The Captive Mind
Understanding the Imposition of
Communist Rule
The Socio-economic Context
According to Jan Gross, we must consider WWII and
the Nazi occupation as crucial factors explaining
the relative ease with which communist rule was
established in Eastern Europe and the context in
which individuals responded to that imposition:
“comprehensive processes of social change
conducive to the etatization and leveling of the
affected societies were set in motion.
Apparently, the Soviet victory over the Nazis did
not entail such a radical break as is customarily
portrayed.” (p. 23, “Themes for a social
history…”)
Essential Continuities from Nazi to
Soviet Occupation: Economic
• Forced economic growth -- habituating the populations
of Eastern Europe to the idea that growth and the
“acceleration of social change” are produced by
planning and the targeting of specific sectors for
advancement
• Forced “decoupling” from international trade and
autarchic development already achieved under
German occupation facilitated Soviet control over the
region
• State ownership and intervention in the economy
already prevalent under the Nazi occupation as
exemplified by the appropriation of Jewish properties.
Social-Behavioral Consequences of
Nazi Economic Polices
• Destruction of property rights – suppressed legitimate
entrepreneurial initiative and promoted the turn to black
market activities
• Collapse of work ethic and labor discipline – economic
growth achieved on the basis of forced labor not labor
productivity
• Alienation of work -- as “one of the major avenues for
socializing people into cooperation”… work “suddenly lost
its capacity for binding the social fabric together.” (p. 21)
Cumulatively, these behavioral patterns meant that the
imposition of communist labor practices did not radically
conflict with existing standards and practices.
Demographic Changes Produced
Under Nazi Occupation
• Loss of population through death, deportation
and displacement “created opportunities for
upward social mobility,” as the younger
generation and lower classes took over the
occupations of those lost
• Loss of population (especially Jews and Germans)
produced more homogenous states that more
closely approximated the ‘ideal’ nation-state
The Communists were able to take credit for both
outcomes thereby helping to legitimate their
rule.
Social Psychology Effects of
Occupation
• Displacement, deportation and repatriation all
created passive population groups dependent
on state authority and prone to infantile
‘regression’ easily amenable to control by
incoming Soviet-backed authorities.
• Experiencing conditions of extreme violence
and brutality during the occupation made
Soviet tactics of control seem ‘normal’ or even
tame in comparison.
On collaboration
While the socio-economic conditions of
occupation facilitated the imposition of Soviet
rule, political and ideological circumstances
also determine the extent to which local elites
will collaborate with invading powers. As
Gross elaborates, collaboration with the Nazis
was determined by several factors that can
also inform our understanding of why local
populations in Eastern Europe collaborated
with Soviet authorities.
When does collaboration take place?
• First and foremost, occupying powers must offer
collaboration as an option for local populations
• In turn, locals will be more prone to collaborate if intense
political factionalization leads them to see each other as
worse enemies than the external occupiers; if political
groups have some ideological affinity with the occupiers
(the Nazis, for example, could count on the support of
“reactionary traditionalists” and the radical right); if
individuals are governed by a logic of ‘realism’ that dictates
“accommodation with the new circumstances” rather than
futile resistance. Accommodation that can then be justified
by the hope that the behavior of the occupiers will thereby
be moderated and/or that history, the future, will
ultimately vindicate the decision to collaborate.
Holding collaborators accountable
• Under these circumstances can we hold
collaborators accountable? According to
Gross, they “can be held accountable only if
they had options, alternative choices…”
Milosz: Judgment and Understanding
In Milosz’s account of his friends and colleagues who decided actively to
support the imposition of Soviet rule in Poland, he attempts to
comprehend the reasons behind this decision while also judging their
actions, thereby attempting to hold them accountable for succumbing to
the “logic of History.” And he hopes that they too have some awareness of
the terrible decision they made as in the case of Gemma: “But sometimes
he is haunted by the thought that the devil to whom men sell their souls
owes his might to men themselves, and that the determinism of History is
a creation of human brains.” (p. 174)
But is his judgment valid according to Gross’ criterion that only in the context
of free choice can collaborators be held accountable? Are the life stories
he recounts constructed to show fateful moments of choice and conscious
decision or do they show the painful inevitability of their behavior given
their particular psyches? And how their psyches interacted with the war
torn environments they found themselves in.
Milosz and the Social History of the
Imposition of Communist Rule
Remarkably, given the fact that Milosz wrote his
book in 1953, his account prefigures the social
history of the era suggested by Jan Gross writing
in 2000. While Gross does not mention memoir
and individual memory in this particular essay, in
general his work does build on memoirs – using
individual memories to challenge conventional
accounts of history, so, implicitly at least, he may
have been drawing on Milosz’s account to inform
his social history.
Milosz and Gross: Overlapping
Observations
• How the violence and brutality of the war impacted individuals (most
evident in the case of Beta); and how the Soviets used hatred of the Nazis
in their “psychological preparation of the country” (p. 126)
• How displacement/emigration and repatriation can generate a sense of
disorientation easily exploited by Communist authorities (most evident in
the case of Delta)
• How the political economy of the war years pre-disposed people to accept
communism – especially the destruction of private property (p. 164)
• How alienation, specifically the alienation of intellectuals from the
surrounding society, made them susceptible to the seductive offers made
by the Soviets (most evident in the case of Alpha)
• How pessimistic realism, political divisions and ideological predispositions
can facilitate collaboration (most evident in the case of Gamma)
In general
Milosz’s account depicts the interactive dynamic underlying collaboration as
outlined by Gross: how/why collaboration is offered as an option by
occupiers (E.g., “Because Communism recognized that rule over men’s
minds is the key to rule over an entire country, the word is the
cornerstone of this system.” p. 161 --hence the offer of collaboration made
to writers and poets), and how/why it is accepted by those targeted.
Milosz’s account also provides insights into why the issue of who supported
the communist regime and who collaborated with the secret police is still
such a polarizing issue in Polish political life. Specifically, he demonstrates
the extent to which these individuals were willing to overlook the extent
to which the Soviets were as culpable as the Nazis in the destruction of
Polish life and society. For example, those Poles who passed the war in
the SU, like Gamma, were well aware of the crimes of Stalin, including the
murders of Polish officers at Katyn (p. 156). From the perspective of
current conservative-nationalist politicians, to knowingly assist in the
imposition of such a murderous system on Poland is a treason for which
there should be no statute of limitation.