have some worth – they have
families and relationships and hobbies and fun – which should be preserved
Coontz 1 (Phyllis D., School of Public and International Affairs – University of Pittburgh,
“Transcending the Suffering of AIDS”, Journal of Community Health Nursing, 18(4), December)
In the 1950s, psychiatrist and theorist Viktor Frankl (1963) described an existentia l theory of purpose and
meaning in life. Frankl, a
long-time prisoner in a concentration camp,
related several instances of transcendent states that he experienced in the midst of that terrible
suffering using his own experiences and observations. He believed that these experiences allowed
him and others to maintain their sense of dignity and self-worth. Frankl (1969) claimed that
transcendence occurs by giving to others, being open to others and the environment, and coming to
accept the reality that some situations are unchangeable. He hypothesized that life
always has
meaning for the individual; a person can always decide how to face adversity. Therefore,
self-transcendence provides meaning and enables the discovery of
meaning for a person (Frankl, 1963). Expanding Frankl’s work, Reed (1991b) linked selftranscendence with mental health. Through a developmental process individuals gain an increasing
understanding of who they are and are able to move out beyond themselves despite the fact that
they are experiencing physical and mental pain. This expansion beyond the self occurs through
introspection, concern about others and their well-being, and integration of the past and future to
strengthen one’s present life (Reed, 1991b).
Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought
Allison, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 1990 (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”)
And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not
actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it,
utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing ... [and] has come to have a significant
impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the
best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore,
is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of
utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, this is,
prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards
Bentham and to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
The 1AC link to paternalism is hyper generic – it’s not about physician assisted
suicide, just paternalism in general
Legalization of PAS harms the most disadvantaged – elderly and disabled and
crushes value to life and inevitably leads to a slippery slope
Patrick Lee June 1, 2013 Ph.D., is the John N. and Jamie D. McAleer Professor of Bioethics and the
director of the Institute of Bioethics at Franciscan University of Steubenville. The slippery slope of
physician-assisted suicide http://www.legatusmagazine.org/the-slippery-slope-of-physician-assistedsuicide/
The protection of life is as an essential component of the public good. Especially important is how the culture as a whole — which is profoundly
influenced by the law — regards human life. If
a culture regards human life as inviolable, that fact protects all of
us; if not, then the most vulnerable among us — especially the elderly and the disabled — are in
danger. A culture that condones PAS views life as merely contingently valuable and so views the
lives of many of the most vulnerable among us as mere burdens. Consider laws that prohibit physicians from
amputating healthy limbs or performing female genital mutilation. Such laws exist precisely because we recognize that physicians should perform
surgery only to provide a real medical (or cosmetic) benefit to the patient — or at least not significantly harm her. Rescinding such laws would
send the message that these practices are not inherently harmful. In the same way, rescinding
the law against PAS would send
the message that in many cases a person’s life is simply not worth living and, by implication, is
merely a burden on his or her family. The sense of self-worth among the elderly, dying, and
disabled would be profoundly harmed by legalizing physician-assisted suicide, and it would lead
many to despair and request suicide out of undue deference to others. A society cannot, then, be neutral with
respect to the lives of these people: It will either protect their lives or it will help shape a culture that views them as better off dead. The logic of
de-criminalizing PAS for the terminally ill who are suffering grievously would lead inexorably to allowing (and encouraging) other types of
killing. If
the rationale for PAS is to respect autonomy, then why limit it to those who are terminally
ill? Why privilege the autonomy of those who are terminally ill above those who are suffering
chronically? Alternatively, if the rationale for PAS is that a person is in misery or has allegedly lost
her dignity — if the law is based on the belief that for some people death is a benefit — then it will
be impossible to deny this alleged benefit to other groups who lack decision-making capacity, for
example, those who are unconscious, demented, or are children (as the Netherlands has been led to
do with the open euthanasia of infants). Thus, PAS is a denial of the equal and inherent dignity of
the elderly, the dying, and the disabled. Respect for human life and genuine compassion and care
for all requires that PAS remain illegal.
No solvency – can’t choose your own means of death because states will still label
suicide as a felony – it limits ones options for death – turns case Liberal norms have
eradicated warfare and structural violence—every field study proves
Horgan 9 (John, Director of the Center for Science at Stevens Institute of Technology, former senior
writer at Scientific American, B.A. from Columbia and an M.S. from Columbia “The End of the Age of
War,” Dec 7, http://www.newsweek.com/id/225616/page/1)
The economic crisis was supposed to increase violence around the world. The truth is that we are now
living in one of the most peaceful periods since war first arose 10 or 12 millennia ago . The
relative calm of our era, say scientists who study warfare in history and even prehistory, belies the
popular, pessimistic notion that war is so deeply rooted in our nature that we can never abolish
it . In fact, war seems to be a largely cultural phenomenon , which culture is now helping us
eradicate . Some scholars now even cautiously speculate that the era of traditional war—fought by two uniformed, statesponsored armies—might be drawing to a close . "War could be on the verge of ceasing to exist as a
substantial phenomenon ," says John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio State University.¶ That might sound crazy, but
consider: if
war is defined as a conflict between two or more nations resulting in at least 1,000 deaths in a year,
there have been no wars since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and no wars between major
industrialized powers since World War II . Civil wars have also declined from their peak in the early
1990s, when fighting tore apart Rwanda, the Balkans, and other regions. Most armed conflicts now consist of low-level
guerrilla campaigns, insurgencies, and terrorism—what Mueller calls the "remnants of war."¶ These facts would provide little comfort
if war's remnants were nonetheless killing millions of people—but they're not. Recent studies reveal a clear downward
trend . In 2008, 25,600 combatants and civilians were killed as a direct result of armed conflicts, according to the University of Uppsala
Conflict Data Program in Sweden. Two thirds of these deaths took place in just three trouble spots: Sri Lanka (8,400), Afghanistan (4,600),
and Iraq (4,000).¶ Uppsala's figures exclude deaths from "one-sided conflict," in which combatants deliberately kill unarmed civilians, and
"indirect" deaths from war-related disease and famine, but even when these casualties are included, annual war-related deaths
from 2004 to 2007 are still low by historical standards. Acts of terrorism, like the 9/11 attacks or the 2004
bombing of Spanish trains, account for less than 1 percent of fatalities. In contrast, car accidents kill more than 1 million
people a year.¶ The contrast between our century and the previous one is striking . In the second half of the
20th century, war killed as many as 40 million people, both directly and indirectly, or 800,000 people a year, according to Milton Leitenberg
of the University of Maryland. He estimates that 190 million people, or 3.8 million a year, died as a result of wars and state--sponsored
genocides during the cataclysmic first half of the century. Considered as a percentage of population, the body count of the 20th century is
comparable to that of blood-soaked earlier cultures, such as the Aztecs, the Romans, and the Greeks. ¶
By far the most warlike
societies are those that preceded civilization . War killed as many as 25 percent of all pre-state
people, a rate 10 times higher than that of the 20th century, estimates anthropologist Lawrence Keeley of the University
of Illinois. Our ancestors were not always so bellicose, however: there is virtually no clear-cut
evidence of lethal group aggression by humans prior to 12,000 years ago . Then, "warfare appeared in the
Haas of Chicago's Field
Museum of Natural History. He attributes the emergence of warfare to several factors: growing population
density, environmental stresses that diminished food sources, and the separation of people into
culturally distinct groups . "It is only after the cultural foundations have been laid for
distinguishing 'us' from 'them,' " he says, "that raiding, killing, and burning appear as a complex
response to the external stress of environmental problems."¶ Early civilizations, such as those founded in
Mesopotamia and Egypt 6,000 years ago, were extremely warlike. They assembled large armies and began inventing new
techniques and technologies for killing, from horse-drawn chariots and catapults to bombs. But nation-states also developed
evolutionary trajectory of an increasing number of societies around the world," says anthropologist Jonathan
laws and institutions for resolving disputes nonviolently , at least within their borders. These cultural
innovations helped reduce the endless, tit-for-tat feuding that plagued pre-state societies.¶ A host of
other cultural factors may explain the more recent drop-off in international war and other forms of
social violence. One is a surge in democratic rather than totalitarian governance . Over the past two
centuries democracies such as the U.S. have rarely if ever fought each other . Democracy is also
associated with low levels of violence within nations . Only 20 democratic nations existed at the end
of World War II; the number has since more than quadrupled . Yale historian Bruce Russett contends
that international institutions
such as the United Nations and the European Union
also contribute to this
"democratic peace " phenomenon by fostering economic interdependence. Advances in civil rights for women may also be making
us more peaceful. As
women's education and economic opportunities rise , birthrates fall, decreasing
demands on governmental and medical services and depletion of natural resources, which can
otherwise lead to social unrest .¶ Better public health is another contributing factor. Over the past century,
average life spans have almost doubled, which could make us less willing to risk our lives by
engaging in war and other forms of violence, proposes Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker. At the same
time, he points out, globalization and communications have made us increasingly interdependent on,
and empathetic toward, others outside of our immediate "tribes ."¶ Of course, the world remains
a dangerous place , vulnerable to disruptive, unpredictable events like terrorist attacks. Other looming threats to
peace include climate change, which could produce droughts and endanger our food supplies; overpopulation; and the spread of violent
religious extremism, as embodied by Al Qaeda. A global financial meltdown or ecological catastrophe could plunge us back into the kind of
violent, Hobbesian chaos that plagued many pre--state societies thousands of years ago. "War is not intrinsic to human nature, but neither is
peace," warns the political scientist Nils Petter Gleditsch of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. ¶
So far the trends
are positive . If they continue, who knows? World peace —the dream of countless visionaries and -beauty--pageant may finally come to pass .
contestants—or something like it
They literally didn’t read a solvency argument about autonomy – that’s cross-x
Right to die movements empirically justify larger use of ableist eugenics
Wright, 2K (Walter Wright - Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Clark University, Journal
of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Historical analogies, slippery slopes, and the question of euthanasia, EBSCO)
The gathering threads of the eugenics and “right-to- die” movements converged in the influential 1920 publication Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens: I hr Mass und Form ( Permitting the Destruction of Lives not Worth
Living: Its Extent and Form) by Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche.37 Binding was perhaps the most distinguished legal scholar of his
time and Hoche was a physician and Professor at Freiburg. Their independent essays on the com- mon question appeared together. Most
importantly, this little volume became a crucial avenue for disseminating the idea that some lives are not worth living. I will briefly review
Binding's historically influential arguments leaving Hoche’s less germane discussion to the side. Binding provides a careful legal
analysis of a range of related cases, including suicide, assisting someone to com- mit suicide, responding to a
request from a terminally ill, hopeless, and suffering patient, killing a mentally ill person at the request of family members, and so on. He is very
careful to make important distinctions, and he attempts to maintain clear boundaries around the specific cases of kill- ing he proposes to
categorize as “not legally forbidden.” Thus, while he finds suicide “not legally forbidden,” assist- ing in a suicide is actually the killing of a third
party and the consent of the victim does not remove legal liability from the assistant. However, not all lives are equal. Binding
introduces the idea that “terminally ill or fatally wounded people” are in a new category. “Here there clearly
appears the idea that such a life no longer merits strict legal protection.” These are, he thinks, “lives not worth living.” He distinguishes three
cases. In the first group are “those irretrievably lost as a result of illness or injury, who, fully understanding their situation, possess and have
somehow expressed their urgent wish for release.”M For Binding, killing such patients is “a duty of legal mercy.” Among other examples, he
includes the fatally injured comrade on a battlefield or a mountain- eering expedition. The second group “consists of incur- able idiots."1’ These
people have the will neither to live nor to die. In this case too Binding finds “no grounds— legally, socially, ethically, or religiously—for not
permitting the killing of these people who are the fearsome counter image of true humanity, and who arouse horror in nearly everyone who meets
them.”40 His restriction in this case is that the right of application should be limited to the family who have been caring for the handicapped
patient, or to the guardian. The third group consists of mentally sound people who “through some event like a very severe, doubt- less fatal
wound,” have become comatose. He docs not think that any blanket rule can cover this last group of cases, but then goes on to conclude with a
general guideline: [OJnly those persons arc candidates for having their deaths permitted who are terminally ill and who, in addition to being
beyond help, have either requested death or consented to dying, or else would have re- quested or consented, had they not fallen into unconsciousness at the critical time or if they had been able to achieve awareness of the situation.41 (Emphasis added.) All of this, Binding views
within the constraint that “Every unforbidden killing of a third person must be expe- rienced as a release, at least by the victim; otherwise allowing it is self-evidently ruled out.”42 Having established his basic principle, Binding then goes on to propose a formal procedure with careful
safeguards as a way to implement it without abuses.4* Binding’s arguments incorporate elements of the “right to die”
movement as well as the eugenicist’s appeals to the preservation of social well-being. If one abstracts from this
work’s historical results, ignores the occasionally crude cal- culations of social utility, and considers the rather careful protections that he includes
against possible abuses, one could perhaps take these arguments as sensible, compas- sionate and progressive.
They are surprisingly modern in tone, suggesting both Singer’s careful defense of permitting a limited practice of euthanasia, and
recent guidelines in the Netherlands. But can one abstract from the work’s historical effects? This is the core of the slippery
slope argument. Binding’s and Hoche’s views were extensively discussed by their con- temporaries and, although never officially accepted in the
^Xfeimar period, became widely influential among physicians. Participants in the T444 program used them explicitly to justify their actions.41
This connection is an instance of both a “precedent based” and a “causal” slippery slope. First, by providing support for a limited
practice of medical killing, Binding and Hoche made such things discussible. In doing so, they provided
intellectual cover for people who wished later to abuse the opportunity. Second, their work brought about a
climate among German medical profes- sionals that permitted doctors to accept the idea of killing their
patients. This climate could be claimed to have been a contributing cause for the vigorous advocacy by
some German physicians of a policy of killing mentally retarded, physically handicapped, elderly people:
the “useless eat- ers.” In that respect, Singer’s opponents might say, the German experience confirms the claim that even
discuss- ing the idea that some lives might not be worth living helps to create the “unmitigated disaster.”
Their argument also connects to the “peg” protecting our wagon from rolling down the hill. Their
influence in Germany effectively
“pulled the peg” in the slope (provided by the Hippocratic ethic), so that, when external social forces pushed the
medi- cal cart, physicians were no longer able to arrest its slide .46
Reject Ableism - it makes ongoing eugenics and extermination inevitable
Brown 11
, Artist Initiative Grantee at Minnesota State Arts Board Senior Academic Adviser for the College of Education and Human Development at University of Minnesota Steering Committee at Education
Abroad Network at University of Minnesota Volunteer Coordinator for Social Inclusion and Bullying Prevention at Marcy Open School see less Past 2012-2013 Buckman Fellow at Buckman Fellowship Travel and Study Grantee at
Jerome Foundation Loft Mentor Series Award Winner for Poetry at The Loft Literary Center Institute on Community Integration Post-graduate Certificate Graduate Student at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota College
of Education and Human Development/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota University Honors Program Academic Advisor at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota Learning Abroad
Center/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota Foreign Lecturer--English Studies, Cultural Awareness, Humanities at Hokkaido University of Education Educational Technologies post-grad certificate program
at University of British Columbia, Vancouver Adjunct Lecturer--Japanese Language at Wayne County Community College Adjunct Lecturer--English Composition at Wayne State University Foriegn Lecturer--English Studies,
Creative Writing, English Literature at Sophia University--Tokyo, Japan ‘Screw normal’: Resisting the myth of normal by questioning media’s depiction of people with autism and their families,
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gara0030/iggds/Screw%20Normal_FINAL_Dosch%20Brown.pdf
The one societal need in our society that is often unacknowledged, silenced, and left unexamined is
that humans have, as Michalko quoted Cornel West, the ― deep, visceral need to belong ‖ (Michalko,
2002, p. 81) — all of us struggle with full acceptance of ourselves and our desire to be seen as acceptable
or welcome in a society that loves to label people. The media creates walls between its ideals and the
people it views as Others , such as when the media views people with autism as ‘abnormal
mysteries’. We are being taught that differences occurring from autism are wrong, and sadly too
many families depicted in the media perpetuate this negative view of their own children. When
thinking of ‗normal‘ henceforth, let‘s consider what Michalko wrote about society and his blindness. He
explained that, although society might have found ways technologically for him to participate (he is a
professor), he is still seen as ‗strange‘ because he is blind. He said the difference in his blindness must
be grappled with inside his being in ―a space between nature and culture‖ and ―normal and
abnormal‖ (2002, p. 83), and it is within this confusing, unmarked space where he has had to build
his own identity. By moving through the world with his ―body of blindness,‖ Michalko has
projected himself into the ―social space,‖ just as my son must project his own self, by moving through
the social space with his ‗mind of difference‘; thus, society reacts to people who have disabilities who
cannot live up to the mythical norms with ―help, ―pity, ―ridicule, ―unease,‖ and ―curiosity‖
(2002, p. 88), and it results in an unequal power structure that creates treacherous terrain for all of
us who have been Othered. Michalko (2002) noted that mainstream Western society views all
disabilities as abnormal, and it thus approaches people with disability as tragic people who live lives
―not worth living‖; they are seen as the Other, as objects of pity, both ―vulnerable and fragile‖ (p.68).
The complexity, diversity, and range of differences of all human beings in this world are erased,
denied, and ignored under a banner of ‗sameness‘ or ‗normalcy‘—and those who cannot or will
not conform are silenced and lumped into the category of Other, and dealt with suspicion for not
conforming to social construction of what is acceptable in appearance, behavior, and experience.
Eugenics, the academic Phil Smith (2008) has concluded, is still very much present in societal
attitudes toward disability. Eugenics formalized ―the Normal, a cultural landscape outlined in
order to support the hegemony of its inhabitants, a liberalist bourgeois class of white, able-bodied
men ‖ (P. Smith, p. 419). By silencing those with perceived disabilities (or those with a particular
perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation , etc.) and deeming them as lesser than
‘normal‘ humans —society is able to continue to deny that ‘being normal‘ is actually a socially
constructed myth (Michalko, 2002, p. 69). Phil Smith further pointed out that not so long ago those
who committed the war crimes by killing or sterilizing people they had deemed of inferior
intelligence in the Nazis T-4 project were consistently given less severe convictions and higher
acquittal rates (P. Smith, 2008, p. 421)—revealing, indeed, that as a society we devalue the lost lives
of those considered too different from the mythical norm, which we will demonstrate later is a
devaluation of human life very much alive in media depiction of autism. Society rarely has ears for
the voices or rooms reserved for those with differences who think otherwise, and it rarely realizes that
indeed people with differences also have value and critical roles to play in society. The media maintains
this gaping silence as well. Society, Michalko has argued, either expects those deemed ―abnormal‖
will ―get through their differences by adapting to the dominant rules, so as to be less noticed, or it
expects them to ―get out‖ by removing themselves from view, by being silent and isolated
(Michalko, 2002, p. 75); and some experts, doctors, educators, and therapists make a sizable income from
attempting to enforce these societal expectations on families.
Physician assisted suicide is vulnerable to changing cultural contexts – justifying a
legal right to die in an ableist society guarantees extermination of disabled people
and the elderly – prefer a pragmatic approach
Wright, 2K (Walter Wright - Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Clark University, Journal
of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Historical analogies, slippery slopes, and the question of euthanasia, EBSCO)
I want to mention two further points. (1) Singer and other euthanasia advocates often miss the fact that “quality
of life” is not a simple
property inherent in individuals. It is rather a relational property describing how we as a society care for one
another, especially the most vulnerable among us. The low quality of life ascribed to many people with
differences is less a result of clinical medical facts than of social attitudes and policies towards those people.69
In particular,
until every seriously ill or disabled person has a right to the health care and support
services necessary to provide a good quality of life, talk about their “right to die” is dangerous,
discriminatory, and unjust. 70 (2) When phy- sicians kill, it causes confusion as to their appropriate role
as healers. In 1993, the Protestant Christian Elderly Soci- ety in Holland surveyed several thousand elders on health care issues. The survey
did not mention euthanasia. Nev- ertheless, 10% of the respondents said that they were afraid that they would be killed without their consent. The
Society’s Direaor Hans Holmans said, “They are afraid that at a certain moment, on the basis of age, a treatment will be considered no longer
economically viable, and an early end to their lives will be made.”7' Such distrust under- mines die capacity of physicians to
serve their healing role. Considerations like these suggest that prudence and a sense of history should keep
us from hastening toward what might seem like an abstractly reasonable social policy. Slip- pery slope arguments
may not establish a conncction of logical necessity between their premises and conclusions, but they are not for that reason fallacious. The
lessons of history are real lessons. Abstract reasoning is too frail a reed to support ignoring them .
The burden of proof that euthanasia is permissible on a limited basis lies with its ad- vocates. It is a burden, I
contend, that has not yet been met.
Biopower
No biopower impact
Edward Ross Dickinson 4, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, Central European
History, Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 34-36
And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and psychological expertise) that pursues these
continuities between early twentieth-century
biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable.¶ Both are
same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the
instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states,
including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And
it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very
broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading , because it
obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of
regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different
from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that
characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass
murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. ¶ In those cases in which the regime of rights does not
there are political and
policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from
those of National Socialist Germany . Democratic biopolitical regimes require , enable, and incite a
degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or
totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic
citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive
policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed
successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again,
by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare
reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 ¶ Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are
characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of
them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of
constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism
cannot be the sole orientation point for our
understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. ¶ This notion is not
at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of
power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that
they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept
“power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and
entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the
same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as
Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be
combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the
democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate.
The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91
No risk of endless warfare
Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the
Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic
Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A
Reconsideration”, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)
In the
hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare.
However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the
purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi
experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by
public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is
7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse.
true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare
and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with
unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that
we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive
war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue
that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a
president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even
the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military
means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim
that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all
convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government . It would be
absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a
policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among
prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little
pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.
supposedly can restore security. But
The thesis of bio-political governmentality is wrong---it’s based on a faulty
understanding of liberal peace-building
Jan Selby 13, Senior Lecturer of IR at the University of Sussex, "The myth of liberal peace-building",
March 13, www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14678802.2013.770259
it
has been claimed from a constructivist perspective that contemporary peace-building is rooted in liberal
‘international norms’.36 Invoking Foucault, it has been argued that the liberal peace-building project is an
exercise in global bio-politics or governmentality, which aims to govern and construct liberal
populations and subjectivities.37 From a post-colonial perspective, liberal peace-building has been
described as a colonial project, ‘cast in the mould of colonialism’, and aiming to restructure Southern societies in
accordance with Northern metropolitan ideology.38And in neo-Gramscian terms, peace-building has been critiqued as
part of a transnational neo-liberal project, ‘reflecting the hegemony of liberal values that reigns in
global politics’.39 Right across this variegated theoretical terrain, peace-building is represented as a liberal project, founded on liberal ideas, pushed forward
Most of the above features are shared right across the liberal peace-building debate and have been advanced from any number of theoretical perspectives. Thus
by a decentralised plurality of institutions irrespective of the particularity of war-endings and peace agreements, in which global consensus is counterposed by local
dissensus or disorder.¶ Yet
for all this trans-theoretical consensus, these shared emphases within liberal peace- building
discourse constitute a questionable foundation for the analysis of contemporary peacemaking. Again, this is not to suggest that
the liberal peace-building literature is without merit: the critical literature, in particular, provides much compelling evidence of the hubris of liberal internationalism,
of the destruction wrought by World Bank-IMF policies and of the frequent complicity of peace-building projects in coercive processes of state-building,
dispossession and subjugation. My contention is not that liberal peace- building research is without value, but that the
above parameters are
unnecessarily limiting, and can generate significant interpretive errors. To advance this case, my focus in the
remainder of this paper is on the relations between post-conflict peace-building on the one hand, and peace agreements and their negotiation on the other. What this
will reveal is that peace-building
is neither a discrete sphere of action, nor the dominant element within
contemporary peace processes; that states, strategy and geopolitics continue, as ever, to be crucial
determinants of these processes; and that the influence of liberalism, and the degree of global consensus over the liberal
peace, are significantly overstated within liberal peace- building discourse. We start by considering one case in some depth,
before generalising from this case with the aid of insights from a broader range of examples.
The agamben ev isn’t about the plan and other issues thump – Ebola proves the aff
doesn’t solve the structures agamben talks about - cx
PAS Programs are Structurally Discriminatory and are Likely to Abuse Minorities
Neil M. Gorsuch 2006 Neil McGill Gorsuch is a federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit. “The Future of Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia” pp 145”
Whether the evidence from the Netherlands and Oregon leaves you with brimming confidence or deep
concern that legalization will be attended by additional nonconsensual killings due to abuse, mistake, and
coercion, that does not entirely end the conversation about the potential "costs" associated with legalization. It bears considering whether yet
other unintended costs might also attend legalization including, for example, the
possibility of discrimination against
minority populations like the elderly, African Americans, and the poor or disabled. Concerned about
what might happen to them, many elderly Dutch patients have actually taken to insisting on written contracts assuring [*1384] against
nonvoluntary euthanasia before they will admit themselves to hospitals. n205 And, poll after poll suggests that ethnic
minorities in the United States are relatively more troubled by the prospect of legalized euthanasia and its
impact on them than their white counterparts. Indeed, it is an unanswered, but interesting, question whether Oregon's highly
homogenous population (approximately 90% white) n206 contributed in any way to its adoption of the first-ever U.S. law allowing assisted
suicide. The Detroit Free Press has found, for example, that while 53% of whites sampled in Michigan could envision requesting assistance in
suicide, only 22% of blacks could. n207 A poll in Ohio revealed that, while roughly half those sampled favored legalization of assisted suicide,
those most likely to favor the practice were those with higher income and education levels, and young
adults, and those most likely to oppose the practice were black, people sixty-five and older, and those with
low levels of income and education. n208 Empirical evidence concerning the medical treatment presently provided to minority
groups suggests that their relative unease with the legalization of assisted suicide may not be irrational. The New England Journal of
Medicine has reported that female, African American, elderly, and Hispanic cancer patients are all less
likely than similarly situated nonminorities to receive adequate pain-relieving treatment that may obviate
a patient's perceived need to resort to assistance in suicide or euthanasia. n209 Indeed, minority cancer
patients are fully three times less likely than nonminority patients to receive adequate palliative care . n210
Minorities also receive poorer AIDS treatment: only 48% of blacks receive medicines designed to slow
the progress of AIDS, compared to 63% of whites; while 82% of whites receive effective treatments for preventing AIDSrelated pneumonia, only 58% of black patients receive similar attention. n211 African Americans have higher mortality rates than whites across
disease categories and recent declines in breast cancer mortality rates have been enjoyed among white, but not [*1385] black, women. n212
African Americans have fewer physician visits and receive different treatment than whites even within the
federally funded Medicare and Veteran's Affairs programs. n213 African Americans are also 3.5 times
more likely than whites to have one or more of their limbs amputated, even though diabetes, the most common reason
for amputation, is only 1.7 times more common among blacks than whites. n214
Their attempts to “reframe the debate” get hijacked
Kamisar, 98 (Yale, Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan, “Why the proposal to legalize physician-assisted suicide in Michigan failed”, Human Life
Review, Ebsco)
Money, though, is not the whole story. The Michigan experience--where the proposal to legalize PAS failed by more
than 40 percentage points--shows that it is much easier to sell the basic notion of assisted suicide than
to sell a complex statute making the idea law. The wrenching case where a dying person is suffering unavoidable pain is the
main reason there is so much support for the concept of assisted suicide in this country (as opposed to support for specific laws). All too often, a
reporter thinks the way to treat the issue in depth is to give a detailed account of someone who is begging for help in committing suicide. But
such cases--which are relatively rare--blot out what might be called societal or public policy considerations, like
how to tell if the patient actually has treatable but hard-to-detect depression. When pollsters ask about the issue, most people, I suspect, focus on
the poignant case. But when people are asked to approve a complex 12,000-word initiative, as in Michigan, the
focus shifts. Now people start worrying about whether the measure provides too few procedural safeguards,
or too many. They worry about whether it would impose too many burdensome requirements on dying patients and their loved ones, or
whether, on the other hand, it would permit too much abuse. When Ed Pierce, the retired Ann Arbor physician who led the group that got
Proposal B on the ballot, realized a few weeks before the election that support for the measure was eroding, he tried to explain
why his cause had lost momentum. He argued that opponents' "attack ads" were "ignoring the central issue"--whether a
terminally ill person should have the right to physician-assisted suicide. But the idea of assisted
suicide was no longer the central issue. The main debate had shifted--it was now about how the
complex measure would actually work in a state where more than a million residents have no health insurance. Another concern
became whether and how the proposal would change the way seriously ill patients and their loved ones view their lives--and the "hastening" of
their deaths. Many Michigan voters seemed disturbed that the proposal included no requirement that family
members be notified of a patient's decision to seek assisted suicide. Critics argued that a daughter might go to
visit her father in a nursing home, only to discover that he had committed suicide the previous day. But if the
proposal had required that all members of the immediate family be informed, that provision, too, would have
been criticized as unduly burdening a person's right to assisted suicide. Perhaps a few opponents of the measure acted
in bad faith. But not all. The Detroit Free Press and the Ann Arbor News have consistently supported the basic
idea of physician-assisted suicide. But alarmed by various provisions in the measure, both newspapers urged
their readers to reject it. Newspapers all over the state especially disliked exempting the committee that would oversee the procedures
from the state's Open Meetings and Freedom of Information acts, exemptions which would promote secrecy and a lack of accountability to the
public. Other states likewise have had difficulty creating what they believe is a "workable" assisted suicide
law. Although some members of the New York Task Force on Life and the Law regarded assisted suicide as ethically acceptable in exceptional
cases, all 24 members concluded that "constructing an ideal or 'good' case is not sufficient for public policy if it bears little relation to prevalent
medical practice." Many task force members were deeply moved by the sufferings of some patients, but ultimately were convinced these patients
could not be provided publicly sanctioned assistance in committing suicide without endangering a much larger number of vulnerable patients.
Proponents can discuss compelling cases and talk majestically about the rights to define one's own
concept of existence. But as Michigan shows again, the debate changes significantly when those
favoring assisted suicide propose specific statutes to cover everyday situations. As the eminent ethicist Sissela
Bok recently observed: "No society has yet worked out the hardest questions of how to help those patients who desire to die,
without endangering others who do not. There is a long way to go before we arrive at a social resolution of those questions that does not do
damage to our institutions."
Turn – their aff negates the agency over one’s decision to choose life or death – they
trust doctors way too much
Miles, 4 (Steven H., Professor of Medicine at the University of Minnesota Medical School, expert on
medical ethics, “The Hippocratic Oath and the Ethics of Medicine”, Oxford University Press,
http://sjmse-library.sch.ng/EBooks%20Phil/The_Hippocratic_Oath_and_the_Ethics%20of%20Medicine.pdf)
I agree with Littre that "I will not give a drug that is deadly" addresses the fear that physicians would
collaborate with murder by poisoning.37 Murder was common in the ancient world, especially at the
time the Oath was written, during the turmoil after the defeat of Athens by Sparta in 405 BCE. Murder eliminated kings, successors, competitors, and municipal figures. A
wealthy family, for example, overthrew Hippias, dictator of Athens in 510 BCE after his brother was assassinated. In 460 BCE, after interfering with a Greek Council, Phialtes was assassinated.
In 413 BCE, Archelaus used assassination to become king of Macedon. In 336 BCE, Phillip of Macedon was assassinated, probably at the behest of his wife, the mother of Alexander the Great.
.
Physicians were bound by oaths requiring them to assist their city-state. They were personally connected to military or civil leaders or
Each succeeding assassination set the stage for revenge murders or further killings to regain power lost through the previous murder. Countless murders for gain went unrecorded
wealthy patrons. Moral conflicts arising from duty to the state were keenly felt, widely discussed, and well documented.38 As the Oath was being written, the Athenian economy was collapsing,
In such a world, physicians had the skills for poisoning,
trusted access, and would have been vulnerable to coercion or temptation to join in homicidal
schemes. Fear of the physician-poisoner may be traced very close to the time of the Oath. In 345 BCE, Plato
fewer city-physicians were being hired, and physicians were under economic pressure.39
wrote that a physician who administers a poison with the intention of causing death should be executed, as such deeds are acts of terror.40 Plato's depiction of the physician who poisons is a
discussion of skilled and secret assassin and bears no similarity to compassionate medical euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. Edelstein asserted that ancient physicians routinely killed
patients but his sources describe malevolent homicides rather than medically assisted death to end suffering. Most of his accounts come from Roman and Christian societies centuries after the
Oath was written.41 For example, Pliny (23-79 CE) quotes Cato, a xenophobic Roman, as saying that Greek physicians were barbarians who were preoccupied with death, expert in poison, and
potential assassins.42 Tacitus tells how are physician, Gaius Stertinius Xenophon, murdered the Roman emperor Claudius in 54 CE. Claudius's wife, Agrippina, wanted to ensure that the empire
The tale, though late, is representative of
the stories of physicians' administering deadly drugs that are found in the ancient literature. . . . the poison was
passed to her son by a previous marriage, Nero. She asked a convicted poisoner, Locusta, about poison mushrooms.
sprinkled on a particularly succulent mushroom. But because Claudius was torpid or drunk, its effect was not at first apparent. An evacuation of the bowels seemed to save him. Agrippina was
horrified. . . . She had already secured the complicity of Xenophon; and now she called him in. ... While pretending to help Claudius to vomit, he put a feather dipped in a quick poison down his
throat. Xenophon knew that major crimes, though hazardous to undertake are profitable to achieve.43 Scholars believe that much of this literature is a genre of fiction or satire44 somewhat akin
to modern medical horror novels. Fictional or not, the ancient physician with the deadly drug came as an assassin and not as a friend. There is another piece of evidence that this passage refers to
the crime of murder rather than the misplaced compassion of euthanasia. "I will not give a drug that is deadly" follows the words "from injustice I will keep them" and thus seems to speak of the
doctor's refusing to act at the behest of others who would commit an injustice in the public world. If this vow had been situated after "Into the houses I enter . . . while being far from all voluntary
The physicianassassin damaged the trustworthiness of the entire profession, and the Oath's simple vow spoke to this
fear. There are still physicians who exploit their access to medical tools to commit murder.45 Such crimes
and destructive injustice," it seems more probable that it would have been a vow to refrain from using poison to end suffering during a clinical relationship.
are probably the closest descendents of the transgressions alluded to by this passage. In addition to criminal sanctions, such physicians are expelled from the practice of medicine, though in truth
they exile themselves. The Oath did not anticipate the scale of medical homicide that was practiced by Nazi physicians who designed and supervised mass executions and genocide and who
engaged in vivisection.46 That large-scale collaboration between the medical profession and a genocidal government in crimes against humanity seems to call for history's judgment rather than
some a simple courtroom proceeding. The Oath addresses history's judgment on medicine in its closing passage.
Their focus on preserving a right to die tradeoffs with access to quality care – means
in the end they deteriorate the right to choose life or death
Keown, 3 (John, Review: Death Talk: The Case against Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide by
Margaret Somerville; The Case against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care by Kathleen
Foley; Herbert Hendin, The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 215-217, JSTOR)
A few minor criticisms could perhaps be made. Some material in the former book, perhaps inevitably in
such a compilation, contains material which either overlaps or is a little dated. Both books could have said
more about the argument from the sanctity of life, at least as that argument has traditionally been
understood. However, such criticisms cannot detract from the fact that these thoughtful, scholarly works
will enrich what is too often a superficially-conducted debate and, in their cogently argued conclusion
that society's focus must be on better caring, not easier killing, should give even the keenest
euthanasia supporter pause. Which of the two should anyone interested in the euthanasia debate buy?
In this reviewer's opinion, both.
Their evidence is one-sided and biased – it refuses to investigate the overwhelming number of
historical examples where mass murder did not result in biopolitical societies
Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, ‘4 (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our
Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)
A second example is Geoff Eley’s masterful synthetic introduction to a collection of essays published in 1996 under the title Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870–1930. Eley set forth two research agendas derived from his review of recent hypotheses regarding the origins and
nature of Nazism. One was to discover what allowed so many people to identify with the Nazis. The second was that we explore the ways in which welfare policy contributed to Nazism, by examining “the production of new values, new mores, new social practices, new ideas about the good
and efficient society.” Eley suggested that we examine “strategies of policing and constructions of criminality, notions of the normal and the deviant, the production and regulation of sexuality, the . . . understanding of the socially valued individual . . . the coalescence of racialized thinking . .
Why not examine the expanding hold of the language of rights on the political imagination,
or the disintegration of traditional authority under the impact of the explosive expansion of the public
sphere? Why not pursue a clearer understanding of ideas about the nature of citizenship in the modern
state; about the potentials of a participatory social and political order; about human needs and human
rights to have those needs met; about the liberation of the individual (including her sexual liberation, her
liberation from ignorance and sickness, her liberation from social and economic powerlessness); about the
physical and psychological dangers created by the existing social order and how to reduce them, the
traumas it inflicted and how to heal them? In short, why not examine how the construction of “the social”
— the ideas and practices of the modern biopolitical interventionist complex — contributed to the
development of a democratic politics and humane social policies between 1918 and 1930, and again after
1945
the language of biopolitics was
demonstrably one on which liberals, socialists, and advocates of a democratic welfare state could also
capitalize, and did. Or again, Jean Quataert remarked—quite rightly, I believe — that “the most progressive
achievements of the Weimar welfare state were completely embedded” in biopolitical discourse. She also
.”62 So far so good; but why stop there?
? Like Fritzsche’s essay, Eley’s accurately reflected the tone of most of those it introduced. In the body of the volume, Elizabeth Domansky, for example, pointed out that biopolitics “did not ‘automatically’ or ‘naturally’ lead to the rise of National Socialism,” but rather
“provided . . . the political Right in Weimar with the opportunity to capitalize on a discursive strategy that could successfully compete with liberal and socialist strategies.”63 This is correct; but
commented that Nazi policy was “continuous with what passed as the ruling knowledge of the time” and was a product of “an
extreme form of technocratic reason” and “early twentieth-century modernity’s dark side.” The implication seems to be
that “progressive” welfare policy was fundamentally “dark”; but it seems more accurate to conclude that
biopolitics had a variety of potentials.64 Again, the point here is not that any of the interpretations offered in these pieces
are wrong; instead, it is that we are, collectively, so focused on unmasking the negative potentials and realities
of modernity that we have constructed a true, but very one-sided picture. The pathos of this picture is
undeniable, particularly for a generation of historians raised on the Manichean myth— forged in the crucible of World War II
and the Cold War— of the democratic welfare state. And as a rhetorical gesture, this analysis works magnificently — we
explode the narcissistic self-admiration of democratic modernity by revealing the dark, manipulative,
murderous potential that lurks within, thus arriving at a healthy, mature sort of melancholy. But this
gesture too often precludes asking what else biopolitics was doing, besides manipulating people, reducing
them to pawns in the plans of technocrats, and paving the way for massacre. In 1989 Detlev Peukert argued that
any adequate picture of modernity must include both its “achievements” and its “pathologies”— social
reform as well as “Machbarkeitswahn,” the “growth of rational relations between people” as well as the “swelling
instrumental goal-rationality,” the “liberation of artistic and scientific creativity” as well as the “loss of substance and
absence of limits [Haltlosigkeit].”65 Yet he himself wrote nothing like such a “balanced” history, focusing exclusively on
Nazism and on the negative half of each of these binaries; and that focus has remained characteristic of the literature as a whole.
What I want to suggest here is that the function of the rhetorical or explanatory framework surrounding our
conception of modernity seems to be in danger of being inverted. The investigation of the history of
modern biopolitics has enabled new understandings of National Socialism; now we need to take care that
our understanding of National Socialism does not thwart a realistic assessment of modern biopolitics.
Much of the literature leaves one with the sense that a modern world in which mass murder is not
happening is just that: a place where something is not —yet— happening. Normalization is not yet giving way to
exclusion, scientific study and classification of populations is not yet giving way to concentration camps and extermination
campaigns. Mass
murder, in short, is the historical problem; the absence of mass murder is not a problem, it
does not need to be investigated or explained.
CP
CP Solves Social Justice
Universal health care solves social justice and fulfills society’s obligation to promote
and support all life
Pelton 5 (Leroy H., professor in and former director of the School of Social Work, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, Frames of Justice, 2005, p. 152-153)
Everyone has an obligation to promote and support life . When government is formed, as the
representative and instrument of the people, it too incurs that obligation . It is not a contractual obligation, but a
moral one. Liberalism took to specifying what rights individuals have, thus by implication opening the door to nonrights. Therefore, for example,
we could debate whether people should have economic rights, such as the right to a job, housing, or a decent standard of living. The
principle of life affirmation is not about rights, but about the support of all individuals without
discrimination. Unless we talk in the sense of universal human rights, the concept of rights becomes co-opted by the concepts of desert and
entitlement. The language of "women's rights," "gay rights," "black rights," and so on, is the language of desert and entitlement, necessary for
playing the game of group interests that is set up when the desert frame dominates politics, but which can be transcended, with appropriate
political leadership and framing, by the concepts of universal human rights, nondiscrimination, and life affirmation. For example,
government engages in discrimination when, on the basis of marital status, it provides benefits, or allows
them to be provided, to some individuals but not others equally in need of them. Marriage (which is merely a
word that, like all words, is subject to arbitrary definition) is not the issue; the benefits are. In order to address injustice to gays and lesbians, we
must unravel or identify the various benefits provided on the basis of marital status. For example, married people are often covered by the health
if we had a truly universal health care insurance system , every individual
would be covered, and discrimination against gays and lesbians in this regard, or against any unmarried individuals, would
become a non-issue. There is no question of group rights for gays and lesbians here. On the contrary, justice is promoted by
care insurance of their spouses. But
reexamining policies to ensure that they do not respect group membership, such as membership in the ranks of married people.
Benefits should be tied to individuals, not groups.
Social Justice Turns the Aff
Social justice turns the affirmative
Goodman 1 (Diane, Owner of Law and Mediation Office of Diane M. Goodman and Member at CA
State Bar Family Law Executive Committee (FLEXCOM), ??/??/01, “Promoting Diversity and Social
Justice: Educating People From Privilege”, http://books.google.com/books?id=XyvzrmmE2AC&pg=PA190&lpg=PA190&dq=%22It+is+important+that+people+learning+about+diversity+and+opp
ression+realize+how+our+sense+of+reality+is+socially+constructed+and+can+be+transformed.%22&so
urce=bl&ots=2_53SxzVOY&sig=gsJMYUfqrBCeaWfVSa3x1t9BeDI&hl=en&ei=7v4yTvawDojEtAaw
mL3pBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22It%
20is%20important%20that%20people%20learning%20about%20diversity%20and%20oppression%20real
ize%20how%20our%20sense%20of%20reality%20is%20socially%20constructed%20and%20can%20be
%20transformed.%22&f=false, pg. 190.)
As previously discussed, people from dominant groups are able to recognize numerous psychological, moral/spiritual, social, intellectual, and
material costs of oppression to themselves and others from privileged groups. In a myriad of ways, they realize the loss of mental health and an
authentic sense of self; the loss and diminishment of relationships; the loss of moral integrity and spiritual center; the loss of a full range of
knowledge; and the loss of safety, resources, and quality of life. Yet eliminating the costs does not clearly indicate what it might be like if there
was true equality. I have also found that people from privileged groups can readily identify the benefits of social justice. Many people realize
their personal stake in fostering equity. Imagining a different future reduces the tendency for people from dominant groups to become attached to
victim status when they realize the costs. We can encourage people from privileged groups to see that creating
"liberty and justice
for all" can, in fact, have positive results for them as well as others. Enabling them to identify and envision the benefits of greater
equity offers an invitation for change. It encourages people to consider ways to create a better society for everyone. When people from dominant
groups recognize what they stand to gain, they are more motivated to change. Below, I present some of the benefits of social justice that people
from privileged groups have discussed. The positive effects of equality that I briefly describe are based more on conjecture than my discussion of
the costs. Because we have yet to live in a truly just society, the benefits suggested below are based on what people imagine life would be like.
They also reflect our experiences when we do have moments of freedom, authenticity, and equity (in relation ships, personal pursuits,
workplaces, social/religious organizations). Exactly how the benefits would look or be experienced would depend in part on the larger social
system. My intent is not to portray a full alternative reality. Rather, it is to point to possibilities and to suggest how
justice could lead to
greater humanity, connection, and fulfillment for people from privileged groups. Psychologically, people could
have the freedom to explore their interests and abilities without the interference of rigid, externally imposed norms and
expectations. There could be greater opportunity for creativity and experimentation. Individuals could have greater trust and confidence in their
accomplishments without feel ing they were somehow ill-gotten or fraudulent. Real choice about how one wanted to live one's life-in terms of
work, partner, or life style-could be available. Psychological and emotional development would be nurtured and enhanced. Many fears
and
worries would also diminish. People would be able to walk the streets, interact with others, and explore new areas and interests with
a greater sense of ease. The fear of offending someone from a dominated group or of retaliation and violence from the have-nots would fade.
People could spend less energy on protecting and worrying about themselves, their loved ones, and their possessions and would have more time
for productive and enjoyable pursuits. Socially, if the dominant-subordinate structure and other barriers that block equal relationships between
people were removed, meaningful connections with different kinds of people could be established.
Relationships that were previously prevented or distorted could be allowed to flourish on the basis of mutual interests and respect. Differences in
social identities would not tear families or communities apart. Individuals would not have to choose between living their conscience and their
heart and maintaining important relationships. People would no longer be isolated from other human beings. There
would be greater potential for honesty and depth in relationships. Morally, because the conditions that give rise to many moral contradictions and
pangs of conscience would be eliminated, people could more easily create lives that would be consonant with their morality and spirituality.
They could experience a sense of liberation as a result of acting in ways consistent with their beliefs and of knowing that
others can live with dignity as well. People could feel pride in their identity and life choices, not shame, guilt, or envy. There would be greater
freedom to explore the world, not a need to rationalize or hide from it for fear of moral discomfort. Intellectually, people's
minds and
worlds could be expanded and enriched by the exposure to and knowledge of other ways of being and doing (e.g., solving
problems, setting priorities, relating to nature). Intellectual and personal development could flourish. People could more readily enjoy the foods,
music, and arts from other cultural traditions. The diversity of worldviews could contribute to our understanding of the universe and to a more
complete and accurate view of reality. We also could have access to the creativity, wisdom, and insights from all those who could help illuminate
and alleviate social concerns. Our
potential as human beings and a planet would have the greatest
opportunity to develop and thrive. Materially and physically, people would experience less stress and economic insecurity. For
most people, their standard of living would rise if wealth were distributed more equitably. Without the intergroup conflicts that are promoted to
prevent people from unit ing to change an unjust system, we would be able to have more effective and collaborative working relationships in
workplaces that did not exploit employees. Because individual and cultural differences would exist, conflict itself would not disappear, but it
would not be fueled by social, political, and economic inequities. The ways of addressing conflict would also be
Significantly different and far more productive, as discussed earlier. Morale would improve, and the barriers between people that were based on
social identities and hierarchical positions would be eliminated. Organizations would be better able to attract and retain desired employees and
better able to allow them to maximize their talents and contributions. Because housing would no longer be (de facto) segregated, people would
have more options for where to live, at more reasonable prices. Overall, public schools would be improved, and sending children to private
schools to get a good and safe education would not be necessary. Neighborhoods could reflect the diversity of our society and allow for the
development of relationships across differ ences. Violence would be significantly reduced. Because all people would have their
basic needs met and their human rights respected, there would be less need to engage in personally and socially destructive actions. The resources
and energy used to maintain in equalities and to address the results of social injustice could be used to address issues that affect us all. There
would be more money available to devote to things like health, education, and the environment. There would be more time and energy available
to develop broad-based efforts on other common concerns because people would not be fighting for their basic rights, exhausted from just try ing
to survive, or disenfranchised from society. A better-educated, productive, and engaged populace could al low us to better realize our national
democratic goals. If people re ally believe that a democracy is the best form of government and way of life, this could provide us with a closer
model of what it might truly look like. Our political system and other organizations could be more reflective of and responsive to the needs of
(all) the people. Without such compelling self-interests, fostered by social and economic inequities, there could be greater opportunity for
institutions to function more effectively and efficiently. These benefits are also interconnected. Psychological well-being is one aspect that can
underlie or affect other benefits. If individuals have good mental health, including a strong sense of self-esteem and personal authenticity, they
are more likely to desire and be able to have meaningful relationships with different people and to feel a sense of connection and responsibility to
other human beings. They
will be able to create effective collaborative relationships and organizations that
value their members and will be able to support social systems that foster the empowerment and
dignity of all people . After doing this exercise with a group in which they identified the costs of oppression and the benefits of social
justice for dominant-group members, the participants reminded me that it wasn't simply that there would be less fear, better relationships, or
improved quality of life. There also would be more joy and fun. This is a wonderful example of how health is not simply the absence of illness,
that wellness transcends just the removal of the sickness. They spoke about how people could more fully experience life and truly enjoy
themselves and others. There is a freedom and exuberance that is captured by the word joy that more accurately reflects the liberation that a just
and caring world could offer us. The
above examples provide a broad outline of how life could be improved
for people from privileged groups if there was greater social justice . These illustrations do not ignore the fact that
there would be some losses as well. However, they highlight that diversity and equity hold benefits and promote the liberation of all people. We
all have something to gain.
2NC Vulnerability
PAS leads to a slippery slope whereby many vulnerable groups in society can be
killed – we should ERR on the side of protecting life
Miedema 14 (Derek, Researcher @ Institute of Marriage and Family Canada, "Derek Miedema: Be
wary of assisted dying," 8/20, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/08/20/derek-miedema-be-waryof-assisted-dying/)
Seeing the slippery slope isn’t terribly hard either. The situation on the ground in Belgium (which
legalized euthanasia is 2002) and the Netherlands (which has a long history of access to euthanasia, even before legalization in 2001)
points to a different reality than the one Dr. Belchetz describes. In Belgium, like the Netherlands, euthanasia
started with terminally ill people, then it was allowed for the mentally ill. Now, even though the law itself
hasn’t changed, anyone with unbearable physical or psychological suffering can be killed this way. Twin
deaf brothers who were going blind found a doctor who would kill them. A depressed mother was killed (her son found out when asked to collect
her things from the morgue). Earlier this year, the Belgian Parliament voted to make euthanasia legal for children, with parental consent. A public
campaign in the Netherlands argued that anyone over 70 and tired of life should be able to get euthanasia. It garnered enough support to force the
Dutch Parliament to consider the proposal. In 2013, Dutch doctors killed a 70-year-old widow who was going blind. She wasn’t dying, but she
was a stickler for cleanliness and couldn’t bear not being able to see the dirt on her clothes. The
movement in both countries is
aimed exclusively at making more people eligible to be killed. If society agrees that all suffering
(physical and psychological) is bad and death is a potential solution, it will be next to impossible to limit
euthanasia or assisted suicide to terminally ill patients. If euthanasia is good for them, why not for those who are
mentally ill? If mental illness, why not dementia? If adults, why not children? Quebec legalized assisted suicide and euthanasia earlier this year
by passing Bill 52, which was modelled after the system in Belgium. Claude Leblond, president of the Quebec order of social workers and family
therapists, applauded Bill 52, saying that, “the day may come when the wishes of children will also have to be taken into account.”
Unbearable suffering exists in this world. I, for one, will not deny this, having watched my own father die of ALS. But unbearable
suffering ought to be met with treatment and care to relieve that suffering, not a needle to kill the patient. The offer of death as
treatment would put pressure on vulnerable, sick and elderly people to end their lives. This is why many
seniors and people with disabilities feel that legalized assisted suicide would put them at risk. If doctors decide that such people
are better off dead, doctors may interpret their cries for help as a request for death. Legalizing
assisted suicide or euthanasia would give them the go-ahead . The question of legalizing euthanasia is not an openand-shut case.
We need all the evidence on the table before we take the big step of allowing doctors to
kill their patients. After all, there’s no chance of a do-over when it comes to death .
1NR PTX
Failure to stop ISIS turns both paternalism and biopower – their ascendancy ensures
CENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIAN power and specific forms of oppression like torture
and death
Rogan 14 (Tom, Washington DC based foreign affairs correspondent @ Daily Telegraph, "ISIS is
Dysfunctional," http://www.nationalreview.com/article/381460/isis-dysfunctional-tom-rogan)
As I outlined prior to the ISIS march on Mosul, that assessment is wrong. Supplied by a deep well of European recruits, supported by a war chest
worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and driven by pure hatred, ISIS poses a major transnational threat. Because of its
pernicious reshaping of regional political dynamics, ISIS must be challenged. That being said, over the long term ISIS is unlikely to retain control
over vast swaths of Iraq and Syria. Here are three interconnected reasons why. CLASHING IDEOLOGIES Let’s be clear: The crisis in Iraq isn’t
about general Sunni-vs.-Shia sectarianism. Instead, it’s the consequence of a blood feud between Salafi jihadists and Iran. While both seek to
segregate Iraq into base sectarian allegiances, that agenda isn’t shared by most Iraqis. Indeed, ISIS
is the most extreme fringe of
Sunni Islamism, consolidating its power by both promising security and creating fear . The group has
improved its position by mobilizing vehement anti-Maliki sentiment in the Baathist heartlands north of Baghdad. However, now that ISIS has
expanded deep into Anbar province, their ideology will face an increasing social disconnect. Advertisement That’s because where ISIS subscribes
to a psychotic Salafi interpretation of Hanbali medievalism, in Anbar’s tribal structured society the dominant Sunni school is Hanafi. Hanafi
doctrine is more moderate than the Arabian Peninsula–centered Hanbali. These ideological divergences mean that where Anbar tribes regard their
local independence as paramount, ISIS is obsessed with establishing a centralized, authoritarian caliphate . In
turn, while Sunnis may tolerate ISIS over the short term, as ISIS usurps communal governance structures (and it will), resistance against it will
increase. EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE ISIS believes it has learned from the experience of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In 2006, having suffered
years of devastation at the hands of AQI gangsters, many Sunni-majority communities joined with the U.S. military (and British Special Forces)
to eviscerate AQI. Its brutal sharia courts and death gangs simply became intolerable. Today, ISIS thinks its softly-softly approach toward music
etc. will placate those in the cities it claims. It’s mistaken. As America learned in 2003 in Iraq, occupying forces must provide basic services
alongside security. The two are mutually dependent. In the cities that ISIS now rules, the collapse of government services has cut access to
electricity and water. This is an especially big problem in Iraq. After all, as I write, Mosul’s temperature is 113 degrees Fahrenheit. ISIS
is
good at torturing people and seizing refineries, but it lacks the technical skills and bureaucratic temperament to support populations.
Moreover, its theocratic mania means that it has a very different governing agenda. Ultimately, as ISIS constructs a “holy order,” its temptation to
dominate Iraqi civilians is likely to overwhelm any sense of political realism. In the days ahead, it will be interesting to see how various Anbar
tribal leaders react to ISIS’s seizure of border transit points to Syria and Jordan. These positions provide lucrative smuggling routes for the tribes.
AQI’s history carries another warning here. As Richard Shultz has noted, the 2006 uprising against AQI was caused partly by AQI’s capture of
these roads. As the summer advances, ISIS will probably face far greater resistance. MAINTAINING CONTROL As ISIS has stormed down the
Euphrates and taken towns, cities, and refineries, many have come to perceive the group as near-omnipotent. ISIS almost certainly believes that
its military fortune is the result of divine providence. Nevertheless, just as occupations are complicated, managing limited military resources is
also far from simple. The more territory ISIS controls, the harder the territory will be to hold (especially if it faces insurrections). From maps of
territory presently under ISIS control, it’s clear that the group has vulnerable supply lines. Most estimates are that ISIS has under 10,000 combat
troops, and dominating vast areas of both Syria and Iraq is a major task. And that’s just today. As Iraqi military pressure grows alongside new
American support, ISIS will be forced to make hard choices about what to retain and what to surrender. The abovementioned factors surrounding
ISIS ideology and governance will further complicate its ability to navigate this process. Even then, wherever ISIS tries to hold territory, it will be
forced to adopt more-formal command structures and a more overt defensive military posture. Such adaptions will render the group vulnerable to
U.S. intelligence monitoring and targeting. None of the above is to suggest that ISIS can be left alone. Because of the recruits it has already
accumulated, and because of its pursuit of an unrestrained proxy war between the Sunni Arab kingdoms and Iran (something I’ve long worried
about), the
group must be confronted. Still, we must always remember that ISIS isn’t just a deplorable organization. Ultimately, it’s
it can offer nothing but misery and death .
also a dysfunctional one. At the political level,
Strikes Escalate
Extinction
Stirling 11 (The Earl of Stirling 11, Hereditary Governor and Lord Lieutenant of Canada, Lord High
Admiral of Nova Scotia, MA in European Studies and B.Sc. in Political Science and History, “General
Middle East War Nears - Syrian Events More Dangerous Than Even Nuclear Nightmare In Japan”, 3-30,
http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html)
Any Third Lebanon War/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides
know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater
Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. It will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive
WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian
populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the
Northern Hemisphere. However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities
including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in
Syrian territory. The Iranians
are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike
against not only Israel and American and allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British,
French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically
engineered 'super killer viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors. There
are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and
there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'. This could kill a
third of the world's
total
population . Such a result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a
Russian-Chinese response that would eventually finish off what is left of Israel and begin a truly global war/ WWIII
with multiple war theaters around the world. It is highly unlikely that a Third World War, fought with 21st Century
weaponry will be anything but the Biblical Armageddon .
1NC Corre also says Israel will feel pressured to strike Iran – that causes global conflict
and turns the case
Reuveny 10 (Rafael – professor in the School of Public and Environmental affairs at Indiana University,
Unilateral strike on Iran could trigger world depression, p.
http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml)
A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a
regional war , global economic collapse and a major power clash . For an Israeli campaign to
succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would
not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s
nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground . All of these
widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but
also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear
facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran
is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of
its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a
second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and,
perhaps, Turkish
forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the P alestinian A uthority to
join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel
was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is
greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents . Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian
coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of
massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s
military resources may quickly dwindle , forcing it to use its alleged nuclear
weapons , as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities,
but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the
Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments
would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle
Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the U nited S tates and Europe. The world
economy would head into a tailspin ; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the
United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and
Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the
U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as
Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s
response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert , replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran
may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States headto-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike,
its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force. While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be riskaverse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A
unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III .
Link Debate
Liberal rulings cause massive backlash to the democrats and Obama’s agenda – gets
blamed due to Kagan and Sotomayor
Mirengoff 10 (Paul, attorney in Washington, D.C. A.B., Dartmouth College J.D., Stanford Law
School, June 23 The Federalist Society Online Debate Series, http://www.fedsoc.org/debates/dbtid.41/default.asp)
The other thing I found interesting was the degree to which Democrats used the hearings to attack the "Roberts Court." I don't recall either party
going this much on the offensive in this respect during the last three sets of hearings. What explains this development? My view is that liberal
Democratic politicians (and members of their base) think they lost the argument during the last three confirmation battles. John Roberts
and Samuel Alito "played" well, and Sonia Sotomayor sounded like a conservative. The resulting frustration probably induced the Democrats to
be more aggressive in general and, in particular, to try
to discredit Roberts and Alito by claiming they are not the
jurists they appeared to be when they made such a good impression on the public. I'm pretty sure the strategy didn't work. First, as I
said, these hearings seem not to have attracted much attention. Second, Senate Democrats are unpopular right now, so their attacks on members
of a more popular institution are not likely to resonate. Third, those who watched until the bitter end saw Ed Whelan, Robert Alt and others
persuasively counter the alleged examples of "judicial activism" by the Roberts Court relied upon by the Democrats -- e.g., the Ledbetter case,
which the Democrats continue grossly to mischaracterize. There's a chance that the
Democrats' latest partisan innovation
will come back to haunt them. Justice Sotomayor and soon-to-be Justice Kagan are on record having
articulated a traditional, fairly minimalist view of the role of judges. If a liberal majority were to emerge -- or even if the
liberals prevail in a few high profile cases -- the charge of "deceptive testimony" could be turned against them. And if Barack
Obama is still president at that time, he likely will receive some of the blame .
Obama gets the electoral blame for liberal Court rulings
Loftin 10 (Britton, Political Strategist and Director of a Legislative & Government Affairs firm, "Is
Obama To Blame for Decline in Supreme Court Approval Ratings,"
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CwTZ3gilzFQJ:politic365.com/2010/10/12/isobama-to-blame-for-decline-in-supreme-court-approval-ratings/+&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
Although the 2010 percentage is low compared to the previous year, the approval ratings for 2007 and 2008 are near the current rate. Could it be
that President Obama’s declining approval ratings over the past year have resulted in guilt by association for the Supreme Court? Instead, is it
possible that the Supreme Court’s recent 5-4 decision to reverse a position it took in 2003 to uphold government restrictions on political
expenditures by corporations has been perceived negatively in the public eye? ¶ The Supreme Court had great public approval ratings in 2009,
perhaps, in part, evidenced by the outpouring of support it received for then-appointee Justice Sonya Sotomayor. At the time, fervent support for
a Latino woman to be appointed to the Court seemed to generate positive feelings about its general performance. During President Obama’s 2010
appointment of now Justice Elana Kagan, however, the Court’s job approval numbers declined, even in spite of overwhelming support by the
Democratic base.¶ The
President’s first Supreme Court appointment was a sign of transition from the
previous Republican era to a new Democratic administration. Further, America was engaged through wide media
coverage of both of the President’s Supreme Court nominations.¶ Sotomayor marked the first appointment of a Latino to the nation’s highest
court. And as Democratic excitement fueled President Obama’s nomination, the Court’s approval ratings remained high, according to Gallup,
which polled American approval ratings at 53% satisfied versus 33% dissatisfied. ¶ So what’s changed? President Obama
has now made
two lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court, and yet, the Democratic leaning presence has yet
to politically balance the bench. Ironically though, the view of most people polled by Gallup is that the bench has become more
liberal. Thus, the Court’s overall approval ratings have declined. It’s also interesting to note that as President Obama’s approval
ratings declined throughout 2010, so too did overall satisfaction with the job performance of the
Supreme Court.¶ In the 2010-2011 Supreme Court Session, the cases coming before the justices involve emotion
driven topics: undocumented immigrant rights, information privacy, and free speech, all issues that are sure to engage the
American electorate.¶ Back in 2009, the Court’s approval ratings were bolstered by an energized Democratic base consisting primarily
of African Americans, Latinos and young people. Now, given a marked shift toward more conservative ideology in the wake of continued
economic recession and unemployment, it seems that satisfaction
performance than it is
with the Supreme Court is based less on actual job
on the perception that the Court has become too liberal under Obama’s watch.
PAS is highly controversial AND well-organized opposition always wins out – costs
capital
Tucker 12 (Kathryn, Director of Legal Affairs, Compassion & Choices since 1996. Prior to that, she
was in private practice with Perkins Coie in Seattle, WA. She teaches "Law, Medicine and Ethics at the
End of Life" at law schools, including the University of Washington, Seattle University and Loyola/Los
Angeles.," Aid in Dying: An End of Life-Option Governed by Best Practices, 8 J. Health & Biomed. L. 9,
lexis)
Enacting legislation to create an affirmative permission for aid in dying is difficult and has only been
achieved to date in two states: Oregon and Washington. n2 Another state has recognized that its citizens may freely choose this option through a
[*10] state Supreme Court decision, Baxter v. State of Montana. n3 Two states
have passed legislation specifically
outlawing aid in dying. n4 In the other states, it is unclear whether providing aid in dying exposes physicians to prosecution under
criminal laws. This paper will explore the issue with a focus on Hawaii, a jurisdiction where it appears that aid in dying can be provided without
fear of criminal prosecution, yet physicians and patients are largely unaware of this. In 2002, Hawaii nearly became the second state, after Oregon
in 1994, to pass a law that would have established a statutory permission to choose aid in dying. n5 However, the bill was voted down by a
narrow margin on the final day of the session. n6 Since the 2002 session, a proposal to establish specific statutory permission for this choice has
not received a full floor vote in the Hawaii State Legislature. n7
Efforts to enact an affirmative permission for aid in
dying are often politically and emotionally charged. This is due, in part, to misinformation promoted
by a well-organized opposition , as evident in the recent consideration of Hawaii Senate Bill 803: Death with Dignity. n8
Opponents misleadingly referred to the bill as "Doctor Prescribed Death." n9 It was evident from Hawaii's Senate Health Committee hearing that
such tactics are effective. n10 Those opposing the bill testified that a law permitting aid in dying would lead to involuntary euthanasia and would
create a culture in which there is a "duty [*11] to die." n11 Swayed by this testimony, legislators voted the measure down. n12
Legalized physician assisted suicide is unpopular – it’s highly contentious and
publically salient
Long 9 (Leonard, Prof of Law @ Quinnipiac Univ., "Can Health Care Conscientious Objectors Thread
the Needle," 13 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 51, lexis)
n43. The same can be said regarding physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. If these medical services are prohibited by law, then physicians
with conscientious objections to either physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia do not require protection. Meanwhile, physicians lacking such
objections or physicians advocating physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia would want and arguably need legal protections to treat their
patients in a way that fulfills their ethical belief. Neil M. Gorsuch,
a federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
discussed the conflict over assisted suicide and euthanasia in his first book: Whether to permit assistance
in suicide and euthanasia is among the most contentious legal and public policy questions in America
today. The
issue erupted into American public consciousness on June 4, 1990, with the news that Dr. Jack
Kevorkian ... had helped Janet Adkins, a fifty-four-year-old Alzheimer's patient, kill herself... . While perhaps the most
notorious contemporary American proponent of assisted suicide and euthanasia, Dr. Kevorkian hardly stands alone. In 1984 the Netherlands
became the first country in the world to endorse certain forms of assisted suicide and euthanasia. The Dutch Supreme Court declared that,
although euthanasia was punishable as murder under the nation's penal code, physicians could claim an "emergency defence" under certain
circumstances. After several failed attempts, in November 2000 the lower house of the Dutch Parliament voted 104-40 in favor of a physicianassisted suicide exception to the nation's homicide laws, codifying-and liberalizing in some key respects-the prior judicial "emergency defence";
the Dutch Senate gave its assent in April 2001. The Northern Territory of Australia passed a law permitting assisted suicide in 1996, but that
legislation was criticized by the Austrian Medical Association and quickly voided months later by Australia's federal parliament. Belgium has
now also followed the Dutch example, adopting a law that took effect in September 2002.
1NR UTIL
2NC Ext 1 & 2 – Consequences First
Ethics are inherently situational. We are forced to make hard choices because we have
finite resources and political capabilities. Ethics makes us push the blame onto others
to maintain the purity of our intentions instead of taking responsibility
Chandler, 1 – Policy Research Institute @ Leeds Metropolitan University
(David, Human Rights Quarterly 23, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism”)
When intervening for ethical ends there is little pressure to account for final policy outcomes. Whatever
happens in the targeted states, under international sanctions or military action, it can be alleged to be
better than non-intervention. As both Tony Blair and The Guardian argued in response to the ‘collateral’ deaths of ethnic
Albanian refugees from the high altitude Nato bombing campaign in Kosovo: ‘Milosevic is determined to wipe a people from the
face of this country. Nato is determined to stop him’(The Guardian, 15 May 1999). The House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee, although dismissing the idea that there was a Serb policy of genocide, still concluded that ‘The issue in Kosovo was
... whether in the absence of Nato intervention, the Serb campaign would have continued over many years, eventually resulting in
more deaths and instability in the region than if Nato had not intervened. We believe that it would’ (UKFAC 2000, para.123).
The belief that it would have been even worse without international action provides a hypothetical post facto justification that is
difficult to disprove. The discourse of ethical foreign policy establishes a framework of western intervention
which inevitably encourages a positive view of intervention in the face of exaggerated fears of nonintervention.
The impact is genocide
Mohawk, Associate Professor of History @ SUNY Buffalo, ‘2K
(John C, Utopian Legacies, p. 4-5)
People who believe that they are acting on a plan to solve all of the humankind’s problems think they are on
a kind of sacred mission, even when the origin of their inspiration is secular in nature and makes no claim to intervention by a higher
power. Although adherents may have only a vague idea about how the utopia will come about or what it will be
like when it arrives, utopian movements often stimulate high levels of enthusiasm and a widely shared sense of being a “chosen people” with a
special destiny. People caught up in such movements tend to be intolerant of others who are not part of this projected
destiny, who do not believe in the same things, and are not expected to share in the future benefits. One reason for the popularity of
these movements is that they exalt the importance of the group, praise their imagined superior qualities and
future prospects, and urge that, relative to other peoples, they are special and more deserving. This pattern of self-aggrandizement has often
proven popular and energizing. It contains a message that others who are not special or chosen are without significant value
and may be treated accordingly. This kind of intolerance can result in the denial of rights, including the right to
live, to hold property, to vote, or to hold professional licenses, if the inspired group has the power to do these things. A scornful indifference to
these unbelieving and unentitled others can manifest as racism and/or ethnocentrism. Such intolerance has been known to lead to
crimes against humanity, including systematic acts of genocide.
Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free
expression?”, Lee immediately answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather
crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in
politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. While
an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always
weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human
rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the
promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever
be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and
promoting them will always have to be considered.
Once an action enters the policy realm we must use a Consequentialist approach, this
is necessary to minimize suffering and conflict.
Murray in 97, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh, [Alastair J. H.,
Reconstructing Realism: between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 110]
Weber emphasised that, while the 'absolute ethic of the gospel' must be taken seriously, it is inadequate to
the tasks of evaluation presented by politics. Against this 'ethic of ultimate ends' — Gesinnung — he
therefore proposed the 'ethic of responsibility' — Verantwortung. First, whilst the former dictates only the
purity of intentions and pays no attention to consequences, the ethic of responsibility commands
acknowledgement of the divergence between intention and result. Its adherent 'does not feel in a position
to burden others with the results of his [or her] own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he will
say: these results are ascribed to my action'. Second, the 'ethic of ultimate ends' is incapable of dealing
adequately with the moral dilemma presented by the necessity of using evil means to achieve moral ends:
Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic
of responsibility endangers the 'salvation of the soul.' If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a
war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be changed and discredited for
generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking. The 'ethic of responsibility', on the other
hand, can accommodate this paradox and limit the employment of such means, because it accepts
responsibility for the consequences which they imply. Thus, Weber maintains that only the ethic of
responsibility can cope with the 'inner tension' between the 'demon of politics' and 'the god of love'. 9
The realists followed this conception closely in their formulation of a political ethic.10 This influence is
particularly clear in Morgenthau.11 In terms of the first element of this conception, the rejection of a
purely deontological ethic, Morgenthau echoed Weber's formulation, arguing that: the political actor has,
beyond the general moral duties, a special moral responsibility to act wisely ... The individual, acting on
his own behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his inexpedient
action concern only [her or] himself. What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns
others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with good intentions but unwisely and
hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all
action affecting others, and hence political action par excellence, is subject.12
Only our framework creates moral reponsibility
Saul D. Alinsky, Activist, Professor, and Social Organizer with International Fame, Founder of the Industrial
Areas Foundation, Rules for Radicals, 71, p. 24-27
We cannot think first and act afterwards. From the moment of birth we are immersed in action and can only fitfully guide it by
taking thought. Alfred North Whitehead That perennial question, “Does the end justify the means?” is meaningless as it
stands; the real and only question regarding the ethics of means and ends is, and always has been, “Does
this particular end justify this particular means?” Life and how you live it is the story of means and ends. The end is what you
want, and the means is how you get it. Whenever we think about social change, the question of means and ends arises. The man of action views
the issue of means and ends arises. The man of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and strategic terms. He has no other
problem; he thinks only of his actual resources and the possibilities of various choices of action. He asks of ends only whether they are achievable
and worth the cost; of means, only whether they will work. To say that corrupt means corrupt the ends is to believe in the
immaculate conception of ends and principles. The real arena is corrupt and bloody. Life is a corrupting process from the time a
child learns to play his mother off against his father in the politics of when to go to bed; he who fears corruption fears life. The practical
revolutionary will understand Geothe’s “conscience is the virtue of observers and not of agents of action”; in action, one does not always
enjoy the luxury of a decision that is consistent both with one’s individual conscience and the good of
[hu]mankind. The choice must always be for the latter. Action is for mass salvation and not for the individual’s personal
salvation. He who sacrifices the mass good for his personal conscience has peculiar conception of “personal salvation”; he doesn’t care enough
for people to be “corrupted” for them. The men [and women] who pile up the heaps of discussion and literature on the
ethics of means and ends—which with rare exception is conspicuous for its sterility—rarely write about their won experiences in the
perpetual struggle of life and change. They
are strangers, moreover, to the burdens and problems of
operational responsibility and the unceasing pressure for
immediate decisions. They are passionately committed to a mystical objectivity where passions are suspect. They assume a nonexistent
situation where man suspect. They assume a nonexistent situation where men dispassionately and with reason draw and devise means and ends as
if studying a navigational chart on land. They can be recognized by one of two verbal brands; “We agree with the ends but not the means,” or
“This is not the time.” The means-and-end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means. The means-and-ends
moralists, constantly obsessed with the ethics of the means used by the Have-Nots against the Haves, should search themselves as to their real
political position. In fact, they are passive—but real—allies of the Haves. They are the ones Jacques Maritain referred to in his
statement, “The fear of soiling ourselves by entering the context of history is not virtue, but a way of escaping virtue.” These non-doers
were the ones who chose not to fight the Nazis in the only way they could have been fought; they were the ones who drew their
window blinds to shut out the shameful spectacle of Jews and political prisoners being dragged through the streets; they were the ones who
privately deplored the horror of it all—and did nothing. This is the nadir of immorality. The most unethical of all means is the nonuse of any
means. It is this species of man how so vehemently and militantly participated in that classically idealistic debate at the old League of Nations on
the ethical differences between defensive and offensive weapons. Their fears of action drive them to refuge in an ethics so divorced from the
politics of life that it can apply only to angels, not to men. The standards of judgment must be rooted in the whys and wherefores of life as it is
lived, the world as it is, not our wished-for fantasy of the world as it should be. I present here a series of rules pertaining to the ethics of means
and ends: first, that one’s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one’s personal interest in the issue. When we are not
directly concerned our morality overflows; as La Rochefoucauld put it, “We all have strength enough to endure the misfortunes of others.”
Accompanying this rule is the parallel one that one’s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one’s distance from the
scene of conflict. The second rule of the ethics of means and ends is that the judgment of the ethics of means is dependent upon the political
position of those sitting in judgment. If you actively opposed the Nazi occupation and joined the underground Resistance, then you adopted the
means of assassination, terror, properly destruction, the bombing of tunnels and trains, kidnapping, and the willingness to sacrifice innocent
hostages to the end of defeating the Nazis. Those who opposed the Nazi conquerors regarded the Resistance as a secret army of selfless, patriotic
idealists, courageous beyond expectation and willing to sacrifice their lives to their moral convictions. To the occupation authorities, however,
these people were lawless terrorists, murders, saboteurs, assassins, who believed that the end justified the means, and were utterly unethical
according to the mystical rules of war. Any foreign occupation would so ethically judge its opposition. However, in such conflict, neither
protagonist is concerned with any value except victory. It is life or death.
You’re responsible for catastrophic consequences if you could prevent them
Russ Shafer-Landau, University of Kansas Ethics, July 97 v107 n4 p584(28)
Even Nozick, a staunch absolutist, allows that cases of "catastrophic moral horror" may require
suspension of absolute side constraints.(18) Attention to the dire consequences that may be brought about by allegiance to absolute
rules needn't move us to the consequentialist camp--it didn't incline Ross or Nozick in that direction, for instance. But it does create a presumptive
case against absolutism. Absolutist responses to the argument standardly take one of two forms. The first is to reject premise (1) and deny that
absolutism generates tragic consequences, by arguing that a set of suitably narrowed absolutist rules will not require behavior that results in
"catastrophic moral horror." The second response is to reject premise (2) and defend the moral necessity of obedience even if tragic consequences
ensue. Rejecting Premise (1) Consider the first strategy. This is tantamount to a specificationist program that begins by admitting that the
standard candidates--don't kill, lie, cheat, commit adultery--cannot plausibly be construed as absolute rules. Just as we had to narrow their scope
if we were to show them universally relevant, so too we need to narrow the scope of such properties to show them universally determinative. The
question, though, is how far, and in what way, this added concreteness is to be pursued. The double dangers that the absolutist must avoid at this
juncture are those of drawing the grounding properties too broadly, or too narrowly. Rules drawn too narrowly will incorporate concrete details of
cases in the description of the grounding properties, yielding a theory that is particularist in all but name. The opposite problem is realized when
we allow the grounding properties to be drawn broadly enough as to be repeatably instantiated, but at the cost of allowing the emerging rules to
conflict. Some middle ground must be secured. How could we frame an absolute rule that enjoined just the actions we want, while offering an
escape clause for tragic cases? There seems to be no way to do this other than by appending a proviso to the rule, to the effect that it binds except
where such obedience will lead to catastrophic consequences, very serious harm, horrific results. Because of the great variety of ways in which
such results can occur, there doesn't seem to be any more precise way to specify the exceptive clause without reducing it to an indefinitely long
string of too-finely described scenarios. Is this problematic? Consider an analogous case. Someone wants to lose weight and wants to know how
long to maintain a new diet. A dietician offers the following advice: "Cut twenty percent of your caloric intake; this will make you thinner, but
also weaker. If you reach a point where you've gotten too thin and weak, increase your calories." The dietician's advice is flawed because it
doesn't give, by itself, enough information to the person trying to follow it. It's too general. The qualified moral rule is similarly uninformative. If
abiding by the rule will occasion harmful results, one wants to know how harmful they have to be to qualify as too harmful. The rule doesn't
really say--`catastrophic' is just a synonym for `too harmful'. Such a rule is crucially underspecific, and this undermines efforts to apply it as a
major premise in deductive moral argument. This lack of specificity results from an absence of necessary and sufficient conditions that could
determine the extension of the concept "catastrophic consequences."(19) Efforts to remove this underspecificity by providing a set of definitional
criteria typically serve only to falsify the resulting ethical assessments; imagine the futility of trying to precisely set out in advance what is to
count as catastrophic consequences. Rendering the notion of "catastrophic" more precise seems bound to yield a rule that omits warranted
exceptions. Or it may cover all such exceptions, but at the cost of making the exceptive clause so fine-grained that it will be nothing less than an
indefinitely long disjunction of descriptions of actual cases that represent exceptions to the general rule. Neither option should leave us very
sanguine about the prospects of specifying absolute rules so as to ensure that such rules can be obeyed without occasioning catastrophic
consequences. Rejecting Premise (2) The alternative for the absolutist is to stand fast and allow that morality requires adherence to rules that will
sometimes yield catastrophic horrors. There is no inconsistency in taking such a stand. But the ethic that requires conduct that is tantamount to
failure to prevent catastrophe is surely suspect. Preventing catastrophe is presumptively obligatory. The obligation might be
defeasible, but absolutists have yet to tell the convincing story that would override the presumption . Imagine that you are a sharpshooter in a
position to kill a terrorist who is credibly threatening to detonate a bomb that will kill thousands. If you merely wound him, he will be able to trigger the firing
mechanism. You must kill him to save the innocents. Suppose that in obedience to an absolutist ethic you refrain from shooting. The terrorist
detonates the bomb. Thousands
die. Something must be said about the agent whose obedience to absolute rules occasions catastrophe. It is
possible that an absolutist ethic will blame you for doing your duty. Possible, but unlikely. Absolutists who allow that obedience to their
favored rules may occasion catastrophe typically seek ways to exculpate those whose obedience yields tragic results. The standard strategy is to
endorse some version of the doctrine of double effect, or the doctrine of doing and allowing. The former says that
harms brought about by indirect intention may be permissible even though similar harms brought about by direct intention
are forbidden. The latter says that bringing about harm through omission or inaction may be permissible even though similar harms brought about
by positive action are forbidden. The motivating spirit behind both doctrines is to legitimate certain kinds of harmful
conduct, to exculpate certain harm doers, and to forestall the possibility that absolute rules might conflict.
The truth of either doctrine would ensure that agents always have a permissible option to pursue--namely, obedience to an absolute moral
rule.(20) Quite apart from the fact that these doctrines have yet to be adequately defended,(21) their adequate defense would still leave us short of
a justification of the absolute rules that are to complement them. Neither of these doctrines is itself a defense of absolutism;
rather, they are really "helping doctrines," whose truth would undermine the inevitability of conflict among
absolute rules. We may always have a permissible option in cases where we must choose between killing and letting die, intending death or
merely foreseeing it, but this by itself is no argument for thinking that the prohibition on intentionally killing
innocents is absolute.
All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number
saved
Cummisky, 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)
Finally, even
if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing
one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify
deontologieal constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation
than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that 1 may still saw two;
it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hills example of a
priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one. Then 1 cannot claim that
saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But Similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not
destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent
with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus
compensate for the lass of the one, each is priceless: thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not
clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more
persons with dignity who are saved, the better.*
2NC Ext 3 – Util Inev
Utilitarianism inevitable even in deontological frameworks
Green, 02 – Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, November
2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It",
314)
Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take
priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort
of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its
most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about
“balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of
their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the
thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five
people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry
protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms
Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness
of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has
faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were
tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both
sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so
on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite
the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological
gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When
deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way
or covertly consequentialist.