MDAW 2014
Ozzy & George
LawOftheSeaTreaty AFF
LAW OF THE SEA
LOST: 1AC
1AC Plan + Solvency (1/2) ....................................................................................................................................... 2
1AC Plan + Solvency (2/2) ....................................................................................................................................... 3
1AC China advantage (1/6) ...................................................................................................................................... 4
1AC China advantage (2/6) ...................................................................................................................................... 5
1AC China advantage (3/6) ...................................................................................................................................... 6
1AC China advantage (4/6) ...................................................................................................................................... 7
1AC China advantage (5/6) ...................................................................................................................................... 8
1AC China advantage (6/6) ...................................................................................................................................... 9
1AC Hegemony advantage (1/6) ............................................................................................................................ 10
1AC Hegemony advantage (2/6) ............................................................................................................................ 11
1AC Hegemony advantage (3/6) ............................................................................................................................ 12
1AC Hegemony advantage (4/6) ............................................................................................................................ 13
1AC Hegemony advantage (5/6) ............................................................................................................................ 14
1AC Hegemony advantage (6/6) ............................................................................................................................ 15
LOST: China Ext
LOST solves China ................................................................................................................................................ 16
LOST solves China ................................................................................................................................................ 17
Russia impact ........................................................................................................................................................ 18
A2 Diplomacy solves China .................................................................................................................................... 19
China-Russia ......................................................................................................................................................... 20
China impact – uniqueness .................................................................................................................................... 21
China impact – escalation ...................................................................................................................................... 22
China impact – U.S. intervention ............................................................................................................................ 23
China impact – turns stuff....................................................................................................................................... 24
LOST: Heg Ext
LOST solves hegemony – soft power ..................................................................................................................... 25
LOST solves – trafficking ....................................................................................................................................... 26
LOST solves hegemony – Navy ............................................................................................................................. 27
LOST solves hegemony – Navy ............................................................................................................................. 28
LOST: Other Case
LOST – biodiversity ................................................................................................................................................ 29
LOST – energy....................................................................................................................................................... 30
LOST – energy....................................................................................................................................................... 31
T – LOST meets “development” ............................................................................................................................. 32
T – LOST meets “development” ............................................................................................................................. 33
Politics – LOST link turn ......................................................................................................................................... 34
LOST: Negative
A2 China advantage............................................................................................................................................... 35
A2 China-U.S. impact ............................................................................................................................................. 36
A2 Russia-U.S. impact ........................................................................................................................................... 37
A2 China-Russia impact ......................................................................................................................................... 38
A2 Hegemony impact ............................................................................................................................................. 39
A2 Hegemony impact ............................................................................................................................................. 40
A2 Hegemony advantage – turns ........................................................................................................................... 41
A2 Hegemony advantage ....................................................................................................................................... 42
A2 Hegemony advantage – kills sovereignty .......................................................................................................... 43
A2 Hegemony – soft power .................................................................................................................................... 44
A2 Hegemony – soft power .................................................................................................................................... 45
A2 Resources advantage – turns ........................................................................................................................... 46
A2 Resources advantage – turns ........................................................................................................................... 47
LOST NEG – politics link ........................................................................................................................................ 48
LOST NEG – midterms link .................................................................................................................................... 49
Steven Wagner ...................................................................................................................................................... 50
2AC – turbine ......................................................................................................................................................... 51
1
MDAW 2014
Ozzy & George
LawOftheSeaTreaty AFF
1AC Plan + Solvency (1/2)
The United States Federal Government should topically ratify the Law of the
Sea Treaty.
US basically adheres to LOST now – ratification provides official standing in
dispute resolution
Haider 2013, Yale Global, 13 March, Yale Global Online: A Publication of the MacMillan
Center http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-must-adopt-law-sea
At a time when North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship requires a common front, growing maritime
disputes over small islands in the South China Sea and East China Sea are pitting major
countries against one another. Key players, including China, Japan and South Korea, are at odds
and increasingly relying on military bluster. Attorney Ziad Haider urges the United States to
lead in easing the tensions by supporting ongoing diplomacy and communications; presenting
varying models for joint exploration of natural resources in the region, including fish and oil;
determining US priorities and developing “internal clarity,” before using policies like the
sequester cuts, to assure both allies and China. Most importantly, the US Senate must ratify
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. More than 160 other nations have
signed on, and the US already adheres to the treaty’s terms . To have standing in maritime
disputes and urge adherence to rules by others, Haider argues, the United States must also
adopt the rules.
2
MDAW 2014
Ozzy & George
LawOftheSeaTreaty AFF
1AC Plan + Solvency (2/2)
Plan grants American access to the most expansive and important legal
framework on earth – helps control ocean sovereignty disputes.
Daniel Hollis, (Environmental Law and International Law) Tatjana Rosen (International lawyer
and wildlife researcher) February 26, 2013 “United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS),” http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/156775/ Acc. 6/26/14
Frustrated by the continuing inconsistency in the ocean governance regime, Malta's ambassador to the
United Nations, Arvid Pardo, called upon the General Assembly to take action and called for "an effective
international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor," that clearly defined national jurisdiction.[15]
One month later, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2467 A (XXIII) and resolution 2750 C (XXV),
which created the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction and called for the convening of a third Law of the Sea meeting to be held in
1973.[16] The deliberations lasted for nine years, saw the participation of 160 nations, and concluded in
1982 with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is now commonly referred to as
simply "UNCLOS" or the Law of the Sea Treaty.[17] UNCLOS is one of the largest, and likely one of the most
important, legal agreements in history. The treaty contains 320 articles and 9 annexes. It synthesizes and builds upon the agreements that were developed at the first
conference (see UNCLOS I above). The agreement addresses a myriad of issues including navigational rights of
ships and aircraft, limits on the extension of national sovereignty over the oceans,
environmental protection of the oceans, conservation of living resources and mining rights. While
UNCLOS was first signed in December of 1982, the agreement did not come into force until November of 1994, a period of nearly 12 years.[18] UNCLOS required 60 signatures for ratification and could only enter
into force one year after the final nation had ratified or acceded to the treaty.[19] The main reason many nations took so long to sign the treaty is because of Article 309, which prohibits nations from taking out
reservations to any part of a treaty. A reservation is a statement made by a nation when accepting a treaty, whereby it excludes or modifies the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty as those terms apply to
the nation accepting the treaty.[20] The inability of a nation to take out reservations to particular terms of the treaty caused many nations to hesitate. UNCLOS represented a significant number of compromises
and some of the terms of the agreement did not sit well with various nations. However, in order to establish a unified doctrine of the law of the sea, UNCLOS necessarily had to prevent reservations or risk
One of the most powerful features of UNCLOS is that it settled the
question of the extent of national sovereignty over the oceans and seabed. Parts II, V, VI, and VII establish the various
maintaining a fractured regime. Divisions of Ocean Areas.
regions of the oceans, who has sovereignty over each, and to what degree. The following sections explain both how the maritime regions are divided and the sovereign powers that nations may exercise over each
region. Baselines caption Diagram of the various regions of the ocean over which a State may exercise sovereignty. The baseline is the boundary from which a nation may begin measurements to determine the
portion of the adjacent oceans or continental shelf over which it may exercise sovereignty. Except in some special cases, the baseline is the low-water line along the coast.[21] Detailed explanations of how
baselines are determined are provided in Articles 5-7 and 9-14. Special rules have been established for determining the baselines of archipelagic nations (nations that consist of a number of small islands such as
the Philippines) and can be found in Article 47. Internal Waters Internal waters are those that are contained on the landward side of the baseline.[22] These waters fall under the exclusive sovereignty of the nation
in which they are contained. Territorial Sea Article 3 of UNCLOS declares that a nation may establish a territorial sea that extends up to 12 nautical miles from the baselines. Within the territorial sea, a nation has
exclusive sovereignty over the water, seabed, and airspace.[23] The treaty establishes that all nations have the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of another nation and that, outside certain
UNCLOS adopted the basic concepts of the
territorial sea and the right of innocent passage that had been codified in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, but the new
conditions, the nation laying claim to the territorial sea cannot hamper innocent passage of a foreign vessel.[24]
treaty went a step further by establishing the limits of a nation's territorial sea. By the late 1960's many nations recognized a 12-mile limit to the territorial sea. At the start of the UNCLOS, only twenty-five nations
maintained the traditional claim of 3 nautical miles. Sixty-six nations were claiming 12 nautical miles, fifteen nations claimed between 4 and 10 nautical miles, and eight nations were claiming an astounding 200
nautical miles. Smaller nations, including those without large navies or merchant fleets, favored a larger territorial sea in order to protect their coastal waters from infringements by more powerful nations. The
world's major naval and maritime powers, however, pressed for the 3-mile rule because the 12-mile rule would have placed over 100 straits used for international navigation under the exclusive sovereignty of
other nations. Some of these included the Strait of Gibraltar (the only open access to the Mediterranean), the Strait of Hormuz (the only passage to the oil-producing Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman nations), and
the Strait of Malacca (the main route connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans).[25] Remembering that the Cold War was still ongoing during the Convention, smaller nations were particularly concerned about the
possibility of threats to their national security posed by warships of foreign nations or even the possibility of becoming embroiled in the conflicts of foreign powers. In an attempted compromise, the small nations
offered the larger maritime powers the right of innocent passage, however the maritime powers were not satisfied with this offer. The problem, in the view of the great powers, was that restrictions to innocent
passage would prohibit covert movements of vessels (such as submarines) and did not guarantee overflight rights, thereby creating a security risk.[26] In the end, the parties came together to form a compromise
known as "transit passage." Applied specifically to straits that would otherwise fall within the territorial sea of a nation, transit passage applies to straits used for international navigation between one part of the
high seas to another and allows for "navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of [a] strait...."[27] In all other ways aside transit passage, the waters of a strait still
remain the territorial sea of the adjacent nation.[28]
3
MDAW 2014
Ozzy & George
LawOftheSeaTreaty AFF
1AC China advantage (1/6)
Tensions are rising in South China Sea – unmediated Chinese leadership has
created instability and sovereignty disputes
Perlez 2014 (Jane Perlez, chief diplomatic correspondent in the Beijing bureau of The New
York Times, June 19, 2014, “South China Sea troubles: For Vietnam and China, there is no
easing of tensions”, New York Times, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-0619/news/50711092_1_south-china-sea-paracels-pham-binh-minh)
HONG KONG: China and Vietnam exchanged sharp views Wednesday in their dispute
over a Chinese oil rig deployed in contested waters in the South China Sea near Vietnam's
coast and appear to have made little headway in cooling tensions , according to accounts by
both governments summarizing a top-level meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam.¶ China's state
councilor, Yang Jiechi, accused Vietnam, which has sent ships to the area, of conducting "unlawful interference" in the operations
of the rig, and told Vietnam that China would "take all necessary measures to safeguard its
national sovereignty," the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in the statement.¶ Vietnam's prime minister, Nguyen Tan Dung,
said that China had instead violated Vietnam's sovereignty, and added that China had breached international and regional agreements
on the South China Sea. The Chinese had also "hurt the feelings of the people of Vietnam."¶ The uncompromising language was
unusual for diplomatic statements describing discussions between two communist countries, and reflected the unyielding positions
since China sent the rig last month to a position 120 miles off the coast of Vietnam and close to the Paracel Islands, which both
countries claim. The statements suggested the meeting failed to get beyond oft-repeated arguments.¶ Yang, China's most senior
diplomat and a former foreign minister, met in Hanoi not only with the prime minister, but also with Vietnam's foreign minister, Pham
Binh Minh, and the general secretary of the Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong.¶ Unlike China, Vietnam called for negotiations
under the auspices of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, a position Vietnam has adopted since the start of the recent conflict. But
the Chinese diplomat insisted that there was no dispute over the Paracel Islands. The Chinese Foreign Ministry made no reference to
the possibility of negotiations, a basic tenet of China in matters to do with the South China Sea .¶ Vietnam
says the waters
around the oil rig are its territory because they fall within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive
economic zone, while China bases its claim on the waters' proximity to the Paracels.¶ To
protect the rig, China has dispatched a large contingent of coast guard vessels that have established a perimeter. A smaller flotilla of
Vietnamese coast guard and fishing boats try to penetrate the cordon, and the vessels from each side ram each other regularly.¶
Military ships from both sides are in the general area of the rig, according to U.S. officials. China seized control of the southern
Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in a war in 1974.¶ To back up its claim to the Paracels, China recently released a 1958 letter from
Pham Van Dong, then the prime minister of Vietnam, to Premier Zhou Enlai of China. It said that Vietnam recognized China's
sovereignty over the islands. Vietnam has argued the letter has no validity because it was written under duress.¶ The arrival of the rig
so close to the Paracels has become a defining event in the mounting campaign by China to control vast portions of the South China
Sea, a vital waterway for international commerce where other countries also have claims .¶ The
standoff led to violent
protests in Vietnam.¶ Before the Hanoi meeting, the first at a senior level since the standoff at sea started last month, experts
predicted both sides would stick to their views.¶ "China and Vietnam have been working on their relationship for 4,000 years, and
some days the work goes better than others," said Brantly Womack, a professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia who has
written extensively on the countries.¶ Yang, in particular, is known as a fierce proponent of China's rights to large parts of the South
China Sea.¶ He took exception in 2010 at a gathering of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Hanoi, when Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton
raised the issue of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the
need to resolve the various territorial disputes through mediation . In her new book, "Hard Choices,"
Clinton quotes him as telling delegates that "China is a big country, bigger than any other countries
here."¶ Clinton noted that Yang's attitude of China's superiority toward its Asian neighbors
did not go down well.
4
MDAW 2014
Ozzy & George
LawOftheSeaTreaty AFF
1AC China advantage (2/6)
South China Sea tensions escalate into all-out war – America will intervene,
guaranteeing major power conflict with China
Bonnie S. Glaser 2012 Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies April 2012
http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883
The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations
within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that
nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice
negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without
coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without
prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and
international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ
and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the
April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan
Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S.
Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the
USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also
increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S.
destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean
surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by
Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding
could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and
precipitating a major political crisis . Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral
strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult. A second
contingency involves conflict between China and the Philippines over natural gas deposits,
especially in the disputed area of Reed Bank, located eighty nautical miles from Palawan. Oil
survey ships operating in Reed Bank under contract have increasingly been harassed by Chinese
vessels. Reportedly, the United Kingdom-based Forum Energy plans to start drilling for gas in
Reed Bank this year, which could provoke an aggressive Chinese response. Forum Energy is
only one of fifteen exploration contracts that Manila intends to offer over the next few years for
offshore exploration near Palawan Island. Reed Bank is a red line for the Philippines, so this
contingency could quickly escalate to violence if China intervened to halt the drilling. The
United States could be drawn into a China-Philippines conflict because of its 1951 Mutual
Defense Treaty with the Philippines. The treaty states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area
on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers
in accordance with its constitutional processes." American officials insist that Washington does not take sides in the territorial
dispute in the South China Sea and refuse to comment on how the United States might respond to Chinese aggression in contested
waters. Nevertheless, an apparent gap exists between American views of U.S. obligations and Manila's expectations. In mid-June
2011,
a Filipino presidential spokesperson stated that in the event of armed conflict with China,
Manila expected the United States would come to its aid. Statements by senior U.S. officials
may have inadvertently led Manila to conclude that the United States would provide military
assistance if China attacked Filipino forces in the disputed Spratly Islands.
5
MDAW 2014
Ozzy & George
LawOftheSeaTreaty AFF
1AC China advantage (3/6)
U.S. – China war causes extinction
Straits Times 2k
(6-25, Lexis, No one gains in war over Taiwan)
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a
full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its
national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil
other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already
told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China
as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent,
east Asia will be set on fire . And the conflagration may not end there
as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted,
Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly
upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear
arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to
Singapore. If China were to retaliate,
General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at
the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal
account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that
US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the
US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there
is little hope
of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China
possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear
option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding
nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at
the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle,
there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory
if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should
that come to pass,
we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a
nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China
puts sovereignty above everything else.
6
MDAW 2014
Ozzy & George
LawOftheSeaTreaty AFF
1AC China advantage (4/6)
Vietnam will turn to Russia, causes escalation with China
Liping, 2014 (Xu Liping, Vice section chief at Investment Promotion Bureau of Changzhou
Wujin National Industrial Zone, 6/22/2014, “Vietnam offers Russia port priority in move against
China”, Global Times, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclasscnt.aspx?id=20140622000101&cid=1101)
The Vietnamese ambassador in Moscow has pledged to give Russia priority access to its
military port of Cam Ranh Bay as enticement for support against China in its ongoing
territorial dispute in the South China Sea , reports the Global Times, a tabloid under the auspices of the Communist
Party mouthpiece.¶ Pham Xuan Son announced the promise at a press conference on June 19, a day before three vessels from the
Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet completed logistical supply at the bay, a key inlet of the South China Sea situated on the southeastern
The ambassador said the two sides were still discussing a joint-venture to
provide maintenance services to military and civilian vessels at the bay, adding that
Vietnam considered its cooperation with the Russian military "very important."¶ In a
separate interview, Son told Russian media that 95% of Vietnam's weapons are purchased
coast of Vietnam.
from Russia, and also noted that the two countries are currently cooperating in the fields of
oil exploration and helicopter manufacturing, and were in talks to build Vietnam's first
nuclear power station.¶
Vietnamese defense minister Phung Quang Thanh said during the inter-governmental security
forum Shangri-La Dialogue last month that all commercial enterprises and military are welcome at Cam Ranh Bay. The statement had
been perceived as extending an olive branch to the United States, given that the decision coincided with Ted Osius, the new nominee
for US ambassador to Vietnam, suggesting that it may be time for Washington to consider lifting a ban on the sale and transfer of
whether it is allowing
Russia to contain China in the South China Sea or buying weapons from the US, China will
lethal weapons to the former American enemy.¶ Chinese scholar Xu Liping told the Global Times that
not allow Vietnam to get its wish .¶ Citing the views of Russian academics, the Global Times said
Hanoi is trying to cozy up to Moscow because it does not have the ability to take on China by itself in the
ongoing territorial dispute over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, which escalated last month
when China's deployment of an oil rig near the islands resulted in violent anti-China rioting across
Vietnam. Russia has so far taken a neutral stance in the dispute, just as China had taken a neutral stance
after Russia made the much-maligned decision to invade Ukraine's Crimean peninsula earlier this year.¶
Top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi visited Hanoi last week in an attempt to ease tensions between the two
countries, though reports say no obvious progress was made during Yang's talks with Vietnamese deputy
prime minister Pham Binh Minh. However, both sides said they would continue to maintain high-level
contact in an effort to resolve the dispute.
7
MDAW 2014
Ozzy & George
LawOftheSeaTreaty AFF
1AC China advantage (5/6)
China-Russia conflict goes nuclear
Alexander Sharavin, “The Third Threat,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie N. 27, September
28, 2001, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY (RUSSIA), October 1, 2001, LN.
Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however,
A billion Chinese people are still
living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have
absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The
that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population.
strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was
equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to
liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air
defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air
defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our
"eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian
Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if
full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become
strategic if states have common borders) and
would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of
the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It
would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last
tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either).
Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only
way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the
aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our
against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and
country would be absolutely unprotected
even against the first frost of a possible nuclear
winter. An aforementioned prospect is, undoubtedly, rather disagreeable and we would not like to believe it can be true. However, it is a
realistic prospect - just like a war against NATO or Islamic extremists
8
MDAW 2014
Ozzy & George
LawOftheSeaTreaty AFF
1AC China advantage (6/6)
Only LOST paves the way for diplomacy – starting point for all solutions to
sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea
Satur C. Ocampo , June 7 2014, (Reporter for the Philippine Star) “Handling our sea dispute
with China” The Philippine Star, http://bulatlat.com/main/2014/06/07/handling-our-seadispute-with-china/ Acc. 6/25/14
Invoking the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and seeking resolution to our maritime
dispute with China via the arbitral tribunal provided under the UNCLOS is probably the best tack to
take, a belated realization by the Philippine government. Better, certainly, than the following options: 1. The Aquino government’s obdurate stand to rely primarily on the US
commitment of military support, under the 1951 RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, against China’s increasing aggressive intrusions into the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf in the West Philippine/South China Sea. That commitment has been proven to be unreliable, with President Obama himself averring that the MDT does not
apply in the case of the maritime dispute with China. Nonetheless, the Aquino government used the dispute to justify its signing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.
The EDCA, now challenged before the Supreme Court as to its constitutionality, allows increased US troop presence and grants America the right, upon its request, to use any
part of the country as military base. In effect, on the premise of seeking US support to assert our national sovereignty, the P-Noy government has committed to worsen
America’s long-running derogation of such sovereignty in exchange for dubious benefits to the Filipino people. 2. To dialogue or negotiate with China without first seeking
China has repeatedly claimed “undisputable,” “nonnegotiable” historical
sovereignty over practically the entire sea and the islands within it. Our strongest argument
against China’s spurious claim is the UNCLOS provision upholding a member-country’s
exclusive right to exploit the resources of waters within a 370-kilometer (200-mile) radius
from its outermost territorial baseline, designated (as earlier mentioned) as exclusive
economic zone. The Panatag, Ayungin, Mabini and other shoals claimed by the Philippines all fall within our EEZ. China has acceded to the
UNCLOS, which was approved in 1982 but came into force only in 1996. Thus China is morally bound to adhere to its
provisions. As of Jan. 10, 2014, the convention had been ratified by 166 UN member-countries. This large number of adherents
recourse through the arbitral tribunal, even as
enhances its international viability or moral force. Last Tuesday the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration acted on the Philippines’
legal challenge to China’s sovereignty claim in a 4,000-page “memorial” filed last March 30. (The original request for arbitration,
under Annex VII of the UNCLOS, was filed in January 2013.) The court ordered China to submit its reply or defense by December 15.
(The permanent arbitration court is based in The Hague. It was established by the Hague Peace Conference in 1899 to provide
services for the arbitration and resolution of disputes among states, international nongovernment organizations, and private
parties.) As one would expect, China has spurned the order. It reiterated its refusal to participate in the arbitral proceedings,
implying that it would not recognize the outcome. However, while noting China’s rejection, the court said: “The arbitral tribunal will
determine the further course of the proceedings, including the need for, and scheduling of any other written submission and
hearings, at an appropriate later stage, after seeking the views of the parties.” With the UN tribunal giving due course to the
challenge, the Philippines is now in a better position to entertain an out-of-court negotiation with China. It’s a diplomatic option —
while pursuing the case at the UN and using the submitted “memorial” as leverage — should China reiterate its offer to seek
resolution of the dispute through dialogue. Thus far, the Philippine challenge to China’s claim before the arbitral tribunal has
generated other positive developments. For one, it has impelled President Obama to publicly press the US Senate to ratify the
UNCLOS.
As a superpower, the US has refused to ratify the UNCLOS (as well as the 1991 International Criminal Court
statute) on the imperialistic presumption that it hampers or overrides American sovereignty. In a commencement address at the US Military Academy last week, Obama said:
“
We can’t try to resolve the problems in the South China Sea when we have refused to make
sure that the Law of the Sea Convention is ratified by the United States — despite the fact
that our top military leaders say that the treaty advances our national security.” In what amounts to a
rebuke to the US government, Obama added: “That’s not leadership; that’s retreat. That’s not strength; that’s weakness.” It remains to be seen how the US Senate would react.
Another positive development has been the Vietnamese government’s indication that it was considering taking a similar action before the UN arbitral tribunal. However, at the
Asian Dialogue on Security held in Singapore last week, defense minister Gen. Phung Quang Thanh clarified that Vietnam would rather solve its current maritime dispute with
China through dialogue. He said international arbitration would be the “last resort.” Further, this week a communiqué was issued in Brussels by the Group of 7 (Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, US, United Kingdom) and the European Union declaring support for the right of territorial and maritime claimants to seek peaceful resolution of disputes
in accordance with international law, including “legal dispute settlement mechanisms.” Inversely, the G-7 opposes any unilateral attempt to assert any claim through
intimidation or force.
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Global affairs are rearranging – American integration into LOST must occur so
that international interests can be balanced in a stable fashion
Bower and Poling ’12 Ernest Z. (Senior Adviser and Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies)
Gregory B. (Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies and Pacific Partners Initiative) May 25, 2012
“Advancing the National Interests of the United States: Ratification of the Law of the Sea,” http://csis.org/publication/advancing-national-interestsunited-states-ratification-law-sea. Acc. 6/24/14
The credibility of the United States in the Asia Pacific is at stake on
a decision whether to ratify the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While there are other compelling arguments for ratification, none is as
urgent as the requirement for the United States to solidify its commitment to the rule of international law, including in the Asia Pacific. This is particularly true in regard
to one of the world’s most important foreign policy and security challenges: resolving disputes in the South China Sea. This week, the Obama administration went all in on
UNCLOS and sent Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, and the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, to testify before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of ratification. The ball is now in the Senate’s court .
A decision to anchor the United States
in UNCLOS is one that cannot be delayed. The president has wisely refocused the country on Asia to advance U.S. interests, from economic
recovery and growth to regional peace and security to developing new sources of innovation. Countries around the Asia Pacific are assessing whether the United States has the
political will, the pocketbook, and the commitment to further institutionalize its presence in the region .
UNCLOS ratification is necessary
to answer
those important questions in the affirmative. The debate over ratifying of the treaty began in 1982 when President Ronald Reagan refused to send it to Congress even for a discussion. The
argument grew more heated following the renegotiation of the treaty leading to its entering into force in 1994. Those renegotiations addressed most of Reagan’s concerns and drew the active
support of President Bill Clinton, though not of his opponents in the Congress. More recently, the treaty was vigorously advanced by President George W. Bush and brought before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in 2007. That effort failed to reach the Senate floor and the bill was shelved again. This month, a new effort is under way amid a substantially changed international
context. Senator John Kerry, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, has scheduled a series of hearings, led off by strong statements from both Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta May 23.
General Dempsey also testified, asking the Senate to act to support the national security interests of the United States. Among other reasons given, Dempsey noted that “joining the convention
would provide us another way to stave off conflict with less risk of escalation.” That message of support for ratification is consistent with the views of every chairman of the Joint Chiefs since
1994. What sets the upcoming hearings apart from those that preceded them is that the United States is entering an era when leadership and credulity are earned by actions and influence
sustained through consistency. A rising China will continue to test the limits of its power in the Asia Pacific. History shows that nations, including our own, have consistently explored
U.S. strategy involves convincing
China and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region that China’s interests will be most effectively and
sustainably advanced by engaging in regional frameworks in which it makes the rules along
converting economic power to political might. We do not know what China wants or what it wants to be. So
with others, by abiding by international laws , and by promoting and investing in public
goods. This process will take time, but it can be successful only if other countries believe the United
States is willing to commit itself to these standards and norms. The other factor that is different this time as the Senate considers
ratification is the overwhelming support of U.S. business. Manufacturers along with oil, telecommunications, and shipping companies, and every other sector of the economy with a stake in access to sea lines of
communication and undersea resources support ratification of the convention. Both the American Petroleum Institute and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have voiced their support. Senator Kerry is taking
advantage of this support from U.S. businesses by including their representatives in upcoming hearings. In a rare show of solidarity, American labor and the environmental community have joined hands in
supporting accession. The AFL-CIO and the Seafarers International Union of North America both sent letters to the administration in the last year expressing support. A group of nine environmental conservation
groups, including the Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Ocean Conservancy, and the World Wildlife Fund, sent a letter to Secretary Clinton in October voicing support for
ratification. The Law of the Sea has been ratified by 162 countries, including every other member of the UN Security Council and every other industrialized nation on the planet. It undergirds the modern
international order in the maritime domain, an order built by the United States and its allies. It is the only comprehensive treaty recognized worldwide that lays out the rules for vessels on the high seas. The U.S.
Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, recognizing its value, operate under its guidelines even in the absence of ratification. So why has it repeatedly failed to receive Senate approval? Opponents have presented four
general arguments: The Law of the Seas restrictions would interfere with U.S. military interests. The International Seabed Authority (ISA), which determines rights to seabed mining, would block U.S. economic
interests. The Law of the Sea’s taxation scheme for exploitation of resources within a nation’s exclusive economic zone would redistribute revenues unfairly. The treaty would limit U.S. sovereignty. Fortunately for
the law’s proponents, each of these ideological battles has been fought and won, especially following the treaty’s renegotiation. The first objection has largely been dropped in the face of more than two decades
of overwhelming support from every branch of the U.S. military. The second is clearly not a concern to the U.S. industries actively pushing U.S. ratification. The ISA’s 39 staff and narrow jurisdiction have little
chance of bullying the United States or anyone else. U.S. mining interests meanwhile are sitting on the sidelines while the ocean’s resources are claimed by others, and U.S. telecom companies lack the protections
and dispute resolution mechanisms for undersea cables that all their international competitors enjoy. Regarding the third concern, the taxation on resource extraction in exclusive economic zones amounts to just
over 2 percent on average, a price that mining and hydrocarbon companies have signaled they are willing to pay as the world’s energy markets hunger for new resources and prices of commodities climb. As for
revenue redistribution, opponents too often overlook the fact that following renegotiation of the Law of the Sea, the United States is guaranteed the only permanent veto on how funds are distributed. It is also
exempt from any future amendments to the treaty without Senate approval. In other words, the United States would enjoy a position of unequaled privilege, not unfair treatment, within UNCLOS. The final, and
currently most prominent, argument against ratification surrounds sovereignty. Opponents say that, by limiting itself to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and whatever extended continental shelf it can
claim, the United States is restricting its jurisdictional sovereignty. What this argument misses, however, is that the United States’ continental shelf is the largest of any—up to 600 miles offshore in the Arctic
alone. John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia School of Law has argued that ratification would “massively increase [U.S.] sovereign jurisdiction” by more than the size of the Louisiana Purchase and Alaska
combined. The arguments against ratification have been steadily weakened in the last three decades and were overwhelmingly addressed in 1994. The most important reason, however, for U.S. accession has
remained unchanged for 30 years: a rules-based international order is in the United States’ interests. The current global order and the U.S. preeminence within it are built upon legal norms and rules. Those rules
do not unfairly constrain the United States. They constrain those that would overturn the system, and they prevent a return to an earlier era of great-power competition and might-makes-right diplomacy. General
Dempsey said May 9 at a forum on the Law of the Sea, “Force of arms should not be our only national security instrument. [A] stable legal framework has never been more important to the United States.” Much
attention surrounding the Law of the Sea debate has focused on the Arctic. But the waters that best illustrate the need for an agreed-upon system of rules for the world’s oceans and a U.S. seat at the table are in
the South China Sea, where a rising great power, China, decided to assert its maritime claims over smaller neighbors. It did so most aggressively when it submitted the infamous “9-dash line” claim to the United
Nations in 2009. That claim has no basis in international law—a fact acknowledged by experts in China—and instead recalls an earlier era when the only rule of international relations was the prerogative of the
mighty. Beijing has walked back its assertive claims. But it did so not because of its ASEAN neighbors’ opposition to the “9-dash line” in May 2009. It did so only when Washington made clear—first with Secretary
of State Clinton’s statements at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010 and most recently with President Barack Obama’s appearance at the East Asia Summit last November—that preserving international
maritime law, embodied in the Law of the Sea, is a vital U.S. national interest .Without accession, however, the U.S. position is considerably weakened by charges of hypocrisy, a fact not lost on Beijing and of real
concern to China’s neighbors who rely on the United States. The United States need not take a position on the claims of parties in the South China Sea dispute or in any other dispute. It need only ensure that
whatever resolutions are reached are within the bounds of international law. If China or any other party is permitted to simply ignore the rules of one facet of the international system—in this case the Law of the
Sea—then the entire system loses legitimacy. Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Robert Papp said it best at the same May 9 forum: “Our legitimacy as a sovereign state and as a world leader…rests with the
rule of law.” The Senate should act to assert the national interests of the United States and ratify UNCLOS as soon as possible. Asserting U.S. credibility in the Asia Pacific and globally by standing by the rule of law
U.S. ratification of UNCLOS will determine whether the twenty-first
century resembles the relatively stable order of the late-twentieth century or is more like the
is in our economic and security interests. In fact,
competitive free-for-all of the nineteenth.
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U.S. hegemony deters war – most stable arrangement possible
Khalilzad, Rand Corporation 95 (Zalmay Khalilzad, Spring 1995. RAND Corporation. “Losing the
Moment?” The Washington Quarterly 18.2, Lexis.)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude
the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the
best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but
because a world in which the
U nited S tates exercises leadership would have
tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to
American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would
have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major
problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states,
and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of
another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid
another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers , including a
global nuclear exchange . U.S. leadership would therefore be more
conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of
power system.
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Legitimacy is crucial to sustainable and effective US hegemony—collapse causes
great power war
Knowles 9 [Spring, 2009, Robert Knowles is a Acting Assistant Professor, New York University
School of Law, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution”, ARIZONA STATE LAW
JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87]
American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists. Unipolarity was thought to be inherently
unstable because other nations, seeking to protect their own security, form alliances to counterbalance the leading state. n322 But no nation or group of nations has yet attempted to challenge
America's military predominance. n323 Although some realists predict that [*140] counter-balancing will occur or is
already in some ways occurring, n324 William Wohlforth has offered a compelling explanation for why true counter-balancing, in the
traditional realist sense, will probably not happen for decades. n325 American unipolarity is unprecedented. n326 First, the
U nited S tates is geographically isolated from other potential rivals, who are located near one
another in Eurasia. n327 This mutes the security threat that the U.S. seems to pose while increasing
the threats that potential rivals seem to pose to one another. n328 Second, the U.S. far exceeds the
capabilities of all other states in every aspect of power - military, economic, technological, and in
terms of what is known as "soft power." This advantage "is larger now than any analogous gap in the
history of the modern state system." n329 Third, unipolarity is entrenched as the status quo for the first
time since the seventeenth century, multiplying free rider problems for potential rivals and rendering less relevant all modern
previous experience with balancing. n330 Finally, the potential rivals' possession of nuclear weapons makes the concentration of
power in the United States appear less threatening. A war between great powers in today's world is very unlikely. n331 These
factors make the current system much more stable, peaceful and durable than the past multi-polar and bipolar systems in which the
United States operated for all of its history until 1991.
The lack of balancing means that the U nited S tates, and
by extension the executive branch, faces much weaker external constraints on its exercise of power
than in the past. n332 Therefore, the internal processes of the U.S. matter now more than any other
nations' have in history. n333 And it is these internal processes, as much as external developments,
that will determine the durability of American unipolarity. As one realist scholar has argued, the U.S.
can best ensure the [*141] stability of this unipolar order by ensuring that its predominance appears
legitimate . n334 Hegemonic orders take on hierarchical characteristics, with the preeminent power
having denser political ties with other nations than in a unipolar order. n335 Stability in
hegemonic orders is maintained in part through security guarantees and trade relationships that result
in economic specialization among nations. n336 For example, if Nation X's security is supplied by
Hegemon Y, Nation X can de-emphasize military power and focus on economic power. In a
hegemonic system, the preeminent state has "the power to shape the rules of international politics
according to its own interests." n337 The hegemon, in return, provides public goods for the system as
a whole. n338 The hegemon possesses not only superior command of military and economic
resources but "soft" power, the ability to guide other states' preferences and interests. n339 The
durability and stability of hegemonic orders depends on other states' acceptance of the hegemon's
role . The hegemon's leadership must be seen as legitimate. n340 [*142] The U nited S tates
qualifies as a global hegemon. In many ways, the U.S. acts as a world government. n341 It provides
public goods for the world, such as security guarantees, the protection of sea lanes, and support for open markets. n342
After World War II, the U.S. forged a system of military alliances and transnational economic and political institutions - such as the
United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank - that remain in place today. The U.S. provides security
for allies such as Japan
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and Germany by maintaining a strong military presence in Asia and Europe. n343 Because of its overwhelming military might, the
U.S. possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly" on the use of force. n344 This prevents other nations from launching wars that
would tend to be truly destabilizing. Similarly,
the United States provides a public good through its efforts to
combat terrorism and confront - even through regime change - rogue states. n345 The U nited
S tates also provides a public good through its promulgation and enforcement of international
norms . It exercises a dominant influence on the definition of international law because it is the largest
"consumer" of such law and the only nation capable of enforcing it on a global scale. n346 The U.S. was the
primary driver behind the establishment of the United Nations system and the development of contemporary treaties and
Moreover, controlling
international norms are [*143] sometimes embodied in the U.S. Constitution and domestic law rather
than in treaties or customary international law. For example, whether terrorist threats will be
countered effectively depends "in large part on U.S. law regarding armed conflict, from rules that
define the circumstances under which the President can use force to those that define the proper
treatment of enemy combatants." n348 These public goods provided by the United States stabilize the
institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both public and private international law. n347
system by legitimizing it and decreasing resistance to it. The transnational political and economic
institutions created by the U nited S tates provide other countries with informal access to
policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to American hegemony, encouraging others to
"bandwagon " with the U.S. rather than seek to create alternative centers of power. n349 American hegemony also coincided
with the rise of globalization - the increasing integration and standardization of markets and cultures - which tends to stabilize the
global system and reduce conflict. n350
The legitimacy of American hegemony is strengthened and sustained
by the democratic and accessible nature of the U.S. government . The American constitutional
separation of powers is an international public good. The risk that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to
act swiftly, coherently or decisively in foreign affairs is counter-balanced by the benefits it provides in
permitting foreigners multiple points of access to the government. n351 Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and
executive branch agencies in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign policy is made. n352 They use the media to
broadcast their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers. n353 Because the United States is a nation of immigrants, many
American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of particular countries and form "ethnic lobbies" for the purpose of affecting foreign policy. n354
The courts, too, are accessible to foreign nations and non-citizens. The Alien Tort Statute is emerging as
an [*144] important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among non-citizens in U.S. courts. n355 Empires are more
complex than unipolar or hegemonic systems. Empires consist of a "rimless-hub-and-spoke structure," with an imperial core - the preeminent state - ruling the periphery through intermediaries.
n356 The core institutionalizes its control through distinct, asymmetrical bargains (heterogeneous contracting) with each part of the periphery. n357 Ties among peripheries (the spokes) are
thin, creating firewalls against the spread of resistance to imperial rule from one part of the empire to the other. n358 The success of imperial governance depends on the lack of a "rim." n359
Stability in imperial orders is maintained through "divide and rule," preventing the formation of countervailing alliances in the periphery by exploiting differences among potential challengers.
n360 Divide-and-rule strategies include using resources from one part of the empire against challengers in another part and multi-vocal communication - legitimating imperial rule by signaling
"different identities ... to different audiences." n361 Although the U.S. has often been labeled an empire, the term applies only in limited respects and in certain situations. Many foreign
relations scholars question the comparison. n362 However, the U.S. does exercise informal imperial rule when it has routine and consistent influence over the foreign policies of
other nations, who risk losing "crucial military, economic, or political support" if they refuse to comply. n363 The "Status of Force Agreements" ("SOFAs") that govern legal rights
and responsibilities of U.S. military personnel and others on U.S. bases throughout the world are typically one-sided. n364 And the U.S. occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan had
a strong imperial dynamic because those regimes depended on American support. n365 [*145] But the management of empire is increasingly difficult in the era of globalization.
Heterogeneous contracting and divide-and-rule strategies tend to fail when peripheries can communicate with one another. The U.S. is less able control "the flow of information
... about its bargains and activities around the world." n366 In late 2008, negotiations on the Status of Force Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq were the subject of intense
media scrutiny and became an issue in the presidential campaign. n367 Another classic imperial tactic - the use of brutal, overwhelming force to eliminate resistance to imperial
rule - is also unlikely to be effective today. The success of counterinsurgency operations depends on winning a battle of ideas, and collateral damage is used by violent
extremists, through the Internet and satellite media, to "create widespread sympathy for their cause." n368 The abuses at Abu Ghraib, once public, harmed America's "brand"
and diminished support for U.S. policy abroad. n369 Imperial rule, like hegemony, depends on maintaining legitimacy. B. Constructing a Hegemonic Model International
relations scholars are still struggling to define the current era. The U.S.-led international order is unipolar, hegemonic, and, in some instances, imperial. In any event, this order
diverges from traditional realist assumptions in important respects. It is unipolar, but stable. It is more hierarchical. The U.S. is not the same as other states; it performs unique
functions in the world and has a government open and accessible to foreigners. And the stability and legitimacy of the system depends more on successful functioning of the
U.S. government as a whole than it does on balancing alliances crafted by elite statesmen practicing realpolitik. "World power politics are shaped primarily not by the structure
created by interstate anarchy but by the foreign policy developed in Washington." n370 These differences require a new model for assessing the institutional competences of
the executive and judicial branches in foreign affairs. [*146] One approach would be to adapt an institutional competence model using insights from a major alternative theory
of international relations - liberalism. Liberal IR theory generally holds that internal characteristics of states - in particular, the form
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of government - dictate states' behavior, and that democracies do not go to war against one another. n371 Liberalists also regard economic interdependence and international
institutions as important for maintaining peace and stability in the world. n372 Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter has proposed a binary model that distinguishes between liberal,
democratic states and non-democratic states. n373 Because domestic and foreign issues are "most convergent" among liberal democracies, Slaughter reasons, the courts should
decide issues concerning the scope of the political branches' powers. n374 With respect to non-liberal states, the position of the U.S. is more "realist," and courts should deploy
a high level of deference. n375 One strength of this binary approach is that it would tend to reduce the uncertainty in foreign affairs adjudication. Professor Nzelibe has
observed that it would put courts in the difficult position of determining which countries are liberal democracies. n376 But even if courts are capable of making these
determinations, they would still face the same dilemmas adjudicating controversies regarding non-liberal states. Where is the appropriate boundary between foreign affairs and
domestic matters? How much discretion should be afforded the executive when individual rights and accountability values are at stake? To resolve these dilemmas, an
institutional competence model should be applicable to foreign affairs adjudication across the board. In constructing a new realist model, it is worth recalling that the functional
justifications for special deference are aimed at addressing problems of a particular sort of role effectiveness - which allocation of power among the branches will best achieve
, America's global role has changed, and the best means
of achieving effectiveness in foreign affairs have changed as well. The international realm remains
highly political - if not as much as in the past - but it is American politics that matters most. If the U.S. is
general governmental effectiveness in foreign affairs. In the twenty-first century
truly an empire - [*147] and in some respects it is - the problems of imperial management will be far different from the problems of
managing relations with one other great power or many great powers. Similarly,
the management of hegemony or
unipolarity requires a different set of competences. Although American predominance is recognized as a salient fact,
there is no consensus among realists about the precise nature of the current international order. n377 The hegemonic model I offer
here adopts common insights from the three IR frameworks - unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial - described above. First, the
"hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U.S. foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is
more stable, more peaceful, and better for America's security and prosperity, than the alternatives.
If the U nited S tates
were to withdraw from its global leadership role, no other nation would be capable of taking its place.
n378 The result would be radical instability and a greater risk of major war. n379 In addition, the
United States would no longer benefit from the public goods it had formerly produced; as the largest consumer, it would suffer the
American hegemony is unusually stable and durable . n380 As
noted above, other nations have many incentives to continue to tolerate the current order . n381 And
most. Second, the hegemonic model assumes that
although other nations or groups of nations - China, the European Union, and India are often mentioned - may eventually overtake
the United States in certain areas, such as manufacturing,
the U.S. will remain dominant in most measures of
capability for decades. According to 2007 estimates, the U.S. economy was projected to be twice
the size of China's in 2025. n382 The U.S. accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007
and holds enormous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip would-be competitors. n383
Predictions of American decline are not new, and they have thus far proved premature. n384 [*148]
Third, the hegemonic model assumes that preservation of American hegemony depends not just on
power, but legitimacy. n385 All three IR frameworks for describing predominant states - although
unipolarity less than hegemony or empire - suggest that legitimacy is crucial to the stability and
durability of the system . Although empires and predominant states in unipolar systems can
conceivably maintain their position through the use of force, this is much more likely to exhaust the
resources of the predominant state and to lead to counter-balancing or the loss of control . n386
Legitimacy as a method of maintaining predominance is far more efficient . The hegemonic model generally values
courts' institutional competences more than the anarchic realist model. The courts' strengths in offering a stable interpretation of the law, relative
insulation from political pressure, and power to bestow legitimacy are important for realizing the functional constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign
policy. This means that courts' treatment of deference in foreign affairs will, in most respects, resemble its treatment of domestic affairs. Given the
amorphous quality of foreign affairs deference, this "domestication" reduces uncertainty. The increasing boundary problems caused by the
proliferation of treaties and the infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by reducing the deference gap. And the dilemma
caused by the need to weigh different functional considerations - liberty, accountability, and effectiveness - against one another is made less
intractable because it becomes part of the same project that the courts constantly grapple with in adjudicating domestic disputes.
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LOST can only boost hegemony – adds legitimacy to American leadership – no
unique risk of a turn
David Ross Meyers, New York Political commentator, May 29, 2012, Fox News, “The Law of the Sea Treaty could
strengthen our national security, not harm it” http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/05/29/law-sea-treaty-couldstrengthen-our-national-security-not-harm-it/
These national security concerns are legitimate, but mostly unfounded. Joining the Law of the Sea
Convention is a rare opportunity to sign onto an international agreement that has numerous
benefits and very few liabilities . And that's why numerous Democrats and Republicans
continue to support it. ¶ President George W. Bush was a strong advocate for signing the treaty. Many of his
top diplomatic and military officials, including Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and Deputy
Secretary of Defense Gordon England, stated that joining the Convention would have little practical
effect on the rights we currently enjoy . For example, our ships already have the right of free transit, our
government has control over our coastal economic zones, and we have the right to enact environmental protections
over our maritime zones. ¶ The Law of the Sea convention
is a low-risk opportunity to demonstrate
our commitment to global leadership, international law, and multilateralism without altering
many of our current practices . Joining the Convention will give us credibility when we call on
other nations to follow international legal standards. And it will blunt the negative reaction we receive
for taking actions opposed by the international community. ¶ For example, joining the Convention could
lessen the negative impact of our repudiation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
United States was correct in refusing to submit to the ICC's jurisdiction. But our opposition to the Court has
perpetuated our image as a country that rejects international standards while calling for other
countries to adhere to them. ¶ By signing agreements such as the Sea Convention, we can argue that our
policy on the ICC is the exception rather than the rule. And joining the Convention will build up goodwill
for times when we may need to buck the international community in the future (in Syria and Iran,
for example). ¶ Joining the Convention will also provide some new benefits to the United States.
¶ First, it will give us a legal forum to turn to if other countries violate our existing rights on
the high seas. ¶ Second, it will give us a seat at the bargaining table to shape future ocean and
coastal region policy. China is already a party to the Convention, and it will have an oversized impact on shaping future
policy if the United States doesn’t serve as a counterbalance. ¶ Finally, the Convention provides us with a legal forum to thwart
China’s policy of territorial expansion in Asia. ¶ Critics of the Convention, including numerous Republican Senators and legal
fear that submitting our actions to the review of an international
tribunal will weaken our national security, our military, and our sovereignty. ¶ These
arguments are not convincing . ¶ First, military actions are explicitly exempted from the
Convention. ¶ Second, even if the tribunals tried to intervene in military actions, they could
only do so after the fact. The tribunals, for example, cannot stop the U.S. from seizing a ship
with suspected nuclear supplies; they can only criticize our actions afterwards. ¶ Finally, if other
scholars such as Jack Goldsmith,
countries unfairly use these tribunals to attack American hegemony and try to restrict our military rights (as in the
nuclear scenario above), we can always withdraw from the Convention. This is an important point that the treaty's
supporters have failed to note. ¶ If the worst fears of the Convention's critics come to bear, the
president has the power to withdraw from the treaty. And if the treaty was being abused to thwart
America's interests, that's what any responsible president, Republican or Democrat, would do.
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LOST solves China
LOST solves tensions in South China Sea—Makes U.S. less hypocritical
Scott Stearns, June 02, 2014, (VOA’s State Department correspondent, White House
correspondent, and Nairobi Bureau Chief) “Obama Pushes Law of the Sea to Help Settle S. China
Sea Claims,” Voice of America, Acc. 6/24/14
U.S. President Barack Obama says a U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea would help ease tensions in the
South China Sea if is ratified by U.S. lawmakers China is facing a series of maritime disputes with its neighbors in
the South China Sea. Speaking to Army Cadets at West Point, President Obama says it's more difficult for the U.S. push for a
resolution of rival claims because it exempts itself from rules that apply to everyone else. "It’s a lot harder to
call on China
to resolve its maritime disputes under the Law of the Sea Convention when the United States
Senate has refused to ratify it - despite the repeated insistence of our top military leaders that the treaty advances our
national security," he said. "That’s not leadership; that’s retreat." The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea -- or UNCLOS -establishes rules for commercial and military shipping as well as the distribution of offshore oil and gas royalties. That has made it a
target for the president's opponents, including former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. "I do not believe the United States
should endorse a treaty that makes it a legal obligation for productive countries to pay royalties to less-productive countries based
on rhetoric about common heritage of mankind," he said. While not ratified by the Senate, the United States does observe most of
the structures of the Law of the Sea treaty. "I think the president was making a false choice," said American Enterprise Institute
analyst Michael Auslin. "He was saying
if we don't ratify UNCLOS, we can't call China to account for any
of its provocative, coercive, and aggressive behavior.
That's completely false. Of course we can." The latest
flare-up in the South China Sea concerns a Chinese oil rig in disputed waters off Vietnam - a standoff that Chinese Deputy Army
Chief Wang Guangzhong says is being forced on Beijing. "China, in its issues concerning territorial sovereignty and maritime rights,
has never taken the first step to provoke trouble," he said. "It has always been that China has been forced to respond." Vietnamese
protesters say Beijing is trying to provoke wider confrontation over disputed islands. American University professor Hillary Mann
Leverett says Beijing is trying to undermine U.S. alliances in Asia. "The way China has done that is to push these allies over issues
that the United States doesn't really care about -- a craggy island here, a craggy island there," she said. "Why should the United
States really send the 7th Fleet out to fight China over these various islands?" U.S. reluctance to confront China has nothing to do
with the Law of the Sea, says Auslin. "I think it shows a very disturbing trend line in the Obama administration of trying to find
excuses for not getting more involved in the maritime and naval disputes that are roiling Asia," he said. The
Philippines is
using Law-of-the-Sea mechanisms to challenge China's territorial claims, but China is refusing
to join that non-binding tribunal.
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LOST solves China
LOST is central to mitigating South China Sea conflict
Will Rogers 12, Center for a New American Security
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_SecurityAtSea_Rogers_0.pdf
Ratifying LOSC will give the United States added legitimacy as it seeks to defend the interests
of allies and partners in the Asia Pacific, particularly countries involved in disputes over the
South China Sea. Tensions between China and Southeast Asian states over historical territorial
claims and jurisdiction over potentially lucrative seabed natural resources are escalating
because of increasingly assertive behavior on all sides . LOSC is central to mitigating tensions
and avoiding conflict in the South China Sea , which involve territory demarcation, maritime
navigation and other issues covered by the convention. Without ratifying LOSC, the United
States will be unable to credibly encourage efforts of allies like the Philippines as it attempts
to mediate a dispute with China over the joint development of resources in the South China
Sea using the LOSC dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, U.S. failure to ratify LOSC will
leave America hamstrung as countries in the region promote new international maritime
norms that may conflict with U.S. interests. Legal scholars and military and political leaders in
China, Thailand and elsewhere are interpreting the treaty in ways that bolster their own
interests, but the United States cannot effectively counter these interpretations or promote
new ones without ratifying LOSC and availing itself of the convention’s legal bodies.28These
interpretations could harm U.S. maritime security activities in the region if these counties
successfully build consensus with others that conflict with the U.S. interpretation of customary
international law.
Solvency – Ratifying LOST bolsters global perception and solves SCS tensions
Bonnie S. Glaser 2012 Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies April 2012
http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883
Against the background of rebalancing U.S. assets and attention toward the Asia-Pacific region,
the United States should takes steps to prevent a conflict in the South China Sea and to defuse
a crisis should one take place. Although the possibility of a major military conflict is low, the
potential for a violent clash in the South China Sea in the near future is high, given past
behavior of states in the region and the growing stakes. Therefore, both U.S. and regional
policymakers should seek to create mechanisms to build trust, prevent conflict, and avoid
escalation. First, the United States should ratify UNCLOS; though it voluntarily adheres to its
principles and the Obama administration has made a commitment to ratify the convention, the
fact that the United States has not yet ratified the treaty lends credence to the perception
that it only abides by international conventions when doing so aligns with its national
interests. Ratifying UNCLOS would put this speculation to rest. It would also bolster the U.S.
position in favor of rules-based behavior, give the United States a seat at the table when
UNCLOS signatories discuss such issues as EEZ rights, and generally advance U.S. economic and
strategic interests.
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Russia impact
United States-Russia War would cause human extinction
Nuclear Darkness, 2014 (NuclearDarkness.org, May 14, 2014, Summary of consequences: U.S.Russian war producing 150 million tons of smoke,
http://www.nucleardarkness.org/warconsequences/hundredfiftytonessmoke/)
2600 U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons on high-alert are launched (in 2 to 3
minutes) at targets in the U.S., Europe and Russia
fraction of
(and perhaps at other targets which are considered to have strategic value). Some
the remaining 7600 deployed and operational U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear
warheads/weapons are also launched and detonated in retaliation for the initial attacks .
Hundreds of large cities in the U.S., Europe and Russia are engulfed in massive firestorms which burn urban areas of tens or hundreds of thousands of square miles/kilometers.
150 million tons of smoke from nuclear fires rises above cloud level, into the stratosphere,
where it quickly spreads around the world and forms a dense stratospheric cloud layer. The
smoke will remain there for many years to block and absorb sunlight . The smoke blocks up
to 70% of the sunlight
from reaching the Earth's surface in the Northern Hemisphere, and up to 35% of the sunlight is also blocked in the Southern
Hemisphere. In the absence of warming sunlight, surface temperatures on Earth become as cold or colder than they were 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age There
would be rapid cooling of more than 20°C over large areas of North America and of more than 30°C over much of Eurasia, including all agricultural regions 150 million tons of
smoke in the stratosphere would cause minimum daily temperatures in the largest agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere to drop below freezing for 1 to 3 years.
Nightly killing frosts would occur and prevent food from being grown. Average
global precipitation would be reduced by 45%
the prolonged cold. Growing seasons would be virtually eliminated for many years. Massive
due to
destruction of the protective ozone layer
would also occur, allowing intense levels of dangerous UV light to penetrate the atmosphere
and reach the surface of the Earth. Massive amounts of
radioactive fallout would be generated and spread
both locally and
globally . The targeting of nuclear reactors would significantly increase fallout of long-lived isotopes. Gigantic ground-hugging clouds of toxic smoke would be released
from the fires; enormous quantities of industrial chemicals would also enter the environment. It would be impossible for many living things to survive the extreme rapidity and
degree of changes in temperature and precipitation, combined with drastic increases in UV light, massive radioactive fallout, and massive releases of toxins and industrial
chemicals. Already stressed land and marine
ecosystems would collapse . Unable to grow food , most humans would
starve to death . A mass extinction event would occur, similar to what happened 65 million
years ago, when the dinosaurs were wiped out following a large asteroid impact with Earth
(70% of species became extinct, including all animals greater than 25 kilograms in weight). Even humans living in shelters equipped with many years
worth of food, water, energy, and medical supplies would probably not survive in the hostile post-war environment.
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A2 Diplomacy solves China
Talks between China, Vietnam over territorial dispute yield no result
Adamczyk 2014 (Ed Adamczyk, UPI writer, June 19, 2014, “Talks between China, Vietnam
over territorial dispute yield no result”, UPI, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/WorldNews/2014/06/19/Talks-between-China-Vietnam-over-territorial-dispute-yield-noresult/8311403193247/)
HANOI , Vietnam, June 19 (UPI) -- A
top-level meeting in Hanoi between Chinese and Vietnamese
negotiators, over a Chinese oil rig in disputed South China Sea waters, offered no solution in
reducing tensions.¶
China's state councilor Yang Jiechi met with Vietnam's Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung Wednesday,
Statements
after the meeting indicated little was accomplished and neither side offered any
compromise.¶ At issue is China's installation in May of an oil rig in the South China Sea, 120 miles off Vietnam's coast and near
as well as with Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong.
the Paracel Islands, claimed by both countries. Ships from both countries' coast guards have been involved in low-level face-offs in
close proximity to the oil rig. Meanwhile,
tensions over China's perceived territorial encroachment
have led to rioting and the burning of Chinese-owned factories in Vietnam.¶ In statements
Wednesday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said China would "take all necessary measures to safeguard its national sovereignty," while
Dung claimed China breached international and regional agreements and "hurt the feelings of the people of Vietnam."¶
The
strong language was unusual for diplomatic statements arising from conflicts involving two
communist countries.
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China-Russia
Escalation in South China Sea leads to Russian involvement against China
Chunshan 2014 (Mu Chunshan, Beijing-based journalist, June 21, 2014, “Why doesn’t Russia
support China in the South China Sea?”, thediplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/why-doesnt-russia-supportchina-in-the-south-china-sea/)
Recently, tensions over maritime disputes in the South China Sea seem to have surpassed
even those caused by the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China and Vietnam are embroiled in
their worst political conflict in decades over an oil drilling platform near the Paracel
Islands. The resulting anti-China protests in Vietnam brought China-Vietnam relations to a temporary halt. In addition, the Philippines’ detention of Chinese fishermen has
increased the discord between China and the Philippines. With all these frictions occurring at the same time, the
situation in the South China Sea has suddenly become very serious.¶ Against this
background, we have seen the U.S. criticize China, express support for Vietnam, and shield
the Philippine military. But we have not heard Russia, China’s “strategic partner,” take a
stand on the South China Sea disputes, much less publicly support China’s position. This
has upset some people in China, who now think that China-Russia relations aren’t as good
as previously imagined. Even on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute between China and Japan, Russia has kept an ambiguous position. In my
eyes, however, this does not mean that Russia’s is of two minds in its relationship with China. Instead, there are complicated political and strategic
factors, including four main reasons I will list below.¶ First, the China-Russia relationship is different from U.S.-Philippines relations
. China and
Russia are not allies . There is no alliance treaty between them, while there are security treaties between the U.S. and the Philippines as well as between the U.S. and Japan. In an alliance
relationship, each side has treaty obligations to provide political and even military support to its partner. In international relations, this is the highest-level type of bilateral relationship. While the China-Russia
the two parties are not bound by treaty obligations to
strive for each other’s international space and national interests.¶ For a long time, China’s state media has been emphasizing
relationship has some characteristics of a comprehensive strategic partnership,
and promoting the positive factors in China-Russia relations, while overseas media also often over-praise this relationship. Sometimes media outlets even posit that China and Russia are “allies” without an alliance
treaty. This has led many people to believe that China-Russia political cooperation is boundless, causing a great improvement to China’s security situation. But the facts of international relations tell us that no matter
how good the China-Russia relationship is, it won’t influence China’s basic policy in the South and East China Seas. The fact is that China-Russia relations are fundamentally based on mutual interests. The South
. Chinese people cannot
misinterpret the character of China-Russia relations and expect too much from Russia.¶
Second, Russia enjoys good relations with countries bordering the South China Sea and
does not need to offend Southeast Asia for the sake of China. As noted above, Russia is not enthusiastic about publicly backing China
China Sea is not a place where Russia can expand its interests, nor is it necessary for Russia to interfere in this region absent a formal alliance with China
on the South China Sea issue. One of the most important reasons for this is that Russia enjoys good relations with many of the Southeast Asian countries.¶ For example, Russia’s predecessor, the Soviet Union, was
historically even closer to Vietnam than it was to China. Because of the USSR’s strong support, Vietnam was able to fight off the United States. Afterward, Vietnam began to undertake anti-China activities, again
with Soviet backing. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia inherited this extraordinary friendship. There are no major obstacles to the development of the Russia-Vietnam relationship — there are no serious
disputes or conflicts on either the historical or the practical level. And there is one particular area of cooperation between the two countries: defense, where cooperation has stretched from World War II to today.
, in the second half of 2014
Russia will deliver four Su-30MK2 fighters to Vietnam, which could potentially become
Many of Vietnam’s weapons come from Russia, such as the Kilo-class diesel submarines fueling the growth of Vietnam’s navy. In addition
weapons in a future China-Vietnam confrontation.¶ Russia also enjoys a good relationship
with the Philippines.
For example, two years ago, three Russian navy vessels (including the anti-submarine destroyer Admiral Panteleyev) arrived in Manila for a three-day port visit.
According to Russia, this visit helped improve Russia-Philippine ties.¶ Third, it’s unnecessary for Russia to seek out a direct confrontation with the U.S. over the South China Sea. Currently Russia’s focus is on
Europe, especially the Ukraine crisis that has already solidified the confrontation between Russia and the West. Such a problem will be difficult to solve in the short term. Given this, Russia has neither the desire nor
the ability to confront the U.S. in the South China Sea.¶ Besides, the South China Sea disputes are not really conflicts between China and the United States. The disputes stem from disagreements between the South
China Sea border countries about the history and the status quo of maritime rights. The U.S. is only an influencing factor, not a determining factor that will determine the future of the situation. In this context, as an
outsider and bystander, Russia has even less of a motivation to support China and criticize the U.S.¶ Fourth,
the development of China has actually
caused some worries within Russia . To some people in the West, the discord between China and other South China Sea countries could help
restrict China’s “expansion” into other regions. In Russia, there has always been some concern that China’s development will lead to the Russian far east being gradually
“occupied” by the Chinese, with this vast territory, along with its resources, becoming fodder for China’s development. Although Russian officials are optimistic about the
potential for cooperation in the far east, they have never for a moment relaxed their guard against China’s so-called “territorial expansion.”
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China impact – uniqueness
China is causing regional instability – momentum is headed for confrontation
Leaf, 2014 (Paul J. Leaf, International Law firm attorney, U.S. foreign policy
commentator, and former Stanford Law Review editor, 6/3/2014, “South China Sea
Standoff: The U.S. Must Get Off The Sidelines”, Dailycaller, http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/03/south-china-sea-standoff-the-u-smust-get-off-the-sidelines/)
TAIPEI, TAIWAN — Within days of President Obama concluding his recent trip to Asia,
which was meant to reinforce America’s commitment there as the Chinese threat grows,
China attacked Vietnamese vessels to advance its claim over disputed waters and to test
Washington’s resolve. A firm, multilateral response is needed to avoid escalation and to
demonstrate that China’s combativeness pushes its adversaries together and closer to the
U.S.¶ China has sought to aggressively expand its control of the East and South China Seas,
where its claims conflict with those of other countries. Throughout 2011, China harassed
Vietnamese fishing and oil exploration vessels. In June 2012, after India and Vietnam
agreed to jointly explore oil in the South China Sea, a Chinese navy vessel shadowed
Indian ships traveling in international waters between the Philippines and South Korea. In
mid-2012, China expelled Filipino ships from the Scarborough Shoal, which is 399 miles
closer to the Philippines than China. In November 2013, China expanded its air defense
identification zone (ADIZ) to cover parts of the East China Sea claimed by Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan. In March 2014, China blocked the Philippines from resupplying a ship in
disputed territory.¶ Distracted by budget issues and foreign policy crises outside of Asia,
the U.S. took little action against China’s pattern of coercion. Indeed, China aims to press
its interests in small increments that do not individually provoke a strong U.S. response.
The reason for President Obama’s tour of Asia last month was to demonstrate that America’s
security guarantees remain strong. Beijing was unconvinced.¶ On May 2, just three days
after President Obama’s Asia trip, China placed a state-owned oil-drilling rig in contested
parts of the South China Sea — 120 miles from Vietnam and 180 miles from China .
Vietnamese ships intervened, but some of the 80 or so Chinese vessels accompanying the rig
rammed and blasted them with water cannons. A tense standoff persists as Beijing plans to
keep its rig there until August 15.¶ Beijing is gauging Washington’s resolve to stop its
creeping expansionism. China seeks in the contested waters more than control of natural
resources and a valuable trade passage. Indeed, China wants to seize these assets by
overpowering Vietnam while keeping the U.S. on the sidelines to show that it can engage in a
string of hostilities without the U.S. and its partners stopping it. Emboldened, China’s
confrontations will continue until it supplants American primacy in Asia or it is met by a
resolute balancing bloc.¶ The U.S. and its Asian partners must meet China’s aggression
together.¶ First, China must realize that escalation is costly. The U.S. should declare that if
China continues using force, it will dispatch naval and aerial support near the rig to restore
peace and consider sanctioning the subject Chinese energy company and its leaders.
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China impact – escalation
Multiple countries in Asia will group against China – ensures escalation
Leaf, 2014 (Paul J. Leaf, International Law firm attorney, U.S. foreign policy
commentator, and former Stanford Law Review editor, 6/3/2014, “South China Sea
Standoff: The U.S. Must Get Off The Sidelines”, Dailycaller,
http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/03/south-china-sea-standoff-the-u-s-must-get-off-thesidelines/)
By maintaining ships near the rig and returning water cannon fire, Vietnam has shown
that it will stand up to China. Still, Vietnam, which has no defense treaty with the U.S., must
calibrate its use of defensive force because it cannot beat China in a maritime battle and it
benefits from China being seen as the sole aggressor. Hanoi should thus continue talks with
Beijing to reach a nonviolent resolution, but it must not unilaterally withdrawal from the
area as Beijing demands. During the Scarborough Shoal incident, the U.S. brokered a
deal requiring China and the Philippines to simultaneously remove their ships from the
disputed waters, but only the Philippines did so and China has since controlled the shoal.
Additionally, Vietnam should continue mobilizing international support and shaming China,
because Beijing values its image. Indeed, after the Philippines initiated international
arbitration of the Scarborough Shoal incident, China allegedly offered to withdrawal from
the area if the Philippines delayed the arbitration.¶ Other Asian countries clashing with China
over territorial and maritime claims should condemn it and announce that Chinese hostility
drives them closer to each other and the U.S. This dynamic is already underway. The
Philippines recently increased U.S. access to its military bases and agreed to enhance naval
cooperation with Vietnam. Japan announced this week that it would provide maritime aid to
Vietnam . India has offered Vietnam a credit line to purchase weapons and agreed to train
Vietnam in submarine warfare. The goal is for regional partners to respond jointly when China
targets one of them.
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China impact – U.S. intervention
America’s hand will be forced – sovereignty and historical issues are being
raised in the South China Sea
Bowring, 2014 (Philip Bowring, Asia Sentinel Consulting Editor, June 9, 2014, “Why China's
Actions in the South China Sea Matter to the U.S.”, Global Post,
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/why-chinas-actions-south-china-sea-matter-u-sn126461)
HONG KONG — Conflicts have recently escalated between China and its Southeast Asian
maritime neighbors over rocks, reefs, shoals and islets in the South China Sea. ¶ Last week,
Hanoi released video footage of its vessels being rammed by the Chinese Coast Guard after
Vietnam tried to block China’s attempt to commence drilling for hydrocarbons off the coast of
central Vietnam. China also protested the Philippines' May 9 arrest of Chinese fishermen at a
shoal 60 miles off its southwestern coast for allegedly possessing large marine turtles, an
endangered species.¶ At first glance, the clashes may seem like a contest for energy and fishing
resources, and they are often reported as such.¶ But they are far more important than that.¶
The continental shelf certainly has deposits already being exploited by all parties off their
respective coasts. But these are mostly small. While economically significant for Malaysia and
Vietnam, they are unlikely to yield resources on a meaningful scale for China.¶ Instead, the
territory’s significance is primarily strategic for Beijing. As such, this is an issue of huge
importance for the United States — which insists that the sea is part of international waters
— and for other countries such as Japan, for which the sea provides a crucial link to the West, the
Middle East, and much of South and Southeast Asia.¶ Indeed for two millennia this sea has been a
generator of global trade by providing the link between China and northeast Asia and the spice
and forest islands of southeast Asia, on the one hand, and with India, Iran, the Arab world,
western Europe and Africa.¶ China’s claim is represented by a nine-dash line on its maps and in
its passports, extending southward roughly 1,080 nautical miles (or 18 degrees of latitude) from
its coast to within a few miles of Malaysian Borneo, and including almost all the waters and
features between Vietnam and the Philippines. Intermittently, and particularly over the past two
years, China has used force to implement some of this claim.¶ For sure, China is in no position
yet to contest use of the sea for international commerce and may never do so. However it
claims almost all the islands and rocks, around which it then claims 200-nautical-mile
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). That
provides a basis for turning the sea into a “Chinese lake.” ¶ Vietnam is an immediate focus
because of its proximity and history of resistance to China.¶ Recent events are a reminder to the
Vietnamese of China’s invasion in 1979, and of its seizure of the Paracel Islands in 1974, the very
islands which now provide its justification for drilling in waters off Da Nang, which Vietnam
considers its EEZ. China also wants to ensure deep water access from its submarine bases in
Hainan.¶ The Philippines is a target because it is perceived as weak. Pressuring the Philippines is
also a way to test US commitment to its former colony. Last year China occupied the
Scarborough Shoal, bringing its naval presence to within 110 nautical miles of Subic Bay, the
once and possibly future focus of US naval power in the region.
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China impact – turns stuff
A War between the United States and China would cause WWIII, Causing
economic pain, disrupting global shipping patterns, and causing severe
industrial bottlenecks
Farley, 2014 (Robert Farley, Assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce, June 9, 2014, “Asia’s Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War”, National
Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asia-flames-us-china-war-10621)
How would it start? Who would win? Welcome to World War III. ¶ How does the unthinkable happen? As we wind our way to the
100thanniversary of the events that culminated in World War I, the question of unexpected wars looms large. What series of events
could lead to war in East Asia, and how would that war play out?¶ The
United States and China are inextricably
locked in the Pacific Rim’s system of international trade. Some argue that this makes war impossible, but
then while some believed World War I inevitable, but others similarly thought it impossible.¶ In this article I concentrate less on the
operational and tactical details of a US-China war, and more on the strategic objectives of the major combatants before, during, and
after the conflict.
A war between the United States and China would transform some aspects of
the geopolitics of East Asia, but would also leave many crucial factors unchanged. Tragically,
a conflict between China and the US might be remembered only as “The First Sino-American
War.Ӧ
How the War Would Start¶ Fifteen years ago, the only answers to “How would a war between the People’s Republic of
China and the United States start?” involved disputes over Taiwan or North Korea. A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a
North Korean attack on South Korea, or some similar triggering event would force the PRC and the US reluctantly into war.¶ This has
changed.
The expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means that we can envision several
different scenarios in which direct military conflict between China and the United States might
begin. These still include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea scenario, but now also involve
disputes in the East and South China Seas, as well as potential conflict with India along the
Tibetan border.¶ The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese
dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance commitments to a
variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold, the possibility for war will endure.¶
Whatever the trigger, the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations.
Although the US military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access assets before they can target US planes, bases, and
ships, it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay the political costs associated with
climbing the ladder of escalation.¶ Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. This doesn’t necessarily
mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have to wait for Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United
States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military
combat before it can begin engaging Chinese forces.¶ If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow the
United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first strike, or properly prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a
“bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead,
a brewing crisis will steadily escalate over a few incidents,
finally triggering a set of steps on the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that
Washington is genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups,
shifting deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons
towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need to decide whether to push forward or
back down.¶ On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions (the
US effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as
those of any co-belligerents. This will begin the economic pain for capital and consumers
across the Pacific Rim, and the rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also
disrupt global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in industrial
production.
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LOST solves hegemony – soft power
LOST is key to countering proliferation – soft power
Will Rogers 12, Center for a New American Security
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_SecurityAtSea_Rogers_0.pdf
Ratifying LOSC will bolster the U.S. ability to create bilateral and multilateral agreements with
other countries to counter WMD proliferation, one of the biggest threats to U.S. security
according to numerous analysts both in and outside of government.17 Government efforts to
strengthen land-based interdiction efforts are increasing maritime transit of dual-use
technologies critical to developing and deploying WMD. In just one striking example, in June 2011 a U.S. Navy
destroyer trailed a Belize-flagged ship suspected of carrying missile components to Burma and pressured the vessel to return to its
origin in North Korea.18 In particular, ratifying LOSC will strengthen programs such as the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), since key partner and potential partner countries often voice skepticism over U.S. commitments to these
transnational programs in light of the U.S. failure to ratify the convention. President George W. Bush launched PSI in 2003 to
leverage existing national laws to improve interception of materials in transit and halt WMD-related financial flows. LOSC ratification
will give PSI a stronger legal foundation under international law by removing “the bogus argument that PSI is a renegade regime that
flies in the face of international law,” according to Rear Admiral William D. Baumgartner, former U.S. Coast Guard Judge Advocate
General. “The net result will be more partners, more intelligence, more preemptive actions that help protect us from this most
serious threat.”19 Indeed,
removing this excuse for other countries’ non-participation in programs to
counter proliferation would benefit the United States diplomatically and could help in
negotiating future innovative solutions and programs.
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LOST solves – trafficking
Joining LOST helps US soft power and is key to fighting Proliferation and
Trafficking
Adm. Bob Papp, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, April 19, 2012, The Hill, “Benefits of joining the
Law of the Sea Convention”, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/222647-benefits-ofjoining-the-law-of-the-sea-convention
We live in a maritime world, and we rely on the sea for commerce. The Convention is the
international legal framework on usage of the oceans. We face a dynamic strategic
environment, and preserving freedom of navigation on the sea and protecting U.S.
maritime sovereignty remain key U.S. interests. Joining the Convention will lock in
vital navigational rights that ensure the mobility of Coast Guard cutters, Navy
warships, and other U.S. vessels and aircraft, and will protect America's sovereign
rights over offshore resources that the Coast Guard is charged with protecting on
behalf of the American people.¶ The Coast Guard is responsible for enforcing the nation's
laws on the waters and vessels over which we have jurisdiction, and our reach is global . The
Coast Guard stops an average of more than half a ton of cocaine each day far at sea
and prevents it from entering the United States. Excessive territorial sea claims by
other nations not only impact our mobility but can interfere with our drug interdiction
and other law enforcement activities. The Convention's 12-nautical mile territorial sea
boundary secures vital boarding rights for the Coast Guard. The Convention also secures the
important rights of approach and visit by Coast Guard cutters to determine a vessel's
nationality and provides the process for enforcing U.S. laws on the many stateless
vessels that dominate the illicit smuggling of drugs and people into the country.¶ The
Convention sets the overarching framework for cooperative law enforcement at sea,
an important force multiplier for the Coast Guard. We rely on bilateral and
multilateral international agreements and cooperation with partner nations to
effectively interdict and combat threats to America, especially drug trafficking,
migrant smuggling, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These
agreements ensure expeditious boarding, search, enforcement, and prosecution
decisions, enabling the Coast Guard to quickly counter the threat and then release onscene personnel, cutters, and aircraft to continue operations across a vast ocean
operating area. When diplomatic negotiations over where to bring and prosecute contraband
and detainees are prolonged because the U.S. is not a party to the Convention, we keep our front
line cutters and boarding teams sidelined from the battle. Joining the Convention better
positions the United States to interpret and demand adherence to Convention
provisions that ensure rapid disposition of cases, and better protect America's
maritime security.
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LOST solves hegemony – Navy
Law of the Sea provides global access and navigation rights to the U.S. Navy
Jim Garamone, May 9, 2012, “Dempsey Urges Ratification of Law of the Sea
Convention”, U.S. Department of Defense,
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116265
“It codifies navigational rights and freedoms essential for our global mobility,” he
said. “It helps sustain our combat forces in the field.”¶ In addition, the treaty also
affirms the sovereign immunity of U.S. warships and other public vessels. “And it
gives us the framework to counter excessive claims by states seeking to illegally
restrict movement of vessels and aircraft,” Dempsey said. “These are all rights and
capabilities that we want and that we need. In fact, they are of our own making. We
negotiated them into the convention to advance our national security interests.Ӧ More
than 160 nations are now a party to the convention. “Even so, the world looks to us for
leadership,” he said. “We have the world’s largest and most capable navy, largest
economy, and the largest exclusive economic zone. We will become the leader
within the convention as soon as we enter it. And that’s never been more
important.”¶ “As a party to the convention, we can help resolve conflicts,
strengthen alliances and foster innovative partnerships,” he said. “We have never
been better poised – or more welcomed – to lead a global security order benefiting
all peaceful nations.Ӧ The convention secures legitimate global freedom of access
for the U.S. armed forces, Dempsey told the audience. “Today, we rely on customary
international law and assert it through physical presence – warships and aircraft
transiting and challenging illegal restrictions,” he said. “Some say this alone is
sufficient.”¶ “We are strong enough for this role. We can and will continue to defend
our interests, and we’ll do that with force when necessary,” Dempsey said. “But we can
also be smart. We can leverage law to mitigate the need for physical assertion. Under
the Law of the Sea Convention, we can be both strong and smart.Ӧ Finally,
Dempsey said, joining the Law of the Sea Convention will strengthen America’s
strategic position in Asia. “The Western Pacific is a mosaic of competing claims for
territory and resources,” the chairman said. “This is a critical region where, as a
Pacific nation, our security and economic prosperity are inextricably linked.”
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LOST solves hegemony – Navy
UNCLOS is key to maintaining U.S. hegemony through complete legal access to
the oceans for the navy.
Martine E. Dempsey 2012 (Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) “Discussion regarding
accession to UNCLOS in the United States,” http://oceans.oprf-info.org/analysis_en/c1205.html
Acc. 6/24/14
First, joining
the convention would give U.S. Navy’s day-to-day maritime operations a firmer,
codified legal foundation. The United States relies on customary international law and
physical presence to secure global freedom of access. But there is risk in this approach. Tradition is a shaky basis upon
which to rest U.S. national security and the protection of U.S. forces. Customs can be disputed, and they can change . Joining the
convention would provide legal certainty to U.S. navigational freedoms and legitimacy to U.S.
maritime operations that customary law simply cannot . UNCLOS would affirm critical navigational freedoms and
reinforce the sovereign immunity of our warships as they conduct these operations. These include the right of transit through international straits, the
right to exercise high seas freedoms in foreign exclusive economic zones, and the right of innocent passage through foreign territorial seas. The
convention would also provide a stronger legal basis for some important activities such as stopping and boarding stateless vessels. Second, joining the
convention would provide a consistent and effective legal framework for opposing challenges to the rules-based international order in the maritime
domain. Around the globe nations are expanding their naval capabilities. We are also seeing countries expand their maritime claims—in the direction of
restricting movement on the oceans. Illegitimate expansionism could become particularly problematic in the Pacific and the Arctic Ocean, two regions
whose importance to our security and our economic prosperity will only increase over the next several decades. The convention would provide the
United States an important tool to help stave off jurisdictional creep in these areas and to resolve future conflicts peacefully and with less risk of
escalation. Last, being
a member of the convention would better allow the United States to exercise
global security leadership—a critical component of our global strategy. At this rate, the United
States is the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and the only Arctic nation that is not a party
to the convention. As a result, there are limits to U.S. ability to build coalitions for important international security efforts. The United States should
become party to the Law of the Sea Convention now and demonstrate our global maritime leadership.
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LOST – biodiversity
Law of the sea is key to maintaining biodiversity
Downes and Fontaubert 1996
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/BiodiversityinSeasEng.pdf
As the major global legal instrument on biodiversity, the Convention on Biological Diversity
can and should be a major force to stimulate and support much-needed law and policy
reforms to protect marine and coastal biodiversity. In 1995, the Partiesto the Convention
agreed on the Jakarta Mandate, a program forapplying the Convention in marine and coastal
areas. One essential means for advancing the Convention's goals will be to strengthen and
implement existing international agreements relating to marine living resources, such as the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the U.N. Agreement on Straddling andHighly
Migratory Fish Stocks.
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LOST – energy
UNCLOS gives U.S. legal rights to oil and gas, Arctic resources, and navigation
Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2012 (Secretary of State) “Discussion regarding accession to UNCLOS
in the United States,” http://oceans.oprf-info.org/analysis_en/c1205.html Acc. 6/24/14
First, for years, American oil and gas companies were not technologically ready to take advantage of the convention’s provisions
regarding the extended U.S. continental shelf. Now they are. The convention allows countries to claim sovereignty over their
continental shelf far out into the ocean, beyond 200 nautical miles from shore. The relevant area for the United States is probably
more than 1.5 times the size of Texas. U.S.
oil and gas companies are now ready, willing, and able to
explore this area. But they have made it clear to us that they need the maximum level of
international legal certainty before they will or could make the substantial investments, and,
we believe, create many jobs in doing so needed to extract these far-offshore resources. If the
Unites States were a party to the convention, we would gain international recognition of our sovereign rights, and therefore be able
to give our oil and gas companies this legal certainty. Staying
outside the convention, we simply cannot .
The
second development concerns deep seabed mining, which takes place in that part of the ocean floor that is beyond any country’s
jurisdiction. Now for years, technological challenges meant that deep seabed mining was only theoretical; today’s advances make it
very real. But it is also very expensive, and before any company will explore a mine site, it will naturally insist on having a secure title
to the site and the minerals that it will recover. The convention offers the only effective mechanism for gaining this title. China,
Russia, and many other countries are already securing their licenses under the convention. The third development
that is
now urgent is the emerging opportunities in the Arctic Ocean. As the area gets warmer, it is
opening up to new activities such as fishing, oil and gas exploration, shipping, and tourism.
This convention provides the international framework to deal with these new opportunities.
The United States is the only Arctic nation outside the convention. Russia and the other Arctic states are
advancing their continental shelf claims in the Arctic Ocean. As a party to the convention, we would have a much stronger basis to
assert our interests throughout the entire Arctic region. The fourth development is that the convention’s bodies are now up and
running. The U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that makes recommendations regarding countries’
continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles is actively considering submissions from over 40 countries without the participation of
a U.S. commissioner. International Seabed Authority (ISBA), the body addressing deep seabed mining, is now drawing up the rules to
govern the extraction of minerals of great interest to the United States and American industry. It simply should not be acceptable to
us that the United States will be absent from either of those discussions. Our negotiators obtained a permanent U.S. seat on the key
decision-making body for deep seabed mining. No other international body that accords one country and one country alone − us − a
permanent seat on its decision making body. But until we join, that reserved seat remains empty. Now as
a non-party to the
convention, the United States has to rely on what is called customary international law as a
legal basis for invoking and enforcing these norms. So far we have been fortunate, but our
navigational rights and our ability to challenge other countries’ behavior should stand on the
firmest and most persuasive legal footing available, including in critical areas such as the
South China Sea. The benefits of joining have always been significant, but today the costs of not joining are
increasing.
Please give advice and consent to this treaty before the end of this year.
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LOST – energy
U.S. urgently needs to ratify UNCLOS to secure natural resources
Stephen L. Kass August 31, 2012 (Co-Director, Environmental Practice Group) “United Nations
Convention on Law of the Sea and Climate Change” New York Law Journal, Acc. 6/24/14
High on the list of subjects that will neither be discussed nor acted on during the coming presidential campaign is U.S. ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the most
important international effort in history to protect the marine environment. This is unfortunate because ratification of
UNCLOS is not only in our national interest, but is now more
urgent than at any time since the Convention was first approved by the UN in 1982. Ironically, it is the failure of the
United States and other nations to limit their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that has given rise to conditions that now make UNCLOS attractive to some of the very business interests that have opposed GHG
limits. Despite the corporate support for UNCLOS by the oil and gas industry, shipping firms and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, opposition among Republican senators to any form of new international
agreement, whether environmental or otherwise, threatens to derail ratification of UNCLOS at a time when the marine environment is under extreme and potentially irreversible stress, with the most profound
implications for mankind. This column reviews the current status of efforts to ratify UNCLOS; the compelling economic, environmental and national security reasons for that action; and the often overlooked
relationship between climate change and the health of the oceans. It also suggests a possible approach to reconciling economic and environmental concerns if UNCLOS were to be ratified and urges both the
Obama administration and those favoring ratification to deal more directly with the canard that UNCLOS would undermine U.S. "sovereignty." Although UNCLOS was the product of many years of negotiation in
which the United States was actively involved, President Ronald Reagan declined to submit the 1982 Convention for Senate ratification principally because of objections to the deep sea-bed mining provisions of
UNCLOS's Article XI. When those objections were met by amendments to the Convention in 1994, both Presidents William Clinton and George W. Bush urged ratification on the ground that UNCLOS was, in
addition to its role in protecting the marine environment, important for future U.S. economic and security interests. For a variety of reasons, the Senate nevertheless failed to ratify UNCLOS, leaving the United
States as the only major nation absent from the Convention when it came into force in November 1994. This past spring the Obama administration, with strong support from both Senator John Kerry, the
Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Richard Lugar, the committee's ranking Republican member, made a renewed effort to ratify UNCLOS and dispatched Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey to testify in favor of ratification. At the same time, five former secretaries of state in
Republican administrations, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, James Baker III, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, all urged ratification in a widely circulated article in The Wall Street Journal. Secretary Clinton
pointed to four major developments that now make UNCLOS ratification even more important than it was in 1994: (1)
new technology permits U.S. companies
to exploit oil and gas reserves in the newly accessible continental shelf, which can be
recognized and accepted as U.S. territory by UNCLOS even beyond the United States' 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); (2)
similar improvements in deep seabed mining technology, which now make it feasible for U.S.
firms to extract rare earth and other minerals from the ocean floor outside of any nation's
jurisdiction ; (3) newly available oil and gas exploration, shipping, tourism and fishing in the
Arctic as a result of global warming ; and (4) the fact that two of UNCLOS's new international institutions, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the Continental
Shelf Commission (CSC), are now up and running without any U.S. participation. Panetta and Dempsey emphasized the national security implications of protecting U.S. rights of passage in newly accessible Arctic
sea routes as well as in other potentially contested sea lanes in the South China Sea. There are indeed compelling national security reasons for the United States to ratify UNCLOS, and U.S. participation in both the
CSC and the ISA is already overdue. Moreover, the opportunity to extend the reach of U.S. law (and U.S. energy policy) beyond the United States' EEZ offers potentially significant advantages, both economically
and environmentally, provided U.S. environmental laws are applied rigorously to Arctic and deep seabed mining activities. However, BP's Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as other
companies' spills in other coastal waters, make clear that the potentially serious risks of Arctic oil spills cannot be ignored, particularly in view of the far greater difficulty of containing and remediating a major spill
in isolated and challenging sea conditions and in locations where the impact of such a spill could be felt by a half-dozen nations bordering (and claiming sovereignty over) Arctic waters. Because the Deepwater
Horizon spill did not appear to cause any significant environmental impacts to other nations' coasts or marine life, the United States escaped the prospect of international damage claims for its failure to exercise
adequate supervision over its lessee BP. That might not be the case for an Arctic spill, where the injured parties might include Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom and Russia. Moreover, even vigorously enforced
U.S. regulation over Arctic drilling should not obscure the risk that the benefits from Arctic oil and gas will further sap what is left of U.S. efforts to develop renewable energy sources able to meet the nation's longterm energy requirements while reducing GHG emissions by the required 80 percent by 2050. Both the Obama administration and environmentalists undoubtedly welcome their newfound corporate allies in the
campaign for UNCLOS ratification. That support, however, should not come at the expense of a renewed effort by the Obama administration (a) to require more stringent regulation of offshore oil and gas
exploitation; (b) to fund and implement far more ambitious wind, solar, geothermal and even tidal energy projects (including transmission lines) concurrently with offshore drilling in the Arctic and elsewhere; and
(c) to finally put in place either a carbon tax or, failing that, a cap-and-trade program to discourage continuing reliance on fossil fuels (particularly coal and oil) by U.S. industry and consumers. It is not sufficiently
recognized just how much the Earth's oceans—as much or more than its atmosphere—are at risk from accelerating climate change. While the atmosphere absorbs about half of the world's carbon dioxide
emissions and can take decades (or even centuries) to overcome the warming effects of these and other emissions, the oceans absorb almost one-third of carbon dioxide emissions and can take centuries or
millennia to achieve a more "normal" state. During this period, the world's weather patterns can be severely affected in ways not yet fully understood (but which are clearly linked to both more rain and more
drought in food-producing areas), warming seas expand to erode coastlines and flood coastal cities, the increased acidity of ocean waters threatens coral reefs and, in turn, the marine life on which people also
depend for food. In addition to these long-term climate impacts, the Earth's oceans are increasingly threatened by land-based pollution from industrial effluent, fertilizer and pesticide runoff from farms, untreated
urban sewage, solid waste in the form of plastic, pollution from vessels and overfishing that has reduced many of the oceans' principal fishstocks nearly to extinction. UNCLOS, which was drafted before the effects
of climate change were widely recognized, seeks to curtail these ocean threats through a variety of techniques, ranging from regional agreements on threatened fishstocks to both generalized and, in some cases,
specific obligations on UNCLOS parties to avoid polluting the parties' territorial seas, their EEZs and the high seas. Articles 192-206 of UNCLOS set forth a broad range of general obligations of the parties to
prevent, reduce and control marine pollution, to cooperate on a global or regional basis, to notify other parties of imminent or actual damage to the oceans and to adopt contingency plans and provide technical
assistance to developing countries in combatting marine pollution. Articles 207-211 and 213-221 contain more specific obligations with respect to pollution from land-based sources, seabed activities, ocean
dumping and maritime vessels and the obligations of parties to enforce their respective laws and any applicable international rules and standards relating to such activities, including the enforcement obligations
of "flag states," "port states" and "coastal states" with respect to vessels flying their flag, visiting their ports or transiting their waters.
from this fall's presidential and congressional elections, at least some of the 34 Republican
One can only hope that , when the dust clears
senators who currently oppose UNCLOS will respond
to either the environmental, national security or economic opportunity arguments in favor of
ratification and permit the United States to begin to play the constructive role reserved for it
in the Convention.
While it is ironic that our nation's failure to limit our GHG emissions has contributed to the reasons that ratification is now attractive to some, UNCLOS will provide only
modest support for the genuine U.S. climate change policy that is necessary if we are to preserve the Earth's oceans in the condition that has nurtured human life and civilization. That effort will require the
support of those most likely to benefit economically from UNCLOS, and the Obama administration and the environmental community should make clear that any support for Artic or deep seabed mining by U.S.
firms under UNCLOS must be matched by those firms' support for a comprehensive program to protect the oceans by limiting our nation's GHG emissions.
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T – LOST meets “development”
U.S. ratification of LOST is exploitation
John B. Bellinger III (Adjunct Senior Fellow for International and National Security
Law) November 11, 2013, “Should the United States ratify the UN Law of the Sea?”
Acc. 6/22/14 http://www.cfr.org/treaties-and-agreements/should-united-states-ratify-unlaw-sea/p31828
Yes, the Senate should approve, and
the United States should join, the Law of the Sea Convention, to which 166 countries
are already party. When I was the legal adviser for the National Security Council, the Bush administration concluded after a careful interagency review that
the
Convention clearly serves U.S. national security, economic, and environmental interests. As a result,
the Bush Administration strongly supported Senate approval of the Convention, as does the Obama administration. I testified in favor of the Convention in both 2007 and 2012.
The Convention provides clear, treaty-based rights for U.S. ships and aircraft to travel through and over the territorial seas of other coastal states. This is why the U.S. Navy, with
the largest fleet in the world, has long supported the treaty. In this time of shrinking defense budgets, the Navy wants clear legal rights to freedom of navigation when
have more ships to assert these rights in practice. The Convention
it cannot
would also codify U.S. legal rights to exploit vast oil and gas
resources on our extended continental shelf off the coast of Alaska (an area the size of two Californias), to
mine valuable minerals on the deep seabed, and to lay and service submarine
telecommunications cables. U.S. companies are not willing to invest the billions of dollars
necessary to exploit Arctic resources unless they have the clear legal rights guaranteed by the
Convention. As a result, the treaty is also strongly supported by the U.S. business community, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, major oil companies, the
shipping and fishing industry, and telecommunications companies.
Unfortunately, some Republican Senators have blocked
Senate approval of the Law of the Sea Convention based on myths and misperceptions about the
treaty, including concerns that president Reagan opposed the treaty when it was originally drafted in 1982, and that it might now infringe on U.S. sovereignty. But the flaws
identified by president Reagan were fixed by amendments to the treaty in 1994 (which led all other major industrial countries to join the treaty). And far from infringing on U.S.
sovereignty, joining the Law of the Sea Convention would codify U.S. sovereignty over vast new oil and gas resources in the Arctic.
Other countries have
benefited greatly by joining the Convention, and the United States is losing out by remaining
on the sidelines.
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T – LOST meets “development”
Topicality: LOST is Development
Miguel de Serpa Soares, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs for the United Nations Legal
Council, 2/3/2014, “The Role of UNCLOS in Sustainible Dveolpment”, UN Office of Legal Affairs,
http://legal.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/mss/speeches/MSS_DOALOS_Side_event-3-Feb2014.pdf
Successive conferences on sustainable development have highlighted the important role ¶ of
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the ¶ sustainable
development of oceans and seas, as also recognized by the General Assembly ¶ in its annual
resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea.
Topicality: LOST Opens the Door to Development
John Moore, Recipient of the Morris I. Leibman Award in Law and National Security,
5/12/2004 “United States Adherence To The Law Of The Sea Convention”, House Committee
on International Relations, http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/house-testimony.pdf
It is no accident that the representatives of the National Oceans Industries ¶ Association, the
American Petroleum Institute, the Chamber of Shipping of ¶ America, the Chemical
Manufacturers Association, and the Congressionally ¶ established National Commission on
Oceans Policy support United States ¶ adherence to this Convention. The Convention provides a
strong legal basis for ¶ development of ocean resources and it provides strong guarantees of
navigational ¶ freedom so vital to United States trade around the world. To my knowledge, no ¶
United States industry association has opposed moving forward with the ¶ Convention.
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Politics – LOST link turn
Republican senators now shifting to embrace bipartisan support of UNCLOS
Joshua Brook, June 16 2013 (Attorney and a Truman Security Fellow) “LOST at Sea”
http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/lost-at-sea/ Acc. 6/25/14
Several weeks ago, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS). The
treaty, several decades in the making, is
supported by the military, the business and environmental
communities, five Republican secretaries of state, President Obama and former presidents Bill Clinton and even
George W. Bush. Supporters believe that the treaty will open up valuable ocean resources to
U.S. companies, strengthen our diplomatic hand in dealing with China, Iran, and North Korea,
and guarantee the legal rights of naval vessels in international waters. Nevertheless, a cadre of conservative
ideologues have rallied to oppose the treaty. Opponents, including George F. Will, Edwin Meese, and some conservative think tanks, argue that
UNCLOS or the Law of the Sea Treaty as they call it (LOST – get it?) will undermine U.S. sovereignty and transfer American treasure to the developing
world. Their arguments don’t hold much water, but because it takes only 34 out of 100 senators to sink a treaty, they may be able to capsize UNCLOS.
The treaty’s conservative critics speciously claim fidelity to the legacy of President Ronald Reagan, who refused to sign an earlier draft of the treaty
when it was opened for signature in 1982. Reagan opposed the seabed mining provisions in the original draft of the treaty, but issued a policy
statement that the United States would regard the rest of the treaty as binding, even though the USA was not legally a state-party. The specific
provisions Reagan objected to were modified in 1994, clearing the way for sensible Republicans to support it. (The Gipper actually had a mixed record
on international law. He spurned the World Court over its decision regarding the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors, but he also signed landmark human
rights treaties such as the Torture and Genocide Conventions.) Given
the overwhelming bipartisan support for
UNCLOS, critics were forced to admit that the treaty would confer significant advantages on
America if we were to ratify.
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A2 China advantage
Vietnam-China relations are high – China won’t let SCS conflict escalate
Rukmani Gupta 2011, October 23, The Diplomat “South China Sea Conflict? No Way”
http://thediplomat.com/2011/10/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/1/
Vietnam, too, hasn’t let its relationship with China be stymied by the disputes over the South
China Sea. The General Secretary of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, visited Beijing this
month, with the joint statement issued there stating that the two sides would ‘actively boost co-operation’ in offshore oil and gas
exploration and exploitation. It was also agreed that negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the
territorial disputes in the South China Sea would be speeded up, military cooperation
between China and Vietnam would be strengthened, a hotline between defence ministers
established and contacts between high-level officials would be increased. As of July 2011, China,
ranking 14th among Vietnam’s foreign investors, had 805 operational projects in Vietnam with a capitalized value of $4.2 billion.
Furthermore, China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner since 2004. Bilateral trade between the
two was valued at $27 billion in 2010. In the event of military hostilities, the first casualty would be the economic relationship, an
outcome both countries are keen to avoid. Despite what opinion pieces in the Global Times may say, there’s reason to suspect that
China doesn’t want to escalate conflict in the region. Although commentary from the United States has suggested that China
considers the South China Sea a ‘core interest,’ no official Chinese writing can be found to corroborate this. In addition, China’s
caution can also be seen as a reflection on Chinese military capabilities, which aren’t seen as
strong enough to win a war over the South China Sea. In fact, the China National Defence News, published by
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s General Political Department, has likened the use of force by China in the South China Sea to
shooting one’s own foot. Not only would the use of force bring ASEAN together on the issue, it could conceivably involve the United
States and Japan, derail China’s plans for continued economic growth and undo China’s diplomacy. Chinese declarations on the
South China Sea can therefore be seen as attempts to exaggerate claims so as to secure a better negotiating stance.
Turn – America can only lose diplomatic influence by subjecting its power to the
LOST framework
Frank Gaffney, May 5, 2012, “Law of the Sea Treaty Is Wrong for US”, Newsmax,
http://www.newsmax.com/FrankGaffney/Law-Sea-Treaty Senate/2012/06/05/id/441292/
Still, this S&R agreement suggests the obvious: It is far easier to achieve
understandings in a group of eight — or, better yet, five — nations that have
similar, if not identical, interests and a shared understanding of the stakes, than
among a group of 150-plus nations, most of whom do not.
Just as common sense argues for using bilateral or, at most, five-party forums to
establish arrangements governing the Arctic Ocean’s resources, it strongly militates
against the United States allowing itself to be bound to a treaty whose core
provisions (i.e., those governing limitations on territorial claims and mandatory dispute
resolutions) are already being serially violated by Communist China.
On May 9, Secretary Panetta nonetheless asserted that “By moving off the sidelines,
by sitting at the table of nations that have acceded to this treaty, we can defend
our interests, we can lead the discussions, we will be able to influence those
treaty bodies that develop and interpret the Law of the Sea.”
That is simply not so if, as is true of the LOST’s various institutions, we would have
but one seat among many, and no certainty that we can decisively “influence
bodies that develop and interpret the law of the sea.”
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A2 China-U.S. impact
US-China war won’t happen – not in the interests for either country
Carlyle A Thayer, UNSW Canberra 13 May 2013
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-the-us-wont-go-to-war-over-thesouth-china-sea/
So the bottom line is that, despite ongoing frictions in their relationship, the United States and China will
continue engaging with each other. Both sides understand that military-to-military contacts
are a critical component of bilateral engagement. Without such interaction there is a risk that
mistrust between the two militaries could spill over and have a major negative impact on
bilateral relations in general. But strategic mistrust will probably persist in the absence of greater
transparency in military-to-military relations. In sum, Sino-American relations in the South China
Sea are more likely to be characterised by cooperation and friction than a modus vivendi of collaboration
or, a worst-case scenario, armed conflict.
Military cooperation between the U.S. and China will stabilize any conflict
Xinhua 6/26/12
(Xinhua, “China, U.S. to forge new military relations,” 6/26/12,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/26/c_123334081.htm /mr)
BEIJING, June 26 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie met here on Tuesday with Samuel Locklear,
head of the U.S. Pacific Command, vowing to forge a new type of military ties.¶ China-United States
relations have kept moving forward in the past 40 years despite ups and downs, said Liang, noting
that the main reason has been the broad common interests shared by the two sides.¶ Healthy, stable
development of China-United States relations is not only in the interests of the two countries,
but also conducive to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the
world, he added.¶ China and the United States both have important domestic political agendas
this year and have to concentrate on economic recovery, development and reform, so it is a
common need of both sides to maintain the steady development of bilateral ties , according to the
defense minister.¶ Chinese President Hu Jintao raised a four-point proposal on forging a new model of
relations between the two world powers during his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in
Mexico last week, which has pointed out the direction for bilateral relations, he noted.¶ Liang called on the
two armed forces to establish a rapport based on equality, mutual benefit and win-win
cooperation, which is corresponding to the new model of bilateral relations.¶ He also reviewed his
meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta in May, noting that China is ready to work with the United
States to beef up high-level military exchanges, deepen cooperation in non-traditional
security, and develop bilateral military ties.¶ He also elaborated on China's stance on the U.S. side's adjustment of
its Asia-Pacific strategy as well as reconnaissance activities by U.S. warships and planes close to China.¶ Locklear affirmed the
importance of China-United States relations as well as bilateral military relations.¶
Although there remain differences
between the two sides on some issues, they have common interests in broader areas , he pointed
out.¶ In order to safeguard the common interests of the two sides and build a safe international environment, he called on the two
armed forces to further enhance dialogue, communication and cooperation.
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No risk of US-Russia war – This evidence assumes Ukraine invasion
MARK KARLIN, 2014 EDITOR OF BUZZFLASH AT TRUTHOUT Thursday, March 09:19 “The
Major Reason There Will Be No War With Russia: They Are Rasputin Capitalists Now”
http://www.truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/the-major-reason-there-will-be-no-war-withrussia-they-are-shady-capitalists-now/18564-the-major-reason-there-will-be-no-war-withrussia-they-are-shady-capitalists-now
All this talk of a new cold war is just a lot of political blather coming out of DC due to the reemergence of the neocons. The reality is that there will be no war with the Russian Federation
because Russia is now a raffish capitalist nation. Let us just remember Vladimir Putin was a lieutenant colonel in
the KGB (for 16 years) at a time that they might have surpassed the CIA for lacking scruples, although probably not by much. Since
Putin assumed power in Russia in 2000, he has served as either president or prime minister of the Russian Federation, effectively
being the most powerful man in the nation for the past 13 years. There
is no ideological conflict with Russia now,
no wall to bring to down, no communism to overthrow. Under Putin, the Russian Federation has become a
full-fledged member of the global capitalist system, only with the sleight variation that the Russian mafia plays an open role in the
free market system. Instead of bankers crushing people with financial maneuverings, the Russian oligarchs allegedly prefer using
their friends "Smith and Wesson" to resolve business disputes. Who better to oversee the full emergence of Russian capitalism -mafia style -- than the shirtless former KGB agent, Vladimir Putin? There is
much speculation that Putin assumed
control of Crimea (where it is speculated that most residents identify with Russia more than the Ukraine) after NATO
overreached by offering Ukraine membership in 2008. Ukraine never became a NATO member due to internal
political upheaval. Yet, with the latest unrest and overthrow of pro-Russian leadership in Ukraine, Putin no doubt assumed that new
Ukrainian leadership might turn to NATO as a way to intidimidate Putin. During the confusion over the power shift in Ukraine this
year, Putin sent Russian troops into the Crimea as a likely warning to the US and NATO that he was not going to let US and Europe
get any closer to the Russian border. He
was, in essence, protecting his turf, just as a drug dealer might do. This is
not a confrontation over ideology; it is a turf war for hegemony.
Even a rapid US-Russia war would end in peace negotiations before nukes
were launched – Russian generals concede.
Ivashov ‘7 (Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. July 2007 “WILL
AMERICA FIGHT RUSSIA”. Defense and Security, No 78. LN
Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything
may begin as a local conflict that
will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia:
say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access
to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts,
infrastructure) will
be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation.
even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the
deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be
met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of
defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may
follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save
face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of
the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO
control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the
Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with
the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations
into motion.
Once this phase is over, an
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No Russia/China war – deterrence and economics check
Garnett 1 (Sherman, Dean of James Madison College – Michigan State University, Washington Quarterly, Autumn,
Lexis)
Perceiving this partnership as a reversal of the balance in the old strategic triangle is
also a mistake. Such a view overestimates Sino-Russian leverage, especially given
Russia's economic weakness and the current military balance. Most critically, it
misdiagnoses an emerging security environment that cannot be reduced to a triangle. Japan, the two Koreas, key
Central Asian states, India and many other countries have a direct say in many of the core issues of interest to
Russia, China, and the United States. All three powers must adjust to these new actors and to the new patterns
their actions will engender on important trade, energy, environmental and security questions. Such a view
underestimates the continued leverage Washington has in its bilateral ties
over both Moscow and Beijing, even in the aftermath of the Friendship Treaty and the crisis in SinoU.S. relations over the downed spy plane earlier this year. Russia and China need trade and
investment far in excess of what the other can provide.
Negotiations solve
Chicago Tribune 4 (10-15, Lexis)
China and Russia settled the last of their decades-old border disputes Thursday during a
visit to Beijing by President Vladimir Putin, signing an agreement fixing their 2,700-mile-long
border for the first time. The struggle over border areas resulted in violent
clashes in the 1960s and 1970s, when strained Sino-Soviet relations were at their most acrimonious,
feeding fears abroad that the conflict could erupt into nuclear war. Beijing and
Moscow had reached agreements on individual border sections as relations warmed in the past decade. But a
stretch of river and islands along China's northeastern border with Russia's Far East had remained in dispute.
Fear of escalation checks
Moriarty 4 (Tom, Military Intelligence Analyst – U.S. Air Force, World Affairs, 9-22, Lexis)
However, the Soviet Union ultimately chose to forgo a preemptive attack and attempted to defuse
tensions through diplomatic channels. Numerous reasons led Soviet leaders to decide against preemptive attack.
The main reason was the Soviet Union's fear that even if they could destroy all of
China's nuclear weapons capability (which, in itself, was a big assumption), they feared a
conventional attack by China. Like the United States during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union
understood that they would lose the ability to prevent the crisis from escalating into a full-blown war. Soviet
leaders grew concerned that China would respond with a prolonged people's
war against the Soviet Union. Knowing that a prolonged war against a country with more than one
billion people and a proven resiliency would exhaust the Soviet Union and would require forces to
be withdrawn from Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders chose to ignore the Chinese
provocations and let the confrontation defuse naturally. (12)
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U.S. involvement does not solve the bigges threats to insecurity – withdrawal
would not be a disaster.
Barbara Conry is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, hottest woman evar, 1997 [U.S.
"Global Leadership": A Euphemism for World Policeman, February 5, Policy Analysis no. 267,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1126&full=1]
In other words, if America abdicates its role as world leader, we are condemned to repeat the
biggest mistakes of the 20th century--or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is
seriously flawed, however. First, to assert that U.S. leadership can stave off otherwise
inevitable global chaos vastly overestimates the power of any single country to
influence world events. The United States is powerful, but it still can claim only 5 percent of
the world's population and 20 percent of world economic output. Moreover, regardless of the
resources Americans might be willing to devote to leading the world, today's
problems often do not lend themselves well to external solutions. As Maynes has
pointed out, Today, the greatest fear of most states is not external aggression but
internal disorder. The United States can do little about the latter, whereas it used to be
able to do a great deal about the former. In other words, the coinage of U.S. power in the
world has been devalued by the change in the international agenda. [58] Indeed, many
of the foreign policy problems that have confounded Washington since the demise of the
Soviet Union are the kinds of problems that are likely to trouble the world well into the next
century. "Failed states," such as Somalia, may not be uncommon. But, as the ill-fated
U.S. and UN operations in that country showed, there is very little that outside powers
can do about such problems. External powers usually lack the means to prevent or
end civil wars, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, unless they are willing
to make a tremendous effort to do so. Yet those types of internecine conflicts are likely to be
one of the primary sources of international disorder for the foreseeable future.
Despite the doomsayers who prophesy global chaos in the absence of U.S.
leadership, however, Washington's limited ability to dampen such conflicts is not cause
for panic. Instability is a normal feature of an international system of sovereign
states, which the United States can tolerate and has tolerated for more than two
centuries. If vital American interests are not at stake, instability itself becomes a serious
problem only if the United States blunders into it, as it did in Somalia and Bosnia.
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Their impact is silly – U.S. engagement actually increases the likelihood of war
in Asia and Europe – these areas can easily secure themselves.
Gholz and Daryl G. Press (doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute
and Harvey M. Sapolsky (Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at
M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program Spring 1997 “come home America – the
Eugene
of Technology)
strategy of restraint in the face of temptation” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4
The selective engagers’ strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the
effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today’s world,
disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably
prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of
conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate
the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure.
Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the
United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for
America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight.
Selective engagers overstate America’s effect on the likelihood of future great power
wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to
deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America’s major allies have
sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt
from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East
Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk
of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country’s attempt to achieve
security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors’ attempts to
eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch
preventive war.71 But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages.
Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has
a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which
stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever- trusted ally,
strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an
attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In
fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East
Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued U.S. engagement does not
reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union,
controlling more than 21 percent of the world’s GDP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44
percent of the world’s GDP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more
NATO frightens Russia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect
its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states.72 But if the U.S. military
were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe’s strongest advocate for NATO
expansion, might become less enthusiastic, because it would be German rather than American
troops standing guard on the new borders.
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Law of the Sea Treaty would hurt the US economy and lead to Proliferation
Peter Roff, editor at U.S. News & World Report, U.S. News & World Report, May 10, 2012,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2012/05/10/kill-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty ¶
The Law of the Sea Treaty would do irreparable harm to U.S.
military and intelligence operations and would force the United
States to hand over proprietary technology to countries actively
hostile to U.S. interests. It would also create a system for
resolving disputes lying outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. legal
system, leaving American citizens and businesses at the mercy of
international tribunals whose members are not necessarily adherents to
Western political or legal traditions and who may not hail from democratic
nations.¶ The Law of the Sea Treaty, as previously mentioned,
establishes a global bureaucracy that could leave U.S.
businesses awash in a sea of destructive environmental regulations
that would be costly and anticompetitive while these same bureaucrats
handed out U.S. government money to give the economies of
unfriendly countries a boost. The treaty would, Hanna says, impose
global royalties and fees on American energy companies that will destroy
U.S. jobs and make energy from traditional sources like natural gas and oil even
more expensive. It might also embolden the military of countries like
the People's Republic of China, who could use its language to justify a
more aggressive posture in the South China Sea, while at the
same time impeding the ability of the United States to interdict
weapons of mass destruction being transported from one nation
to another on the high seas.
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U.S. Navy ensures hegemony – LOST is not necessary, only risk of a turn
Jim Inhofe, May 22, 2012, “Law of the Sea would usurp U.S. Navy’s authority”, Politico,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76627.html
It is true that the treaty’s navigational articles codify noncontroversial traditional maritime
rules of the road. But the Navy has successfully preserved and protected its
navigational rights and freedoms for 200 years without it. For the treaty to be
“essential for our global mobility,” the Navy would have to suffer a devastating
decline — either from drastic budget cuts or a major reduction in its mission and
capabilities. Ceding any authority to an international body is not only a threat to our
sovereignty, it also creates another avenue for other nations to stop U.S. unilateral
activity. Could it be that some have decided to put their hope in a piece of paper
rather than provide the resources necessary to maintain our Navy’s traditional
strength? Does this U.N. treaty provide real justification for such devastating cuts? If
not, we need detailed explanations from our top military officials.
Law of the Sea is unnecessary and detrimental to US hegemony
SEN. ROGER WICKER et al 2012, SEN. JIM INHOFE, and SEN. JEFF SESSIONS 5/22/
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76627.html
A steady stream of admirals and service chiefs over many years have advocated for the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, or the Law of the Sea Treaty — an accord rejected by
President Ronald Reagan in 1982. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
for example, said this treaty “codifies navigational rights and freedoms essential for our global
mobility.” It is true that the treaty’s navigational articles codify noncontroversial traditional
maritime rules of the road. But the Navy has successfully preserved and protected its
navigational rights and freedoms for 200 years without it. For the treaty to be “essential for
our global mobility,” the Navy would have to suffer a devastating decline — either from drastic
budget cuts or a major reduction in its mission and capabilities. Ceding any authority to an
international body is not only a threat to our sovereignty, it also creates another avenue for
other nations to stop U.S. unilateral activity .
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Law of the Sea is a dangerous use of funds that will ultimately hurt American
interests
Groves 2011 Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, self-governance and independence as
leader of The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Project. Groves, who is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in
Heritage’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, also advocates American leadership on issues involving international political and
religious freedom, human rights and democratic institutions.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/accession-to-un-convention-law-of-thesea-is-unnecessary-to-secure-us-navigational-rights-freedoms
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a controversial and fatally
flawed treaty. Accession to the convention would result in a dangerous and irreversible loss of
American sovereignty. It would require the U.S. Treasury to transfer tens, if not hundreds, of
billions of dollars to an unaccountable international organization in Jamaica, which in turn is
empowered to redistribute those American dollars to countries with interests that are inimical
to the U.S. The convention’s mandatory dispute mechanisms will result ultimately in
troublesome and costly legal judgments if the United States is deemed to have “violated” the
convention—most likely when the United States has acted in its own best interests.
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Not reverse-causal – no silver bullets
COLIN S. GRAY April 2011. Professor of International Poli- tics and Strategic Studies at the
University of Reading, England. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
(London), and at Hudson Institute (Croton-on-Hudson, NY) before founding the Na- tional
Institute for Public Policy, a defense-oriented think tank in the Washington, DC, area. Dr. Gray
served for 5 years in the Reagan administration on the President’s General Advisory Committee
on Arms Control and Disarmament. He has served as an ad- viser to both the U.S. and British
governments (he has dual citizenship). His government work has included studies of nuclear
strategy, arms control, maritime strategy, space strategy and the use of special forces. Dr. Gray
has written 24 books. “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” SSI Monograph, .pdf online
It bears repeating because it passes unnoticed that culture, and indeed civilization itself, are
dynamic, not static phenomena. They are what they are for good and sufficient local
geographical and historical reasons, and cannot easily be adapted to fit changing political and
strategic needs. For an obvious example, the dominant American strategic culture, though allowing exceptions, still retains its principal features , the exploitation of technology and
mass.45 These features can be pathological when circumstances are not narrowly conducive to
their exploitation . Much as it was feared only a very few years ago that, in reaction to the
neglect of culture for decades previously, the cultural turn in strategic studies was too sharp, so
today there is a danger that the critique of strategic culturalism is proceeding too far.46 The
error lies in the search for, and inevitable finding of, “golden keys” and “silver bullets” to
resolve current versions of en- during problems. Soft-power salesmen have a potent productmix to sell, but they fail to appreciate the reality that American soft power is a product
essentially unalterable over a short span of years. As a country with a cultural or civilizational
brand that is unique and mainly rooted in deep historical, geographical, and ideational roots,
America is not at liberty to emu- late a major car manufacturer and advertise an extensive and
varied model range of persuasive soft-power profiles. Of course, some elements of soft power
can be emphasized purposefully in tailored word and deed. However, foreign perceptions of the
United States are no more developed from a blank page than the American past can be retooled
and fine-tuned for contemporary advantage. Frustrating though it may be, a country cannot
easily escape legacies from its past .
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Geneva failure proves American credibility cannot be revived**
Caroline Glick (Caroline B. Glick is the senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy
in Washington, D.C., and the deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post) Nov 15, 2013.
“The Demise of Pax Americana,” http://townhall.com/columnists/carolineglick/2013/11/15/thedemise-of-pax-americana-n1747202
Most analyses of what happened in Geneva last week have centered on what the failure of
the talks means for the future of Obama’s foreign policy.¶ ¶ Certainly Obama, now universally
reviled by America’s allies in the Middle East, will be diplomatically weakened. This diplomatic
weakness may not make much difference to Obama’s foreign policy, because appeasement and
retreat do not require diplomatic strength.¶ ¶ But the real story of what happened last week is far
more significant than the future of Obama’s foreign policy. Last week it was America that lost
credibility, not Obama. It was America that squandered the essential component of global
leadership. And that is the watershed event of this young century .¶ ¶ States act in concert
because of perceived shared interests. If Israel and Saudi Arabia combine to attack Iran’s
nuclear installations it will be due to their shared interest in preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear arsenal. But that concerted action will not make them allies.¶ ¶ Alliances are based on
the perceived longevity of the shared interests , and that perception is based on the
credibility of international actors.¶ ¶ Until Obama became president, the consensus view of the
US foreign policy establishment and of both major parties was that the US had a permanent
interest in being the hegemonic power in the Middle East. US hegemony ensured three
permanent US national security interests: preventing enemy regimes and terror groups from
acquiring the means to cause catastrophic harm; ensuring the smooth flow of petroleum
products through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal; and demonstrating the credibility of
American power by ensuring the security of US allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. The third
interest was an essential foundation of US deterrence of the Soviets during the Cold War, and of
the Chinese over the past decade.¶ ¶ Regardless of who was in the White House, for the better
part of 70 years, every US government has upheld these interests. This consistency built US
credibility, which in turn enabled the US to throw its weight around.¶ ¶ Obama departed from
this foreign policy consensus in an irrevocable manner last week. In so doing, he destroyed
US credibility.¶ ¶ It doesn’t matter who succeeds Obama. If a conservative internationalist in the
mold of Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy or Ronald Reagan is elected in 2016, Obama’s legacy
will make it impossible for him to rebuild the US alliance structure . US allies will be willing to
buy US military platforms – although not exclusively.¶ ¶ They will be willing to act in a concerted
manner with the US on a temporary basis to advance specific goals.¶ ¶ But they will not be
willing to make any longterm commitments based on US security guarantees.¶ ¶ They will not
be willing to place their strategic eggs in the US basket.¶ ¶ Obama has taught the world that the
same US that elected Truman and formed NATO, and elected George H.W. Bush and threw
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, can elect a man who betrays US allies and US interests to
advance a radical ideology predicated on a rejection of the morality of American power. Any US
ally is now on notice that US promises – even if based on US interests – are not reliable .
American commitments can expire the next time America elects a radical to the White House.
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Law of the Sea diminishes US global influence – Reduces access to minerals
Thomas W Jacobson 2011 Published by The Center for Sovereignty and Security
A Division of Freedom Alliance http://freedomalliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/Ratifying-UN-Treaty.pdf
LOST claims authority and ownership of 71 percent of the surface of the Earth. Instead of recognizing
the obvious truth and historical fact that no person, nation, or government owns the open seas and skies reasonably beyond
national borders, LOST vaguely claims, “The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind” [Part XI, Art. 136]. The
Treaty defines the Area as “the seabed and ocean floor,” subsoil, and skies, “beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” [Preamble;
Part I, Art. 1(1)]. By the “common heritage” claim,
the Treaty seeks to bring nearly three-fourths of the
Earth’s surface under ISA and developing nations control. As Doug Bandow wrote in a report for the
Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Among the precedents enshrined by the LOST is that the nation states—not peoples—of the world
LOST declares, “No State may validly purport to
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty,” or exercise “sovereign rights over any
part of the Area or its resources.” [Part VII, Art. 89; Part XI, Art. 137]. Party Nations as a whole claim global jurisdiction
collectively own ‘all the unclaimed wealth of this Earth.’”5 Thus,
over the high seas, and all its resources, and agree together that they have no right to any individual claim that they themselves
don’t approve.
If the USA ratifies LOST, then “ownership” of “the Area” goes to the United Nations
and ISA, both global government entities. Subsequently, whatever the U.S. Navy, Air Force, Army, Marines, Coast
Guard, Government, or American Companies did or desired to do on, under, or above international waters could be subject to ISA
oversight and approval.
The U.S. Government and American companies would lose the right to make
any sovereign or independent claim on the resources in international waters, and U.S.
authority within its own continental shelf would be diminished. Mr. Bandow observed, “Granting
ownership and control to Third World autocracies with no relationship to the resource nor any ability to contribute anything to their
development makes neither moral nor practical sense.”
Law of the Sea costs billions of dollars through sovereignty challenges and trials
Groves and Loris 7/9/2012 Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, self-governance and
independence as leader of The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Project. Groves, who is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior
Research Fellow in Heritage’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, also advocates American leadership on issues involving
international political and religious freedom, human rights and democratic institutions.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/07/law-of-the-sea-treaty-bad-for-american-energy-policy
Accession to UNCLOS would sacrifice American sovereignty by exposing our nation to baseless
environmental lawsuits that would punish Americans both as taxpayers and as consumers. The
treaty would further sacrifice sovereignty by requiring the U.S. to forfeit billions of dollars in
oil and gas royalty revenue. The U.S. should pursue oil and gas development as a sovereign
nation, continuing the tradition of American Presidents in proclaiming the nation’s maritime and
resource rights and without acceding to a deeply flawed treaty or seeking the approval of an
international commission of experts housed at the United Nations.
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UNCLOS hurts US resource access and development – 3 reasons
Heritage Action for America 2014 “Why the “Law of the Sea Treaty” is Still a Bad Idea” For too long, big-government
special interests have dominated Washington. Heritage Action believes Washington should work for America’s best interest, and we
hold them accountable to ensure they do.http://heritageaction.com/stoplost/why-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty-is-still-a-bad-idea/
• Redistribution of U.S. Wealth to the “Developing World”: The U.S. currently enjoys full
sovereignty over its entire continental shelf. It can claim all its mineral resources (e.g., oil and
gas) and can collect royalty revenue from oil and gas companies for exploitation. If the U.S.
joined UNCLOS, Article 82 would require the U.S. to transfer a significant portion of any such
royalties to the ISA for “redistribution” to the so-called developing world, including corrupt
and despotic regimes. • Mandatory Dispute Resolution: Under Part XV, the U.S. would be
required to engage in mandatory dispute resolution for any claim brought against it by
another member of UNCLOS. This may open the U.S. to any number of specious allegations
brought by opportunistic nations, including allegations of environmental degradation or
polluting the ocean environment with carbon emissions or even from land-based sources. •
U.S. Economic Interests at Risk: UNCLOS claims the deep seabed resources of the oceans as
“the common heritage of mankind” and forbids mining unless permission is first received by
the ISA, which, of course, takes into account the interests of “developing states” regarding the
exploitation of those resources. UNCLOS encourages technology transfers from advanced
mining companies to support the mining activities by developing states, which is likely to
discourage U.S. companies from participating in such activities.
U.S. joining the LOST forces high royalties to be paid on resources collected.
Steven Groves, June 14, 2012, (Senior Researcher for the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The
Heritage Foundation) “The Law of the Sea: Costs of U.S. Accession to UNCLOS”
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2012/06/the-law-of-the-sea-convention-treaty-doc-103-39 Acc. 6/24/14
no treaty comes without costs. As with comprehensive legislation, there are often provisions of a treaty that are
that are controversial and divisive. This rule generally holds true
for all treaties, including those involving arms control, human rights, the environment, international courts, and others. UNCLOS is no exception. However,
unlike most other treaties, the terms of UNCLOS prevent the United States from exempting itself from its
more controversial provisions. Specifically, pursuant to Article 309, UNCLOS forbids states parties from
submitting reservations or exceptions that would otherwise allow the United States to
disregard provisions that do not comport with the U.S. Constitution or long-standing U.S. law
and policy. My testimony today focuses on the costs associated with U.S. accession to UNCLOS and whether the benefits of accession are such that the costs are
By its nature,
uncontroversial and attractive in themselves. Likewise, there are other provisions
outweighed. The costs of accession are not imaginary. Nor is opposition to U.S. accession based on purist ideology, but rather on the available evidence, current U.S. law and
policy, customary international law, U.S. experience in other international organizations, the U.S. record in international tribunals, and of course the provisions of the convention
If the U.S. accedes to UNCLOS, it will be required by Article 82 to transfer royalties
generated from hydrocarbon production of the U.S. “extended continental shelf” (ECS) to the
International Seabed Authority for redistribution to developing and landlocked countries. Since the value of the
hydrocarbon resources lying beneath the U.S. ECS may be worth trillions of dollars, the
amount of royalties that the U.S. Treasury would be required to transfer to the Authority
would be substantial. In any event, U.S. accession would amount to an open-ended commitment to forgo an incalculable amount of royalty revenue for no
appreciable benefit. U.S. accession to UNCLOS is not necessary to develop or secure title to the hydrocarbon
resources of the ECS. Under international law and long-standing U.S. policy and practice, the
U.S. has established full jurisdiction and control over its ECS and is in the process of delimiting
its ECS boundaries on a worldwide basis. The successful delimitation of areas of U.S. ECS and subsequent leasing of those areas in the Gulf of
itself. In summary:
Mexico to U.S. and foreign oil exploration companies demonstrate that the United States does not need to achieve universal international recognition of its ECS to provide
“certainty” to oil exploration companies.
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LOST NEG – politics link
Conservative forces will fight LOST to the death
Fox News July 17 2012 http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/07/16/sea-treaty-all-butdead-34-gop-senators-oppose/ (associated press)
A treaty governing the high seas is all but dead in the Senate as two Republican senators
announced their opposition Monday, giving conservative foes the necessary votes to scuttle
the pact. Sens. Rob Portman of Ohio and Kelly Ayotte of New Hampshire -- both mentioned as
possible running mates for likely Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney -- said they had
serious concerns about the breadth and ambiguity of the Law of the Sea treaty and would
oppose it if called up for a vote. The Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate -- 67 votes
-- to ratify a treaty; Portman and Ayotte bring the number of opponents to 34 along with Sens.
Mike Johanns, R-Neb., and Johnny Isakson, R-Ga. The development was a blow to the Obama
administration, military leaders and the business community led by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, who had argued that the treaty would improve national security and enhance U.S.
standing in the world. They had pressed for ratification of the treaty, which was concluded in
1982 and has been in force since 1994. The United States is the only major nation that has
refused to sign the pact.
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LOST NEG – midterms link
Voters are fearful and are opposed to LOST and UN treaties
Brain Hardzinski & Suzette Grillot, June 13 2014, (BBC writers, KGOU) “How Local Partisan
Politics Affects U.S. Foreign Policy,” http://kgou.org/post/how-local-partisan-politics-affects-usforeign-policy, Acc. 6/23/14
Even when foreign policy initiatives receive wide bipartisan support, like support for Ukraine after the Russian annexation of Crimea, the broader discourse is still politicized.
Gries says President Obama is still slammed consistently by GOP opponents for being too soft on Russian President Vladimir Putin. “That is not just partisan posturing,” Gries
when our senators and other elected representatives make these kinds of
arguments, they’re reflecting deeper ideologies that they hold, that are actually reflective of
the primary voters who elect them.” Gries’ research showed a clear distinction that Republicans and most conservatives support the use of military
says. “I actually think that
force much more than liberals and Democrats, who tend to favor diplomatic solutions. But he says those averages paint too broad a portrait, with President Obama the most notable
example of a group of Democrats he calls “forceful idealists.” “He’s not one of these kids of the hippie generation who will not use force in any circumstance. In his Nobel Prize
acceptance speech, he argued that there’s evil in this world, and sometimes force is needed,” Gries says. “There were conservatives in the administration who counseled against
him doing what he did in Benghazi. He went out beyond what our allies wanted to do – Britain and France – because he was concerned about a genocide, he was willing to use
force.” Gries serves as the director of OU’s Institute for U.S./China Issues, and started this entire project when his early survey work showed American attitudes about social issues
like abortion fit with American attitudes about China. “That didn’t particularly surprise me given that China’s one-child policy has gotten a lot of press,” Gries says. “But then I
discovered that culture war issues like school prayer would also track onto attitudes toward China. So that got me more and more interested. Is there something deeper and
ideological here?” “What you find is this pattern of different kinds of liberals and conservatives sometimes disagreeing with each other, but usually agreeing,” Gries says. “And it
depends on how many different kinds of liberals and conservatives agree in their disagreement, basically, that determines how strong these overall differences are between liberals
and conservatives.” I guess when we look at the level of things like the big outcomes in American politics like presidential elections, usually foreign policy is not a major issue.
Now it can be in certain contexts, such as during the Vietnam War. It played a major role. So the salience of foreign affairs in presidential elections can vary substantially. But
these attitudes that the American people hold can have an impact on a whole range of issues that impact lots of different groups of Americans that is less big, and visible than
there have been several international treaties that have been
up for ratification in the U.S. Senate recently. UNCLOS is the law of the sea, and that's something that our Pentagon and our business
groups are passionate that we need to pass for our business interests and for our national security. And yet, I think 35 Republican senators blocked its
passage last year. Why? Because their constituents, the primary voters who elected them, are
very fearful of the UN. They do not trust international treaties. Or say you have someone in your family who is handicapped and they want to travel outside of
presidential elections. To take a couple of recent examples,
the United States, or you're a veteran who has been injured in war, but you want to go to Canada or Mexico. Well, the U.S. has not ratified the UN treaty on the disabled, either,
because the Republican senators are doing what their primary voters voted for them to do, which is to oppose any kind of international treaty. So these attitudes among the extreme
ends of Main Street do end up shaping the behaviors, I believe, of our elected representatives, even when they're more discreet, influencing specific policy outcomes, and not
necessarily the most visible thing, which is our presidential elections. In which case, it's usually only one of many variables, and usually, to be honest, not the most important.
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Steven Wagner
Conflict between Russia and China Leads to Nuclear Confrontation, Ropes in
United States Attention
Osborn, 2010 (Andrew Osborn, Chief UK Political Correspondent, May 13, 2010, “USSR planned
nuclear attack on China in 1969”, Telegraph.co.uk,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclearattack-on-China-in-1969.html)
The Soviet Union wa s on the brink of launching a nuclear attack against China in 1969 and only backed
down after the US told Moscow
such a move would start World War Three , according to a Chinese historian. The extraordinary assertion,
made in a publication sanctioned by China's ruling Communist Party, suggests that the world came perilously close to nuclear war just seven years after the Cuban missile crisis.
Liu Chenshan, the author of a series of articles that chronicle the five times China has faced a nuclear threat since 1949, wrote that the most serious threat came in 1969 at the
height of a bitter border dispute between Moscow and Beijing that left more than one thousand people dead on both sides. He said Soviet
diplomats warned
Washington of Moscow's plans "to wipe out the Chinese threat and get rid of this modern
adventurer," with a nuclear strike, asking the US to remain neutral . But, he says, Washington told
Moscow the United States would not stand idly by but launch its own nuclear attack against
the Soviet Union if it attacked China, loosing nuclear missiles at 130
Soviet
cities.
The threat worked, he
added, and made Moscow think twice, while forcing the two countries to regulate their border dispute at the negotiating table. He quotes Soviet ministers and diplomats at the
time to bolster his claim. On 15 October 1969, he quotes Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin as telling Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that Washington has drawn up "detailed plans"
for a nuclear war against the USSR if it attacked China. "[The United States] has clearly indicated that China's interests are closely related to theirs and they have mapped out
detailed plans for nuclear war against us," Kosygin is said to have told Brezhnev. That same day he says Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to Washington, told Brezhnev
something similar after consultations with US diplomats. "If China suffers a nuclear attack, they (the Americans) will deem it as the start of the third world war," Dobrynin said.
"The Americans have betrayed us." The historian claims that
China to counter-balance
effect of a nuclear war on
Soviet
Washington
saw the USSR as a greater threat than China and
power. The n US President
250,000
Richard Nixon wa
want ed a strong
s also
apparently
US troops stationed in the Asia-Pacific region
fearful of the
and still smarting from a Soviet
refusal five years earlier to stage a joint attack on China's nascent nuclear programme. The claims are likely to stir debate about a period of modern history that remains mired in
controversy. Mr Liu, the author, admits his version of history is likely to be contested by rival scholars. It is unclear whether he had access to special state archives but the fact
that his articles appeared in such an official publication in a country where the media is so tightly controlled is being interpreted by some as a sign that he did have special
access.
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2AC – turbine
China already restricts REM in the status quo – We should have seen the impact
Alan W. Dowd, August 13, 2013 Alan W. Dowd is an award-winning writer with experience in
opinion journalism, public-policy research and communications
consultancy.http://www.american.com/archive/2013/august/afghanistans-rare-earth-elementbonanza
The Chinese produce 97 percent of the world’s REEs, but have begun to manipulate the global REE market
by dramatically slowing, and in some cases halting, export of these materials. After a maritime
dispute with Japan, China stopped supplying REEs to Japanese customers, reduced overall
global exports by 72 percent in the second half of 2010, cut export quotas for the first half of
2011 by 35 percent, and slashed REE mining permits by 41 percent in 2012, claiming its actions
were a function of efforts to fight pollution. Although Beijing has resumed delivery of REEs, China’s actions
have prompted the United States, Japan, and Europe to explore alternative sources. The good
news is that market forces are already at work diversifying the REE supply chain.
Afghanistan has over 1 million tons of REM – can supply the world for 10 years
Sarah Simpson, 2011 Scientific American | September 30, 07:25am ET
http://www.livescience.com/16315-rare-earth-elements-afghanistan.html
Recent exploration of rare volcanic rocks in the rugged, dangerous desert of southern Afghanistan has
identified world-class concentrations of rare earth elements, the prized group of raw
materials that are essential in the manufacture of many modern technologies, from electric cars to
solar panels. So far, geologists say, they have mapped one million metric tons of these critical
elements, which include lanthanum, cerium and neodymium. That's enough to supply the
world's rare earth needs for 10 years based on current consumption, points out Robert Tucker, the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) scientist who is the lead author on a report released on September 14. And from clues his team
gathered during three high-security reconnaissance missions to the site, he suspects the
deposit is actually much larger.
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