European Best Practice for industrial Disaster
Risk Management (iDRM)
F. Bemmerlein-Lux
GIZ Senior Advisors of the cdDRM Programme under ASEM
and
Dr. Christian Jochum
Director of Centre, European Process Safety Centre (www.epsc.org)
Chairman, German Commission on Process Safety
NCDC industrial Disaster Management Programme
8.-19.Augsut 2011
Outline
1
iDRM Approach in Europe
2
Risk Management Principles
3
Best Practice of Emergency Management
4
Conclusions
2
Ger:
357 111 km²
> 81 Million
Inhabitants
MA:
307.762 km²
> 112 Million
Inhabitants.
3
Germany
Panorama
Hamburg
Berlin
Ruhr
District
Frankfurt
Nuremberg
Munich
Alps
4
5
Instruments
6
Environmental
Education
Environmental
Research
Self-Regulation
Advisory
Services
EIA
Economic
Instruments
Laws and
Regulations
Spatial Planning
Principles
Prevention
Polluter pays
Cooperation
März, 00
Emissions and land-use should be avioided
using the latest technical standards.
Precausion is important for:
+
+
+
Still not known/undedrstood risks
Long term efficts
Combined Risks (cascading effects)
The principle is most important for political
and guiding decisions.
7
Principles
Prevention
All costs for not done environmental care and
the use of environmental resources have to
be paid by the one causing the alterations
Polluter pays
Cooperation
Even while developing products and processes
the use of environmental resources have to be
considered – should lead to ecological honest
prices.
8
Principles
Prevention
Wherever possible a voluntary cooperation is
requested and required.
Polluter pays
Cooperation
März, 00
Motivations based on marked economy are
used to initiate and sustain innovations of
environmental protection (via tax,
compensations, self-obligations, fees etc. )
9
10
Example: Air
Federal Emission Control Act
21 Ordinances
5 Guidelines for administration.
All rules are oriented on the sources
of the immissions.
Areas of origin (cause) Like:
• The ordinance for large boilers
11
•
The Technical Ordinance Air (TA Luft)
•
The ordinance for small boilers
Regulations for Hazardous Substances
Laws / Acts
+ Hazardous Chemicals
+ Law on Plant protection
+ Law on Genetic Techniques
+ Private Liability Law
+ Criminal Law Environment
+ …..
Ordenances:
: Disasters (Störfallverordnung)
: Prüfnachweisverordnung
: Chemikalienverbotsverordnung
: Gefahrstoffverordnung
: Giftinformationsverordnung
: Verordnungen des Abfallgesetzes
12
Technical Standards and Guidelines
;
TA Air, TA Noise, TA Waste, TA
Regulations for Hazardous Substances
Ordinances
+ Chemikaliengesetz zum Schutz vor gefährlichen
Stoffen (ChemG)
+ Gefahrstoffverordnung (GefStoffV)
+ Verordnung über brennbare Flüssigkeiten (VbF)
+ Verordnung über Anlagen zum Umgang mit
wassergefährdenden Stoffen (VAwS)
+ Gefahrgutbeauftragtenverordnung (GbV)
+ Technische Regeln brennbare Flüssigkeiten
(TRbF)
+ Gefahrgutverordnung Straße (GGVS)
+ Arbeitsstättenverordnung (ArbStättV)
+ Störfallverordnung etc…..
13
Regulations for Hazardous Substances
Ordinances
Beispiele:
Symbols for
Storage and
Transport of haz.
Substances
(nach Gefahrstoffverordnung)
Explosionsgefährlich
Brennbarkeit
Giftigkeit
Reizend
14
The drivers for Process Safety and industrial Disaster
Risk Management (iDRM) in Europe are
• Lessons learnt (Bhopal,
Seveso, Toulouse, Texas
City, Buncefield, ...)
• Ethical dimension
(Responsible Care )
• Seveso 2
• National Standards
• Industry benchmarking
(Major Hazard record of
industry)
• Economics (Business
Continuity)
15
iDRM basic principle
Crisis management assessment should cover all parts
of emergency- and crisis- management ...
• identify hazards comprehensively
• avoid or control risks
• communicate remaining risks
• mitigate consequences
• remediate damages
• restore trust
... pursuing the goal to define and train as much as possible
in advance
16
Commission on Process Safety (Kommission fuer
Anlagensicherheit [KAS])
• Mandated by the Federal Emission Control Act
– Advises government as well as plant operators and state
and local authorities on process safety
– 32 members with different professional and educational
background representing different stakeholders (“Round
Table”)
– Any group needs “allies” to win votes
– Consensus intended, but majority decisions possible
• About 55 guidelines issued on different topics, e.g.
– Land Use Planning (Safety distances)
– Risk evaluation and perception
– Emergency Planning
– Industrial parks
– Provisions against terrorist attacks on chemical plants
• All publications of the Commission are available (partly in
English) at www.kas-bmu.de
17
18
19
Outline
1
iDRM Approach in Europe
2
Risk Management Principles
3
Best Practice of Emergency Management
4
Conclusions
20
“Farbwerke Hoechst” outside Frankfurt/Germany at about 1870
Hoechst Industrial Park (Frankfurt/M, Germany) today
22
Zoning around Industrial Sites
(Off-site Emergency
Plan)
Recommended separation distances for “greenfield”
planning
[Distance in m]
Class I
0
100
Class II
200 300 400 500
Class III
Class IV
600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
Phosgene (DN 15)
Acrolein
Chlorine
Sulphur dioxide
Hydrogen sulphide
Formaldehyde (>90%)
Hydrogen cyanide, HCN
Oleum 65 % (Sulphur trioxide)
Bromine
Ammonia
Hydrogen fluoride
Fluorine
Ethylene oxid
Acrylonitrile
Hydrogen chloride
Methanol (fire)
Propane (explosion)
Benzene (fire)
Ethylene oxide (fire)
Methanol
Allocation to
distance class
SIMPLIFIED RISK
MANAGEMENT PROCESS
DETERMINE
RISK REVIEW
REQUIREMENTS
This map is common,
you will see it again
WHEN
&
WHO
Prevention
IDENTIFY
HAZARDS
REDUCE
RISK
Analyze/Assess
RISK
WHAT
&
YES
HOW
CAN
RISK BE
REDUCED
?
NO
DISCONTINUE
ACTIVITY
NO
Risk is a
combination
of HAZARD
Severity and
FREQUENCY or
LIKELIHOOD
IS
RISK
TOLERABLE
?
YES
MANAGE
RESIDUAL RISK
Mitigation
25
Risk Review Requirements
The risk review process has to be determined
• by all relevant stakeholders/departments of the
organisation
• in writing (company guideline)
• shared with authorities etc.
• defining the risk review team (multi-disciplinary
including operator level)
• defining milestones for and different levels of risk
review (e.g. Design phase, pre-commissioning, prestart up, changes, etc)
26
Hazard Identification
All hazards have to be identified comprehensively and
systematically ...
Operation
hazards
• eg. „classical“ EHS (Environment, Health, and
Safety)-hazards, loss of production, ...
Network
hazards
• eg. failure of utilities, supplies, transportation ...
Environmental
hazards
• eg. natural hazards, adjacent plants and traffic
ways, ...
Environmental
vulnerability
• eg. densely populated areas/buildings, natural
reserves, ...
Terrorist
threats
• eg. plant vulnerability, neighbourhood/environment
sensitivity, company image, ...
... by e.g. “What if”, checklists, HAZOP, FMEA etc.
27
FMEA
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• is a procedure in product development and operations
management
• potential failure modes within a system for classification
by the severity and likelihood of the failures
28
HAZOP
Hazard and operability study
• A systematic examination of a planned or existing
process or operation in order to identify and evaluate
problems that may represent risks to personnel or
equipment, or prevent efficient operation.
• developed to analyze chemical process systems
• A HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on guidewords and is carried out by a multi-disciplinary team
(HAZOP team) during a set of meetings.
The HAZOP team determines what are the possible significant Deviations from
each intention, feasible Causes and likely Consequences. It can then be decided
whether existing, designed safeguards are sufficient, or whether additional
actions are necessary to reduce risk to an acceptable level
29
Risk Assessment
Risk is a combination of hazard Severity and Likelihood or frequency,
often expressed as R=f(S,L)
• Severity may be determined by
•
•
Gas dispersion in combination with criteria for human effects such as:
• ERPGs (Emergency Response Planning Guidelines)
• AEGLs (Acute Exposure Guideline Levels)
Explosion Overpressure & Fire radiation effects using tools such as:
• estimating local overpressure as a function of explosion source
strength and distance TNO- methodology
• FLACS - explosion simulator
• Likelihood may be estimated by
•
•
•
•
expert opinion/experience
databases for failure frequencies
(semi-) quantitative assessments (risk graph, fault or event trees etc.)
Assessment of safety barriers and mitigation (e.g. “bow tie” diagram,
Layer of Protection Analysis = LOPA, “Swiss cheese model”)
30
The “Swiss Cheese Model”
31
The LOPA “Onion”
Community Emergency Response
Plant Emergency Response
Physical Protection e.g. Relief Devices
Safety Instrumented System preventative action
Critical Alarms and Operator intervention
Basic Process Control System,
Operating Discipline /
Supervision
Plant Design
integrity
Layer of Protection Analysis
32
Protection Layer Concept
IPL1
IPL2
IPL3
Impact Event
Occurs
PFD3 = y3
PFD2 = y2
Impact Event
Frequency,
f3 = x * y 1 * y2 * y3
f2=x * y 1 * y2
PFD1 = y1
success
f1 = x * y 1
Initiating Event
Estimated
Frequency
fi = x
Safe Outcome
success
Safe Outcome
success
Key:
Arrow represents
severity and frequency of
the Impact Event if later
IPLs are not successful
Safe Outcome
Im pact
Event
Frequency
Severity
IPL
- Independent Protection Layer
PFD - Probability of Failure on Demand
f
- frequency, /yr
33
LOPA criteria -1-
Initiating events
•
•
•
•
Control system failures
Human error
Piping and equipment failures
Interruption of utilities (e.g. Cooling)
Independent layers of protection
•
•
•
•
•
•
Basic Process Control System (possibly)
Alarm and operator response
Relief systems
Safety Instrumented Systems
Other qualifying Safety Related Protection Systems
Need to be independent, effective, tested, audited
LOPA criteria -2-
Conditional Modifiers
•
•
•
•
•
•
Weather conditions
Probability of ignition
Probability of ignition leading to explosion
Probability that person(s) will be exposed
Probability that an exposed person will suffer a particular harm
May be difficult to justify and evaluate
Mitigation (right hand side of bow tie)
•
•
•
•
•
Fire protection
Emergency Response
Water curtains
Secondary and tertiary containment
etc
‘Tolerable’ frequencies for events
• What risk can we tolerate?
– Frequency for an event of a given severity (injury,
environmental insult etc.)
• Users need to specify but aim to meet or exceed (do
better than) regulator requirements
• The chosen tolerability becomes the target for risk
management sometimes called ‘Risk Governance’ for
the company (usually Individual or Societal Risk)
• Data and guidance available for injury/fatality and
environmental effects
36
Tolerability Data (Fatalities) (Buncefield LOPA Guidance Dec 2009,
final report from U.K. HSE)
Likelihood of ‘n’ fatalities
from a tank explosion
per tank per year
Risk Tolerability
10-4/yr - 10-5/yr
Tolerable if
ALARP
Tolerable if
ALARP
Tolerable if
ALARP
10-5/yr - 10-6/yr
Broadly
acceptable
Tolerable if
ALARP
Tolerable if
ALARP
10-6/yr - 10-7/yr
Broadly
acceptable
Broadly
acceptable
Tolerable if
ALARP
10-7/yr - 10-8/yr
Broadly
acceptable
Broadly
acceptable
Broadly
acceptable
Fatalities (n)
1
2-10
11-50
ALARP = As Low as Reasonably Practicable
37
Categories for Environmental Risk (U.K. Environment Agency)
Catastrophic
• Major airborne release with serious offsite effects
• Site shutdown
• Serious contamination of groundwater or watercourse with extensive loss of
aquatic life
Major
• Evacuation of local populace
• Temporary disabling and hospitalisation
• Serious toxic effect on beneficial or protected species
• Widespread but not persistent damage to land
• Significant fish kill over 5 mile range
Severe
• Hospital treatment required
• Public warning and off-site emergency plan invoked
• Hazardous substance releases into water course with ½ mile effect
Significant
• Severe and sustained nuisance, e.g. strong offensive odours / noise
disturbance
• Major breach of Permitted emissions limits with possibility of prosecution
• Numerous public complaints
Noticeable
• Noticeable nuisance off-site e.g. discernible odours
• Minor breach of Permitted emission limits, but no environmental harm
• One or two complaints from the public
Minor
• Nuisance on site only (no off-site effects)
• No outside complaint
38
Heading and introduction from Section 3.7 in “IPPC H1: Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC)
and Environmental Assessment and Appraisal of BAT”, Version 6 July 20
Typical Environmental Tolerability Criteria
Category
Acceptable if
frequency less
than
Acceptable if Reduced as
Reasonably Practical and
frequency between
Unacceptable if
frequency above
Catastrop
hic
10-6 per year
10-4 to 10-6 per year
10-4 per year
5 Major
10-6 per year
10-4 to 10-6 per year
10-4 per year
4 Severe
10-6 per year
10-2 to 10-6 per year
10-2 per year
3 Significant
10-4 per year
10-1 to 10-4 per year
10-1 per year
2 Noticeable
10-2 per year
~ 10+1 to 10-2 per year
~10+1 per year
1
All shown as
acceptable
-
-
6
Minor
39
Example for Risk Calculation
SINGLE FATALITY
(e.g.)
10-5
PER YEAR
CONTROL
SYSTEM LOOP
FAILS
10-1
PROBABILITY OF
IGNITION (e.g.)
PROBABILITY
Quantity, M.I.E.,
site factors
10-1
PROBABILITY OF
EXPOSURE
PROBABILITY
100%
10-0
INDEPENDENT
LAYER OF
PROTECTION 1
PROBABILITY OF
FAILURE ON
DEMAND
Basic Process
Control System
10-1
INDEPENDENT
LAYER OF
PROTECTION 2
PROBABILITY OF
FAILURE ON
DEMAND
Safety
Instrumented
System

<10-2
TOLERATED EVENT
FREQUENCY
(Target)
PER YEAR
INITIATING EVENT
FREQUENCY
(per year)
40
Risk Assessment has to be adopted to the needs
LEVEL 1: PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS
Should be done by plant based people
They then have a better understanding of the
risks and possibly how they may be reduced
Level 1:
LEVEL 2: RISK REVIEW
Specialist help from e.g. Process Engineering
or Process safety function at site – should
include Plant based people in the team
PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS
LEVEL 3: ENHANCED RISK REVIEW
Specialist help from e.g. Process Engineering or
Process Safety function within Corporate – should
include Site and Plant based people in the team
LEVEL 4: QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
Specialist help from external expertise. Owner needs
to define scope and data and critique the outcome.
Level 2:
RISK REVIEW
Level 3
ENHANCED RISK
REVIEW
L4:
QRA
41
Outline
1
iDRM Approach in Europe
2
Risk Management Principles
3
Best Practice of Emergency Management
4
Conclusions
42
Crisis Management Systems: can the unpredictable be
planned?
Define as much as possible in advance, because ...
• ... crisis always happen at the wrong time and place
• ... your regular organisation is not sufficient to
handle crisis
• ... all resources of the whole company have to be
available in due time
• ... public, media and authorities expect professional
handling of crisis, too
43
Management of Remaining Risks
Communicate remaining risks
• to staff (operating procedures, training, drills, …)
• to external stakeholders (customers, neighbours,
authorities – but careful regarding security risks!)
Mitigate consequences
• Internal emergency planning (above all organisation,
equipment, drills)
• Cooperation with external services (neighbouring
plants, public services)
Important: ability to react fast!
The bigger a corporation,
the higher the expectations even for small sites
44
Safety Operating Procedures
• Examples for visualization of safety
information
•
Acetone
Ladders
Emergency Response
The basic principle: the faster and more effective the initial
response, the smaller the consequences for men, environment
and economy.
• Provide the infrastructure for fast response (fire brigade,
emergency control room, availability of key personnel, etc.)
• Encourage immediate reporting of incidents (not to wait until
own efforts failed ...), do not blame for false alarms
• If the fire brigade is (partly) staffed by operators be aware of the
risks of understaffed production
• Better start with a higher level of alarm (worst case
assumption) and grade it down later than vice versa
• Notify and involve public fire brigades and authorities as soon
as possible
• Analyse every incident and the response to improve the
emergency organisation without blaming anyone
46
Emergency Response Workflow: Example Industrial Park
Frankfurt-Hoechst (this and following slides: courtesy of Infraserv Höchst
and Sanofi-Aventis)
Categorisation of the incident
Emergency Manager
warning procedures
Notification to local and
state authorities
safety
regulations
radio announcements
by police dep.
Emergency
response
management
group
sirens
dark page
automated
telephone
messages
Emergency Response Workflow: Example Industrial Park
Frankfurt-Hoechst (Sanofi-Aventis/Infraserv Höchst)
emergency call
fire alarm system
incident
dispatch
of task forces
Integrated Command Centre Hoechst Industrial park
(Frankfurt/Germany)
24 hours crewed by 5 Dispatchers
49
Mock Drills
Major incidents hopefully become less frequent.
This makes drills even more important ...
• ... to train seldom used procedures
• ... to reduce mental stress during incidents
• ... to optimise emergency- and crisismanagement
• ... to make sure that necessary resources are
available
50
Site Fire Brigade with 2 Fire Stations within the
Industrial Park
Crisis management group Operational Structure
Scene of Incident
Emergency Manager
Fire Brigade (site)
Emergency Response Committee
Site Incident Manager
Emergency Manager3-5
Documentation
Secretary
Company Representative
Environmental control
Emergency Manager 2
Site Security
Fire Brigade (site)
Plant Manager
Occupational Physician
Occupational Physician
Environmental Protection Additional Experts
Public Fire Brigade
Site Security
Public Fire Brigade
Police
Plant Safety
Police
(company affected by incident)
Communications
Toxicology
Crisis Management regulations / operating
procedure
53
EHS Management System BI Germany
„Integrated Handbook System“,
Environmental
Protection
Occupational
Health &
Safety
Emergency
Management
Organising
Safety
taking into account:
• internal requirements (Corporate Centre)
• external requirements (Safety Management Systems,
statutory order on hazardous incidents - StörfallV)
54
Objectives & Targets
Safe management of the company`s technical risks
Technical risks
(examples)
Business risks
(examples)
• Product quality
• Production failure
• Environmental
protection
• Occupational Health &
Safety
• Fires & Explosions
• Site Protection
• Market risks
• Product risks
• Portfolio risks
• Investment risks,
• Financing and taxation
risks
• Risks with large-scale
projects
55
Management review process
Customer
feedback
Findings of
inspections
and audits
Annual reports by
specialist officers „Betriebsbeauftragte“
Evaluation of
suitability of
management
system
Change in
legislation,
market,
technology
Annual
Management
review
Updating of New and/or
Responsible amended
Care
objectives/
Programme
targets
Status in achievement
of
objectives/targets
and actions
Events
Actions to improve
management system
56
Warning Procedures – Warning of Neighborhood
Warning of affected areas by
17 external sirens in 4 groups
Radio announcements
Automated telephone
messages to hospitals,
day care centers or
schools
57
Transport-AccidentInformation- and EmergencyResponse-System
Managing Transportation Emergency in
Germany
VCI
The TUIS-System
Foundation in 1982 in Germany
Voluntary Assistance Program of the Chemical Industry
Association (VCI) in Germany
Agreements between VCI and Minister of Interior in 11 German
Countries to ensure assistance during transportation emergency
TUIS  Transport-Accident-Information and
Technical-Support-System
Part of the global Responsible Care® Initiative
„The Responsibility of the Chemical Industry doesn't stop at
the gateway of the plant“
TUIS Emergency Call System
Scene of accident
Authorized public authority
(e.g. police, public fire brigade)
TUIS member company as included
in the list of companies, e.g.
 a company near the site of
accident
 a manufacturer
Emergency call centers
Telephone exchange within
 the Federal Republic of Germany
 Europe
Level 1 Advice given by phone
Level 2 Expert Advice on the scene
Level 3 Technical Assistance on the
scene
Sites of TUIS member companies (130)
TUIS- Emergency Centers (12)
BASF SE, Ludwigshafen (NRC)
BASF Schwarzheide GmbH
Bayer Industry Services,
Leverkusen
Dow Deutschland, Stade
Henkel KGaA, Düsseldorf
Infracor, Marl
InfraLeuna GmbH, Leuna
InfraServ, Gendorf
Infraserv, Frankfurt
Merck KGaA, Darmstadt
Schering AG, Berlin
Wacker Chemie AG, Burghausen
Level 1 - Advice given by phone
Consultation in local language given by the Technical Officer of the
companies fire department in case of incidents and accidents involving
hazardous materials during transportation (rail, road, waterway), in
production facilities or warehouses, depending on
 Special Situation on the scene
 Weather conditions on the scene
 Location, Neighborhood
Form of Information
 Characteristics / Hazard / Impact
 Address of the producer
 Tactical advices to the Incident
Commander on the scene
 Waste disposal treatment
 Recommended technical equipment and personal protection
Level 2 - Advice given on the scene
Advice given on the scene in difficult
situations e.g.
 Unknown product or not enough
information about the product
 Unknown producer
 Persons with less experience in managing
incidents with hazardous materials
Possible supporting experts:
 Technical Officer of the companies
fire department
 Chemist
 Master craftsman of the production plant
 Specialists (Environment, Engineering,…)
Level 3 - Technical assistance given on the scene
Situation on the scene:
 Large accident / incident
 No suitable technical equipment
 Special operations necessary
Form of Support:
 Special technical equipment
 Salvage tanks
 Special knowledge in handling
hazardous
materials / managing thr incident
 Technical Officer of the companies
fire department
 Operational Units of the company
 Chemist / Specialist (Environment, …)
 Master craftsman of the production
plant
Costs
Level 1
Free of charge
Level 2
Reimburse insurance company of the party who was
responsible for the incident / accident
 Experts
Level 3
Reimburse insurance company of the party who was
responsible for the incident / accident
 Emergency Services of the company on the
scene
 Experts
 Equipment Clean-Up (Technical Equipment,
Protective Equipment, etc.)
TUIS - 1990 to 2007
1400
1200
Advice given by phone
1000
800
Advice given on the scene
600
Technical Assistance given
on the scene
400
200
0
1990
1995
1996
1997 1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004 2005
2006
2007
TUIS member companies have helped 1310 times in 2007.
The advice given by phone is like the past years the most used
level by authorized public authority. In 220 cases Technical
Assistance given on the scene was necessary.
VCI
Technical Equipment - Level 3
BASF-HAZMAT-TRUCK
Extensive Special Technical Equipment
75 kVA integrated Power Generator
360° Flood Lighting System 6 m / 9000 W
80 kN / 60 m Winch System (Treibmatic)
Technical Equipment - Level 3
Mobile flare
Capacity:
ca. 250 kg/h Propane
ca. 350 kg/h Ethylene
Intended for use in
emergency cases e.g.
Pumping propylene from a
derailed pressurized tank
car to an empty one.
Technical Equipment - Level 3
Remote Controlled Robotic Vehicle
(ROBI) – The Manipulator
Step-climbing ability:
Gripper closing force:
Max. carrier load:
35° (70%)
max. 600 N
500 kg
Technical Equipment - Level 3
ROBI in action
Technical Equipment - Level 3
Mobile Chlorine Absorption
Unit
Chlorine absorption: 150 kg/h
Absorbency:300 kg
Cleaning it to an extent that the
exhaust gas chlorine
concentration is less than
10 mg/m3 (ppm)
Technical Equipment - Level 3
Turbo-Extinguisher
Chassis: MAN LX 90
Power: 198 kW
Equipment:
2 x Turbines Larzac 04C6
(Alphajet) each with 13.1 kN
thrust
ICE - International Chemical Environment
 Founded by the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) in
1991
 Cross-border Transportation Emergency Assistance in Europe
 Objectives:
 To train chemical companies (Company Scheme)
 To set up in each country a system like „TUIS“
(Country Scheme)
 To set up in each country a National Response Center
(NRC)
 To establish Emergency Response Intervention Cards
(ERICs)
ICE - Country Scheme (17)
= ICE-System ready for action
= ICE-System in preparation
Germany
Austria
Italy
Sweden
Netherlands
Norway
Great Britain
Finland
France
Spain
Czech
Republic
Hungary
Belgium
Denmark
Switzerland
Poland
Slovakia
ICE - Cross boarder Communication
Producer
NRC Germany
Ludwigshafen / Rhein
NRC Spain
Madrid
Accident
BAB 478 Neunkirchen 12. August 2004
Battery factory Trepcka/Mitrovica, Kosovo 13. September 2000
The Role of Authorities
The cooperation between authorities and companies at an
incident depends on their cooperation before the incident.
• Open communication about risks and safety measures on a
regular basis (e.g. in a local or regional committee) builds up
trust which is urgently needed during emergency response
• Authorities need to know about the possible scenarios for
major accidents to do their own preparations
• Authorities should have clear rules about their
responsibilities in handling major incidents to avoid conflicts
between the different agencies (e.g. labour safety,
environment, civil protection, police etc.)
• Mitigation of consequences should come first, legal
prosecution of individuals responsible for the incident later
82
Neighbours, Journalists and Environmentalists
The basic issue: Neighbours and the general public share the risks
of industrial sites, but not necessarily the benefits.
• Communication of relevant risks has to be done openly and in
an adequate form (“not scientific”) prior to incidents (e.g.
“neighbourhood councils”, brochures, ...)
– to build up trust in the competence of the company to handle
risks
– to enable the neighbours to react adequately during an
incident
• The response of neighbours etc. to incidents is strongly
influenced by the company´s response to requests and
complaints prior to the incident
• Fast and open information after an incident is crucial
• Fears and worries of neighbours etc. have to be taken seriously
even if they are based on emotions rather than science
• On the long term, conflicts with neighbours etc. endangers the
“licence to operate”
83
Crisis Communication
Sometimes crisis communication becomes a crisis of
communication!
84
Outline
1
iDRM Approach in Europe
2
Risk Management Principles
3
Best Practice of Emergency Management
4
Conclusions
85
Conclusions 1
– Investing in safe and eco-efficient plants pays
off at least on the long term
– The (remaining) risks of industrial plants can
be assessed and are the basis for scenarios for
emergency planning
– The knowledge and experience of the
operators should be used by all means
– Risks should be communicated as well as
benefits to all stakeholders, esp. the
neighbours
86
Conclusions 2
– The resources for emergency response (manpower,
equipment, communications, organisation etc) have to
be planned in advance and readily available in case of
an incident. People usually accept the risk of a
chemical/pharmaceutical plant, but not incompetence
in handling it
– Authorities should involve themselves actively in
emergency planning, balancing this out with their law
enforcement duties
– Combined efforts will definitely lead to safer and more
accepted plants, as the figures from Germany may
show
87
Development of Accidents in Germany since 1950
120
109,18
100
80
98,65
Per 1000 full
time workers
83,12
Arbeitsunfälle
Wegeunfälle
60
54,51
„Arbeitsunfälle“
= occupational
accidents
40
34,9
20
21,13
18,08
20,45
13,92
8,96
8,16
5,85
5,42
5,37
16,79
15,78
14,93
5,31
5,01
4,96
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005
„Wegeunfälle“
= acc. on the
way to work
Benefits of implementing Risk Management
 Avoid accidents  avoid costs, bad publicity and image
 Safe workplace environment for employees and
improved social responsibility for industrial estates
 Less criticism from local communities and authorities
due to a safer environment
 Only industrial estates complying with international
safety standards are interesting for foreign investors
 Increased competitiveness of the industrial estate
Design, Build and Operate
What the client
ordered
How the project mgr.
understood it
How it was
documented
How it was
eventually built
How it was planned
by the engineer
What was charged
To the client
How it was implemented
by the technicians
How the consultant
interpreted it
What was subject of
the service agreement
What the client
really wanted
90
iDRM Training Modules
http://www.hrdp-idrm.in/e5783/e17327/
91
http://www.hrdp-idrm.in/
92
iDRM Training Modules
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Confined Space Safety
Safety in Transportation of Hazardous Chemicals
Hazards Identification and Control Measures in Chemical (Industrial)
Workplaces
First Aid in iDRM
Personal Protective Equipment
Accident Causation: Models and Theories
Human Factors in Accidents and prevention
Organisational Commitments in Reducing Accidents
Job safety analysis
What should I Know as District Collector and Why?
Risk Assessment and Management
Consequence analysis: application in emergency planning
On-site emergency plan
Off-site emergency management plan
Industrial Disaster Response Guide
93
Thank you for your attention!
... and special thanks to Richard Gowland, EPSC Technical
Director, who contributed a number of slides
http://www.hrdp-idrm.in/e5783/e17327/
PLANNING OF AN INDUSTRIAL ESTATE
State
levelState level
Development
Programme
Federal
Building Code
Nature
Regional
Conservation
Planning
Act
Law
Planning Laws
Regional
level
Existing Planning
Objectives
Regional Plan
Local
levelMaster Plan
Legally Binding
Land-Use Plan
Water Supply Act
Private or Public
Building Project
„HARBOUR“
...
Legally
Binding
Plan
Approval
Affected Public
Regional
Policy Harmonization
Procedure
Interests
Sectoral
Planning
Authorities
Nature
Conservation
Organizations
Training-cum-Visit Environmental
Supplementary
Environmental
Planning
Impact
Study