Nuclear Shipping
1AC
Plan
The United States Federal Government should establish a regulatory
framework for the use of nuclear reactors for shipping in the ocean as well as
guarantee insurance coverage for them under the Price-Anderson Act.
Trade
Current Model for Saving Money is Slowing Down
Maritime Economics & Logistics 2013 (http://www.palgravejournals.com/mel/journal/v15/n2/full/mel20132a.html)
Full’ speed for a container ship might typically be 24 knots (generally 85–90 per cent of
engine capacity) (Bonney, 2010a). Reducing vessel speed to 21 knots represents ‘slow’
steaming with 18 knots defined as ‘extra slow’ and 15 knots as ‘super slow’ (Bonney and
Leach, 2010). Slower speeds generally improve vessel fuel efficiency (Rosenthal, 2010),
allowing carriers to save on bunker (that is, marine fuel), a volatile and expensive cost
item. Fuel can exceed half of overall operating costs for container ships (Notteboom,
2006), and consequently, changes in fuel prices will have significant impacts on per TEU
transport costs (Notteboom and Vernimme, 2009). As bunker prices have increased
considerably in recent years (Notteboom and Vernimme, 2009; Bonney and Leach,
2010), slow steaming has become more appealing to carriers. At $500 per ton fuel prices,
carriers can save 5–7 per cent on costs (Bonney, 2010b), which might represent
$250 000 on one voyage (White, 2010) and $15–$20 million annually for one AsiaEurope lane (Bonney and Leach, 2010). Given thin profit margins in the industry
(Notteboom, 2006; Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2009), carriers infer that slow steaming is
becoming the new norm (Barnard, 2010b; Bonney and Leach, 2010).
Status quo emissions regulations will drive up fuel cost and crush the
shipping industry
Hirdaris 13- Dr. Spyro, Senior Specialist at Lloyd's Register, PHD in Naval Architecture at the
University of Southampton, 2013
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/351357/1/CONCEPTS%20FOR%20A%20MODULAR%20NUCLEAR%20P
OWERED%20CONTAINERSHIP.pdf)
The shipping industry is an efficient mode of transport and is responsible for 90% of
world trade, however in doing so contributed 2.7% of global CO2 emissions in 2007. The
shipping industry is expected to keep growing and without control measures for
greenhouse gas emissions, by 2050, CO2 emissions are estimated to be 2.4 to 3 times
their current value (McCarthy, 2009). Restrictions on ships’ emissions are being put into place
and talks are underway regarding a carbon tax. Although the cost penalties have not been
decided, estimates put their value anywhere between $5 to $50 per tonne of CO2 (Nika, 2010).
Other environmental concerns are the emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrous oxides
(NOx) and particulate matter. Shipping is responsible for 4-9% and 15% of the global
SOx and NOx ¶ emissions respectively (Eyring et al., 2010). These are regulated by Annex VI
of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) which was
first adopted in 1997. Due to the shortcomings of the regulations, Annex VI was revised by the
IMO to significantly strengthen emissions standards. Emission Control Areas (ECAs) were
introduced in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, North America, Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands. Ships
operating in these waters must comply with extremely strict emissions standards by
using ECA compliant fuel oil which is much cleaner than conventional heavy fuel oil. The sulphur
limits will change from 4.5% currently to 3.5% in 2012 and to 0.5% by 2020. The new NOx
emissions regulations have set ‘Tier’ limits for different engines. ‘Tier I’ applies to all engines
installed from January 1990, ‘Tier II’ to those installed after January 2011 and ‘Tier III’ to those
installed on ships operating in ECAs after January 2016. ‘Tier II’ and ‘Tier III’ NOx limits are
estimated to cut emissions by 16-22% and 80% relative to those of ‘Tier I’ (AirClim, 2010). The
impacts of the new regulations are that by 2020 the estimated cost of marine fuel will
further increase by 45-80% with an average of 75% leading to probable sea transport
cost increases of 30-50% (Castanius, 2010). The increase in bunker prices between 20042009 are ¶ about 300% (ICS, 2009). Carnival Shipbuilding Corporation saw a decrease in
income of 13% during the first quarter of 2011 due to increased fuel prices (Mackay, 2011). The
restrictions on ships’ emissions and the consequent anticipated additional costs are only
going to make the situation worse. Since fuel costs are the most considerable proportion
of operational costs, it is in the owners’ interests to reduce consumption or to
reconsider the use of heavy fuel oil and use alternative technologies
High Oil Price Can Hinder the Industry
Tverberg 13 – M.S. Mathematics (Gail, “Oil Prices Unlikely to Climb Much Higher”,
11/12/13, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Oil-Prices-Unlikely-to-Climb-MuchHigher.html)
To see one reason why wages might flatten, consider the situation of a manufacturer or other company shipping goods. The
cost of goods, with shipping, would rise simply because of the cost of oil used in transport.
Companies using oil more extensively in producing their products would need to raise prices even more, if their profits are to
remain unchanged. If these companies simply pass the higher cost of oil on to consumers, they likely will
sell fewer
of their products, since some consumers will not be able to afford the products at the new
higher price. To “fix” the problem of selling fewer goods, companies would likely lay off workers, to reflect the smaller
quantity of goods sold–one reason for the drop in wages paid to workers shown on Figure 1. (Note that Figure 1 will reflect
reduced wages, whether it results from fewer people working or lower wages of those working.)
Nuclear shipping is key to prevent a decline and increase volume
SINGLA 2011 (Smita, MA in food tech and professional blogger on maritime issues, “Nuclear Ship Propulsion: Is it the Future of the
Shipping Industry?,” Marine Insight, Sept 2, http://www.marineinsight.com/tech/nuclear-ship-propulsion-is-it-the-future-of-the-shippingindustry/#ixzz2BqcUcPcN)
Amongst all the speculations and standing doubts about use of marine propulsion system
based on nuclear energy, there are some key factors that make this a good idea, whatever way you
look at it.¶ In the current scenario of extreme fuel shortage, nuclear ships are the answer that
everyone has been looking for. Energy produced from nuclear reactions is immense which can be used easily.¶ Since amount of
energy produced in every reaction is quite large, a single time energy production can be used for a propulsion ship for a long time. Nuclear
ships offer a refilling solution of as less as once a month. This could make shipping a speedy
and hassle free process.¶ A nuclear reactor is designed to produce energy under controlled
conditions. It is compact and can be moved around easily. So apprehensions about
practicality of a nuclear reactor on ships, boats and vessels can be put to a rest.¶ Nuclear military
ships like submarines can survive for months underwater without feeling the need to resurface for refueling. This can make combative forces
much more efficient.¶ Fuel
efficiency of nuclear propulsion engines is more than most of the fuels
currently in use. This means that amount of energy derived from nuclear reactions per unit
weight is more than any other fuel.¶ The better power to weight ratio means that nuclear
ships can have better weight carrying capacity than other ships, offering quicker traveling
over longer distances with greater load.¶ Nuclear ships tackle problem of air pollution too as there is no production of
undesirable smoke or particular pollutants that have become a menace all over the world.
Shipping key to stable food prices, trade, and world economic stability
MITROPOULOS 2005 (Efthimios, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations, World
Maritime Day Parallel Event, 11/15, International Maritime Organization,
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1028&doc_id=5415)
We hoped to kick-start moves towards creating a far broader awareness that a
healthy and successful shipping industry has
ramifications that reach far beyond the industry itself. Global economic prosperity is
dependent on trade and trade, in turn, is dependent on a safe and secure transport network.
Shipping is the most important part of that global network, although it is rarely acknowledged as such, and
seldom given the credit it deserves. Indeed, I have long come to the sad conclusion that the contribution made by the shipping industry - and, in
particular, by those who work hard, both on board ships and ashore, to make it safer and more environmentally friendly - is greatly undervalued
by the public at large. You may have noticed that I used the word "sad" to brand my conclusion. I am sorry to say that there is another word I
might suggest as more fitting to characterize the situation and that is the word "unfair" - in capital letters! I think it is worth pausing for a
moment to consider just how vital the contribution of ships and shipping actually is. More
than 90 per cent of global trade
is reportedly carried by sea; over the last four decades, total seaborne trade estimates have nearly quadrupled, from less than 6
thousand billion tonne-miles in 1965 to 25 thousand billion tonne-miles in 2003; and, according to UN figures, the operation of merchant ships
in the same year contributed about US$380 billion in freight rates within the global economy, equivalent to about 5 per cent of total world trade.
This year, the shipping industry is expected to transport 6.6 billion tonnes of cargo. If you consider this figure vis-à-vis the 6.4 billion population
of the world, you will realize that this works out at more than one tonne of cargo for every man, woman and child on the face of the planet - even
more for the richer nations. As seaborne trade continues to expand, it also brings benefits for consumers throughout the world. The transport
cost element in the price of consumer goods varies from product to product and is estimated to account for around 2 per cent of the shelf price of
a television set and only around 1.2 per cent of a kilo of coffee. Thanks to the growing efficiency of shipping as a mode of transport and to
increased economic liberalization, the prospects for the industry's further growth continue to be strong. Shipping
is truly the
lynchpin of the global economy. Without shipping, intercontinental trade, the bulk transport
of raw materials and the import and export of affordable food and manufactured goods
would simply not be possible. Shipping makes the world go round and, so, let us be in no
doubt about its broader significance. To put it in simple terms, as I have done before on a number of
occasions during the campaign initiated at IMO to encourage all those involved in shipping to pay more attention to its public perception,
without international shipping half the world would starve and the other half would freeze.
Transit time and fuel cost are key to food prices
OECD 2012 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Trade Costs,” date is date last mod, Oct 29,
www.oecd.org/tad/tradefacilitation/tradecosts.htm)
Maritime transport costs¶ Ships have moved goods across the world for thousands of years, and today shipping is still essential to international
trade. Ninety percent of world trade by volume is carried by ship, and maritime traffic in 2007 was almost double its 2003 level. Operation of
merchant ships generated an estimated annual income approaching US$ 380 billion in 2007, equivalent to about five percent of total world
trade.¶ Maritime
transport costs are affected by factors such as port infrastructure, the price of oil,
time at sea, competition among carriers, corruption and piracy. Trade in some products is particularly affected
by changes in maritime transport costs, in particular cereals and oilseeds, which are
shipped in bulk. A doubling in the cost of shipping for agricultural goods would be
associated with a 42% drop in trade on average.¶ Time as a trade barrier¶ Time spent in transit also
has a strong effect on trade. An extra day spent at sea on an average sea voyage of 20 days
implies a 4.5% drop in trade in agricultural products between a given pair of trading partners. Not only
cost but also efficiency in getting agricultural goods to market are therefore important
factors in explaining trade flows.¶ OECD analysis confirms that the longer the time required
for trade transactions, the greater the tendency for trade volumes to be reduced. Lengthy
procedures for exports and imports reduce the probability that firms will enter export
markets for time-sensitive products at all.
High food prices cause nuclear war
CRIBB 2010 (Julian, Julian Cribb is a science communicator, journalist and editor of several newspapers and books. His published
work includes over 7,000 newspaper articles, 1,000 broadcasts, and three books and has received 32 awards for science, medical, agricultural
and business journalism. He was Director, National Awareness, for Australia's science agency, CSIRO, foundation president of the Australian
Science Communicators, and originated the CGIAR's Future Harvest strategy. He has worked as a newspaper editor, science editor for "The
Australian "and head of public affairs for CSIRO. He runs his own science communication consultancy, “The coming famine: the global food crisis
and what we can do to avoid it,” p. 26)
This is the most likely means by which the
coming famine will affect all citizens of Earth, both through the direct
consequences of refugee floods for receiving countries and through the effect on global food prices and the cost to
public revenues of redressing the problem. Coupled with this is the risk of wars breaking out over
local disputes about food, land, and water and the dangers that the major military powers may be sucked
into these vortices, that smaller nations newly nuclear-armed may become embroiled, and that
shock waves propagated by these conflicts will jar the global economy and disrupt trade,
sending food prices into a fresh spiral. Indeed, an increasingly credible scenario for World War
III is not so much a confrontation of superpowers and their allies as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource
conflicts driven by the widening gap between food and energy supplies and peoples' need to
secure them.
Shipbuilding Competitiveness
American Ship Building is not competitive now—the plan increases
production and speed
HAAS 2014 (Benjamin, engineering student at SUNY Maritime, “Strategies for the Success of
Nuclear Powered Commercial Shipping,” Presented to the Connecticut Maritime Association, March
2014, http://atomicinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/CMA-Nuclear-Paper_Benjamin-Haas-3.pdf)¶
Nuclear powered vessels have inherently lower operating costs compared to conventional vessels.
The United States cannot build a conventionally powered ship that is cheaper than one built
in a foreign shipyard because there is no operating cost advantage for the U.S.-built ship.
There is, however, a significant operating cost advantage to nuclear power, which may be
enough to make American shipyards competitive. There are several areas where the U.S.
could gain the upper hand in the development of nuclear powered commercial vessels, which no
other countries at present seem to be pursuing at all. They are:¶ Construction of marine
reactors,¶ Refueling and maintenance of nuclear powered ships,¶ Manning and training of
nuclear merchant ship crews, and¶ Construction of nuclear powered commercial ships.¶ The
first two areas will always require detail and expertise and are activities that cannot be
offshored for cheaper labor. The United States’ current experience with the refueling of
nuclear reactors in shipyards will allow U.S. shipyards to gain the productivity they need to
reduce their costs and achieve competitiveness in that area. The latter potential, that of building
nuclear powered commercial ships in U.S. shipyards, requires further elaboration. ¶ The reason for
America’s uncompetitive, surprisingly overpriced shipbuilding costs compared to foreign
shipyards is not just higher labor and materials costs (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). It is a
combination of lack of productivity and inefficiencies in the corporate and labor structures
(Hansen M., 2012). In some cases, the maintaining of high overheads to acquire complex naval
contracts may also negatively affect certain shipyards abilities to perform commercial work. ¶
Nuclear powered ships could potentially be built in U.S. shipyards and carry the U.S. flag
because their operating costs are inherently lower compared to fossil fueled vessels. Along with
this, there is an environmental advantage associated with nuclear power in the arctic for which a
premium could be paid. By making the most of these cost advantages, a series of nuclear
powered ships could be designed and built in order to give American shipyards enough
orders to increase their productivity and reduce their costs, allowing subsequent nuclear
powered vessels, ranging from bulk carriers to container ships, to be even more competitive
against their foreign counterparts.
There are two internal links – first is naval power
The commercial shipbuilding industry is key to Naval Power
A.M.P No Date (American Maritime Partnership, “National Security,” No date, date is
date accessed, June 29, 2014 http://www.americanmaritimepartnership.com/nationalsecurity/)¶ A strong and vibrant maritime industry helps ensure the United States
maintains its expertise in shipbuilding and waterborne transportation. A cautionary
lesson surrounds Great Britain, which has seen its maritime industry outsourced and the
global influence of its naval forces drastically reduced. The U.S. Department of Defense
recognizes the importance of maintaining a strong domestic shipbuilding industry to
keep our nation safe and secure.¶ “We believe that the ability of the nation to build and
maintain a U.S.-flag fleet is in the national interest, [and] we also believe it is in the
interest of the DoD for U.S. shipbuilders to maintain a construction capability for
commercial vessels.Ӧ A study by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export
Administration, reached a similar conclusion:¶ “The U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry
is a strategic asset analogous to the aerospace, computer, and electronic industries.” ¶
“Frontline warships and support vessels are vital for maintaining America’s national
security and for protecting interests abroad.” ¶ “In emergency situations, America’s cargo
carrying capacity is indispensable for moving troops and supplies to areas of conflict
overseas.”¶ “A domestic capability to produce and repair warships, support vessels, and
commercial vessels is not only a strategic asset but also fundamental to national
security.Ӧ
US shipbuilding is the lynchpin of global deterrence and commerce
NLUS, 12 – a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating our citizens about the
importance of sea power to U.S. national security and supporting the men and women of the
U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine and their families
(Navy League of the United States, “Maritime Primacy & Economic Prosperity: Maritime
Policy 2012-13”, Navy League of the United States, 1/21/12,
http://www.navyleague.org/files/legislative_affairs/maritime_policy20122013.pdf)
Global engagement is critical to the U.S. economy, world trade and the protection of
democratic freedoms that so many take for granted. The guarantors of these vital elements
are hulls in the water, embarked forward amphibious forces and aircraft overhead. The Navy
League of the United States’ Maritime Policy for 2012-13 provides recommendations for strategy, policy and the allocation of national resources
in support of our sea services and essential to the successful execution of their core missions. We
live in a time of complex
challenges — terrorism, political and economic turmoil, extremism, conflicts over
environmental resources, manmade and natural disasters — and potential flash points exist
around the globe. It is the persistent forward presence and engagement of maritime forces
that keep these flash points in check, prevent conflict and crisis escalation, and allow the
smooth flow of goods in a global economy. The United States has fought multiple wars and
sacrificed much to ensure unchallenged access to sea lanes and secure the global commerce
upon which the U.S. economy depends. The “persistent naval presence” provided by our
forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps ships, aircraft, Sailors and Marines is the
guarantor of that hard-won maritime security and the critical deterrent against those who
might seek to undermine that security. Maintaining naval forces that can sustain our national commitment to global
maritime security and dissuade transnational aggression in the future must be a national imperative. The No. 1 challenge to that
imperative is the lack of a fully funded, achievable Navy shipbuilding program that produces
the right quantity and quality of ships, with the right capabilities, for the right costs, in economically affordable numbers
over the next 25 years. A shipbuilding plan must be defined and agreed upon by the Navy, the Departments of
Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security, Congress and the administration — and executed now. Recognizing that hard choices must
be made in a reduction of the defense budget, the Navy League is reducing its recommended funding for the
Department of the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN), account to $20 billion or more per year. This reduced funding leads to a
recommended reduced force level of 305 ships to meet our nation’s global security challenges. This also recognizes that the worldwide
commitment of ship deployment must be reduced. America’s amphibious expeditionary force is prepared to engage today’s threats — today.
Our Marines remain heavily engaged in Afghanistan and support numerous other small-unit
operations that enable nation-building with allies around the globe. The Marine Corps needs the
authorization to reduce to an end strength of 186,800 Marines, and this force level must be properly resourced to maintain a balanced airground logistics team. The Corps must regain its expertise in amphibious operations and maintain that capability in force structure. The service
also must be provided the resources to reset the force, to restore or acquire new equipment and capabilities consumed in the ongoing wars. The
Coast Guard is a multimission, worldwide-deployed armed force with broad law enforcement authorities. It operates seamlessly with the DoD
services as prescribed by the National Command Authority and is the lead agency for maritime homeland security and law enforcement support
to the Navy in deployed operations. In addition, it fulfills several legally mandated missions, including its most employed mission of search and
rescue, plus protection of living marine resources, drug interdiction, illegal migrant interdiction, defense readiness, marine safety, ice operations,
aids to navigation, marine environmental protection, and ports, waterways and coastal security. The substantial breadth of operations, which
has increased markedly in tempo since the 9/11 attacks, continues to overstress aging equipment, resulting in rising maintenance costs and a
greater workload for Coast Guard personnel. The Coast Guard must increase its active-duty military strength to at least 45,000, have an
operational expense budget of at least $6.7 billion and an Acquisition, Construction and Improvements (AC&I) budget resourced at no less than
$2.5 billion per year, of which $2 billion should be dedicated to continuing the recapitalization of the fleet. Skilled
Mariners are
more critical than ever to ensuring our ability to sustain U.S. national and global security
interests. Ninety-five percent of the equipment and supplies required to deploy the U.S.
armed forces is moved by sea. The base of skilled U.S. Merchant Mariners is shrinking. The
shipping capabilities of the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force and the DoD’s Military Sealift Command are sized to support routine
and some surge logistics and specialized mission requirements. This critical capability must be maintained by ensuring an active commercial
U.S.-flag Merchant Marine to support efficient and cost-effective movement of DoD cargo. The
U.S. shipbuilding industry is
in crisis. Finding a solution must be an imperative if our nation is to maintain a Navy
capable of supporting the nation’s defense. Jobs lost in this sector mean precious ground
lost in capability and capacity that cannot be regained. The current production levels for
ship construction and the manufacturing of the other critical systems, equipment and
weapons that we install in our ships, submarines and aircraft are at critically low levels.
Sustaining and upgrading our nation’s critical, defense-related industrial base must be an
essential element of our National Security Strategy. Personnel must train as they will fight to remain operationally
ready. This all-volunteer military also must receive highly competitive compensation in the way of salary as well as health care, retirement and
quality-of-life benefits to remain an effective fighting force. Taking care of our wounded warriors is fundamental.
Second is growth differential –
The US manufacturing industry is on a steep decline and must be
reversed
Ezell 13
STEPHEN EZELL, 27 November 2013, Revitalizing U.S. Manufacturing, http://issues.org/282/ezell-3/ [Stephen Ezell is a senior analyst at the Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation in Washington, DC, and the coauthor, with ITIF President Robert D. Atkinson, of
the September 2011 report International Benchmarking of Countries’ Policies and
Programs ]
Unfortunately, the United States is lagging badly in these efforts. Lack of support for SMEs
was a key factor in the precipitous decline of U.S. manufacturing during the past decade. The
United States must step up its efforts to revitalize manufacturing in general and SME
manufacturing in particular. Free fall Manufacturing’s share of U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP) and employment has fallen precipitously during the past decade. Yet many argue that
U.S. manufacturing is actually quite healthy and that any job losses are simply a result of
superior productivity gains. Others assert that manufacturing is in decline everywhere, so
that the relative decline in U.S. manufacturing is not noteworthy. In contrast to these
sanguine views, the reality is that, although U.S. manufacturing output and employment
remained relatively healthy up until 2000, during the past decade the United States
experienced the deepest industrial decline in world history. Some 54,000 U.S.
manufacturers, including 42,000 SMEs, were shuttered. Manufacturing output, when
properly measured, actually declined. Manufacturing employment fell by 33%, with the loss
of 5.7 million jobs, a steeper decline than even during the Great Depression. Official
government figures suggest that U.S. manufacturing output grew just 5% during the prior
decade, even as U.S. GDP grew 18%. However, that figure is inflated because it significantly
overstates output from two industries: computers/electronics and petroleum/coal
products. Overestimation of the output growth from those two industries masks the fact
that, from 2000 to 2009, 15 of 19 aggregate-level U.S. manufacturing sectors, which account
for 79% of U.S. manufacturing, experienced absolute declines in output. The vast majority of
apparent growth in manufacturing output came from the computers/electronics industry,
which, according to official statistics, grew 260.5%. In other words, this one sector, which
accounts for just 9% of overall U.S. manufacturing output, accounted for 80% of
manufacturing output growth from 2000 to 2009, even though the number of workers in
the industry declined from 1.78 million to 1.09 million. The reality, as explained in detail in
The Case for a National Manufacturing Strategy, is that technical errors afflict official U.S.
government measurements of manufacturing output, such that, when calculated accurately,
real U.S. manufacturing output actually fell by at least 10% during the prior decade. A major
cause of that decline has been a lack of investment in U.S. manufacturing. From 2000 to
2010, capital investment within the United States by U.S. manufacturers declined more than
21%, even as capital investment abroad by U.S. manufacturing firms was on average 16%
higher than at home. Likewise, the notion that manufacturing job losses primarily reflect
productivity gains is also mistaken. U.S. manufacturing productivity grew at similar rates
between 1990 and 1999 and between 2000 and 2009—56 and 61%, respectively—yet
manufacturing employment declined 3% in the former decade but 33% in the latter.
Moreover, U.S. manufacturing job losses have been extreme as compared to those
experienced in peer countries. Of the 10 countries tracked by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, no country lost a greater share of its manufacturing jobs than the United States
between 1997 and 2009. In fact, if manufacturing output had grown at the same rate as GDP
during the prior decade, the United States would have ended the decade with 2.2 million
more manufacturing jobs. Given the multiplier effect that manufacturing jobs have on the
rest of the economy, which is at least two to one, had U.S. manufacturing not shrunk, there
would be perhaps 6 million more Americans working today. In short, the extreme job loss in
U.S. manufacturing during the past decade reflects not productivity increases but rather
output declines resulting from the lack of U.S. manufacturing competitiveness and the fact
that U.S. manufacturers were increasingly offshoring and investing abroad. This is not the
picture of a healthy domestic manufacturing sector. Finally, the notion that U.S.
manufacturing decline is either inevitable or normal is also mistaken, as demonstrated by
the fact that manufacturing is growing in many countries, including developed countries.
For example, from 2000 to 2008, manufacturing output in constant dollars as a share of
GDP increased by 10% in Austria and Switzerland, 14% in Korea, 23% in Finland, 32% in
Poland, and 64% in the Slovak Republic. Moreover, from 1970 to 2008, Germany’s and
Japan’s shares of world manufacturing output remained stable, even as the U.S. share
declined by 12 percentage points, from 28.6 to 17.9%, and China’s share rose 13.4
percentage points, from 3.8 to 17.2%. The deindustrialization of high-wage economies is not
preordained. Competitors such as Germany and Japan have avoided the sharp declines in
manufacturing that befell the United States in the last decade. They have done so by
remaining committed to manufacturing as a core contributor to their economies and by
implementing coherent strategies to boost the productivity, innovation, and
competitiveness of their manufacturing sectors, including specific programs and robust
funding in support of their SME manufacturers.
Nuclear shipbuilding helps jobs, stimulates growth, and is empirically
the foundation for manufacturing
HAAS 2014 (Benjamin, engineering student at SUNY Maritime, “Strategies for the Success of
Nuclear Powered Commercial Shipping,” Presented to the Connecticut Maritime Association, March
2014, http://atomicinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/CMA-Nuclear-Paper_Benjamin-Haas-3.pdf)
According to a recent study done by MARAD in 2013 on the impact of America’s
shipbuilding and repair industry on the U.S. economy (the author will simply use the term
“shipbuilding industry”), each direct job creates 2.7 other jobs indirectly in other parts of
the U.S. economy (MARAD, 2013). While the Gross Domestic Product of America’s
shipbuilding industry is small compared to the national overall, it does employ a
considerable amount of people for its size. U.S. shipbuilding and repair employs over
400,000 workers directly and indirectly, and the average income of a shipbuilding industry
worker was $73,630 in 2011, which is 45 percent higher than the national average (MARAD
2013). Nuclear power is a potential way for the United States to expand its shipbuilding
industry beyond reliance on Jones Act and Naval contracts. The foreign revenue
generated from providing services for nuclear powered ships could be considerable
once their place in the world market becomes widespread. The United States should try to
get back into building commercial ships for foreign trade through the use of nuclear power.
Whether it is in maintenance or construction, shipyard work employs hundreds of well-paid
workers per vessel and is a significant source of foreign capital for a country, making it
desirable for the national economy. The United States should try to get back into building
commercial ships for foreign trade through the use of nuclear power. For example, South
Korea understood the value of commercial shipbuilding in the 1970’s when it sought to
create its’ own shipbuilding industry from the bottom up. The genesis of South Korean
shipbuilding was not privately funded, but heavily supported by the government due to its
importance to the country’s national economy (Walker, 1999). Today, South Korea’s
shipbuilding industry employs tens of thousands of workers per major shipyard and has
the secondary economic effect of utilizing many of the country’s domestic materials
and manufacturing industries.
Manufacturing is key to the US economy
Ian Benjamin,2013, April 11 Top scientist says manufacturing industry is key to strong
economy, http://www.troyrecord.com/general-news/20130417/top-scientist-saysmanufacturing-industry-is-key-to-strong-economy-video
The region's manufacturing sector has had good news in recent years with several smaller
and one major manufacturers settling in the Capital District, but fostering a climate
conducive to manufacturing throughout the country needs to be achieved, said the Director
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. "Why has the president been so
emphatic in regards to manufacturing?" asked Patrick D. Gallagher, also the U.S.
Undersecretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology. "It's two things: one was a
long-standing trend and one was the searing experience of a major economic recession."
The undersecretary was the keynote speaker during the first Advanced Manufacturing
Conference which continues at the Hilton Garden Inn today. The recession, which was the
most serious economic downturn since the Depression, caused the federal government to
look at the causes and to compare the country to other nations, Gallagher explained. The
government found that Germany and China, the economies of which have strong
manufacturing sectors, weathered the economic storm more mildly. Countries like the U.S.,
which has an economy more heavily based on financial services, fared much less well. This
experience combined with a "trend," that being a growing conversation about the
importance of research and innovation, caused the president to bring attention to
manufacturing -- even bringing it to the fore during his State of the Union. Presently, the
government supports one third of all research and development and the private sector
supports the rest. However, this is not equal across all R&D, said Gallagher -- the
government focuses its funding primarily on basic research, spurring the discoveries upon
which new technologies are based. By contrast, the private sector tends to support latestage product development, that is involved with bringing products to market. Of that,
roughly 75 percent is supported by manufacturing-based companies, such as
GlobalFoundries. "This is why manufacturing was going to come into the conversation," said
Gallagher. "If you're talking about the nation's capacity to innovate, manufacturing is the
single biggest player. [...] We are talking about manufacturing as an innovation engine for
the country." What the government needs to learn to do, he emphasized, is work more
closely with the private-sector. Such a partnership is currently taking place at the College of
Nanoscale Science and Engineering in Albany. Gallagher noted that the conversation about
the importance of manufacturing received further attention on the national stage following
the government's decision to bail out the "Big Three" auto manufacturers: General Motors,
Chrysler and Ford. "When the auto industry collapsed and it was clear that it was more than
just auto makers," said Gallagher. "In fact, what was driving this [collapse] was the
enormous amount of activity underneath the automakers. Entire supply chains that
employed hundreds of thousands." When the big three began to falter it endangered not
only their employees, but those employed at parts manufacturers and other related
industries. With the near collapse of the auto industry, the government was confronted with
a truth, explained Gallagher -- a manufacturing industry is a sound bedrock for a nation's
economy.
The impact is hegemony – US capability solves regional and global
instability and proliferation
Brooks et al 13
[Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G. John
Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee
University.William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of
Government at Dartmouth College. “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against
Retrenchment”, Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 7-51,
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107]
A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more
dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’
overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action.
Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations
to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure,
reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others
and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the
baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed,
arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the
“American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous
multipolar regions replete with security
Attempts to maintain hegemony are inevitable - US growth differential
key to maintain alliances and prevent rival challengers
Tellis 9 Senior Associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in
international security, defense and Asian strategic issues. [Ashley J. Tellis (Research
Director of the Strategic Asia program @ National Bureau of Asian Research, “Preserving
Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States”, Global Asia, Vol.4, No. 1, Spring
2009]
Precisely because the desire for dominance is likely to remain a permanent feature of US
geopolitical ambitions — even though how it is exercised will certainly change in
comparison to the Bush years — the central task facing the next administration will still
pertain fundamentally to the issue of US power. This concern manifests itself through the
triune challenges of: redefining the United States’ role in the world, renewing the
foundations of US strength, and recovering the legitimacy of US actions. In other words, the
next administration faces the central task of clarifying the character of US hegemony,
reinvigorating the material foundations of its power, and securing international support for
its policies. The challenge of comprehensively strengthening US power at this juncture,
when the United States is still in the early phase of its unipolar role in global politics, arises
importantly from the fact that the hegemony it has enjoyed since 1991 represents a “prize”
deriving from victory in intense geopolitical competition with another great power. The
historical record suggests that international politics can be unkind to such victors over
the long term. A careful scrutiny of the hegemonic cycles since 1494 confirms quite clearly
that power transitions at the core of the global system often occur because successes in
systemic struggles — of which the Cold War is but one example — can irreparably weaken
otherwise victorious hegemonies. The annals of the past actually corroborate the surprising
proposition that no rising challenger, however capable, has ever succeeded, at least thus far,
in supplanting any prevailing hegemony through cold or hot war. Over the centuries, Spain,
France, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union all tried in different ways but failed. This
reassuring fact notwithstanding, hegemonic transitions still occurred regularly in
international politics, a reality that points to two critical insights about succession struggles
in the international system — which is a subject that ought to be of great significance to the
United States and its allies as well as to its adversaries. First, struggles for hegemony in
global politics are rarely limited to dyadic encounters between states. These struggles
involve not only the existing hegemon and the rising challenger as the preeminent
antagonists — roles that many expect will be played respectively by the United States and
China over the long term — but also the entire cast of international characters, including
non-state actors involved in economic processes, and the nature of their involvement in the
competition become relevant to the succession process. Thus, the nature of the alliances
orchestrated and managed by the United States (and possibly China as well) in the future,
the relationship between state entities and the global economic system, and the
relative burdens borne by every actor involved in this contest become relevant to the
outcome. Second, and equally importantly, who wins in the ensuing struggle — whether
that struggle is short or long, peaceful or violent — is as important as by how much. This is
particularly relevant because the past record unerringly confirms that the strongest
surviving state in the winning coalition usually turns out to be the new primate after the
conclusion of every systemic struggle. Both Great Britain and the United States secured
their respective ascendancies in this way. Great Britain rose through the wreckage of the
wars with Louis XIV and with Napoleon. The United States did so through the carnage of the
hot wars with Hitler and Hirohito, finally achieving true hegemony through the detritus of
the Cold War with Stalin and his successors. If the United States is to sustain this hardearned hegemony over the long term, while countering as necessary a future Chinese
challenge should it emerge, Washington will need to amass the largest differential in
power relative not only to its rivals but also to its friends and allies. Particularly in an
era of globalization, this objective cannot be achieved without a conscious determination to
follow sensible policies that sustain economic growth, minimize unproductive
expenditures, strengthen the national innovation system, maintain military capabilities
second to none, and enjoin political behaviors that evoke the approbation of allies and
neutral states alike. The successful pursuit of such policies will enable the United States to
cope more effectively with near-term challenges as well, including the war on terrorism and
managing threatening regional powers, and will ineluctably require — to return full circle
— engaging the central tasks identified earlier as facing the new US administration. These
tasks involve the need to satisfactorily define the character of desirable US hegemony, the
need for sound policies that will renew the foundations of US strength, and the need to
recover the legitimacy of US purposes and actions. What is clearly implied is that the
principal burdens facing the next US president transcend Asia writ large. The success of
these pursuits, however, will inevitably impact Asia in desirable ways, even as the
resolution of several specifically Asian problems would invariably contribute to the
conclusive attainment of these larger encompassing goals. Policy Implications US efforts in
three areas will reaffirm its role as global leader: supporting a durable framework for
international trade, maintaining unqualified military supremacy, and ensuring the delivery
of certain public goods, such as peace and security, freedom of navigation, and a clean
environment. The renewal of traditional US economic might requires policies that favor
growth and innovation, increased capital and labor pools, and sustained pursuit of total
factor productivity. Legitimacy is an important facet of US power that has eroded over the
last eight years. The US can secure legitimacy for future political acts by shaping world
opinion through a combination of decisiveness, cultivation of key allied support, and
attentiveness to the views of others.
Solvency
Specific Types of Reactors can Meet Nuclear Ocean Safety
Haas 2014(http://atomicinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/CMA-Nuclear-Paper_Benjamin-Haas-3.pdf)
Several types of reactor technologies exist that can achieve the necessary safety goals while
still being appropriate for installation aboard ships. They are the High- Temperature GasCooled reactor and the Molten Salt reactor. While it may be possible to design other reactor
types, such as Pressurized Water reactors or Liquid Metal-¶ Cooled reactors, to achieve passive safety in a
shipboard setting, the necessary features might not be suitable or economical for ships, if the features of the passively safe NuScale
pressurized water reactor, or the Toshiba 4S liquid metal-cooled reactor are any indication (NuScale, 2014; Toshiba 2013). Those
reactors are intended for land based electricity generation and not for any use at sea. In this case, the time honored maxim applies,
“What works well at sea works well on land,” but not the other way around (Crommelin, 2013).
Federal insurance increases acceptance of nuclear power and creates a
commercial role
HAAS 2014 (Benjamin, engineering student at SUNY Maritime, “Strategies for the Success of
Nuclear Powered Commercial Shipping,” Presented to the Connecticut Maritime Association, March
2014, http://atomicinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/CMA-Nuclear-Paper_Benjamin-Haas-3.pdf)
Current protection and indemnity insurance for nuclear reactors in the United States
follows the Price-Anderson Act, a law enacted in 1957 at the beginning of commercial nuclear
power to ensure that adequate compensation existed for the public in the event of nuclear or
radiological accidents, regardless of who might be liable (American Nuclear Society, 2005). This
was to ensure that members of the public would be compensated, versus getting bogged down in
legal battles. In short, all nuclear reactors in the U.S. are required to purchase a certain amount of
coverage based on criteria published by the NRC, but if damages exceed a reactor’s individual
coverage, all reactors pay into a pool to cover the costs (up to $12 billion currently). Beyond that,
Congress can appropriate additional funds if deemed necessary. In essence, all reactor operators
have responsibility, so an accident for one is an accident for all.
The Price-Anderson Act is an appropriate model for insuring future nuclear powered
commercial ships and was, in fact, used by the NS Savannah. While the Price-Anderson Act
gave the Savnnah the liability coverage it needed to be accepted into many ports, the
technology of the Savannah was relatively new and did not have the passive safety features
recommended for future marine reactors (Femenia, 2012). At least for the first generation of
modern nuclear ships, the Price-Anderson Act should be used to guarantee that coverage
will exist for accidents, but the true risks will only be known when actual reactors and completed
ship designs are available, and a modern understanding of radiation health effects is adopted
Private Sector is Interested
Walsh
11/11/10(http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,202949
7_2030622,00.html)
Welcome aboard the cruise ship of the future: shuffle board, casino, ballroom,
and….nuclear reactor?¶ Today Lloyd’s Register, the international standards organization
for the classification and design of ships, announced that it has begun a two-year project
with a consortium of companies to look into the feasibility of nuclear-powered
commercial ships. The primary application will be for cargo ships, but all large vessels,
including cruise ships, could use the technology if Lloyd’s Register endorses it.¶ Atomic
propulsion is already widespread in the world’s oceans — in nuclear submarines,
aircraft carriers and Russian ice-breakers. But the idea of bringing small reactors on to
privately owned ships is a throw-back to the heady days of “atoms for peace,” the era
shortly after the Manhattan Project in which nuclear enthusiasts imagined nuclear
powered cars, fridges, ships and spacecraft. With climate change such an urgent concern,
companies and governments are now dusting off some of those old dreams for carbonfree nuclear–and shipping, which accounts for roughly 5% of global greenhouse gas
emissions, seemed to Lloyd’s Register like a logical place to start.¶ The nuclear golden
age never transpired, of course, in part because safety concerns. On nuclear-powered
military vessels even to this day, for example, crew members wear dosimeters at all
times to measure radiation exposure. Will Mr. and Mrs. Vandecamp be required to do the
same as they play bingo?¶ Another barrier to nuclear-propulsion was that the
minitiarization of nuclear technology (the reactor that propels a submarine for example
is no bigger than a garbage can) required uranium fuel to be highly enriched. And highly
enriched fuel is dangerous–it can be used to build atomic bombs.¶ But a new generation
of small reactors avoids this concern. Hyperion Power Generation, a spin-off from Los
Alamos National Laboratory in the U.S. and a member of the Lloyd’s Register consortium,
has developed a “small modular reactor” that produces 25 MW of electricity (traditional
power plant reactors produce up to 1,500 MW) using low enriched uranium. The
company has big plans for its little reactors—which it calls “nuclear batteries.” They
hope their little atom splitters can be used to power everything from American
subdivisions to desalination plants in the developing world. Their design has Lloyd’s
Register interested.¶ The other consortium members are ship designers BMT Nigel Gee
and Greek shipping company Enterprises Shipping and Trading. Beyond the technical
challenges, one of the primary obstacles will be how the ships can be used in countries
that are currently unfriendly or have statutory prohibitions of nuclear power. BMT Nigel
Gee will be looking at the feasibility of a physical separation of the ship, meaning that the
portion of the ship with the nuclear propulsion would be used for deep-sea transit but
then remain in international waters while a large module with the cargo (or passengers)
enters port under battery power.¶ Small modular reactors such as Hyperion Power’s
“nuclear battery” do not have universal support, however. Some environmentalists say
their small size makes them vulnerable to terrorist sabotage or theft. And it’s unclear
how investors will view a fleet of nuclear ships. Nuclear power requires political support,
and a single accident (a maritime equivalent to Chernobyl or Three Mile Island) could at
anytime swing sentiment against the technology. But Nick Brown, Maritime
Communications Manager at Lloyd’s Register, says that, like nations themselves, the
shipping industry has been forced by climate change to look at all alternatives to fossil
fuels. “There is this perception that nuclear represents an increased risk but really it
needs to be one of the options we consider in how to manage the much larger risk of
global climate change.Ӧ In other words, cruise ship enthusiasts should think about
packing sun screen in the future. I can hear my Mrs. Vandecamp now: do you have the
SPF 500, dear?
Private Sector Companies are Interested in Nuclear Shipping
World Nuclear News 11/18/10 (http://www.world-nuclearnews.org/NN_Full_steam_ahead_for_nuclear_shipping_1811101.html)
Although shipping is already highly energy efficient, pressure has come on the industry to
lower emissions. There is the potential for market-based measures for controlling carbon
dioxide emissions, while the entry into force of strict International Maritime Organisation
controls in 2020 provides a firm deadline against which the industry can weigh the benefits
of a range of technology enhancements and fuel options. But with no clear technological fix
to lower emissions using traditional diesel or LPG fuels, nuclear energy is emerging as a
practical option.¶ ¶ This trend has been developing quickly in recent years and the recent
announcement of a major joint research project on the topic is the most significant to date.¶ ¶
Marine and energy consultants BMT Group and Enterprises Shipping and Trading have
joined with start-up small reactor firm Hyperion and Lloyd's Register to "investigate the
practical maritime applications for small modular reactors."¶ ¶ "We will see nuclear ships on
specific trade routes sooner than many people currently anticipate," said Lloyd's Register
CEO Richard Sadler. The organisation has been an independent service provider to the
shipping industry for 250 years.¶ ¶ In response to its members' interest in nuclear
propulsion Lloyd's Register has recently rewritten its 'rules' for nuclear ships, which
concern the integration of a reactor certified by a land-based regulator with the rest of the
ship. A draft of the rules was put before Lloyd's technical committee two weeks ago and this
represents a further step towards an international regulatory regime to ensure worldwide
safety in a potential nuclear shipping sector. Vince Jenkins of Lloyd's Register told World
Nuclear News: "National maritime regulators have little nuclear capability, so land based
nuclear regulators will be needed in support. Since there are no internationally traded
nuclear powered merchant vessels today, our nuclear powered ship rules have suggested a
framework, which may allow nuclear powered shipping to operate. Within this suggested
framework, we have developed the area where it is felt that a ship classification society can
add value and confidence to the safety of nuclear powered vessels, the integration of the
reactor plant into the ship."¶ ¶ The new program of joint research is meant to produce "a
concept tanker ship design based on conventional and modular concepts," said Lloyd's. It
noted that "Special attention will be paid to analysis of a vessel's lifecycle cost as well as to
hull-form designs and structural layout, including grounding and collision protection."¶ ¶
Nuclear power looked set for a maritime role in the 1960s thanks to early vessels like the
Savannah and Otto Hahn, although in the end the Savannah worked for only ten years and
the Otto Hahn was repowered with diesel engines after nine years. The Japanese-built
Mutsu operated from 1970 until 1992 but none of these ships was a commercial success. ¶ ¶
A notable exception has been the icebreaker fleet that works Russia's trade routes in the
Arctic Ocean. These vessels number only seven, but one is a cargo vessel and small reactors
of the same type are currently being fitted to the Akademik Lomonosov, the world's first
floating nuclear power plant, set for deployment in Russia's far east.¶ ¶ Nevertheless, there
remain about 200 small reactors at sea in military fleets but this technology cannot easily be
transferred to the civil sector due to the requirement of using low-enriched uranium (LEU).
In the military sector of recognised nuclear weapons states, high-enriched uranium allows
more compact reactor designs with weight and controllability benefits.¶ ¶ The reactor of
the Hyperion system uses LEU and measures about 1.5 metres by 2.5 metres. It would
produce about 70 MWt - enough for about 25 MWe for propulsion. Its 'battery' design
simplifies refuelling to a swap-out operation every 8-10 years with the possibility of
managed lease arrangements similar to aircraft engines.¶ ¶ However, incorporation of any
reactor in a ship would require extensive radiation shielding, consideration of impact
protection. A step change in crew training would be required and there is a strong case for
crew to be supplied by reactor vendors.¶ ¶ Similar to nuclear power on land, the additional
capital cost of nuclear compared to fossil fuels is a significant obstacle despite the fact that
savings on fuel and potential emissions charges would make nuclear economic in the long
run. One of the most effective ways for a diesel-powered vessel to save fuel and emissions is
to travel more slowly and avoiding this practical constraint could make nuclear vessels
particularly attractive for certain cargoes and routes
Nuclear Ships are Feasible but still need Governmental Regulation
Nuclear Engineering International 9/15/11
(http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurethe-nuclear-propulsion-of-merchantships)
The nuclear propulsion of ships was first introduced into submarine practise in 1955 when the USN Nautilus sailed on its
maiden voyage. Since that time some 700 nuclear reactors have served at sea and today there are about 200 reactors
providing the power for marine vehicles. Following the USN Nautilus, the NS Savannah sailed as a passenger-cargo
demonstrator ship under US president Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace programme. The Otto Hahn and Mutsu followed,
again both designed as technology demonstrators. Since
that time a number of other nuclear propelled
merchant ships have been designed, most notably the Russian icebreaker classes, as well as
a few ships engaged on specialist duties. More recently, the Yamal and the 50 Years of
Victory have worked as dual-purpose passenger cruise ships and icebreakers.¶ Significant
changes in the normal design process of a merchant ship would need to be introduced to
incorporate nuclear propulsion. The design process will have to be driven by a safety case in which building,
operation, maintenance and decommissioning are the principal features. These safety cases will embrace the nuclear,
mechanical, electro-technical and naval architectural aspects of the ship design with the safety and integrity of the nuclear
plant taking precedence. Such procedures would be required to involve all parties concerned with the ship including the
builder, classification society, flag state and national nuclear administration, as well as the ship owner, who, as the duty holder,
would in addition need to demonstrate its ability to operate the ship in a competent manner. This entire process would need
to embrace the principles and requirements set out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), albeit adapted for the
marine environment.¶ Most commonly, enrichment of the uranium fuel to a level of 3.5% to 5% might be anticipated, from
which a refuelling interval for a merchant ship might be around 5 to 7 years; not dissimilar to classification survey intervals.¶
The majority of reactors that have been deployed at sea have been of the pressurised water reactor type. Consequently, a
significant body of experience has built up around these reactors, and it is likely that any early applications of nuclear
technology in merchant ships would aim to utilise this accumulated knowledge. In the longer term, high-temperature reactors
and other types might find applications. If suitably marinised, nuclear batteries (small reactors with replaceable, pre-fuelled,
tamper-resistant cores) might also find deployment. Fuel usage in a reactor will be considerably less than the quantities of
heavy fuel burnt in conventionally-powered large ships. For example, the amount of fuel required to power the voyage of a
12500 TEU container ship from Rotterdam to a port on the east coast of the USA at a speed of 25 knots would be on the order
of 1550 tonnes of fuel oil, or about 2.2kg of uranium fuel enriched to 3.5%.¶ Steam produced by the heat of a nuclear reactor
could be expanded through a turbine, either forming part of a direct-drive transmission system to the propeller or,
alternatively, a turbo-electric power station system from which power might be drawn for the ship’s hotel, cargo handling or
storage and propulsion purposes. The latter could become a particularly attractive option for some types of ship. Direct-drive
propulsion systems have a number of disadvantages relating to the transmission system, particularly with respect to the
gearbox. Alternatively, the turbo-electric concept would more readily facilitate the use of complex steam cycles to gain a
higher overall cycle efficiency, since reversing of the turbine would no longer be necessary for astern operation of the ship.¶
The positioning of the reactor within the ship would likely present some constraint on the overall ship general arrangement.
Clearly, it is beneficial that the reactor plant is protected as far as is reasonably possible from undue sea induced motions and
vibration and the most benign location would be around the centre of floatation of the ship. The reactor and containment
location will also need to be protected from the effects of collision between ships. As
the deployment of nuclear
power is perhaps only likely, for large merchant ships in the foreseeable future, vessel size
offers significant scope for a protection system to be designed, since the size of the reactor
containment will be significantly smaller than the breadth of the ship. This, therefore, gives
ample opportunity to design an arrangement which will distribute the energy of the
collision into the hull and away from the reactor location. Typically, this might be achieved by the
transfer of technology from the automobile industry in the use of elasto-plastic principles of design for crash protection.
Similar energy principles should also form the design basis for resisting a piracy attack on a ship using missiles and the
fundamental principles to be utilised would derive directly from the safety case for the ship.¶ Nuclear propulsion deployment
in a merchant ship could change other aspects of ship design. For example, nuclear fuel’s relative cheapness might enable
operation of a ship at much faster speeds than oil-powered ships sail at today; 35 knots for a container ship, or 21 knots for a
tanker (see box) compared with around 22 and 15 knots today. Running a fast ship on a liner route might save the deployment
of one ship when moving a fixed volume or weight of cargo. Alternatively, the minimal mass and volume of fuel used may give
scope for increased deadweight capacity or, alternatively, provide greater flexibility in the hull design.¶ In terms of
procurement, the purchase price of the nuclear propelled ship would be considerably greater than that of an equivalent
conventional ship, assuming that the nuclear plant were purchased by the ship owner. However, for the conventionallypropelled ship, the through-life fuel costs are high and are likely to rise further with the phasing out of heavy fuel and any
introduction of carbon tax. In contrast, the price of uranium enriched to commercial levels is much cheaper than conventional
fuels. Therefore, the fuel costs become very much less for the nuclear ship. These, together with the other known costs, can be
offset against the high initial cost to show a break-even point sometime between the first and second decade of the ship’s life.
Clearly, however, there are other cost elements about which little is known at present, such as insurance, maintenance,
pilotage and port dues and survey fees.¶ A key question that would need resolution for merchant ship application would be
whether the nuclear plant were purchased or leased by the shipowner. A leasing arrangement may simplify the execution of
those duties by the plant manufacturer undertaking the complete machinery cycle process through the design, certification,
manufacture, operation and eventual disposal of the propulsion plant. Such an arrangement would not relieve the ship owners
from their responsibilities as duty holders. Indeed, nuclear plant operation and disposal are particularly onerous aspects that
would require detailed knowledge on the part of the ship owner which, at present, few possess. Achieving that level of
knowledge would require establishing training programmes analogous to those operated by nuclear Navies.¶ Even in the
leasing model, some lesser level of nuclear operation expertise would still be required of the ship’s officers, since the nuclear
propulsion plant would need to be integrated within the ship’s overall command structure. Clearly, in both respects the
current Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping code requirements are deficient. Moreover, training would
need to be reactor-specific with revision periods and recertification necessary. These requirements would have serious
implications for many of the current employment contractual arrangements within the merchant navy.¶ In 1981 the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) adopted a code of safety for nuclear merchant ships, Resolution A.491(XII), and
although it has not been implemented it is still extant. However, although relatively farsighted at the time, it would need
updating so as to be aligned with current thinking on nuclear safety. Prior to that resolution, Lloyd’s Register also maintained a
set of provisional rules for nuclear-propelled merchant ships. These have recently been completely revised [see box].¶ The
role of the land-based nuclear regulator and the views of the flag and port state controls will be critical for the successful
implementation of marine nuclear propulsion. Mutual acceptance of certification between different countries will become the
key to nuclear ship operation and voyage planning.¶ An analogous issue is the question of plant maintenance. While normal
hull and structural maintenance is unlikely to be a significant issue, any maintenance involving either directly or indirectly the
nuclear plant is of concern. Plant-related maintenance will need to be embraced by the safety case for the ship and then
planned accordingly together with the possibility of having to use dedicated berths or ports where such desired activity can be
carried out.¶ In the case of public opinion, it is clear that there is a perception that CO2 and greenhouse gases present a
significant threat for the future. There is some growing acceptance that the use of nuclear power for ship propulsion is
beneficial. Some countries, however, remain opposed to nuclear-propelled ships entering their ports, while other federallyorganised countries have states with conflicting views. Notwithstanding these differing views, other countries are suggesting
that serious consideration should be given to nuclear propulsion for merchant ships. For example, in a recently-produced UK
government memorandum detailing options for decarbonising Britain by 2050, the section on international shipping suggests
“building and maintaining a new fleet of nuclear-powered container ships and passenger ships.”¶ Decommissioning the ship is
another major issue, particularly for a non-state owned shipping company, although this is not an insoluble problem. A
number of dismantling options are available and the immediate dismantling and safe storage options have been used, in part,
for the Otto Hahn and Savannah respectively. The third option is entombment, of which there are a number of naturallyoccurring examples.¶ The question of the insurance of nuclear propelled ships raises a number of issues. The first is clearly the
stance of hull and machinery underwriters and that of Protection & Indemnity Clubs. In the former case nuclear technology
and its mechanical risks are comparatively well-understood and, if not, lend themselves to probabilistic analysis of the risk. In
the latter case if one member of a club purchased a nuclear ship which was subsequently subject to a claim, the claim could
place the other members of the mutual club to considerable financial exposure. It is unlikely that governments or flag states,
for the most part, would enter into the underwriting process for commercial ships.¶ If a nuclear-propelled ship came into
difficulties while on passage the salvage or rescue process would need some careful analysis. It is unlikely that the standard
Lloyd’s procedure would suffice and an amendment to that would almost certainly be required. Such a scenario would clearly
be an extreme case, since a ship would need to have an auxiliary means of propulsion if it was fitted with only a single reactor
plant. Typically, this would be a diesel engine capable of propelling the ship at six or seven knots towards a safe haven. Again,
this might suggest specifying a turbo-electric main propulsion system so that the auxiliary diesel generator could then
contribute to the onboard electric power station, from which propulsion power would be derived. If two or more independent
small nuclear power plants were provided, the need for an auxiliary propulsion diesel engine would not exist.¶ In summary, it
is clear that the technical aspects of nuclear propulsion are well-understood as there has been a considerable body of
The principal issues relate to training, insurance,
perception and operational change that a nuclear-powered ship would place upon an
owner. These are in addition to the reorientation of the ship procurement process that
would be necessary, so that all parts of the design, construction, operation, maintenance
and decommissioning processes would become explicitly governed by the safety case for
the ship. Indeed, the production of the safety case would require the involvement at the
design conception stage of all of the interested parties including the appropriate nuclear
inspectorates, flag states, classification societies, shipbuilder and nuclear plant
manufacturer and the ship owner, who is the duty holder.
experience accumulated with marine platforms.
2ac- 1:15
1nr- 3
1ar-2:15
2nr- 2:15
2ar- 2:15
1nc- immigration reform good because good for econ
aff- not key or no impact
1nr- new impact and responding, how am I gonna make my best impacts on top of those
GOP IS SUSCCESSFUL AND GOOD FOR THE ECONOMY. WE SOLVE FOR THE IMPACTS
THAT THEY CLAIM TO SOLVE FOR.
The republicans have a very high chance to take the senate in the
current political landscape
Sides 7/15 (John Sides is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at George Washington
University.—“ New Election Lab forecast suggests 86 percent chance that GOP wins Senate”—washingtonpost.com—
15 July 2014-- http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/15/new-election-lab-forecastsuggests-86-percent-chance-that-gop-wins-senate-- WH)
Election Lab, our midterm elections forecast, has been updated with a host of new
features, including — most importantly — an updated forecast. Our model currently gives
Republicans an 86 percent chance of winning a Senate majority.¶ Among Election
Lab’s new features are a new balance-of-power bar that compares the forecast to the
current Senate make-up, a view of both the House and Senate map that isolates seats
expected to change hands, drop-down menus that take you to any race, and the ability to
share individual races via social media.¶ The updated forecast for the House is nothing
surprising. In line with what we’ve previously written, we estimate that the Democrats have
less than a 1 percent chance of taking the House. Our model currently estimates that the
Democrats will win 193 seats, down slightly from the 201 they controlled after the 2012
election and the 199 they currently control, given existing vacancies. We expect to update
this forecast with additional data about the candidates once the primaries are over, and
with polling data as well. But, given how strong the Republicans’ position is, we would be
surprised if any new information significantly altered the strong odds of continued
Republican control.¶ The updated forecast for the Senate is perhaps more striking, of course.
Our Senate model includes the same factors noted previously, but now also includes a
polling average from various races that currently have sufficient polling data. Last week I
described what we have learned about early Senate polls and how we combine the model
and forecast. (We are indebted to Mark Blumenthal and the folks at Pollster for making
these polling data available to us for this purpose.)¶ By itself, our forecasting model has
always indicated that the GOP had a good chance of retaking the Senate. Nothing in the
political landscape has shifted the model’s forecast. National conditions continue to
provide headwinds for Democratic candidates. Most importantly, President Obama’s
approval rating continues to be middling at best, and may even have declined slightly.
Senate primaries have not yet produced the sorts of Republican candidates that arguably
cost their party Senate races in 2010 and 2012.¶ There was a time, though, when the polling
data suggested more GOP vulnerability. Consider, for example, the Kentucky Senate race
between Republican Mitch McConnell and Democrat Alison Lundergan Grimes. In late 2013
and the first few months of 2014, polls suggested the race was tied. But now the polling has
begun to line up more cleanly with the forecast. McConnell has opened up a narrow lead
that, in combination with the model, is sufficient for us to forecast a Republican victory
there.¶ Thus, although current polls adjust our model’s forecast for individual races, the
polls do not change our topline prediction, which is currently bullish for the GOP.¶ Why so
bullish? Here’s an explanation in a nutshell. Most analysts give the GOP a very good shot
at controlling at least 46 seats. See the list over at The Upshot. Control of the Senate
depends on nine apparently competitive seats: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Michigan. The GOP needs to win at least five of
those seats to control a majority (since the Democrats would presumably control the Senate
with 50 seats, given Vice President Biden’s tie-breaking vote).¶ At the moment, our model
suggests that the GOP has a very good chance of winning the Republican-leaning
states: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, and Louisiana. That gives them five
seats. They also have a better than 50-50 chance of winning Iowa, where Joni Ernst’s
recent surge has made the race neck-and-neck—a trend that is consistent with what our
model suggested about the Iowa race back in May. Meanwhile, Democrats have a good
chance of winning Colorado, Michigan, and North Carolina.¶ Our forecast in states like
Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, and Louisiana gives the GOP a much better chance than many
observers do. These races are toss-ups according to the Cook Political Report, for example.
The reason is that our model is very confident of a GOP win in all three campaigns, and the
polls do not give us enough reason to question this for now. At the same time, the
Democrats have strong candidates in these races, so it is possible that the prediction could
shift in their favor. However, absent a clear trend toward the Democrats in the polls, our
forecast will continue to favor the GOP in these races.
A republican senate will pass immigration reform
Bolton 5/15 (Alexander Bolton is a staff writer for The Hill—“ GOP: We'll move immigration reform if we take
back Senate”—thehill.com—15 May 2014-- http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/206177-gop-well-moveimmigration-reform-if-we-take-back-senate--WH)
Senate Republicans say they'll try to pass immigration reform legislation in the next two
years if they take back the Senate in November. ¶ The Republicans say winning back the
Senate will allow them to pass a series of bills on their own terms that have a better chance
of winning approval in the House. ¶ Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a central member of the
coalition that passed a comprehensive reform bill in the Senate last year, said he would craft
a better legislative approach if Republicans control the upper chamber in 2015.¶ That would
give his party a chance to pass immigration legislation before the presidential election,
when Hispanic voters will be crucial to winning the White House.¶ But Democrats are
threatening that if the House does not pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill this
year the issue will be dead in 2015 and 2016, sinking the GOP brand among Hispanics ahead
of the 2016 election.¶ “I certainly think we can make progress on immigration particularly
on topics like modernizing our legal immigration system, improving our mechanisms for
enforcing the law and I think if you did those things you could actually make some progress
on addressing those who are illegally,” Rubio said Wednesday evening of the prospects of
passing immigration reform in 2015. ¶ He said the Senate next year should pass immigration
reform through a series of sequential bills that build upon each other to enact
comprehensive reform. This approach would be more palatable in the House, he said. ¶
Rubio said he was not fully satisfied with the comprehensive bill that passed the Senate last
year, adding Republicans would “absolutely” pass better legislation if they pick up six or
more seats in the midterm election. ¶ Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), who is poised to take
over as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said he will vote to pass immigration
legislation in the next Congress if Republicans ascend to the majority.¶ “We’d start over
again next year,” Grassley said, when asked about the next steps if Congress does not pass
immigration reform by September.¶ “I’d make a decision about whether you could get more
done by separate bills or a comprehensive bill,” he said.¶ Grassley said he may have
supported the 2013 Senate immigration bill if it had tougher border security and interior
enforcement provisions. ¶ “For that reason, not for the legal immigration stuff that’s in it,” he
said, explaining why he voted against it.¶ Some Republicans, such as Sen. Jeff Sessions (RAla.), strongly oppose increasing legal immigration.¶ “Washington can’t rewrite the law of
supply and demand: we can’t rebuild our middle class if we continue to bring in record
numbers of new workers for companies to hire at the lowest available wage,” he said.¶ Only
14 Republicans voted for the Senate bill, which conservative critics panned for giving too
much discretion to the Obama administration in deciding how its border security
requirements would be met. ¶ Senate Republicans believe that House Republicans would be
more likely to pass immigration reform if the midterm election shifts control of the upper
chamber because it would be easier to negotiate a Senate-House compromise.¶ House
conservatives have opposed bringing immigration legislation to the House floor because
they fear even a narrow bill could be used as a vehicle to jam the sprawling Senate bill
through the House. That threat would be less dire if the Senate passed a series of smaller
immigration reform bills.¶ “It could pass if we break it down into smaller pieces,” said
Senate Republican Whip John Cornyn (Texas). “[The House] has always been amenable to
passing smaller bills on a step-by-step basis.Ӧ Once Congress passes legislation to tighten
border security and interior enforcement, it could pave the way for a deal legalizing an
estimated 11 million illegal immigrants, expanding work visas and enlarging the flow of
legal immigration, Senate Republicans argue.¶ Democrats, however, would balk at reforming
the nation’s immigration laws through a variety of separate bills.
GOP good – poverty/economy
GOP Senate would bring 1 million people out of poverty and solve
unemployment- key to economic growth
Voth ‘14(Ben, associate professor of communication and director of debate at Southern
Methodist University, “What Republican Senate Control Means for America”, January 19
2014,
http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/01/what_republican_senate_control_means_for_a
merica.html, C.B.)
The United States experienced the most dramatic reduction in poverty from
1996 to 2000. Poverty in the United States fell to an astounding level of 11
percent. Why? This is an important question, given that poverty is over 15% today
and we are approaching the 50th anniversary of a war on poverty. The Welfare
Reform Act of 1995, compelled by a Republican Senate against the wishes of
Democratic President Clinton, ushered in the era of big government being
"over." Anti-conservative revisionists credit the booming tech economy of the late
1990s and not the Republican inspired legislation. But how does that refute the
point? Republican control of the Senate left the economy free to innovate,
grow, and reduce poverty alongside welfare reforms. The poverty rate fell
more mildly between 1982 and 1989 -- also correlating with strong
Republican control of the Senate. The poverty rate rose from 2000 to 2003 and
dipped again between 2004 and 2007. It has risen dramatically since 2008. It seems
rather clear that electing Republicans to the Senate correlated with poverty
reductions, and electing Democrats to the Senate in 2007 correlated with
increases in poverty. Republican Senate control correlates with a greater than
2% reduction in the national poverty rate over four-year periods. That is
roughly a million people moved out of poverty. Unemployment In 1982, U.S.
unemployment reached an incredible 10.2 percent. By March of 1989, the
unemployment rate had fallen to 5.2 percent. Unemployment rebounded
upward to over 7 percent by November of 1992. Notice again that Republican
control of the Senate correlates rather nicely with economic prosperity. In
August of 1995, U.S. unemployment stood at 5.5%. Incredibly, that rate would drop
to 3.4% by 2000. Here again the robust strength of the U.S. economy while
Republicans controlled the Senate is impressive. Intellectual revisionists give all
the credit to the Democratic President Clinton, but it may well be his January 2005
legislative capitulation on "big government" to Newt Gingrich that did the trick. In
June of 2003, unemployment reached a high of 6.3 percent. It plunged again to 4.4
percent in May of 2007. Here again it is nearly impossible to miss the powerful
correlation with a Republican Senate. Almost everyone knows what has
happened to unemployment since 2007, with renewed Democratic control of
the Senate. Unemployment drops by about half a percent every year
Republicans control the body.
Employment key to economic resilience- consumer demand insulates
collapse
Dewan and Bernhardt ’12(Sabina, Director of Globalization and International
Employment at the Center for American Pogress and directs the Just Jobs Network, Jordan,
Special Assistant at the Center, “Creating Just Jobs Must Be Our Top Priority”, November 15
2012,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/news/2012/11/15/45121/creating-justjobs-must-be-our-top-priority/, C.B.)
Creating jobs—and making sure they are the right jobs—will be how we lift
millions of people out of poverty and into the middle class, how we empower
billions of women and young people, and how we develop a strong, secure, and
robust 21st century global economy. Access to jobs will be what determines
whether or not the United States has a world of flourishing consumers to
which to sell its goods and services. U.S. exports already support 7 percent of
American jobs and 25 percent of U.S. manufacturing jobs are supported by exports.
Creating good jobs for people in other countries is a fundamental part of creating
more jobs for Americans here at home.
Nuclear Ships would be clean – Navy proves
Mueller et al. 12 (T.J., J.M. Steele, and L. E. Murphy, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program,
Department of the Navy, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND DISPOSAL OF
RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM U.S. NAVAL NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS AND THEIR
SUPPORT FACILITIES, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM, 2012,
http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14-inlinefiles/2014-04-09%20NT-131.pdf)//rh
The radioactivity in materials discussed in this report originates in the pressurized water
reactors of U.S. naval nuclear-powered ships. As of the end of 2012, the U.S. Navy had 72
nuclear-powered submarines, 10 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and 2 moored training
ships in operation. Facilities involved in construction, maintenance, overhaul, and refueling
of these nuclear propulsion plants include six shipyards, two tenders, and five naval bases.
This report describes disposal of radioactive liquid, transportation and disposal of solid
wastes, and monitoring of the environment to determine the effect of radioactive releases,
and updates reports on this subject issued by the Navy in references 1 through 6
(references are listed on page 30). This report concludes that radioactivity associated with
U.S. naval nuclear-powered ships has had no discernible effect on the quality of the
environment. A summary of the radiological information supporting this conclusion follows:
From the start of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, the policy of the U.S. Navy has
been to reduce to the minimum practicable the amounts of radioactivity released into
harbors. Since 1971, the total long-lived gamma radioactivity released each year within 12
miles of shore from all U.S. naval nuclear-powered ships and their support facilities has
been less than 0.002 curie; this includes all harbors, both U.S. and foreign, entered by these
ships. As a measure of the significance of these data, the total quantity of long-lived
radioactivity released within 12 miles of shore in any of the last 42 years is less than the
quantity of naturally occurring radioactivity in the volume of saline harbor water occupied
by a single nuclear-powered submarine, or the quantity of naturally occurring radioactivity
in the top inch of soil on a half-acre lot. In addition, if one person were able to drink the
entire amount of radioactivity discharged into any harbor in any of the last 42 years, that
person would not exceed the annual radiation exposure permitted by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for an individual nuclear worker. Environmental monitoring is
conducted by the U.S. Navy in U.S. and foreign harbors frequented by U.S. naval nuclearpowered ships. This monitoring consists of analyzing harbor sediment, water, and marine
life samples for radioactivity associated with naval nuclear propulsion plants; radiation
monitoring around the perimeter of support facilities; and effluent monitoring.
Environmental samples from each of these harbors are also checked at least annually by a
Department of Energy laboratory to ensure analytical procedures are correct and
standardized. Independent environmental monitoring has been conducted by the
Environmental Protection Agency in U.S. harbors during the past several decades. The
results of these extensive, detailed surveys have been consistent with Navy results. These
surveys have again confirmed that U.S. naval nuclear-powered ships and support facilities
have had no discernible effect on the radioactivity of the environment.
Economy
American Ship Building is not competitive—the plan increases
production speed
HAAS 2014
(Benjamin, engineering student at SUNY Maritime, “Strategies for the Success of Nuclear
Powered Commercial Shipping,” Presented to the Connecticut Maritime Association, March
2014, http://atomicinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/CMA-Nuclear-Paper_BenjaminHaas-3.pdf)¶
Nuclear powered vessels have inherently lower operating costs compared to conventional vessels. The United States
cannot build a conventionally powered ship that is cheaper than one built in a foreign
shipyard because there is no operating cost advantage for the U.S.-built ship. There is, however, a significant
operating cost advantage to nuclear power, which may be enough to make American
shipyards competitive. There are several areas where the U.S. could gain the upper hand in
the development of nuclear powered commercial vessels, which no other countries at present seem to be
pursuing at all. They are:¶ Construction of marine reactors,¶ Refueling and maintenance of
nuclear powered ships,¶ Manning and training of nuclear merchant ship crews, and¶
Construction of nuclear powered commercial ships.¶ The first two areas will always require detail and
expertise and are activities that cannot be offshored for cheaper labor. The United States’ current experience
with the refueling of nuclear reactors in shipyards will allow U.S. shipyards to gain the
productivity they need to reduce their costs and achieve competitiveness in that area. The latter potential,
that of building nuclear powered commercial ships in U.S. shipyards, requires further elaboration. ¶ The reason for America’s
uncompetitive, surprisingly overpriced shipbuilding costs compared to foreign shipyards is not just higher labor and materials
costs (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). It is a combination of lack of productivity and inefficiencies in the corporate and labor
structures (Hansen M., 2012). In some cases, the maintaining of high overheads to acquire complex naval contracts may also
negatively affect certain shipyards abilities to perform commercial work. ¶ Nuclear powered ships could potentially be built in
U.S. shipyards and carry the U.S. flag because their operating costs are inherently lower compared to fossil fueled vessels.
Along with this, there is an environmental advantage associated with nuclear power in the arctic for which a premium could
be paid. By making the
most of these cost advantages, a series of nuclear powered ships could
be designed and built in order to give American shipyards enough orders to increase their
productivity and reduce their costs, allowing subsequent nuclear powered vessels, ranging
from bulk carriers to container ships, to be even more competitive against their foreign
counterparts.
-
To specific sector is important – manufacturing, not total econ collapse
Nuclear shipping popular
Make sure no advantage CPs for the economy – use competitiveness as mechanism
Trade - ! grown differential – make sure growing faster than other countries
And, the economy is on brink of collapse – new jobs are needed now
Sprott 3/25
Eric Sprott, 25 March 2014, The non-recovery of the U.S. economy,
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140325/FREE/140329956 [Eric Sprott is
chairman and CIO of Sprott Inc. and senior portfolio manager of Sprott Asset Management.]
Yes, the U.S. has been adding new jobs, but a large share of the decline in the unemployment rate can be explained by
discouraged workers leaving the labor force. This effect can be seen in the falling participation rate.
Many argue that
this decline in the participation rate is structural and is caused by population aging. This
explanation is superficial and misleading. Figure 1, shows the contribution to the total participation rate for
various age groups. Since January 2005, the participation rate has fallen by 2.9% (from 65.8% to 62.9%). Of this
decrease, 1.3% and 4.7% were driven by the 16-24 and 25-54 age groups, respectively. The rest
was offset by a 3.1% increase in participation by the 55+ cohort. (Source: Bloomberg, Sprott calculations) This is
reflective of a deep problem, as it suggests that baby boomers are failing to make ends meet
and have to work for longer or even come out of retirement, and that the future workforce, those in their
prime working years, are leaving the labor force. Interestingly, without the “3% contribution” from the 55+
cohort, the labor force would have fallen below 60% for the first time since 1971, a period when the participation rate was
starting to expand, driven mainly by women entering the workforce. But that's not all; many of
those in their early
20s, seeing how hard it is to find a job, are staying in college for longer, amassing
outrageous levels of student debt in the process. This is obviously not a sustainable solution.
Delinquency rates on student loans (the bulk of them insured by the U.S. government) are now at all-time highs (Figure 2).
Most of these student loans have been securitized and sold to investors with the government's stamp (sound familiar?).
(Source: Bloomberg, Sprott calculations) For all the rest (ages 25-54), participation in the labour force has also been declining,
although at a slightly slower pace. Nevertheless, the
average U.S. consumer is still worse off than it was
before the Great Recession. Real disposable income per capita (Figure 3) is lower than it
was at the end of 2005 while, over the same period, health care costs have increased to 11.5% from 10.0% of GDP,
thereby • The participation rate is low and supported by baby boomers working more or coming out of retirement. Indicators
of the state of the U.S. economy point to a non-recovery: Disposable income is still below its pre-recession level. • An ever-
increasing share of disposable income is being spent on health care, crippling discretionary
spending. • Higher interest rates are further depressing discretionary spending (home and
auto sales). • All of which is resulting in anemic business and economic activity. Claims that the U.S. economy is suddenly
rebounding have been made before. They are misleading at best and fallacious at worst. It would not be surprising
to see further deterioration, which would force central planners to initiate additional
unconventional intervention (i.e., quantitative easing).
Nuclear shipbuilding helps jobs, boosts the economy, and is empirically
the foundation for manufacturing
HAAS 2014 (Benjamin, engineering student at SUNY Maritime, “Strategies for the Success of
Nuclear Powered Commercial Shipping,” Presented to the Connecticut Maritime Association, March
2014, http://atomicinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/CMA-Nuclear-Paper_Benjamin-Haas-3.pdf)
According to a recent study done by MARAD in 2013 on the
impact of America’s shipbuilding and repair
industry on the U.S. economy (the author will simply use the term “shipbuilding industry”), each direct job
creates 2.7 other jobs indirectly in other parts of the U.S. economy (MARAD, 2013). While the Gross Domestic
Product of America’s shipbuilding industry is small compared to the national overall, it does employ a considerable amount of
U.S. shipbuilding and repair employs over 400,000 workers directly and
indirectly, and the average income of a shipbuilding industry worker was $73,630 in 2011, which is
45 percent higher than the national average (MARAD 2013). Nuclear power is a potential way
for the United States to expand its shipbuilding industry beyond reliance on Jones Act and
Naval contracts. The foreign revenue generated from providing services for nuclear
powered ships could be considerable once their place in the world market becomes
widespread. The United States should try to get back into building commercial ships for foreign trade through the use of
nuclear power. Whether it is in maintenance or construction, shipyard work employs hundreds of well-paid
workers per vessel and is a significant source of foreign capital for a country, making it
desirable for the national economy. The United States should try to get back into building commercial ships for
foreign trade through the use of nuclear power. For example, South Korea understood the value of
commercial shipbuilding in the 1970’s when it sought to create its’ own shipbuilding industry from the bottom
up. The genesis of South Korean shipbuilding was not privately funded, but heavily supported by the
government due to its importance to the country’s national economy (Walker, 1999). Today,
people for its size.
South Korea’s shipbuilding industry employs tens of thousands of workers per major shipyard and has the
secondary economic effect of utilizing many of the country’s domestic materials and
manufacturing industries.
Manufacturing is key to competitiveness
Immelt 13
Jeffrey R. Immelt: Manufacturing Now a Key Source of Industry and Country
Competitiveness, 4 September 2013,
http://www.ideaslaboratory.com/2013/09/04/manufacturing-now-a-key-source-ofindustry-and-country-competitiveness/
Manufacturing is the new basis for competitiveness for industrial companies and, for that
matter, for countries. The notion of manufacturing has changed. Today, materials decide the performance of our
products. There are novel processes and capabilities, like additive manufacturing. High-performance computing
opens the door for cycle-time reduction. Better labor relations on the factory floor have
allowed for training and empowerment. And, entrepreneurs inhabit the manufacturing
space like never before. Manufacturing is being digitized, decentralized and democratized. GE is pioneering advanced
materials and work-force training. We are making big investments at the Global Research Center in high-performance
computing, novel processing and additive manufacturing. We are working with suppliers on cycle time and entrepreneurial
behavior. This requires us to think differently about the factory floor. I have seen three generations of manufacturing thinking
at GE. The first (1980s+) really dealt with the difficult relations with our workforce and the need to compete. The second
(1990s+) led with a desire to outsource. Every manufacturing leader became a sourcing leader. Today, our
manufacturing leaders must exhibit process skills, technical innovation and
entrepreneurship. They must leverage their teams. This requires new thinking. Our goal at GE is to make products to
serve our markets. Localization, innovation and materials are far more important than labor cost
in our products. We need flexible people in supportive locations. We will grow our supply chain where we are growing
our sales and our innovation. Based on all of this, the geographic nature of manufacturing has changed. The notion that
one or two countries will manufacture for the rest of the world is old thinking. Many places
can compete. We must be aware of the fact that manufacturing competitiveness has
become the key source of country competitiveness. We must always challenge old-fashioned thinking. I
find that our leaders can have a very old view of manufacturing. Today, there is more innovation in our plants than anywhere
in our company.
Top scientist says manufacturing is key to the US economy
http://www.troyrecord.com/general-news/20130417/top-scientist-says-manufacturingindustry-is-key-to-strong-economy-video
Blergh impact this 1ac is really ready huh?
Hegemony
American Ship Building is not competitive now—the plan increases
production and speed
HAAS 2014 (Benjamin, engineering student at SUNY Maritime, “Strategies for the Success of
Nuclear Powered Commercial Shipping,” Presented to the Connecticut Maritime Association, March
2014, http://atomicinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/CMA-Nuclear-Paper_Benjamin-Haas-3.pdf)¶
Nuclear powered vessels have inherently lower operating costs compared to conventional vessels.
The United States cannot build a conventionally powered ship that is cheaper than one built
in a foreign shipyard because there is no operating cost advantage for the U.S.-built ship.
There is, however, a significant operating cost advantage to nuclear power, which may be
enough to make American shipyards competitive. There are several areas where the U.S.
could gain the upper hand in the development of nuclear powered commercial vessels, which no
other countries at present seem to be pursuing at all. They are:¶ Construction of marine
reactors,¶ Refueling and maintenance of nuclear powered ships,¶ Manning and training of
nuclear merchant ship crews, and¶ Construction of nuclear powered commercial ships.¶ The
first two areas will always require detail and expertise and are activities that cannot be
offshored for cheaper labor. The United States’ current experience with the refueling of
nuclear reactors in shipyards will allow U.S. shipyards to gain the productivity they need to
reduce their costs and achieve competitiveness in that area. The latter potential, that of building
nuclear powered commercial ships in U.S. shipyards, requires further elaboration. ¶ The reason for
America’s uncompetitive, surprisingly overpriced shipbuilding costs compared to foreign
shipyards is not just higher labor and materials costs (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). It is a
combination of lack of productivity and inefficiencies in the corporate and labor structures
(Hansen M., 2012). In some cases, the maintaining of high overheads to acquire complex naval
contracts may also negatively affect certain shipyards abilities to perform commercial work. ¶
Nuclear powered ships could potentially be built in U.S. shipyards and carry the U.S. flag
because their operating costs are inherently lower compared to fossil fueled vessels. Along with
this, there is an environmental advantage associated with nuclear power in the arctic for which a
premium could be paid. By making the most of these cost advantages, a series of nuclear
powered ships could be designed and built in order to give American shipyards enough
orders to increase their productivity and reduce their costs, allowing subsequent nuclear
powered vessels, ranging from bulk carriers to container ships, to be even more competitive
against their foreign counterparts.
The impact is hegemony – US capability solves regional and global
instability and proliferation
Brooks et al 13
[Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank
Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William C. Wohlforth
is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. “Don't Come Home, America: The
Case against Retrenchment”, Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 7-51,
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107]
A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence
of a far more dangerous global
security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives
it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important,
its core alliance
commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from
contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to
adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas.
The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent
with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that
would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who
forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear
proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional
hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are
realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security
guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in
Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that
the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United
States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker
argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other
international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73
Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies
and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional
multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in
regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional
linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give
decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net
security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of
intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political
costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a
Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing
within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global
security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising
powers. What about
the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial
military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward
pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and
Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security
dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the
American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and
South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which
could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South
Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a
still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s
sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s
optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on
its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this
assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of postAmerican tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only
relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the
homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly
distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research
across the social and
other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for
security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the
various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of
many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless
engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the
case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these
nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have
predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some
of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism
predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with
associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which
may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive
behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to
focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S.
national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers,
but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and
war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers
may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more
dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels
of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all
of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United
States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors
would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz,
many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79
Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation
optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions
are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational
problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk
averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty
nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of
nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly
survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis
dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these
concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet
more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely
accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference
between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as
the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore
balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local
rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great
power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in
the midtwentieth century. The problem
is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining
regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United
States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not
strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to
act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It
follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the
future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably
expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the
presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security
commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In
addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of
nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the
savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult.
Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for
retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active
management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a
hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide
leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the
United States’ formidable
military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a
percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S.
military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84
All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts
for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is
by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85
There are two internal links – first is naval power
The commercial shipbuilding industry is key to Naval Power
A.M.P No Date (American Maritime Partnership, “National Security,” No date, date is date accessed, June 29,
2014 http://www.americanmaritimepartnership.com/national-security/)¶ A strong and vibrant maritime
industry helps ensure the United States maintains its expertise in shipbuilding and
waterborne transportation. A cautionary lesson surrounds Great Britain, which has seen its maritime industry
outsourced and the global influence of its naval forces drastically reduced. The U.S. Department of Defense
recognizes the importance of maintaining a strong domestic shipbuilding industry to
keep our nation safe and secure.¶ “We believe that the ability of the nation to build and
maintain a U.S.-flag fleet is in the national interest, [and] we also believe it is in the
interest of the DoD for U.S. shipbuilders to maintain a construction capability for
commercial vessels.Ӧ A study by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, reached a
similar conclusion:¶ “The U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry is a strategic asset analogous to
the aerospace, computer, and electronic industries.” ¶ “Frontline warships and support
vessels are vital for maintaining America’s national security and for protecting interests abroad.” ¶ “In
emergency situations, America’s cargo carrying capacity is indispensable for moving troops and supplies to areas of
conflict overseas.”¶ “A domestic capability to
produce and repair warships, support vessels,
and commercial vessels is not only a strategic asset but also fundamental to national
security.Ӧ
US shipbuilding is the lynchpin of global deterrence and commerce
NLUS, 12 – a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating our citizens about the
importance of sea power to U.S. national security and supporting the men and women of the
U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine and their families
(Navy League of the United States, “Maritime Primacy & Economic Prosperity: Maritime
Policy 2012-13”, Navy League of the United States, 1/21/12,
http://www.navyleague.org/files/legislative_affairs/maritime_policy20122013.pdf)
Global engagement is critical to the U.S. economy, world trade and the protection of
democratic freedoms that so many take for granted. The guarantors of these vital elements
are hulls in the water, embarked forward amphibious forces and aircraft overhead. The Navy
League of the United States’ Maritime Policy for 2012-13 provides recommendations for strategy, policy and the allocation of national resources
in support of our sea services and essential to the successful execution of their core missions. We
live in a time of complex
challenges — terrorism, political and economic turmoil, extremism, conflicts over
environmental resources, manmade and natural disasters — and potential flash points exist
around the globe. It is the persistent forward presence and engagement of maritime forces
that keep these flash points in check, prevent conflict and crisis escalation, and allow the
smooth flow of goods in a global economy. The United States has fought multiple wars and
sacrificed much to ensure unchallenged access to sea lanes and secure the global commerce
upon which the U.S. economy depends. The “persistent naval presence” provided by our
forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps ships, aircraft, Sailors and Marines is the
guarantor of that hard-won maritime security and the critical deterrent against those who
might seek to undermine that security. Maintaining naval forces that can sustain our national commitment to global
maritime security and dissuade transnational aggression in the future must be a national imperative. The
No. 1 challenge to that
imperative is the lack of a fully funded, achievable Navy shipbuilding program that produces
the right quantity and quality of ships, with the right capabilities, for the right costs, in economically affordable numbers
over the next 25 years. A shipbuilding plan must be defined and agreed upon by the Navy, the Departments of
Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security, Congress and the administration — and executed now. Recognizing that hard choices must
be made in a reduction of the defense budget, the Navy League is reducing its recommended funding for the
Department of the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN), account to $20 billion or more per year. This reduced funding leads to a
recommended reduced force level of 305 ships to meet our nation’s global security challenges. This also recognizes that the worldwide
commitment of ship deployment must be reduced. America’s amphibious expeditionary force is prepared to engage today’s threats — today.
Our Marines remain heavily engaged in Afghanistan and support numerous other small-unit
operations that enable nation-building with allies around the globe. The Marine Corps needs the
authorization to reduce to an end strength of 186,800 Marines, and this force level must be properly resourced to maintain a balanced airground logistics team. The Corps must regain its expertise in amphibious operations and maintain that capability in force structure. The service
also must be provided the resources to reset the force, to restore or acquire new equipment and capabilities consumed in the ongoing wars. The
Coast Guard is a multimission, worldwide-deployed armed force with broad law enforcement authorities. It operates seamlessly with the DoD
services as prescribed by the National Command Authority and is the lead agency for maritime homeland security and law enforcement support
to the Navy in deployed operations. In addition, it fulfills several legally mandated missions, including its most employed mission of search and
rescue, plus protection of living marine resources, drug interdiction, illegal migrant interdiction, defense readiness, marine safety, ice operations,
aids to navigation, marine environmental protection, and ports, waterways and coastal security. The substantial breadth of operations, which
has increased markedly in tempo since the 9/11 attacks, continues to overstress aging equipment, resulting in rising maintenance costs and a
greater workload for Coast Guard personnel. The Coast Guard must increase its active-duty military strength to at least 45,000, have an
operational expense budget of at least $6.7 billion and an Acquisition, Construction and Improvements (AC&I) budget resourced at no less than
$2.5 billion per year, of which $2 billion should be dedicated to continuing the recapitalization of the fleet. Skilled
Mariners are
more critical than ever to ensuring our ability to sustain U.S. national and global security
interests. Ninety-five percent of the equipment and supplies required to deploy the U.S.
armed forces is moved by sea. The base of skilled U.S. Merchant Mariners is shrinking. The
shipping capabilities of the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force and the DoD’s Military Sealift Command are sized to support routine
and some surge logistics and specialized mission requirements. This critical capability must be maintained by ensuring an active commercial
U.S.-flag Merchant Marine to support efficient and cost-effective movement of DoD cargo. The
U.S. shipbuilding industry is
in crisis. Finding a solution must be an imperative if our nation is to maintain a Navy
capable of supporting the nation’s defense. Jobs lost in this sector mean precious ground
lost in capability and capacity that cannot be regained. The current production levels for
ship construction and the manufacturing of the other critical systems, equipment and
weapons that we install in our ships, submarines and aircraft are at critically low levels.
Sustaining and upgrading our nation’s critical, defense-related industrial base must be an
essential element of our National Security Strategy. Personnel must train as they will fight to remain operationally
ready. This all-volunteer military also must receive highly competitive compensation in the way of salary as well as health care, retirement and
quality-of-life benefits to remain an effective fighting force. Taking care of our wounded warriors is fundamental.
Second is growth differential –
The US manufacturing industry is on a steep decline and must be
reversed
Ezell 13
STEPHEN EZELL, 27 November 2013, Revitalizing U.S. Manufacturing, http://issues.org/282/ezell-3/ [Stephen Ezell is a senior analyst at the Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation in Washington, DC, and the coauthor, with ITIF President Robert D. Atkinson, of
the September 2011 report International Benchmarking of Countries’ Policies and
Programs ]
Unfortunately, the United States is lagging badly in these efforts. Lack of support for SMEs was a key factor in the
precipitous decline of U.S. manufacturing during the past decade. The United States must step up
its efforts to revitalize manufacturing in general and SME manufacturing in particular. Free fall Manufacturing’s
share of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and employment has fallen precipitously during the past decade. Yet many
argue that U.S. manufacturing is actually quite healthy and that any job losses are simply a
result of superior productivity gains. Others assert that manufacturing is in decline
everywhere, so that the relative decline in U.S. manufacturing is not noteworthy. In contrast to these sanguine views, the
reality is that, although U.S. manufacturing output and employment remained relatively healthy up until 2000, during
the past decade the United States experienced the deepest industrial decline in world
history. Some 54,000 U.S. manufacturers, including 42,000 SMEs, were shuttered. Manufacturing
output, when properly measured, actually declined. Manufacturing employment fell by
33%, with the loss of 5.7 million jobs, a steeper decline than even during the Great
Depression. Official government figures suggest that U.S. manufacturing output grew just 5% during the prior decade,
even as U.S. GDP grew 18%. However, that figure is inflated because it significantly overstates output from two industries:
computers/electronics and petroleum/coal products. Overestimation of the output growth from those two industries masks
the fact that, from 2000 to 2009, 15 of 19 aggregate-level U.S. manufacturing sectors, which account for 79% of U.S.
manufacturing, experienced absolute declines in output. The vast majority of apparent growth in manufacturing output came
from the computers/electronics industry, which, according to official statistics, grew 260.5%. In other words, this one sector,
which accounts for just 9% of overall U.S. manufacturing output, accounted for 80% of manufacturing output growth from
2000 to 2009, even though the number of workers in the industry declined from 1.78 million to 1.09 million. The reality, as
explained in detail in The Case for a National Manufacturing Strategy, is that technical errors afflict official U.S. government
measurements of manufacturing output, such that, when calculated accurately, real U.S. manufacturing output actually fell by
at least 10% during the prior decade. A major cause of that decline has been a lack of investment in U.S. manufacturing. From
2000 to 2010, capital investment within the United States by U.S. manufacturers declined more than 21%, even as capital
investment abroad by U.S. manufacturing firms was on average 16% higher than at home. Likewise, the notion that
manufacturing job losses primarily reflect productivity gains is also mistaken. U.S. manufacturing productivity grew at similar
rates between 1990 and 1999 and between 2000 and 2009—56 and 61%, respectively—yet manufacturing employment
declined 3% in the former decade but 33% in the latter. Moreover, U.S. manufacturing job losses have been extreme as
compared to those experienced in peer countries. Of the 10 countries tracked by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, no country
lost a greater share of its manufacturing jobs than the United States between 1997 and 2009. In fact, if manufacturing output
had grown at the same rate as GDP during the prior decade, the United States would have ended the decade with 2.2 million
more manufacturing jobs. Given the
multiplier effect that manufacturing jobs have on the rest of
the economy, which is at least two to one, had U.S. manufacturing not shrunk, there would
be perhaps 6 million more Americans working today. In short, the extreme job loss in U.S. manufacturing
during the past decade reflects not productivity increases but rather output declines resulting from the lack of U.S.
manufacturing competitiveness and the fact that U.S. manufacturers were increasingly offshoring and investing abroad. This
is not the picture of a healthy domestic manufacturing sector. Finally, the notion that U.S.
manufacturing decline is either inevitable or normal is also mistaken, as demonstrated by the fact
that manufacturing is growing in many countries, including developed countries. For example, from 2000 to 2008,
manufacturing output in constant dollars as a share of GDP increased by 10% in Austria and Switzerland, 14% in Korea, 23%
in Finland, 32% in Poland, and 64% in the Slovak Republic. Moreover, from 1970 to 2008, Germany’s and Japan’s shares of
world manufacturing output remained stable, even as the U.S. share declined by 12 percentage points, from 28.6 to 17.9%, and
China’s share rose 13.4 percentage points, from 3.8 to 17.2%. The deindustrialization of high-wage
economies is not preordained. Competitors such as Germany and Japan have avoided the sharp
declines in manufacturing that befell the United States in the last decade. They have done so
by remaining committed to manufacturing as a core contributor to their economies and by
implementing coherent strategies to boost the productivity, innovation, and competitiveness of their manufacturing sectors,
including specific programs and robust funding in support of their SME manufacturers.
Nuclear shipbuilding helps jobs, stimulates growth, and is empirically
the foundation for manufacturing
HAAS 2014 (Benjamin, engineering student at SUNY Maritime, “Strategies for the Success of
Nuclear Powered Commercial Shipping,” Presented to the Connecticut Maritime Association, March
2014, http://atomicinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/CMA-Nuclear-Paper_Benjamin-Haas-3.pdf)
According to a recent study done by MARAD in 2013 on the
impact of America’s shipbuilding and repair
industry on the U.S. economy (the author will simply use the term “shipbuilding industry”), each direct job
creates 2.7 other jobs indirectly in other parts of the U.S. economy (MARAD, 2013). While the Gross Domestic
Product of America’s shipbuilding industry is small compared to the national overall, it does employ a considerable amount of
U.S. shipbuilding and repair employs over 400,000 workers directly and
indirectly, and the average income of a shipbuilding industry worker was $73,630 in 2011, which is
45 percent higher than the national average (MARAD 2013). Nuclear power is a potential way
for the United States to expand its shipbuilding industry beyond reliance on Jones Act and
Naval contracts. The foreign revenue generated from providing services for nuclear
powered ships could be considerable once their place in the world market becomes
widespread. The United States should try to get back into building commercial ships for foreign trade through the use of
nuclear power. Whether it is in maintenance or construction, shipyard work employs hundreds of well-paid
workers per vessel and is a significant source of foreign capital for a country, making it
desirable for the national economy. The United States should try to get back into building commercial ships for
foreign trade through the use of nuclear power. For example, South Korea understood the value of
commercial shipbuilding in the 1970’s when it sought to create its’ own shipbuilding industry from the bottom
up. The genesis of South Korean shipbuilding was not privately funded, but heavily supported by the
government due to its importance to the country’s national economy (Walker, 1999). Today,
South Korea’s shipbuilding industry employs tens of thousands of workers per major shipyard and has the
secondary economic effect of utilizing many of the country’s domestic materials and
manufacturing industries.
people for its size.
Manufacturing is key to the US economy
Ian Benjamin, 17 April 2013, Top scientist says manufacturing industry is key to strong
economy, http://www.troyrecord.com/general-news/20130417/top-scientist-saysmanufacturing-industry-is-key-to-strong-economy-video
The region's manufacturing sector has had good news in recent years with several smaller and one major manufacturers
settling in the Capital District, but fostering a climate
conducive to manufacturing throughout the
country needs to be achieved, said the Director of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology. "Why has the president been so emphatic in regards to manufacturing?" asked Patrick D. Gallagher, also the
U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology. "It's two things: one was a long-standing
trend and one was the searing experience of a major economic recession." The undersecretary was
the keynote speaker during the first Advanced Manufacturing Conference which continues at the Hilton Garden Inn today. The
recession, which was the most serious economic downturn since the Depression, caused the federal government to look at the
causes and to compare the country to other nations, Gallagher explained. The
government found that Germany
and China, the economies of which have strong manufacturing sectors, weathered the
economic storm more mildly. Countries like the U.S., which has an economy more heavily
based on financial services, fared much less well. This experience combined with a "trend," that being a
growing conversation about the importance of research and innovation, caused the president to bring attention to
manufacturing -- even bringing it to the fore during his State of the Union. Presently, the government supports one third of all
research and development and the private sector supports the rest. However, this is not equal across all R&D, said Gallagher -the government focuses its funding primarily on basic research, spurring the discoveries upon which new technologies are
based. By contrast, the private sector tends to support late-stage product development, that is involved with bringing products
to market. Of that, roughly 75 percent is supported by manufacturing-based companies, such as GlobalFoundries. "This is why
manufacturing was going to come into the conversation," said Gallagher. "If
you're talking about the nation's
capacity to innovate, manufacturing is the single biggest player. [...] We are talking about
manufacturing as an innovation engine for the country." What the government needs to
learn to do, he emphasized, is work more closely with the private-sector. Such a partnership is
currently taking place at the College of Nanoscale Science and Engineering in Albany. Gallagher noted that the conversation
about the importance of manufacturing received further attention on the national stage following the government's decision to
bail out the "Big Three" auto manufacturers: General Motors, Chrysler and Ford. "When the
auto industry
collapsed and it was clear that it was more than just auto makers," said Gallagher. "In fact, what
was driving this [collapse] was the enormous amount of activity underneath the
automakers. Entire supply chains that employed hundreds of thousands." When the big
three began to falter it endangered not only their employees, but those employed at parts
manufacturers and other related industries. With the near collapse of the auto industry, the government was
confronted with a truth, explained Gallagher -- a manufacturing industry is a sound bedrock for a
nation's economy.
Attempts to maintain hegemony are inevitable - US growth differential
key to maintain alliances and prevent rival challengers
Tellis 9 Senior Associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in
international security, defense and Asian strategic issues. [Ashley J. Tellis (Research
Director of the Strategic Asia program @ National Bureau of Asian Research, “Preserving
Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States”, Global Asia, Vol.4, No. 1, Spring
2009]
Precisely because the desire for dominance is likely to remain a permanent feature of US
geopolitical ambitions — even though how it is exercised will certainly change in comparison to the Bush years — the
central task facing the next administration will still pertain fundamentally to the issue of US power. This concern manifests
itself through the triune challenges of: redefining the United States’ role in the world, renewing the foundations of US strength,
and recovering the legitimacy of US actions. In other words, the
next administration faces the central task of
clarifying the character of US hegemony, reinvigorating the material foundations of its power, and securing
international support for its policies. The challenge of comprehensively strengthening US power at
this juncture, when the United States is still in the early phase of its unipolar role in global politics, arises importantly
from the fact that the hegemony it has enjoyed since 1991 represents a “prize” deriving from victory
in intense geopolitical competition with another great power. The historical record suggests that
international politics can be unkind to such victors over the long term. A careful scrutiny of
the hegemonic cycles since 1494 confirms quite clearly that power transitions at the core of the global system often
occur because successes in systemic struggles — of which the Cold War is but one example — can
irreparably weaken otherwise victorious hegemonies. The annals of the past actually corroborate the surprising
proposition that no rising challenger, however capable, has ever succeeded, at least thus far, in supplanting any prevailing
hegemony through cold or hot war. Over the centuries, Spain, France, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union all tried in
different ways but failed. This reassuring fact notwithstanding, hegemonic transitions still occurred regularly in international
politics, a reality that points to two critical insights about succession struggles in the international system — which is a subject
that ought to be of great significance to the United States and its allies as well as to its adversaries. First, struggles
for
hegemony in global politics are rarely limited to dyadic encounters between states. These
struggles involve not only the existing hegemon and the rising challenger as the preeminent
antagonists — roles that many expect will be played respectively by the United States and China over the long
term — but also the entire cast of international characters, including non-state actors involved in economic
processes, and the nature of their involvement in the competition become relevant to the succession process. Thus, the nature
of the alliances orchestrated and managed by the United States (and possibly China as well) in the future, the
relationship between state entities and the global economic system, and the relative
burdens borne by every actor involved in this contest become relevant to the outcome. Second, and
equally importantly, who wins in the ensuing struggle — whether that struggle is short or long, peaceful or violent
— is as important as by how much. This is particularly relevant because the past record unerringly confirms that
the strongest surviving state in the winning coalition usually turns out to be the new primate after the conclusion of every
systemic struggle. Both Great Britain and the United States secured their respective ascendancies in this way. Great Britain
rose through the wreckage of the wars with Louis XIV and with Napoleon. The United States did so through the carnage of the
hot wars with Hitler and Hirohito, finally achieving true hegemony through the detritus of the Cold War with Stalin and his
successors. If
the United States is to sustain this hard-earned hegemony over the long term, while
countering as necessary a future Chinese challenge should it emerge, Washington will need to amass the
largest differential in power relative not only to its rivals but also to its friends and
allies. Particularly in an era of globalization, this objective cannot be achieved without a
conscious determination to follow sensible policies that sustain economic growth, minimize
unproductive expenditures, strengthen the national innovation system, maintain military capabilities
second to none, and enjoin political behaviors that evoke the approbation of allies and neutral
states alike. The successful pursuit of such policies will enable the United States to cope more
effectively with near-term challenges as well, including the war on terrorism and managing
threatening regional powers, and will ineluctably require — to return full circle — engaging the central tasks
identified earlier as facing the new US administration. These tasks involve the need to satisfactorily define the character of
desirable US hegemony, the need for sound policies that will renew the foundations of US strength, and the need to recover the
legitimacy of US purposes and actions. What is clearly implied is that the principal burdens facing the next US president
transcend Asia writ large. The success of these pursuits, however, will inevitably impact Asia in desirable ways, even as the
resolution of several specifically Asian problems would invariably contribute to the conclusive attainment of these larger
encompassing goals. Policy Implications US efforts in three areas will reaffirm its role as global leader: supporting a
durable framework for international trade, maintaining unqualified military supremacy, and ensuring the delivery of certain
public goods, such as peace and security, freedom of navigation, and a clean environment. The
renewal of traditional
US economic might requires policies that favor growth and innovation, increased capital and
labor pools, and sustained pursuit of total factor productivity. Legitimacy is an important facet of US
power that has eroded over the last eight years. The US can secure legitimacy for future political acts by shaping world opinion
through a combination of decisiveness, cultivation of key allied support, and attentiveness to the views of others.
2ac case
A2: alt causes
No demand is the problem, not skill shortages
Osterman and Weaver 3/26
Paul Osterman and Andrew Weaver, 26 March 2014, Why Claims of Skills Shortages in
Manufacturing Are Overblown, http://www.epi.org/publication/claims-skills-shortagesmanufacturing-overblown/
While skill requirements are real—a strong back no longer suffices—the skills manufacturers seek are at
the community college level or below, well within the reach of the vast majority of
Americans. The demand for some basic skills is extensive, although fewer than half of manufacturing employers seek the full complement
of basic reading skills (defined as the ability to read basic manuals), basic writing skills (the ability to write short notes), and basic math skills
(the ability to add, subtract, multiply, divide, and handle fractions). While
38.0 percent of manufacturing firms
require extended math skills, the level of math that is expected is within reach of a good
high school or at most community college education. Only a minority of manufacturing
establishments report difficulty recruiting the employees they need. Nearly 65 percent of establishments
report they have no vacancies whatsoever, and 76.3 percent report they have no long-term vacancies (in which jobs have remained unfilled for
three months or more). Only 16.1 percent of survey respondents—typically plant managers—responded affirmatively when asked whether
Persistent unemployment in the
manufacturing sector is more likely driven by inadequate demand than by any form of
mismatch.
“lack of access to skilled workers is a major obstacle to increasing financial success.”
STEM would go hand in hand with a rising nuclear industry
Jones 6/7
Lauren Jones, 7 June 2014, AREVA CHARLOTTE YOUNG GENERATION GROUP ADVOCATES
FOR NUCLEAR POWER AND STEM EDUCATION, http://us.areva.com/EN/home3037/areva-inc-areva-charlotte-young-generation-group-advocates-for-nuclear-powerand-stem-education.html
CHARLOTTE, N.C., June 12, 2014 – On June 4, the AREVA Charlotte chapter of the North America Young Generation in Nuclear
(NAYGN) sent seven members to Raleigh, N.C. to participate in an annual state “Hill Day” to advocate for nuclear energy and
for Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) education. A key component of NAYGN’s mission is to engage and
inform the public, including local legislators. During this year’s Hill Day, participants met with North Carolina Rep. Carla
Cunningham, Rep. Kelly Alexander, Rep. Ruth Samuelson, Rep. Marcus Brandon, and policy advisors Emily Wilson (Energy
Advisor to N.C. House Speaker Thom Tillis), Dion Terry and Hugh Johnson (policy advisors to N.C. Governor Pat McCrory).
“Our
future leaders are helping to ensure that our state legislators and policy advisors
understand the value that clean, safe, affordable and reliable nuclear energy brings to the
Carolinas,” said Tom Franch, senior vice president, Reactors & Services Business Group, AREVA Inc., and local executive
sponsor of the NAYGN chapter. “In addition, many of
our young generation employees have careers
thanks to a strong foundation of STEM education. With 39 percent of the nuclear industry
workforce eligible to retire by 2018, our employees are great representatives for the
industry and advocates for both nuclear energy and the importance of STEM education.” The
AREVA Charlotte Chapter of NAYGN comprises more than 120 members, including engineers, managers, and support
personnel. NAYGN is committed to developing leadership and professional skills, creating life-long connections,
engaging and informing the public, and inspiring today’s
nuclear technology professionals to meet the
challenges of the 21st century – and that includes filling the talent pipeline needed to
sustain the nuclear industry.
A2: Terrorists target ships
Very slim chance terrorists will cause substantial, if any, threat
Smith 8
R.C. Smith, February 2008, Terrorism and maritime shipment of nuclear material,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wAkua9reqBUJ:researchcommon
s.waikato.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10289/976/Smith%2520terrorism.pdf%3Fsequence%3
D1+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
The substantive discussions above have encompassed broadly three possibilities for terrorist
action against these ships and their cargoes: terrorists might aim to take the ship and separate its cargo; they
might take the ship and create some incident involving the ship and cargo together; or, they might aim to assault the ship from
outside by explosive or missile (including a suicide aeroplane attack). In the
first case, the terrorists need to
find the ship, approach it, and successfully board it and subdue the defenders. After this they
need to unload the cargo, either in mid ocean, or by taking the ship to a suitable port without being intercepted. The very
formidable problems entailed in each of these stages have been elaborated in some detail. It is
hard to resist the
conclusion that, taken together, they add up to an operation that has an extremely low
probability of success, having regard to the known defensive capabil-ities of the ships
concerned and the capabilities that would be required to overcome them. There are alsosignificant
problems in turning the material thus secured into a usable device and, if the device is a radiological one, doubts about
whether the actual consequences of its use would be worth all the efforts. Even if the cargo that has been seized is plutonium
in the form of MOX fuel, there would be a great deal of technicallysophisticated processing required to turn that into
bombmaterial, and further difficulties in assembling anddelivering the weapon. Many of the same
considerations
apply to the second envisaged scenario. Again, the ship needs to be takenand the defenders subdued but in this
case there arecrucial difficulties in turning ship and cargo togetherinto a plausible threat. In great part, these concern
thenature of the cargo itself and the way it is held. The most likely cargo to which this scenario is applicable is vitrified high
level waste. This is very radioactive material but there is considerable doubt that it can be turned easily (or at all) into a form
that might constitute an environmental threat in the event that it was somehow dispersed. There would be broadly the same
problems in separating MOX fuel from its container and cladding, with the added drawback that it is only feebly radioactive.
Spent fuel, on the other hand, is certainlyhighly radioactive (through the presence of the fission products) but it, too, would be
difficult to get at and, likethe high level waste, very dangerous in the attempt. Without getting any of these materials out of
theircontainment, it is not at all evident that a terrorist eventinvolving significant contamination of the environmentcould be
Scenarios in the third category do not require that the ship (or ships) be taken. In this
case, there is merely an assault from the ‘outside’ by missile, fast attack vessel, aeroplane, or frogman. Considerations of
what could actually be achieved by such an operation suggest that the effect of the attack is
unlikely to be anything more than superficial damage to the ship (although such an assault could have
contrived.
an impact on the operation of theship by damaging equipment and/or killing crew). On the other hand, the possibility that a
dedicated nuclearcargo vessel could be struck by (say) a missile, cannot be excluded. This would be most likely when the ship
wasclose to shore and, perhaps, when ‘protest’ activityprovided the cover for a firing position. More generally,it is also
possible that considerations of restraint andproportion on the part of security personnel couldinhibit or condition the
response to an apparent assaultwhich threatened only minimal damage. However, itdoes need to be noted here, how far this
hypotheticaloutcome is from the scare scenarios with which we began.There is a renewed interest in civilian nuclear power.In
the context of a growing anxiety about climate changeand increasing uncertainty about oil and gas resources,more countries
are acquiring (or intending to acquire)nuclear capacity and countries that have it are planning further developments. These
factors, together with adesire to internationalise the more sensitive nuclear technologies, seem likely to bring on more
shipments ofnuclear material to more destinations. It
will be important to make sure that this is
performed as safely as it can be, both as regards accidents, and as regards the terrorist
threat. Present regulatory standards and practices, especially in regard to dedicated ships,
such as those operated by PNTL and the Japanese and Swedish utilities, provide very
considerable assurance that this is so. There is very little prospect of an attack of the kind
envisaged in the above scenarios having any serious consequences beyond the inevitable
media frenzy it would undoubtedly provoke.
Attempts to maintain hegemony are inevitable - US growth
differential key to maintain alliances and prevent rival challengers
Tellis 9
Senior Associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in
international security, defense and Asian strategic issues. [Ashley J. Tellis (Research
Director of the Strategic Asia program @ National Bureau of Asian Research, “Preserving
Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States”, Global Asia, Vol.4, No. 1, Spring
2009]
Precisely because the desire for dominance is likely to remain a permanent feature of US
geopolitical ambitions — even though how it is exercised will certainly change in
comparison to the Bush years — the central task facing the next administration will still
pertain fundamentally to the issue of US power. This concern manifests itself through the
triune challenges of: redefining the United States’ role in the world, renewing the
foundations of US strength, and recovering the legitimacy of US actions. In other words, the
next administration faces the central task of clarifying the character of US hegemony,
reinvigorating the material foundations of its power, and securing international support for
its policies. The challenge of comprehensively strengthening US power at this juncture,
when the United States is still in the early phase of its unipolar role in global politics, arises
importantly from the fact that the hegemony it has enjoyed since 1991 represents a “prize”
deriving from victory in intense geopolitical competition with another great power. The
historical record suggests that international politics can be unkind to such victors over
the long term. A careful scrutiny of the hegemonic cycles since 1494 confirms quite clearly
that power transitions at the core of the global system often occur because successes in
systemic struggles — of which the Cold War is but one example — can irreparably weaken
otherwise victorious hegemonies. The annals of the past actually corroborate the surprising
proposition that no rising challenger, however capable, has ever succeeded, at least thus far,
in supplanting any prevailing hegemony through cold or hot war. Over the centuries, Spain,
France, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union all tried in different ways but failed. This
reassuring fact notwithstanding, hegemonic transitions still occurred regularly in
international politics, a reality that points to two critical insights about succession struggles
in the international system — which is a subject that ought to be of great significance to the
United States and its allies as well as to its adversaries. First, struggles for hegemony in
global politics are rarely limited to dyadic encounters between states. These struggles
involve not only the existing hegemon and the rising challenger as the preeminent
antagonists — roles that many expect will be played respectively by the United States and
China over the long term — but also the entire cast of international characters, including
non-state actors involved in economic processes, and the nature of their involvement in the
competition become relevant to the succession process. Thus, the nature of the alliances
orchestrated and managed by the United States (and possibly China as well) in the future,
the relationship between state entities and the global economic system, and the
relative burdens borne by every actor involved in this contest become relevant to the
outcome. Second, and equally importantly, who wins in the ensuing struggle — whether
that struggle is short or long, peaceful or violent — is as important as by how much. This is
particularly relevant because the past record unerringly confirms that the strongest
surviving state in the winning coalition usually turns out to be the new primate after the
conclusion of every systemic struggle. Both Great Britain and the United States secured
their respective ascendancies in this way. Great Britain rose through the wreckage of the
wars with Louis XIV and with Napoleon. The United States did so through the carnage of the
hot wars with Hitler and Hirohito, finally achieving true hegemony through the detritus of
the Cold War with Stalin and his successors. If the United States is to sustain this hardearned hegemony over the long term, while countering as necessary a future Chinese
challenge should it emerge, Washington will need to amass the largest differential in
power relative not only to its rivals but also to its friends and allies. Particularly in an
era of globalization, this objective cannot be achieved without a conscious determination to
follow sensible policies that sustain economic growth, minimize unproductive
expenditures, strengthen the national innovation system, maintain military capabilities
second to none, and enjoin political behaviors that evoke the approbation of allies and
neutral states alike. The successful pursuit of such policies will enable the United States to
cope more effectively with near-term challenges as well, including the war on terrorism and
managing threatening regional powers, and will ineluctably require — to return full circle
— engaging the central tasks identified earlier as facing the new US administration. These
tasks involve the need to satisfactorily define the character of desirable US hegemony, the
need for sound policies that will renew the foundations of US strength, and the need to
recover the legitimacy of US purposes and actions. What is clearly implied is that the
principal burdens facing the next US president transcend Asia writ large. The success of
these pursuits, however, will inevitably impact Asia in desirable ways, even as the
resolution of several specifically Asian problems would invariably contribute to the
conclusive attainment of these larger encompassing goals. Policy Implications US efforts in
three areas will reaffirm its role as global leader: supporting a durable framework for
international trade, maintaining unqualified military supremacy, and ensuring the delivery
of certain public goods, such as peace and security, freedom of navigation, and a clean
environment. The renewal of traditional US economic might requires policies that favor
growth and innovation, increased capital and labor pools, and sustained pursuit of total
factor productivity. Legitimacy is an important facet of US power that has eroded over the
last eight years. The US can secure legitimacy for future political acts by shaping world
opinion through a combination of decisiveness, cultivation of key allied support, and
attentiveness to the views of others.