Hydrocarbons QPQ NEG – HSS

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Hydrocarbons QPQ NEG – HSS
Note
You can still use evidence from the normal hydrocarbons neg file.
There are also helpful cards in the Mexico politics file to answer the Nieto credibility scenario.
1NC Dependence Adv.
Defense
Oil dependence is at a record low – especially from the Middle East
Brandon 7-19 (Hembree Brandon, 7/19/13; Editorial Director, Farm Press; Pump prices aside, U.S.
dependence on Mideast oil continues to drop; http://deltafarmpress.com/blog/pump-prices-aside-usdependence-mideast-oil-continues-drop)
The economy has improved of late, government analysts tell us. And in almost perfect synchronicity
with that news oil prices rose, with the likelihood that the cost of almost everything else will rise, even
though those same government wizards tell us core inflation is negligible, discounting food and energy. After all,
who spends money on food and energy? In yet another touch of irony, the U.S., for so long dependent on imported energy, had
as its No. 1 export in 2012 gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil. While U.S.-produced petroleum products sail away to China, the EU, and
elsewhere, often at the same time U.S. inventories are falling, imports increasing, and pump prices rising. Ahh, the magical
mysteries of capitalism at work. A lot has happened in the almost 40 years since the Arab oil embargo gave
the world its first traumatic experience with the term “energy crisis,” and started the price escalation
that has continued off and on since then. America’s dependence on Mideast oil has been steadily
diminishing in recent years — no thanks to Washington leadership, which for four decades has failed to
develop a sound, meaningful long term energy policy. Rather, drilling technology, for which America
leads the world in innovation, and new methods of finding oil and natural gas have resulted in
extensive additional supplies both offshore and onshore. This has not been without controversy,
particularly for natural gas and worries of environmental contamination related to the “fracking”
process. In 2012, the U.S. had the largest annual increase in oil production since the first commercial
gushed skyward in Pennsylvania in the mid-1800s. The U.S. Energy Information Administration
forecasts another record for 2013. Some analysts are predicting that within a few years U.S. oil
production could top that of Saudi Arabia and Russia , the world’s two largest producers. Vast new
stores of natural gas are being discovered here, enough experts say, to last hundreds of years. For
much of the last 40 years, a large chunk of U.S. oil imports was subject to the political vicissitudes of
an increasingly unstable Mideast. By 2012, however, Persian Gulf nations were supplying only 28
percent of our oil, down sharply from almost 50 percent in 2005 . Now, more than half our oil comes
from western hemisphere nations; Canada is the biggest supplier, at 28 percent in 2012. We now
import more oil from Africa than from the Persian Gulf.
Oil dependence is down – increased US production and reduced consumption
Green 7 – 12 (Miranda Green, 7/12/13; Reporter for The Daily Beast; Increasing Oil Production in the
U.S. Sparks Less OPEC Reliance; http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/12/increasing-oilproduction-in-the-u-s-sparks-less-opec-reliance.html)
The U.S. is often painted as an energy-strapped nation reliant on foreign countries for most of its oil
use. But that picture is changing as the country gets closer to complete energy independence. A report
issued this week shows that the U.S. is increasingly producing more crude oil inside of its borders .
Production jumped last week to its highest level since January 1992, according to a recent report by
the Energy Information Administration. In the week ended July 5, the U.S. produced 7.4 million barrels
per day, up 1.8 percent from the previous week, and the highest weekly level in more than 20 years.
The increase is largely attributed to more drilling and the sharp rise of hydraulic fracturing in the U.S. The controversial
technique of fracturing, or fracking, involves drilling into rock formations to release oil embedded in shale. Many of the U.S.
reserves of crude oil are found in the Midwest and along the plains region. Two of the largest reserves are the Bakken and Eagle
Ford oilfields located in North Dakota and Texas, respectively.
The increase of oil production in the U.S. is
reversely driving down the amount of foreign oil the country is importing from OPEC countries
because the fuel is less needed. Meanwhile, the U.S. is reducing its use of oil —thanks to more
efficient vehicles, less driving, the use of natural gas as a transport fuel, and greater investments in
renewable energy. Total liquid fuel consumption in the U.S. declined by 2.1 percent in 2012, according
to the EIA, and is expected to rise by less than 1 percent in 2013. And that means the U.S. needs to
import less oil—especially from OPEC countires. Numbers from the EIA report show that only 11
percent of the oil the U.S. used in March came from sources outside the U.S.
Strong U.S. oil industry offsets dependence of Middle Eastern oil
Jaffe, ’13. Amy Myers Jaffe is executive director of energy and sustainability at University of California
at Davis Graduate School of Management. She was formerly the director of the Energy Forum at the
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. “An Oil Boom Means Washington—Not
Riyadh—Could Become the World's Swing Oil Producer” Wall Street Journal. March 27, 2013.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324105204578382690249436084.html – clawan
For four decades, the geopolitical leverage achieved by large petro-exporting states has been a major
challenge for the U.S. and its allies. Now, the rapid growth of oil and natural-gas production from
unconventional shale resources in North America is rapidly eliminating this threat, with positive geopolitical implications
for the U.S. As political uncertainty spreads across the Mideast, rising U.S. shale-oil production may become a more
critical touchstone to market stability. In fact, the U.S. shale-oil boom might roll back the clock to the 1960s when a
U.S. oil surplus (via the Texas Railroad Commission), put Washington, not Riyadh, as the world's swing producer. In a
world where the U.S. will have few, if any, oil imports to replace during a global supply outage, Washington will have more
discretion to use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to help allies in times of crisis or to prevent oil producers from
using energy cutoffs to achieve financial or geopolitical goals. U.S. oil and gas exports will also garner
closer ties to allies and friendly countries through closer economic relations. A domestic oil and gas boom will
also bring the US back to a stronger economic footing, possibly giving the country back some of the financial sway that
previously allowed it to dominate international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank. U.S. foreign aid and even energy
exports could become a stronger counterpoint to continuing Chinese global investment. Beijing
might also find soon that its
overt policies of aiding problem states like Iran and Syria and thereby tying up the U.S. in conflicts
across the Middle East will become more and more counterproductive over time as rising energy costs hit oilimport dependent China harder than an energy self-sufficient America.
Iran Prolif Defense
No impact to Iranian proliferation
Waltz 12 — Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth N.
Waltz, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2012, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”,
http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/ptbr/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf,
Accessed 07-04-2013 | AK)
The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States
has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the
a palpable sense of crisis still looms. It should not. Most U.S.,
policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible
outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore
stability to the Middle East. POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with
United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table,
European, and Israeli commentators and
serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons
can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its
weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to
change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent. The second
possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to
acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear
weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hardliners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such
as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. The United States and its
European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a
significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western
powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at
subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only
The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current
course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that
outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such
language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country
has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to
shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with
it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional
weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks.
and international stability, not less . Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled
instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the
Power
begs to be balanced
current crisis.
, after all,
. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is
easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to
its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term
have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop
current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis
but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power
is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the
the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the
debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings
of how states generally behave in the international system . The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others,
is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian
policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like
any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no
propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume
otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to
argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a
nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though
doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear.
Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the
purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at
the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for
example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly
Nevertheless, even some
observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear
weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts
even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these
concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945 .
History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely
aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness
discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear
weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break
this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk
of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States'
impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never
entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran
acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal . After all, building a bomb is
costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties
that cannot be trusted or managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other
states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear
age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly
defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked
slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will
concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.
change now . Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly
signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the
Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear
Iran should now. REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more
worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have
If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as
nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states.
Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other
country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally
kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent.
dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a
nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear
Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel,
the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear
capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever,
and
Iran Prolif Good
Stable deterrence between Iran and Israel and Pakistan will ensure regional stability.
Madson, 2006
[Peter N. Madson, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Master’s degree in National Security Affairs, 3-6, “The
Sky is Not Falling: Regional Reaction to a Nuclear Armed Iran,”
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA445779]
This thesis analyzes the reaction of key players in the region, the reaction of nuclear states, such as Israel and Pakistan, to a nuclear-armed
Iran. Naturally, this situation carries with it serious, though separate, security issues to each. The two states’ reactions will go far in
determining the impact of a nuclearlized Iran upon regional security. Iran must step cautiously in its actions due to both states nuclear
weapons. To be sure, these states will have to deal with the same, non-nuclear threats that Iran represents, but all parties involved will tread
lightly in these affairs, avoiding nuclear brinkmanship. In addition to a detailed analysis of Israel and Pakistan, this thesis considers the
reaction of the Arab Gulf States in relation to a nuclear-armed Iran. Although Israel and Pakistan are capable of deterring Iran by themselves
with a deterrence understanding, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have much to fear. This fear, on
the other hand, need not cripple the militarily weaker states. This thesis argues Iran presents no critical nuclear threat to the region or the
Deterrence between Iran and its neighbors will remove serious security obstacles and stabilize
the region. Stability, for the sake of this thesis, is defined as the regional states, with the aid of the United States, being able to keep Iran
world.
relatively limited in its ability to disrupt the regional status-quo. This will be conducted through a regional deterrence relationship that even
For Tehran, deterrence is not a difficult concept to
understand: In return for nuclear adventurism, Iran risks nuclear destruction and the end of its bid for
dominance over the Muslim world. This thesis accepts the Nuclear Optimist point of view. A nuclear Iran , equipped with
the fiercest revolutionaries in Tehran will understand.
a clearly defined C2 structure,
will not destabilize the Arabian Gulf Region.
Iran cannot be stopped from constructing
nuclear weapons. The more nations try to deter it from this course, the more Tehran is convinced of the need for these weapons, and the less
likely it is to behave rationally. A better course for the United States to follow would be allowing Tehran its nuclear weapons, and use the
resources that would have been wasted on preventing Iranian nuclearization to improve military ties in the region.
Iran prolif solves Middle East conflict.
Madson, 2006
[Peter N. Madson, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Master’s degree in National Security Affairs, 3-6, “The
Sky is Not Falling: Regional Reaction to a Nuclear Armed Iran,”
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA445779]
Nuclear weapons represent a new level of warfare, raising the severity of miscalculation to an
unacceptable level of loss. This forces state leaders to consider their actions carefully in the face of
nuclear-armed antagonists. The introduction of a nuclear Iran is bound to provoke significant tensions
within the international community, but these need not be entirely negative. What Professor Richard
Lebow of Dartmouth University describes as the “long peace” was partially due to the stability that
nuclear weapons bring. 174 Two belligerents who have these weapons and are ready to use them,
knowing that if either does, it will spell disaster for both, have inherent peace of mind and a solution
to their security dilemma. Deterrence is not terribly difficult to create, as Pakistan has learned. Once
achieved, it provides stability, security, and as in Pakistan’s case, significant economic benefit.
Nukes solve Iran stability – give the regime credibility, respect and domestic security
reducing the likelihood of irrational and aggressive action- solves the incentive for
Saudi Iran conflict
Madson, 2006
[Peter N. Madson, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Master’s degree in National Security Affairs, 3-6, “The
Sky is Not Falling: Regional Reaction to a Nuclear Armed Iran,”
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA445779]
In the case of Iran and its neighborhood, an argument can be made that Tehran’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons might help stabilize the region. When one accepts that Israel has possessed nuclear weapons for decades
and Pakistan unveiled its capability in 1998, the region seems capable of gradually accepting new nuclear states. Since then, both nuclear
states have dealt with serious conflicts and nuclear weapons have provided security. To gain an understanding of how Iran will use its nuclear
weapons, one can look briefly at how these nuclear states have used their weapons for security. For Israel, memories of the Holocaust will
never diminish. The quote “Never Again!” is reportedly welded on the side of the first Israeli nuclear bomb. 28 These words summarize
Israel’s commitment to never allow a second Holocaust. With India being Pakistan’s one, and apparently only foe, Pakistan faces a
conventionally superior enemy, in both numbers and sophistication of weapons. Nevertheless, to date, Islamabad’s nuclear deterrent has
States acquiring nuclear weapons one at a
time and with significant time between them may seem fraught with danger and uncertainty.
However, Iran, as the most populous state in the region and the historical hegemon of the Arabian
Gulf has lost its previous standing as regional arbiter to the United States. Detracting further from Iran’s image,
proven suitable to defending that state from an otherwise more powerful enemy.
the United States has rapidly removed two bordering regimes. Tehran cannot help but notice the capabilities of America’s armed forces and
Nuclear
weapons, with a clear C2 doctrine and regional deterrent relationships can garner Iran respect,
domestic security, and the chance to add stability. Stability, for the purpose of this thesis, is
considered to be the removal of the threat of conflict and its corresponding devastation
worry it could be next. This concern could lead Iran to behave irrationally, causing its decision making to become unstable.
Iran nuclearization solves War on Terror, permanently lowers oil prices and creates
regional stability.
Lowther, 2010
[Adam, defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute, Feb. 8, op-ed in NYT, “Iran’s Two-Edged
Bomb.” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/opinion/09lowther.html?_r=1&ref=opinion]
First, Iran’s development of nuclear weapons would give the United States an opportunity to finally
defeat violent Sunni-Arab terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. Here’s why: a nuclear Iran is primarily a
threat to its neighbors, not the United States. Thus Washington could offer regional security —
primarily, a Middle East nuclear umbrella — in exchange for economic, political and social reforms in
the autocratic Arab regimes responsible for breeding the discontent that led to the attacks of Sept. 11,
2001. Until now, the Middle East autocracies have refused to change their ways because they were
protected by the wealth of their petroleum reserves. A nuclear Iran alters the regional dynamic
significantly, and provides some leverage for us to demand reforms. Second, becoming the primary
provider of regional security in a nuclear Middle East would give the United States a way to break the
OPEC cartel. Forcing an end to the sorts of monopolistic practices that are illegal in the United States
would be the price of that nuclear shield, bringing oil prices down significantly and saving billions of
dollars a year at the pump. Or, at a minimum, President Obama could trade security for increased
production and a lowering of global petroleum prices. Third, Israel has made clear that it feels
threatened by Iran’s nuclear program. The Palestinians also have a reason for concern, because a
nuclear strike against Israel would devastate them as well. This shared danger might serve as a catalyst
for reconciliation between the two parties, leading to the peace agreement that has eluded the last
five presidents. Paradoxically, any final agreement between Israelis and Palestinians would go a long
way to undercutting Tehran’s animosity toward Israel, and would ease longstanding tensions in the
region.
1NC Human Capital Adv.
AT: Immigration Scenario
Multiple alt causes to growth – state monopolies, infrastructure, and banking
O’Niell, 2011. Shannon K. O'Neil, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies. “Mexico: Development and
Democracy at a Crossroads.” Council for Foreign Relations. February 2011.
http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-development-democracy-crossroads/p24089 – clawan
Yet despite its free trade and pro-business credentials, from other vantage points Mexico's markets are much less free.
Oligopolies and state monopolies continue to exert considerable influence over crucial sectors of the
Mexican economy. In telecommunications, the media, cement, soft drinks, bread and tortillas, and electricity and energy, one or a few
companies dominate. Mexico's billionaires, unlike American heavyweights such as Bill Gates or Warren Buffett, generally made their money
from these uneven playing fields. Special
interest groups, in business as well as labor, have managed to block changes.
Perpetuating these economic fiefdoms increases inequality and limits competitiveness, innovation,
and ultimately growth. Physical infrastructure holds Mexico back as well. By the early 2000s, Mexico was last
among Latin American economies—and far behind their OECD counterparts—in terms of
infrastructure investment as a portion of GDP. The limits on roads, railroads, ports, water and electricity systems,
telecommunications, and the like hamper efficiency and productivity throughout the economy—shaving valuable cents off
Mexico's industrial competitiveness. To fund an infrastructure transformation, Mexico will have to reform its tax
system—currently one of the lowest in the world, besting only Guatemala in the hemisphere by collecting some 11 percent
of GDP. Last year, Mexico celebrated as it claimed the top spot in Latin America in the World Bank's Doing Business survey, overtaking
Colombia. By revamping its bankruptcy laws and cutting the burdens on doing business, at a global ranking of 35 (up from 41 in 2010) Mexico
today is far ahead of Brazil, its much-hyped rival, at 127. Nevertheless, as
its peers and neighbors reform their institutions
and labor markets and invest in education, infrastructure, and innovation, Mexico is falling behind on
broader measures of competitiveness. In the World Economic Forum's 2010 Global Competitiveness Index, Mexico's ranking fell
six notches to sixty-sixth among 139 countries. The country's large, unwieldy bureaucracy; unreformed labor laws;
weak regulatory framework; and low investment in human and physical capital will continue to hinder
competitiveness,3 while its customs regulations and product standards introduce further pitfalls for foreign investors. Finally,
financing, particularly for small and medium sized companies—those that provide the most jobs and most
opportunity for social and economic mobility—is limited. Mexico's large banks, owned today predominantly by
international players, are more interested in lending to easy borrowers—blue chip companies well known in domestic or
international markets—than in taking a chance on local entrepreneurs. This hobbles job growth and the economy overall.
Mexican development strong now – middle class
O’Niell, 2011. Shannon K. O'Neil, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies. “Mexico: Development and
Democracy at a Crossroads.” Council for Foreign Relations. February 2011.
http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-development-democracy-crossroads/p24089 – clawan
Perhaps the most important dynamic to emerge in recent years is the rise of Mexico's middle class. Now
nearly forty million strong, middle-class families are the pillars of open market and democratic stability. They
work in small and medium enterprises (often in the informal economy), and strive for six Cs: casa propia (a home of one's own), a car, a
cellphone, a computer, cable television, and trips to the cinema.8 As some businesses are realizing, they are important consumers and the
backbone of future growth. Wal-Mart opened nearly three hundred stores in 2010 alone—all small supermarkets targeted at this expanding
income bracket—and continues to aggressively expand throughout the country.9 This
middle class will in large part
determine the economic future of Mexico. If it grows, so too will Mexico's economy. More important, this
socioeconomic sector is the most likely to push for the changes necessary to truly open Mexico's
markets. And, as the sector grows, its economic demands may find a receptive environment in Mexico's
burgeoning democracy.
Mexican democracy fails – corruption and public disillusionment
O’Niell, 2011. Shannon K. O'Neil, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies. “Mexico: Development and
Democracy at a Crossroads.” Council for Foreign Relations. February 2011.
http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-development-democracy-crossroads/p24089 – clawan
Yet many worry about the true depth of change within Mexico's political system. Mexico's formal and informal rules still limit
transparency and accountability from the political class. The blanket prohibition of reelection—whether for
president or local town council—leaves few incentives for politicians to fulfill their campaign promises . Instead, as
they seek higher office, they must have the support of unelected party leaders. Informally, some of the most powerful ministries
in Mexico, as well as the increasingly influential state governments within the federal system, have begun to push back against
broader transparency and accountability. Denied or ignored requests under Mexico's freedom of information act are
increasing, particularly in the realm of security. Continued weak democratic governance and a lack of accountability
is perpetuating corruption, and persistent impunity erodes the credibility of institutions. Public
opinion is showing increasing disillusionment with democracy. Last year's Latinobarómetro survey of attitudes
toward democracy in eighteen Latin American countries showed Mexico with the lowest level of support in
the region. Only 62 percent of Mexicans agreed that “democracy was the best form of government,” compared to an average of 76 percent
across the region.10
Alt cause to development/security – drug wars
UN, 2012. “Thematic Debate of the 66th session of the United Nations General Assembly on Drugs and
Crime as a Threat to Development: On the occasion of the UN International Day against Drug Abuse and
Illicit Trafficking.” United Nations: New York. June 26, 2012.
http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/Issues/drugs/drugs-crime.shtml – clawan
As we move towards 2015, and take stock of the Millennium Development Goals, there is a growing recognition that organized
crime and illicit drugs are major impediments to their achievement. As economic development is
threatened by transnational organized crime and illicit drugs, countering crime must form part of the development
agenda, and social and economic development approaches need to form part of our response to organized crime. If we are to ensure that the
MDGs are achieved, we must strengthen strategies to deliver these goals, including stepping up efforts to address issues such as money
laundering, corruption and trafficking in wildlife, people and arms, and drugs. Organized crime
and drugs impact every
economy, in every country, but they are particularly devastating in weak and vulnerable countries. Weak and fragile countries are
particularly vulnerable to the effects of transnational organized crime. These countries, some devastated by war, others
making the complex journey towards democracy, are preyed upon by crime. As a result, organized crime
flourishes, successes in development are reversed, and opportunities for social and economic
advancement are lost. Corruption, a facilitator of organized crime and drug trafficking, is a serious impediment to the rule of law and
sustainable development. It can be a dominant factor driving fragile countries towards failure. It is estimated that up to US$40 billion annually
is lost through corruption in developing countries. Drugs
and crime undermine development by eroding social and
human capital. This degrades quality of life and can force skilled workers to leave, while the direct impacts of victimisation, as well as fear
of crime, may impede the development of those that remain. By limiting movement, crime impedes access to possible
employment and educational opportunities, and it discourages the accumulation of assets. Crime is also
more “expensive” for poor people in poor countries, and disadvantaged households may struggle to cope with the shock of victimisation.
Drugs and crime also undermine development by driving away business. Both foreign and domestic investors see
crime as a sign of social instability, and crime drives up the cost of doing business. Tourism is a sector especially sensitive to crime issues.
Drugs and crime, moreover, undermine the ability of the state to promote development by destroying
the trust relationship between the people and the state, and undermining democracy and confidence
in the criminal justice system. When people lose confidence in the criminal justice system, they may engage in vigilantism, which
further undermines the state.
Lack of gun control means the aff can’t solve drug violence
Sweig, ’13. Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and
Director for Latin America Studies. Council for Foreign Relations. July 2013. “A Strategy to Reduce Gun
Trafficking and Violence in the Americas.” http://www.cfr.org/arms-industries-and-trade/strategyreduce-gun-trafficking-violence-americas/p31155#cid=soc-twitter-at-policy_innovation_memoranduma_strategy_to_reduce_gun_traff-070113 – clawan
Six years later, little has changed: the U.S. civilian firearms market continues to supply the region's
transnational criminal networks with high-powered weaponry that is purchased with limited oversight, especially
from unlicensed individuals at gun shows, flea markets, pawn shops, and on the Internet. Lax U.S. gun laws enable straw
purchasers, including those under investigation in Operation Fast and Furious, to legally procure thousands of AK-47 and
AR-15 variants every year and traffic them across the border to sell them illegally to criminal factions.
U.S. government data highlights the problem. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) Web-based firearm trace request
and analysis system, eTrace, enables law enforcement officials to collaborate with ATF to track the path of recovered weapons from the
manufacturer or importer though the distribution chain to the first retail purchase. Over
70 percent of the ninety-nine
thousand weapons recovered by Mexican law enforcement since 2007 were traced to U.S.
manufacturers and importers. Likewise, 2011 eTrace data for the Caribbean indicates that over 90 percent of the weapons
recovered and traced in the Bahamas and over 80 percent of those in Jamaica came from the United States. The ATF has not released data for
Central America, but the numbers are likely similar. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports that easy
access to firearms is a
major factor influencing homicide trends in Latin America and the Caribbean; the gun-related homicide rate in
Latin America exceeded the global average in 2010 by more than 30 percent. The World Bank estimates that crime and violence cost
Central America nearly 8 percent of its GDP when accounting for the costs of law enforcement,
security, and health care. The U.S. government has empowered law enforcement in the region to recover and investigate the source
of weapons used by criminal factions. In December 2009, the ATF introduced the Spanish version of eTrace. Since 2012, the State Department
has funded the Organization of American States' (OAS) program to provide firearm-marking equipment and training to law enforcement in
twenty-five countries. Yet, these efforts notwithstanding, the ATF
intercepted only 15 percent of the roughly 250,000
guns smuggled into Mexico between 2010 and 2012. In effect, the United States undermines its own efforts at
preventing arms trafficking with its unwillingness to strengthen oversight of the firearms industry and
lukewarm support for multilateral agreements.
AT: Nieto Credibility
Turn: Increasing cooperation with the US hurts Nieto
Long, 13 – American University international relations professor
[Tom, PhD in International Relations focusing on US-Latin America relations, American University Center
for Latin American and Latino Studies research fellow, "Will tensions over security spoil the Obama-Peña
Nieto Summit?," AULA Blog, American University Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, 4-16, 14,
aulablog.net/2013/04/16/will-tensions-over-security-spoil-the-obama-pena-nieto-summit/]
Peña Nieto’s political incentives do not point to the same, high-profile cooperation with the United States that
occurred under President Felipe Calderón, who had already begun shifting priorities last year. Despite the major turnaround signified by the
PRI’s signing NAFTA almost 20 years ago, Peña Nieto’s PRI still contains
elements more skeptical of U.S. “intervention”
of the U.S. aid planned under the Mérida Initiative has been disbursed,
and Congress exhibits little appetite for major new appropriations. (Even at its height, U.S. spending was a fraction of
than Calderón’s PAN. Materially, moreover, most
Mexico’s contribution to the drug war.) That reduction, coupled with growing awareness that the Calderón strategy actually fueled violence,
diminishes the enthusiasm in and outside of government for continuing his policies. Frustration from the left in both countries regarding
persisting human rights violations and the slow pace of judicial reform could also grow more serious.
US investments de-rail reform- urgency of failure key to reform motivation
Rodriguez, 12 -- reporter for Bloomberg News in Mexico City
[Carlos Manuel, and Jonathan Roeder, "A Big Oil Find May Derail Reforms in Mexico," Business Week,
10-4-12, www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-10-04/a-big-oil-find-may-derail-reforms-in-mexico,
accessed 7-10]
A Big Oil Find May Derail Reforms in Mexico
When Mexican President Felipe Calderón turned 50 last August, the head of the state oil company called with what he labeled “a great gift.”
After years of deep exploration and almost $10 billion in investment since 2009, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) made a big oil find in the
ultradeep waters of the Gulf of Mexico. A week later, Calderón appeared at a press conference holding a flask of crude from the new site, the
Trion field. Pemex is preparing to announce a second deepwater discovery in coming days, according to company executives. The finds will
bolster the legacy of President Calderón, who had overseen declines in crude output by Pemex every year since he took office in late 2006. But
ultimately the discovery could derail an overhaul of the company promised by President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto, who assumes office on Dec.
1. Because Pemex’s petroleum production has dropped 25 percent from its peak of 3.4 million barrels a day in 2004, Peña Nieto called energy
reform his “signature issue.” He promised to change rules that allow private and foreign oil companies to provide services to Pemex but ban
them from owning stakes in Mexico’s oil and gas fields. Mexico depends on royalties from Pemex for about a third of its budget. Pemex
lacks experience beyond shallow waters, and Mexico’s deepwater Gulf territory is too vast for a single
company to explore and exploit, says Juan Carlos Zepeda, head of the nation’s Hydrocarbons Commission. Capital Economics, a
London-based research firm, says allowing international companies to invest and produce in Mexico’s fields could boost
the nation’s growth by as much as 0.8 percent a year. Now, with a possible 10 billion barrels in new reserves from the recent finds,
politicians may find it easier to stick with the status quo. “Reforms are easier done in an urgency
moment,” says Lisa Schineller, chief of Latin American ratings at Standard & Poor’s (MHP), which downgraded Mexico in 2009 in part
because of its overreliance on oil. “When you’re losing oil revenue, there’s greater pressure.”
Public hates Nieto’s Pemex reform, hurts stability
Estevez 13
“Most Mexicans Oppose President Peña Nieto's Plans To Open Up Pemex To Private Investment” By Dolia Estevez, 6/26/2013 11:51AM,
Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2013/06/26/most-mexicans-oppose-president-pena-nietos-plans-to-open-up-pemex-toprivate-investment/
Foreign oil companies were expropriated by Mexican President Lazaro Cárdenas in 1938, and ever since
Mexico’s vast oil resources — 13.9 billion barrels of crude-oil and possibly the world’s fourth-largest
shale-gas reserves– became forbidden to outsiders. The Wall Street Journal said the announcement
highlights a “willingness to break with the past among young, reformist members” of the PRI, Peña
Nieto’s party. Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell are reported to be ready to return to Mexico, if
Congress passes the measure. Both were among the group of American and British companies
expropriated 75 years ago.
But Mexicans are less than ready to support Peña Nieto’s most ambitious and controversial reform to
date. A new poll by the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), a research institute,
shows that 65 out of every 100 Mexicans are against opening up Pemex, the world’s seventh-largest
oil producer with annual sales of more than $100 billion. “Energy, particularly oil, continues to be the
stronghold of Mexican nationalism,” said CIDE.
Pemex reform not key- renewables too easily exploited
Lee, 11 -- Houston Journal of International Law executive editor
[Zachary, "The Silver Lining to a Cloudy Situation," Houston Journal of International Law, 2011, 33.2,
ebsco]
WITH OR WITHOUT PEMEX REFORM
Much has been made of Mexico’s efforts to inject private capital and expertise into Pemex.42 Likewise,
much has been made of the absolute failure of these efforts.43 The result is a stagnation of Mexico’s oil
industry and an inability to exploit the potentially vast oil reserves in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico.44 Fortunately,
renewable energy in Mexico does not face the same obstacles to private investment, and Mexico’s wind
and solar potential can be exploited relatively easily.45 President Calderón has made it clear that Mexico’s energy
industry will continue to grow—with or without Pemex reform: “With nothing but wind power, without burning a drop
of petroleum, we are generating electricity so people can live better, so companies can produce more and generate more jobs, and so that
people here can benefit through rent or association with these projects.”46
Reform cuts government revenues and public services
Siskind 6/25 [Cory, research analyst for Control Risks, a global risk management consultancy]
(Mexico Plays the Waiting Game on Big Reforms, Huffington Post, 06/25/2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cory-siskind/mexico-plays-the-waiting-_b_3493542.html)
Members of Mexico's left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) party are skeptical. Beyond
the political complications of amending Mexico's constitution lies a historical distrust of foreign
competition in the energy sector. US and Anglo-Dutch oil companies operating in Mexico were
expropriated in 1938 by then President Lázaro Cardenas, a source of national pride for most citizens.
Some Mexicans believe that opening the oil giant will dramatically decrease government revenue, of
which PEMEX currently provides approximately 35%. They fear that this, in turn, will reduce
government spending on badly needed public services.¶ Another challenge to the speedy passing of
energy reforms is the rupture of the political cohesion seen in early 2013. The PAN, party of former
presidents Felipe Calderón and Vicente Fox, ousted its senate party leader, Ernesto Cordero, on May 20.
The ousting, as well as July 7 local elections, has caused a shake-up in the party. Divisions are solidifying
between two factions and tensions have come to a head in recent weeks. Yet, while the shake-up may
delay the approval process, it is unlikely to entirely halt the passage of energy reforms.
Says “No”
Mexico says no – empirics prove conditional engagement is contentious
James C. Mckinley Jr. 8 - (journalist for The New York Times, "Conditions on U.S. Aid in Drug Fight
Anger Mexico" http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/07/world/americas/07mexico.html?_r=0)//AP
MEXICO CITY — Few slights irk Mexican politicians so much as when Washington treats Mexico like a backward country in need of outside
anger raged full throttle this week as top Mexican officials threatened to walk away
from a major United States aid package to help defeat drug traffickers. The reason: Democrats in the
House and Senate have tied the aid to guarantees that the police and military will not violate human
rights. Officials from President Felipe Calderón on down have assailed the idea that the United States Congress would withhold a quarter
of the aid for Mexico if it did not meet human rights standards, calling it an attack on their sovereignty. “The bills approved
by both chambers of the United States Congress contain some aspects that make them, in their current versions,
unacceptable to our country,” Interior Minister Juan Camilo Mouriño said Monday. A day later, President Calderón
said, “My government will defend at all times its national sovereignty and the interests of Mexicans and
we will act strictly in accordance with the Constitution, and, of course, we will not accept conditions
that simply are unacceptable.” A chorus of similar protests went up this week from Mexican lawmakers, prosecutors and law
enforcement officials, who called the bills insulting and reeking of Yankee arrogance. Some pointed out the United States had no
room to talk, given the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Others said Mexico had not asked for unilateral
aid from America, but a partnership in fighting crime. Some politicians complained that drug consumption in the
United States, along with the sale of arms to Mexican drug dealers by American arms merchants, were driving the violence here. “The
guidance, and that
only thing we need is for them to stop selling arms to narcotics traffickers,” said Javier González Garza, the leader of the left-wing opposition
party in the Chamber of Deputies. Democratic leaders in the United States Congress, however, have stood firm. They refused to hand over $350
million to $400 million in aid, including Black Hawk helicopters, to military and police forces with a checkered human rights history unless they
got assurances that abuses would be prevented and prosecuted.
Human rights conditions on US aid to Mexico drive widespread opposition in Mexico
and hurt relations between the countries
Ellingwood, 08 Ken, LA Times staff writer since 1992, based in Mexico City, with responsibility for covering Mexico and Central
America, 6/5, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/05/world/fg-merida5, “U.S. aid offer angers Mexico,” ADM
MEXICO CITY — Billed as a way to strengthen bilateral ties, a
proposed U.S. aid package for Mexican crime-fighting efforts has
into a fresh reminder of the prickly dynamics that often drive the two nations apart. At issue are
human rights conditions that Congress attached to the so-called Merida Initiative, a three-year $1.4-billion proposal
instead turned
by the Bush administration to equip and train security forces in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean to combat drug trafficking. Senior
Mexican officials have called the provisions a form of U.S. interference and threatened to turn down the first-year
installment if the conditions survive in a final version yet to be worked out by the House and Senate. The two chambers approved different
first-year sums for Mexico, $400 million in the House and $350 million in the Senate. But both imposed requirements to guard against human
rights abuses and corruption by Mexican officials. "The
legislative initiatives approved in both chambers of the U.S. Congress
incorporate some aspects that make them, in their current versions, unacceptable for our country," Juan Camilo
Mourino, Mexico's second-highest-ranking official and a proxy for President Felipe Calderon, said this week. Mexican Public
Safety Secretary Genaro Garcia Luna, who leads the government's current crackdown on drug trafficking, said the money wouldn't make or
break the effort. That campaign, which includes 45,000 troops and federal police, has come as violence has claimed more than 4,100 lives since
Calderon took office in December 2006. Garcia Luna suggested that the money might do more good on the U.S. side to quell arms-smuggling
across the border into Mexico. The Mexican comments
are aimed, in part, at persuading the Democrat-controlled
Congress to delete the human rights provisions. Congress required that alleged violations by soldiers be prosecuted by
civilian authorities rather than the military and that assistance be barred for authorities involved in corruption. The flap highlights the
delicate political sensitivities that hover over the U.S.-Mexican relationship . Mexicans, who haven't forgotten
losing a war to the United States 160 years ago, are fiercely protective of their sovereignty. Officials here are quick to resist what they see as
efforts by their northern neighbor to assert its will south of the border. Mexicans often frame the problem of drug violence, which has left more
than 1,400 dead here thus far this year, as one driven mainly by the U.S. appetite for illegal drugs. For their part, U.S. officials have long been
wary of granting security aid to Mexico, with its history of corruption and the army's human rights record. "Ensuring that our tax dollars are
spent effectively and in accordance with basic human rights is the least that Congress and the taxpayers have a right to insist on," said U.S. Sen.
Patrick J. Leahy, a Vermont Democrat who chairs the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on foreign aid. Still, some analysts say the good
news is that all sides seem to agree on the need for collaboration against drug trafficking. "These are the growing pains of a closer
cooperation," said Andrew Selee, director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. "It's
a difficult relationship. It's not going to be the last time there are misunderstandings." Mexican
critics of the aid conditions
have drawn parallels to drug certification of the 1990s -- the annual process in which the U.S. judged the anti-drug efforts
of recipient countries before doling out aid. The policy angered Mexico and strained bilateral relations . The newest
initiative grew out of meetings between President Bush and Calderon in March 2007 in Merida, Mexico. Mexico would get military hardware,
such as helicopters and surveillance airplanes, along with high-tech scanners to detect drugs and other contraband and training and equipment
for police. The proposal includes $100 million in the first year for efforts in Central America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Bush
administration officials warn that the congressional conditions could torpedo the package and deal a blow to Calderon's 18-month-old war on
organized crime. Mexican commentators say the aid conditions are little more than U.S. meddling. "To turn this
initiative into a form of institutional scrutiny of our armed forces and the government in general is an affront," columnist Federico Reyes
Heroles wrote in the daily Reforma newspaper.
Mexico says no
AP 8 - (Associated press quoting mexican gov't, "Mexican government rejects conditions U.S. lawmakers have imposed on drug aid"
http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/mexico/20080602-1651-mexico-usaid.html)//AP
MEXICO CITY — The
Mexican government warned Monday it would not accept conditions that the U.S.
Congress has imposed on an aid package to combat drug trafficking. The Merida Initiative would provide $1.4 billion
over several years to help Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti combat drug trafficking. But the U.S. House and
Senate have imposed several conditions on the aid, including guarantees of civilian investigations into
human rights abuses by the Mexican military. Interior Secretary Juan Camilo Mourino said the
conditions were “counterproductive and profoundly contrary to the object and spirit” of the initiative
announced by U.S. and Mexican officials last year. “The initiatives approved by both chambers of the U.S. Congress incorporate some aspects
that, in their current versions, are unacceptable for our country,” Mourino said. The House and Senate approved different amounts for the first
installment of the aid, and the two versions must be reconciled. Both bills fell well short of the $500 million sought by the Bush administration.
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