Cultural Role of Youth and their Militarization
In the modern context of lawlessness, insecurity, and self-reliance, the role
of male youth as protectors continues to grow in importance (Simonse
2005). The inability of the state to provide security is in direct opposition to
the increasing reliance communities have on their own youth for protection.
Understanding the traditional role that youth play in pastoralist societies is
thus of vast importance in understanding the escalating violence.
Pastoralist societies in North East Africa1 are most often organized either by
age (usually generational), lineage, or a combination of the two. Lineage, or
segmentary, societies are structured primarily around patrilineal lines, or
more simply family groups. Segments, clans, sections and family are the
primary means of identity and social function. The Nuer, Dinka (South
Sudan), and Somali societies are examples of this, and loyalty lies primarily
with kin rather than with the ethnic group as a whole (Spencer 1998).
Alternatively, age system societies identify across the ethnic group, but
primary loyalty rests with each generation, or age-set. In societies like the
Toposa, Pokot, and Murle peers are where loyalty is strongest, rather than
kin from another generation (ibid:171). However, in some societies both
lineage and generational structures exist. The Nuer, for example, are
primarily defined as a segmentary society, but in certain Nuer communities
age-sets still play a part in social organization.
In both lineage and age-based systems the youth play a major role in the
defense and protection of the society. Most agro-pastoralist2 societies in the
region require seasonal migrations for livestock to areas with adequate
water and grazing pastures away from the permanent settlements. While
the elders are the primary owners of the livestock, the youth are
responsible for herding them. As a result, young men travel to temporary
dry season settlements, or cattle camps, on an annual basis to watch and
protect the family herds (Simonse 2005). Being away from the principle
community, affords a freedom to youth while there. Youth told Simonse
that their favorite time of the year is in the cattle camps, where they have
little supervision and more independence (2005). In the cattle camps the
young men interact with youth from different communities but also
different ethnic groups. Many of the best water points and grazing lands are
shared, and often local youth leaders give permission for others to access
the area (Simonse 2005). Not surprisingly the relationships with other groups
can also be tense and frequent raiding occurs at the cattle camps despite
1
The major groups involved in the current conflict, and the majority of inter-ethnic
clashes in South Sudan, are pastoralists. The major ethnic groups in Greater Upper
Nile that instead are primarily agrarian are the Chollo (Shilluk) and Anuak. While
agrarian peoples also are involved in conflicts, it is more frequently with pastoralist
neighbors (particularly over land). See ethnic profile section.
2 Agro-pastoralist societies rely on livestock, cultivation, and often fishing for their
livelihoods. The Dinka, Nuer, and others would identify primarily as pastoralists, but
are not solely reliant upon livestock.
existing agreements. As Simonse explains the “the dry-season pastures are
not only associated with the youthful joys of freedom from authority but
also with the dangers of war” (Simonse 2005:244).
The responsibility to protect the family herds as well as defend the
community from attacks means the youth need to be well armed.
Historically, the youth carried spears and shields, but now the Kalashnikov
automatic rifle is the weapon of choice in the cattle camps. The limited
government presence in the rural regions, and the consequent security and
justice vacuum, means that cattle raids and violence between rival
communities, age-sets, or ethnic groups rarely leads to any arrests or action
by the security forces (Simonse 2005). Further, the fierce reputation of
many of the cattle camp youth means that the security forces often fear to
engage with them or carry out arrests.
Tension between youth and elders is a phenomenon that has been identified
by scholars as a root cause of conflict in many parts of the world. Indeed,
“due to rapid processes of change related to colonialism, modernization,
social upheaval and disturbed demographic trends such as runaway
population growth, this phenomenon has assumed crisis proportions,
fundamentally different from those in the past” (Abbink 2005:11). This rapid
demographic change has been described as the “youth bulge,” and
according to quantitative studies an increase in this demographic runs
parallel to an increase in political violence (Urdal 2012). However, “while a
correlation between a high relative youth population and higher risk of
violence supports a causal claim, it does not prove causality and reveals
little about the processes at work and why certain young people engage in
violence” (Hilker and Fraser 2009:3). There are two schools of thought as to
the general motivations for youth to join in violence- greed and grievance.
The greed perspective claims youth participate because of socio-economic
opportunities- looting and raiding provide socio-economic benefits and
increased status in society (Urdal 2012:8). Alternatively involvement is
because of grievances held by the perpetrators- i.e. towards the state for
being marginalized or towards other groups due to historic tensions
exacerbated by politicians. Youth in South Sudan have incentive from both
perspectives. Abbink succinctly explains that “virtually everywhere on the
continent, youth, while forming a numerical majority, are in a situation of
dependency, economically marginalized, and feel excluded from formal
power and prestige, even when the time has come for them to become part
of established society” (2005:11).
Both the rising dependence on youth for protection as well as the increasing
presence of arms among the youth, has had direct effects on the historically
tense relationship between elders and youth. Numerous academic studies
(Abbink 2005, Kurimoto and Simonse 1998, Mkutu 2008) show the ownership
of semi-automatic weapons has undermined the ability of the elders to
control or influence the youth and to keep the traditional balance with
other communities. In the past, the ownership and distribution of cattle was
controlled by the elders, and therefore the youth were dependent upon
them in order to access marriage. However, the large scale raids carried out
by youth with semi-automatic weapons has increased the herds, and
therefore the independence of the young men. Elders complain that they
have less direct influence over the young men, and that small cattle raids
by the youth “are not sanctioned or controlled by the community or older
generations” (Rolandsen and Breidlid 2013:8). Without the ability to limit or
control the type of violence the youth engage in, violence has increased in
brutality. Importantly though, the same study also found that the elders and
youth in South Sudan are more dependent upon each other than is
commonly recognized. Elders do not only depend on youth for protection,
but also for justice, in the form of reciprocal attacks or raids (Rolandsen &
Breidlid 2013). Breidlid and Rolandsen state that not only are youth’s value
and identity directly connected to their ability to guarantee local security
and justice, but also that “their communities at large consider participation
in such violence as legitimate and moral” (ibid 2013:6). In other words,
youth involvement in large scale revenge attacks are usually supported by
the local community as a form of local justice, while small scale cattle raids
are not approved and are perceived as criminal acts (ibid).
As explained in the historical engagement section, the ‘ritual war’ between
pastoralist communities was largely limited and controlled by the elders to
ensure a level of peace and balance. However with modern weapons large
amounts of cattle can be stolen in a short period of time by someone with
little physical skill. Aside from the high risks during an actual raid, the long
term chances of being caught are low. The low risk balanced against the
high benefits of raiding mean that there are almost daily raids in some
areas. The expectation that young men are responsible for justice and
revenge creates a cycle of violence that is not limited by the social
sanctions or rules warfare that existed in the past (Rolandsen & Breidlid
2013). This results in not only an increasing amount of violence and
targeting of high numbers of civilians during attacks, but a limited ability by
the community elders to stop the conflicts from escalating.
Finally, Nyaba points out that militia movements, including the Sudan
People’s Liberatino Army (SPLA), took over many of the functions of the
chiefs during the war years. Others explain that some of the most influential
chiefs were even targeted and killed by military groups, as they were
perceived as threats to the SPLM/A. The various systems and authorities
that functioned to mitigate violence in South Sudan (chiefs, spiritual leaders
such as prophets and diviners, spear masters, healers, and elders) were not
only undermined by the introduction of guns, but were frequently
dismantled by the military actors. It is worth noting that the British also
imposed similar tactics during their colonial rule - Nuer prophets and others
perceived as a threat to the colonial authority were killed, while the British
chieftain system was imposed upon the various peoples. Now these tactics
were being repeated but the chieftain system was also a victim of the
process of imposing military rule over civilian life. The traditional
authorities have never fully recovered.
Abbink, Jon and Van Kessel, Ineke (eds.) 2005. Vanguard or Vandals: Youth,
Politics and Conflict in Africa. Leiden-Boston: Brill.
Mkutu, Kennedy A. 2008. Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley:
Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms. James Currey, Oxford.
Nyaba, Peter. 2001. “The Disarmamament of the Gelweng of Bahr el Ghazal
and The consolidation of the Nuer-Dinka Peace Agreement 1999.”
(https://db.tt/umNSgolg)
Rolandsen, Øystein H. & Ingrid Marie Breidlid. 2013. “What is Youth Violence
in Jonglei?”, PRIO Paper. Oslo: PRIO
(http://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=7067)
Simonse, Simon. 2005. “Warriors, hooligans and mercenaries: Failed
statehood and the violence of young male pastoralists in the Horn of
Africa.” Chapter 11 in Abbink, Jon and Ineke van Kessel (eds.) Vanguard or
Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa. Leiden-Boston: Brill.