Essential Components and Theoretical Bases of Humanitarian
Intervention: Why Humanitarian Intervention?
Alan Lachica*
Jaechun Kim**
Abstract
Humanitarian intervention, in all its’ moral underpinnings, is always undertaken as parcel of the political
process of those states who are willing and capable of intervention. As such, it is always subject to the
political judgments of government leaders. To expect that humanitarian intervention would happen on
purely moral and ethical reasons is an illusion of grandeur completely detached from reality. In the era of
the globalization of human rights, the involvement in international actions in response to humanitarian
concerns will boost a country’s image in the international community. It is not surprising therefore for
states to pursue foreign policies dealing with humanitarian issues for doing so projects an image of a
caring and a responsible member in the community of nations. This study points out the incontrovertible
assumption that humanitarian intervention not supported by selfish motives is difficult to be realized.
The presence of mass murder alone would not guarantee a quick and effective intervention. National
interest on the part of the intervening states particularly those who are willing to take the lead is by far the
single most important consideration. Humanitarian intervention is a complex juggernaut of political
expediencies. Its possibility is grounded on how would-be interveners perceived the necessity of engaging
in foreign military adventures and oftentimes their engagements are reflective of the gains derived from
these humanitarian crises. The killings in Rwanda and East Timor provide a very good insight on how
countries, through the United Nations, had responded to the unfolding tragedy in varying degrees of
involvement and commitment.
Key Words: Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, Sovereignty, Genocide, United Nations,
*Alan Lachica is a Ph.D. of International Relations from Sogang GSIS
**Jaechun Kim, Corresponding Author, Professor, Graduate School of International Studies,
Sogang University, Korea. E-mail: jaechun@sogang.ac.kr
1
I. Introduction
The end of the Cold War heralded a ‘new world order’ where the traditional threats to
world stability manifested by aggression, territorial conquest and irredentism were reinforced by
a host of new complex security problems such as the breakdown of states, proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and the explosion of civil wars. The last decade of the 20th century had become
a source of dilemma for the United Nations in dealing with the numerous cases of massive
violence, humanitarian emergencies and gross abuses of human rights within the borders of
states.1 The Security Council, using its Chapter VII powers, had authorized military operations as
a response to violations of human rights and humanitarian emergencies – a seismic change in its
past practices decades earlier.
There is a critical need to understand the various facets of humanitarian intervention
given the growing importance of protecting grow human rights violations. This study will
elaborate on the nature of humanitarian intervention by first defining its terminology. The crucial
elements of humanitarian intervention are also presented to elucidate the notion of humanitarian
intervention which answers the relevant questions “what to intervene”, “how to intervene”, and
“who will intervene”. The theoretical perspective which explains why countries intervene in the
name of humanity is also discussed.
II. Essential Components of Humanitarian Intervention
1. Defining Humanitarian Intervention
1
Brian Urquhart, “The UN and International Security after the Cold War” in Adam Roberts and Benedict
Kingsbury, eds., United Nations, Divided World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 87. (81-103)
2
The complexity of humanitarian intervention has resulted into various definitions of its
meaning and has encompassed the wide diverse fields of political science, international law,
sociology and morality. As such, various scholars define it in several ways. For Jonathan Moore,
humanitarian intervention is an “action by the international actors across national boundaries
including the use of military force, taken with the objective of relieving severe and widespread
human suffering and violation of human rights within states where local authorities are unwilling
or unable to do so.” 2 Wil Verwey says that humanitarian intervention is “referring only to
coercive action taken by states, at their initiative, and involving the use of armed force, for the
purpose of preventing or putting a halt to serious and wide-scale violations of fundamental
human rights, in particular the right to life, inside the territory of another state". 3Terry Nardin
gives emphasis on the use of force by saying that humanitarian intervention is “the use of force
by a state that aims to protect innocent people who are nationals of another state from harm
inflicted or allowed by that state’s government.”4 Martha Finnemore on the other hand defines it
as "military intervention with the goal of protecting the lives and welfare of foreign civilians"5
while Jennifer Welsh claims that humanitarian intervention is the “coercive interference in the
internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing
massive human rights violations or preventing human suffering.”6
Jonathan Moore, “Deciding Humanitarian Intervention”, Social Research, Vo. 74, No. 1, p. 169. (169-200)
Wil D. Verwey, 'Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s and Beyond: An International Law
Perspective', in Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ed., World Orders in the Making (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), p.
180 (180-210)
4
Terry Nardin, “Introduction”, in Terry Nardin and Melissa Williams, eds., Humanitarian Intervention (New York:
New York University Press, 2006), p. 9 (1-28)
5
Martha Finnemore, 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention', in Peter Z. Katzenstein
ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press), 1996, p. 154. (153-185)
6
Jennifer Welsh, “ Introduction,” in Jennifer Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 3(1-7)
2
3
3
These definitions given by different scholars have converged on two aspects- that of the
purpose of humanitarian intervention and the way in which the intervention is to be carried out
which is through military force. However, their definitions as to what kind of situations warrant
humanitarian intervention are vague and insufficiently defined. To simply focus on violations of
human rights as a condition for intervention would open the flood gates of confusion and
criticisms. Which human rights? What specific violations? It is therefore productive and less
confusing if a narrower and specific definition of humanitarian intervention can be given. Hence,
for the purpose of this study, humanitarian intervention is hereby defined as the action by a
group of states authorized under international law to use military force across national
boundaries in order to swiftly end genocide, ethnic cleansing and other acts of mass killings that
endanger the existence of a particular group of people. From this definition a set of essential
elements necessary for humanitarian intervention is established namely: the nature of human
rights violations; the method of intervention; and the question on the right authority. Through
these common elements, the following parameters are hereby set for this research namely: 1.
Humanitarian intervention as used in this study concerns only with those cases involving mass
killings such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Other humanitarian
crises arising from natural disasters are excluded; 2. The intervention dealt with in this study is
focused on armed intervention; 3. Finally, this study deals only on UN sanctioned multilateral
interventions.
2. Cases for Intervention
4
Accordingly, massive violation of human rights is sine qua non for humanitarian
intervention. What makes ‘humanitarian intervention’ distinct from ‘intervention’7 is the fact that
the former, by using the term “humanitarian”, is understood to be focusing only in the prevention
or putting an end to extreme violations of human rights perpetrated against innocent civilians
because such violations threaten the lives and existence of the targeted group. The latter could be
manifested as political or economic interferences.
The occurrence of violation of human rights is not a justification for states to intervene
in the affairs of the state committing the abuses. Walzer says that the “occasions have to be
extreme if they are to justify, perhaps even require, the use of force across an international
boundary.”
8
For Wheeler, these crises should be considered as “supreme humanitarian
emergency.”9 Robertson clarifies that these serious violations of human rights are so atrocious
that it is inconceivable that brilliant, rational and otherwise highly-esteemed rulers were capable
of planning and committing these acts that diminish in whatever way the value of being human.10
Although the rights of individual should be protected similar to that of the wider group,
Jean-Christopher Merle pointed out that there are massive offences against the rights of entire
groups which warrant primary attention than the isolated infringement upon the rights of
individuals.11 A number of violations on the human rights of citizens might occur within the
borders of a particular state but their occurrence would not necessarily trigger outside
interference. In contrast, if any group or entity of the state would embark on a policy of
Intervention as defined by Hedley Bull is the “dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside party or parties, in
the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an independent political community.” Hedley Bull,
Intervention in World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 1.
8
Michael Walzer, “The Argument About Humanitarian Intervention”, Dissent, Winter 2002, (29-37) p. 29
9
Wheeler, p. 34
10
Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (New York: New Press, 1999), p.
239
11
Jean-Christophe Merle, “The Problem with Military Humanitarian Intervention and Its Solution,” The
Philosophical Forum , Vol, 36, No. 1, Spring 2005, p. 72
7
5
destroying a particular group owing to their ethnicity, culture or religious characteristics, then
humanitarian intervention is the expected measured response. Such intervention is defensible on
the fact that the “abuses are systematic and involve large numbers of relatively defenseless
people.”12 Therefore, classifying offenses against human rights for the purpose of humanitarian
intervention is a way of recognizing the impracticality to respond to any human rights violation.
It is true that any violation of human rights is evil in itself but some infringements of human
rights are so repulsive that they are considered as an affront to our collective humanity and thus
according to Stanley Hoffman, warrant our “collective intervention.”
13
It is said that
humanitarian intervention is permissible when the violations that are occurring in a country are
so outrageous that as to shock the conscience of mankind.14
The Report of the International Commission on State Sovereignty has viewed
humanitarian intervention as justifiable in situations when “civilians are threatened with
massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing in a large scale.” 15 This threshold criteria is further
elaborated as events where there are “large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with
genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or
inability to act, or a failed state,” 16 and “large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended,
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.” 17 The report has also
classified “crimes against humanity” 18 as part of the few exemptions to the non-interference
12
Iris Marion Young ‘ Violence against power: critical thoughts on military intervention” in Deen K. Chatterjee
and Don E. Scheid, eds., Ethics and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 251
13
Stanley Hoffmann, “Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention,”, in Stanley Hoffman, ed., The Ethics and
Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 23
14
Kok-Chor Tan, ”The Duty to Protect”, in Terry Nardin and Melissa Williams, eds., Humanitarian Intervention
(New York: New York University Press, 2006) p. 89 (84-116)
15
“The Responsibility to Protect”, Report of the International Commission on State Sovereignty, (Ontario:
International development Research Center, 2003), para.4.13, p. 31
16
Ibid, para. 4.19, p. 32
17
Ibid
18
Ibid, para. 4.20, p. 33
6
principle of the United Nations in the domestic affairs of the member-states. The primacy of
these inhuman acts in undertaking humanitarian intervention is supported by many scholars. 19
This is because in these crimes against humanity the danger lies not on the absence of humanness
or the denial of moral quality but it is the damage done to humanity imagined as an entity of
some kind that makes them so revolting.20 Laurence Thomas wrote that these crimes signify “a
level of callousness that embodies the very essence of evil itself.” 21 Mary McDougal viewed
these crimes, particularly mass persecutions and genocides, as sources of conflict and have the
tendency to lead to international upheaval and therefore warrant the prevention by the whole of
humanity.22
3. Armed Intervention
One of the major issues that this study would like to tackle is on the nature of the
humanitarian intervention. In what manner should humanitarian intervention be pursued? From
the previous definitions of humanitarian intervention, it is explicitly established that intervention
is undertaken through ‘coercive means’ which presumably involves the use and employment of
military forces. For the anti-interventionist camp, the use of force across national boundaries is
prohibited by international law. This principle on the non-usage of force has evolved through
international customs and norms since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The Hague Convention
19
See for example Jack Donnelly, “Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 1 No.
1 March 2002; C.A.J. Coady, “The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention”, Peace Works No. 45 ( Washington
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2002); Jonathan Moore, “Deciding Humanitarian Intervention”, Social
Research, Vo. 74, No. 1; Gareth Evans (2006) ‘Crimes Against Humanity: Overcoming Indifference’, Journal of
Genocide Research, Vol. 8, No. 3 September 2006; Michael Walzer, “The Argument About Humanitarian
Intervention,” Dissent, Winter 2002; Robert C. Johansen, “Limits and Opportunities in Humanitarian Intervention,”
in Stanley Hoffman, ed., The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1996), pp.61-86
20
Richard Vernon, “What is Crime Against Humanity?”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 10, No.3, 2002
(231-249), p. 239
21
Laurence Thomas quoted in Ibid p. 232
22
Myres McDougal quoted in Vernon, p, 239
7
of 1907; the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 and the Charter of the United Nations have all
reaffirmed this prohibition. But needless to say, the use of force prohibition is not a static
concept in international relations. International law has recognized and permitted the use of force
for self-defense purposes and in situations where international security and peace are
compromised if so determined by a competent international authority such as the United Nations.
Under the Charter of the United Nations, should the Security Council determine the
“existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” 23 the
international community may intervene in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security. This intervention is generally manifested in three distinct forms: military, economic and
political. Accordingly, the non-military forms of intervention are the first-line of actions against
the would-be aggressor or violators. However, there are certain cases when military or armed
intervention is the only choice. Philip Johnston says that “while non-forcible methods of
humanitarian intervention must first be fully explored and exhausted, there will be times when
bold actions will be needed to adequately protect populations suffering human rights abuses.”24
By focusing on the military aspect of humanitarian intervention, this study would
emphasize that in situations of widespread killings, the use of force is an essential ingredient for
the success of the armed operations in terms of saving the lives of innocent civilians; and among
the other choices of instruments of coercion it is the “only realistic one.”25 In cases of large-scale
loss of lives such as in genocide, quick and decisive intervention is the only way to save people
from death since elements conducting mass purges usually do the atrocities in a deliberate, well-
23
Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39
Philip Johnston, “Relief and Reality,” in K.M. Cahill, ed., A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights and
Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters (New York: Basic Books/Council on Foreign Relations, 1993)
quoted in Clarke, p. 505
25
Stanley Hoffman, “The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 99 (97-99)
24
8
planned execution and in a speedy and systematic manner. 26 It is therefore crucial that
humanitarian intervention should employ force for its success is dependent on the necessity that
it be pursued forcefully in order to “defeat the people, whoever they are, who are carrying out the
massacres.”27 This sentiment is echoed by Michael Blake that though he is skeptical about the
military means in humanitarian intervention, nevertheless, he agreed that force is justified to
evils sufficient enough to warrant the risk of killings in most egregious cases of human rights
violations.28 Take for example in cases of genocide, the efficiency of the killings and the speed
in which it is consummated offers the perpetrators a great chance of success. For those who are
morally and legally bound to intervene, the speed of the response should equal, if not exceed, the
pace of the killings. If we take the case of Rwanda as an example, it was believed that armed
intervention through the immediate deployment of the soldiers offers the only hope of a rapid
end to the bloodletting.29 Stopping any genocide would be dependent on the speedy intervention
by groups, countries and other entities which have the capacity to mount a military operation to
defeat the perpetrators of such horrific crimes.
However, it should be emphasized that the resort to the use of force is always and should
be the ultima ratio. This criterion has been recognized as inseparable in the Just War tradition
advanced by Saint Augustine and is supported by several noted luminaries on the issue of
humanitarian intervention. Iris Marion Young is highly critical of armed intervention seeing it as
Humanitarian interventions during periods of mass murders such as genocide and ethnic cleansing are “special”
military operations; special because compared to peacekeeping operations, humanitarian intervention are sent to
areas where there is no peace to keep; the primary task of the troops sent is to enforce the peace in order to create a
secure environment for the alleviation of the sufferings of the civilian populace most especially when they are in a
situation where their lives are threatened.
27
Michael Walzer, “The Argument About Humanitarian Intervention”, Dissent, Winter 2002, p. 33
28
Michael Blake, “Reciprocity, stability and intervention,” in Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid ,eds., Ethics
and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) (53-71), p. 66.
29
Paul Lewis, “3 African Lands Offer Troops for Rwanda”, The New York Times, May 25, 1994
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE7D81F38F936A15756C0A962958260&scp=300&sq=rwand
a&st=nyt
26
9
just another form of violence. She argues that military intervention, a form of using violence in
public affairs is always questionable even if the aims are well intentioned. 30 For her, the
justification of violence must involve consequentiality reasoning demonstrating that in the longer
as well as the short term, the violent acts have prevented more harm than they have caused. She
based this argument on the fact that in military humanitarian intervention, the war instruments
used in achieving the humanitarian end could result into more loss of lives making it very
difficult to justify.31 Kirsch echoes the same sentiment by noting that those who advocate the use
of force on humanitarian reasons cannot claim a higher sense of morality because past
interventions have shown abuses and the loss of lives during their course.32
There is indeed truth to the argument that the use of military intervention is not the only
effective means of responding to human rights violations. Peaceful options such as diplomatic
pressure, economic sanctions or “less violent means” 33 could be effective instruments in
pressuring abusive governments and other human rights violators. Nevertheless, when diplomatic
negotiations break down and as a “consequence people would continue to die if no military
action was taken” 34 or when hundreds or thousands of lives are lost every day because of
genocide or mass killings then “we cannot be expected to wait upon every possibility other than
effective violence.” 35 Peaceful means must be pursued but when a large segment of the
population is attacked and directly threatened, then peaceful means have to give way to the use
of force if only to save lives. The necessity to resort to the usage of force should be recognized
30
Young, p. 253
Ibid, p. 266
32
Nico Krisch, “Review Essay: Legality, Morality and Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo”,
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 324 (323-335).
33
Op.cit., p. 251
34
Jane Stromseth, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” in J.L. Holzegrefe, et. al, eds., Humanitarian
Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 249 (232272)
35
C.A.J Coady ,” War for Humanity: A Critique” in Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, eds., Ethics and
Foreign Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 288 (274-295)
31
10
“if the conscience-shocking catastrophe cannot be averted any other way”
36
or if the
“humanitarian crisis will persevere without it.”37 Weiss notes that in some instances, the early
resort to more coercive measures would actually be the best course of action since “by the time
that all alternatives to military force have been explored, many of the people whom humanitarian
intervention is intended to save could be dead or have fled.”38
4. The Right Authority
One of the important issues dealing with humanitarian intervention is the issue on the
right authority. Humanitarian intervention is a business done exclusively by nation-states being
the principal units in the international system. Though the objects of the intervention are the
individuals, the means in which humanitarian intervention can only be done is through the use of
force, hence, an exclusive domain of the intervening states. If states are willing to intervene in
cases of emergency humanitarian crises, of which force is expected to be employed, then under
whose authority the intervention should emanate?
The desire in responding to save a large group of people whose lives are threatened by
genocide and other forms of mass killings always necessitate coercion through military
operations. It is not enough that these gross violations of human rights are present, the question
of the legal authority to decide whether to intervene is so vital to be left out in the whole
equation. No matter if there exists a strong political will to intervene or there is superiority of
military capability, yet these can never replace the failure to act with a legal mandate and
legitimacy. Also worth asking is the question whether a unilateral intervention is acceptable even
Gareth Evans, “Crimes Against Humanity: Overcoming Indifference,” Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 8, No.
3, September 2006, p. 336 (325-339)
37
Jonathan Moore, p. 194
38
Weiss, p. 104
36
11
if massive violations of human rights are indeed occurring. Unilateral intervention, even with its
best intention, is always prone to suspicion of abuse more so if undertaken by a major power.
Humanitarian intervention, being a response of the universal obligation to preserve humanity
should be done through the collective decision of the community of nations since the evil ought
to be stopped is seen as an affront to the entire human race. “Unilateral intervention,” according
to George Lucas, “should be prohibited.”39 This is because intervention which is unilateral harms
the inevitable victims of humanitarian wars, threatens the security of the states and undermines
the solidarity of the international community, thus it is both unlawful and dangerous.40
Hassner argues that the “only generally accepted legitimization for the use of force is
multilateral”41 since the more inclusive the decision to intervene becomes the more likely it is
credible. In the post-Cold War era, interventions for humanitarian purposes were mostly done
through collective decision by the member-states of the United Nations. Intervention has always
been a contentious issue in international relations even if ostensibly done on altruistic motives,
much more if it is undertaken unilaterally. For humanitarian intervention to be legitimate, one
scholar insists that it “should come about through multilateral debate and decision and should
reflect the collective will of the international community.” 42 Under the present set-up of
international law, the legalization of the use of force for humanitarian purposes rests solely on
the United Nations through the Security Council whose “authorization is a prerequisite for
humanitarian as for any other type of intervention.”43 The Security Council is the only political
body with global authority whose decisions are binding to all member-states hence it is the most
George R. Lucas, “From Jus Ad Bellum to Jus ad pacem,” in Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, eds., Ethics
and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 84 (72-96)
40
Nardin, op.cit, p. 188
41
Pierre Hassner, “From War and Peace to Violence and Intervention,” in Jonathan Moore, ed., Hard Choices:
Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 26
(9-28)
42
Lucas, p. 84
43
Weiss, p. 26
39
12
“appropriate body to deal with military intervention issues for humanitarian protection
purposes.”44
Joseph Boyle claims that “the UN does plausibly represent humanity in a way that any
member state or regional alliance cannot.”45 For him, if the basis for intervention is humanity’s
collective welfare, expressed in common morality, then the UN has claimed to be the
authoritative body.46 It is further argued by Weis that UN decision making is the only available
and acceptable avenue to coordinate international efforts in responding to “genocidal misery and
massive human rights abuse in war zones around the world.”47This recognition of the United
Nation’s role in international law could be attributed to the belief that there exists in the United
Nations some shadow of international authority that a world state as envisaged would possess.48
By being the premier international organization capable of impacting world peace and security
then it is presumed that any international action it undertakes is driven with a sense of justice and
reflects the will of the international community. If the action of the United Nations is supported
by the majority of its members then it gains a semblance of justice. The perception of justice is
crucial because it provides a high probability that the action will be perceived as legitimate by
the parties in conflict and by the international community. 49 Donnelly further states that
“interventions not authorized by the Security Council may undermine respect for international
law and order, even if there are genuinely humanitarian motivations and consequences.”50
“The Responsibility to Protect”, para.6.14, p. 49.
Joseph Boyle, “Traditional Just War Theory and International Intervention,” Terry Nardin and Melissa Williams,
eds., Humanitarian Intervention (New York: New York University Press, 2006), p. 51 (31-57)
46
Ibid
47
Thomas G. Weis, “Triage: Humanitarian Intervention in a New Era,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1
(Spring 1994), p. 66 (59-68)
48
C.A.J. Coady, “The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 26
49
Ibid
50
Jack Donnelly, “Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention,” p.97
44
45
13
At certain times, even in clear cases of massive human catastrophe when a ‘coalition of
states’ are determined to intervene but without UN endorsement, the supposed humanitarian act
would still have “dubious legal status.”51Most countries in the world are adamant to recognize
any use of military force without the approval of the Security Council even for humanitarian
justifications. The rationale behind this opposition is the recognition that the authority of the
international political process, though imperfect, is at least regulated internationally. 52 It is
therefore incumbent upon the states undertaking humanitarian intervention which bypasses the
UN to present a very strong and credible justification to rebut the presumption that such act is
ethically dubious.53
III. Humanitarian Intervention and the Role of the UN
1. Humanitarian Intervention and the UN Charter
The use of force across national boundaries has been a fixture in the modern international
relations between nation-states. Its general prohibition and exceptional usage has been practiced
through customary law and then embedded in international legal jurisprudence. With the creation
of the United Nations in 1945, the regulation on its use is institutionalized in global affairs and is
considered as the bedrock of post World War II international order and stability.
The Charter on its whole can be interpreted as basically ‘non-interventionist’ given the
purpose of its creation after the big failure of its precursor, the League of Nations, to prevent
aggression and the redrawing of the national boundaries of Europe after Hitler’s murderous
rampage. The Charter explicitly states that “all members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
51
Jennifer Welsh, p. 6
Weiss, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 123-124
53
Coady, “War for Humanity”, p. 286
52
14
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”54 and
forbids in intervening matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state.55 These provisions are jealously guarded by the majority of the UN member-states and the
supremacy of individual sovereignty in their dealings has always been the sacred rule. By being
sovereign, states are shielded from external interference that may challenge the supremacy of the
political authorities of the state or to acts that may compromise its territorial integrity. However,
the prohibition in Article 2 on the use of force is not prejudiced on matters of self-defense and
therefore not absolutist in intention. Article 51 provides the member-states the authority to use
force in case of external armed attack; no other provisions in the Charter apart from this article
gives a license to use force outside the national boundaries of member-states.
Advocates of sovereignty believe it provides a “stable and predictable international
relations” 56 by establishing an international society that “privileges the state as the sole
repository of sovereign authority.”57 This presupposes that order in the international system is
established if the states within this system value their own sovereignty by recognizing and
respecting the sovereignty of other states. Therefore, to protect its own sovereignty, a state has to
recognize the sovereignty of other states. This defense of sovereignty is rooted in the accepted
and established norm of the inviolability of the sovereign state for intervening in what is
considered as the domestic affairs of the state is tantamount to waging war. Ayoob warned that if
the structures of sovereignty “are undermined, it may lead to either unadultered anarchy or
unmitigated hegemony or a combination of the two- anarchy within and hegemony without”.58
54
Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, para. 4
Ibid, para. 7
56
Iris Marion Young,“ Violence against power: critical thoughts on military intervention” in Ethics and Foreign
Intervention, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) ,p. 252.
57
Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty’ The International Journal of Human
Rights, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 81 (81-102)
58
Ibid
55
15
This primacy of sovereignty has put it at odds with the other purpose of the United
Nations which is to is to “promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights”59and
to reaffirm its recognition of the “inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
people.” 60 Member-states further noted that “disregard and contempt for human rights have
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind”.61 While these two
pillars of the United Nations have co-existed, in reality they often clashed and created a source of
disagreement among the UN member-states on which should prevail. It’s a question of choosing
whom to save between your own child and mother. This dilemma causes Kofi Annan to say that
“few would disagree that both the defense of humanity and the defense of sovereignty are
principles that must be supported. Alas that does not tell us which principle should prevail when
they are in conflict.”62
There are those who believed that Article 2(4) is not an absolutist concept and thus can be
actually be interpreted to allow humanitarian intervention. Michael Reisman, writing back
decades earlier said that
“Since a humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the
political independence of the State involved… it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations but is rather in conformity with the most fundamental peremptory norms of the Charter, it is a
distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 2(4).”63
59
Charter of the United Nations, Article 55, para. C.
See the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
61
Ibid
62
Kofi Annan, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, Report of the Secretary
General (New York: United Nations, 2000), p. 35, para 218.
63
Michael W. Reisman with the collaboration of Myres S. McDougal, “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the
Ibos,” in Richard Lillich, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville, VA: University
Press of Virginia, 1973), p. 177 (167-196). See also Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of
United Nations’ Theories of Aggression(London: Steven, 1958); Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An
Inquiry into Law and Morality, (2nd Edn, Irvnington-on Hudson: Transnational Publishers, 1997), p. 151
60
16
This is further interpreted by Christine Gray in advancing the argument that although the
prohibition of force is established not only through customary laws and treaty laws but also as
jus cogens, there is no definitive agreement which prescribes the exact scope of the
prohibition.64But Schacter finds these arguments unconvincing since for him “the idea that wars
waged in good cause such as democracy and human rights would not involve a violation of
territorial integrity or political independence demands an Orwellian construction of those
terms.”
65
Other scholars have reinforced this argument in claiming that “humanitarian
intervention endangers international order and peace”66 and “violates the autonomy of nations.”67
Nowhere in the UN Charter where the concept of intervening for humanitarian purposes
is explicitly provided. Though Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force, a further evaluation of the
other provisions of the Charter unarguably reveal that this prohibition on the use of force can be
overridden and cannot be interpreted in absolute terms. Article 2(7) provides that though the
domestic affairs of a member-state are off limits to any form of interference, “this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”68 Under the rules of
the Charter contained in Article 39 of Chapter VII, the Security Council “shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken.” 69 Should the Security Council
decides that there’s a ‘a threat or breach to the peace’, then it can implement non-military
64
Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2000), p. 24
Oscar Schachter, “The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion,” American Journal of International Law Vol. 78,
July 1984, p. 649 (645-650)
66
Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), p. 291
67
David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 77-8
68
Article 2(7)
69
Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII Article 39
65
17
measures (Article 41)70 and if such measures are deemed insufficient military measures can be
employed as provided in Article 42. 71 This broad discretionary powers given to the Security
Council in determining whether there are “threats to the peace”, “breaches of the peace” and
“acts of aggression” trump the argument of the ‘invincibility’ of the principle of sovereignty
under Article 2(4) which guarantees non-interference. This power provided by Article 39
conferred upon the Security Council a definitive authority to declare the existence of a threat to
peace and in providing the appropriate responses to contain or eliminate the threats without
regards to their location.
This then leads us to ask the question: Do massive human rights violations such as
genocide, ethnic cleansing and other forms of mass killings constitute ‘threats to international
security and thus justify humanitarian intervention’? Lori Damrosch strongly disagrees on the
idea that massive and pervasive human rights violations involve threats to peace and security.
She pointed out that nowhere in the UN Charter is found a clear authority for the transboundary
use of force against violations that do not pose a threat to peace and security across national
borders.72Ayoob vehemently denies the justification for humanitarian intervention under Chapter
VII because he believes that the circumstances that lead to such interventions usually do not fit
into the category of threats to international peace and security as defined in that chapter. He
elaborated this argument by saying that “much of the violence that usually prompts such
intervention is intrastate in character. Even where there are cross border implications of such
“These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”
71
“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”
72
Lori Fisler Damrosch, “Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce Human Rights” quoted in J.L.
Holzgrefe, p. 41
70
18
violence, usually in the form of refugees spilling over neighboring states, these do not normally
fall in the category of interstate conflict or aggression by one state against another.”73
But Peter Malanczuk reminds us that the decision of the Security Council on what
constitutes a threat to international peace and security is a political one74; therefore it is subject to
political negotiations and interpretations. It would be an indefensible proposition to claim that
Article 39 confines the definition of threats to international security and peace only to armed
aggression across national boundaries. Delegates to the 1945 San Francisco Conference had
foreseen the many facets of threats to world order that an overwhelming majority of them “were
of the opinion that the circumstances in which threats to the peace or aggression might occur are
so varied that Article 39 should be left as broad and as flexible as possible.” 75 The Security
Council could therefore, under Article 39, declare that large scale loss of lives and extreme
violation of human rights in a certain country satisfy the requirement of acts that are considered
as endangering global stability; it “could take military action to terminate such human rights
violations.”76 Even the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia,
in a summary on one of its rulings, has concluded that it is already a settled practice of the
Security Council and a common understanding of the members of the United Nations that an
armed conflict purely internal in nature may constitute a threat to peace. 77In recent years, troops
deployment in the former territories of Yugoslavia (1992-1999), Rwanda (1994) and East Timor
(1999) authorized by the Security Council were triggered by gross human rights violations such
73
Ayoob, p. 95
Peter Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis,
1993), p. 26
75
US Department of State, Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Result of the San
Francisco Conference (1945) , (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 91
76
Michael Akehurst, “Humanitarian Intervention,” in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 106 (95-118)
77
Quoted in Weiss, “Humanitarian Intervention”, p. 48
74
19
as “mass murder and ethnic cleansing which clearly qualified as threats to international peace
and security.”78
2. Theoretical Perspective on Humanitarian Intervention
Contemporary scholars have also argued that humanitarian intervention is necessary when a
large group of people are victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other forms of mass killingssituations that “shock the moral conscience of mankind.” 79 John Rawls wrote in the Law of
Peoples that states have a duty to intervene to rescue citizens of those states whose governments
fail to defend their fundamental rights of freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty of
conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.80 This argument is
further supported by Teson who claims that it is justified to intervene and interfere in other
places to protect human rights because it is our duty to help those victims of injustice81 and that
the “goal of saving lives and restoring human rights and justice is compelling enough to
authorize humanitarian intervention.”82
These liberalist and idealist explanations on why states intervene in cases of massive
human rights violations have been advanced in the case of the Australian-led INTERFET in East
Timor in 1999. The successful intervention in East Timor has been heralded as a dramatic
development in using military forces to “stop crimes against humanity-that is, the most severe
abuses
committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
78
Ibid., p. 49
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books,
2000), p. 107.
80
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1999), p. 79
81
Fernando R. Teson, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention”, in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane,
eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2003), p. 95 (93-129)
82
Ibid, 117
79
20
population.” 83 Furthermore, it has been touted as a signal on the new readiness of the
international community to utilize resources and mobilize troops to stop crimes against
humanity.84 According to Coral Bell, the intervention in East Timor demonstrates an ongoing
“process of normative shift in the society of states,” 85 a phenomenon in which countries are
beginning to accept the norms of intervention to protect people in places where massive human
rights violations are occurring. Such shift of consciousness is considered as a “sort of earthtremor running through the normative foundations of the society of states shaking the sovereign
structures”86 which would ultimately result into the acceptance of states of the ‘duty to protect’
those whose human rights are blatantly violated. For Kofi Annan, the case of intervention in East
Timor represented a break from the UN member-states conception of sovereignty by sending
troops to “protect civilians from wholesale slaughter.”87
If this emergence of a new developing norm of intervention in cases of crimes against
humanity or massive human suffering is taken as the reason why member-states of the United
Nations decided to intervene in East Timor, then does it mean that the states-particularly the
major contributors- which participated in mobilizing their troops for the Australian-led
International Forces for East Timor (INTERFET) did so because of their commitment to human
rights and of their moral responsibility to save the lives of the East Timorese.
The existing literature and public pronouncements on the intervention in East Timor
seemed to adopt the benevolent motivations of the member-states. One argument that supports
83
Human Rights World Report 2000 at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Front.htm#TopOfPage
Ibid
85
Coral Bell, “ “East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A Case Study in Crisis Management,” Australian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 54, no. 2 (2000), p. 175 (p. 171-176)
86
Ibid, p. 175.
87
Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” The Economist, September 16, 1999
http://www2.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_PNQSJV&source=login_payBarrier (Accessed October
9, 2009)
84
21
this altruistic reason is the claim that the mass killings East Timor in 1999 was a crisis in small
and resourced-poor places “which are not of much strategic or economic importance”88 to most
countries in the world particularly to the major powers. Wheeler and Dunne claimed that
Australia, the lead state of the INTERFET, took the leadership role because of the moral impulse
to do the right thing in East Timor.89They claimed that the move by Australia to risk its troops in
East Timor was “not supported by strong national interests” 90 and “Australia’s vital interests
were clearly not being served by its armed rescue of the East Timorese.”91 By responding to the
humanitarian crisis in East Timor they considered the Howard-led Australian government as a
“good international citizen”92 Furthermore, it is claimed that the humanitarian operations was
truly a departure from the old practice of non-intervention particularly for the countries in
Southeast Asia because member-states of the ASEAN contributed troops to the military
operations against a fellow ASEAN member and acknowledged leader, Indonesia. The support
of ASEAN member states for the intervention in East Timor is for Wheeler and Dunne “a
groundbreaking development for the region.” 93 The Australian government, through Prime
Minister John Howard, had advanced the claim that the deployment of troops to East Timor was
done in order to defend East Timor’s desire for independence and not to occupy the territory. He
further said that in responding to the humanitarian crisis in East Timor, Australia was not
imposing its will on others or to act against the legitimate interests of another country.94
If the arguments of moral obligations and the duty to protect are indeed the main
motivation in military interventions by the United Nations, an anomaly will surely be detected if
88
Op.cit., p. 174
Wheeler and Dunne, p. 807
90
Ibid
91
Ibid, p. 825
92
Ibid, p. 808
93
Ibid, p. 823
94
INTERFET, http://pandora.nla.gov.au/parchive/2000/S2000-Nov-7/easttimor.defence.gov.au/index.html
89
22
the case of the late intervention in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 will be considered. The late
intervention belies the so- called ‘duty to protect’ argument. This is because humanitarian
intervention can also be viewed as an “imperfect duty”- one that is not taken as an obligation
similar to that of an agreement or treaty entered into by the parties which bound them to perform
a specified act. Intervention to save and defend the lives of others can be interpreted as a nonspecific obligation, one that assumes a general character. The duty to assist cannot be specifically
required unlike the duty not to violate the rights of others where clear-cut boundaries of
conformities are established. Under this assumption, it is therefore imprudent to expect states to
respond to all forms of human rights violations.
Being an imperfect duty, humanitarian intervention would be undertaken by the states
should they choose to do so and not because they are morally required to intervene. In this case,
intervention assumes an optional nature because ‘imperfect duty’ is one for which “there is no
corresponding right”95or a duty that “cannot definitely assign in what way and to what extent
something should be brought about by an action directed toward an end.”96 Thus, benevolence is
an act which gives an indeterminate and unspecified benefit to the recipient; it cannot be
perfected even if performed in a finite series of action. This interpretation of humanitarian
intervention as an imperfect duty is not lost to Walzer. He wrote that
“Intervention, even when it is justified, even when it is necessary to prevent terrible crimes- even
when it poses no threat to regional or global stability is an imperfect duty- a duty that doesn’t belong to
any particular agent. Someone ought to intervene, but no specific state or society is morally bound to do
so. And in many of these cases no one does.”97
95
Holzgerefe, p. 26
Kant, Vol. 6., p. 390
97
Walzer, “Just and Unjust Wars,” p. xiii
96
23
This notion of an imperfect duty paves the way for selective humanitarianism. In the
language of political realism, the decision to intervene for humanitarian purposes should always
take into consideration the advancement of national interests; hence countries adopt a “chooseand-save” strategy. It is not unexpected for powerful states to employ humanitarian intervention
if such increases their power and influence. States can maximize their relative gain by using
humanitarian intervention as a pretext of their expansionist policies in their effort to acquire
territories and critical resources or to build strategic alliances.
In situations when the
humanitarian crisis of the target state poses a direct threat to the national security of the
intervening state or threatens the security of important allied states, then humanitarian
intervention will be possible. The use of humanitarian intervention would be dependent on the
necessity at hand that’s why political realists do not “prescribe human rights intervention; it does
not necessarily proscribe them.”98States use a variety of methods to accumulate power and as
Ayoob opined humanitarian intervention has a strong likelihood that powerful states will utilize
it in order to influence and affect the domestic affairs of weaker countries in order to preserve
their dominance in the global arena.99
Mearsheimer has argued that in a self-help system, states must never “subordinate their
interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so called international
community.” 100 There are times however that international organizations and alliances may
prove convenient for power projection and expansion or for “acting out power relationships”.101
The United Nations, as well as many other regional and international organizations, is being used
98
John Mearsheimer, “Tragedy of the Great Power Politics” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., International
Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issue (New York: Pearson Longman, 2001) p. 58
99
Ayoob, p. 92
100
John Mearsheimer, op.cit., p. 33
101
Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, “Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A
Comparison,” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1992), p. 330. (329-351)
24
by the member-states as a tool to pursue their self-serving goals. This is because cooperation in
an anarchical international system is based on the pursuit of individual national interests and
therefore “fleeting and temporary”.102 For the states in the international system, participation in
international institutions is an option if it enhances the state’s power and doesn’t come in direct
collision with its national interest.
The support of member-states to any actions driven by humanitarian motivations is
oftentimes constrained by political needs and has become just a mere instrument in gaining
advantage above others in the international arena. International organizations are based on “selfinterested calculations” 103 of states and especially to the great powers. According to an
observation of one former UN official, the member states, particularly of the Security Council,
have used the organization to advance their own national agenda.104 Humanitarian actions have
become a means in achieving a particular goal and not the final result in saving lives and
defending the greater interests of humanity.
The argument about morality and humanitarian norms is often problematic when it comes
to the rational calculations of states in their conduct outside the domestic realms. To do what is
morally good is an ideal normative action only when it benefits the doer. Machiavelli said that
the prince (state) “should not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if
constrained”105 The supposed morality in humanitarian intervention-no matter how justified the
intervention may be-is always subordinated to the expected benefits in terms of national interests.
For the defenders of state authority and power they hold to the belief that “universal moral
102
Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1990), p. 7
103
John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Winter 1994/1995,
Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 7 (5-49)
104
Phylis Bennis and Denis J. Haliday, “Iraq: The Impact of Sanctions and US Policy,” in Anthony Arnove, ed.,
Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, (London, Pluto Press, 2001), p. 38 (35-46).
105
Niccolo Machiavelli, “The Prince”, XVIII, p. 65 in Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations
(New Jersey: Princeton University, 1979), p. 21.
25
principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation but
that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.”106
States cannot be compelled to undertake humanitarian intervention even on issues which
are clearly humanitarian if intervening doesn’t contribute to the advancement of national goals;
thus humanitarian intervention can only be possible if the political and strategic interests of the
intervening state are satisfied. “States,” according to Mearsheimer, “are rarely willing to expend
blood and treasure to protect foreign populations from gross abuses including genocide.”107 No
country would risk the lives of its troops for purely moral reasons and oftentimes morality is
detached from political decisions. In fact for national leaders, even when they are acting to help
others, the obligation to consider the interests of their own people is a politically-sound
judgment.108 To engage in humanitarian intervention is a political decision which necessitates a
“sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible and between what is desirable
everywhere and at all times and what is possible under concrete circumstances of time and
place.”109
Self-interest on the part of the intervening states is always a consideration when
participating in any humanitarian intervention to save lives; the good of others is secondary to
the state’s own welfare, the highest aim governing its relations with other states.110 The global
stage is a system of self-reliant states where survival is the only rule and clearly “there are no
106
Hans Morgenthau, “Politics Among Nations” (Random House Inc., 1972) in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis,
eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York: Pearson Longman, 2001), p.
12
107
Mearsheimer, “Tragedy of Great Power politics”, p. 57-58
108
Michael Walzer, “ The Argument About Humanitarian Intervention,” Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 2002), p.
33 (p. 29-37)
109
Morgenthau, op.cit., p. 9
110
Georg Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Oxford, England: Clarendon, 1942), p. 264.
26
humanitarian heroes out there.”111 Politics are subject to the dynamics of reason and necessity
and barely on moral responsibility. Morality in itself cannot be a basis for sound political
judgments because political actions of the state are inspired by a different set of moral principles
of “national survival.”112 Altruism is rarely present in politics and humanitarian interventions are
“most likely to happen if the motives to do them are supported by selfish national interests.”113
The compulsion to intervene is a well-calculated foreign policy of the intervening state for
whatever reason that furthers its goals. Miller doubted the willingness of the major powers to
undertake intervention operations out of moral compulsion to save people. He is highly
suspicious of such motives and alludes that major powers commit themselves to interventions in
order to exploit the chance of consolidating their spheres of influence or even displaying their
impressive firepower and military capabilities.114
IV. Concluding Remarks
The moral argument for humanitarian intervention is not realistic enough to be the sole
motivation behind acts of saving lives. If it were so, then it is expected that in situations of
serious violation of human rights, the international community would be obliged to act in
stopping the atrocities and save the lives of those affected. However, judging on the many
massive violations of human rights occurring in different parts of the world which continue to
persist, it is evident that countries adopt a ‘select and help’ strategy. Though the moral
111
Thomas Pogge, “Moralizing Humanitarian Intervention: Why Jurying Fails and How Law Can Work” in Nardin,
Terry & Vanessa Williams, eds., Humanitarian Intervention (New York: New York University Press, 2006), p. 166
(158-187).
112
Morgenthau, “ Politics Among Nations”, p. 10
113
John N. Clarke, “Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention”, Global Society, Vol.13, No.4, 1999, p. 502 (489-510)
114
Richard W. Miller, ‘Respectable Oppressors, hypocritical liberators: Morality, Intervention, and Reality in Deen
K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, eds., Ethics and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), p. 229 (215-250)
27
imperatives are invoked in humanitarian interventions, these are often cleverly used to
camouflage the greater economic, political and geostrategic interests of the countries advocating
for intervention. This is because that while national interest, in its various manifestations, could
be for most times the most important consideration, however, in order to gain support and
legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention, countries must take the higher moral ground of
saving the lives of people elsewhere otherwise the humanitarian intervention would invite
adverse reactions from other actors and thus defeat the aims of using the intervention for its
national interest.
In the changed landscape of international relations of the post- Cold War era where
multilateralism has taken the driver’s seat, states are reluctant to undertake unilateral
humanitarian intervention hence the United Nations has become the only arena where the
national interests of those directly affected by the humanitarian crises in a particular area, either
directly or indirectly, are advanced. In these humanitarian emergencies, it is usually the memberstate which has the most to gain from any intervention who is willing to lead the military
operations or borne the substantial costs of the intervention. Thus in the case of the Rwandan
genocide in 1994, France was unwilling to help during the early stages of the genocide when the
French- backed Hutu government was still in control of the country; however, when the Hutu
government was on the run, France suddenly reversed course and offered to lead a military
operations purportedly to halt the genocide. In the case of East Timor, it was natural for Australia
to take the lead because of the huge potential impact of the crisis to its national security and to its
business investments hence, it advocated fast intervention since early resolution of the crisis
greatly served its interests.
28
It can be argued therefore that the business of humanitarian interventions is a mixed bag
of priorities of the desire to defend human rights and the pursuit of economic, political and
geostrategic considerations. The existence of a massive violation of human rights which involved
the actual and potential loss of numerous lives provide legitimacy and a moral cover in
advancing the broader national interests of the major participating states. This study will prove
that this was true in East Timor when the major players in the region, particularly Australia
(which led the intervention), the United States and the ASEAN actively supported the sending of
an international military force invoking the community of nations’ collective moral
responsibility in saving the people of East Timor. The same rationale also existed in the case of
Rwanda in 1994 when France used the moral obligation justification in launching Operation
Turquoise supposedly to save the Tutsis from the genocide in a timing which greatly affected the
outcome of the humanitarian intervention.
Bibliography
Annan, Kofi. “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” The Economist, September 16, 1999
http://www2.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_PNQSJV&source=login_payBarrier
(Accessed October 9, 2009)
Annan, Kofi. We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century,
Report of the Secretary General. New York: United Nations, 2000.
29
Arnove, Anthony. ed., Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, London,
Pluto Press, 2001
Art, Robert J. and Jervis, Robert. eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and
Contemporary Issues. New York: Pearson Longman, 2001.
Ayoob, Mohammed. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,’ The International
Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 81-102.
Beitz, Charles. Political Theory and International Relations. New Jersey: Princeton University,
1979.
Bell, Coral. “East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A Case Study in Crisis Management”
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2 (2000), pp. 171-176.
Bull, Hedley. ed., Intervention in World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Cahill, K.M. ed., A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights and Humanitarian
Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters. New York: Basic Books/Council on Foreign Relations,
1993.
Chatterjee, Deen K. and Scheid, Don E. eds., Ethics and Foreign Intervention. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
30
Clarke, John N. “Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention”, Global Society, Vol.13, No.4, (1999),
pp. 489-510.
Coady, C.A.J. “The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention”, Peace Works No. 45
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2002.
Donnelly, Jack. “Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 1 No.
1 (March 2002), pp. 93-109
Evans, Gareth. “Crimes Against Humanity: Overcoming Indifference,” Journal of Genocide
Research, Vol. 8, No. 3, (September 2006), pp. 325-339.
Evans, Tony and Wilson, Peter. “Regime Theory and the English School of International
Relations: A Comparison,” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter
1992), pp. 329-351.
Gray, Christine. International Law and the Use of Force. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Hoffman, Stanley. ed., The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1996.
31
Holzegrefe, J.L. et. al, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Jackson, Robert. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000.
Katzenstein, Peter Z. ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World
Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
Krisch, Nico. “Review Essay: Legality, Morality and Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention
after Kosovo”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, (2002), pp. 323-335.
Lillich, Richard. ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations. Charlottesville, VA:
University Press of Virginia, 1973.
Malanczuk, Peter. Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force
Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1993.
Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Vol.
19, No. 3, (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49.
Merle, Jean-Christophe. “The Problem with Military Humanitarian Intervention and Its Solution,”
The Philosophical Forum , Vol, 36, No. 1, (Spring 2005), pp. 59-79.
32
Moore, Jonathan. “Deciding Humanitarian Intervention”, Social Research, Vol. 74, No. 1
(Spring 2007), pp. 169-200.
Moore, Jonathan. ed., Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention. Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998.
Nardin, Terry and Williams, Melissa. eds., Humanitarian Intervention. New York: New York
University Press, 2006.
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. ed., World Orders in the Making. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998.
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Roberts, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict. eds., United Nations, Divided World. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Robertson, Geoffrey. Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice. New York:
New Press, 1999.
Schachter, Oscar. “The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion,” American Journal of
International Law Vol. 78, (July 1984), pp. 645-650.
33
Stein, Arthur. Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Stone, Julius. Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations’ Theories of
Aggression. London: Steven, 1958.
Teson, Fernando. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality. 2nd Ed,
Irvnington-on Hudson NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997.
US Department of State, Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Result of
the San Francisco Conference (1945). New York: Greenwood Press, 1969.
Vernon, Richard. “What is Crime Against Humanity?”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol.
10, No.3, (2002), pp. 231-249.
Walzer, Michael. “The Argument About Humanitarian Intervention,” Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 1
(Winter 2002), pp. 29-37.
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New
York: Basic Books, 2000.
Weis, Thomas G. “Triage: Humanitarian Intervention in a New Era.” World Policy Journal, Vol.
11, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 59-68.
34
Welsh, Jennifer. ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004.
35