An Economic Approach for
Collective Dominance
Ekrem Kalkan
Ş.Demet Kaya Korkut
(Turkish Competition Authority)
Aim and Plan
• Aim: Present how empirical economics can be a useful tool in
evaluating collective dominance in merger cases.
• Plan
• Law: Legal assessment on collective dominance
• Merger legislation (single dominance and collective dominance)
• Case law (old Ladik Çimento decision)
• Economics: Economic approach to assess collective dominance
• Factual analysis (Merger guidelines)
• Applied economics (Game theory: grim-trigger strategies, merger simulation method)
Confidentiality
• No details of the analysis at firm level
• Only methodological issues to be presented
Legal assessment of collective dominace
• Turkish Merger Legislation (Art. 7 of Competition Law):
• Merger by one or more undertakings, or acquisition by any undertaking or person from another
undertaking … with a view to creating a dominant position or strengthening its / their dominant
position, which would result in significant lessening of competition in a market … is illegal and
prohibited.
• Dominant position (Art. 3): The power of one or more undertakings in a particular market to
determine economic parameters such as price, supply, the amount of production and
distribution, by acting independently of their competitors and customers,
Horizontal Merger Analysis
(EU and USA Guidelines)
• Single Dominance / Unilateral effects :
• Whether merging parties unilaterally - independent of the reaction of the rivals- could gain a market power or
strengthen their existing power to increase prices, decrease production, restrict innovation etc.
• Loss of competition between the merging firms
• Non-merging firms in the same market can also benefit from the reduction of competitive pressure that results from
the merger, since the merging firms' price increase may switch some demand to the rival firms, which, in turn, may
find it profitable to increase their prices.
• Collective Dominance / Coordinated effects :
• The concept of dominance is also applied in an oligopolistic setting to cases of collective dominance.
• A horizontal merger may change the nature of competition in such a way that firms that previously were not
coordinating their behaviour, are now significantly more likely to coordinate and raise prices or otherwise harm
effective competition. A merger may also make coordination easier, more stable or more effective for firms which
were coordinating prior to the merger
Case Law on Collective Dominance:
Airtours vs. Commission (CFI, 2002)
• EU Commission prohibited Airtours/First Choice merger
• CFI annuled the decision (2002) and criticized the Commission: Considering
only market characteristics is not sufficient
• Three conditions for collective dominance:
• 1. Ability to monitor to a sufficient degree whether the terms of
coordination are being adhered to
• 2. Is there some form of credible deterrent mechanism, that can be
activated, if deviation is detected
• 3. The reactions from outsiders such as current and future competitors not
participating in the coordination, as well as customers, should not be able
to jeopardise the results expected from coordination
EU Merger Guidelines on Collective
Dominance
• EU Commission considers the changes that the merger brings about.
• Structural factors which facilitate coordination:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Low number of firms
Homogenous product
Stable economic environment (demand and supply conditions), difficult entry, no innovation.
Symmetric firms (cost/supply fn., similar capacity levels and vertical integration levels )
Easy exchange of information, transparency in firms’ conducts
Simple characteristics of consumers (easy to identify a customer’s supplier)
Cross-shareholding
A maverick firm in the merger?
Evidence of past coordination or evidence of coordination in similar markets may be useful information.
EU Merger Guidelines on Collective
Dominance
• Monitoring: Are markets sufficiently transparent to allow the coordinating firms to monitor
whether other firms are deviating and to know when to retaliate?
• Enforcement: Deterrent mechanisms: Is there a credible threat of future
retaliation that keeps the coordination sustainable?
• Credibility: Punishing the deviator by temporarily engaging in a price war or increasing output significantly, may
entail a short-term economic loss for the firms carrying out the retaliation.
• Are the short-term losses smaller than the long-term benefits of retaliating, which aims to return to coordination.
• Other factors: Potential competition, buyer power, efficiencies.
Case Law in Turkey
• (2005) Acquisition of Ladik Çimento by Akçansa (Cement market)
• TCA blocked the merger depending on the argument of creation of
collective dominance
• Council of State: interim judgement
• Collective dominance is not defined in the Turkish Competition Act
• TCA objected
• Market conditions changed (a JV is terminated by their owner)
• Akçansa re-applied and got the permission
• Case is closed, we did not have any final judgement on the problem of
lack of «the defitinion of collective dominance in the Act»
Case Law in Turkey
• (2009) Acquisition of LaFarge plants by OYAK (Cement)
• TCA assessed the collective dominance, but decided that the merger
does not create a collective dominace due to the existence of
powerful rival in the market (Nuh Çimento)
• No economic analysis is done for collective dominance in these cases
• Only factual analysis done
Literature on sustainability of coordination
• In the recent studies the enforcement mechanism has become a central concern to gauge
coordinated effects.
• Sabbatini (2006), Kovacic et al. (2009), Davis and Huse (2010), Harrington (2013) study
sustainability of collusion in differing market conditions.
• They present empirical methods to be employed in the assessing the risk of collusion after the
merger as focusing on a collusive equilibrium and relevant discount factors which are used to
calculate the future profits and make this equilibrium feasible and profitable for all the parties.
• They differentiate in employing several market features such as differentiated products, existence
of competitive fringe, multi-market contact, the existence of antitrust authority etc.
• Besides, all of them adopt an approach for the type of competition, whether Bertrand or Cournot,
but the same punishment mechanism in the market.
• Punishment mechanism: Trigger strategies (Friedman 1971), and results in a competitive
equilibrium forever, once cheating occurs from the collusive behavior.
• We follow Davis and Huse (2010).
Incentive of a firm (f) to coordinate
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋𝑓
and 𝜋𝑓𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ are the profits of the one-period
stage game in cases of coordination, defection and Nash equilibrium,
respectively.
• These profits are calculated by assuming a particular strategic
interaction among firms (coordination, defection or Nash equilibrium)
and then by solving the first-order conditions of firms according to
this behavioral assumption.
• Behavioral assumption: firms compete in prices with differentiated
products (Bertrand game)
•
𝜋𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ,
Incentive of a firm to coordinate
•
•
•
𝑉𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑡
∞
𝛿
𝑡=0 𝑓
≥
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑉𝑓
(1)
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
. 𝜋𝑓𝑡
≥ 𝜋𝑓
1
𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
. 𝜋𝑓𝑡
1−𝛿𝑓
≥
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋𝑓
+
+
𝑡
∞
𝛿
𝑡=1 𝑓
𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ
. 𝜋𝑓𝑡
𝛿𝑖
𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ
. 𝜋𝑓𝑡
1−𝛿𝑓
• Is the incentives to coordinate increase after merger?
(2)
(3)
Problem and solution we suggest:
• 𝛿𝑓 : discount factor at firm level (Between 0-1)
• This is a measure of the «importance that a firm assigns to future
revenues»
• difficult to know for every firm, for every period.
• 𝛿𝑓 =
1
1+𝑟𝑓
• 𝑟𝑓 : cost of capital (weighted average of equity and cost of borrowing)
• Solution: Find and use «critical» discount factor 𝛿𝑓∗ for every firm f.
•
1
𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
.
𝜋
𝑓
1−𝛿𝑓∗
=
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋𝑓
+
𝛿𝑓∗
𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ
.
𝜋
∗
𝑓
1−𝛿𝑓
Interpretation of critical discount factor
• Coordination is profitable if the true discount factor is larger than 𝛿𝑓∗
Coordination
possible
𝛿𝑓∗
0
1
• If 𝛿𝑓∗ decreases after merger, then the incentive to coordinate for a
firm f increases.
Larger possibility of
coordination after merger
0
𝛿𝑓∗
1
Why would
∗
𝛿𝑓
change after merger (and how)?
Remember:
•
1
𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
.
𝜋
𝑓
1−𝛿𝑓∗
=
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋𝑓
+
𝛿𝑓∗
𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ
.
𝜋
∗
𝑓
1−𝛿𝑓
• 𝜋𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 : same before and after merger, for all firms
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
• 𝜋𝑓
: same before and after merger for non-merging firms,
but decreases after merger for merging firms, because they
deviate from coordination together instead of deviating individually.
• 𝜋𝑓𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ
: increases after merger for all firms,
because merging firms increase their prices and nonmerging firms respond also by increasing their prices (Bertrand game).
How much change in
• It depends on the changes in
∗
𝛿𝑓 ?
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋𝑓
and 𝜋𝑓𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ after merger.
Merger simulation: estimate demand
elasticities
• First, estimate a demand function for firms
• Examples: Logit, nested logit, random coefficients, AIDS …
• logit demand.
• Restrictions on cross-price elasticities:
 kj   mj , j  m.
• Use firm level monthly data:
•
•
•
•
Prices,
Market shares
Demand shifters
Cost instrumental variables to address endogeneity of prices.
Merger Simulation
• Choose an initial period and equilibrium (price) with a particular
conduct (i.e. Bertrand Nash equilibrium)
• FOC:
s  E '.diag ( S ).m  0
• s: revenue market share (vector)
• E: elasticity matrix
• m: gross-profit margins (vector)
• Solve for m vector, obtain MC.
• Iterative process: p, s, e, m … new p, s, e, m … until convergence
• p(t)=p(t-1)
Simulation: Merger, Coordination, Defection
• Calculate first, Bertrand-Nash profits before merger.
• Then, use same MC to find equilibrium prices and profits under
• Full-coordination scenario
ˆ '.diag ( Sˆ ).mˆ  0
ˆ
s

E
• Merger scenario
• Different defection equilibrim prices and profits before and after merger
• 𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑
𝜋𝑓
(𝑝𝑓
, 𝑝−𝑓 )
𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑
given 𝑝−𝑓
• Repeat both before and after merger: get critical discount factors
Conclusion
• Compare critical discount factors of every firm before and after
merger
• If it decreases, this firm’s incentive to coordinate increases
• If it increases, this firm’s incentive to coordinate decreases
• Evaluate whether the increase/decrease in incentives is large/small.
• If delta decreases only for some of firms :
• Find joint probability : (1-𝛿1∗ )x…x(1-𝛿𝐹∗ )
• Other game theoretic punishment mechanisms may be modelled and
applied for similar purpose.