Religious belief
Michael Lacewing
enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk
© Michael Lacewing
Belief-that
• Standard analysis: content + attitude
• Content: what the person believes, given by
a proposition
– E.g. ‘He believes that elephants are grey.’
• Belief-that aims at truth:
– Beliefs are true or false (unlike desire)
– To believe that p is to believe that p is true.
– To say ‘I believe that p’ implies that you take p
to be true.
Other types of belief
• ‘I believe him’ =
– ‘I believe that what he says is true’
– ‘I believe that he is trustworthy/sincere’
• Belief-in
– ‘I believe in God’ = ‘I believe that God
exists’?
– ‘I believe in love’
– Not belief-that (no truth claim), but faith,
trust, commitment
Religious belief
• Does belief in God presuppose belief
that God exists?
– Yes: you can’t believe in a person if you
think they don’t exist
– No: you don’t have believe that love exists
(literally) to believe in love
• What is more basic in religious belief?
Should belief-that be analysed as
(really) belief-in or vice-versa?
The religious ‘hypothesis’
• Is ‘God exists’ a factual hypothesis about
reality?
– Presupposes that the claim expresses a beliefthat
• Empirical statements are capable of being
false; the meaning of the statement is
connected to this.
– What circumstances or tests would lead us to
atheism?
Is the test correct?
• A statement can be empirical without
us knowing what experiences would
show that it is false.
• ‘God exists’ may help explain
experience - it is tested not directly by
experience but by philosophical
argument.
• But philosophy is not what gives ‘God
exists’ its meaning.
Does ‘God exist’ state a
fact?
• Not tested against empirical
experience
• Not purely intellectual
• Theism not acquired by argument or
evidence
• Religious ‘belief’ is belief-in, an
attitude or commitment, towards life,
others, history, morality… a way of
living.
Objections
• Different religions can prescribe similar ways
of life while arguing for different beliefs
about God
– Orthodoxy (right belief) has been thought very
important
• What supports or justifies the attitude if not
beliefs about how things are?
• Perhaps religions distinguished by their
stories
– But stories don’t justify commitments
• This approach makes religion too subjective
Wittgenstein on meaning
• To understand language, we must
understand how it is used.
• Compare uses of language to ‘games’ - rules
that allow or disallow certain
moves/meanings
• Surface grammar v. depth grammar
– ‘The bus passes the bus stop’ v. ‘The peace of
the Lord passes all understanding’
– Asking your boss for a raise v. asking God for
prosperity
• Language is part of life, a ‘form’ of life
Wittgenstein on religious
belief
• So religious language takes its meaning from
religious life
• Its surface grammar looks empirical, but its
depth grammar is very different
– God is not a ‘thing’ like any other
– ‘a religious belief could only be something like a
passionate commitment to a system of reference.
Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s really a way of
living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately
seizing hold of this interpretation.’ (Culture and
Value, §64)
Implications
• The ‘Last Judgment’ is not a future event
• Prayer is not asking to be given good things
• Talk of ‘God’ only makes sense in the
context of religious belief - God does not
‘exist’ independent of belief in God
• Religious belief cannot be criticized by facts
and ‘evidence’, although it must make sense
as part of human life
Objection
• This interpretation contradicts what
most religious believers believe!
• Suggestion: religious language is both
factual and expressive