1NC
OFF
A. Interpretation: Legalize means to give legal validity or sanction to
Merriam Webster 14 “legalize” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/legalize
legalize : to make legal; especially : to give legal validity or sanction to — le·gal·i·za·tion noun — le·gal·iz·er noun
Prostitution is the act of offering one’s self for hire to engage in sexual relations
for payment
Legal Dictionary No Date “Prostitution” http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Prostitution
Prostitution The act of offering one's self for hire to engage in sexual relations.
B. Violation: Decriminalization is the removal of penalties and prohibitions
Deadwyler 11 - January 21st Radio Commentary Posted on 01/21/2011 WILL JUVENILE PROSTITUTION BE
DECRIMINALIZED? Radio Commentary, 90.7, 91.7 New Life FM, January 21, 2011 By Sue Ella Deadwyler
http://georgiainsight.org/905
Good morning, Jim. The lame-duck session of Congress was a study in liberal determination to pass as many destructive bills as
possible, but I’m glad to report good news. Some of those bad bills died. Two that died were H.R. 5575 and S.2925 that would
have decriminalized prostitution for anyone under 18. S.2925 passed both House and Senate, but a House amendment
meant it had to go back to the Senate for another vote, which never happened. If the Senate had handled it again and had agreed
with the House changes, it would have passed. Thankfully, it didn’t. S.2925
removed all prostitution penalties for
anyone under 18 and prohibited law enforcement from bringing charges against any prostitute under
age 18. If this had passed, prostitutes under 18 would not be arrested, but would be classified as victims of sex trafficking,
regardless of how, why or how long they worked in the sex industry. The rationale for such strange reasoning is to classify underage prostitutes as victims, to make them eligible for victim compensation funds. If they are charged with a sex crime, they are NOT
eligible to receive victim compensation funds, since the law says they are perpetrators rather than victims.
And, they only regulate facilitators of prostitution—not prostitution itself
C. Vote Neg
1. Limits – there are already tons of different legalization models for prostitution –
allowing them to also advocate decrim explodes the neg research burden
2. Ground loss – they spike out of core disads and gain new advantages by
saying their form of regulation is different because they regulate facilitators
rather than prostitutes
3. Precision – the topic committee decided that legalize should be the mechanism
with decrim as core neg ground – means the aff guts predictability
D. Voter for fairness, education and jurisdiction
E. Extra-T—the aff should only be able to win off of the material effects of the
plan—anything else opens the floodgates for any number of discursive
advantages which are impossible for the neg to research and answer
OFF
Independently the Aff must say what “US” and what “legalize nearly all” means—
vote neg
Fairness—legalize can include hundreds of regulations which radically alter the
case neg we need- makes the aff a moving target and spikes out of our disads
Topic education—confusion over what legalize means kills productive debate
over sex work
In the T file
PEN, Prostitutes Education Network, Last Modified Sunday, August 10, 2008 2:40:54 PM “Prostitution Law Reform:
Defining Terms” Definitions Legalisation and Decriminalisation according to Scarlet Alliance, Australia from PRINCIPLES FOR
MODEL SEX INDUSTRY LEGISLATION Scarlet Alliance and the Australian Federation of AIDS Organisations,
http://www.bayswan.org/defining.html ac 8-17
Many (or most) societies that allow prostitution do so by giving the state control over the lives
and businesses of those who work as prostitutes. Legalization often includes special taxes for
prostitutes, restricting prostitutes to working in brothels or in certain zones, licenses, registration
of prostitutes and government records of individual prostitutes, and health checks which often
means punitive quarantine. The term legalization does not necessarily have to refer to the above
sorts of regulations. In fact, in one commonly accepted definition of legalization, legal can
simply mean that prostitution is not against the law.¶ Legalization ¶ From sociological perspective,
the term legalization usually refers to a system of criminal regulation and government control of
prostitutes , wherein certain prostitutes are given licenses which permit them to work in specific
and usually limited ways. Although legalization can also imply a decriminalized, autonomous
system of prostitution, in reality, in most "legalized" systems the police are relegated the job of
prostitution control through criminal codes. Laws regulate prostitutes businesses and lives, prescribing health
checks and registration of health status (enforced by police and, often corrupt, medical agencies), telling prostitutes where they may
or may not reside, prescribing full time employment for their lovers, etc. Prostitute activists use the term legalization
to refer to systems of state control , which defines the term by the realities of the current
situation, rather than by the broad implications of the term itself.¶ Because of the range of
definitions of legalization , it is difficult to use the term in a discussion of reform. When the
general public concerned with civil rights, privacy, etc., call for "legalization," they may not be
aware implications of that term , or of the problems inherent in many legalized systems.
OFF
Plan increases trafficking - best empirics prove the scale effect increases demand
for the illegal market
Cho et al, ’13 [Seo-Young (German Institute for Economic Research-DIW Berlin, Germany); Axel Dreher (Heidelberg
University, Germany); and Eric Neumayer (London School of Economics and Political Science, UK), “Does Legalized Prostitution
Increase Human Trafficking?”, World Development, Vol. 41, pp. 67-82, 2013, RSR]
This paper has investigated the impact of legalized prostitution on inflows of human trafficking. According to economic theory, there
are two effects of unknown magnitude. The scale effect of legalizing prostitution leads to an expansion of the
prostitution market and thus an increase in human trafficking, while the substitution effect reduces demand for trafficked
prostitutes by favoring prostitutes who have legal residence in a country. Our quantitative empirical analysis for a
crosssection of up to 150 countries shows that the scale effect dominates the substitution effect .
On average, countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger degree of reported human trafficking
inflows . We have corroborated this quantitative evidence with three brief case studies of Sweden,
Denmark, and Germany. Consistent with the results from our quantitative analysis, the legalization of prostitution has led to
substantial scale effects in these cases. Both the cross-country comparisons among Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, with their
different prostitution regimes, as well as the temporal comparison within Germany before and after the further legalization of
prostitution, suggest that any compositional changes in the share of trafficked individuals among all prostitutes have
been small and the substitution effect has therefore been dominated by the scale effect. Naturally, this
qualitative evidence is also somewhat tentative as there is no “smoking gun” proving that the scale effect dominates the substitution
effect and that the legalization of prostitution definitely increases inward trafficking flows. The problem here lies in the clandestine
nature of both the prostitution and trafficking markets, making it difficult, perhaps impossible, to find hard evidence establishing this
relationship. Our central finding, i.e., that countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger reported incidence of
trafficking inflows, is therefore best regarded as being based on the most reliable existing data, but needs to be
subjected to future scrutiny. More research in this area is definitely warranted, but it will require the collection of more reliable data to
establish firmer conclusions. The likely negative consequences of legalized prostitution on a country’s inflows of human trafficking
might be seen to support those who argue in favor of banning prostitution, thereby reducing the flows of trafficking (e.g., Outshoorn,
2005).
Sex trafficking is a form of gendered structural violence –reject it
Rieger 7 – April, J.D. Cornell Law School, “MISSING THE MARK: WHY THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT
FAILS TO PROTECT SEX TRAFFICKING VICTIMS IN THE UNITED STATES,” Harvard Journal of Law & Gender Vol. 30,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/jlg/vol301/rieger.pdf
Conditions. Effects, and Aftermath of Sex Trafficking 1. Isolation and Control Sex trafficking victims often
work under slave-like and inhumane conditions . Once in the United States, victims often find that their
freedom is severely constrained by a combination of means including debt bond- age, document
confiscation, security guards, violence, and threats* One woman recounted the control traffickers had
over undocumented women: In the strip clubs . . . they have a lot of girls there from outside without green cards,
or illegal aliens. And they really work them like they were stupid, and with those girls they really recruit them to do porno. The
club manager has a hold on them , because they don't have their green card.91 Traffickers use their victims*
fears of deportation and arrest to keep them under their control.92 Many victims are also vulnerable
because they lack English proficiency. One study reported that 40% of the women who were sexually
exploited in the U nited S tates had no English-language proficiency, and 33% reported very little
understanding of or speaking ability in English.91 Traffickers also use isolation to control their victims by forcing
them to live where they work and by constantly moving them around the country/4 2. Rape In the United
States, many victims are forced to work in illegal brothels. In fact, the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration
Services ("USCIS," formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Services) has discovered over 250 brothels in 26 different cities—
Many victims suffer rape and violence at the
hands of their traffickers and customers, often repeatedly . Being forced to have sex with twenty-five men or
more per day is not uncommon.96 Rape is a frequently deployed tool used to initiate victims into the world of
prostitution, although virgins are often not raped until after their virginity has been "sold" at a higher price.97 After being
many of which are thought to be staffed by sex trafficking victims.94
raped by "customers" all day long, many victims are raped by their traffickers at night. One victim reported.
"In the first brothel, there were terrible guards . . . awful perverts. Once they gobbled some pills that prevent men from cumming
quickly. They fucked me for five hours straight. I have never experienced anything like that."*9,' Similarly, a social services provider
reported that Latinas trafficked into the South protected themselves by sleeping together, because
the traffickers had "underlings who would rape them in the middle of the night ."99 3. Physical Violence
and Threats Physical
abuse and even murder is a constant fear for many victims. One woman reported, "I
had one pimp in the States who liked to whip me with thin belts and urinate on my body .. . Sometimes he would
even invite his friends."100 Another victim described being punished by her pimp after a customer had
raped her: "I've been beat with hangers, tied to a bedpost. Beaten for being with a trick for too long. I was robbed
and raped by a trick and then beaten by the pimp for letting that happen."101 Traffickers not only harm
their victims, but they also threaten harm to the victims* families.102 Traffickers in the United States often have
international organized crime connections that include connections in the victims* home country. Traffickers make clear that
they have the ability to carry out the threats on the victims" families in their home countries. Thus, these
threats are usually quite effective at maintaining control over victims . One victim recounted threats made to
her family: "I have been sold by lots of pimps. So many that it's scary. Pimps who resold me globally .... I was like a dog on a short
leash. When I pulled it just a little bit. they threatened to put me in jail .... Last pimp in Turkey . . . described how he would ... (kill my
family). I think at the end he could have."11" It is not uncommon for victims to be forced to participate in the
violence against other trafficking victims. One woman described being one of many women from
Asia whom her traffickers had enslaved and impregnated : "We were beaten and raped if we didn't comply .... I
had to hold down women as he raped them .... I saw five women being raped."" victims appear to disappear.""- Sadly,
deportation to a victim's home country often results in re-trafficking; some studies indicate a retrafficking rate as high as 50%." '
Their attempt to semantically draw a clear line between “sex work” and trafficking
erases exploitative aspects inherent to prostitution
Murphy 13 (Meghan, reporter, "Decriminalizing Prostitution May Not Be the Answer" Vice)
www.vice.com/en_ca/read/decriminalizing-prostitution-may-not-be-the-answer
Recent efforts to frame prostitution as “sex work” are strongly connected to this push to completely decriminalize the
industry. And while some might argue that the term “prostitution” is outdated and disrespects the women in trade (as Sarah
Ratchford does in her recent VICE article), according to some prostitution survivors and feminist organizations, the
terms "sex work" and "sex worker" are disrespectful and offensive for a myriad of other reasons. Sometimes framed
as a politically correct approach, the language of “sex work” and the discourse surrounding it has
been adopted by some as a way to normalize and sanitize the sex industry—while apparently
erasing the exploitative aspects that are inherent to prostitution . Bridget Perrier is an Aboriginal woman who
was prostituted on the streets and in brothels across Canada from the age of 12. She managed to exit the trade and is now cofounder and First Nations educator at Sextrade 101, a survivor-led, abolitionist organization out of Toronto. “To me the terms ‘sex
work’ and ‘sex worker’ are both very offensive because of my own experience as a sexually exploited child,” she told me over email.
When I spoke with author and prostitution survivor, Rachel Moran, she told me she hated those more politically
correct terms because they were “lies.” “They are deliberately constructed in order to conceal a
truth that I was living every day,” she told me. “I hated what I was doing. I hated every moment of it. But I
absolutely despised lying about it.” Andrea Matolcsi, a trafficking expert at Equality Now, an international human rights organization
advocating on behalf of girls and women, was disappointed when two reports, backed by UNAIDS, UNDP, and UNFPA came out
advocating for the full decriminalization of prostitution. Shortly thereafter, UN Women sent out a note that, while not an official
position, uses the language of “sex work.” And while “They talk a lot about people’s ‘right’ to be in prostitution, but not their right to
be out of it,” Matolcsi says. Conversations around “sex work” often focus on the issue of “choice”—
whether or not, for example, women should have the right to “choose” prostitution as a “career,”
or whether or not “consenting adults” should have to right to engage in sex in exchange for money.
What we don’t talk about enough is the context behind said “choices.” Issues like poverty, abuse,
gender inequality, racism, and a history of colonialism all play a role in leading women into
prostitution and keeping them there. Perrier agrees that the framing of prostitution as a “choice” for
some women distorts reality: “Those words—‘choice’ and ‘choose’—are words that those who are encased in the sex
industry say to themselves so that they can cope,” she told me. One of the key mistakes made by UN Women, UNAIDS
and other groups working to decriminalize the purchase of sex, is the push to distinguish between “sex work” and
trafficking. The idea behind this framing is that one situation is “chosen” while the other is not.
But it isn’t as simple as that . Experts, advocates, and prostitution survivors know that to ignore
the connections between prostitution, exploitation, and trafficking is to ignore the realities of the
sex industry. Swedish journalist Kajsa Ekis Ekman recently published a book looking at the sex trade and Sweden’s experience
with the Nordic model. She believes that trafficking is intricately tied to prostitution . “Trafficking comes in
when there isn’t a large enough supply of prostitutes for the demand that exists, if you’re talking in
market terms. In the Western world there are never enough women who enter the sex industry willingly. So trafficking is the
answer to the question of supply and demand." “If there were thousands of women lining up
outside brothels saying ‘Please, let me in to work!’ why would the mafia need to drag them across
Europe or across the world?” Ekman asks.
OFF
The United States should decriminalize prostitution.
State shifts any regulatory regime to punish prostitutes- leaves them worse off
and more controlled
Phoenix, 8 -- Durham University reader in the School of Applied Social Science
[Jo, "Be Helped or Else!" in Demanding Sex ed by Marina della Giusta, google books, pg 43-44, accessed 9-21-14]
Using existing social services, voluntary organisations and the police to regulate young peop|e’s involvement in prostitution is not without difficulty.
Voluntary organisations and social services now have a legal obligation to get young people out of prostitution, often without extra funding. Perhaps
more importantly, though, the complex needs of young people are not easily accommodated by child protection methods of working. Many agencies
repon that they can olTer little more than "˜working with where the young person is at' through self-esteem work. counselling and advocacy. ln the
more coercive forms of regulation have emerged as many young
women in prostitution have ended up incarcerated in secure units - not as a punishment for their involvement
in prostitution, but as a means to limit the liability ofthe organisation and the individual professional when girls continue to sell
sex. Safeguarding has also acted to challenge the dominance and progressive agenda of non-judgmental support. New language has
entered policy documents and practitioners' discussions. Instead of young people or children in prostitution, the concem is now for the
seven years since the introduction of this guidance,
sexual exploitation of children (that is anyone under the age of I8 years). Bamardos in particular has been instrumental in expanding the term of
reference such that any sexual abuse of children which involves some pecuniary gain is now treated and thought of as the same. The point here is that
such a change creates a very different landscape for regulation and practice. The non-judgmental approaches of supporting agencies, within such a
landscape. are located as supponing and condoning child abuse. At a practical level. this meant that these organisations found themselves engaged
with statutory social services and police whose child protection trump card forced changes to the way the support organisations worked. So. for
instance, early research
into the implementation of safeguarding revealed that a constant complaint from
the voluntary sector about the involvement of the police was that. although the one or two officers that had had the most
sustained and regular contact through the multi-agency forum were "˜good'. "˜he|pful' and `engaged`. the message and approach had not spread
throughout the organisation locally. This was especially clear in relation to the regulation of young people in prostitution wherein both `vice`
police and child protection police teams threatened voluntary organisation workers if and when the workers attempted to
ensure the confidentiality of their clients. The point that emerges out of this critique, then, is that those state agencies
with statutory powers are always and already able to shift the terrain of regulation in their favour (Phoenix
2002). One of the more controversial clauses within Safeguarding Children Involved in Prostitution, which has come to be known as the "˜persistent
retumers clause'. retained the possibility of criminal justice interventions against the very young. By drawing such a sharp line of demarcation between
child victims of prostitution and sex workers, Safeguarding foreclosed the possibility that young people could be victimised within prostitution but
nevertheless also voluntarily engage in prostituting activities. Simply, according to the constmctions underpinning Sqfeguarding. young people either
are or are not victims. When they are victims, help. support and assistance through child protection is offered - even if that means incarceration for
welfare reasons. However. when they are not victims. then the full force of criminal justice can be warranted: However it would be wrong to say that a
boy or girl under I8 never freely chooses to continue to solicit. loiter or importune and does not knowingly break the law The criminal justice process
should only be considered iflhe child persistently and voluntarily continues to solicit, loiter or imponune for the purposes of prostitution (Department of
Health/Home Ollice 2000. 27~8: original emphasis). There are two significant consequences of the persistent retumers' clause. Firstly. just at a time
when it locked increasingly possible to decriminalise prostitution (at least for the under I8 year olds). govemmental guidance ensured that this would
not happen. ln effect, this clause reinforced the centrality ofa state-centred criminal justice response. By basing the type of intervention that a young
person receives on an adjudication and assessment of their motivation (that is. are they voluntarily engaged in prostitution or are they forced).
Safeguarding compels supporting organisations as well as statutory social services and criminal justice organisations to assess not simply a girl's
prostituting activities but her wider relationships with men and her deeper psychological state of being. To put it another way, the
provision of
help, support and care exists as part of a continuum of possible interventions which include punitive
criminal justice interventions. Creating such a continuum has the perverse effect of forcing
supporting organisations to work with statutory organisations - even though the partnerships that might be forged
can never be `equal` partnerships, since the police and social services carry legal liabilities as well as legal powers that welfarc~based. support
organisations do not. To summarise, the recognition of the plight of young people and children in prostitution created an imperative for policy refomts.
Despite the laudable aims of those policy reforms, they are based on a totalising discourse of
victimhood that extends the controls and regulations operated on young women as well as the supporting
agencies - il' only because when they encounter a young person o£ for instance. I6 years old, they are compelled to break confidentiality. share
infomation with statutory agencies and engage in a process of classification that could polenlialbt result in the punishment of that young person. In
short, young women are now enmeshed in tighter systems of control than before - in the name of
their own protection.
OFF
Obama will prevent congress from tanking the deal but sustained capital is key
Stephen Collinson, Journalist, “Will Congress kill an Iran nuclear deal?” 11-12-14, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/12/politics/iran-congress/
Veto Obama would be sure veto any legislation that could threaten the agreement. But Republicans could draw on
skeptical Democrats to get closer to a veto proof majority of 67 Senate votes. An official with a prominent
pro-Israel policy group in Washington added: "It is not a question of doing the math. The precise change is in the
leader's office. That now enables sanctions legislation to move forward." But other sources doubt that if
it really came to it, there would be enough Democrats to challenge the president's veto and risk being
But they admit the numbers are tightening . Jim
Walsh, a research associate at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), who is an expert on
Iranian nuclear diplomacy, predicted a fierce political battle . "There will definitely be a fight. It will be a hard
fight, but I think it will be a fight that the president can win because the consequences of failure are high," he said.
The White House has already won one skirmish over Iran. Last year, critics sought to derail an
interim nuclear deal, but failed largely because Democratic Senate Majority leader Harry Reid blocked sanctions bills.
accused of trashing a deal the rest of the world has embraced.
Republican Senate Obama will not have that safety net in the new Republican Senate which convenes in January and backers of an
agreement fear even the threat of tougher action. Dylan Williams, director of Government Affairs for J Street, a left-leaning pro-Israel
group said new sanctions would "guarantee" a fracturing of the international coalition against Iran.
Even if opponents fail to overcome a veto, Congress could still stir up the kind of trouble that could embolden hardline opponents of
President Hassan Rouhani who argue Washington can never be trusted to stick to its commitments. And a deal could not
survive as "temporary" forever -- eventually Congress would have to act. "It is clear there is a significant
problem," said Trita Parsi, founder of the National Iranian American Council, which advocates dialogue between Washington and
Tehran. "At the end of the day, the president needs to lift sanctions through Congress in order to make a
deal possible." The politics on Iran are getting trickier for Obama by the day. Republicans are outraged at
reports last week that he wrote to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, days before the Ayatollah issued a barrage of tweets
slamming the "barbaric, wolflike and infanticidal regime" in Israel. Meanwhile, a report by the UN's nuclear watchdog body last week
suggested Tehran may have violated an interim nuclear deal by feeding natural uranium gas into one of its centrifuges. Iran was
also accused of blocking existing inspections to its nuclear plants. Political hardball The White House has already
shown it is ready to play political hardball over Iran, warning last year that anyone who opposes
the deal is effectively backing a march to war with Iran. Obama is also at odds over Iran with Israeli Prime
minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who views the prospect of an Iranian bomb as an existential threat to the Jewish state. Netanyahu
warned in a video address to Jewish Federations leaders on Tuesday that it was obvious Iran wanted to remove sanctions and it
should be "equally obvious" that it is not prepared to dismantle its nuclear program in return. The White House argues Israel's
demand for a complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear infrastructure is impractical. Instead, it wants the deal between the permanent
five members of the UN Security Council, Germany and Iran to lengthen the period of time it would take Tehran to dash towards a
bomb. "We will not let Iran get a nuclear weapon. Period. We mean it," Vice President Joe Biden said in Washington Monday as
negotiators from Iran, the US and Europe toiled in Oman to bridge gaps on a deal ahead of a final round of talks in Vienna next
week. Several key players could determine how the row over an Iran deal plays out on Capitol Hill. Incoming Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, R-Tennessee, has voiced skepticism about Obama's Iran diplomacy but has been more
pragmatic than other critics on sanctions.
Plan drains PC – supporting legalization is political suicide
Coral Flanagan 3-3-14, Penn State University, “Week 2: Sexokopslagen, and some other words about Legalized Prostitution in
Sweden”, PENN STATE UNIVERSITY, http://sites.psu.edu/coralflanagan/2014/03/03/week-2-sexokopslagen-and-some-otherwords-about-legalized-prostitution-in-sweden/
In America, even mentioning legalized prostitution is political suicide –akin to coming out as a
polygamist or denying the existence of God– so its easy for us to forget that sex work is (at least
partially) legal in a majority of other countries, including many of our “First World” peers in the EU. Regulating
prostitution is a delicate task in the birthplace of both the Enlightenment and the Syphilis epidemic, and the Europeans have devised
diverse alternatives to prohibition, from the famous Dutch model of complete legalization to an increasing popular “Nordic model,”
based on Sweden’s Sex Purchase Act of 2001.
Passage of sanctions bill causes Israel strikes
Perr 13 – B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland,
Oregon. Jon has long been active in Democratic politics and public policy as an organizer and advisor in California
and Massachusetts. His past roles include field staffer for Gary Hart for President (1984), organizer of Silicon Valley
tech executives backing President Clinton's call for national education standards (1997), recruiter of tech executives
for Al Gore's and John Kerry's presidential campaigns, and co-coordinator of MassTech for Robert Reich (2002).
12/24 (Jon, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-againstIran#
As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate
dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that
promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in
Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict
empowers Israel to decide whether the United
States will go to war against Tehran. On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six
months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment
to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will
come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates: If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate selfwith Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially
defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the
United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the
Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence. Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck
Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the
Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the
constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming
from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel"
resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July: "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a
resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb." Graham would have plenty of company from the
hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war
authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama
the lack of an explicit AUMF in the
mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto
carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American
interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway. Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike
administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come." But at the end of the day,
Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't
against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even
potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining
down from Gaza. That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous"
impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified
war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an
Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a
wider regional war , which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that
September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now
Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with
the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged
period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of
resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The
anticipated blowback? Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global
A dynamic of escalation , action, and counteraction could
produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to
all-out regional war.
and regional stability, including economic stability.
Escalates to major power war
Trabanco 9 – Independent researcher of geopoltical and military affairs (1/13/09, José Miguel Alonso Trabanco, “The Middle
Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at anytime,” **http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762**)
In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A
possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases
in the regions. Teheran will unquestionably resort to its proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah (or even some of its Shiite allies it has
in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) to carry out attacks against Israel, America and their allies, effectively setting in flames a large
portion of the Middle East. The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed
asphyxiated, that would dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring intense financial
and economic havoc upon the West, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary
conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given . Such conflict could rapidly spiral out of control
and thus a relatively minor clash could quickly and dangerously escalate by engulfing the whole region and perhaps
even beyond. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies
and some great powers could become involved in one way or another (America, Russia, Europe, China).
Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that
the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.
Case—militarized humanitarianism
HJ Good: War 1NC (1:45
Humanitarian Justifications solve war- “pretext wars” are wrong
By Ryan Goodman 6 * ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard
Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf
**NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
Second , the plausibility of a humanitarian justification may depend on how it is expressed in
conjunction with other rationales for using force. According to a standard version of the pre- text
model, state R will employ a humanitarian exception to conceal its ulterior motives . On this view, the
availability of an authorized humanitarian justification would suppress the artic- ulation of other
reasons for escalating hostilities. Similarly, state R would have difficulty in pro- claiming humanitarianism as the reason
for using force if the proclamation is superficially attached to existing objectives. A meager, formal reference to humanitarianism
while military efforts are obviously pursued for other reasons should not obtain the political benefits of a pub- licly legitimated use of
force. The important point is that state
R will need to invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale possibly to the relative exclusion of other (generally less justifiable) reasons . This factor may
partially explain why past uses of a humanitarian rationale failed to gain meaningful political
traction, even though the factual predicate was potentially meritorious (an issue that I explore later with respect to the United
States' 2003 invasion of Iraq). Some of the points just discussed might cast doubt on whether a
humanitarian rationale can alter the course of events if leaders have already embarked on
different justifications; that is, preexisting public rationales may preclude leaders from reframing a
dispute along humanitar- ian lines. This observation raises a legitimate concern but does not
undermine the present anal- ysis of UHI. First , to the extent that preexisting rationales foreclose
the promulgation of alter- native rationales, the pretext objection to legalizing UHI loses its force;
that is, concerns about states' abuse of a humanitarian exception are misplaced or exaggerated if
leaders are unable to succeed with a justification after having espoused an earlier one .134
Second , such consider- ations regarding the impact of preexisting rationale should , if anything, add
support to the project of fashioning institutions to take account of empirical patterns of state practice. The prospect of early
lock-ins simply helps to establish the tasks for institutional design . Accord- ingly, in part III, I propose some
institutional reforms to encourage the early and emphatic articulation of humanitarian purposes in interstate disputes. Third , recall
that the studies on MIDs recognize that multiple issues might be at stake in a dispute. T he question is:
which issue becomes the principal claim raised by the revisionist state. A humanitarian claim need not com- pletely replace or retire
Finally , if the assertion of humanitarian claims
only supplements-rather than displaces- other issues, a road to war may yet be averted . One
means for defusing a crisis involves issue linkage. Accordingly, the introduction of humanitarian
issues can facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities for trade-offs with
other issues in a dispute .'36 More- over, studies of international crises suggest that issue linkage is
more likely to succeed when the salience ascribed to an issue is different for the disputing
parties'37-a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights conditions
in one of the countries. Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate face-saving
compromises . As Senese and Vasquez posit, other disputed issues can propel leaders unwittingly to a
point at which they have trouble "bail[ing] out." In this context, the addition of humanitarian issues
might reduce the political costs of such a reversal. An "important finding related to crisis
bargaining," accord- ing to a leading review of the literature by Paul Huth, is that the inclusion of
secondary issues can allow leaders to take politically sensitive, pacifying steps that avert war:
[D]iplomatic policies that include flexibility and a willingness to compromise and nego- tiate on
secondary issues , combined with a refusal to concede on vital security issues ... can help leaders
of attacker states to retreat from their threats by reducing the domestic or international political
an earlier claim; in such cases, it is more a matter of emphasis.135
costs of backing away from a military confrontation. Leaders can claim that defender concessions
on certain issues were a major gain , or that a defender's willingness to negotiate was a promising
diplomatic development. In either case, foreign policy leaders can use even limited
accommodative diplomatic actions of the defender to fend off domestic or foreign political
adversaries who claim that the government of the would-be attacker state has retreated under
pressure.38 In Huth's own work on territorial disputes, he notes that humanitarian issues can provide these types
of opportunities for deescalation: [T]o induce the challenger to make concessions, the terms of a
settlement need to be formulated so that leaders can counter charges of appeasement and
capitulation. Thus, if claims to territory have to be withdrawn, some form of concessions by the
target on policies within the disputed territory (e.g., treatment of ethnic minorities) may be critical
to pack- aging a politically viable agreement. 39 For such a tactic to work, however, the secondary issue would
presumably need to be perceived as a genuine part of the dispute.
War destroys the environment, health, and human rights and causes domestic
violence
Barry Levy, Adjunct Professor, Community Health, Tufts University School of Medicine and Victor Sidel, Professor, Social
Medicine, Albert Einstein Medical College, WAR AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 2nd Edition, 2007, p. 3.
War accounts for more death and disability than many major diseases combined. It destroys families, communities, and
sometimes whole cultures. It directs scarce resources away from protection and promotion of health, medical
care, and other human services. It destroys the infrastructure that supports health. It limits human rights
and contributes to social injustice. It leads many people to think that violence is the only way to
resolve conflicts—a mindset that contributes to domestic violence, street crime, and other kinds of violence. And it contributes to the destruction of the environment and overuse of nonrenewable resources. In sum.
war threatens much of the fabric of our civilization.
HI Good: 1NC (1:10
humanitarian interventions are highly effective
Western and Goldstein 11
JON WESTERN is Five College Associate Professor of International Relations at Mount Holyoke College. JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN
is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at American University and the author of Winning the War on War: The Decline of
Armed Conflict Worldwide, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, "Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age",
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/humanitarian-intervention-comes-ofage?page=show
To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and
foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet such skepticism is unwarranted. Despite the
early setbacks in Libya, NATO’s success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a
corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception. As
Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of
humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. Over the last 20 years, the international
community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass
atrocities. Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms
about violence, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a
special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of
conflict management strategies that includes today’s more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international
criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed
conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in
previous periods. A TURBULENT DECADE Two decades of media exposure to genocide have altered global attitudes about
intervention. Modern humanitarian intervention was first conceived in the years following the end of the Cold War. The triumph of
liberal democracy over communism made Western leaders optimistic that they could solve the world’s problems as never before.
Military force that had long been held in check by superpower rivalry could now be unleashed to protect poor countries from
aggression, repression, and hunger. At the same time, the shifting global landscape created new problems that cried out for action.
Nationalist and ethnic conflicts in former communist countries surged, and recurrent famines and instability hit much of Africa. A new
and unsettled world order took shape, one seemingly distinguished by the frequency and brutality of wars and the deliberate
targeting of civilians. The emotional impact of these crises was heightened by new communications technologies that transmitted
graphic images of human suffering across the world. For the first time in decades, terms such as “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”
appeared regularly in public discussions. Western political elites struggled to respond to these new realities. When U.S. marines
arrived in Somalia in December 1992 to secure famine assistance that had been jeopardized by civil war, there were few norms or
rules of engagement to govern such an intervention and no serious plans for the kinds of forces and tactics that would be needed to
establish long-term stability. Indeed, the marines’ very arrival highlighted the gap between military theory and practice: the heavily
armed troops stormed ashore on a beach occupied by only dozens of camera-wielding journalists. Although the Somalia mission did
succeed in saving civilians, the intervention was less successful in coping with the political and strategic realities of Somali society
and addressing the underlying sources of conflict. U.S. forces were drawn into a shooting war with one militia group, and in the
October 1993 “Black Hawk down” incident, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and one of their bodies was dragged through the streets of
Mogadishu while television cameras rolled. Facing domestic pressures and lacking a strategic objective, President Bill Clinton
quickly withdrew U.S. troops. The UN soon followed, and Somalia was left to suffer in a civil war that continues to this day.
Meanwhile, two days after the “Black Hawk down” fiasco, the UN Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission for Rwanda,
where a peace agreement held the promise of ending a civil war. The international force was notable for its small size and paltry
resources. Hutu extremists there drew lessons from the faint-hearted international response in Somalia, and when the conflict
reignited in April 1994, they killed ten Belgian peacekeepers to induce the Belgian-led UN force to pull out. Sure enough, most of the
peacekeepers withdrew, and as more than half a million civilians were killed in a matter of months, the international community
failed to act. Around the same time, a vicious war erupted throughout the former Yugoslavia, drawing a confused and ineffective
response from the West. At first, in 1992, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared that the United States did not “have a dog
in that fight.” Even after the world learned of tens of thousands of civilian deaths, in May 1993, Clinton’s secretary of state, Warren
Christopher, described the so-called ancient hatreds of ethnic groups there as a presumably unsolvable “problem from hell.”
Unwilling to risk their soldiers’ lives or to use the word “genocide,” with all of its political, legal, and moral ramifications, the United
States and European powers opted against a full-scale intervention and instead supported a UN peacekeeping force that found little
peace to keep. At times, the UN force actually made things worse, promising protection that it could not provide or giving fuel and
money to aggressors in exchange for the right to send humanitarian supplies to besieged victims. The UN and Western powers
were humiliated in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. War criminals elsewhere appeared to conclude that the
international community could be intimidated by a few casualties. And in the United States, a number of prominent critics came to
feel that humanitarian intervention was an ill-conceived enterprise. The political scientist Samuel Huntington claimed that it was
“morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible” to put U.S. soldiers at risk in intrastate conflicts, and he argued at another point
that it was “human to hate.” Henry Kissinger saw danger in the United States becoming bogged down in what he later called “the
bottomless pit of Balkan passions,” and he warned against intervening when there were not vital strategic interests at stake. Other
critics concluded that applying military force to protect people often prolonged civil wars and intensified the violence, killing more
civilians than otherwise might have been the case. And still others argued that intervention fundamentally altered intrastate political
contests, creating long-term instability or protracted dependence on the international community. Nonetheless, international
actors did not abandon intervention or their efforts to protect civilians. Rather, amid the violence, major
intervening powers and the UN undertook systematic reviews of their earlier failures, updated
their intervention strategies, and helped foster a new set of norms for civilian protection. A key
turning point came in 1995, when Bosnian Serb forces executed more than 7,000 prisoners in the UN-designated safe area of
Srebrenica. The Clinton administration quickly abandoned its hesitancy and led a forceful diplomatic and military effort to end the
war. The persistent diplomacy of Anthony Lake, the U.S. national security adviser, persuaded the reluctant Europeans and UN
peacekeeping commanders to support Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s aggressive air campaign targeting the Bosnian Serb
army. That effort brought Serbia to the negotiating table, where U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke crafted the
Dayton agreement, which ended the war. In place of the hapless UN force, NATO sent 60,000 heavily armed troops into the “zone
of separation” between the warring parties, staving off renewed fighting. The “problem from hell” stopped immediately, and the
ensuing decade of U.S.-led peacekeeping saw not a single U.S. combat-related casualty in Bosnia. Unlike previous interventions,
the post-Dayton international peacekeeping presence was unified, vigorous, and sustained, and it has kept a lid on ethnic violence
for more than 15 years. A related innovation was the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a court that
has indicted 161 war criminals, including all the principal Serbian wartime leaders. Despite extensive criticism for ostensibly putting
justice ahead of peace, the tribunal has produced dramatic results. Every suspected war criminal, once indicted, quickly lost political
influence in postwar Bosnia, and not one of the 161 indictees remains at large today. More important than an exit strategy is a
comprehensive transition strategy. Buoyed by these successes, NATO responded to an imminent Serbian attack on Kosovo in 1999
by launching a major air war. Despite initial setbacks (the operation failed to stop a Serbian ground attack that created more than a
million Kosovar Albanian refugees), the international community signaled that it would not back down. Under U.S. leadership, NATO
escalated the air campaign, and the ICTY indicted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for crimes against humanity. Within three
months, the combined military and diplomatic pressure compelled Serbia to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. And even though
many observers, including several senior Clinton administration officials, feared that the ICTY’s indictment of Milosevic in the middle
of the military campaign would make it even less likely that he would capitulate in Kosovo or ever relinquish power, he was removed
from office 18 months later by nonviolent civil protest and turned over to The Hague. Outside the Balkans, the international
community continued to adapt its approach to conflicts with similar success. In 1999, after a referendum on East Timor’s secession
from Indonesia led to Indonesian atrocities against Timorese civilians, the UN quickly authorized an 11,000-strong Australian-led
military force to end the violence. The intervention eventually produced an independent East Timor at peace with Indonesia. Later
missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire used a similar model of deploying a regional military force in coordination with
the UN and, on occasion, European powers. CORRECTING THE RECORD Despite the international community’s impressive
record of recent humanitarian missions, many of the criticisms formulated in response to the botched
campaigns of 1992–95 still guide the conversation about intervention today. The charges are
outdated. Contrary to the claims that interventions prolong civil wars and lead to greater humanitarian suffering and civilian
casualties, the most violent and protracted cases in recent history -- Somalia, Rwanda, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia before Srebrenica, and Darfur -- have been cases in
which the international community was unwilling either to intervene or to sustain a commitment
with credible force. Conversely, a comprehensive study conducted by the political scientist Taylor
Seybolt has found that aggressive operations legitimized by firm UN Security Council resolutions,
as in Bosnia in 1995 and East Timor in 1999, were the most successful at ending conflicts. Even
when civil wars do not stop right away, external interventions often mitigate violence against
civilians. This is because, as the political scientist Matthew Krain and others have found, interventions aimed at
preventing mass atrocities often force would-be killers to divert resources away from slaughtering
civilians and toward defending themselves. This phenomenon, witnessed in the recent Libya campaign,
means that even when interventions fail to end civil wars or resolve factional differences
immediately, they can still protect civilians. Another critique of humanitarian interventions is that they create perverse
incentives for rebel groups to deliberately provoke states to commit violence against civilians in order to generate an international
response. By this logic, the prospect of military intervention would generate more rebel provocations and thus more mass atrocities.
Yet the statistical record shows exactly the opposite. Since the modern era of humanitarian intervention
began, both the frequency and the intensity of attacks on civilians have declined. During the Arab
Spring protests this year, there was no evidence that opposition figures in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, or Yemen sought to trigger outside
intervention. In fact, the protesters clearly stated that they would oppose such action. Even the Libyan rebels, who faced long odds
against Qaddafi’s forces, refused what would have been the most effective outside help: foreign boots on the ground. Recent efforts
to perfect humanitarian intervention have been fueled by deep changes in public norms about violence against civilians and
advances in conflict management. Two decades of media exposure to mass atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide have altered
global -- not simply Western -- attitudes about intervention. The previously sacrosanct concept of state sovereignty has been made
conditional on a state’s responsible behavior, and in 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously endorsed the doctrine of the
responsibility to protect at the UN’s World Summit. NATO’s intervention in Libya reflects how the world has become more committed
to the protection of civilians. Both UN Security Council resolutions on Libya this year passed with unprecedented speed and without
a single dissenting vote. In the wake of conflicts as well, the international community has shown that it can and will play a role in
maintaining order and restoring justice. Peacekeeping missions now enjoy widespread legitimacy and have
been remarkably successful in preventing the recurrence of violence once deployed . And because of
successful postconflict tribunals and the International Criminal Court, individuals, including national leaders, can now be held liable
for egregious crimes against civilians. Collectively, these new conflict management and civilian protection tools have contributed to a
According to the most recent Human Security Report,
between 1992 and 2003 the number of conflicts worldwide declined by more than 40 percent, and
between 1988 and 2008 the number of conflicts that produced 1,000 or more battle deaths per year
fell by 78 percent. Most notably, the incidence of lethal attacks against civilians was found to be
lower in 2008 than at any point since the collection of such data began in 1989 . Still, although
marked decline in violence resulting from civil war.
international norms now enshrine civilian protection and levels of violence are down, humanitarian interventions remain constrained
by political and military realities. The international community’s inaction in the face of attacks on Syrian protesters, as of this writing,
demonstrates that neither the UN nor any major power is willing or prepared to intervene when abusive leaders firmly control the
state’s territory and the state’s security forces and are backed by influential allies. Furthermore, the concept of civilian protection still
competes with deeply held norms of sovereignty, especially in former colonies. Although humanitarian intervention can succeed in
many cases, given these constraints, it is not always feasible.
Case—States of Injury
**Case O: Welfare Turn—1NC
The plan creates forced prostitution and forced eligibility testing by allowing sex
work to be a part of work for welfare requirements
Spector 06, Jessica, Prof @ Trinity. “Prostitution and pornography: Philosophical debate about the sex industry.” Stanford
University Press, 2006.
We can perhaps make the point more vivid by noting two other protections
against forced sex that, on our hypothesis, should fall
by the wayside. First, to the extent that welfare and unemployment compensation are intended for persons who
cannot find suitable employment, if sex work is available and a person is suitable for it (however that is judged),
government should encourage people to take such work and cut off benefits if such work is refused . 30 Second, insofar as
persons are allowed to make enforceable labor contracts, they should be allowed to make contracts for sexual services, including tacit or implicit
agreements, and the courts would have to uphold them. This was the point in the expensive date scenario, discussed at the start of this section. As the
lesson of that scenario suggests, the barriers established between sex and commerce not only function to keep the workplace free of sexual pressures
but also to keep private sexual relations free of the norms of business, where broken promises and defeated expectations can bring enforced
remedies.
***Footnote 30***
30. The suggestion is meant to be provocative, but it's short of absurd. The principal objection to it is that, while
government assistance may be conditional on one's willingness to take available work, one need only seek "suitable work." One can reject a job
without losing unemployment compensation benefits if one does so on bona fide religious grounds, because it pays less than one is used to earning,
Despite such protections, in
York City's welfare-to-work program called "Business
Link" made arrangements with the Psychic Network to train welfare recipients in Tarot reading
and other skills and then to hire them as telephone psychics at Sto-$12 per hour. See Nina Bernstein, "New York
because it interferes with family obligations. because it poses a health risk, or because it's a new line of work.
the last nine months of 1999, until the press reported it, New
Drops Psychic Training Program," New York Times (January 29, 2.000); and Michael Daly, "Veil of Secrecy Lifted: Program Training Poor to Be Phone
Psychics ls Exposed," New York Daily News (March 19, 2.000). (I am indebted to Jacob Levi for alerting me to this factoid.) It
is also
understood that, if one's unemployment drags on, the range of jobs one must consider suitable is
expected to grow. Furthermore, former prostitutes might be required to consider such work suitable if
it were available. Finally, welfare reform as we know it has imposed a number of fairly draconian conditions on eligibility, including work
requirements that seem to pay little attention to the benefit recipients' suitability for the jobs they are required to take. As Sylvia Law has noted. "The
state enjoys a large freedom to condition receipt of public assistance upon the sacrifice of otherwise
constitutionally protected rights. Perhaps courts would see a policy that conditioned aid on a requirement
that a woman engage in commercial sex as so egregious that the policy would be found to violate constitutional liberty.
But this conclusion is far from clear" (Law, p. 606). Hence, the suggestion in the text may be farfetched at present but is
not inconceivable, especially given current trends in eligibility requirements for public assistance
and social insurance. For a more general discussion of eligibility requirements for unemployment compensation, see Mark A. Rothstein,
Charles B. Craver, Elinor P. Schroeder, and Elaine W. Shoben, Employment Law, 2d ed. (St. Paul. Minn.: West, 1999), pp. 767-70, 786-88.
**Forced prostitution is immoral
Demleitner 94 Nora V. Demleitner, Assistant Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas; LL.M.
(International & Comparative Law), with distinction, 1994, Georgetown University Law Center;, J.D., 1992, Yale Law School; BA.,
summa cum laude, 1989, Bates College. The Author would like to thank Anne Tierney Goldstein and Susan Deller Ross for their
valuable suggestions. “Forced Prostitution: Naming an International Offense”
One of the United Nations' dominant methods of analysis with regard to forced prostitution is to equate its practice with slavery.'52 According to the
1926 Slavery Convention, slavery
is "the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the
powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised."1 53 Forced prostitution fits this
definition of slavery.154 The procurement of women into forced prostitution is sometimes based on seduction or, more frequently, on
fraudulent promises of marriage or employment. It also takes the form of forceful abduction, often involving drugs that make it easier to kidnap, beat,
torture, and threaten the victims.155 Once
inducted into the "profession," women are sold like property. They
have no opportunity to escape from their state of servitude . 5 '
The practice of slavery violates countless human rights treaties and humanitarian law
conventions as well as customary international law.157 However, the United Nations and its agencies do not seem to take a uniform view
towards forced prostitution as slavery. Whereas the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women considers forced prostitution to be slavery, the Special
Rapporteur on slavery deems it merely a slavery-like practice.' 5 8
Ressentiment
Ressentiment key to effective action
Stefan P. Dolger 10, Brock University, "In Praise of Ressentiment: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Glenn Beck",
APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642232
After Ressentiment ¶ In closing I would suggest that my praise of ressentiment is also in line with the more
deliberatively conceived multiculturalism of the Left than is the current puritanical disdain. As Monique Deveaux argues, it is a
failure of political imagination when we fixate on liberal principles as preconditions lo multicultural dialogue, and in particular it is
necessary to move toward a deeper level of intercultural respect rather than mere toleration (Deveaux 2000).10 But if it is
appropriate to go beyond simply tolerating non- liberal peoples abroad and in immigrant communities, if we must go beyond
toleration to do justice to the rich tradition of cultural pluralism, then perhaps we can also open our hearts and minds to the
possibility that the ressentiment-suffused need to be heard out as well. Perhaps rather than demonizing ressentiment
as a toxin to politics, as the worst of the worst for subjects whom we purport to free, we must accept that
ressentiment is for many inseparable from their conception of their own freedom. Perhaps rather than pitying
these poor fools, in ways that we would never pity a plural wife in the global South, we should ponder whether
ressentiment as a precondition of subjectivity is as much a gift as a curse.¶ And are we so sure, after all, we late
Nietzscheans, that our crusade against ressentiment is not itself suffused with ressentiment ? Is not itself
fully in the grips of it? How would we know if it were or weren’t? Perhaps we are, in our own way, as spiteful, vain, petty, weak,
subjected, enraged against the past, capitalized, consumerized, unfree, as those we purport to want to free from the chains of slave
morality. Perhaps it is ourselves that we need to give a break to, that we need to get over, when we first look to purge the other of
ressentiment. Perhaps we all swim in this current, perhaps we are all Ressentiment’s children, and perhaps that
is OK – even to the extreme of the using ressentiment unconsciously in the effort to rid the world of ressentiment. Though just in
saying so I wouldn’t expect that to do much to overturn Ressentiment’s reign. No, she is far too puissant for that. But we do not
need to rage against the weakness in others because we fear the dependence and weakness in ourselves. ¶ As
Vetlesen puts it, defending Amery: “Against Nietzsche, who despised victims because he saw them as weak, as losers in
life’s struggles, Amery upholds the dignity of having been forced by circumstances beyond one’s control into that position,
thus reminding Nietzsche that as humans we are essentially relational beings, dependent, not self-sufficient. In
hailing the strong and despising the weak, in denying that vulnerability is a basic ineluctably given human condition, a
condition from which not only the role of victim springs but that of the morally responsible agent too, Nietzsche fails to be the
provocateur he loves to believe he is: He sides with the complacent majority and so helps reinforce the existential and moral
loneliness felt by Amery, the individual victim who speaks up precisely in that capacity” (Vetlesen 2006, 43). Perhaps we can begin
to see how we have been using the weak, the viewers of Glenn Beck and others, as the targets for our need to find blameworthy
agents. And that too is fine. The trouble comes when we think we’ve gone beyond Ressentiment when in fact we’re just listening to
her whisperings without realizing it. We think that we can well and truly look down on the Rush Limbaughs, these destroyers of
civilization, because they are possessed by something that we are above. And far be it from me to suggest that we should not
resent, should not blame; I merely suggest we direct our blame toward more useful ends than where it is currently located.
No impact to ressentiment
Bernard N. Meltzer 2, and Gil Richard Musolf, profs of sociology at Central Michigan University, “Resentment and
Ressentiment,” Sociological Inquiry, V72 N2, Spring, 240-55
Given this negative characterization—a prevailing evaluation—of ressentiment, it is not surprising to learn that Sartre (1965, p. 14)
describes those who experience the emotion as individuals who ‘‘establish their human personality as a perpetual negation.’’
Augmenting the negative view of this emotion is a widely held view among scholars that both resentment and ressentiment tend to
be base, dastardly emotions resorted to by thin-skinned individuals and seekers after excuses for failure, that these emotions are
often felt irrationally, on occasions in which one has not been morally wronged. Thus, Solomon (1995) refers to a ‘‘vindictive’’
emotion, frequently a personal, petty, disproportionate reaction to a slight; Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) write of a ‘‘distasteful’’
emotion; and Adam Smith [1759] (1969) designates a ‘‘disagreeable’’ passion.7 On the other hand, Solomon (1994), elsewhere,
takes a more positive view of ressentiment, pointing out that it often entails compassion for others in the same situation, and its
implicit sense of injustice may lead to corrective action; thus, ressentiment can be seen as an expression of ‘‘the
socially responsible insistence of the community on justice and justification’’ (p. 124).
Similarly, Haber (1991) argues that resentment can be a form of personal protest that expresses regard for oneself,
for others, and for the normative order (p. 48). Moreover, Haber (1991, p. 82) holds that a display of resentment may serve as an
instrument of individual or social change. In fact, the historian Hippolyte Taine (cited in Jameson 1976, p. 131) sought to explain
revolutions in terms of underlying ressentiment, and Jameson (1976) contends that this emotion is the very content
of revolutions. In the same vein, various scholars have asserted that ‘‘the individual of ressentiment is a potential revolutionary’’
(Vaneigem 1979, p. 9) and that ‘‘our revolutionaries are men and women of resentment’’(Solomon 1995, p. 266).8 Thus, Merton
(1957, p. 155) maintains that ‘‘organized rebellion may draw upon a vast reservoir of the resentful and discontented as institutional
dislocations become acute.’’ In the light of such characterizations, the role of the political agitator is readily recognized as that of
raising consciousness of unjust treatment (where such consciousness is absent), inducing ressentiment (where the emotion is
absent), and organizing resistance to the recurrence or continuation of unjust treatment. Moreover, Folger (1987) claims that
That ressentiment can be used to initiate (and
sustain) revolution argues against the more passive—and contemptuous—conceptions held by
Nietzsche , Scheler, and their many followers.
revolutionary ideologies can help to create ressentiment.
Case –Don’t Solve
They don’t solve
**Doesn’t solve – masculine militarism is too deeply entrenched
Landreau 11 John, associate professor of women's and gender studies at The College of New Jersey, “Fighting Words:
Obama, Masculinity and the Rhetoric of National Security”, thirdspace: a journal of feminist theory and culture, Vol 10, No 1 (2011)
Obama's national security policies and rhetoric are, to be fair, significantly different in many ways than Bush's. Nonetheless, he
steeps his rhetoric of hope for a new foreign policy in the old, familiar language of American exceptionalism. This illustrates how
the political logic of a militarized and masculinized nation, presidency and citizenry has proved to be more
enduring, significant and powerful than the strategy differences that have divided Democrats and Republicans over the
exceptionalism guaranteed by military power makes
so many questions difficult to ask because the questions themselves seem absurd, effeminately
nave, or simply out of rhetorical limits. These are unasked questions such as what violence was required to achieve
last 60 years. It is important also because the cultural logic of American
our affluence and power? How can that violence be justified? Are there models for world peace, prosperity and freedom other than
America's dominance and "leadership?" Does military power and violence produce security? What constitutes security? Is
invulnerability a legitimate security goal? Is the authority of Commander-in-chief one that automatically adheres to the presidency at
all times, or should the executive be more limited in its power as originally envisioned in the Constitution? Is citizenship best
characterized in terms of a militarized and masculinized patriotism? Can terrorism be fought with large-scale military tactics? Of
course, it
is impossible to know all the ins and outs of how Obama and his advisors reached the
decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. For those who voted for Obama over Clinton during the Democratic
primary campaign because of his clear-spoken commitment to a different kind of foreign policy, the decision is disappointing to say
the least. In the final analysis, when the decision was made, and its justification needed to be formulated into public rhetoric, what is
clear is that the Obama administration felt at home in and oriented by - the old language of American exceptionalism. Familiar
orientations, as Sara Ahmed argues, are an "effect of inhabitance." That is, their sense, their familiarity
and their surety are products of their alignment with an already aligned world (7). My argument here is
that the sense Obama makes of war is indebted to and made possible by - the familiarity and common-sense orientation of
American exceptionalism. If the militarism and masculinism of his national security logic seem sensible or reassuring, it is
because they are oriented in deeply familiar ways. The rhetoric of war and national security also works, of course, to
recreate the familiar orientation from which it emerges. As Susan Jeffords argues, in the post-Vietnam context, heroic narratives
about the war had the decisive (but indirectly manifested) effect of "remasculinizing American culture." This is why the work of
disorientation that is proposed by feminist International Relations scholars and activists with its specific focus on the hidden injuries
of gender in the familiar discourses of war and security is so important. It is also why it is so difficult. I have argued that Obama's war
logic is oriented by, and serves to reorient us towards, a national mythology grounded in narratives of glorified violence and
masculinity. The difficulty of challenging and disorienting that prevailing narrative is eloquently
described by Jorge Luis Borges in his story "The South." The story serves as an apt allegory of the mythology of American
exceptionalism with its multiple commitments to masculinity and violence, and for the ways this mythology works to make military
violence the seemingly inevitable and sensible locus where the national story is both resolved and reinvigorated. The main character
in "The South" is named Juan Dahlmann. Dahlmann feels "deeply Argentine" despite the fact that his paternal grandfather was a
northern European immigrant. Dahlmann's patriotic sense of identity involves, among other things, having purchased a little ranch in
the south that had once been in his mother's family. Dahlmann lives in Buenos Aires, and for him the south has tremendous
symbolic resonance as that place that retains the masculinist features of national mythology: the pampa, the gaucho, the singing
bard, the tavern, the duel. Dahlmann dreams about the ranch and its old house, and takes comfort in imagining it waiting for him on
the pampa, even though he never really gets a chance to actually go there. One day, Dahlmann is struck gravely ill with a terrible
infection and is hospitalized with high fever. As is typical of so many of Borges' stories, it is impossible to tell if the subsequent
narrated events are products of his hallucinatory state or are really happening to him. In any event, after some days of medical
intervention, he is released and boards a train towards the south to convalesce at his ranch. He arrives, enters a tavern where he
eats barbeque and drinks wine, and then is taunted by some young men who have been drinking too much. Although the bar owner
tells him to pay them no mind, Dahlmann confronts them as any traditional male character in a gaucho story would be required to
do. In seeming recognition of his decisive entrance into one of the enduring storylines of nationalist mythology (the knife fight
between men at a watering hole on the pampa), the ancient gaucho in the corner of the bar who until now has remained motionless
as if frozen in time, becomes "ecstatic" and throws him a dagger. The rest is preordained: Dahlmann will walk out of the tavern with
a knife in his hand, he will fight bravely, and then die with the stranger's blade in his gut. It is, the narrator says, "as if the South had
decided that Dahlmann should agree to the duel." (203) When he picks up the dagger, he feels two things: first, "that this almost
instinctive act committed him to fighting" and, second, "that, in his clumsy hand, the weapon would not serve to defend him, but
rather to justify their killing of him" (Borges, 203 translations mine). For me, "The South" is a story about the masculinist mythology
of national identity and violence. Intricate and contradictory is it dream or reality? the myth exercises its force both from within on
Dahlmann's imagination and from without on his body. The logic of a militarized and masculinized rhetoric of national security, in
concert with the economic logic of our military budget and the imperial logic of our global ambition, serves as our "south" leading us
onward towards the use of large-scale military violence as if in a dream from which we cannot wake. We cannot hear the warnings
of the barkeep who tries to tell us that we do not have to kill or be killed in this instance. Like Dahlmann, our politicians, even
the less bellicose among them when faced with security threats simply cannot imagine any alternative to
masculinist bravado and the duel to the death.
**Congressional symbolic politics fails – Tea Party shuts down the debate
Nader, 13 – Ralph, JD Harvard Law School, A.B. magna cum laude @ the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs, activist. “Tea Party Energy vs. Progressive Lassitude in Congress,” October 9, http://nader.org/2013/10/09/tea-party-energyvs-progressive-lassitude-congress/
The difference between the sheer energy levels of the far Right and the progressive Left in
Congress is stunning. There is no comparison. The extreme Right know who they are: bulls. Their
pathway to public recognition comes by defying the Republican Party leadership, thereby securing major media attention. This helps
these extremists advance their minority-supported goals of privileges for the few at the expense of the many. Progressive Left
activists, on the other hand, make good speeches and statements but generally defer to their
Party leaders who are largely out of gas, except when it comes to raising money from commercial interests. Let’s go to
the specifics and proper names. Whatever your opinions may be, it is hard to argue that Senator Ted Cruz, Senator
Rand Paul, Senator Mike Lee, Representative Justin Amash and about 35 other Tea Party fighters aren’t getting
the daily attention of the mass media and setting the agenda for their Congressional leaders. Republican
Representative Amash even managed to get both House Republicans and Democrats within a whisker of properly stopping some of
the NSA’s blanket snooping on Americans in July. The
high-energy extreme Right-wing in Congress can nullify
the effects of overwhelming public sentiment on many matters that benefit the American people.
Where is the pushback by the fifty single-payer (full Medicare for everyone) supporters in Congress as represented by H.R.676 and
supported by a majority of the American people, physicians and nurses? Nowhere. The Congressional drums are being beaten
against Obamacare. Both Right and Left believe, for different reasons, that Obamacare is seriously flawed. But the progressives
have left this best alternative on the shelf. Where is the progressive Left’s political energy in Congress behind raising the federal
minimum wage? Thirty million workers are making less today than workers made in 1968, adjusted for inflation. Had the minimum
wage kept pace with inflation over these forty-five years, it would be $10.56 per hour instead of the current federal minimum wage of
$7.25. A few members of Congress have put their modest bills in the hopper, but not on the Table. Meanwhile, the far Right
opponents can focus their energies on their agenda, unworried that the progressive-Left activists are even going to seriously bestir
themselves on what should be a signature issue for them. After much exhortation by worker-allied groups, Senator Tom Harkin and
Representative George Miller introduced legislation to raise the federal minimum wage to $10.10 over three years. Remember over
70 percent of the American people support such an increase. Even Republican Rick Santorum, the 2012 presidential candidate,
supports raising the minimum wage. Speaking with the Democrats’ leader in the House, Nancy Pelosi, earlier this year at a social
gathering, I raised the need to “catch up with 1968” for thirty million American workers. “That’s a good thing,” she said, smiling and
moving to the next series of handshakes. Apparently, not enough of a “good thing” for the comfortable veteran Democrats, with their
secure Congressional seats, to aggressively champion the cause of thousands of workers picketing fast food chains, Walmart and
federal contractors who pay low wages, while many of their CEOs make millions of dollars a year. Dozens of non-profit advocacy
groups and social service associations for the poor, whose members lean heavily Democratic, want an increase in the minimum
wage to meet the necessities of life. Even that support, with majority poll-backing, is not enough to get progressive members of
Congress to go ‘hell-bent for leather’ like the Tea Partiers. The self-styled progressive Democrats actually
outnumber the self-described Tea Partiers in the Congress. But the latter vastly outhustle their
opponents and pressure their own leadership either to go along or be neutral . Great majoritarian
issues such as cracking down on corporate crime, ending tax havens for corporations and the rich, creating public works
programs with good paying jobs, pulling back on the Empire abroad , and rejecting corporate welfare and bailouts
cannot seem to arouse what is left of the Left in Congress. Sure, here and there these lawmakers
are on the record. But they’re not on the ramparts. The mocking Tea Partiers, along with the corporate opponents
of these reforms, know the difference. Even the best of the Left, legislators such as Senators Bernie Sanders and Sherrod
Brown, seem unable to vigorously network their like-minded colleagues and allied citizen groups and rev up
the horsepower behind their beliefs. At best, with few exceptions, they are Lone Rangers. Long-time Congressman,
now Senator, Edward Markey has taken many a leading stand warning about climate change and the Greenhouse effect on the
planet. Yet when Republican Senator James Inhofe, who has called climate change a “hoax,” agreed to debate the thenCongressman Markey, Mr. Markey said he too was willing to debate but then found every scheduling excuse he could to avoid the
debate over a period of 18 months! The willing sponsor, Politico, was kept waiting to no avail. Legislators like Senator Markey are
losing the public opinion battle over taking hold of the climate change issue, notwithstanding the issuance of more reports that more
extensively confirm the science and point to the already damaging effects on the polar ice caps and the acidification of the Oceans.
Citizen groups are frustrated that their allies on Capitol Hill are continually defeatist and unwilling
to shake the place up as the Tea Partiers have been doing even as their financiers in the big business
community have become appalled by the Tea Party’s leveraged partial government shutdown and its curled lip against the
upcoming debt ceiling crisis. Progressive words must never mask the absence of progressive action in
Congress. The people deserve better than progressive sinecurists in Congress who are so smug that they increasingly do not
return calls from civic leaders who press them to move out of their comfort zones and from words to deeds. Many can learn from the
very few determined, energetic exceptions within their ranks like the wave-making Congressman Alan Grayson from Florida.
Reframing around gender fails – public apathy and confusion
Aravosis, 13 – John, Editor of AMERICAblog, JD/Masters in Foreign Service from Georgetown, “Why women’s rights are
moving backwards as gay rights advance,” AMERICABlog, April 8, http://americablog.com/2013/04/why-gay-rights-success-andwomen-not.html.
I was asked asked by someone on Twitter this weekend why the fight for gay rights we doing so well of late, especially when some
other progressive movements, like women’s rights, seem ed to be moving backwards. Do u think part of
the reason gay rights has moved forward while women’s rights backwards is b/c gay rights includes men’s rights? It’s an interesting
question, and a difficult one, because it takes a good understand of both question: Why gay rights have done so well; and why
women’s right haven’t? I know a lot about the former, and while I worked on women’s issue for a number of years consulting with
Planned Parenthood, I don’t know them as deeply as I know gay rights. Still, it’s a point worth considering. First, as for the gender
issue, it’s hard to say. The conventional wisdom in gay politics has always been that lesbians were the kinder and gentler face of the
movement. That straight men aren’t threatened by lesbians (and even, crudely, find lesbians “hot”). Whereas they hate gay men, are
threatened by gay men, etc. And gay men represent the sexualized component of our movement, in part because gay men got
AIDS, whereas lesbians didn’t in as great of numbers, and the religious right and their GOP allies were happy to use AIDS against
us. So it’s not clear that the presence of gay men made the gay movement more sympathetic-seeming to the outside, but still, it’s an
interesting argument. It’s not just women, the left hasn’t done terribly well the last 12 years In reality, the issue, and the problem,
seems to go far beyond women’s rights. Ever since September 11, a lot of progressive issues haven’t done terribly well.
Women’s issues, to be sure, but on the environment and gun control things have generally been stagnant
legislatively and moving backwards in the polls (up until Sandy Hook changed things on the gun issue, though
possibly only temporarily). Chris handles Wall Street reform for us, and I’m sure he’ll tell you that not nearly enough has happened
on that issue, even after the world almost ended in September of 2008. On health care reform, we eeked out a victory by the skin of
our teeth, and it still wasn’t the extent of victory we should have had considering the forces lined up against the Republicans (and
conservative Dems) right after the 2008 election. On immigration, things are only improving after 1) the immigration movement
adopted the in-your-face tactics of gay activists; and 2) the GOP freaked out about the Latino vote after the 2012 elections.
Democrats are bad at PR, gays less so Having said that, the Democrats are in control of the White House and the Senate, so it’s
not like America has turned against Democrats and our ideas. The problem is something else. I’ve often chalked it up, in part at
least, to a lack of political marketing know-how, or even an appreciation of the need for political marketing, among Democrats.
Democrats often don’t know how to fight, at least in the policy realm (for elections, oddly, they tend to do better). So we don’t win
nearly as much as we should, and could, because the people fighting for our ideas don’t do it very well. On gay rights, the most
innovative, and some of the most influential, work in the past few years came from non-standard players. You had the gay Netroots,
Get Equal, Dan Choi and a number of ticked off current and former servicemembers, which included upstart groups like OutServe
and Servicemembers United, and some mainstream groups like SLDN. And all of them were effective because they were willing to
exert more pressure than is polite on the administration, and Congress. Now, it’s an interesting question as to whether gender
played a role here, going back to the question I was asked on Twitter, about whether the presence of men in the gay movement
made a difference. I have been told by a number of women that men tend to practice politics, and talk about
politics, differently than women, in part because women face far more, and nastier, vitriol than
men when they get involved in politics in the first place. It’s an interesting question as to whether an activist
group that inclues men acts differently, comes up with different strategies and tactics, and challenges power more than a group
made up exclusively of women (put another way, were gay advocates willing to be nastier, and less worried about blowback,
because many of the activists were men?). I’m not entirely sure. GetEqual, for example, was run by a fierce woman, my friend Robin
McGehee. But gender, per se, defines the women’s movement in a way that it doesn’t define other progressive movements, so it’s a
question worth asking. It would be interesting to hear from more women as to whether they think a group of women might act
differently, in a political context, strategically and tactically, than a group of men and women, or just men. Back to the independent
gay activists I mentioned above, it should be noted that those players didn’t act in a vacuum. There were other mainstream groups
that will say they were influential, and one hopes they were, and the times were a-changin’, and that didn’t hurt either. As gay people
continued to come out to family, friends and coworkers, and as Hollywood and the media increasingly portrayed gay people as
human beings, the religious right caricature (lie) of a gay person couldn’t stand against the reality of the truth. Gays have the
“advantage” of being further behind women, which makes our message clearer To some degree, I feel that asking why gay rights is
proceeding and issue X isn’t is a bit like comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Yes, there were a number of media-savvy,
fearless, advocates who were critical to advancing our cause, especially online the past 15 or so years. But perhaps the gay rights
battle did well because we lacked the subtlety of the women’s rights cause. What I mean by that is that the religious right invested
an awful lot of time and money into portraying gay people as something we weren’t. As that false image started to shatter, so did the
Do women face the same demonization? Maybe, but I don’t think the public
perceives it the same. I think today’s gay rights movement is more akin to the fight for women’s suffrage – a clear
prejudice long upheld by that falsity.
discriminatory harm that made it easier to rally against, and eventually easier to poke holes in, than the current battles facing
women. I’m not saying suffrage was easy – I’m saying that as an organizer, a political operative, the
battle lines were clearer, and the issue easier to sell, in my view, than the problems women face
today. Women’s advocates, in many ways, are fighting a war of nuance. Where gays want to get married, women
don’t want the right to choose, which varies by trimester, cut back any further by a seemingly-endless series of small, but significant,
legislative advances by anti-choice forces that slowly but surely whittle away at the right to choose. The gay battle lines, and
message, are much clearer, and thus an easier sell, I think. Are women a victim of their own success? In many ways, the
women’s rights movement is a victim of its own success. As a man, it’s not as easy to see where
women are still lacking in rights (that doesn’t mean they aren’t, I’m saying that clarity of the harm
isn’t as stark as perhaps it once was). On gay rights, there are hate crimes that shock the sensibilities. There were
decorated gay servicemembers losing their livelihood simply because of who they were. And there were loving gay couples who just
wanted the chance to settle down like everyone else. It was easy for us as advocates to define the rights we didn’t have. From a
man’s perspective, you see women getting the same jobs as man as never before. Women are corporate CEOs, doctors and pilots
and lawyers and astronauts (something noteworthy if you’re in your 40s or older and lived through a time when women simply didn’t
hold those jobs), and they even become Speaker of the House, and might even become President in 2016. And, for all appearance,
Roe v Wade is still the law of the land, so it’s understandable that some might scratch their heads and ask, what are pro-choicers
complaining about? They’re complaining because in the 40 years since Roe the religious right and the Republican party have so
whittled away at Roe as to make it meaningless, according to some lead women’s advocates. And, even though women now hold
many of the same jobs as men, they don’t always get the same pay. But that takes some complicated explaining, and it contradicts
what the public might consider an obvious “truth,” that Roe hasn’t been overturned, so how can it be in danger, or nearly already
gone, and women “have the same jobs as men,” so what’s the problem? And in many ways, African-Americans face the same
problem as women. It’s easy for people to say “slavery ended 150 years ago, and the Civil Rights Act passed 50 years ago, so the
African-American struggle is over,” without realizing that, for example, some schools in the south still hold segregated proms.
People see African-American CEOs, doctors, lawyers, astronauts, and might think “they’ve won, employment discrimination over,”
without understanding that, in some ways, it may never be over, at least not for a very long time. But the devil is in the details much
more so than it is with gay rights because we’re still fighting for some of the rights that African-Americans got (at least on paper) fifty
years ago. It makes our cause, I think, easier to explain. It also means that once we get many of our basic civil rights, gays may
have the same difficulty fine-tuning those rights once people already think we have them. Voters don’t do nuance In a nutshell,
people don’t do nuance . If you have to explain too many details, the public’s eyes glaze over. And
on gay rights, in part because a lot of us are good at messaging, and in part because our message itself, the harm itself, is rather
clear-cut, we’ve had more success than many on the left in the past decade. But it’s not just that. I’ve written a lot about how much
of the professional left, as some like to call it, rolled over and played dead the past 12 years. And I think a lot of professional gay
rights did too, to a degree. But our activists didn’t. Which actually raises another issue, AIDS. Nothing galvanizes a community, and
inspires activists, like widespread death and political inaction. That’s an essay in and of itself. So I do think that each
community has its own unique problems that it faces in selling its message. But I also think that a big part
of the problem is what I called “political marketing,” or public relations. Aka, knowing how to sell your product (and knowing the value
of knowing). The gays are particularly good at it. Other lefties in the past ten years, less so. And the one group that watched our
success, and tried to learn from it and emulate it – immigration reform advocates – are now having success of their own, not just
because they copied our model, but it helped. So that’s a modest beginning at trying to explain what the heck happened that made
gay rights one of the shining successes of progressivism this past decade.
**aff doesn’t solve gender violence - tons of alt causes
UN 13 United Nations Entity for Gendered Equality and the Empowerment of Women 13 (“Ending Violence Against Women and
Girls: Programming Essentials,” http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/300-causes-protective-and-risk-factors-.html, June)
Gender inequality and discrimination are root causes of violence against women, influenced by
the historical and structural power imbalances between women and men which exist in varying
degrees across all communities in the world.¶ Violence against women and girls is related to their
lack of power and control, as well as to the social norms that prescribe men and women’s roles in
society and condone abuse. Inequalities between men and women cut across public and private
spheres of life, and across social, economic, cultural, and political rights; and are manifested in
restrictions and limitations on women’s freedoms, choices and opportunities. These inequalities
can increase women’s and girls’ risks of abuse, violent relationships and exploitation, for
example, due to economic dependency and limited survival and income-earning options, or
discrimination under the law as it relates to marriage, divorce, and child custody rights.¶ Violence
against women and girls is not only a consequence of gender inequality, but reinforces women’s
low status in society and the multiple disparities between women and men . (UN General Assembly,
2006)¶ A variety of factors at the individual, relationship, community and society (including the
institutional/state) levels intersect to increase the risk of violence for women and girls. These factors,
represented in the ecological model, include:¶ witnessing or experiencing abuse as a child (associated with future perpetration of
violence for boys and experiencing violence for girls);¶ substance (including alcohol) abuse (associated with increased incidences of
violence)¶ women’s membership in marginalized or excluded groups ;¶ low levels of education (for boys
associated with perpetrating violence in the future and for girls, experiencing violence);¶ limited economic opportunities
(an aggravating factor for unemployed or underemployed men associated with perpetrating violence; and as a risk factor for women
and girls, including of domestic abuse, child and forced marriage, and sexual exploitation and trafficking);¶ the presence of
economic, educational and employment disparities between men and women in an intimate relationship;¶
conflict and tension within an intimate partner relationship or marriage;¶ women’s insecure access to and control
over property and land rights;¶ male control over decision-making and assets;¶ attitudes and practices that
reinforce female subordination and tolerate male violence (e.g. dowry, bride price, child
marriage);¶ lack of safe spaces for women and girls, which can be physical or virtual meeting spaces that allow free
expression and communication; a place to develop friendships and social networks, engage with mentors and seek advice from a
supportive environment.¶ normalized use of violence within the family or society to address conflict;¶ a limited
legislative and policy framework for preventing and responding to violence;¶ lack of punishment (impunity)
for perpetrators of violence; and,¶ low levels of awareness among service providers, law enforcement and judicial actors.
(Bott, et al., 2005;
Case O: General—1NC
Legalization backfires—makes everything worse
Brenda Zurita, staff, “Amsterdam’s Legalized Prostitution Experiment Failed, Miserably,” Concerned Women for America,
Legislative Action Committee, 2—22—13, http://www.cwfa.org/amsterdams-legalized-prostitution-experiment-failed-miserably/,
accessed 9-21-14.
To paraphrase Captain Renault in Casablanca, the
government in the Netherlands is shocked, shocked to find
pimps and sex traffickers involved in their legalized prostitution industry! Yes, who indeed could have
seen that happening? By legalizing prostitution, the Dutch government made it legal for pimps to sell people
for the sexual use of johns, the buyers. Instead of being called “pimps” or “traffickers,” the government gave them new
titles – “businessmen” and “managers.” The government made the buying and selling of human beings respectable, at least
as seen through their own distorted lenses. Why would a government promote such a plan? Isn’t it obvious? To make it safer for
prostitutes, of course! You see, when prostitution is illegal, you get all sorts of nasty characters involved who buy and sell women,
men, and children in the commercial sex industry, beat prostitutes at will for pleasure or to keep them in line, and make the
prostitutes ashamed of themselves because they “work” in an illegal industry. Once the Netherlands legalized prostitution, magically
overnight the pimps, traffickers, and brutish johns all disappeared. They were replaced by managers, businessmen, and Richard
Gere clones from Pretty Woman . Prostitutes lined up outside of government assistance offices to register as prostitutes, pay their
fair share of the taxes, and avail themselves of all sorts of government services to make their lives better, especially after incidents
now classified as “occupational hazards,” formally known as “abuse.” Why didn’t this utopian plan work? This is what occurs when
fuzzy, feel-good policies are promoted in the face of common sense and the dark side of human nature. Julie Bindel, in the U.K.
Spectator, exposes the ugly truth of this epic failure. Since the Netherland’s grand experiment began in 2000, Bindel points out that
women are still abused, the commercial sex industry is expanding, prostitutes are not joining the
government-funded union created to “protect” them (because they are “too scared to complain”), sex
tourism is on the rise, women are being imported (read “trafficked”) into the country to meet the
increasing demand created by legalization, children are being exploited in the industry, and only
five percent of the women signed up to pay taxes “because no one wants to be known as a whore,” even if the
government condones it. Illegal brothels, pimping, and trafficking have flourished, because the government luminaries
ignored the basic principle that when you remove legal and judicial institutions from the picture, the void is filled by criminals.
Case O: Stigma—1NC
Legalization increases stigma—employer control, counterplan is superior
Arnot 02 (Alison Arnot B.A. (Hons), A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the
Department of Criminology, Faculty of Arts, University of Melbourne, “LEGALISATION OF THE SEX INDUSTRY in the State of
Victoria, Australia: The impact of prostitution law reform on the working and private lives of women in the legal Victorian sex
industry”, http://www.scarletalliance.org.au/library/a-arnot02)
It can be argued that Victoria's system of legalisation has been successful to the extent that it has improved some working
conditions, particularly physical surroundings, and the feeling of safety and control over clients experienced by escort workers. It
must, however be considered only a first step toward improving the working and private lives of Victorian sex workers. With
legalisation has come an increase of control over workers by owners and management in the
industry. These owners have been somewhat legitimised through licensing , however, workers
continue to be stigmatised , increasing the potential power of owners over them. The primary objective
of the legislation, to control the location and ownership of brothels, has failed as there is a large
section of the sex industry that is operating outside of the law . Whether legalisation has lessened the impact
of the industry on the general population is not known, as the legislators have never defined the impact of an illegal industry on the
community.
Legalisation has not lessened the negative impact industry involvement has on worker's private
lives . This is because legalisation does not decrease stigma and in the case of Victoria the legislators
perpetuate stigma by continually reinforcing the belief that they do not support or condone
prostitution . The most serious consequence of this stigma is the reluctance of workers to report
crimes committed against them or by industry operators and the stress that it places on their
lives. It is necessary to ask whether there is a legal structure that would be of greater benefit to workers to solve some of the
problems raised in the preceding discussion.
As mentioned previously most advocates
for law reform, including (most) sex worker rights groups, believe that
decriminalisation is the preferred approach when considering the legal status of the sex industry .
After analysing the concerns raised by the interviewees relating to the current legal structure’s
impact on their work decriminalisation would be beneficial to them in terms of providing a greater
range of work choices . For instance they would be able to see clients on their own terms on their
own premises.
Decriminalisation in itself would not increase the control individual workers experience in the workplace, although it could be
argued, that it would increase the number of places in which women could work. This increase in
businesses would then increase competition amongst operators to attract workers, giving workers
greater bargaining power. Decriminalisation would also mean that operators could advertise for
workers , allowing workers to make a better informed choice of who they work for and the
conditions they work under.
Framing
Framing: 1NC (1:15
Calculation is good, inevitable and ethical
Richard L. Revesz, Professor, Law, NYU and Michael A. Livermore, Executive Director, Institute for Policy Integrity,
RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR
HEALTH, 2008, p. 1-4.
Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often
affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our
decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints
of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments,
however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental
decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of
empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns
and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points
on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response
curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what
makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be
dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine
Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—
when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion
seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual
compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us
to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—
problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem
as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis,
properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human
lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an
approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best
protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to
step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the
challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and
safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several
decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety,
and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid
products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there
is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a
temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of
seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis.
Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make
the best choices possible.
Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one
another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what
numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an
interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the
beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we
are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it
would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when
making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory
decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since
1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years,
however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning
the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting
asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the
technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason,
when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive
groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference
between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is
unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our
emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We
use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.
All lives are valuable—means you should prefer util
Cummisky 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, “Kantian Consequentialism”, p. 131)
even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for
killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify
deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger
obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would
seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill's example of a priceless
Finally,
object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two
even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation
that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus
compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short , it
is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed,
inconsistent with the idea
is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who
are saved, the better.8
the disad isn’t linear causality- it’s scenario planning
Steven Bernstein 2k et al., “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World,”
EJIR, 6, 43, 2000, p. 53-55
One useful alternative approach is the development of scenarios, or narratives with plot lines that map a
set of causes and trends in future time. This forward reasoning strategy is based on a notion of
contingent causal mechanisms, in opposition to the standard, neo-positivist focus on efficient causes, but
with no clear parallel in evolutionary biology. It should not be confused with efforts by some to develop social scientific concepts
directly analogous to evolutionary mechanisms (such as variation or selection) in biology to explain, for example, transformations in
the international system or institutions, or conditions for optimum performance in the international political economy. Scenarios
are not predictions; rather, they start with the assumption that the future is unpredictable and tell
alternative stories of how the future may unfold. Scenarios are generally constructed by distinguishing what
we believe is relatively certain from what we think is uncertain. The most important ‘’certainties’ are common
to all scenarios that address the problem or trend, while the most important perceived uncertainties differentiate one scenario from
another. The approach differs significantly from a forecasting tournament or competition, where advocates of different theoretical
perspectives generate differential perspectives on a single outcome in the hope of subsequently identifying the ‘best’ or most
accurate performer. Rather, by constructing scenarios, or plausible stories of paths to the future, we can identify the
different driving forces (a term we prefer to independent variable, since it implies a force pushing in a certain direction rather
than what is known on one side of an ‘equals’ sign) and then attempt to combine these forces in logical chains that
generate a range of outcomes, rather than single futures. Scenarios make contingent claims rather than
point predictions . They reinsert a sensible notion of contingency into theoretical arguments that would otherwise tend toward
determinism. Scholars in international relations tend to privilege arguments that reach back into the past
and parse out one or two causal variables that are then posited to be the major driving forces of past and future outcomes. The field
also favors variables that are structural or otherwise parametric, thus downplaying the role of both agency and accident . Forward
reasoning undercuts structural determinism by raising the possibility and plausibility of multiple
futures. Scenarios are impressionistic pictures that build on different combinations of causal variables
that may also take on different values in different scenarios . Thus it is possible to construct
scenarios without pre-existing firm proof of theoretical claims that meet strict positivist standards.
The foundation for scenarios is made up of provisional assumptions and causal claims. These become the subject of
revision and updating more than testing. A set of scenarios often contains competing or at least contrasting assumptions. It is less
important where people start, than it is where they end up through frequent revisions, and how they got there . A good
scenario is an internally consistent hypothesis about how the future might unfold; it is a chain of
logic that connects ‘drivers’ to outcomes (Rosell, 1999:126). Consider as an example one plausible scenario at the
level of a ‘global future’ where power continues to shift away from the state and towards international institutions, transnational
actors and local communities. The state lose its monopoly on the provision of security and basic characteristics of the Westphalian
system as we have known it are fundamentally altered. In this setting, key decisions about security, economics and culture will be
made by non-state actors. Security may become a commodity that can be bought like other commodities in the global marketplace .
A detailed scenario about this transformation would specify the range of changes that are expected to
occur and how they are connected to one another. It would also identify what kinds of evidence might support
the scenario as these or other processes unfold over the next decade, and what kind of evidence would count against the
scenario. This is simply a form of process tracing, or increasing the number of observable implications of an
argument, in future rather than past time. Eventually, as in the heuristics of evolutionary biology, future history
becomes data. But instead of thinking of data as something that can falsify any particular hypothesis,
one should think of it as something capable of distinguishing or selecting the story that was from
the stories that might have been.
Predictions work
Chernoff 09
[Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an
Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1, Sage]
For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that
prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have
attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox,
who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently,
HeikkiPatomäki has argued that ‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ defective and that the
latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that
there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever.
Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism.First, we all make reliable
social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a
spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past
experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema)
(1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of
current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing
democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’
might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic
Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had
done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more
thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and
China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders
understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has
adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world,
China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to
plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible
contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct
diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decisionmaker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific
facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese
territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a
prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or
military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like
P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of
‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful
one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to
China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-andeffect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to
China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow nonscientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural
sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe
the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for
example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’.
DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort
of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With the help of these ‘non-point
predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action
(e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to
accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decisionmaking situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The
critics thus commit the straw [person] man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if
any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based
predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 The range of
theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point
of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that
reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any
commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 Thereflexivist
commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.
Patriarchy’s not the root cause of war—war causes patriarchy
Goldstein 1 – IR, American U (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412)
Many peace scholars and activists
support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism
contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace.
This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that
injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way.
War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all
of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other
injustices.9 S
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace.
o, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace.
Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It
runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to
“reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies,
and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war
seems to be empirically inadequate.
Extinction outweighs structural violence
Nick Bostrom, Professor, Oxford and Director, Future of Humanity Institute, “We’re Underestimating the Risk of Human
Extinction,” Interviewed by Ross Andersen, THE ATLANTIC, 3—6—12,
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/
Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human
extinction
risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well
known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset
that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century. Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite.
In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he
sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of
philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with
Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to
make sure we outlast them. Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because
existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant
moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have
many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that
a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't
matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral
point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the
moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations
matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk
mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many
people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we
might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and
there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small
reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense
benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous und
2NC
2NC More
humanitarian justifications displace security justifications--that causes warworld war 1 and crimean war prove
By Ryan Goodman 6 * ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard
Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf
**NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
Snyder identifies deeper forms of
socialization that may result from leaders' efforts to justify the escalation of hostilities with
another state. He hypothesizes and ultimately concludes that logrolling among domestic political coalitions
explains incidents of self-defeating expansionism by powerful states. The empirical evidence
compels Snyder to conclude that blowback effects have signif- icant explanatory power .107 In
several cases that Snyder studies, government officials and opin- ion leaders promulgated "strategic
myths" to justify expansionist policies, and these images were internalized by members of the
public, elites, and, at times, proponents of the rational- izations themselves.108 For example, in the
Crimean War, members of the British ruling party promoted conceptions of Russian hostility and
other security-based rationales to justify foreign military ventures.109 The same leaders later
found themselves unable to rescind bellicose pol- icies due to hardened public and elite
opinions formed around the original myths.110 In a com- parable effort to justify military ambitions, leaders of
Wilhelmine Germany supported stra- tegic myths about the aggressive intentions of potential
adversaries (Britain and Russia), the definition of a favorable balance ofpower, the German
nation's relative strengths, and the pros- pects of success."1 The German leadership was
subsequently unable to change course once powerful domestic actors internalized those
conceptions. The domestic groups came to expect and demand aggressive behavior abroad and
became increasingly unable to recognize flaws in contemporary policies."2 Notably, other scholars'
examinations of the historical cases largely support Snyder's conclusions.113 In addition, Charles
Kupchan extends these theoretical explanations to strategic myths used to justify self-defeating
cooperative foreign policy agendas (not only self-defeating competitive agendas)."14 As these historical cases suggest,
blowback effects may occur (with some variation) across different regime types-that is, across a range of
domestic political systems. This point may appear surprising. One might suppose that illiberal states would be relatively
In Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Jack
unresponsive to public opinion and thus not susceptible to blowback effects. On this view, such regimes lack internal mechanisms of
accountability to exert pressure on governmental leaders. Recent research on state behavior and military conflict, however, provides
a more nuanced account. That research suggests the importance of disaggregating illiberal states and understanding internal
constraints on political coalitions in nondemocracies.115 Specifically, Snyder finds that two types of regimes are highly prone to
experiencing blowback: nondemocratic regimes governed by cartels and democratic regimes with significant cartelization.116 He
identifies two features that accentuate blowback effects in such cases. First, logrolling among cartels encour- ages the maintenance
of strategic myths."17 Second, a free press and open political space-in- stitutions that illiberal states lack-provide important checks
on strategic mythmaking.118 Members of the cartelized groups internalize (or fail to distinguish strategic from genuine) dis- course
justifying military expansion; they can also become entrapped by justificatory discourse used to mobilize mass support for the
military effort."19
To help explain internalization, Snyder's findings can be usefully supplemented with studies of"bureaucratic politics." Lebow
contends that once governmental leaders have propounded a guiding rationale and beliefs with
respect to a crisis situation, subordinate organs and individuals within the governmental
bureaucracy are often loath to contest , and eager to substan- tiate, those commitments. 20 Lebow
calls this dynamic " cognitive closure ." 21 Another scholar has appropriately redescribed the dynamic as sociological
in nature, however, and has thus con- ceptualized the effect as "social closure."'22 In a similar vein, Kupchan identifies institutional
effects that produce bureaucratic conformity: " Even
if strategic images are crafted primarily for public
consumption , they gradually spread through the top-level elite community, the bureau- cracy,
and the military services. They become, as it were, organizing principles for the broader decisionmaking community."'23 As a result, members of the bureaucracy become less directed by "inference-based strategic
pragmatism" or by "strategic conceptions informed by logic alone."124
beliefs about the conflict,
The originating rationales, along with associated
shape their subsequent actions.
First , the institution of war is
often founded upon a process of justification, with audiences potentially including the public,
elites, or members of the governing coalition.125 Second , the rationales that leaders contrive to
justify hostilities can meaningfully shape the content of social and political discourse. Accordingly,
there are strong reasons to believe that justifying hostil- ities on the basis of humanitarian
purposes can shift the terms of the conflict by disrupting com- peting rationales or, more
affirmatively, by establishing humanitarian issues as the dominant framework for the dispute. The
articulation of a humanitarian justification can produce (through various causal pathways such
as strategic manipulation by political actors, internal- ization by relevant members of society, and
bureaucratic conformity) a new normative equi- librium and shared beliefs about the conflict, its
aims, the interests at stake, and the attributes and inclinations of the opposing state. Third , an
important consequence of new beliefs and normative commitments taking root is the constraint
placed on subsequent action. Though slightly dramatic, one scholar describes blowback effects as "the
The politics of justification contain three lessons for regulating humanitarian intervention.
Procrustean bed that decision- makers create for themselves when, after persuading the public of a theory which justifies [mil- itary]
expansion, they can no longer diverge from it.""26 In short, these
effects suggest the potential strength and
durability of humanitarian justifications for escalating hostilities .
Kosovo proves - deescalates or stops war from happening in the first placeallows leaders to make politically difficult concessions
By Ryan Goodman 6 * ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard
Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf
**NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
Two conflicts-the Kosovo intervention and the recent Iraq war-will help to illustrate
these claims. The above
discussion analyzes consequences that may ensue when a revisionist state proffers foreign
human rights violations as a casus belli. The Kosovo and Iraq conflicts each involved such
framing efforts by revisionist states. Both cases therefore potentially illuminate some of the
consequences that could ensue were states (legally) encouraged to set forth a humanitarian
justification for using force in other disputes. Consider first the Kosovo intervention. Although not a perfect fit,
the conflict illustrates the opportunities for face-saving settlements in a multi-issue dispute. More
specifically, the case indicates how a humanitarian rationale can prevent all-out war or deescalate
an existing con- flict. As I discuss shortly, having proffered a humanitarian justification for initiating
force, NATO leaders were able to make politically difficult concessions and deescalate the
conflict before it turned into full-scale, ground warfare . The Kosovo conflict thus showcases
some of the mechanisms whereby humanitarian justifications could serve the interests of peace at
these and other stages in a dispute The use of force by NATO led "only to a limited military intervention,"140
and the conflict deescalated once NATO (and Milosevic) found political space to make significant
concessions. The intervention served multiple interests: securing regional stability, maintaining
the cred- ibility of NATO, and protecting human rights.141 Notably, some commentators doubt whether the last of
these rationales genuinely motivated NATO's actions.142 We need not resolve that particular question here. It is worth noting,
however, that if
the official human- itarian justifications were disingenuous , the Kosovo intervention
would serve our analytic pur- poses even better. Regardless of which motivations actually
inspired them to act, when gov- ernment leaders made the commitment to use force, they
expected that Milosevic would quickly capitulate.143 Once the conflict was under way, however,
member states became increasingly concerned that NATO would have to escalate to ground
warfare in order to obtain the concessions initially demanded ofMilosevic.144 Indeed, President Clinton and other lead- ersespecially in Germany and Italy-were reportedly searching for an opportunity to claim success and bring the conflict to an end. 145
NATO ultimately obtained guarantees from Milos- evic for the protection of Kosovo Albanians but
compromised on other significant demands. Political leaders secured an imperfect peace and
claimed victory. Notably, some close observers of the conflict argued that NATO had abandoned some of the main objectives
of the intervention.146 Champions of the intervention pointed to the achievements gained and the relatively low number of battlerelated deaths.147 In short, the availability of a humanitarian rationale allowed NATO leaders, in Huth's terms,
"to packag[e] a politically viable agreement" and " counter charges of appeasement and
capitulation " while retreating from a major military commitment and terminating the conflict.148 In
other words, NATO leaders could "claim that [Milosevic's] concessions on certain issues were a
major gain, " thereby "fend[ing] off domestic or foreign political adversaries who claim[ed] that the
government of the would-be attacker state[s] ... retreated under pressure."'49 As a more general lesson,
these events indicate how a humanitarian justification in a multi-issue dispute can facilitate
opportunities for leaders to bail out of militarized disputes that they do not want to escalate.
iraq proves- security justifications caused it- HJ would have prevented it
By Ryan Goodman 6 * ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard
Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf
**NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
Leaders will not always seek opportunities to avert escalation, as the UK and U.S. actions in the recent
Iraq war demonstrate. The question is, then, whether the Iraq conflict is a coun- terexample to the preceding analysis. In
that case the U.S. government included humanitarian intervention as one of the potential grounds
for invading Iraq, and the conflict nonetheless ended in war. A single contradictory (or consistent) case would
not, of course, either repudiate or confirm an analysis of aggregate tendencies of state behavior.'50 Nevertheless, it is helpful
to examine the Iraq conflict as a salient case of a humanitarian justification used to promote war.
As the following discussion demonstrates, the Iraq conflict does not serve as a counter- example; the case is,
instead, consistent with points made above. The Iraq conflict illustrates, in particular, the importance of the
politics of justification and the ineffectiveness of an implau- sible humanitarian rationale. The political process leading up to
the Iraq war shows the importance of justificatory strat- egies. Borrowing from Snyder's analysis of strategic myths, Chaim
Kaufmann's case study of the war examines the theoretical significance of various rationales that the
Bush administration promulgated for invading Iraq.15 Most importantly, the administration framed
the conflict away from the previously dominant justification (Saddam Hussein's threat to the
region) to a new justification (Saddam Hussein's direct threat to the U.S. homeland and citizenry).
The latter required a concerted strategy of depicting a threat that linked Hussein to transnational
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).152 While the earlier framework created a
political consensus favoring military containment, the subsequent framework mobilized sup- port
for an attack.153 A useful supplement to Kaufmann's analysis might be that the post-9/1 1 context uniquely
amplified the political effect of the more recent framework.154 Independent of 9/11, however, it was this
general justificatory campaign - concentrating on Hussein's direct threat to U.S. security-that ultimately led to
the war . The Iraq war may illustrate the significance of security-oriented MIDs that dated back to
the 1990s. Had the United States spent the previous years framing those hostilities principally
around humanitarian conditions inside Iraq rather than around Iraq's military threat to the region, it
may have proven more difficult for the U.S. government to go to war in 2003. At the very least, the late
invocation of humanitarian concerns as a justification for the 2003 Iraq war may have been less
of a cause for the escalation of hostilities than were the MIDs in years prior. More significantly, the
likelihood of war might have been lower had the legal regime encour- aged the United States to
promulgate humanitarian objectives as the driving force for interstate hostilities during that earlier
period. The Iraq conflict also demonstrates how a humanitarian pretext will fail- either to empower or to constrain leaders-if it is
considered implausible. That is, a humanitarian ratio- nale can produce constraining (blowback) effects only if it creates the initial
impression assumed by the pretext model: the justification must be both believed and accepted if it is to produce any meaningful
social effects. As explained above,155 this point is straightforward. The political support that state R can achieve in employing a
humanitarian pretext will depend on the plausibility of the justification. Plausibility turns, in significant part, on whether the facts of
the case match the justificatory rationale. Half-heartedly using a humanitarian justification as a supplement to other reasons for war
also undercuts the plausibility of the asserted human- itarian rationale. And if the rationale is unpersuasive, we should not expect its
promotion to exert significant influence in building public support or, as a result, in constraining behavior through a blowback
mechanism. The road to war will be determined on other grounds. The humanitarian rationale for invading Iraq was generally not
believed or accepted. The human rights conditions in Iraq were conspicuously unlike previous cases in which human- itarian
intervention was considered appropriate.156 Indeed, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz admitted that the
administration "settled on the one issue that every- one could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core
reason"-rather than "the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people," which he believed was by itself "not a reason to put American kids'
lives at risk."'57 As Sean Murphy explains, the agreed "justification ... reflected a public rejection of the argument for a U.S. invasion
based solely on humanitarian grounds." '58 Analyzing the rhetorical efforts preceding the war, Rodger Payne explains that the
administration did not sell the war on the basis of a humanitarian justification but instead relied
on national security threats.159 The administration's humanitarian rationale for the conflict came
to the fore only after the military defeat of the Hussein regime and the realization that Iraq had no
WMDs.
OV--War Is Bad 2NC
War turns gender violence
Eaton 04. [Shana JD Georgetown University Law Center 35 Geo. J. Int'l L. 873 Summer lexis]
While sexual violence against women has always been considered a negative side effect of war, it is only
in recent years that it has been taken seriously as a violation of humanitarian law. In the "evolution" of war, women themselves have
become a battlefield on which conflicts are fought. Realizing that rape is often more effective at achieving their aims than plain
killing, aggressors have used shocking sexual violence against women as a tool of conflict, allowing battling
forces to flaunt their power, dominance, and masculinity over the other side. The stigma of rape is used to effectuate genocide,
destroy communities, and demoralize opponents-decimating a woman's will to survive is often only a secondary side effect. Sexual
violence against women during wartime had to reach horrifying levels before the international community was shocked enough to
finally take these atrocities seriously. It took the extremely brutal victimization of vast numbers of women, played out against a
backdrop of genocide, to prove that rape is not simply a natural side effect of war to be lightly brushed aside. The conflicts in both
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia put women's rights directly in the spotlight, and the international community could no longer
avoid the glare. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, ethnic cleansing was central to the conflict. Raping women helped to achieve this
aim in a number of ways, from forced impregnation, where offspring would have different ethnicities than their mothers, to the use of
sexual violence to prevent women from wanting to have sex again (thus limiting their likelihood of bearing children in the future).
Additionally, rape was used as a means of destroying families and communities. Raping a woman
stigmatized her, making it unlikely that she would ever want to return home, and in many cases, ensuring that if she did return home
that she would be rejected. Civilians, particularly women, came to be used as tools to achieve military ends, putting the human
rights of these women at the heart of the conflict.
War dehumanizes—otherization
Michele Maiese, Conflict Resolution Consortium, “Beyond Intractability Version IV,” The Beyond Intractability Project: Guy
Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Co-Directors and Editors, 7—03, www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization
Dehumanization is a psychological process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of
moral consideration. Jews in the eyes of Nazis and Tutsis in the eyes of Hutus (in the Rwandan genocide) are but two examples.
Protracted conflict strains relationships and makes it difficult for parties to recognize that they are part of a
shared human community. Such conditions often lead to feelings of intense hatred and alienation among
conflicting parties. The more severe the conflict, the more the psychological distance between groups will widen. Eventually, this can
result in moral exclusion. Those excluded are typically viewed as inferior, evil, or criminal.[1] We typically think that all people have
some basic human rights that should not be violated. Innocent people should not be murdered, raped, or tortured. Rather,
international law suggests that they should be treated justly and fairly, with dignity and respect. They deserve to have their basic
needs met, and to have some freedom to make autonomous decisions. In times of war, parties must take care to protect the lives of
innocent civilians on the opposing side. Even those guilty of breaking the law should receive a fair trial, and should not be subject to
any sort of cruel or unusual punishment. However, for individuals viewed as outside the scope of morality and
justice, "the concepts of deserving basic needs and fair treatment do not apply and can seem irrelevant."[2] Any harm that befalls
such individuals seems warranted, and perhaps even morally justified. Those excluded from the scope of morality are
typically perceived as psychologically distant, expendable, and deserving of treatment that would not be acceptable for those
included in one's moral community. Common criteria for exclusion include ideology, skin color, and cognitive capacity. We typically
dehumanize those whom we perceive as a threat to our well-being or values.[3] Psychologically, it is necessary to
categorize one's enemy as sub-human in order to legitimize increased violence or justify the
violation of basic human rights. Moral exclusion reduces restraints against harming or exploiting certain groups of people.
In severe cases, dehumanization makes the violation of generally accepted norms of behavior regarding one's fellow man seem
reasonable, or even necessary
Case
Case O: Welfare Turn—2NC
Yes—gov can say they have to be prostitutes
1st No link—People can reject jobs without losing compensation and courts would
reverse it—we assume your author
Spector 06 (Jessica, Prof @ Trinity. “Prostitution and pornography: Philosophical debate about the sex industry.” Stanford
University Press, 2006)
We can perhaps make the point more vivid by noting two other protections against forced sex that, on our hypothesis, should fall by
the wayside. First, to the extent that welfare and unemployment compensation are intended for persons who cannot find suitable
employment, if sex work is available and a person is suitable for it (however that is judged), government
should encourage people to take such work and cut off benefits if such work is refused . 30 Second,
insofar as persons are allowed to make enforceable labor contracts, they should be allowed to make contracts for sexual services,
including tacit or implicit agreements, and the courts would have to uphold them. This was the point in the expensive date scenario,
discussed at the start of this section. As the lesson of that scenario suggests, the barriers established between sex and commerce
not only function to keep the workplace free of sexual pressures but also to keep private sexual relations free of the norms of
business, where broken promises and defeated expectations can bring enforced remedies. ***Footnote 30*** 30. The
suggestion is meant to be provocative, but it's short of absurd. The principal objection to it is that, while government
assistance may be conditional on one's willingness to take available work, one need only seek
"suitable work." One can reject a job without losing unemployment compensation benefits if one
does so on bona fide religious grounds, because it pays less than one is used to earning , because it
interferes with family obligations. because it poses a health risk, or because it's a new line of work.
Despite such protections, in the last nine months of 1999, until the
press reported it, New York City's welfare-to-work program called
"Business Link" made arrangements with the Psychic Network to
train welfare recipients in Tarot reading and other skills and then
to hire them as telephone psychics at Sto-$12 per hour. See Nina Bernstein,
"New York Drops Psychic Training Program," New York Times (January 29, 2.000); and Michael Daly, "Veil of Secrecy Lifted:
Program Training Poor to Be Phone Psychics ls Exposed," New York Daily News (March 19, 2.000). (I am indebted to Jacob Levi
for alerting me to this factoid.) It is also understood that, if one's unemployment drags on, the range of jobs one must consider
Furthermore, former prostitutes might be required to
consider such work suitable if it were available. Finally, welfare reform as we
suitable is expected to grow.
know it has imposed a number of fairly draconian conditions on eligibility,
including work requirements that seem to pay little attention to the benefit
recipients' suitability for the jobs they are required to take. As Sylvia Law has noted. "The state
enjoys a large freedom to condition receipt of public assistance upon the sacrifice of otherwise constitutionally protected rights.
Perhaps courts would see a policy that conditioned aid on a requirement that a woman engage in
commercial sex as so egregious that the policy would be found to violate constitutional liberty . But
this conclusion is far from clear" (Law, p. 606). Hence, the suggestion in the text may be farfetched at present but is not
inconceivable, especially given current trends in eligibility requirements for public assistance and social insurance. For a more
general discussion of eligibility requirements for unemployment compensation, see Mark A. Rothstein, Charles B. Craver, Elinor P.
Schroeder, and Elaine W. Shoben, Employment Law, 2d ed. (St. Paul. Minn.: West, 1999), pp. 767-70, 786-88.
Legalizing sex work will force women on public assistance into state sponsored
prostitution
Law 0 (Sylvia A. Law is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Medicine, and Psychiatry, New York University School of Law,
COMMERCIAL SEX: BEYOND DECRIMINALIZATION, Southern California Law Review, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 523, March, 2000, pp.
604-06)
More generally, poor women might fear that if commercial sex is legal, it will be compelled as a condition of
subsistence because the U.S. has a long history of denying aid to women who are judged to be
"unworthy," particularly those who have had a sexual relationship outside marriage. Poor women have little reason to expect that the state will respect their choices in
relation to the nature of work they can be required to do. Women can be required to pick up garbage, including dead rodents and urine soaked mattresses. Often these women
are not provided gloves or other protective clothing, or bathroom facilities. This work is not compensated, but is rather required as a condition of receiving subsistence aid. Such
work is required of women with very young children who are [*605] forced to leave them with inadequate childcare. Frequently the work women are required to do as a
the
assumption is that no work is demeaning to the worker, if someone is willing to pay for it. As suggested
condition of subsistence aid denies them control over family life, and exposes them to the risk of sexual and other forms of harassment. In relation to the poor,
above, one way around the conflict between legal and cultural expectations that people seeking subsistence aid from the state can be required to do whatever work is available,
and the equally strong cultural norm that sex is legitimate only if it is consensual, is to allow women to decline work that violates strongly held conscientious beliefs and personal
values. For a time, the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to hold that the state could not deny benefits to people who were willing to work at a large range of jobs, but
had strong religious and conscientious objections to particular jobs and working conditions. nThe principle that the constitution prevents the state from telling individuals that
they may only receive benefits if they give up fundamental liberties and convictions has not been limited to religiously based beliefs and liberties. The norm that consent defines
the bounds of legitimate sexual relations is an historically grounded, traditional fundamental liberty and it is possible to argue that the state may not constitutionally condition
subsistence benefits on submission to coerced sex. Unfortunately, the principles described in the prior paragraph have been largely abandoned by the Supreme Court,
especially in relation to poor women challenging restrictions on benefits that burden the exercise of [*606] fundamental liberties. In Dandridge v. Williams, the Court rejected
the claim of a poor grandmother who sought additional aid to enable her grandchild to join the family. In Wyman v. James, the Court held that public assistance may be
terminated if a woman receiving aid refuses to "consent" to an investigative "home visit," even though the Fourth Amendment otherwise prohibits government officials from nonconsensual visits without a warrant based on reasonable cause to suspect wrongdoing. Similarly, even though the right to choose abortion is a fundamental constitutionally
protected liberty, and the federal Medicaid statute requires states to pay for all medically necessary physician services, the Supreme Court approved a federal law excluding
coverage for medically necessary abortions from the otherwise comprehensive Medicaid program. Following these cases, lower courts have approved rules that deny aid to
the state enjoys a large
freedom to condition receipt of public assistance upon the sacrifice of otherwise constitutionally
protected rights. Perhaps courts would see a policy that conditioned aid on a requirement that a woman engage in commercial
children born to women receiving public aid, even though such rules provide strong incentives for abortion. These cases suggest that
sex as so egregious that the policy would be found to violate constitutional liberty. But this conclusion is far from clear.
Making prostitution legitimate work allows the state to force poor women into it.
Cherry 2001 (April L., Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University; B.A.,
Vassar University, J.D., Yale Law School) “Welfare Reform and the Use of State Power in the Prostitution of Poor Women”
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:67]
CONCLUSION: WELFARE REFORM AND THE COERCIVE USE OF STATE POWER TO INDUCE THE PROSTITUTION OF
POOR WOMEN
The work requirements of the new welfare regime are premised on the belief that those women with
children who are not working at paid employment should be made to do so . And that they should be
made to work at whatever jobs are available, regardless of whether the job will actually lift the
woman and her children out of poverty, and really without regard to whether jobs are really
available. So with respect to the conceptualization of prostitution as work , or the cultural normalization of
prostitution as work, I worry about what will stop the state from requiring women to take jobs in the
legal sex industry. What mechanisms will prevent caseworkers from suggesting to women, poor women of color, that they
should or must take jobs in the stripping and pornography industries. We know that there are always stripping jobs, porno movies to
be made, phone sex jobs, and jobs at Hooters. And then there is the implicit requirement. What happens when
the states and the federal government write the last check for the woman who has been unable to
find other "work"? Won't there be a cultural expectation that the woman will, in order to feed and shelter her
children be willing to take on the "job" of a prostitute, since, its only a "job," and "'women are
gonna do what they gotta do."'45 And given our stereotypes about poor women's sexuality, isn't
prostitution a perfect job? I know that I don't want to go there. I don't want to be part of a system, or member of a culture
that sends more women down the river, into "work" where their lives are literally meaningless. And finally I want to reiterate a
question asked by my friend and colleague in struggle, Meg Baldwin: should prostitution "be the price that women are expected to
pay for being homeless, unloved, jobless, and afraid?"4'6 I sure hope not.
Solvency
Unions
Every model—prost don’t want to use them
Legalization fails—all models, including regs, only make things worse
Lauren Hersch, Director, Anti-Trafficking Policy, Sanctuary for Families, “The Failed Prostitution Experiment,” HUFfINGTON
POST, 9—18—13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lauren-hersh/failed-prostitution-experiment_b_3941883.html, accessed 9-21-14.
To some, the solution is simple -- legalize the commercial sex industry and stigma will vanish. But experts, government
reports and academic publications are increasingly confirming what survivors have been saying for a
long time -- that the legalization or decriminalization of the commercial sex industry does not reduce
stigma, does not eliminate violence and fails to make things safer for people in prostitution. In an effort "to put
an end to the exploitation of people for the purposes of prostitution: human trafficking," the Netherlands introduced legislation
in 2000, which legalized prostitution. For the last 13 years, the world has watched this important experiment to reduce stigma and
violence. The Netherlands is a known destination for sex tourism and continues to experience the
commercial sexual exploitation of children and trafficking in both its legal and illegal sectors. In an
attempt to normalize prostitution and "bring it out in the open," women are encouraged to register for tax purposes in the
Netherlands. And yet, only a small number of women actually register. Rachel Moran describes the
reasons for this in her book, Paid For: I understand exactly why many reject that and work illegally to avoid it, because if I had
been forced to choose between working in secret or being officially tagged a prostitute, I would have done exactly the same thing.
The pro-prostitution lobby would say I was suffering from the ill-effects of 'whore stigma.' No. The
only ill-effects I was suffering from were the ill-effects of prostitution. But the Netherlands is not
alone in recognizing the huge failings in what was intended to de-stigmatize prostitution, to bring it "out of the shadows" and to
reduce exploitation. In New Zealand, where prostitution and activities surrounding it were decriminalized in 2003,
Prime Minister John Key has said this has not resulted in significant reductions in street and underage
prostitution. In a government report, women in prostitution also said that the deregulation of prostitution
did not reduce violence in the sex industry and that "abuse and harassment of street-based sex workers by drunken
members of the public is common." Meanwhile, a service provider in Victoria, Australia, where prostitution was legalized in the
1980s, said, "Women constantly tell us that their status as having done prostitution is used against them ."
Germany is the latest country to openly discuss the failure of legalization in its national media. Neither legalization nor
decriminalization cures the inherent gender inequality that arises when a buyer purchases the
body of a woman or girl. Stella Marr, a survivor of prostitution and founder of Sex Trafficking Survivors United, emphasizes that
stigma originates on the demand side "from the buyers who use their political and financial power
to buy the younger, poorer, disadvantaged and more vulnerable. The secrecy demanded by these buyers to
conceal the harm they cause creates an especially devastating form of stigma: a suffocating
silence enforced by fear and shame." When governments fail to tackle the demand side of the
commercial sex industry, they not only fail to protect people in prostitution, they also financially benefit
through the increased tax income generated from the exploitation of people. But they are not the only ones to
benefit. By bringing the commercial sex industry "above ground," traffickers , pimps, brothel owners
and sex buyers all profit in this billion-dollar business. In an effort to prioritize the human rights and safety of
people in prostitution, Sweden, Norway and Iceland have adopted the Nordic Model, an approach that criminalizes the purchase of
sex, decriminalizes the sale of sex and provides exit strategies for those who are being purchased. At the launch of the EU Civil
Society Platform against Trafficking in Human Beings in Brussels this May, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator Myria Vassiladou,
suggested that, "Member states of the EU are legally obligated to take measures to tackle the demand that fuels trafficking." Yet,
few have done so. After courageously exiting the commercial sex industry, Rachel Moran explains what is fundamentally wrong
about government attempts to legalize prostitution rather than focus on demand: "To be prostituted is humiliating
enough; to legalize prostitution is to condone that humiliation, and to absolve those who inflict it.
It is an agonizing insult."
CP
SW Vote Neg 2NC
Sex workers want decrim
Lutnick and Cohan 9 (Alexandra Lutnick, Public Health Analyst, Research Triangle Institute International. Deborah
Cohan, Associate Professor, Department of Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproductive Sciences, University of California San
Francisco. “Criminalization, legalization or decriminalization of sex work: what female sex workers say in San Francisco, USA”,
Reproductive Health Matters, 2009) ac 8-17
Decriminalization The
majority of study participants expressed sup- port for certain tenets of a
decriminalized model. Seventy-one per cent agreed or strongly agreed that courts should get rid of laws that make sex work
illegal. A large portion felt that they should be allowed to trade sex in strip clubs and mas- sage parlors (68%), on the streets (77%),
and in escort agencies and brothels (87%). The majority of the women, 82%, preferred street-based sex work to happen in
commercial areas and red light districts. Ninety-one per cent wanted laws that protected the rights of sex workers. Legalization The
legalization of sex work often times results in sex workers and their businesses experiencing
heightened forms of regulation that are not wit- nessed in other businesses . One-third of the
women thought that the San Francisco Health Department should regulate sex work, and 84% felt that
they should have to undergo health screening to be able to engage in sex work. Discussion The sex workers in this study
were predominately those who are considered the most marginalized . In the qualitative phase, one-third of
the women were street-based sex workers, and 25% were current injection drug users. Over two-thirds of those in the
quantitative phase reported cur- rent street-based sex work, and over half were current injection
drug users. These are the work- ers who are likely most at risk for physical and sexual assault, as
well as arrest. Taking all the women's responses into consideration, their pref- erences do not fit neatly into any one of the three
pre-existing legal frameworks. The majority of sex workers voiced a preference for removing the statutes
that criminalize sex work in order to facilitate a social and political environment where they would
have legal rights and could seek help when they were victims of violence. They did not want to be arrested
for their sex work, yet they also did not want to be regulated by government or pay taxes, sentiments that
hold true for many people. Likewise, with over half the women receiving some type of federal or state financial assistance, if they
reported sex work income they would likely cease to be eligible for assistance. While many women voiced their opposition to
government oversight, some advocated for ele- ments of regulation that are found in legalized systems, including mandated health
screening, and decriminalized models, such as zoning restric- tions. It is possible that these responses were influ- enced by the
setting where the interviews were conducted – a sex worker health clinic. As such, they may have felt that health examinations
would be done in a community-based, peer-led clinic. The preference that street-based sex work be covered by zoning restrictions
may have been informed by the reality that those who work on the street in a criminalized system have very little control over their
work situation. If there were specified areas for street prostitution, women might feel safer due to the more controlled nature of the
work environment. An argument frequently used against crimi- nalization is the rampant violence sex workers experience in
criminalized settings. 1,2,9,17 – 24 Police abuse, such as sexual demands in lieu of arrest 19,23 and excessive use of physical
force have been reported, e.g. in Canada and the United States. 21,25 Most crimes against sex workers go unpunished, as most
sex workers do not go to the police when they have been victimized. 3,22,23,26 Few papers address the risk of violence among
femalesexworkersinSanFrancisco.Inacross- sectional study of 783 adults accessing health care at St. James Infirmary from 19992004, we found that 36.3% of the women experienced sex work-related violence, and 7.9% police violence. 24 Another study
conducted in San Francisco in 1990-91 found that female sex workers, as com- pared to male and transgender workers, were at
higher risk of rape and arrest for prostitution- related offences. 27 Hay's article about police abuse of prostitutes in San Francisco
acknowledges that the most frequent type of police abuse reported by sex workers, the demand for sex in lieu of arrest, is the
hardest to verify. Many of the women in that study reported not filing a complaint when abused by a police officer as they doubted it
would result in any positive change. Hay sees police abuse as just another occupational hazard, 19 but it is presumably one th at
could be challenged more readily if prostitution were decriminalized. Even if sex work were to be decriminalized or legalized, many
things might not change. If prostitution codes were removed, there are still other legal codes such as loitering, trespassing, public
nuisance and narcotics which could be used to target sex workers. Additionally, given the deep cultural beliefs about sex work,
decrim- inalization or legalization would likely not elim- inate the stigma associated with prostitution. A change in the criminal code
would also not guar- antee access to the health and social services the women want. Incarceration should not be the only way for
the women to stop using/drinking or accessing vital services such as health care, drug treatment or housing. Any future work
towards decriminalization will need to be coupled with a commitment that the health and social services sex workers want will be
available. The
vast majority of women in this study did not want sex work to be a criminal offence,
but they did not want to be regulated by government or pay taxes either. This disparate set of preferences cannot co-exist under the framework of decriminalization. Therefore, it is clear that future work by advocacy
groups needs to explore with a diversity of sex workers the compromises they are willing to make
to ensure safe working con- ditions and the same legal protections afforded to other workers. More
of the women might be willing to pay taxes and accept the same regu- lations as other businesses if they knew it would result in the
acquisition of legal protection. This requires further inquiry. It is also probable that marginalized sex workers have not been as visible in previous decriminalization campaigns because their basic needs are not being met, and organizing for legal change is not
their immedi- ate priority. Advocacy groups need to work with sex workers – women, men and transgender – who are most
marginalized, to understand their immediate needs and how these can be addressed through decriminalization.
Frug
Their “legalize key” ev says decrim is sufficient—the decrim bad parts of the card
are a straw person about sex-negative feminists
Frug 91, their author [Mary, Professor, New England School of Law, “A POSTMODERN FEMINIST LEGAL
MANIFESTO”, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1045]
Feminists who are against legalization -- this is the radical position -- envision a decriminalization project
that would develop strategies for preventing women from participating in sex work , rather than
strategies that would make prostitution a more comfortable line of work. Radical feminists, such as Kathleen Barry, are sympathetic
their conviction that women are defined as women by their sexual
subordination to men leads them to argue that sex workers are particularly victimized by patriarchy and that
they should be extricated from their condition rather than supported in their work. These arguments against
to the plight of sex workers. n20 But
legalization are in the language of the terrorized female body.
Not all legal feminist believe that prostitutes are terrorized full time . Some feminists -- I'll call this group the
liberals -- believe that at least some sex workers, occasionally, exercise sexual autonomy. But these feminists do not favor
assimilating sex work into the wage market. They oppose legalization because they object to the kind of sexual autonomy
legalization would support. n21 That is, although they support the right of women to do sex work -- even at the cost of reinforcing
male dominance -- they resist the commodification of women's sexuality.
Sex workers themselves -- who inspire the postmodern position as I develop it here -- want legal support for sex that is severed from
its reproduction function and from romance, affection, and long-term relationships. n22 Because "legal" sexual autonomy is
conventionally extended to women only by rules that locate sexuality in marriage or [*1059] by rules that allow women decisional
autonomy regarding reproductive issues, arguments in support of law reforms that would legalize sex work conflict with the
language of the maternalized female body. The arguments that sex workers are making to assimilate their work into the wage
market appeal to a sexualized femininity that is something other than a choice between criminalized and maternalized sex or a
choice between terrorized and maternalized sex. This appeal to a fresh image of the female body is based on a reorganization of
the three images of femininity I described earlier; it arises within the play of these three images. Its originality suggests, to me,
resistance to the dominant images.
It is significant that sex workers have "found" a different voice of feminine sexuality through the process of political organizing,
through efforts to speak out against and to change the conditions of their lives. For me, the promise of postmodern legal feminism
lies in the juncture of feminist politics and the genealogy of the female body in law. It is in this juncture that we can simultaneously
deploy the commonalities among real women, in their historically situated, material circumstances, and at the same time challenge
the conventional meanings of "woman" that sustain the subordinating conditions of women's lives.
Texas ev ends
I do not think that the sex workers' claims for legalization constitute the postmodern feminist
legal voice. I am also unsure whether I support their position on legalization. But I believe that my
analysis of the decriminalization dispute in which they are participating illustrates how
postmodern legal feminism can seek and claim different voices , voices which will challenge the
power of the congealed meanings of the female body that legal rules and legal discourse permit
and sustain.
McKinstry
Their ev says that they don’t want regulations and unionization fails
McKinstry 7—their author [Oliver, J.D. candidate, 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 2002,
Macalester College, “WE'D BETTER TREAT THEM RIGHT: A PROPOSAL FOR OCCUPATIONAL COOPERATIVE BARGAINING
ASSOCIATIONS OF SEX WORKERS”, U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, Vol 9:3]
In a dimly lit room at a local community center, a group of workers comes together to discuss their work. The agenda includes
issues like promoting health and safety standards, standardizing wages, and obtaining health benefits. Before getting through the
agenda, however, members of the group share their stories from the job. Some have positive things to say about their work, others
One thing they all agree on is the unfair amount of animosity they face in the
workplace. From their bosses and their clients, to outside government regulators, these workers
are constant targets of harassment and disdain . Although they are concerned about the discrimination they face
are more critical.
for being low-wage workers, the meeting eventually returns to how the group can obtain a healthier work environment, higher
wages, and health benefits of some kind. Although the workers' goals might seem easy to accomplish through collective bargaining
techniques under the National Labor Relations Act, n1 these workers face hardship in changing the conditions under which they
work. People who sell sex face great amounts of social and legal alienation preventing them from effectively organizing collective
bargaining units. This comment seeks to explore why prostitutes face such obstacles in organizing and to suggest ways for them to
organize effectively and without hardship. n2¶ [*680] Ideas about and images of prostitution appear in almost every aspect of our
society. Sometimes prostitutes are people at whom we laugh, n3 sometimes they are people we love. n4 "One may be for or against
prostitution, one may adhere to an ideology that seeks to abolish, regulate, or normalize it (through decriminalization or legalization,
for example), but one cannot deny its existence all around us." n5 Despite the ubiquity of ideas about and images of prostitution,
there is a noticeable dearth of academic work exploring the implication of selling sex. n6 ¶ [*681] Analysis of the criminalization of
prostitution is the largest source of scholarship on the subject. n7 Statutes criminalizing prostitution, broadly defined as exchanging
sexual intercourse for a fee, n8 have been deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court. n9 The development of laws criminalizing
the act of prostitution n10 has led to broad criminalization of acts that promote prostitution. n11 Even recent attempts at legalization
in the most liberal American communities have failed. n12 The legalization debate [*682] has been heated, but "despite their
theoretical differences, most feminists have tended to agree that the current criminalized status of prostitution and the selective
enforcement of prostitution laws are unsatisfactory." n13 Arguments on both sides of the criminalization debate seek to empower
prostitutes, protect them from violence, n14 and improve health standards in the profession. n15
Texas ev begins
Despite the heated debate surrounding the criminalization of prostitution and the widespread images of and narratives about
prostitution, general understanding of the realities faced by sex workers is inaccurate. n16 This comment does not specifically seek
to correct or inform general understandings of prostitution. It seeks to illustrate, however, ways for prostitutes to more effectively
achieve their goals in a manner that will accurately illuminate the realities of sex work. "The sex industry is rapidly expanding. With
newly emerging markets and on-line technologies, sex workers face even more challenging issues. There are expanding choices as
well as increasing opportunities for exploitation." n17 This comment seeks to fill the void in academic work with practical application
for sex workers before technological progress exacerbates the current situation any further. Part I is a practical and theoretical
exploration of sex workers' lives and a [*683] discussion of the economic impact of their work. Part II explores the historical function
of collective bargaining and illustrates the ways it has been recently used in non-traditional contexts. Finally, in Part III, it is argued
that occupational cooperative organizing, one of the recent uses of non-traditional collective bargaining, can be used by prostitutes
to potentially obtain a healthier work environment, higher wages, and some level of health benefits.¶ I. Sex Workers: Working Hard
for Their Money¶ A. Defining the Group¶ ¶ Although many jobs involve using sexuality for economic gain, this work focuses solely on
individuals who exchange sex acts for money and the ability of organized labor to ameliorate their struggles. I call these individuals
sex workers. n18 Although my use of this term involves some nuance, I prefer sex worker to other highly political and potentially
derogatory and offensive terms, such as prostitute, streetwalker, slut, or whore. n19 Also, although the majority of scholarship
focuses on female sex workers with male clients, I do not wish to have my work read so narrowly. Male sex workers have a history
all their own n20 and face problems similar to those faced by female sex workers. n21 Although some outstanding [*684]
scholarship has specifically explored particularities of male sex work, n22 paradigms for understanding and analyzing male and
female sex work are substantively the same. n23 Also, same-sex intercourse constitutes much of the work done by sex workers,
particularly male sex workers, n24 but I do not make gay/straight distinctions in my work. Gays and lesbians play important and
unique roles in sex work communities and in contemporary society at large. n25 Although the differences between homo-and
hetero-sexual sex work may be telling, n26 this comment forgoes that analysis to focus on the importance of organization for all sex
workers, straight, gay, or lesbian. Although each individual sex worker's experience is different, n27 occupational cooperative
organizing offers a powerful means of trans-identity organization.¶ B. Experiences of Sex Workers¶ ¶ Regardless of a sex worker's
identity, there are struggles associated with the job. Of course, every job has its difficulties. However, the struggles faced by sex
workers are not reasonable in many circumstances. Sex workers face a social stigma that few other professions can match. [*685]
This stigma sometimes affects the psychology of sex workers and their ability to love outside of work. n28 Social construction of
contempt and blame for sex workers can be seen affecting the workers in the form of internal battles concerning shame. n29
However, even winning the internal battle does not meaning winning the war over acceptance or even the war over safe and healthy
working environments.¶ Beyond the psychological warfare, sex workers also face on-the-job violence. This violence often comes
from the individuals who arguably benefit most from the work of sex workers, their clients. n30 Violence toward sex workers is such
a commonly accepted risk of the trade that sex workers are taught not to wear and carry items that can be used to hurt them. n31
Sex workers are often required to bring security with them to house calls and are often forced into bargaining over prices due to
clients' potential for violence. n32 Although violent robbery is considered the most common form [*686] of violence toward sex
workers, n33 sex workers must also contend with sometimes merely strange, and other times bizarre, fetishes. n34¶ Sex workers
also face disdain from sources often thought to protect even the weakest members of our society. Sex workers caught in the legal
system are subject to the whim of an individual police officer, lawyer, or judge and his or her politics. n35 Sex workers have a
difficult time obtaining fair treatment from these legal entities. Some sex workers have experienced egregious disdain from so-called
officers of the court. n36 The legal system's treatment of sex workers has caused a proliferation of theoretical thinking on sex work
in contemporary American culture. n37¶ C. Theories of Sex Work¶ ¶ Common to academic thinking about prostitution is the idea that
prostitutes have few people, if anyone, to turn to for support in their everyday lives. n38 Many feminist scholars focus their work on
prostitution. n39 [*687] Almost in step with changing social mores, writings about sex workers have changed drastically over the last
several decades. n40 Their writings suggest that oppression and liberation dominate thinking on prostitution: ¶ ¶ Two major feminist
perspectives are documented in the available literature. First, women working as prostitutes are exploited by those who manage and
organize the sex industry (mostly men). Moreover, prostitution and the wider sex industry serve to underpin and reinforce
prostitution as a patriarchal institution that affects all women and gendered relations. Second, in contemporary society, prostitution
for many women is freely chosen as a form of work, and women working in the sex industry deserve the same rights and liberties as
other workers, including freedom from fear, exploitation and violence in the course of their work. Additionally, sex work or erotic
labour can actually be a "liberatory terrain for women." n41¶ ¶ The most recent academic analysis of sex work has focused on not
only the liberation involved in sex work, n42 but also the economic benefits to sex workers. n43 Some of these works focus on the
development of the study of sex work n44 while others take a different approach by focusing on issues [*688] of race, class, and
gender in sex work. n45 However, "for those working in the area of prostitute women's rights, the most frustrating trend deals with
prostitution as if it were a monolithic and uniform institution in which women are entirely free or entirely enslaved." n46 ¶ D. Weighing
Economic Benefits in Sex Work¶ ¶ Many sex workers feel strongly that there is positive social value in the work they do. These
workers tend to frame their sex work as service work or employment that brings about a positive result through service to a
customer. n47 Some sex workers comparatively weigh the costs and benefits of sex work against other jobs before joining the
profession:¶ ¶ Many sex workers come to the work because they've made a cool, calm, rational decision. If your options are to make
six dollars an hour flipping burgers, or $ 500 a day turning tricks, suddenly selling your sex doesn't seem quite so unreasonable.
And that is your right in America. Many professions are high risk. But if you want to run into a burning building for a living, that is
your right. And of course no one has the right to put a gun to your head and say, "Be a fireman." n48 ¶ ¶ Other sex workers join the
profession because there are no jobs that would pay them more per hour. n49 However, these economic benefits of sex work must
be weighed against the potential harm involved in doing business with [*689] some of the least trustworthy individuals in society. n50
Sex workers have a need for a method of protecting the economic value in their work that also protects them from the physical and
emotional harm involved in their work. One potential solution is for sex workers to utilize the principles of labor unions to organize for
positive change within their community.¶ II. Labor Unions: Working Hard for Their Members¶ A. Rise and Fall of Unions¶ ¶ New Deal
legislation codified a support for and protection of collective bargaining practices in the form of the National Labor Relations Act (the
NLRA). n51 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was created and given power through the Constitution's Commerce Clause
n52 to enforce the promotion of collective bargaining, the freedom of organization, and healthy interstate commerce. n53 Although
organized labor flourished for several decades under the NLRA, the development of legal protections for individual employee rights,
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, n54 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, n55 the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, n56 and the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, n57 have resulted in stagnation in the labor movement. n58 [*690]
Although overall private sector membership in unions has decreased, membership in service worker unions has increased and
minority membership in unions in general has also increased. n59 The question remains: "What can the union movement do to
recoup its losses? The results on the relationship between worker demand for union representation on the one hand, and job
satisfaction and union instrumentality on the other, suggest that the task is to convince workers that unions can play an effective role
in the workplace." n60¶ B. Sex Workers and Democracy in Unionization¶ ¶ Even if employees are convinced of the effectiveness of
unions in the workplace, many union members and employees considering forming or joining unions
recognize the difficulty of having their voices heard in a bureaucratic and sometimes unfriendly
setting. Although the Act recognizes the comparative strength in collective bargaining over
individual bargaining, n61 collective bargaining units function on the tension created between the
obligations of members and the duties conferred on members who meet those obligations. n62 "The
crux of the problem of [*691] democracy in trade unions is how to reconcile the need for authority over the membership with the
democratic rights of workers; for, if a union is to fulfill its obligations to the membership, it must be given authority to make sure that
individual workers comply with its rules of organization." n63¶ This problem is particularly poignant for minorities. n64 In determining
whether and how members have met their obligations and in assigning benefits for having met the obligations, prejudice rears its
ugly head. n65 Formal labor unions are largely dominated by men n66 despite a long history of women using collective bargaining
techniques in the employment context. n67 This ability to effectively use organizing techniques outside unions formally protected by
the NLRA is particularly important for sex workers not included under the Act. n68 ¶ C. Union Membership¶ ¶ The NLRA limits union
membership to "employees.' It also provides that:¶ ¶ The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer ... and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment ... . n69¶ ¶ In some ways, the definition of employee has been interpreted so broadly by the
NLRB and by the Supreme Court as to include undocumented or illegal aliens working in the United States. n70 However, the NLRB
and the [*692] Supreme Court have determined that independent contracts are not protected by the Act n71 nor are they protected
by subsequent legislation designed to protect the individual employee. n72¶ Feminist scholars argue that women's work, including
sex work, is excluded by interpretations of the NLRA's definition of "employee' because of its departure from the concrete definition
of organized linear exchange of wage labor. n73 In some jurisdictions, exotic dancers have successfully argued that under an
"economic realities' test, their work falls within the definition of "employee' because their financial livelihood is directly dependent on
their employers, usually the owner of the club where they work. n74 Sex workers, however, do not neatly fall under this rubric
because their employers are clients who determine the length and limits of the employment. n75 Although common understandings
of employment n76 and [*693] definitions of employment desirable to feminists n77 might include sex workers, the statutory
definition of "employees" does not.¶ D. Organizing Outside the NLRA: Domestics¶ ¶ Sex workers, however, can benefit from the
organization techniques developed in other communities to form collective bargaining units outside the NLRA. Although these units
do not inherently have the power to require legally binding bargaining like unions under the NLRA, they are effective nonetheless in
achieving goals such as increasing wages, creating a safer working, and obtaining health care insurance. Domestic workers, who
care for children and maintain the smooth operation of other peoples' family units from within the home, have achieved some of their
workplace goals through bargaining under an occupational cooperative organization.Domestic work is a low-wage occupation.
Individuals in this line of work experience great hardship in their organizing efforts because of the nature of the work. Unlike
traditional union trades, domestic workers interact directly with their clients, domestics are less
likely to be familiar with unionizing techniques, these workers are not employed at a common job
site, they are not employed by a common employer, and the domestic workforce is not largely
comprised of white males. n78 In fact, domestics [*694] may represent one of the most challenging
groups of employees to organize:¶ As a group, domestic service workers are disproportionately
poor women of color. Earning a mean annual wage of $ 15,160, they experience greater levels of
poverty than do workers in any other occupation. In light of their meager earnings, domestic
service workers often lead a hand-to-mouth, paycheck-to-paycheck existence. Job-related
benefits such as medical coverage, health insurance, paid holidays, paid vacation, or paid sick
leave, are largely unheard of within the field of domestic service. n79 ¶ ¶ Moreover, because of the
nature of their work and the market, domestic workers are forced to secure work through
extremely informal oral contracts from multiple employers. n80 These characteristics cause domestic work to
fall outside of the NLRA and most other legislation created to protected employees. n81
1NR
SW Vote Neg 2NC
Sex workers want decrim
Lutnick and Cohan 9 (Alexandra Lutnick, Public Health Analyst, Research Triangle Institute International. Deborah
Cohan, Associate Professor, Department of Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproductive Sciences, University of California San
Francisco. “Criminalization, legalization or decriminalization of sex work: what female sex workers say in San Francisco, USA”,
Reproductive Health Matters, 2009) ac 8-17
Decriminalization The
majority of study participants expressed sup- port for certain tenets of a
decriminalized model. Seventy-one per cent agreed or strongly agreed that courts should get rid of laws that make sex work
illegal. A large portion felt that they should be allowed to trade sex in strip clubs and mas- sage parlors (68%), on the streets (77%),
and in escort agencies and brothels (87%). The majority of the women, 82%, preferred street-based sex work to happen in
commercial areas and red light districts. Ninety-one per cent wanted laws that protected the rights of sex workers. Legalization The
legalization of sex work often times results in sex workers and their businesses experiencing
heightened forms of regulation that are not wit- nessed in other businesses . One-third of the
women thought that the San Francisco Health Department should regulate sex work, and 84% felt that
they should have to undergo health screening to be able to engage in sex work. Discussion The sex workers in this study
were predominately those who are considered the most marginalized . In the qualitative phase, one-third of
the women were street-based sex workers, and 25% were current injection drug users. Over two-thirds of those in the
quantitative phase reported cur- rent street-based sex work, and over half were current injection
drug users. These are the work- ers who are likely most at risk for physical and sexual assault, as
well as arrest. Taking all the women's responses into consideration, their pref- erences do not fit neatly into any one of the three
pre-existing legal frameworks. The majority of sex workers voiced a preference for removing the statutes
that criminalize sex work in order to facilitate a social and political environment where they would
have legal rights and could seek help when they were victims of violence. They did not want to be arrested
for their sex work, yet they also did not want to be regulated by government or pay taxes, sentiments that
hold true for many people. Likewise, with over half the women receiving some type of federal or state financial assistance, if they
reported sex work income they would likely cease to be eligible for assistance. While many women voiced their opposition to
government oversight, some advocated for ele- ments of regulation that are found in legalized systems, including mandated health
screening, and decriminalized models, such as zoning restric- tions. It is possible that these responses were influ- enced by the
setting where the interviews were conducted – a sex worker health clinic. As such, they may have felt that health examinations
would be done in a community-based, peer-led clinic. The preference that street-based sex work be covered by zoning restrictions
may have been informed by the reality that those who work on the street in a criminalized system have very little control over their
work situation. If there were specified areas for street prostitution, women might feel safer due to the more controlled nature of the
work environment. An argument frequently used against crimi- nalization is the rampant violence sex workers experience in
criminalized settings. 1,2,9,17 – 24 Police abuse, such as sexual demands in lieu of arrest 19,23 and excessive use of physical
force have been reported, e.g. in Canada and the United States. 21,25 Most crimes against sex workers go unpunished, as most
sex workers do not go to the police when they have been victimized. 3,22,23,26 Few papers address the risk of violence among
femalesexworkersinSanFrancisco.Inacross- sectional study of 783 adults accessing health care at St. James Infirmary from 19992004, we found that 36.3% of the women experienced sex work-related violence, and 7.9% police violence. 24 Another study
conducted in San Francisco in 1990-91 found that female sex workers, as com- pared to male and transgender workers, were at
higher risk of rape and arrest for prostitution- related offences. 27 Hay's article about police abuse of prostitutes in San Francisco
acknowledges that the most frequent type of police abuse reported by sex workers, the demand for sex in lieu of arrest, is the
hardest to verify. Many of the women in that study reported not filing a complaint when abused by a police officer as they doubted it
would result in any positive change. Hay sees police abuse as just another occupational hazard, 19 but it is presumably one th at
could be challenged more readily if prostitution were decriminalized. Even if sex work were to be decriminalized or legalized, many
things might not change. If prostitution codes were removed, there are still other legal codes such as loitering, trespassing, public
nuisance and narcotics which could be used to target sex workers. Additionally, given the deep cultural beliefs about sex work,
decrim- inalization or legalization would likely not elim- inate the stigma associated with prostitution. A change in the criminal code
would also not guar- antee access to the health and social services the women want. Incarceration should not be the only way for
the women to stop using/drinking or accessing vital services such as health care, drug treatment or housing. Any future work
towards decriminalization will need to be coupled with a commitment that the health and social services sex workers want will be
available. The
vast majority of women in this study did not want sex work to be a criminal offence,
but they did not want to be regulated by government or pay taxes either. This disparate set of preferences cannot co-exist under the framework of decriminalization. Therefore, it is clear that future work by advocacy
groups needs to explore with a diversity of sex workers the compromises they are willing to make
to ensure safe working con- ditions and the same legal protections afforded to other workers. More
of the women might be willing to pay taxes and accept the same regu- lations as other businesses if they knew it would result in the
acquisition of legal protection. This requires further inquiry. It is also probable that marginalized sex workers have not been as visible in previous decriminalization campaigns because their basic needs are not being met, and organizing for legal change is not
their immedi- ate priority. Advocacy groups need to work with sex workers – women, men and transgender – who are most
marginalized, to understand their immediate needs and how these can be addressed through decriminalization.
Trafficking M: Turns Case
The emotional impact alone flips the case---even if legalization has some positive
aspects, abuse of women will remain rampant, damaging those the aff seeks to
serve
Janice G. Raymond & Donna M. Hughes 1, PhD & professor at the University of Massachusetts AND PhD & professor
at the University of Rhode Island, “Sex Trafficking of Women in the United States: Domestic and International Trends,” Coalition
against Trafficking of Women, March 2001, http://bibliobase.sermais.pt:8008/BiblioNET/upload/PDF3/01913_sex_traff_us.pdf
The emotional consequences of trafficking and prostitution can be just as, and sometimes more, severe than
the physical health effects. Thirty-one percent (N=4) of the international women and 64 percent of the U.S.
women (N=14) said they had suicidal thoughts (See Table 11). One international woman and 12 (63%) of the U.S.
women had tried to hurt or kill themselves at some point. Fifty-four percent (N=7) of the international women and
41 percent of the U.S. women felt hopeless. One U.S. woman said, “I didn’t care if I died.” One
international woman said, “I don’t care about myself.” Eighty-five percent (N=11) of the international women and
86 percent (N=19) of U.S. women experienced depression/sadness. Women who were sexually
exploited continued to experience depression and sadness, even after being out of the sex industry.
Thirty-eight percent (N=5) of the international women, and 27 percent (N=6) of the U.S. women reported that they
were unable to feel. 54 percent (N=7) of the international and 36 percent (N=8) of the U.S. women reported feeling like they
had no energy or felt sluggish. One international woman said she had “no concentration.” And approximately a third of international
and U.S. women (31%, N=4 and 32%, N=7, respectively) said they had difficulty sleeping. Thirty-one percent (N=4) of the
international women and 32 percent (N=7) of the U.S. women suffered from a loss of appetite. Women who are victimized
in the sex industry often blame themselves for what happened to them. This internalization of
responsibility is not surprising given that there is little understanding and little sympathy about about the
situation of women in the sex industry. Consequently, 46 percent (N=6) of the international women and 36 percent
(N=8) of the U.S. women said they felt self-blame and guilt about being sexually exploited and abused. Two international women
said they felt anxiety and guilt about their children. Two U.S. women said they felt “shame.” Although international women blamed
themselves more than U.S. women, the U.S. women reported more anger and rage. Sixty-four percent (N=14)
of the U.S. women compared to 31 percent (N=4) of the international women experienced anger and rage. One U.S.
woman said she “felt like killing someone.” Although women were not asked about feelings of fear, two U.S. women said
that they felt “paranoid,” and one international woman said she was “scared all the time.” Two U.S.
women said they suffered panic attacks. One international woman summed up her mental state prior to and after
entrance into the sex industry. “Before I entered this business I was quite a normal person: laughed, fell in love.
And then everything was gone. I was like in lethargy , I thought I didn’t have the way out.” Another international
woman simply said, “ I was diminished .”
Trafficking U: Efforts work now
Human trafficking efforts are working now – recent data proves.
Campbell, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of Investigation, ’13 [Joseph,
“Combating Human Trafficking”, 9-23-13, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/combating-human-trafficking, RSR]
The Department’s prosecution efforts are led by two specialized units—the Civil Rights Division’s Human Trafficking Prosecution
Unit, and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, which provide subject matter expertise and partner with
our 94 United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs) on prosecutions nationwide. The Civil Rights Division, through its Criminal Section
Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit (HTPU), in collaboration with USAOs nationwide, has principal responsibility for prosecuting
forced labor and sex trafficking of adults by force, fraud, and coercion, while CEOS provides expertise in child exploitation crimes,
including child sex trafficking, and works in collaboration with USAOs to investigate and prosecute cases arising under federal
statutes prohibiting the commercial sexual exploitation of children and the extraterritorial sexual abuse of children. Taken
together, USAOs, HTPU, and CEOS initiated a total of 128 federal human trafficking prosecutions
in FY 2012, charging 200 defendants . Of these, 162 defendants engaged predominately in sex
trafficking and 38 engaged predominantly in labor trafficking, although several defendants
engaged in both. In FY 2012, the Civil Rights Division, in coordination with USAOs, initiated 55 prosecutions involving forced
labor and sex trafficking of adults by force, fraud, or coercion. Of these, 34 were predominantly sex trafficking and 21 were
predominantly labor trafficking; several cases involved both. In FY 2012, CEOS, in coordination with USAOs, initiated 18
prosecutions involving the sex trafficking of children and child sex tourism. During FY 2012, the Department convicted
a total of 138 traffickers in cases involving forced labor, sex trafficking of adults, and sex
trafficking of children. Of these, 105 predominantly involved sex trafficking and 33 predominantly involved labor trafficking,
although some cases involved both. The average prison sentence imposed for federal trafficking crimes during FY 2012 was nine
years, and terms imposed ranged from probation to life imprisonment. During the reporting period, federal prosecutors secured life
sentences against both sex and labor traffickers in four cases, including a sentence of life plus 20 years, the longest sentence ever
imposed in a labor trafficking case. Civil Rights Division Since the Department created the HTPU within the Criminal Section of the
Civil Rights Division in January 2007, HTPU has played a significant role in coordinating the Department’s human trafficking
prosecution programs. HTPU’s mission is to focus the Civil Rights Division’s human trafficking expertise and expand its antitrafficking enforcement program to increase human trafficking investigations and prosecutions throughout the nation. HTPU works to
enhance the Department's investigation and prosecution of significant human trafficking cases, particularly novel, complex, multijurisdictional, and multi-agency cases and those involving transnational organized crime and financial crimes. Consistent with
increases in trafficking caseloads across the Department, in the past four fiscal years, from 2009 through 2012, the Civil Rights
Division and USAOs have brought 94 labor trafficking cases, compared to 43 such cases over the previous four years, an increase
of over 118 percent. This is in addition to the substantial increase in the number of adult sex trafficking
cases prosecuted by the Civil Rights Division and USAOs. The HTPU, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys
(EOUSA), and multiple USAOs have continued to lead the six anti-trafficking coordination teams (ACTeams) in collaboration with
the FBI, DHS, and the Department of Labor. Following a competitive, nation-wide selection process, six pilot ACTeams were
launched in July 2011 in Los Angeles, California; El Paso, Texas; Kansas City, Missouri; Atlanta, Georgia; Miami, Florida; and
Memphis, Tennessee. Since that time, the ACTeams, through enhanced coordination among federal prosecutors and multiple
federal investigative agencies, have developed significant human trafficking investigations and prosecutions, including the first multidistrict, multi-defendant combined sex trafficking and forced labor case in the Western District of Texas; the first domestic servitude
prosecution in the Western District of Missouri; and the first Eastern European forced labor case initiated in the Northern District of
Georgia, in addition to numerous other significant investigations and prosecutions. Of particular interest to this committee, the
Department and DHS have collaborated with Mexican law enforcement counterparts on the
U.S./Mexico Human Trafficking Bilateral Enforcement Initiative, which has contributed
significantly to restoring the rights and dignity of human trafficking victims through outreach,
interagency coordination, international collaboration, and capacity-building. Through the Initiative, the
U nited S tates and Mexico have worked as partners to bring high-impact prosecutions under both
U.S. and Mexican law to more effectively dismantle human trafficking networks operating across
the U.S.-Mexico border, prosecute human traffickers, rescue human trafficking victims, and
reunite victims with their families. Significant bilateral cases have been prosecuted in Atlanta, Georgia; Miami, Florida;
and New York, New York. To advance the interdisciplinary initiative, the Department and DHS have participated in meetings in both
the United States and Mexico to ensure that simultaneous investigations and prosecutions enhance, rather than impede, each other.
These efforts have already resulted in three cross-border collaborative prosecutions, involving
defendants who have been sentenced in Mexico and the United States to terms of imprisonment
of up to 37.5 years, and resulting in the vindication of the rights of dozens of sex trafficking
victims. Outreach and training continue to be a large part of the Department’s efforts to combat human trafficking. HTPU
attorneys presented numerous in-person trainings as part of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's State and Local Law
Enforcement Training Symposiums. CRT, FBI, and other Department components joined with the Department of State to create an
Advanced Human Trafficking Investigator course at the FBI Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia for Central American law
enforcement officers. The program has trained investigators from El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama. The
Department, DHS, and DOL collaborated to develop and deliver the Advanced Human Trafficking Training Program to the
ACTeams, bringing federal agents and federal prosecutors together for an intensive skill-building and strategic planning to enhance
their anti-trafficking enforcement efforts.
Increased crackdown on human trafficking is working now.
Reuters, 7-22-14 [“U.S. Crackdown On Human Trafficking Leads To 192 Arrests, Seizure Of Over $625,000 In Illicit Profits”, 722-14, The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/22/us-crackdown-on-humantrafficking_n_5611821.html,Accessed 9-30-2014 DMW]
WASHINGTON, July 22 (Reuters) - U.S. officials have made almost 200 arrests and seized more than $625,000 in illicit
profits in a month-long crackdown on human smuggling in response to an influx of illegal immigration into Texas, the
Department of Homeland Security said on Tuesday. Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson said the campaign
underscored the government's pledge that U.S. borders were not open to illegal immigration "and that if you enter the
United States illegally, we will send you back." "Equally important, those who prey upon migrants for financial gain will be
targeted, arrested and prosecuted," he added in a statement. "We are focusing on the pocketbooks of these human
smugglers, including their money laundering activities in the United States - working with our Mexican and Central
American partners to track, interdict, and seize the money flowing through Mexico and Central America." Johnson said the
government sent extra personnel to Texas' Rio Grande Valley in late June to combat human smuggling operations on the
already been
arrested on criminal charges, more than 501 undocumented immigrants have been taken into custody and more than
southwest U.S. border. "Less than a month into this operation, 192 smugglers and their associates have
$625,000 in illicit profits have been seized from 288 bank accounts held by human smuggling and drug trafficking
organizations," the secretary said. Immigration enforcement authorities, it said, "will continue to prioritize cases involving smuggling
or transporting of undocumented individuals, including minors, into the United States."
Trafficking L: 2NC Link Wall
Regulating the legal market trades-off with police monitoring of gray markets –
that undermines efforts to prevent sex trafficking
Wim Huisman & Edward R. Kleemans 14, PhD & Chair of Professor of Criminology at VU University Amsterdam AND
PhD, Full Professor at the VU School of Criminology, Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands, “The challenges
of fighting sex trafficking in the legalized prostitution market of the Netherlands,” Crime, Law and Social Change: An Interdisciplinary
Journal, Springer
*Note---text redacted by Joseph Lenart III. Georgetown Debate does not endorse the gendered language of this article.
In three ways, the legalization and regulation of the prostitution sector can influence the capacity of
the police (in terms of manpower) to fight sex trafficking: first, when legalization leads to an increase in the
numbers of trafficked women working in the regulated sector; second, when monitoring the
regulated sector drains capacity from investigating the unregulated sector; and , third, when
monitoring drains the capacity for investigating cases of human trafficking. Evaluation studies show that
the police play a pivotal role in monitoring the licensed sector and in carrying out inspections [1].
The downside of these efforts is that there is insufficient police capacity left to play a major
monitoring and investigative role with regard to punishable forms of operation outside the licensed sector .
Thus, the assumption that the new policy would allow the police more capacity to fight human
trafficking has not come to fruition. What is more, the feeling in the prostitution sector is that licensed
businesses are inspected more often than non-licensed businesses, a situation which undermines
the willingness of operators of licensed businesses to adhere to the rules and complicates the
efforts to combat human trafficking [1]. Internal evaluations made by the police also show that the licensed
prostitution sector is not being fully monitored and that it takes a lot of effort to monitor the
unregulated parts of the business [26, 27]. The monitoring of the unregulated sector was described
as ‘inefficient’ and ‘ineffective’ [26: 101]. Many police forces limit themselves to incidental and reactive
inspections. The internal evaluations also show that the money spent on police efforts to support local
authorities is not always reimbursed. In some regional police forces, local authorities financed extra
police-officers. This can mean, however, that any increase in the police capacity to fight sex
trafficking becomes dependent on the priority that local municipalities put on it.
Legal prostitution shields traffickers and increases illegal prostitution
Hodge, Associate Professor in the School of Social Work at Arizona State University, ‘8 [David, “Sexual Trafficking in the
United States: A Domestic Problem with Transnational Dimensions”, Social Work, Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2008, RSR]
One of the more controversial proposals to address trafficking is to legalize adult prostitution (Long, 2004). Proponents of this
approach argue that the sex industry should be brought out of the shadows and subjected to government regulation. Subsequently,
child prostitution will be eliminated and women will be protected from violence and exploitation. Little if any research,
however, has illustrated that legalizing certain forms of adult prostitution decreases illegal forms of
prostitution (Farley, 2004). Rather the converse seems to be more accurate —legalization appears to
increase the prevalence of illegal and legal prostitution (Farley, 2004; Raymond, 2004). Illegal activities are
shielded behind legal activities. Nations such as the Netherlands, which have legalized prostitution, appear to have
become magnets for traffickers and have witnessed significant increases in child prostitution (Raymond, 2003; Sullivan & Jeffreys,
2001). Similarly, in the United States, research suggests that the presence of large adult prostitution markets fosters higher levels of
child sexual exploitation (Estes & Weiner, 2001).
Trafficking L: A2 “Turns”
No turn – increase in demand outweighs
Wright 13 (Abbey L., “Cleaning Up The Blood, Sweat, and Tears of the Super Bowl [Sex Trade]: What Host Cities Must Do in
Preparation for Major Sporting Events to Combat Sex Trafficking”, 2013, 13 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 97, lexis)
However, while
legalization may provide more supply in terms of the general population seeking
commercial sex, the concept disregards those instances where traffickers are serving the
demand of a specific clientele - for example, clients who can be described as "sadists or pedophiles" and for whom a
standard legal prostitute does not suffice. n203 Additionally, legalization of prostitution necessarily comes hand
in hand with an immediate shift in focus from criminal investigations, allowing both voluntary prostitution as
well as forced prostitution to continue without notice . n204 For those who seek out prostitutes, legalization
removes the stigma that is associated with buying commercial sex, which logically leads to higher demand , but it
does not follow that there will be an increase in supply of willing women to fulfill that demand,
providing traffickers with an increased market and the need for additional victims. n205 Importantly, whether
prostitution is legal or criminal within a state, human trafficking still exists and the system will be abused whether prostitution is legal
or not. n206 But the
benefits of legalization are outweighed by the detrimental effect had on the
victims of sex trafficking, and states should ensure that prostitution in all forms is illegal to confirm that the
focus on the victims of sex trafficking in not lost among the regulation of legal prostitution during major sporting events.
Legalization drastically increases sex trafficking---the scale effect of legalization
vastly outweighs the positive effects of a regulated market
Carol Tan 14, Master in Public Policy student at Harvard’s Kennedy School focusing on conflict management and humanitarian
affairs strategy, former management consultant with the Boston Consulting Group and graduated from the University of California at
Berkeley with honors in Economics and Political Science, 1/2/14, Does legalized prostitution increase human trafficking?,
http://journalistsresource.org/studies/international/human-rights/legalized-prostitution-human-traffickinginflows#sthash.6P2DX6YS.dpuf
A 2012 study published in World Development,
“Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking ?” investigates
the effect of legalized prostitution on human trafficking inflows into high-income countries. The researchers — Seo-Yeong Cho of the German
Institute for Economic Research, Axel Dreher of the University of Heidelberg and Eric Neumayer of the London School of Economics and Political
Science — analyzed
cross-sectional data of 116 countries to determine the effect of legalized
prostitution on human trafficking inflows. In addition, they reviewed case studies of Denmark,
Germany and Switzerland to examine the longitudinal effects of legalizing or criminalizing
prostitution. The study’s findings include: Countries with legalized prostitution are associated
with higher human trafficking inflows than countries where prostitution is prohibited. The scale
effect of legalizing prostitution , i.e. expansion of the market, outweighs the substitution effect,
where legal sex workers are favored over illegal workers . On average, countries with legalized
prostitution report a greater incidence of human trafficking inflows . The effect of legal
prostitution on human trafficking inflows is stronger in high-income countries than middle-income
countries. Because trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation requires that clients in a potential destination country have sufficient
purchasing power, domestic supply acts as a constraint. Criminalization of prostitution in Sweden resulted in the
shrinking of the prostitution market and the decline of human trafficking inflows. Cross-country
comparisons of Sweden with Denmark (where prostitution is decriminalized) and Germany (expanded legalization of prostitution) are
consistent with the quantitative analysis, showing that trafficking inflows decreased with
criminalization and increased with legalization. The type of legalization of prostitution does not
matter — it only matters whether prostitution is legal or not . Whether third-party involvement (persons who facilitate
the prostitution businesses, i.e, “pimps”) is allowed or not does not have an effect on human trafficking inflows into a country. Legalization of
prostitution itself is more important in explaining human trafficking than the type of legalization. Democracies have a higher probability of increased
human-trafficking inflows than non-democratic countries. There is a 13.4% higher probability of receiving higher inflows in a democratic country than
otherwise