Walkable development is not a
drug
Talk at the Design for Health Conference
Minneapolis, April 30, 2007
Jonathan Levine
Professor and Chair
Urban and Regional Planning Program
The University of Michigan
Evaluative Framework for
Walkable Development #1
What would justify
transportation/land-use policy
reform?
Essence of transportation/
land-use policy reform
Market for walkable
development
Proven
effective
Market
interventions
Market uninterested
or incapable of providing
Evaluative Framework for
Walkable Development #2
What would justify
transportation/land-use policy
reform?
Essence of transportation/
land-use policy reform
Market for walkable
development
Choice
expansion
Removal of
obstacles
Municipal regulation
constrains market
Do Developers Want Greater
Density than Regulations Allow?
100%
All Respondents
90%
Northeast
80%
Mid-Atlantic
70%
Southeast/Carribean
60%
Midwest
50%
40%
South Central
30%
Great Plains, Rocky
Mountains
20%
Pacific and
Northwest
10%
Multi-Region
Developers
0%
Central City
Inner Suburb
Outer Suburb
Rural
Residential Neighborhood Preferences, Atlanta and Boston
40
Percent of Sample
35
30
25
20
Atlanta
Boston
15
10
5
0
Very Strong
PedestrianNeighborhood
Preference
Mid-Range
Very Strong
AutoNeighborhood
Preference
The Gap Between Preferences and
Choices in a Sprawling Environment
% Living in Walkable/Transit-Friendly Zones
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
Atlanta
40%
30%
Boston
20%
10%
0%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strong Transit/
Decile in Neighborhood Preference Scale
Pedestrian Preferences
8
9
10
Strong Auto
Preferences
Can walkable
development be required
(where the market isn’t
interested)?
•
•
•
•
•
Smart-growth codes
Transfer of development rights
Incentive zoning
Inclusionary zoning
Urban growth boundaries
The Development
Request for Proposals
• Signal
• Market Facilitation vs. Market
Forcing
You’ve selected a
developer: What do you
do now?
• Zoning code
• Other land-use regulations
• Variance
– (and how to gauge success)
• Pragmatic Compromises
The Three Levels of
Policy Reform
• Educate while leaving municipal
prerogative in place
• Change incentive structure
• Share land-use planning authority
between municipality and higherlevel governments
Oregon Transportation
Planning Rule
“…local governments shall
adopt land use and
subdivision regulations to
reduce reliance on the
automobile which … allow
transit-oriented
developments (TODs) on
lands along transit routes…
Thank you!
Extras
Framework #1: Sprawl as
Potential Market Failure
(the drug model)
• “[D]oes the invisible hand, which guides the
conversion of land to urban use, push too
hard in the direction of bigger cities?
Economists use the term market failure to
describe a situation in which the invisible
hand fails to allocate resources in a socially
desirable manner so as to maximize
aggregate economic well-being. Is a…market
failure involved in the spatial expansion of
cities? If so, the criticism of urban sprawl is
justified, and measures are needed to restrict
urban expansion.” (Brueckner 2000)
High-Density Requirements are
Unenforcable because Capital is
Mobile
Higher-density
development
offers…
Municipal
land-use policy
toward higherdensity
Development
development
outcome
Greater profits
than lowerdensity on-site
and elsewhere
Prohibit
Lower density
Allow
Higher density
Require
Higher density
Lesser profits
than lowerdensity
development
on-site and
elsewhere
Prohibit
Lower density
Allow
Lower density
Require
Vacant
Framework #2: Sprawl as
Potential Government
Failure (the organic
produce model)
• “[T]he belief that sprawl is caused primarily by market
failures is based on the false assumption that there is a
freely operating land use market in U.S. metropolitan
areas. No metropolitan area has anything remotely
approaching a free land use market because of local
regulations adopted for parochial political, social and
fiscal purposes. Most suburban land use markets are
dominated by local zoning and other regulations that
are aimed at excluding low-income households and
that distort what would occur in a truly free market.”
(Downs 1999)
Empirical Research on
Land-use Regulation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
White 1988
Moss 1977
Pasha 1996
Fischel 1999
Shay and Rossi 1981
McMillen and McDonald 1991
Thorson 1994
Thorson 1997
Peiser 1989
Zoning May Lower
Densities and Accelerate
Sprawl, but…
Local Regulation is “the Free Market”
(Political Version)
• “Smart growth is inconsistent with the American dream
of a big home on a five-acre lot," said David Bliden,
executive director of the Maryland Association of
Counties, which opposed [former Maryland Governor]
Glendening's effort as an unreasonable intrusion into
counties' power to regulate building. "The concept of a
higher authority, of a Big Brother, is inconsistent with
the democratic principles that have to be intertwined
with land use management." (Washington Post, August
10, 2004).
Tiebout Model
and Exclusionary Zoning
• “Each community is authorized to enact a
‘zoning’ ordinance which states, ‘No
household may reside in this community
unless it consumes at least some minimum
amount of housing.” (Hamilton 1975)
• Otherwise, risk a game of “musical suburbs,
with the poor following the rich in a neverending quest for a tax base.”
The Costs of Exclusion
and How to Assume them Away
• “Restrictions due to employment
opportunities are not considered.
It may be assumed that all
persons are living on dividend
income.” (Tiebout 1956)
Constructing the Myth of
the Market
Scientific
Evaluation of
Smart Growth
Proven
benefits
Choice
expansion
Market
interventions
Removal of
obstacles
Market uninterested
or incapable of providing
Municipal regulation
constrains market
Framework #1
Framework #2
Assume proof of
benefit of smart
growth is ambiguous
In Framework #1
In Framework #2
Refrain from
intervention
into
markets
Remove
regulatory
obstacles
regardless
Conclusions
• Market failure vs. government
failure
• Travel-behavior science and the
“neutral default”
• Choice-based rationale
Metropolitan
Accessibility and
Transportation
Sustainability:
Comparative Indicators for
Policy Reform
Funding:
EPA-STAR, 2007-2010
Graham Environmental Sustainability Institute,
2007-2009
Mobility
Transportation
Capacity
Expansion
LandUse
Planning
Travel
Demand
Management
Accessibility
ENDS
MEANS
Mobility
Proximity
Connectivity
Job Accessibility by Car,
Boston and Atlanta 1995
Accessibility Score (millions)
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
Atlanta
Boston
800
600
400
200
0
0%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Population Percentile
Hamilton’s Three-Way
Classification of Municipalities
Westminster, Colorado
Can Increased Property Rights Lead to
Increased Production of Multifamily
Housing? (From Mitchell 2004)
Pennsylvania, New Units 1970-1990
Pennsylvania 1970
1.2%
3.2%
21.9%
25.6%
47.2%
58.6%
18.3%
24.1%
New Jersey, New Units 1970-1990
New Jersey 1970
Single Family
Townhouse
Apartment
Mobile Home
2.1%
1.1%
22.8%
26.7%
53.0%
15.9%
60.2%
18.3%
The Fiction of
“Unzoned” Houston
• Subdivision regulations,
transportation standards, parking
requirements still in place
• Deed restrictions are municipally
enforced
An R-1 Zone is (nearly)
Forever
• State of Massachusetts, 19701999
– Existing single-family areas
changing to other uses: between
0.003% and 0.3% of 1970 singlefamily acreage
How a Libertarian Could
View Land-Use Policy
Reform
•
In fact, the market’s delivery of private goods is not related at
all to the scientific validity of people’s preferences. Markets
can and do supply organic lettuce regardless of whether it
really is “better” for your health. The market’s ability to deliver
Miller Lite is not at all contingent on the resolution of the
“Great-Taste, Less-Filling” debate. European consumers do
not want genetically modified food regardless of scientists’
arguments that consumer concerns about such food are
without merit. And people pay good money for light trucks
because they feel “safer” in the vehicles even though
scientific evidence challenges that sentiment. (Peter Van
Doren, Cato Institute, 2003)
By contrast…
• “The New Urbanist fall-back position that
‘...people should be given a choice’ is not
plausible; there is no acknowledgement of the
fact that markets regularly generate the more
feasible choices while discarding the
infeasible ones, based on opportunity costs
compared to consumers’ willingness to pay.”
(Gordon and Richardson 2001)
Even though…
• “An interesting question, especially with
regard to infill projects, is whether these
alternatives are acceptable to the community
at large, as opposed to the prospective
purchasers. There are many examples of
broader community objections to high-density
projects, usually on traffic-generation
grounds.” (Gordon and Richardson 2001)
Proactive roles for
planning
• Foster high quality of life at a range of
densities through:
–
–
–
–
–
Design
Connectivity
Proximity/agglomeration
Open space
Persuasion
Local Regulation is “the
Free Market”
(Academic Version)
A“household’s ability to select a
place of residence from among a
host of fully autonomous
jurisdictions offering different
amounts of public spending” is
tantamount to “freedom of choice
in the public sector.” (Brueckner
2000)