2015 NDI 6WS – Topicality Wave 1
**SUBSTANTIAL**
MUST BE ELIMINATION
Description
Substantial modifies curtailment meaning while restriction might normally be a
curtailment substantial modifies it to require that it is completely eliminated.
1NC
A. Interpretation: Substantially curtailing domestic surveillance necessitates
elimination.
Substantially is without material qualification
Black’s Law 91 (Dictionary, p. 1024)
Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.
Sharply curtailing something means eliminating it.
Ackerman 14 (Spencer, national security editor for Guardian US. A former senior writer for Wired,
“Failure to pass US surveillance reform bill could still curtail NSA powers,” October 3rd, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/03/usa-freedom-act-house-surveillance-powers)//ghsVA
Two members of the US House of Representatives are warning that a failure
to pass landmark surveillance reform will result
in a far more drastic curtailment of US surveillance powers – one that will occur simply by the House doing nothing at all. As
the clock ticks down on the 113th Congress, time is running out for the USA Freedom Act, the first legislative attempt at reining in the National
Security Agency during the 9/11 era. Unless
the Senate passes the stalled bill in the brief session following November’s
midterm elections, the NSA will keep all of its existing powers to collect US phone records in bulk, despite
support for the bill from the White House, the House of Representatives and, formally, the NSA itself. But supporters of the Freedom Act are
warning that the intelligence agencies and their congressional allies will find the reform bill’s legislative death to be a cold comfort. On 1 June
2015, Section 215 of the Patriot Act will expire. The loss of Section 215 will deprive the NSA of the legal pretext for its bulk domestic phone
records dragnet. But it will cut deeper than that: the Federal Bureau of Investigation will lose its controversial post-9/11 powers to obtain vast
amounts of business records relevant to terrorism or espionage investigations. Those are investigative authorities the USA Freedom Act leaves
largely untouched. Section 215’s expiration will occur through simple legislative inertia, a characteristic of the House of Representatives in
recent years. Already, the
House has voted to sharply curtail domestic
Freedom Act in May and voting the following month
dragnet
surveillance , both by passing the
to ban the NSA from warrantlessly searching through its
troves of international communications for Americans’ identifying information. Legislators are warning that the next Congress,
expected to be more Republican and more hostile to domestic spying, is unlikely to reauthorise Section 215.
B. Violation: They only place a restriction or regulation.
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits – They justify an infinite number of affirmatives – there are thousands of
ways the aff could tinker with the scope, target, or means of any of the thousand
surveillance programs which makes it impossible for the neg to prepare.
2. Ground – Allows them to spike out of any disad by claiming that they’re only a
minor reduction. Forces us to rely on the worst forms of generic argumentation.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
MUST BE AT LEAST 13%
1NC – 13%
A. Interpretation: Substantial indicates that the aff has to reduce surveillance by at
least 13%.
Substantial Curtailment is at LEAST 13 percent
Utter 77 (Utter http://courts.mrsc.org/mc/courts/zsupreme/088wn2d/088wn2d0909.htm, This is from
a formal court decision between Shell Oil and the appellant Norward Brooks, Decisions were made by
Wright, C.J., and Rosellini, Hamilton, Stafford, Brachtenbach, Horowitz, Dolliver, and Hicks, JJ.)
The act specifies the particular circumstances in which one who leaves employment due to a labor dispute may qualify for compensation, despite the voluntary
character of such a termination. "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits for any week with respect to which the commissioner finds that his unemployment
is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed . . ." RCW
50.20.090. The parties concede each claimant was unemployed because of the labor dispute. The next issue presented then is whether there was a "stoppage of
work" which raises the ancillary issues of how that term is to be defined and whether the record supports the findings of the commissioner. The term "stoppage of
work" refers to the operation of the employer's plant or business rather than the activity of individual employees. LAWRENCE BAKING CO. v. UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION COMM'N, 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 260, 154 A.L.R. 660 (1944), CERT. DENIED, 323 U.S. 738, 89 L. Ed. 591, 65 S. Ct. 43 (1944). SEE CONSTRUCTION
OF PHRASE "STOPPAGE OF WORK" IN STATUTORY PROVISION DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS DURING STOPPAGE RESULTING FROM LABOR
DISPUTE, Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 693 (1975); Shadur, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND THE "LABOR DISPUTE" DISQUALIFICATION, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 294 (1950). Cases
from other jurisdictions interpreting statutes similar to RCW 50.20.090 are in general agreement that the term "stoppage of work" is most often defined in terms of
a substantial curtailment of the employer's overall operations at the particular situs in question.
MOUNTAIN STATES TEL. & TEL. CO. v. SAKRISON, 71 Ariz. 219, 225 P.2d 707 (1950); INTER-ISLAND RESORTS, LTD. v. AKAHANE, 46 Hawaii 140, 377 P.2d 715 (1962);
GENERAL ELEC. CO. v. DIRECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 349 Mass. 358, 208 N.E.2d 234 (1965); TRAVIS v. GRABIEC, 52 Ill. 2d 175, 287 N.E.2d 468 (1972). SEE
Whether there is a substantial curtailment is resolved by application of a
number of established criteria to the facts of the particular case. There are a few fixed boundaries for
the meaning of the term "substantial" in this context. The attempts by other courts to devise a
formula based upon a percentage of reduction in normal production or operations by which a line
delineating substantial from nonsubstantial could be established have varied from 50 percent of
normal production in early decisions to as low as a 20 percent decline in business activity in
subsequent decisions. More recently, the difficulty of applying a fixed percentage concept to define "substantial" has resulted in courts assessing a
Annot., SUPRA, 61 A.L.R.3d 693, 5, at 705.
number of factors.¶ The specific criteria accented by the commissioner in this case were whether there was a diminution in production and whether there was a
substantial curtailment of other normal nonproduction "operations." The parties concede and the court found there was no curtailment of production. The parties
then focused on whether there was a substantial curtailment of other, nonproduction related, operations. Appellant placed its primary emphasis upon disruptions
resulting from the necessity to reassign nonproduction personnel. Of the nonproduction staff, a total of 64 employees out of the total employment complement of
381 employees, were reassigned. Because these individuals were not replaced, there was at least a 16 percent reduction in the overall personnel within the
employer's operations. Appellant
argues a 16 percent reduction in overall personnel constitutes a substantial
curtailment of normal employer operations. Jurisdictions outside the state of Washington considering
the same question have varied in their conclusions, ranging from a low of perhaps 13 percent to a high
of over 50 percent in personnel reduction as being indicative of "substantial curtailment" of employer
operations. COMPARE MOUNTAIN STATES TEL. & TEL. CO. v. SAKRISON, SUPRA, AND GENERAL ELEC. CO. v. DIRECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, SUPRA.
Appellant asserts first the commissioner's decision was fundamentally wrong as a matter of law in that he failed to consider the nature of the work that was not
being performed in relation to the total operation of the refinery, and that he should have considered factors other than simply the reduction in overall personnel.
We do not read the record as limiting the commissioner's determination solely to that factor. In this context, in his decision the commissioner discussed at length
another case involving a strike at a refinery which is in many respects factually similar to this situation. TRAVIS v. GRABIEC, SUPRA. He emphasized the strike in
TRAVIS had caused a severe curtailment in overall operations, including the destroying of work in the treatment and research department and the suspension of
construction and maintenance work, as well as truck and barge transportation. He recognized that these factors had led the court in that case to find significant
evidence of a stoppage of work despite the fact that for a period of time full production of barrels of oil per day was carried on by a skeleton force working
abnormal hours and performing abnormal functions. Later in his opinion the commissioner made it clear that he believed the impact on normal operations caused
by the reduction in personnel was not as severe as that in the TRAVIS case.
B. Violation: The aff has not substantially curtailed domestic surveillance
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits- The topic is already massive and has a huge aff side bias. A strict definition
of substantial is key to creating debates with clash and negative ground.
2. Topic Research and education- they shift the focus of the topic from discussions
about large forms of surveillance to finding the smallest aff.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
2NC Overview
Our interpretation is the substantial curtailment at the very least is 13%
Their interpretation allows for an infinite number of tiny affs that have no substantial
negative ground.
A big topic restricts debates about specific mechanisms and internal link scenarios and
focuses on broad unspecific policies. Modeling policy makers gives us the best form of
education because it teaches us methods to solve real world problems. Only our
interpretation allows for competitive debates with substantial literature on both
sides.
Fairness is essential to maintaining the educational practices of debate. Their model
incentivizes research on fringe policies, rather than substantive claims about the topic.
Lack of negative literature disincentives students from researching and creating case
and to instead go for generics. Research skills and education allow debaters to identify
problems in the real world and create solutions.
Prefer our evidence
Our evidence is from an official US court ruling. It is the only evidence that speaks to
all official court rulings of the term “substantial curtailment” and says that the lowest
a judge has EVER decided is 13%.
**CURTAIL**
MUST BE ELIMINATION
Eliminate – 1NC
A. Interpretation: Curtailing domestic surveillance necessitates elimination.
Ackerman 14 (Spencer, national security editor for Guardian US. A former senior writer for Wired,
“Failure to pass US surveillance reform bill could still curtail NSA powers,” October 3rd, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/03/usa-freedom-act-house-surveillance-powers)//ghsVA
Two members of the US House of Representatives are warning that a failure
to pass landmark surveillance reform will result
in a far more drastic curtailment of US surveillance powers – one that will occur simply by the House doing nothing at all. As
the clock ticks down on the 113th Congress, time is running out for the USA Freedom Act, the first legislative attempt at reining in the National
Security Agency during the 9/11 era. Unless
the Senate passes the stalled bill in the brief session following November’s
midterm elections, the NSA will keep all of its existing powers to collect US phone records in bulk, despite
support for the bill from the White House, the House of Representatives and, formally, the NSA itself. But supporters of the Freedom Act are
warning that the intelligence agencies and their congressional allies will find the reform bill’s legislative death to be a cold comfort. On 1 June
2015, Section 215 of the Patriot Act will expire. The loss of Section 215 will deprive the NSA of the legal pretext for its bulk domestic phone
records dragnet. But it will cut deeper than that: the Federal Bureau of Investigation will lose its controversial post-9/11 powers to obtain vast
amounts of business records relevant to terrorism or espionage investigations. Those are investigative authorities the USA Freedom Act leaves
largely untouched. Section 215’s expiration will occur through simple legislative inertia, a characteristic of the House of Representatives in
recent years. Already, the
House has voted to sharply curtail domestic
Freedom Act in May and voting the following month
dragnet
surveillance , both by passing the
to ban the NSA from warrantlessly searching through its
troves of international communications for Americans’ identifying information. Legislators are warning that the next Congress,
expected to be more Republican and more hostile to domestic spying, is unlikely to reauthorise Section 215.
B. Violation: The aff is a reduction, not a curtailment because it does not eliminate
surveillance programs.
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits – They justify an infinite number of affirmatives – there are thousands of
ways the aff could tinker with the scope, target, or means of any of the thousand
surveillance programs which makes it impossible for the neg to prepare.
2. Ground – Allows them to spike out of any disad by claiming that they’re only a
minor reduction. Forces us to rely on the worst forms of generic argumentation.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that you must eliminate, not just implement a minor reduction,
in order for it to constitute a curtailment. Your aff ____ (Insert Specific Aff
Mechanism) ____ which doesn’t meet our interpretation.
Topical version of the aff – eliminate instead of reduce which solves all of their offense
because it allows us to discuss and learn about their affirmative without collapsing
limits and ground.
2NC Limits/Case List XT
There are only 3 real evaluative terms in the resolution – defining and limiting them is
necessary in order to make this topic manageable. Allowing curtailment to be minor
reductions allows the aff to alter any aspect of any surveillance program.
The aff could –
- Reduce the scope of PRISM by exempting senior citizens.
- Reduce the means of PRISM by excluding data from AT&T.
- Reduce the amount of money spent on PRISM.
- Reduce the duration of the PRISM program.
Think about all of the thousands of ways the aff could scale back programs without
eliminating them and think about the hundreds of different surveillance programs
that exist. Their interpretation collapses the limiting function of the resolution and
destroys any semblance of predictable negative ground.
MUST BE REDUCTION
1NC – Reduce
A. Interpretation: Curtail means to reduce not eliminate.
Merriam Webster NO DATE (Merriam Webster Dictionary, Online Dictionary, “Curtail,”
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail)//ghs-VA
to reduce or limit (something)
B. Violation: The aff eliminates a program.
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Topic Education – Congressional debates are about restrictions on current programs
not elimination which kills predictable clash and core topic learning.
2. Limits – They allow the aff to defend a massive array of mechanisms that range
from small reductions to complete eliminations. Forcing the aff to defend only
reduction provides a stable and predictable stasis for negative ground.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that curtailment means reduction, not elimination. Your aff ____
(Insert Specific Aff Mechanism) ____ which doesn’t meet our interpretation.
Topical version of the aff – reduce a specific part of ____ (Insert Aff) ____ rather than
eliminate the entire program. Solves their offense because it still constrains the topic
literature but allows for more focused and pragmatic debates.
2NC Topic Education XT
Policymakers aren’t debating the merits of elimination – rather debates are centered
on the question of what additional restrictions are necessary to balance privacy versus
security.
Their interpretation forces us into a binary between no security or no privacy which
eliminates the compromise aspect of policy making. Only our interpretation allows for
a reasonable middle ground that fosters pragmatic discussions of surveillance.
They focus our discussion on the question of whether or not surveillance programs
should exist instead of focusing the discussion on how they should be curtailed.
AT: Curtail = Elimination
Curtail is distinct from elimination – our evidence is comparative.
Williams 2K (Cary, a Lawyer with Williams, Williams & Williams, P.C, “American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 1145 and Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States
Penitentiary, Atlanta, GA,” October 4, 2000, http://www.cpl33.info/files/USP_Atlanta__Annual_Leave_during_ART.pdf)//ghs-VA
The Agency relies on the language of Article 19, Section 1.2. for its right to "curtail" scheduled annual leave during training. The record is clear
that the Agency has limited or curtailed leave during ART in the past, and has the right to do so in the future. But there
in curtailing
leave during ART
is a difference
and totally eliminating it . There was no testimony regarding the intent of the parties in including
the term "curtail" in Section 1.2., but Websters New Twentieth Century Dictionary (2nd Ed) defines
the term as, "to cut short,
import of the term "curtail" in the Agreement based on
these definitions is to cut back the number of leave slots, but there is no proof the parties intended to give
the Agency the right to totally eliminate leave slots in the absence of clear proof of an emergency or other unusual
situation. The same dictionary on the other hand defines "eliminate" as, "to take out, get rid of, reject or ornit". From a comparison of
the two terms there is clearly a difference in curtailing and eliminating annual leave. I disagree with the Agency's
reduce, shorten, lessen, diminish, decrease or abbreviate". The
contention that curtailing leave can also mean allowing zero leave slots. If the parties had intended such a result they would have simply stated
the Agency could terminate or eliminate annual leave during training and/or other causes. This language would leave no doubt the Agency had
the right to implement the policy it put in place for January I through March 25, 2000. That language, however, is not in the Agreement, and the
term "curtail" does not allow the Agency to totally eliminate all scheduled annual leave during the year.
2NC Interpretation XT
Curtail means to reduce not eliminate.
Merriam Webster NO DATE (Merriam Webster Dictionary, Online Dictionary, “Curtail,”
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail)//ghs-VA
to reduce or limit (something)
Curtail is a reduction in quantity.
Oxford NO DATE (Oxford Dictionary, online dictionary, “curtail,”
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail)//ghs-VA
Reduce in extent or quantity; impose a restriction on
Curtail is to reduce not to eliminate – we have comparative evidence.
Barratt and Ord 15 (Own Cotton-Barratt, professor @ University of Oxford, Toby Ord, professor @
University of Oxford, “Existential Risk and Existential Hope: Definitions,” 2015,
http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/Existential-risk-and-existential-hope.pdf)//ghs-VA
Is this an existential catastrophe? Bostrom’s definition doesn’t clearly specify whether it should be considered as one. Either answer leads to
some strange conclusions. Saying it’s not an existential catastrophe seems wrong as it’s exactly the kind of thing that we should strive to avoid
for the same reasons we wish to avoid existential catastrophes. Saying it is an existential catastrophe is very odd if humanity does escape and
recover – then the loss of potential wasn’t permanent after all. The
problem here is that potential isn’t binary. Entering
the regime certainly seems to curtail the potential, but not to eliminate it.
Curtailment are additional regulations.
Martin 12 (Robert, J.D., “HUMAN RESOURCES & EMPLOYMENT LAW CUMULATIVE CASE BRIEFS AND
NOTES,” October 11, 2012, https://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/labor-employment-law/cfsfilesystemfile.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.PostAttachments/00.00.08.42.73/HumanResources-and-Employment-Law-cumulative-database_2D00_Master-2012-10_2D00_12.doc)//ghs-VA
(a) Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field in which Congress has left no room for States to regulate. In Hines, a state alienregistration program was struck down on the ground that Congress
intended its “complete” federal registration plan to
did not allow the States to “curtail or
complement” federal law or “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66–67. The federal registration framework remains
be a “single integrated and all-embracing system.” 312 U. S., at 74. That scheme
comprehensive. Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. Pp. 8–11. (b) Section 5(C)’s
criminal penalty stands as an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), a
comprehensive framework for “combating the employment of illegal aliens,” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U. S. 137, 147,
makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. §§1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2),
and requires employers to verify prospective employees’ employment authorization status, §§1324a(a)(1)(B),
Language in federal documents creates a definite distinction between prohibition and
curtailment as a reduction.
Department of Justice NO DATE (United States Department of Justice, “National Firearms Act,”
https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/national-firearms-act)//ghs-VA
While the NFA
was enacted by Congress as an exercise of its authority to tax, the NFA had an underlying purpose
unrelated to revenue collection. As the legislative history of the law discloses, its
underlying purpose was to curtail, if not
prohibit , transactions in NFA firearms. Congress found these firearms to pose a significant crime problem because of their frequent
use in crime, particularly the gangland crimes of that era such as the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre. The $200 making and transfer taxes on most
NFA firearms were considered quite severe and adequate to carry out Congress’ purpose to discourage or eliminate transactions in these
firearms. The $200 tax has not changed since 1934.
**ITS**
MUST BE GOVERNMENT
1NC – Possessive
A. Interpretation: Its means possessive.
Dictionary.com NO DATE (Online Dictionary, “its”
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its)//ghs-VA
the possessive form of it1.(used as an attributive adjective)
B. Violation: The surveillance must be conducted by the USFG.
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits – Gives them access to plans based on private surveillance which allows for
an infinite number of private industry based affs that makes it impossible for the neg
to prepare.
2. Topic Education – They shift the focus from government to corporate surveillance
programs which kills predictable clash and core topic learning.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that the USFG has to conduct the surveillance that the 1AC
curtails. Your aff ____ (Insert Specific Aff Mechanism) ____ which isn’t topical.
Ours is more qualified
A. Grammar
Bagovich 13 (Sydnee, bachelor’s degree from Robert Morris University and an MBA from The Katz
Graduate School of Business at The University of Pittsburgh, “How to Write Like You Care,” August 01,
2013, http://www.grammarly.com/blog/2013/how-to-write-like-you-care/)//ghs-VA
Its, your, and their are all possessive pronouns. Since the possession is already included in the word, no
apostrophes are needed. Other possessive pronouns include: my, him, her, our. None of these words require an apostrophe.
B. Our authors are all professors and etymologists who analyze the structure and
meaning of words.
2NC Limits/Case List XT
This topic is massive – the only hope of a limited topic is to draw lines around what
kinds of surveillance the government can curtail.
Your interpretation justifies the government reducing corporate, private, or any
surveillance conducted by a third party. Forcing the neg to research private actors
creates an unreasonable research burden and incentivizes defaulting to generics
hurting argument innovation. A precise definition of “its” allows us to have in-depth
focused debates about the topic.
Without the ability to focus preparation, the Affirmative would never have to defend
their arguments against a well-equipped opponent, which prevents us from learning
how to effectively advocate for our positions.
Our interpretation would justify Case List: Big Stick Privacy, FISA Court, Patriot act,
Sarbanes Oxley, Drones, Dual Use, and Borders affs.
2NC Topic Education XT
The USFG conducts the most egregious forms of surveillance in the status quo that
affects everyone – fostering discussions that shift the focus to them creates civic
education that enables us to create change and produces the necessary legal language
to advocate for reform. Government surveillance always affects everyone versus
corporate surveillance that affects certain groups of people.
2NC Interpretation XT
Its means possessive.
Dictionary.com NO DATE (Online Dictionary, “its”
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its)//ghs-VA
the possessive form of it1.(used as an attributive adjective)
Indicates possession as related to the agent.
Merriam Webster NO DATE (Merriam Webster Dictionary, online dictionary, “its,”
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/its)//ghs-VA
of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of an action <going to its kennel> <a child proud of its
first drawings> <its final enactment into law>
Its without the apostrophe indicates possession.
Straus 12 (Jane, etymologist, “Its vs. It’s,” April 12, 2012,
http://data.grammarbook.com/blog/pronouns/1-grammar-error/)//ghs-VA
Rule 1: When you mean it is or it has, use an apostrophe. Examples: It’s a nice day. It’s your right to refuse the invitation. It’s been great getting
to know you. Rule 2: When
paw.
you are using its as a possessive, don’t use the apostrophe. Examples: The cat hurt its
**DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE**
CANT RELATE TO FOREIGN POWER
1NC – Domestic
A. Interpretation: Domestic means physically within the U.S. borders.
DOD 82 (Department of Defense, regulation sets forth procedures governing the activities of DoD
intelligence components that affect United States persons, “PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES
OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS,” December 1982,
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5240_1_r.pdf)//ghs-VA
C10.2.1. Domestic
activities refers to activities that take place within the United States that do not
involve a significant connection with a foreign power, organization or person. C10.2.2. The term organization
includes corporations and other commercial organizations, academic institutions, clubs, professional societies, associations, and any other
group whose existence is formalized in some manner or otherwise functions on a continuing basis. C10.2.3. An organization within
the
United States means all organizations physically located within the geographical boundaries of the United
States whether or not they constitute a United States persons. Thus, a branch, subsidiary, or office of an
organization within the United States, which is physically located outside the United States , is not
considered as an organization within the United States.
B. Violation: The aff has restricted forms of surveillance that affect foreign powers
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits – They justify an infinite number of foreign embassy and cable-based
monitoring affs shifting the topic base and exploding limits.
2. Topic Education – they shift the focus of the topic away from the way surveillance
affects us to how it impacts foreign entities.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that in order to be considered domestic surveillance it cannot
have a significant connection to a foreign power and be within the U.S. Borders. Your
aff ____ (Insert Specific Aff Mechanism) ____ which means you don’t meet our interp.
Evidence Comparison
1. Our evidence is from the department of defense that gives the governments
interpretation of what is considered domestic.
Prefer the DOD – they’re one of the largest organizations in the U.S. and in charge of
defense.
DOD NO DATE (Department of Defense, Government Agency, “About the Department of Defense
(DOD),” http://www.defense.gov/about/)//ghs-VA
The Department of Defense is America's oldest and largest government agency. With our military tracing its roots back to
pre-Revolutionary times, the Department of Defense has grown and evolved with our nation. Today, the Department, headed by
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, is not only in charge of the military, but it also employs a civilian force of
thousands. With over 1.4 million men and women on active duty, and 718,000 civilian personnel, we are the nation's largest employer.
Another 1.1 million serve in the National Guard and Reserve forces. More than 2 million military retirees and their family members receive
benefits. Headquarters of the Department of Defense, the Pentagon is one of the world's largest office buildings. It is
twice the size of the Merchandise Mart in Chicago, and has three times the floor space of the Empire State Building in New York. Built during
the early years of World War II, it is still thought of as one of the most efficient office buildings in the world. Despite 17.5 miles of corridors it
takes only seven minutes to walk between any two points in the building. The
national security depends on our defense
installations and facilities being in the right place, at the right time, with the right qualities and capacities to protect our
national resources. Those resources have never been more important as America fights terrorists who plan and carry out attacks on our
facilities and our people. Our military service members and civilians operate in every time zone and in every climate. More than 450,000
employees are overseas, both afloat and ashore. The
Defense Department manages an inventory of installations
and facilities to keep Americans safe. The Department’s physical plant is huge by any standard, consisting of more than several
hundred thousand individual buildings and structures located at more than 5,000 different locations or sites. When all sites are added together,
the Department of Defense utilizes over 30 million acres of land.
2. Our evidence is in the context of government surveillance and how it operates in
the U.S.
2NC Limits/Case List XT
This topic is massive – the only hope of a limited topic is to draw lines around what
domestic surveillance is. Allowing domestic to be surveillance that impacts foreign
powers allows the aff to curtail surveillance relating to any part of the world.
The aff could –
- Curtail surveillance of fiber optics that run through our country.
- Curtail surveillance of ships passing through our harbors.
- Curtail surveillance of foreign embassies
- Curtail immigration surveillance from all countries around the world.
Our interpretation creates the necessary divide between foreign and domestic that is
necessary for a limited topic. Think about the number of ways the aff could scale back
programs that have connections to hundreds of foreign powers. Their interpretation
collapses the limiting function of the resolution and destroys any semblance of
predictable negative ground. Our interpretation limits the topics to debates about the
way surveillance affects us as citizens.
CANT INVOLVE TARGETS CONSENT
1NC – No Consent
A. Interpretation: Surveillance means the target cannot consent.
FISA 78 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Legal Document Outlining Electronic Surveillance Within
The United States For Foreign Intelligence Purposes, “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 50 us
e 1801,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf)//ghs-VA
(f) "Electronic surveillance" means— (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the
United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person •'• has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes; (2) the acquisition by an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States,
without the
consent of any party thereto , if such acquisition occurs in the United States ; (3) the intentional acquisition by
an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under
circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the
sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States; or (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.
B. Violation: The target has consented to the surveillance.
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits – Would justify an infinite number of affs that curtail contracts between the
government and organizations which makes neg prep impossible kills clash.
2. Topic Education – they move the debate away from privacy versus utility which kills
predictability and core topic learning.
3. Extra-topicality – Justifies any number of untopical actions, which kills neg prep and
causes a rush to generics.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
2NC Overview
Our interpretation says that the target of surveillance cannot consent to being
surveilled. Your aff _____ (Insert Specific Aff Mechanism) _____ which means you
don’t meet our interpretation.
There’s no topical version of the aff – this aff is a whole separate lit base which is a
bad direction for the topic to move in. Meta-data is a huge topic area already and is
important to talk about especially with recent controversies.
Our interpretation is also more qualified and the basis for federal definitions of
domestic surveillance.
EPIC 15 (Electronic Privacy Information Center, non-profit organization of legal analysts, “Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),” 2015, https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/fisa/fisc/)//ghs-VA
The FISC has jurisdiction to hear applications for, and issue orders authorizing, four traditional FISA activities: electronic
surveillance, physical searches, pen/trap surveillance, and compelled production of business records. In addition, the FISC has
jurisdiction to review the government's targeting and minimization procedures related to
programmatic surveillance certified under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The FISC was
originally composed of seven district judges, from seven circuits, appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States to serve for a maximum of
seven years. In 2001, amendments in the USA PATRIOT Act increased the number of judges on the Court to eleven, with three required to live
within 20 miles of the District of Columbia. The Chief Justice appoints a Presiding Judge for the court from amongst these eleven judges. The
FISC operates out of a secure location in the federal courthouse
in Washington, D.C., but can authorize searches or
surveillance "anywhere within the United States." The FISC operations are largely kept secret due to the sensitive nature of the proceedings,
and the court's ex parte process is primarily non-adversarial. The target of the order is not given an opportunity to appear at the hearing or
informed of the presence of the order. However, the court rules of procedure do allow the electronic service providers and business order
recipients to petition to challenge or modify any order. Records from FISC hearings are not revealed, even to petitioners challenging
surveillance orders under the court rules. The FISC has discretion to publish its opinions. FISC Review of FISA Applications Traditional FISA
investigative tools include: electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen/trap surveillance, and orders compelling production of business
records. In
order to conduct electronic surveillance or a physical search, the government must apply to the FISC
and show probable cause to believe that the target is a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power." For electronic surveillance, the
government must also establish that the facilities are being used by an agent of a foreign power or a foreign power. For physical searches, the
government must show that the place to be searched contains "foreign intelligence information" and that it is used, owned, or possessed by an
agent of a foreign power or a foreign power. The government must also provide a description of the information sought and the places or
facilities that will be searched. When
the FISC grants applications for surveillance it issues a "primary order"
finding that all the FISA requirements were met . The FISC also issues a "secondary order" providing that "upon request of
the applicant," a specified third party must "furnish the applicant forthwith with all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary" to
accomplish the search "in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference." Assisting third parties, such as
telephone and Internet service providers, are compensated for any assistance rendered, and can keep certain records under security
procedures adopted by the government.
2NC Limits/Case List XT
Your interpretation allows for SOX, Fracking Regulation, TSA, and more because you
can simply curtail contractual agreements between the government and citizens or
corporations which explodes limits because there’s a whole separate lit base about
corporations who have agreements with the USFG, your interpretation would allow
for curtailment in all of those areas which means the neg is dis-incentivized from
doing specific work and will default to generics. Discussions of surveillance is
important and we won’t get that if we debate the same two process counterplans.
Our interpretation allows for innovation with constraints – SSRA, Big Stick Privacy
Affs, FISA Court, and Border 1AC’s are all topical under our interpretation. Limited
case lists allow for the negative to have specific prep which guarantees topic specific
quality debates and puts both sides on an equal playing field.
Government Info Gathering that people or businesses opt into or consent to:
-
Food stamps
SEC Financial Regulatory Compliance
Export Control Licensing
Federal Standardized Testing
Taxes
Census
FDA Regulatory Compliance
Federal Wage Regulations
Office of Workers Compensation Program Regulations
Federal Contract Compliance Regulations
Federal Safety Regulations
There are a litany of things businesses consent to information wise to the government
– this is JUST TECH.
EDGE NO DATE (Enterprise Development & Growth Engine, Execution-MiH EDGE is an unmatched
platform, which provides an organization with a capacity to significantly boost the field/front-end
effectiveness, “Business Metadata for IT,”
http://www.executionmih.com/metadata/business.php)//ghs-VA
As you will learn further in Metadata Management section, business Metadata is a bigger challenge than IT metadata,
because the IT related meta-data is belonging to an environment, which is mostly owned by IT. Secondly, IT folks are wired to manage these
kinds of initiatives. For business environment, this is a fairly new concept and we are still in the beginning of the evolution life-cycle. This by no
means underplays challenge related to the technical metadata, as it is not far ahead in the evolution curve. Even today, IT has a challenge for
having robust all-encompassing repositories. Examples
of the Business Meta-data Business Model Business data
models Business Analysis models (for business modeling) Business Hierarchies (from a business analyst point of view)
Business dimensions and attributes with business descriptions Data Management Data Groups Data Custodians
owning the data Data stewards responsible for the health of the data. Data quality Data quality business rules Data Quality
statistics Data Analysis and Reporting Business Reports Definition Data Analysis definition in the reports (what analysis is done
in the reports, why and how it is done) Reports structure and layout Performance Management Measures and key
performance metrics Performance dashboards and scorecards Documents Rules Policies Standard Operating
procedures Legal Contracts Business rules and processes Business Processes Business Rules
2NC Extra-Topicality XT
Even if they win their education is good, it’s short circuited by a lack of engagement—
if they are not predictable that skews negative strategy and turns education
arguments – that was above. Staying within the bounds of the topic is necessary for
engagement which is a key internal link to advocacy skills which outweighs their
education arguments because it’s the only thing we take from debate.
2NC Ground XT
Their interpretation also removes core negative arguments – critiques and disads
based around rights violations are removed if the aff can get the target to consent.
2NC Knowledge O/W
Debates over meta-data and the NSA and uniquely key now – outweighs your
education claims.
Mimoso 14 (Michael, award-winning journalist and former Editor of Information Security magazine, a
two-time finalist for national magazine of the year. He has been writing for business-to-business IT
websites and magazines for over 10 years, with a primary focus on information security, “NSA Reforms
Demonstrate Value of Public Debate,” March 26, 2014, https://threatpost.com/nsa-reformsdemonstrate-value-of-public-debate/105052)//ghs-VA
The president’s proposal would end the NSA’s collection and storage of phone data; those records would
remain with the providers and the NSA would require judicial permission under a new court order to
access those records. The House bill, however, requires no prior judicial approval; a judge would rule on the request after the FBI submits it to
the telecommunications company. “ It’s
absolutely crucial to understand the details of how these things will
work ,” the ACLU’s Kaufman said in reference to the “new court order” mentioned in the New York Times report. “There is
no substitute for robust Democratic debate
in the court of public opinion and in the courts.
The system of oversight is
broke and issues like these need to be debated in public .” Phone metadata and dragnet collection of digital data
from Internet providers and other technology companies is
supposed to be used to map connections between
foreigners suspected of terrorism and threatening the national security of the U.S. The NSA’s dragnet ,
however, also swept up communication involving Americans that is supposed to be collected and accessed only with a
court order. The NSA stood by claims that the program was effective in stopping hundreds of terror plots against U.S. interests domestic and
foreign. Those numbers, however, quickly were lowered as they were challenged by Congressional committees and public scrutiny. “The
president said the effectiveness of this program was one of the reasons it was in place,” Kaufman said. “But
as soon as these claims were made public, journalists, advocates
and the courts
pushed back and it could not
withstand the scrutiny. It’s remarkable how quickly [the number of] plots turned into small numbers. The NSA was telling FISC the
program was absolutely necessary to national security, but the government would not go nearly that far in defending
the program. That shows the value of public debate and an adversarial process
in courts.”
AT: PRISM Not Topical
Our interpretation says that the target of surveillance cannot consent to being
surveilled. This doesn’t mean they cannot know about it, which is distinct.
AT: Hurts Neg Generics
Just because certain generics like consult, tradeoff disads, and politics have existed on
previous topics doesn’t mean they should on this one – our interpretation incentivizes
research and innovation and prevents laziness to defaulting to arguments made on
previous topics.
Disads like the big data, president powers, corporation’s disad all focus on the topic
literature versus bad generics that have existed forever which forces innovation.
2NC Interpretation XT
Executives order set the precedent that surveillance means no consent.
XO 12333 (Executive Order 12333, “Executive Order 12333--United States intelligence activities,” The
provisions of Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981, appear at 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p. 200,
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html)//ghs-VA
(b) Electronic
surveillance means acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without
the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic
communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of
not including the use of radio direction-finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
communication, but
There’s an across government consensus that surveillance means no consent.
Jordan 11 (David Alan Jordan, New York University School of Law, “U.S. Intelligence Law,” 2011,
https://books.google.com/books?id=C2b6mqniwyAC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false)//ghs
-VA
Administrative Law Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 3.5(C) (20I0) Electronic
surveillance means
acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a
party to an electronic communication
or, in the case of a non-electronic communication, without
the consent of a
person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio direction-finding
equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter. Department of Defense Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures
Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persotis, f DL1.1.9 (Dec. 1982):
Electronic Surveillance Acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the
consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic
communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio
direction finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter. (Electronic surveillance within the United States is subject to the
definitions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (reference (b)).)
Surveillance applied empirically necessitates a lack of consent.
Lee et al 12 (Lisa M. Lee, the Office of Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Charles M. Heilig, with the Tuberculosis Trials
Consortium, Angela White, with the J. L. Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario,
“Ethical Justification for Conducting Public Health Surveillance Without Patient Consent,” 2012 January;
102(1): 38–44, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3490562/)//ghs-VA
Public health surveillance
by necessity occurs without explicit
patient
consent . There is strong legal and scientific
support for maintaining name-based reporting of infectious diseases and other types of public health surveillance. We present conditions under
which surveillance without
explicit patient consent is ethically justifiable using principles of
contemporary clinical and public health ethics. Overriding individual autonomy must be justified in terms of
the obligation of public health
to improve population health, reduce inequities, attend to the health of vulnerable and
systematically disadvantaged persons, and prevent harm. In addition, data
elements collected without consent must
represent the minimal necessary interference, lead to effective public health action, and be maintained securely.
Surveillance involves access to information that you expect not to be shared without
your consent.
Lemos 11 (Andre, University of Baha, “Locative Media and Surveillance at the Boundaries of
Informational Territories,” 2011,
https://books.google.com/books?id=quEd4w61EYoC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false)//ghsVA
The question I would pose is whether the term surveillance can be generalized to cover ALL these actions and systems. I
do not believe that when I use Facebook I am under surveillance (the information is protected and there is no intent).
But Facebook can be used for surveillance (if there is unauthorized access to my personal data and intent
with a view to avoiding or causing something), I
am not convinced that control, monitoring and surveillance are the
same thing or that systems (social networks) that collect non-nominal data and cross these with other nonnominal data in databases in other systems inherently constitute surveillance. To my mind these systems monitor
and control , which is dangerous precisely because such monitoring and control can give rise, a posteriori, to a form of individual or group
surveillance. It should be noted that locative media pose a threat to private life and anonymity. Privacy can be defined as the control and
possession of personal information, as well as the use that is made of it subsequently. Anonymity in turn implies an absence of information
about an individual and an absence of control over the collection of personal information (GOW. 2005). Privacy is one of the pillars of
democratic societies, as it:
CANT CURTAIL FOREIGN-FOREIGN
1NC – Cannot Be Foreign-to-Foreign
A. Interpretation: One end of the communication has to be a citizen of the U.S. located
in the U.S.
FISA 78 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Legal Document Outlining Electronic Surveillance Within
The United States For Foreign Intelligence Purposes, “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 50 us
e 1801,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf)//ghs-VA
(f) "Electronic surveillance" means— (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known
United States person who is in the United States , if the contents are acquired by intentionally
targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person •'• has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a
warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes; (2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition
occurs in the United States; (3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio
communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States; or (4) the installation or use of
an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or
radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes.
B. Violation: The sender or receiver are not from the U.S.
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits – Justifies affs that choose any country of the week exploding limits which
kills neg prep causing a rush to generics.
2. Topic Education – Shifts the controversy away from constitutional rights violations
of citizens that are at the core of the topic lit which hurts predictability and core topic
learning.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
1NC – PRISM Violation
Repealing PRISM isn’t T – Collects foreigners’ information.
Saletan 13 (Will Salten, writer @ Slate, “PRISM Planet,” Jun 6, 2013,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/06/prism_and_u_s_citizens_does_the_gov
ernment_s_cyber_surveillance_program.html)//ghs-VA
This is the problem at
the core of PRISM, a U.S. surveillance program disclosed yesterday by the Washington Post and the Guardian.
The government has decided that the difficulty of distinguishing foreigners from Americans won’t be
its problem anymore. It will be your problem. Counterterrorism officers will scan everything that goes
through the Internet, collect the stuff that sounds like it might belong to foreigners, and figure out
later whether what they’re reading actually belongs to a U.S. citizen . Unlike the NSA’s phone surveillance program
(code-named BLARNEY), which I defended yesterday, PRISM
captures the content of electronic communications, not
just “metadata” such as the time and length of phone calls. A PRISM briefing slide lists the kinds of materials intelligence analysts can get
through the system, including email, videos, VoIP, and online chats. The Post, paraphrasing a “User’s Guide for PRISM Skype Collection,” says
Skype “can be monitored for audio when one end of the call is a conventional telephone and for any combination of ‘audio, video, chat, and file
transfers’ when Skype users connect by computer alone.” The official who leaked this document told the Post that through PRISM,
surveillance officers “literally can
watch your ideas form as you type.”
2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that in order for something to be considered surveillance the
data must be received or sent by a U.S. Citizen residing in the U.S.
They ____ (Insert Specific Aff Mechanism) ____ which means they don’t meet our
interpretation.
Our interpretation is also more qualified and the basis for federal definitions of
domestic surveillance.
EPIC 15 (Electronic Privacy Information Center, non-profit organization of legal analysts, “Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),” 2015, https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/fisa/fisc/)//ghs-VA
The FISC has jurisdiction to hear applications for, and issue orders authorizing, four traditional FISA activities: electronic
surveillance, physical searches, pen/trap surveillance, and compelled production of business records. In addition, the FISC has
jurisdiction to review the government's targeting and minimization procedures related to
programmatic surveillance certified under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The FISC was
originally composed of seven district judges, from seven circuits, appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States to serve for a maximum of
seven years. In 2001, amendments in the USA PATRIOT Act increased the number of judges on the Court to eleven, with three required to live
within 20 miles of the District of Columbia. The Chief Justice appoints a Presiding Judge for the court from amongst these eleven judges. The
FISC operates out of a secure location in the federal courthouse
in Washington, D.C., but can authorize searches or
surveillance "anywhere within the United States." The FISC operations are largely kept secret due to the sensitive nature of the proceedings,
and the court's ex parte process is primarily non-adversarial. The target of the order is not given an opportunity to appear at the hearing or
informed of the presence of the order. However, the court rules of procedure do allow the electronic service providers and business order
recipients to petition to challenge or modify any order. Records from FISC hearings are not revealed, even to petitioners challenging
surveillance orders under the court rules. The FISC has discretion to publish its opinions. FISC Review of FISA Applications Traditional FISA
investigative tools include: electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen/trap surveillance, and orders compelling production of business
records. In
order to conduct electronic surveillance or a physical search, the government must apply to the FISC
and show probable cause to believe that the target is a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power." For electronic surveillance, the
government must also establish that the facilities are being used by an agent of a foreign power or a foreign power. For physical searches, the
government must show that the place to be searched contains "foreign intelligence information" and that it is used, owned, or possessed by an
agent of a foreign power or a foreign power. The government must also provide a description of the information sought and the places or
facilities that will be searched. When
the FISC grants applications for surveillance it issues a "primary order"
finding that all the FISA requirements were met . The FISC also issues a "secondary order" providing that "upon request of
the applicant," a specified third party must "furnish the applicant forthwith with all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary" to
accomplish the search "in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference." Assisting third parties, such as
telephone and Internet service providers, are compensated for any assistance rendered, and can keep certain records under security
procedures adopted by the government.
Proves our argument about limits and predictability – our evidence is contextualized
to the USFG and shows that it excludes foreign-to-foreign communication which
means we never had the ability to prepare.
2NC Limits/Case List XT
The phrase “domestic surveillance” allows the aff to do potentially anything within
the U.S. The only chance of limiting the topic is through defining the area and targets
they can surveil.
Your interpretation allows you to choose any country of the week to base your
advantages around based on the extra-topical portions of the plan. Under-limiting the
topic is dangerous because allowing them to access the data of foreign-domestic
surveillance explodes affirmative ground and gives them the ability to choose
advantages all around the world which causes the neg to rush to generic process CP’s
and destroys in depth debate which crushes topic education and engagement.
Outweighs because detailed and precise debates on this topic are especially
important.
Mimoso 14 (Michael, award-winning journalist and former Editor of Information Security magazine, a
two-time finalist for national magazine of the year. He has been writing for business-to-business IT
websites and magazines for over 10 years, with a primary focus on information security, “NSA Reforms
Demonstrate Value of Public Debate,” March 26, 2014, https://threatpost.com/nsa-reformsdemonstrate-value-of-public-debate/105052)//ghs-VA
The president’s proposal would end the NSA’s collection and storage of phone data; those records would
remain with the providers and the NSA would require judicial permission under a new court order to
access those records. The House bill, however, requires no prior judicial approval; a judge would rule on the request after the FBI submits it to
the telecommunications company. “ It’s
absolutely crucial to understand the details of how these things will
work ,” the ACLU’s Kaufman said in reference to the “new court order” mentioned in the New York Times report. “There is
no substitute for robust Democratic debate
in the court of public opinion and in the courts.
The system of oversight is
broke and issues like these need to be debated in public .” Phone metadata and dragnet collection of digital data
from Internet providers and other technology companies is
supposed to be used to map connections between
foreigners suspected of terrorism and threatening the national security of the U.S. The NSA’s dragnet ,
however, also swept up communication involving Americans that is supposed to be collected and accessed only with a
court order. The NSA stood by claims that the program was effective in stopping hundreds of terror plots against U.S. interests domestic and
foreign. Those numbers, however, quickly were lowered as they were challenged by Congressional committees and public scrutiny. “The
president said the effectiveness of this program was one of the reasons it was in place,” Kaufman said. “But
as soon as these claims were made public, journalists, advocates
and the courts
pushed back and it could not
withstand the scrutiny. It’s remarkable how quickly [the number of] plots turned into small numbers. The NSA was telling FISC the
program was absolutely necessary to national security, but the government would not go nearly that far in defending
the program. That shows the value of public debate and an adversarial process
in courts.”
Easy topical version of the aff – you simply limit the targets to be individuals who are
sending or receiving messages and are U.S. citizens living within the U.S.
This means the same types of plans are justified but the targets are differentiated
which gives reasonable limits on the affirmative in terms of ground which promotes
equity of ground.
2NC Topic Education XT
You shift the debate away from the heart of the topic – all controversy surrounding
surveillance programs are round constitutional violations such as the fourth
amendment. Shifting the debate away from there takes away critical neg ground such
as critiques with rights based links and disads based on the perception of the plans
effect on U.S. citizens.
Also proves our predictability arguments – shifting the stasis puts us at a disadvantage
leaving us unprepared and destroys fairness meaning the aff wins every debate on
squirrely affs.
AT: FISA Doesn’t Spec U.S. Persons
Protect America Act clarifies that in order for it to be surveillance it has to be sent or
received by a Citizen of the US located within the US, being intentionally targeted.
Bazan 8 (Elizabeth B. Bazan, Legislative Attorney American Law Division, “P.L. 110-55, the Protect
America Act of 2007: Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,” February 14, 2008,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34143.pdf)//ghs-VA
New Section 105A of FISA, as added by Section 2 of P.L. 110-55, states: Nothing
under section 101(f) shall
in the definition of electronic surveillance
be construed to encompass surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed
to be located outside of the United States . Section 101(f) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f), sets forth the definition of “electronic
surveillance” under the statute. It provides: (f) “Electronic
surveillance” means — (1) the acquisition by an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received
by a particular, known United States person6 who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired
by intentionally targeting that United States person , under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;
2NC Interpretation XT
Foreign-to-foreign communication isn’t topical – it’s foreign intelligence.
Mayer 14 (Jonathan, Lawyer @ Stanford, “Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales
from the FISA Frontier,” December 3, 2014, http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-americansoil/)//ghs-VA
The United States is the world’s largest telecommunications hub. Internet traffic and voice calls are
routinely routed through the country, even though both ends are foreign. According to leaked documents, the NSA
routinely scoops up many of these two-end foreign communications as they flow through American
networks.2 The agency calls it “ International Transit Switch Collection,” operated under “Transit Authority.” That
authority stems from Executive Order 12333, not the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
FISA surveillance defines domestic surveillance as communication that begins or ends
in the US.
Mayer 14 (Jonathan, Lawyer @ Stanford, “Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales
from the FISA Frontier,” December 3, 2014, http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-americansoil/)//ghs-VA
The term “electronic surveillance” has a precise (and counterintuitive) meaning in FISA. There are multiple parts to
the definition; the component that directly addresses wireline intercepts is 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2). It encompasses: the acquisition . . . of
the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States . . . if such acquisition
occurs in the United States A two-end foreign communication is, of course, not “to or from a person in the
United States.” When the NSA intercepts a two-end foreign wireline communication, then, it hasn’t engaged in “electronic surveillance.”3
Domestic Surveillance can’t involve a significant foreign connection.
Jordan 11 (David Alan Jordan, New York University School of Law, “U.S. Intelligence Law,” 2011,
https://books.google.com/books?id=C2b6mqniwyAC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false)//ghs
-VA
C2.2.3. Domestic activities refers to activities that take place within the United States that do not involve
a significant connection with a foreign power, organization, or person.
Foreign-to-foreign, even if the data permeates the U.S., is foreign surveillance.
Mayer 14 (Jonathan, Lawyer @ Stanford, “Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales
from the FISA Frontier,” December 3, 2014, http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-americansoil/)//ghs-VA
3. These Aren’t
“Domestic” Communications Under FISA and the Wiretap Act Both the Wiretap Act and FISA
include exclusivity provisions. The Wiretap Act text, in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f), reads: [Procedures] in [the Wiretap Act, the Stored
Communications Act, and FISA] shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in [FISA], and the interception of
domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted. The similar FISA text, in 50 U.S.C. § 1812, says: Except as [otherwise
expressly authorized by statute,] the procedures of [the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, the Pen Register Act, and FISA] shall be
the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications may be
conducted. Once again unpacking the legalese, these
parallel provisions establish exclusivity for 1) “electronic
surveillance” and 2) interception of “domestic” communications. As I explained above, intercepting a twoend foreign wireline communication doesn’t constitute “electronic surveillance .” As for what counts
as a “domestic” communication, the statutes seem to mean a communication wholly within the
United States.7 A two-end foreign communication would plainly flunk that definition. So, there’s the threestep maneuver. If the NSA intercepts foreign-to-foreign voice or Internet traffic, as it transits the United States, that isn’t
covered by either FISA or the Wiretap Act. All that’s left is Executive Order 12333.
MUST HAVE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
1NC – Expectation of Privacy
Surveillance requires a violation of someone’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
FISA 78 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Legal Document Outlining Electronic Surveillance Within
The United States For Foreign Intelligence Purposes, “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 50 us
e 1801,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf)//ghs-VA
(f) "Electronic
surveillance" means— (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United
States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person,
under circumstances in which a person •'• has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes ; (2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such
acquisition occurs in the United States; (3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents
of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States; or (4) the installation or
use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire
or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes.
B. Violation:
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits – infinitely increases the number of affs and reduces the topic to simple
observation – explodes limits and makes neg prep impossible which causes a rush to
generics.
2. Topic Education – Shifts the topic away from rights violations which is at the core of
the topic lit which wrecks predictability and kills topic education.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
1NC – TSA Violation
No expectation of privacy at the airport.
Cavuto 15 (Neil, reporter @ Fox News, “TSA Official Shares Photo of Passenger's Cash-Filled Luggage
on Twitter,” July 1st, 2015, http://insider.foxnews.com/2015/07/01/tsa-official-tweets-photopassengers-cash-filled-luggage-twitter)//ghs-VA
Farbstein told The Washington Post that "the carry-on bag of the passenger alarmed because of the large unknown bulk in his carry-on bag.
When TSA officers opened the bag to determine what had caused the alarm, the money was sitting
inside. Quite unusual. TSA alerted the airport police, who were investigating." She did not respond to questions about whether
posting the photo to social media violated the passenger's privacy rights. On "Your World," attorney Lisa Giovinazzo said the incident is strange,
but passengers
can't expect to have privacy while traveling. " There's no expectation of privacy , we all
go through the same security and we know that everything will be scanned," she stated.
2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that in order for something to be considered surveillance the
target they’re surveilling needs to have a reasonable expectation of privacy based on
legal precedent. Your aff ____ (Insert Specific Aff Mechanism) ____ which means you
don’t meet our interpretation.
Our interpretation is also more qualified and the basis for federal definitions of
domestic surveillance.
EPIC 15 (Electronic Privacy Information Center, non-profit organization of legal analysts, “Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),” 2015, https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/fisa/fisc/)//ghs-VA
The FISC has jurisdiction to hear applications for, and issue orders authorizing, four traditional FISA activities: electronic
surveillance, physical searches, pen/trap surveillance, and compelled production of business records. In addition, the FISC has
jurisdiction to review the government's targeting and minimization procedures related to
programmatic surveillance certified under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The FISC was
originally composed of seven district judges, from seven circuits, appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States to serve for a maximum of
seven years. In 2001, amendments in the USA PATRIOT Act increased the number of judges on the Court to eleven, with three required to live
within 20 miles of the District of Columbia. The Chief Justice appoints a Presiding Judge for the court from amongst these eleven judges. The
FISC operates out of a secure location in the federal courthouse
in Washington, D.C., but can authorize searches or
surveillance "anywhere within the United States." The FISC operations are largely kept secret due to the sensitive nature of the proceedings,
and the court's ex parte process is primarily non-adversarial. The target of the order is not given an opportunity to appear at the hearing or
informed of the presence of the order. However, the court rules of procedure do allow the electronic service providers and business order
recipients to petition to challenge or modify any order. Records from FISC hearings are not revealed, even to petitioners challenging
surveillance orders under the court rules. The FISC has discretion to publish its opinions. FISC Review of FISA Applications Traditional FISA
investigative tools include: electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen/trap surveillance, and orders compelling production of business
records. In
order to conduct electronic surveillance or a physical search, the government must apply to the FISC
and show probable cause to believe that the target is a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power." For electronic surveillance, the
government must also establish that the facilities are being used by an agent of a foreign power or a foreign power. For physical searches, the
government must show that the place to be searched contains "foreign intelligence information" and that it is used, owned, or possessed by an
agent of a foreign power or a foreign power. The government must also provide a description of the information sought and the places or
facilities that will be searched. When
the FISC grants applications for surveillance it issues a "primary order"
finding that all the FISA requirements were met . The FISC also issues a "secondary order" providing that "upon request of
the applicant," a specified third party must "furnish the applicant forthwith with all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary" to
accomplish the search "in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference." Assisting third parties, such as
telephone and Internet service providers, are compensated for any assistance rendered, and can keep certain records under security
procedures adopted by the government.
2NC Limits/Case List XT
The phrase “domestic surveillance” without constraint allows the aff to do virtually
anything – creating a limited interpretation that allows for innovation with constraint
is necessary to produce good debates.
Reducing the topic to simple observation on anything allows the aff to run functionally
unlimited number of plans. They would justify watching TSA, Sarbanes Oxley, Borders,
or any aff based around pure observation and completely lacks a legal basis. Your
interpretation would allow for curtailment in all of those areas which means the neg
never has specific prep and is forced to read generics. That leads to un-educational
repetitive debates and puts the negative at a huge disadvantage which turns their
education arguments.
Our interpretation would allow for SSRA, FISA Court Affs, Employee Protection affs,
which still allows for innovation within all the federal programs but still places
constraints that promotes equitable ground.
2NC Topic Education XT
You shift the debate away from the heart of the topic – all controversy surrounding
surveillance programs are round constitutional violations such as the fourth
amendment. Shifting the debate away from there takes away critical neg ground such
as critiques with rights based links and disads based on the perception of the plans
effect on U.S. citizens.
Also proves our predictability arguments – shifting the stasis puts us at a disadvantage
leaving us unprepared and destroys fairness meaning the aff wins every debate on
squirrely affs.
AT: Smith v Maryland/Katz
Federal courts have concluded that people’s emails have a reasonable expectation of
privacy – it’s still under the purview of the fourth amendment.
Team 14 2011 (Online anonymous blog concerned with surveillance in the 21st Century, “Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy,” April 2011,
https://wikispaces.psu.edu/display/IST432SP11Team14/Reasonable+Expectation+of+Privacy)//ghs-VA
Privacy is defined as "the expectation that confidential personal information disclosed in a private place will not be disclosed to third parties,
when that disclosure would cause either embarrassment or emotional distress to a person of reasonable sensitivities". Reasonable
expectation of privacy is an issue dealing with the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In the constitution the Fourth Amendment known as "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." To learn more about the
Fourth Amendment click here. Expectation
of privacy is defined as the belief in the existence of freedom from
unwanted governmental intrusion of personal property, house, or persons. Expectation of privacy is
similar but not the same thing as right of privacy . There are two different types of reasonable expectation of privacy,
subjective expectation of privacy and objective, legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy. Subjective expectation of privacy is the opinion
of someone that a certain event or occurrence is private whereas objective, legitimate, or reasonable expectation of privacy is a generalized
idea of privacy known by society. A person may not have an expectation of privacy in public places except a ones residence, hotel room, in a
place of business, public restroom, private portions of a jailhouse, and or a phone booth. A personal vehicle is known as a subjective
expectation of privacy, but does not always fall under the category of objective expectation of privacy, like a house. The expectation of privacy
plays a crucial part when deciding if a search and seizure is a correct or incorrect. In order to follow the Fourth Amendment, the US congress
has come up with a two part test to help make a decision if a search and seizure is appropriate. The two circumstances of the test are; (1)
governmental action must take into consideration the individual's subjective expectation of privacy and (2) the expectation of privacy must be
reasonable, in that society agrees and recognizes it. Since the Fourth Amendment was written way before any kind of technology with memory
capabilities, the law has adapted and caught up with the times.
Surveillance equipment has recently diminished the
expectation of privacy . With today's technology, we can watch and predict criminals next moves. Also, we can find out
information about a person and look up background and history information. Computer and internet users are constantly logging
their history onto their hard drives. Government forces can retrieve this information and use it in a trial if needed. E-mails, e-mail addresses, IP
addresses, and websites are all recorded and could be searched. Today, the
Federal courts agree that the sender of an email has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of a message while it is in transmission.
Even under Katz there’s still no expectation of privacy.
Donahue 14 (Laura K, Prof Law @ Georgetown Law Center, "ARTICLE: BULK METADATA COLLECTION:
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS," Summer 2014, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
757)//ghs-VA
Under Katz, in turn, Americans do not expect that their telephony metadata will be collected and analyzed.
n20 Most Americans do not even realize what can be learned from such data, making
invalid any claim that they reasonably
expect the government to have access to such information. The courts also have begun to recognize, in a variety of
contexts, the greater incursions into privacy represented by new technologies.
AT: No Expectation of Privacy for PRISM
Data mining still violates reasonable expectations of privacy – the fourth amendment
simply operates in a diminished capacity.
Grier 1 (Manton M. Grier, Graduated @ Colombia University, “Software Formerley known as Carnivore:
When Does E-Mail Surveillance Encroach upon a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy,” 2001,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/sclr52&div=43&id=&page=)//ghs-VA
B. What is a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy? Although not explicit in the United States Constitution, a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in the context of the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In Katz v. United States,6 the United
States Supreme Court accepted this view by declaring "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."37 In Katz the Court held that
recording Katz's telephone conversations in aphone booth constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment because the conduct "violated
the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth . . . ."' Although the Katz majority opinion did not mention the
phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy," Justice Harlan formulated a test in his concurrence for measuring this expectation.3 Under Justice
Harlan's test a search violates a person's reasonable expectation of privacy if (1) the person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and (2) that expectation is one which society recognizes as reasonable (objective).' Justice Harlan, however, later de-emphasized the
importance of a subjective expectation of privacy.4' Moreover, he suggested an expectation must be more than merely reasonable; something
else was required.42 He proposed the "something else" was a balancing of "the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of its impact
on the individual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement." Subsequent Supreme Court
cases have held that the reasonableness of a search, and whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, is determined by balancing the
needs of the government versus the rights of a particular individual." Thus, an individual may possess an expectation of privacy, but this
expectation is unreasonable if the court concludes that the governmental interest outweighs the individual's privacy interest.45 When an
individual's expectation of privacy is deemed unreasonable, the Fourth Amendment provides no protection, regardless of whether a warrant
was properly obtained.' However, if an individual's expectation is reasonable, the Fourth Amendment provides protection from police intrusion
absent a warrant supported by probable cause. 7 Finding
bright guidelines for this balancing test has proved elusive.
Nevertheless, delineations of what is considered a reasonable expectation of privacy, however vague, can be
placed on a spectrum,"8 and the Court will recognize those expectations as either legitimate, diminished, or altogether nonexistent."9
On one end of this spectrum are situations where an individual experiences the greatest expectation
of privacy. Thus, legitimate expectations are found, for example, in the privacy of one's home, especially at
night,5" or in one's personal effects."' In the middle of this spectrum are instances where an individual
experiences a diminished expectation, such as in a car 2 or at a business establishment.53 However, perhaps the best way
to define a reasonable expectation of privacy is to examine those situations where there is no
legitimate expectation. Thus, the Supreme Court has found, for example, there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of a conversation divulged to a third party,54 in something knowingly exposed to the
public,5 or in the garbage on the side of the street. C. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy While Using E-Mail Electronic
mail, commonly known as "e-mail," is a medium of communication transmitted via computers connected over either the Internet (World Wide
Web) or an intranet (your office system). 7 In many respects, email is a hybrid of the postal mail and the telephone. Communication via e-mail
is similar to postal mail because both (1) are written communications; (2) allow for the attachment of items, such as files or pictures; (3) lack
voice inflection, which affects the recipient's ability to judge the tone of the communication; and (4) cannot be retracted once sent. On the
other hand, e-mail is similar to a phone call because the communication is virtually instantaneous and is electronic, meaning it is capable of
being intercepted by electronic means. Understanding how an e-mail message is sent and received requires a cursory understanding of how the
Internet works. The Internet is basically "a network of networks." 'Rather than a physical entity, it is "a giant network which interconnects
innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks." 59 Because the smaller networks are owned by various individuals or organizations,
public and private, the Internet is essentially a decentralized, global cyberspace that links the entire world. When an e-mail is sent via the
Internet, the message is not sent as a whole entity; rather, it is divided into a series of "packets" which are reassembled at the receiving end.6'
These packets may take many and varying paths to their destination."2 If certain computers along the path become overloaded, some packets
will travel through less congested computers.63 Because e-mail is not sealed or secure, intermediate computers may be used to access or. view
the message, unless it is encrypted.' The first federal appellate court to address the issue of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in
the use of e-mail was the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.6 In United
States v. Maxwell the appellant had been
convicted of knowingly transporting or receiving child pornography in violation of the Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of
Children Act of 1978.6 The appellant was discovered by an FBI sting that targeted a child pornography ring operating on the Internet service
provider America Online (AOL).67 On the one hand,
the court found that the appellant "possessed a reasonable
expectation of privacy , albeit a limited one," in the e-mails he sent via AOL." The court stressed that these e-mail
messages were privately stored by AOL,69 thus affording more protection than, for example, an e-mail transmitted at work.
The court, however, also determined that expectations of privacy depend on the type of e-mail used and on the indentity of the intended
recipient.7" Thus, the court found that "[m]essages sent to the public at large in the 'chat room' or e-mail that is 'forwarded' from
correspondent to correspondent [lose] any semblance of privacy. In United States v. Monroe," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, while acknowledging its holding in Maxwell, found the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mail messages
that were viewed by Air Force personnel who maintained the network system.73 In distinguishing Monroe from the holding in Maxwell, the
court noted that in Maxwell, AOL contractually agreed not to disclose subscribers' e-mail.74 Thus, e-mails sent at work or through the
Internet itself, absent contractual guarantees, experience
a diminished degree of protection from the Fourth
Amendment. In sum, the use of e-mail falls into the middle of the spectrum-a diminished expectation of
privacy. On the one hand, the use of e-mail is generally subject to the same Fourth Amendment
protections found in the use of the telephone and postal mail,76 and the sender of an e-mail can
reasonably expect that the contents will remain private and free from police intrusion, absent a search
warrant supported by probable cause." On the other hand, "chat" messages,78 received e-mails, 79 forwarded e-mails, 0 and
e-mails divulged to third parties"' afford no reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, in order to implicate the
Fourth Amendment, it is necessary to determine how, when, where, and to whom the e-mail was sent.
Privacy expectations are diminished but still exist – means it still operates within the
purview of expected privacy rights.
Ashdown 81 (Gerald, Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law, “The Fourth
Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy",” 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1289 1981)//ghs-VA
In addition to combining the notion of standing with substantive fourth amendment law under the "legitimate expectation
of privacy"
scope of fourth amendment rights—are
dependent upon what a majority of the Court chooses to recognize as constitutionally legitimate.33 This
formula, the Court in Rakas also reaffirmed that such expectations^—and thus the
approach has permitted the Court to develop a new graduated view of fourth amendment rights in which some expectations of privacy are less
legitimate—and thus less entitled to protection—than others. While finding privacy expectations to be clearly legitimate in some situations78
and completely absent in others,7* the
deal with automobiles, in
Court also has chosen to recognize a middle ground, predominantly in cases that
which privacy expectations are diminished and fourth amendment protection is
concomitantly reduced .75 Thus, the Burger Court's view of the fourth amendment, although perhaps still in its incipient stages,
appears to be reducible to a three-tiered hierarchical scheme, with protection being dependent upon the Court's willingness to recognize
asserted privacy interests as either legitimate, diminished, or altogether nonexistent. When the Court is willing to recognize a claimed privacy
interest as legitimate, full fourth amendment safeguards, including both the probable cause and warrant requirements, are applicable. In other
words, the Court demands strict compliance with the fourth amendment's warrant clause in these cases. In United States v. Chadwick,8 for
example, the government argued that the fourth amendment warrant clause protected only those interests traditionally associated with the
home. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion, however, stated that "a fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment [was] to safeguard
individuals from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls
of the home.'"7 The Chief Justice concluded that the users of a locked footlocker, which was characterized as a repository of personal effects,
enjoyed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the locker, and that the warrant clause therefore applied. In a later case the Court
held that the same privacy expectations and warrant requirement applied to an unlocked suitcase found in an automobile, even though
automobiles themselves traditionally had been provided with less fourth amendment protection.78 Recently, a plurality of the Court in Robbins
v. California9 expanded these holdings to apply to any closed, opaque container.80 Other privacy interests that the Court has found to be
legitimate and thus governed by the warrant clause include those associated with the home,81 packaged films,82 and telephone booths.83 The
second level in the new hierarchy of fourth amendment interests comprises those cases in which the Court has concluded that the privacy
expectation in question is diminished or reduced. This category apparently is governed by the fourth amendment's reasonableness clause
rather than its warrant clause. Thus, in a relatively recent line of cases, the Court has held warrantless searches of automobiles to be reasonable
on the ground that any expectation of privacy in a car is diminished.8 The Court has justified this conclusion in a variety of ways, reasoning that
automobiles, unlike houses, are constantly used in plain view for transportation,85 are extensively regulated by the state,86 are often subject
to official inspection, and are frequently taken into police custody.8 Another area of police activity to which the Court applies this second
category of diminished privacy expectations is public arrests. Although it was not specifically stated in Watson v. United States,8 a case
upholding the validity of warrantless public arrests, a majority of the Justices apparently felt that privacy expectations. are diminished when a
person is in public.89 Juxtaposing United States v. Santana"° with Payton v. New York91 makes it even more clear that this was the implication
intended by the Court in Watson. In Santana the Court upheld the warrantless arrest of a defendant who had been standing in the doorway to
her home. The majority concluded that since the defendant was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy, the situation was
governed by Watson. The Payton Court, on the other hand, stressed individual privacy to invalidate a warrantless arrest made in a private
dwelling, declaring that in no setting "is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions
of an individual's home. 9' 2 Although Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Santana stated that the defendant lacked an expectation of
privacy while in the doorway of her home, he undoubtedly meant that her expectation of privacy merely was diminished, since public arrests,
unlike other situations in which the Court has found a complete absence of privacy interests, 9" are governed by the fourth amendment
probable cause requirement. 9 4 That a person retains some privacy interest in his person when he appears in public was indicated in Terry v.
Ohio in which the Court noted that the
fourth amendment applies whenever an individual harbors a reasonable
expectation of privacy. "Unquestionably," the Court stated, "petitioner was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he
walked down the street in Cleveland."96 It can be seen from the Court's treatment of public arrests and vehicular searches that in those cases
in which the new notion of diminished privacy expectations applies, generally only probable cause, and not a warrant, is required. In a few
instances, however, the Supreme Court has relied on its diminished expectations rationale to justify a law enforcement practice even when
probable cause was absent. Examples of this can be found in South Dakota v. Opperman97 and Bell v. Wolfish." In Opperman the Court relied
on the diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle to hold that a police inventory search without probable cause of an automobile that had
been impounded for multiple parking violations was not "unreasonable." Similarly, in Bell the Court found that any privacy expectation of
pretrial detainees necessarily is diminished- and thus outweighed-by the need of the institution to conduct strip searches following contact
visits. The Court concluded that these searches, including body cavity inspections, are reasonable under the fourth amendment even though
conducted on less than probable cause.99 More recently, a majority of the Court upheld the detention without probable cause of persons
found at the scene of the execution of a search warrant.100 The Court reasoned that only a limited interest in personal security was involved,
that sufficient law enforcement interests were present, and that the issuance of a search warrant provided sufficient articulable suspicion to
support the detention. The majority thus held that the officer's actions met the standard of reasonableness embodied in the fourth
amendment. The
Supreme Court thus has subsumed the Camara/Terry reasonableness analysis under its
second category of fourth amendment interests in which the expectations of privacy concerned are of
reduced significance.102 With privacy interests diminished, they easily are outweighed by the law enforcement interests in question;
the amount of fourth amendment protection in this category is then dependent upon how the Court strikes the reasonableness balance.
Although application of the reasonableness clause to this classification generally has resulted in probable cause-but not warrants-being
required, the
Supreme Court occasionally has viewed the privacy interests at issue to be of such reduced
importance in comparison to law enforcement needs that it has justified dispensing with the necessity
of probable cause as a prerequisite for particular police conduct. The third and final classification under the Supreme
Court's current vision of the fourth amendment comprises those cases in which the Court has found an absence of any privacy expectation
whatsoever. This category is the most problematic of the three, since the conclusion that no legitimate expectation of privacy exists at all
excludes the particular interest or activity from fourth amendment protection and frees the police practice concerned from either
constitutional or judicial control. Because the fourth amendment has been geared to the protection of privacy interests, if the Court is able to
conclude that no privacy expectation exists, the fourth amendment affords no protection against the activities of the police regardless of their
general contravention of fourth amendment principles. This conclusion in essence means that the commands of the fourth amendment-both
the warrant and reasonableness clauses-do not apply in such cases. In other words, the police simply are not required to justify their actions by
either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, since, according to the Supreme Court, the object of the fourth amendment-privacy-is not
implicated in these cases.
CANT BE GENERAL OBSERVATION
1NC – Prohibitive Intent
A. Surveillance is preventative rather than general observations.
Lemos 11 (Andre, University of Baha, “Locative Media and Surveillance at the Boundaries of
Informational Territories,” 2011,
https://books.google.com/books?id=quEd4w61EYoC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false)//ghsVA
Although they often appear to be synonymous, it is important
to distinguish between informational control, monitoring
and surveillance so that the problem can be better understood. We consider control to be the supervision of activities, or actions
normally associated with government and authority over people, actions and processes. Monitoring can be considered a form
of observation to gather information with a view to making projections or constructing scenarios and historical records, i.e., the
action of following up and evaluating data. Surveillance, however, can
be defined as an act intended to avoid
something , as an observation whose purposes are preventive or as behavior that is attentive,
cautious or careful. It is interesting to note that in English and French the two words “vigilant” and “surveillance”, each of which is spelt
the same way and has the same meaning in both languages, are applied to someone who is particularly watchful and to acts associated with
legal action or action by the police intended to provide protection against crime, respectively. We
shall define surveillance as
actions that imply control and monitoring in accordance with Gow, for whom surveillance "implies something quite
specific as the intentional observation of someone's actions or the intentional gathering of personal
information in order to observe actions taken in the past or future" (Gow. 2005. p. 8). According to this definition, surveillance
actions presuppose monitoring and control, but not all forms of control and/or monitoring can be called surveillance. It could be said
that all forms of surveillance require two elements: intent with a view to avoiding/causing something and
identification of individuals or groups by name. It seems to me to be difficult to say that there is surveillance if there is no identification of the
person under observation (anonymous) and no preventive intent (avoiding something). To my mind it is an exaggeration to say, for example,
that the system run by my cell phone operator that controls and monitors my calls is keeping me under surveillance. Here there is identification
but no intent. However, it can certainly be used for that purpose. The Federal Police can request wiretaps and disclosure of telephone records
to monitor my telephone calls. The same can be said about the control and monitoring of users by public transport operators. This is part of the
administrative routine of the companies involved. Once again, however, the system can be used for surveillance activities (a suspect can be
kept under surveillance by the companies' and/or police safety systems). Note the example further below of the recently implemented "Navigo
"card in France. It seems to me that the social networks, collaborative maps, mobile devices, wireless networks and countless different
databases that make up the information society do indeed control and monitor and offer a real possibility of surveillance.
B. Violation: They curtail general observations which lack a preventative intent.
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits – Affs about general observations can collect data over a million different
things which makes neg prep impossible and causes a rush to generics.
2. Topic education – shifts it away from the core controversy of things like PRISM
which wrecks predictability and kills core topic learning.
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that in order for something to be considered surveillance it must
have a prohibitive intent. Your aff ____ (Insert Specific Aff Mechanism) ____ which
means you don’t meet our interpretation.
2NC Limits/Case List XT
Your interpretation allows for affs about general observation such as curtailment of
Global Earth Observation, NOAA Observation programs, Survey data about poverty.
Explodes limits and shifts the stasis to a whole other lit base which means they can
access thousands of more affs about general observations.
Think about the millions of different observations governments can make, allowing
them would create an unreasonable research burden forcing the neg to read generics.
Their interpretation collapses the limiting function of the resolution and destroys any
semblance of predictable negative ground.
2NC Topic Education XT
Controversies like rights violations versus terror are at the core of the topic, your
interpretation shifts that stasis to observation which proves our predictability
arguments which turns fairness and education – their benefits are short circuited by a
lack of engagement which is a key internal link to advocacy skills which outweighs
their education arguments because it’s the only thing we take from debate.
Our education outweighs – detailed and precise debates on this topic are especially
important.
Mimoso 14 (Michael, award-winning journalist and former Editor of Information Security magazine, a
two-time finalist for national magazine of the year. He has been writing for business-to-business IT
websites and magazines for over 10 years, with a primary focus on information security, “NSA Reforms
Demonstrate Value of Public Debate,” March 26, 2014, https://threatpost.com/nsa-reformsdemonstrate-value-of-public-debate/105052)//ghs-VA
The president’s proposal would end the NSA’s collection and storage of phone data; those records would
remain with the providers and the NSA would require judicial permission under a new court order to
access those records. The House bill, however, requires no prior judicial approval; a judge would rule on the request after the FBI submits it to
the telecommunications company. “ It’s
absolutely crucial to understand the details of how these things will
work ,” the ACLU’s Kaufman said in reference to the “new court order” mentioned in the New York Times report. “There is
no substitute for robust Democratic debate
in the court of public opinion and in the courts.
The system of oversight is
broke and issues like these need to be debated in public .” Phone metadata and dragnet collection of digital data
from Internet providers and other technology companies is
supposed to be used to map connections between
foreigners suspected of terrorism and threatening the national security of the U.S. The NSA’s dragnet,
however, also swept up communication involving Americans that is supposed to be collected and accessed only with a
court order. The NSA stood by claims that the program was effective in stopping hundreds of terror plots against U.S. interests domestic and
foreign. Those numbers, however, quickly were lowered as they were challenged by Congressional committees and public scrutiny. “The
president said the effectiveness of this program was one of the reasons it was in place,” Kaufman said. “But
as soon as these claims were made public, journalists, advocates
and the courts
pushed back and it could not
withstand the scrutiny. It’s remarkable how quickly [the number of] plots turned into small numbers. The NSA was telling FISC the
program was absolutely necessary to national security, but the government would not go nearly that far in defending
the program. That shows the value of public debate and an adversarial process
in courts.”
2NC Interpretation XT
Surveillance deals with prevention and has specific purpose.
Bush 2 (Eric J, M.D., “The role of surveillance in national animal health strategies,” 2002,
http://www.caribvet.net/en/system/files/gua00_8_rolesurveillance.pdf)//ghs-VA
A broader definition of surveillance is sought along with a more holistic approach to disease prevention and
control . Future surveillance efforts must go beyond screening individual animals and become an ongoing process for
collection, analysis and interpretation of health related events in animal populations to detect health problems based on an epidemiological
description of trends and patterns. Intervention measures should be expanded beyond movement control (import restrictions, herd
quarantine) to incorporate/include diverse response capabilities. Furthermore, to be effective, surveillance
information must be
distributed on a timely basis to those involved in the planning, implementation, and/or evaluation of
prevention and control measures.
Surveillance is a priori about prevention and isn’t general.
Lee et al 12 (Lisa M. Lee, the Office of Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Charles M. Heilig, with the Tuberculosis Trials
Consortium, Angela White, with the J. L. Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario,
“Ethical Justification for Conducting Public Health Surveillance Without Patient Consent,” 2012 January;
102(1): 38–44, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3490562/)//ghs-VA
Public health surveillance is defined as the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of healthrelated data
with the a priori purpose of preventing
or controlling disease or injury,
or of identifying unusual
events of public health importance, followed by the dissemination and use of information for public health action.
Surveillance has the purpose of being a form of “preventative law enforcement”
Bloss 7 (William, Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, The Citadel, South Carolina, USA,
“Escalating U.S. Police Surveillance after 9/11: an Examination of Causes and Effects,” Part 1, 4(3): 208228, http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles4(3)/escalating.pdf)//ghs-VA
Views of surveillance and privacy have changed dramatically in recent years. Some commentators assert that the U.S. has experienced a
progressive shift in the balance between police surveillance authority and individual privacy rights (Chang, 2003; Bloss, 2005). Others cite the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11 hereafter) as a watershed event that provided the catalyst for the widening of police surveillance
and search authority (Posner, 2003; Romero, 2003). The record is replete with examples of U.S. official responses to perceived public safety
threats that have precipitated an increase in police surveillance activity (Brown, 2003). Events such as the detention of Japanese descendents
during World War II, McCarthy anti-communist investigations, anti-crime campaigns, anti-drug wars, and current counter-terrorism policies
provide evidence that U.S. public safety strategies commonly involve a prominent police surveillance and search role (Cole, 2003; Abrams,
2005). Faced with modern transnational crime and terrorism, operating in a technologically fluid global environment, the extant official strategy
obligates the police to ensure greater public safety under increasingly unpredictable circumstances (Posner, 2003; Stohl, 2003; Kugler and Frost,
2001). In what Cole (2003:13) refers
to as “preventive law enforcement,” the legal and operational response has
been to use greater surveillance to reduce threats and prosecute transnational offenders. Since the police
often lack the manpower and technical expertise to keep pace with global terrorists and criminals, they have widened their surveillance
capability by collaborating with private commercial enterprises to obtain personal data or to eavesdrop on the public (O’Harrow, 2005; Bridis
and Solomon, 2006). The central position of this paper is that U.S. lawmakers and courts have
terrorism and crime threats
reacted to perceived global
by modifying established civil privacy protections, under the aegis of
“ preventive law enforcement ,” thereby giving the police broader surveillance powers (Cole, 2003). As a result, the
police have transformed their operational approaches and surveillance practices to focus more on information and intelligence gathering
(Peterson, 2005; Carter, 2004). This has produced a new privacy paradigm, as the balance between police surveillance authority and civil
privacy protection shifts. This paper explains the factors that have caused or contributed to this transition and its effect on civil privacy and civil
life in U.S. society.
Surveillance is preventative rather than general observations – only our author make a
distinctions.
Lemos 11 (Andre, University of Baha, “Locative Media and Surveillance at the Boundaries of
Informational Territories,” 2011,
https://books.google.com/books?id=quEd4w61EYoC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false)//ghsVA
Although they often appear to be synonymous, it is important
to distinguish between informational control,
monitoring and surveillance so that the problem can be better understood. We consider control to be the supervision of activities,
or actions normally associated with government and authority over people, actions and processes. Monitoring can be considered a
form of observation to gather information with a view to making projections or constructing scenarios and historical records,
i.e., the action of following up and evaluating data. Surveillance, however, can
be defined as an act intended to avoid
something , as an observation whose purposes are preventive or as behavior that is attentive,
cautious or careful. It is interesting to note that in English and French the two words “vigilant” and “surveillance”, each of which is spelt
the same way and has the same meaning in both languages, are applied to someone who is particularly watchful and to acts associated with
legal action or action by the police intended to provide protection against crime, respectively. We
shall define surveillance as
actions that imply control and monitoring in accordance with Gow, for whom surveillance "implies
something quite specific as the intentional observation of someone's actions or the intentional
gathering of personal information in order to observe actions taken in the past or future" (Gow. 2005. p. 8). According to this
definition, surveillance actions presuppose monitoring and control, but not all forms of control and/or monitoring can
be called surveillance. It could be said that all forms of surveillance require two elements : intent with
a view to avoiding/causing something and identification of individuals or groups by name. It seems to me to be difficult to say
that there is surveillance if there is no identification of the person under observation (anonymous) and no preventive intent (avoiding
something). To my mind it is an exaggeration to say, for example, that the system run by my cell phone operator that controls and monitors my
calls is keeping me under surveillance. Here there is identification but no intent. However, it can certainly be used for that purpose. The Federal
Police can request wiretaps and disclosure of telephone records to monitor my telephone calls. The same can be said about the control and
monitoring of users by public transport operators. This is part of the administrative routine of the companies involved. Once again, however,
the system can be used for surveillance activities (a suspect can be kept under surveillance by the companies' and/or police safety systems).
Note the example further below of the recently implemented "Navigo "card in France. It seems to me that the social networks, collaborative
maps, mobile devices, wireless networks and countless different databases that make up the information society do indeed control and
monitor and offer a real possibility of surveillance.
Surveillance is specifically to prevent something.
Merriam Webster (Merriam Webster, Online Dictionary, “surveillance,” http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/surveillance)//ghs-VA
the act of carefully watching someone or something especially in order to prevent or detect a crime.
AT: Surveillance Has Other Priorities
Surveillance is a priori about prevention and isn’t general.
Lee et al 12 (Lisa M. Lee, the Office of Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Charles M. Heilig, with the Tuberculosis Trials
Consortium, Angela White, with the J. L. Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario,
“Ethical Justification for Conducting Public Health Surveillance Without Patient Consent,” 2012 January;
102(1): 38–44, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3490562/)//ghs-VA
Public health surveillance is defined as the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of healthrelated data
with the a priori purpose of preventing
or controlling disease or injury,
or of identifying unusual
events of public health importance, followed by the dissemination and use of information for public health action.
CANT BE TARGETED
1NC – Can’t be Targeted
A. Interpretation: Surveillance means mass surveillance.
Langmuir 63 (A. D. Langmuir, “The surveillance of communicable diseases of national
importance,” The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 268, pp. 182–192, 1963.
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM196301242680405)
Surveillance, when applied to a disease, means the continued watchfulness over the distribution and trends of
incidence through the systematic collection, consolidation and evaluation of morbidity and mortality reports and other
relevant data. Intrinsic in the concept is the regular dissemination of the basic data and interpretations to all who have contributed and to all
others who need to know” [67.
Substantially is without material qualification
Black’s Law 91 (Dictionary, p. 1024)
Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.
B. Violation: The aff curtails targeted surveillance
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Limits – They justify an infinite number of affirmatives – they allow for thousands of
different targeted mechanisms which makes it impossible for the neg to prepare each
individual target.
2. Topic Education – they foster discussions about targeted forms of monitoring that
detract us from learning about mass surveillance writ large – kills predictable clash
and core topic learning
Competing interpretations, reasonability makes judge intervention inevitable.
2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that surveillance has to be indiscriminant monitoring not
targeted. Anything that targets a specific group of people or specific type of activity is
NOT surveillance. Your aff _____ (Insert Specific Aff Mechanism) _____ which means
you don’t meet our interpretation.
Topical version of the aff – use the same mechanism of the aff just make it
indiscriminate. Solves your education claims because we can still have the same
discussions just tie them to their larger context.
2NC Limits/Case List XT
There are only 3 real evaluative terms in the resolution – defining and limiting them is
necessary in order to make this topic manageable. Allowing curtailment to target
individual groups allows for infinite variations and permutations of affs.
Restricting targeted surveillance fosters discussion about the large forms of
surveillance that affect the most people. There are an infinite number of different
groups that could potentially be targeted. Making the negative research the individual
groups creates an unreasonable research burden preventing substantive and quality
clash.
They would allow –
- Curtailing surveillance on senior citizens
- Curtailing surveillance of ocean acidification
- Curtailing surveillance of squirrel populations
- Curtailing surveillance of Northwestern Debaters
Clash fosters debates were students can debate the specific warrants behind their
advantages and mechanisms. This turns students into excellent advocates who can
thoroughly defend every part of their advocacy, allowing us to create the most real
world change.
We would allow for SSRA, Dual-Use, Prism, NSA, Freedom-Act affs.
**OTHER DEFINITIONS**
CURTAIL
Both Reduce and Eliminate
Curtail can be to eliminate OR just reduce.
Farlex NO DATE (The Free Online Dictionary by Farlex, “curtail,”
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/curtail)//ghs-VA
To cut short or reduce: We curtailed our conversation when other people entered the room.
DOMESTIC
Can’t Target
Your interpretation is impossible – we can’t limit by targets.
Stray 13 (Jonathan, freelance journalist and a former editor for the Associated Press. He teaches
computational journalism at Columbia University, “What You Need to Know About the NSA’s
Surveillance Programs,” August 5th, 2013, http://www.propublica.org/article/nsa-data-collectionfaq)//ghs-VA
Massive amounts of raw Internet traffic The NSA intercepts huge amounts of raw data, and stores billions of communication records per day in
its databases. Using the NSA’s XKEYSCORE software, analysts can see “nearly everything a user does on the Internet” including emails, social
media posts, web sites you visit, addresses typed into Google Maps, files sent, and more. Currently the NSA is only authorized to intercept
Internet communications with at least one end outside the U.S., though the domestic collection program used to be broader. But because
there is no fully reliable automatic way to separate domestic from international communications , this
program also captures some amount of U.S. citizens’ purely domestic Internet activity , such as emails, social
media posts, instant messages, the sites you visit and online purchases you make. The contents of an unknown number of phone calls There
have been several reports that the NSA records the audio contents of some phone calls and a leaked document confirms this. This reportedly
happens “on a much smaller scale” than the programs above, after analysts select specific people as “targets.” Calls to or from U.S. phone
numbers can be recorded, as long as the other end is outside the U.S. or one of the callers is involved in "international terrorism". There does
not seem to be any public information about the collection of text messages, which would be much more practical to collect in bulk because of
their smaller size. The NSA has been prohibited from recording domestic communications since the passage of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act but at least two of these programs -- phone records collection and Internet cable taps -- involve huge volumes of Americans’
data. Does the NSA record everything about everyone, all the time? The
NSA records as much information as it can,
subject to technical limitations (there’s a lot of data) and legal constraints. This currently includes the metadata for nearly all
telephone calls made in the U.S. (but not their content) and massive amounts of Internet traffic with at least one end outside the U.S. It’s not
clear exactly how many cables have been tapped, though we know of at least one inside the U.S., a secret report about the program by the
NSA’s Inspector General mentions multiple cables, and the volume of intercepted information is so large that it was processed at 150 sites
around the world as of 2008. We also know that Britain’s GCHQ, which shares some intelligence with the NSA, had tapped over 200 cables as of
2012, belonging to seven different telecommunications companies. Until 2011 the NSA also operated a domestic Internet metadata program
which collected mass records of who emailed who even if both parties were inside the U.S. Because it
is not always possible to
separate domestic from foreign communications by automatic means, the NSA still captures some
amount of purely domestic information, and it is allowed to do so by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Geography & No Foreign
Domestic means physically within the U.S. borders.
DOD 82 (Department of Defense, regulation sets forth procedures governing the activities of DoD
intelligence components that affect United States persons, “PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES
OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS,” December 1982,
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5240_1_r.pdf)//ghs-VA
C10.2.1. Domestic
activities refers to activities that take place within the United States that do not
involve a significant connection with a foreign power, organization or person. C10.2.2. The term organization
includes corporations and other commercial organizations, academic institutions, clubs, professional societies, associations, and any other
group whose existence is formalized in some manner or otherwise functions on a continuing basis. C10.2.3. An organization within
the
United States means all organizations physically located within the geographical boundaries of the United
States whether or not they constitute a United States persons. Thus, a branch, subsidiary, or office of an
organization within the United States, which is physically located outside the United States , is not
considered as an organization within the United States.
Surveillance includes ALL residents inside the U.S.
Donohue 6 (Laura, A.B., Dartmouth; M.A., University of Ulster, Northern Ireland; Ph.D., Cambridge
University; J.D., Stanford, “Anglo-American privacy and surveillance,” March 22, 2006,
http://rocket.csusb.edu/~tmoody/F07%20362%20spy%20donahue.html)//ghs-VA
5. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act As the extent of the domestic surveillance operations emerged, Congress attempted to scale
back the Executive's power while leaving some flexibility to address national security threats. (183) The legislature focused
on the
targets of surveillance, limiting a new law to foreign powers, and agents of foreign powers--which included groups "engaged in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor." (184) Congress distinguished between U.S. and non-U.S.
persons, creating tougher standards for the former. (185) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") considered any
"acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication," as well as other
means of surveillance, such as video, to fall under the new restrictions. (186) Central to the statute's understanding of surveillance was that, by
definition, consent had not been given by the target. Otherwise, the individual would have a reasonable expectation of privacy and, under
ordinary circumstances, the Fourth Amendment would require a warrant. (187) FISA provided three ways to initiate surveillance: Attorney
General Certification, application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), and emergency powers. Of these, the second serves as
the principal means via which surveillance is conducted. (188) Under this mechanism, to open surveillance on a suspect, the executive branch
applies to FISC, a secret judicial body, for approval. (189) The application must provide the name of the federal officer requesting surveillance
and the identity of the target (if known), or a description of the target. (190) It must include a statement of facts supporting the claim that the
target is a foreign power (or an agent thereof) and that the facilities to be monitored are currently, or expected to be, used by a foreign power
or her agent. (191) Probable cause must be presented that the individual qualifies as a foreign power and will be using the facilities surveilled.
(192) The application must describe the "nature of the information sought and the type of communications or activities to be subjected to the
surveillance." Importantly, the court is not required to determine that probable cause exists as to whether any foreign intelligence information
will be uncovered. (193) The application requires a designated national security or defense officer to certify that the information is related to
foreign intelligence, and that "such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques." (194) It must specify how
the surveillance is to be affected (including whether physical entry is required). (195) It includes all previous applications involving the "persons,
facilities, or places specified in the application,' and actions taken by the court on these cases must accompany the application. (196) The form
includes an estimate of time required for surveillance and requires an explanation as to why authority should not terminate at the end of the
requested period. (197) Finally, if more than one surveillance device is to be used, the applicant must address the minimization procedures and
describe the range of devices to be employed. (198) In addition to this information, the judge may request additional data. (199) In 1994,
Congress amended the statute to allow for warrantless, covert physical searches (not just electronic
communications' intercepts) when targeting "premises, information, material, or property used exclusively by, or under the open
and exclusive control of, a foreign power or powers." (200) The statute requires that there be no substantial likelihood that the facilities
targeted are the property of a U.S. person. (201) Applications must include the same information as for electronic surveillance. (202) Twice a
year the Attorney General informs Congress of the number of applications for physical search orders, the number granted, modified, or denied,
and the number of physical searches that ensued. (203)
Footnote (185): The
former included citizens and resident aliens, as well incorporated entities and unincorporated
persons qualified as an "agent of a foreign power" by
associations with a substantial number of U.S. persons. Non-U.S.
virtue of membership --e.g., if they were an officer or employee of a foreign power, or if they participated in an international terrorist
organization. Id. [section] 1801(i). U.S. persons had to engage knowingly in the collection of intelligence contrary to U.S. interests, the
assumption of false identity for the benefit of a foreign power, and aiding or abetting others to the same. Id. [section] 1801(b).
Includes the Borders
Courts have decided domestic surveillance includes the area around the borders.
Stanley and Steinhardt 3 (Jay Stanley, Senior Policy Analyst with the American Civil Liberties
Union’s Speech, Privacy and Technology Project, Barry Steinhardt, Director of the ACLU's Program on
Technology and Liberty, “Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The Growth of an American Surveillance
Society,” January 2003,
https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/aclu_report_bigger_monster_weaker_chains.pdf)//ghs-VA
Historically, the courts
have been slow to adapt the Fourth Amendment to the realities of developing
technologies. It took almost 40 years for the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize that the Constitution applies to the wiretapping of telephone
conversations. (Erosion of the Fourth Amendment) "In recent years – in no small part as the result of the failed 'war on drugs' – Fourth
Amendment principles have been steadily eroding. The
circumstances under which police and other government officials may
conduct warrantless searches has been rapidly expanding. The courts have allowed for increased
surveillance and searches on the nation’s highways and at our 'borders' (the legal definition of which actually extends hundreds of
miles inland from the actual border). And despite the Constitution’s plain language covering 'persons' and 'effects,' the courts have increasingly
allowed for warrantless searches when we are outside of our homes and 'in public.' Here the courts have increasingly found we have no
'reasonable expectation' of privacy and that therefore the Fourth Amendment does not apply."
Prefer our interpretation – it cites the fourth amendment which is the a priori limit on
domestic surveillance.
Cole and Lederman 6 (David Cole, B.A., J.D., Yale, Teaches Law at Georgetown University, Martin S.
Lederman, A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., Yale, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department
of Justice's Office, “The National Security Agency’s Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate,” May
2006, https://www.acslaw.org/files/Microsoft%20Word%20-%2012_NSA_Debate.pdf)//ghs-VA
We do not dispute that, absent congressional action, the President might have inherent constitutional authority to collect “signals intelligence”
about the enemy abroad. Nor do we dispute that, had Congress taken no action in this area, the President might well be constitutionally
empowered to conduct domestic
surveillance directly tied and narrowly confined to that goal—subject, of course, to
Fourth Amendment limits. Indeed, in the years before FISA was enacted, the federal law involving wiretapping specifically provided
that “[n]othing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the
President . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976).
U.S. Citizens Only
Domestic surveillance covers U.S. citizens only – our evidence is exclusive and draws a
specific distinction.
Ross 12 (Jeffery Ian, Ph.D. is a Professor in the School of Criminal Justice, College of Public Affairs, and
a Research Fellow of the Center for International and Comparative Law, “An Introduction Into Political
Crime,” 2012,
https://books.google.com/books?id=c32GRo3zBdEC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false)//ghsVA
Domestic surveillance consists of a variety of information-gathering activities, conducted primarily by the state's
coercive agencies (that is, police, national security, and the military). These actions are carried out against citizens, foreigners,
organizations (for example, businesses, political parties, etc.), and foreign governments. Such operations usually include opening
mail, listening to telephone conversations (eavesdropping and wiretapping), reading electronic communications, and infiltrating groups
(whether they are legal, illegal, or deviant). Although a legitimate law enforcement /intelligence-gathering technique, surveillance is often
considered unpalatable to the public in general and civil libertarians in particular. This is especially true when state agents break the law by
conducting searches without warrants, collecting evidence (hat is beyond the scope of a warrant, or harassing and/or destabilizing their
targets.1 These activities are illegal (because the Constitution, statutes, regulations, and ordinances specify the conditions under which
surveillance may be conducted), and they violate individual rights to privacy. Not only should legitimate surveillance be distinguished from
illegal domestic
surveillance, but the latter practice should also be separated from espionage/ spying.2 In short,
spying/espionage, covered in chapter four, is conducted against a foreign government, its businesses, and/or its
citizens, and illegal domestic surveillance takes place inside a specific individuals country.
Limits on Surveillance Key
Defining domestic surveillance is a critical prerequisite to debate – takes out
reasonability arguments as well.
Small 8 (Matthew, US Air Force Academy, “His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil
Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis,” 2008,
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf)//ghs-VA
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies , it is first necessary to
narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence
gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or
understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2).
In essence, domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence community best
understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4)
(i)). With this definition domestic
surveillance remains an overly broad concept.
Limits regarding domestic and foreign surveillance is key to good policy.
Dyer 12 (William R, M.A. in Intelligence studies @ American University, “UNMANNED AERIAL
VEHICLES: THE CHANGING ROLE FROM INTERNATIONAL TO DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE,” February 26,
2012, http://www.apus.edu/content/dam/online-library/masters-theses/Dyer-2012.pdf)//ghs-VA
Congress will need to review current laws in existence today and make adjustments as necessary to clearly draw the line
between domestic surveillance and foreign intelligence and develop practical procedures for the
performance of duties relating
to agencies required to conduct surveillance. Having a clear legal framework
as a foundation can assist other agencies such as the FAA, Customs and Border Patrol, FBI, and local law enforcement agencies
to establish policy governing their respective organization, making it easy to utilize the flexibilities of RPA surveillance
over current methods. By having well thought out legal guidance, larger agencies such as DOD and DHS will be able to participate in domestic
programs that will assist in protecting the national security interests of the United States. In addition, the
Federal Government will
need to work closely with civil liberty organizations such as the ACLU to form a partnership that provide legislation that
both parties can accept instead of more ambiguous language that continue to blur the lines between
homeland security and personal privacy.
US Citizen & Non-Public
The agent being surveilled must be a US Citizen and the information must be nonpublic.
IT Law 15 (IT Law Wiki, Law network, “Domestic surveillance,”
http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Domestic_surveillance)//ghs-VA
Domestic surveillance is the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons.
Domestic Surveillance finds non-public information about US Citizens.
Small 8 (Matthew, US Air Force Academy, “His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil
Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis,” 2008,
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf)//ghs-VA
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to
narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence
gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or understood
needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence,
domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence community
best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning
United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept.
Applies to Foreign Soil
Domestic Surveillance applies to US Citizens in other countries.
Mayer 14 (Jonathan, Lawyer @ Stanford, “Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales
from the FISA Frontier,” December 3, 2014, http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-americansoil/)//ghs-VA
Surveillance Targeting Americans Worldwide Much like Executive Order 12333 can operate on American soil, FISA
can operate on
foreign soil. The first area that I’d like to flag is surveillance intentionally directed against Americans. If
the NSA targets a U.S. person, anywhere in the world, that’s covered by FISA. And it generally requires a court order.17
There are two sources for this protection. U.S. persons inside the United States are covered by the traditional FISA “electronic surveillance”
provisions, even if interception occurs outside the United States.18 U.S. persons outside the United States are protected by the FISA
Amendments Act, which added new procedures for if the person or both the person and the interception are outside the United States.
Within US Borders
Domestic surveillance collects information of people within the border.
Avilez et al 14 (Marie Avilez, Catherine Ciriello, Christophe Combemale, Latif Elam, Michelle Kung,
Emily LaRosa, Cameron Low, Madison Nagle, Rachel Ratzlaff Shriver, Colin Shaffer; Senior Capstone
Students, “Ethics, History, and Public Policy,” December 10, 2014,
http://www.cmu.edu/hss/ehpp/documents/2014-City-Surveillance-Policy.pdf)//ghs-VA
Domestic surveillance – collection of information about the activities of private
individuals/organizations by a government entity within national borders; this can be carried out by federal, state and/or
local officials
SURVEILLANCE
Must be Located in the U.S.
Domestic Surveillance means the person MUST be located in the U.S. even if the data
is routed through a domestic server – it’s grounded in the federal literature.
Seamon 7 (Richard Henry, Professor, University of Idaho College of Law, “Domestic Surveillance for
International Terrorists: Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment Limits,” 2007,
http://www.hastingsconlawquarterly.org/archives/V35/I3/seamon.pdf)//ghs-VA
Congress responded in August 2007 by enacting the Protect America Act of 2007." The Act "clarifies" that
FISA's definition of "electronic surveillance" does not "encompass surveillance directed at a person
reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States ., 56 This clarification at the very least frees
the government from having to obtain a FISA warrant to intercept foreign-to-foreign communications.
Some argue that the Act goes much farther-contending that it, in fact, authorizes the entire TSP and then some.57 Concern about the scope of
the Act, compounded by the extraordinary speed with which it was enacted, led Congress to include a provision that causes the Act to sunset in
six months. 8 Regardless of the scope and duration of the Act, as developed below, its authorization of some aspects of the TSP is relevant both
to whether the TSP falls within the President's power and to whether the TSP violates the Fourth Amendment
Footnote (56): Protect America Act § 2 (provision entitled "Clarification of Electronic Surveillance of Persons
Outside the United States") (to be codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1805a).
Info to Govern Behavior
Surveillance involves gathering info to influence future behavior.
Fuchs 10 (Christian, Department of Informatics and Media Studies, Uppsala University, “The Internet &
Surveillance - Research Paper Series,” October 1, 2010, http://www.sns3.uti.at/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/The-Internet-Surveillance-Research-Paper-Series-1-Christian-Fuchs-HowSurveillance-Can-Be-Defined.pdf)//ghs-VA
“Surveillance involves
the collection and analysis of information about populations in order to govern
their activities” (Haggerty and Ericson 2006, 3).
Surveillance regulates future behavior.
Fuchs 10 (Christian, Department of Informatics and Media Studies, Uppsala University, “The Internet &
Surveillance - Research Paper Series,” October 1, 2010, http://www.sns3.uti.at/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/The-Internet-Surveillance-Research-Paper-Series-1-Christian-Fuchs-HowSurveillance-Can-Be-Defined.pdf)//ghs-VA
Surveillance is “the garnering and processes of personal information to regulate, control, manage and enable human
individual and collective behaviour”
General Info Gathering
Surveillance is general info gathering.
Fuchs 10 (Christian, Department of Informatics and Media Studies, Uppsala University, “The Internet &
Surveillance - Research Paper Series,” October 1, 2010, http://www.sns3.uti.at/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/The-Internet-Surveillance-Research-Paper-Series-1-Christian-Fuchs-HowSurveillance-Can-Be-Defined.pdf)//ghs-VA
”Surveillance
involves the observation, recording and categorization of information about people,
processes and institutions” (Ball and Webster 2003, 1). Ball and Webster (2003, 7f) identify besides three negative forms of
surveillance (categorical suspicion, categorical seduction, categorical exposure) also a positive one, namely
categorical care.
Surveillance gathers data and info about people.
Fuchs 10 (Christian, Department of Informatics and Media Studies, Uppsala University, “The Internet &
Surveillance - Research Paper Series,” October 1, 2010, http://www.sns3.uti.at/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/The-Internet-Surveillance-Research-Paper-Series-1-Christian-Fuchs-HowSurveillance-Can-Be-Defined.pdf)//ghs-VA
Dandeker (2006, 225) identifies three meanings of the term surveillance: “(1) the collection and storage of
information, presumed to be useful, about people or objects; (2) the supervision of the activities of people or
objects through the issuing of instructions or the physical design of the natural and built environments; and (3) the
application of information-gathering activities to the business of monitor-ing the behaviour of those
under supervision and, in the case of subject populations, their compliance with instructions, or with non-subject populations, their
compliance with agreements, or simply monitoring their behaviour from which, as in the control of disease, they may have expressed a with to
benefit”.
Foucault General Watching
Surveillance isn’t static and can manifest itself in any relationship.
Shawki 9 (Sharif, Professor @ Illinois Western University "Surveillance and Foucault: Examining the
Validity of Foucault's Notions Concerning Surveillance through a Study of the United States and the
United Kingdom" (2009). Honors Projects. Paper 23.
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/socanth_honproj/23)//ghs-VA
Before the application sections commence, Foucault's definition of surveillance will be given to provide a clear picture as to what the term
encompasses. First of all, the French word that Foucault utilizes is surveiller. As the translator to Discipline and Punish notes, there is no proper
English equivalent The English correspondent of surveiller, "surveillance," is too restricted and too technical.86 Thus, Foucault
defines
surveillance as a potentially aggressive action. It is clearly not neutral and can be used by one side to
subjugate another. There are always motives behind surveillance and these motives are usually self-serving. Foucault defines
surveillance as a watch kept over a person or a group. But one must realize that this simple definition contains several
components. Foucault considers surveillance in both a personal and complex manner. Surveillance can
take place between two people such as neighbors. This type of surveillance is very simple and usually
involves insignificant issues. At the same time, surveillance can involve many people as well as
institutions. Thus, commanders can surveille many soldiers because these commanders have been given the authority to do so. Therefore,
surveillance is not considered as one static entity. This is a benefit because Foucault allows himself to consider personal
self-surveillance as well as institutional surveillance.
AT: Foucault General
Foucault’s wrong and outdated.
Fuchs 10 (Christian, Department of Informatics and Media Studies, Uppsala University, “The Internet &
Surveillance - Research Paper Series,” October 1, 2010, http://www.sns3.uti.at/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/The-Internet-Surveillance-Research-Paper-Series-1-Christian-Fuchs-HowSurveillance-Can-Be-Defined.pdf)//ghs-VA
Some scholars argue that Foucault’s
notion of surveillance is outdated because surveillance would today no
longer be centralized, but operate in a decentralized and networked form so that there is not a central surveilling
power, but many disperse and heterogeneous agents of surveillance. “Certainly, surveillance today is more
decentralized, less subject to spatial and temporal constraints (location, tie of day, etc.), and less organized than ever before by the dualisms of
observer and observed, subject and object, individual and mass. The
system of control is deterritorializing” (Bogard 2006, 102).
Lace (2005, 210) argues that “allusions to Big Brother scrutiny are becoming dated – instead, we now are moving towards a
society of ‘little brothers’” (see also Castells 2004, 342; Solove 2004, 32) that she terms a democratized surveillance society. Haggerty
and Ericson (2000/2007) define surveillance based on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari as assemblage. The surveillant assemblage
means “a rhizomatic levelling of the hierarchy of surveillance, such that groups which were previously exempt from
routine surveillance are now increasingly being monitored” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000/2007, 104). They argue that one should
conceive contemporary surveillance with analytical tools that are different from Foucault and Orwell .
Haggerty (2006) calls for demolishing Foucault’s notion of the panopticon. Haggerty and Ericson (2000/2007) argue
that contemporary surveillance is heterogeneous, involves humans and non-humans, state and extra-state institutions, “allows for the scrutiny
of the powerful by both institutions and the general population” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000/2007, 112). They
interpret Mathiesen
as saying that synopticism means “’bottom-up’ forms of observation” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000/2007, 113). Hier
(2003/2007, 118) argues that the surveillant assemblage brings about “a partial democratization of surveillance hierarchies”.
FISA Electronic Surveillance
Two requirements
1. The target cannot consent
2. Either the receiving or sending agent must be within the U.S.
FISA 78 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Legal Document Outlining Electronic Surveillance Within
The United States For Foreign Intelligence Purposes, “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 50 us
e 1801,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf)//ghs-VA
(f) "Electronic
surveillance" means— (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular,
known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that
United States person, under circumstances in which a person •'• has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes; (2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire
communication to or from a person in the United States,
without the consent of any party thereto , if such acquisition
occurs in the United States ; (3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents
of any radio communication, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United
States; or (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire
information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.
Focused and Systematic
Surveillance is focused and systematic.
Richards 13 (NM Richards, Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, “THE DANGERS OF
SURVEILLANCE,” 2013, http://harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/vol126_richards.pdf)//ghs-VA
Reviewing the vast surveillance studies literature, Professor David Lyon concludes that surveillance is primarily about power, but it is also
about personhood.8 Lyon offers a definition of surveillance as “the
focused, systematic and routine attention to personal
details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction.”9 Four aspects of this definition are noteworthy, as they
expand our understanding of what surveillance is and what its purposes are. First, it is focused on learning information about
individuals. Second, surveillance is systematic; it is intentional rather than random or arbitrary. Third,
surveillance is routine — a part of the ordinary administrative apparatus that characterizes modern societies.10
Fourth, surveillance can have a wide variety of purposes — rarely totalitarian domination, but more typically subtler
forms of influence or control.1
Surveillance is systematic and ongoing
(Tobacco Free Initiative 2003, The World Health Organization Tobacco Free Initiative is part of the
Noncommunicable Diseases and Mental Health cluster at WHO headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.
http://www.who.int/tobacco/surveillance/about_surveillance/en/)
Surveillance is systematic ongoing collection, collation and analysis of data and the timely
dissemination of information to those who need to know so that action can be taken.
Surveillance is based on Data
(B. C. K. Choi and A. W. P. Pak, “Lessons for surveillance in the 21st century: a historical perspective from
the past five millennia,” Sozial- und Praventivmedizin, vol. 46, no. 6, pp. 361–368, 2001.
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01321662)
Surveillance is based upon successful analysis of population-based, on-going data (e.g., death records). There
are several basic principles of data analysis: reduce volumes of data to a few easy-to-understand tables, then interpret them, and prepare a few
brief and precise paragraphs, so as to gain profit from the data analysis, in order to understand the increase and decrease of diseases [7].
Surveillance means watchfulness over trends
(A. D. Langmuir, “The surveillance of communicable diseases of national importance,” The New England
Journal of Medicine, vol. 268, pp. 182–192, 1963.
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM196301242680405)
Surveillance, when applied to a disease, means the continued watchfulness over the distribution and trends of
incidence through the systematic collection, consolidation and evaluation of morbidity and mortality reports and other
relevant data. Intrinsic in the concept is the regular dissemination of the basic data and interpretations to all who have contributed and to all
others who need to know” [67.
Specific People & Purpose
Surveillance isn’t general but has a specific purpose.
Macnish 12 (Kevin, Professor @ the University of Leeds, “Surveillance Ethics,” 2012,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/surv-eth/)//ghs-VA
Surveillance involves paying close and sustained attention to another person. It is distinct from casual yet
focused people-watching, such as might occur at a pavement cafe, to the extent that it is sustained over time. Furthermore the design is
not to pay attention to just anyone, but to pay attention to some entity (a person or group) in particular
and for a particular reason. Nor does surveillance have to involve watching. It may also involve
listening, as when a telephone conversation is bugged, or even smelling, as in the case of dogs trained to discover drugs, or
hardware which is able to discover explosives at a distance.
AT: Specific Purpose
Your interpretation is outdated.
Liscouski 14 (Bob, more then 30 years of experience in security and law enforcement, and he is the
Executive Vice President of Integrated Strategies Group, “Changing the Definition of Surveillance in the
Age of Converged Risk,” March 1, 2014, http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/85274-changingthe-definition-of-surveillance-in-the-age-of-converged-risk)//ghs-VA
Surveillance deals with the act of carefully watching someone or something with the specific intent to
prevent or detect a crime. A couple of decades ago that would have been a true definition as it related to protecting an enterprise against
threats with limited capabilities and limited access to the enterprise. “Watching one thing” was sufficient. However, in our current
technological state, that simple definition now involves more complexity and sophistication than ever
before. The explosive growth of technological capabilities and people that can use them to probe, prepare and
perpetrate an attack or criminal act against a geographically dispersed enterprise from thousands of miles away, undermines
traditional surveillance strategies.
Technologically Based
Surveillance only uses specific forms of tech.
Fuchs 10 (Christian, Department of Informatics and Media Studies, Uppsala University, “The Internet &
Surveillance - Research Paper Series,” October 1, 2010, http://www.sns3.uti.at/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/The-Internet-Surveillance-Research-Paper-Series-1-Christian-Fuchs-HowSurveillance-Can-Be-Defined.pdf)//ghs-VA
Surveillance is “the act of monitoring the behaviour of another either in real-time using cameras, audio
devices or key-stroke monitoring, or in chosen time by data mining records of internet transactions” (Wall 2007,
230).
AT: XO 12333
Your interpretation is about foreign intelligence gathering – not domestic.
Mayer 14 (Jonathan, Lawyer @ Stanford, “Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales
from the FISA Frontier,” December 3, 2014, http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-americansoil/)//ghs-VA
When the National Security Agency collects data inside the United States, it’s regulated by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. There’s a degree of court supervision and congressional oversight. When the agency collects data
outside the United States, it’s regulated by Executive Order 12333. That document embodies the President’s inherent Article II
authority to conduct foreign intelligence. There’s no court involvement, and there’s scant legislative scrutiny. So, that’s the conventional
wisdom. American
soil: FISA. Foreign soil: EO 12333. Unfortunately, the legal landscape is more complicated.
FRAMEWORK/EDUCATION STUFF
Public Debate – Mimoso
Debates over meta-data and the NSA and uniquely key now – outweighs your
education claims.
Mimoso 14 (Michael, award-winning journalist and former Editor of Information Security magazine, a
two-time finalist for national magazine of the year. He has been writing for business-to-business IT
websites and magazines for over 10 years, with a primary focus on information security, “NSA Reforms
Demonstrate Value of Public Debate,” March 26, 2014, https://threatpost.com/nsa-reformsdemonstrate-value-of-public-debate/105052)//ghs-VA
The president’s proposal would end the NSA’s collection and storage of phone data; those records would
remain with the providers and the NSA would require judicial permission under a new court order to
access those records. The House bill, however, requires no prior judicial approval; a judge would rule on the request after the FBI submits it to
the telecommunications company. “ It’s
absolutely crucial to understand the details of how these things will
work ,” the ACLU’s Kaufman said in reference to the “new court order” mentioned in the New York Times report. “There is
no substitute for robust Democratic debate
in the court of public opinion and in the courts.
The system of oversight is
broke and issues like these need to be debated in public .” Phone metadata and dragnet collection of digital data
from Internet providers and other technology companies is
supposed to be used to map connections between
foreigners suspected of terrorism and threatening the national security of the U.S. The NSA’s dragnet ,
however, also swept up communication involving Americans that is supposed to be collected and accessed only with a
court order. The NSA stood by claims that the program was effective in stopping hundreds of terror plots against U.S. interests domestic and
foreign. Those numbers, however, quickly were lowered as they were challenged by Congressional committees and public scrutiny. “The
president said the effectiveness of this program was one of the reasons it was in place,” Kaufman said. “But
as soon as these claims were made public, journalists, advocates
and the courts
pushed back and it could not
withstand the scrutiny. It’s remarkable how quickly [the number of] plots turned into small numbers. The NSA was telling FISC the
program was absolutely necessary to national security, but the government would not go nearly that far in defending
the program. That shows the value of public debate and an adversarial process
in courts.”
Education – Giroux
Political engagement is necessary – your ethical education absent concrete political
reform is the exact reason the lefts progressivism fails.
Giroux 15 (Henry, currently holds the McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest
in the English and Cultural Studies Department and the Paulo Freire Chair in Critical Pedagogy at The
McMaster Institute for Innovation & Excellence, “Orwell, Huxley and the Scourge of the Surveillance
State,” 30 June 2015, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/31639-orwell-huxley-and-the-scourge-ofthe-surveillance-state)//ghs-VA
In this instance, the surveillance state is one that not only listens, watches and gathers massive
amounts of information through data mining, allegedly for the purpose of identifying "security
threats." It also acculturates the public into accepting the intrusion of commercial surveillance technologies - and, perhaps more vitally, the acceptance of privatized, commodified values - into all aspects of their lives. In
other words, the most dangerous repercussions of a near total loss of privacy involve more than the unwarranted collecting of information by the government: We must also be attentive to the
ways in which being spied on has become not only normalized, but even enticing, as corporations up the pleasure quotient for consumers who use new digital
technologies and social networks - not least of all by and for simulating experiences of community. Many individuals, especially
young people , now run from privacy and
increasingly demand services in which they can share every personal facet of their lives. While Orwell's vision touches
upon this type of control, there is a notable difference that he did not foresee. According to Pete Cashmore, while Orwell's "Thought Police tracked you without permission, some consumers are now comfortable with sharing their
The state and corporate cultural apparatuses now collude to socialize everyone - especially young people into a regime of security and commodification in which their identities, values and desires are inextricably tied to a culture of commodified addictions, self-help, therapy and social indifference.
every move online." (17)
Intelligence networks now inhabit the world of major corporations such as Disney and Bank of America as well as the secret domains of the NSA, FBI and 15 other intelligence agencies. As Edward Snowden's revelations about the
PRISM program revealed, the NSA has also collected personal data from many of the world's largest internet companies, including Apple, Google, Yahoo and Facebook. According to a senior lawyer for the NSA, the internet
companies "were fully aware of the surveillance agency's widespread collection of data." (18) The fact is that Orwell's and Huxley's ironic representations of the modern totalitarian state - along with their implied defense of a
democratic ideal rooted in the right to privacy and the right to be educated in the capacity to be autonomous and critical thinkers - have been transformed and mutilated almost beyond recognition by the material and ideological
registers of a worldwide neoliberal order. Just as we can envision Orwell's and Huxley's dystopian fables morphing over time from "realistic novels" into a "real life documentary," and now into a form of "reality TV,"
privacy and freedom have been radically altered in an age of permanent, nonstop global exchange and
circulation. That is, in the current moment, the right to privacy and freedom has been usurped by the seductions of a
narcissistic culture and casino capitalism's unending desire to turn every relationship into an act of
commerce and to make all aspects of daily life subject to market forces under watchful eyes of both government and corporate regimes of surveillance In a world devoid of care, compassion and protection, personal
privacy and freedom are no longer connected and resuscitated through their connection to public life, the common good or a vulnerability born of the recognition of the frailty of human life. Culture loses its power as the bearer of
public memory, civic literacy and the lessons of history in a social order in which the worst excesses of capitalism are left unchecked and a consumerist ethic "makes impossible any shared recognition of common interests or goals."
(19) With the rise of the punishing state along with a kind of willful amnesia taking hold of the larger culture, we see little more than a paralyzing fear and apathy in response to the increasing exposure of formerly private spheres
to data mining and manipulation, while the concept of privacy itself has all but expired under a "broad set of panoptic practices." (20) With individuals more or less succumbing to this insidious cultural shift in their daily lives, there
is nothing to prevent widespread collective indifference to the growth of a surveillance culture, let alone an authoritarian state. The worst fears of Huxley and Orwell merge into a dead zone of historical amnesia as more and more
people embrace any and every new electronic device regardless of the risks it might pose in terms of granting corporations and governments increased access to and power over their choices and movements. Detailed personal
information flows from the sphere of entertainment to the deadly serious and integrated spheres of capital accumulation and policing as they are collected and sold to business and government agencies that track the populace for
either commercial purposes or for fear of a possible threat to the social order and its established institutions of power. Power now imprisons not only bodies under a regime of surveillance and a mass incarceration state but also
subjectivity itself, as the threat of state control is now coupled with the seductions of the new forms of passivity-inducing soma: electronic technologies, a pervasive commodified landscape and a mind-numbing celebrity culture.
The Growing Role of Private Security Companies Underlying these everyday conveniences of modern life, as Boghosian documents in great detail, is the growing Orwellian partnership between the militarized state and private
security companies in the United States. Each day, new evidence surfaces pointing to the emergence of a police state that has produced ever more sophisticated methods for surveillance in order to enforce a mass suppression of
the most essential tools for democratic dissent: "the press, political activists, civil rights advocates and conscientious insiders who blow the whistle on corporate malfeasance and government abuse." (21) As Boghosian points out,
Nowhere is
this more evident than in US public schools where young people are being taught that they are a
generation of suspects, subject to the presence of armed police and security guards, drug-sniffing dogs and an array of surveillance apparatuses that chart
"By claiming that anyone who questions authority or engages in undesired political speech is a potential terrorist threat, this government-corporate partnership makes a mockery of civil liberties." (22)
their every move, not to mention in some cases how they respond emotionally to certain pedagogical practices. Whistleblowers are not only punished by the government; their lives are also turned upside down in the process by
private surveillance agencies and major corporations that now work in tandem. For instance, Bank of America assembled 15 to 20 bank officials and retained the law firm of Hunton & Williams in order to devise "various schemes to
attack WikiLeaks and [journalist Glenn] Greenwald whom they thought were about to release damaging information about the bank." (23) It is worth repeating that Orwell's vision of surveillance and the totalitarian state look mild
next to the emergence of a corporate-state surveillance system that wants to tap into every conceivable mode of communication, collect endless amounts of metadata to be stored in vast intelligence storage sites around the
country and potentially use that data to repress any vestige of dissent. (24) As Huxley anticipated, any critical analysis must move beyond documenting abuses of power to how addressing contemporary neoliberal modernity has
created a social order in which individuals become complicit with authoritarianism. That is, how is unfreedom internalized? What and how do state- and corporate-controlled institutions, cultural apparatuses, social relations and
policies contribute to making a society's plunge into dark times self-generating as Huxley predicted? Put differently, what is the educative nature of a repressive politics and how does it function to secure the consent of the US
public? And, most importantly, how can it be challenged and under what circumstances? The nature of repression has become more porous, employing not only brute force, but also dominant modes of education, persuasion and
authority. Aided by a public pedagogy, produced and circulated through a machinery of consumption and public relations tactics, a growing regime of repression works through the homogenizing forces of the market to support the
widespread embrace of an authoritarian culture and police state. Relentlessly entertained by spectacles, people become not only numb to violence and cruelty but begin to identify with an authoritarian worldview. As David
Graeber suggests, the police "become the almost obsessive objects of imaginative identification in popular culture ... watching movies, or viewing TV shows that invite them to look at the world from a police point of view." (25) But
it is not just the spectacle of violence that ushers individuals into a world in which brutality becomes a primary force for mediating relations as well as the ultimate source of pleasure; there is also the production of an unchecked
notion of individualism that both dissolves social bonds and removes any viable notion of agency from the landscape of social responsibility and ethical consideration. Absorbed in privatized orbits of consumption, commodification
and display, Americans vicariously participate in the toxic pleasures of the authoritarian state. Violence has become the organizing force of a society driven by a noxious notion of privatization in which it becomes difficult for ideas
to be lifted into the public realm. Under such circumstances, politics is eviscerated because it now supports a market-driven view of society that has turned its back on the idea that social values, public trust and communal relations
are fundamental to a democratic society. This violence against the bonds of sociality undermines and dissolves the nature of social obligations as freedom becomes an exercise in self-development rather than social responsibility.
This upending of the social and critical modes of agency mimics not just the death of the radical imagination, but also a notion of banality made famous by Hannah Arendt who argued that at the root of totalitarianism was a kind of
thoughtlessness, an inability to think, and a type of outrageous indifference in which, "There's simply the reluctance ever to imagine what the other person is experiencing." (26) Confronting the Threat of Authoritarianism By
integrating insights drawn from both Huxley and Orwell, it becomes necessary for any viable critical analysis to take a long view, contextualizing the contemporary moment as a new historical conjuncture in which political rule has
been replaced by corporate sovereignty, consumerism becomes the only obligation of citizenship, and the only value that matters is exchange value. Precarity has replaced social protections provided by the state, just as the state
cares more about building prisons and infantilizing the US public than it does about providing all of its citizens with quality educational institutions and health care. The United States is not just dancing into oblivion as Huxley
suggested; it is also being pushed into the dark recesses of an authoritarian state. Orwell wrote dystopian novels but he believed that the sheer goodness of human nature would in the end be enough for individuals to develop
modes of collective resistance that he could only imagine in the midst of the haunting specter of totalitarianism. Huxley was more indebted to Kafka's notion of destabilization, despair and hopelessness. For Huxley, the subject had
lost his or her sense of agency and had become the product of a scientifically manufactured form of idiocy and conformity. Progress had been transformed into its opposite, and science needed to be liberated from itself. As
Theodor Adorno has pointed out, where Huxley fails is that he has no sense of resistance. According to Adorno, "The weakness of Huxley's entire conception is that it makes all its concepts relentlessly dynamic but nevertheless
The authoritarian nature of the
corporate-state surveillance apparatus and security system with its "urge to surveil, eavesdrop on, spy on, monitor, record, and save every
communication of any sort on the planet" (28) can only be fully understood when its ubiquitous tentacles are connected to
wider cultures of control and punishment, including security-patrolled corridors of public schools, the rise in supermax prisons, the hypermilitarization of local police forces, the justification of secret
arms them against the tendency to turn into their own opposites." (27) Hence, the forces of resistance are not simply underestimated but rendered impotent.
prisons and state-sanctioned torture abroad, and the increasing labeling of dissent as an act of terrorism in the United States. (29) This is part of Orwell's narrative, but it does not go far enough. The new authoritarian, corporatedriven state deploys more subtle tactics to depoliticize public memory and promote the militarization of everyday life. Alongside efforts to defund public and higher education and to attack the welfare state, a wide-ranging assault
is being waged across the culture on all spheres that encourage the public to hold power accountable. If these public institutions are destroyed,
there will be few sites left in which
to nurture the critical formative cultures capable of educating people to challenge the range of
injustices
plaguing the United States and the forces that reproduce them. One particular challenge comes from the success of neoliberal tyranny to dissolve those social bonds that entail a sense of responsibility
toward others and form the basis for political consciousness. Under the new authoritarian state, perhaps the gravest threat one faces is not simply being subject to the dictates of what Quentin Skinner calls "arbitrary power," but
failing to respond with outrage when "my liberty is also being violated, and not merely by the fact that someone is reading my emails but also by the fact that someone has the power to do so should they choose." (30) The
situation is dire when
people no longer seem interested in contesting such power. It is precisely the poisonous spread of a broad culture of political
indifference that puts at risk the fundamental principles of justice and freedom, which lie at the heart of a robust democracy. The democratic imagination has been transformed into a data machine that marshals its inhabitants into
the neoliberal dream world of babbling consumers and armies of exploitative labor whose ultimate goal is to accumulate capital and initiate individuals into the brave new surveillance-punishing state that merges Orwell's Big
Nothing will change unless people begin to take seriously the subjective
underpinnings of oppression in the United States and what it might require to make such issues meaningful in order to make them critical and transformative. As Charles Derber has explained,
Brother with Huxley's mind-altering soma.
knowing "how to express possibilities and convey them authentically and persuasively seems
crucially important " (31) if any viable notion of resistance is to take place. The current regime of
authoritarianism is reinforced through a new and pervasive sensibility in which people surrender
themselves to both the capitalist system and a general belief in its call for security. It does not simply repress independent
thought, but constitutes new modes of thinking through a diverse set of cultural apparatuses ranging from the schools and media to the internet. The fundamental question in
resisting the transformation of the United States into a 21st century authoritarian society must concern the
educative nature of politics
- that is, what people believe and how their individual and collective dispositions and capacities to be either willing or resistant agents are shaped. I want to conclude
by recommending five initiatives, though incomplete, that might help young people and others challenge the current oppressive historical conjuncture in which they along with other oppressed groups now find themselves. My
focus is on higher education because that is the one institution that is under intense assault at the moment because it has not completely surrendered to the Orwellian state. (32) A Resource for Resistance: Reviving the Radical
Imagination First,
there is a need for what can be called a revival of the radical imagination. This call would be part of a larger project "to
reinvent democracy in the wake of the evidence that, at the national level, there is no democracy - if by 'democracy' we mean effective popular participation in the crucial decisions affecting the community." (33) Democracy entails
a challenge to the power of those individuals, financial elites, ruling groups and large-scale enterprises that have hijacked democracy. At the very least, this means refusing to accept minimalist notions of democracy in which
elections become the measure of democratic participation. Far more crucial is the struggle for the development of public spaces and spheres that produce a formative culture in which the US public can imagine forms of democratic
self-management of what can be called "key economic, political, and social institutions." (34) One step in this direction would be for young people, intellectuals, scholars and others to go on the offensive in defending higher
education as a public good, resisting as much as possible the ongoing attempt by financial elites to view its mission in instrumental terms as a workstation for capital. This means fighting back against a conservative-led campaign to
end tenure, define students as consumers, defund higher education and destroy any possibility of faculty governance by transforming most faculty into adjuncts. Higher education should be harnessed neither to the demands of
the warfare state nor to the instrumental needs of corporations. In fact, it should be viewed as a right rather than as an entitlement. Nowhere is this assault on higher education more evident than in the efforts of billionaires such
as Charles and David Koch to finance academic fields and departments, and to shape academic policy in the interest of indoctrinating the young into the alleged neoliberal, free market mentality. It is also evident in the repressive
policies being enacted at the state level by right-wing politicians. For instance, in Florida, Gov. Rick Scott's task force on education has introduced legislation that would lower tuition for degrees friendly to corporate interests in
order to "steer students toward majors that are in demand in the job market." (35) In Wisconsin, Gov. Scott Walker drew up a proposal to remove the public service philosophy focus from the university's mission statement, which
says that the university's purpose is to solve problems and improve people's lives. He also scratched out the phrase "the search for truth" and substituted both ideas with a vocabulary stating that the university's goal is to meet
"the state's work force needs." (36) But Walker's disdain for higher education as a public good can be more readily understood given his hatred of unions, particularly those organized for educators. How else to explain his
egregious comparison of union protesters to the brutal terrorists and thugs that make up ISIS and his ongoing attempts to eliminate tenure at Wisconsin's public universities as well as to eviscerate any vestige of shared
governance. (37) Another egregious example of neoliberalism's Orwellian assault on higher education can be found in the policies promoted by the Republican Party members who control the North Carolina Board of Governors.
Just recently it has decimated higher education in that state by voting to cut 46 academic degree programs. One member defended such cuts with the comment: "We're capitalists, and we have to look at what the demand is, and
we have to respond to the demand." (38) The ideology that drives this kind of market-driven assault on higher education was made clear by the state's Republican governor, Pat McCrory, who said in a radio interview, "If you want
to take gender studies, that's fine, go to a private school and take it. But I don't want to subsidize that if that's not going to get someone a job." (39) This is more than an example of crude economic instrumentalism; it is also a
recipe for instituting an academic culture of thoughtlessness and a kind of stupidity receptive to what Hannah Arendt once called totalitarianism. Crafting Educational Counternarratives Second,
young people
and progressives need to create the institutions and public spaces in which education becomes
central as a counternarrative that serves to both reveal, interrogate and overcome the common
sense assumptions that provide the ideological and affective webs that tie many people to forms of
oppression . Domination is not just structural and its subjective roots and pedagogical mechanisms need to be viewed as central to any
politics that aims to educate, change individual and collective consciousness, and contribute to broadbased social formations. Relatedly, a coalition of diverse social movements, from unions to associations of artists, educators and youth groups, needs to develop a range of alternative public spheres in
which young people and others can become cultural producers capable of writing themselves back into the discourse of democracy while bearing witness to a range of ongoing injustices from police violence to the violence of the
financial elite. Rejecting Criminalization Third, the United States has become a society in which the power at the state and national levels has become punitive for most Americans and beneficial for the financial and corporate elite.
Punishment creep now reaches into almost every commanding institution that holds sway over the US public and its effects are especially felt by poor people, Black people, young people and the elderly. Millions of young men are
held in prisons and jails across the United States, and most of them for nonviolent crimes. Working people are punished after a lifetime of work by having their pensions either reduced or taken away. Poor people are denied
Medicaid because right-wing politicians believe the poor should be financially responsible for their health care. And so it goes. The United States is one of the few countries that allows teenagers to be tried as adults, even though
there are endless stories of such youth being abused, beaten and in some cases committing suicide as a result of such savage treatment. Everywhere we look in US society, routine behavior is being criminalized. If you owe a
parking ticket, you may end up in jail. If you violate a dress code as a student, you may be handcuffed by the police and charged with a criminal offense. A kind of mad infatuation with violence is matched by an increase in state
lawlessness. In particular, young people have been left out of the discourse of democracy. They are the new disposables who lack jobs, a decent education, hope and any semblance of a future better than the one their parents
inherited. In addition, an increasing number of youth suffer mental anguish and overt distress, even, perhaps especially, among the college-bound, debt-ridden and unemployed whose numbers are growing exponentially. Many
reports claim that "young Americans are suffering from rising levels of anxiety, stress, depression and even suicide." For example, "One out of every five young people and one out of every four college students ... suffers from some
form of diagnosable mental illness." (40) According to one survey, "44 percent of young aged 18 to 24 say they are excessively stressed." (41) One factor may be that there are so few jobs for young people. In fact the jobless rate
for Americans aged 15 to 24 stands at 15.8 percent, more than double the unemployment rate of 6.9 percent for all ages, according to the World Bank. (42) Facing what Richard Sennett calls the "specter of uselessness," the war on
youth serves as a reminder of how finance capital has abandoned any viable vision of democracy, including one that would support future generations. The war on youth has to be seen as a central element of state terrorism and
as the claims and promises of a neoliberal utopia have
been transformed into an Orwellian and Dickensian nightmare, the United States continues to
succumb to the pathologies of political corruption, the redistribution of wealth upward into the hands of the 1%, the rise of the surveillance state and the use of the
criminal legal system as a way of dealing with social problems. At the same time, Orwell's dark fantasy of an authoritarian future continues without
enough massive opposition as students and low-income and poor youth of color are exposed to a lowintensity war in which they are held hostage to a neoliberal discourse that translates systemic issues
crucial to critically engaging the current regime of neoliberalism. Reclaiming Emancipatory Morality Fourth,
into problems of individual responsibility. This individualization of the social is one of the most
powerful ideological weapons used by the current authoritarian regime and must be challenged . Under the
star of Orwell, morality loses its emancipatory possibilities and degenerates into a pathology in which misery is denounced as a moral failing. Under the neo-Darwinian ethos of survival of the fittest, the ultimate form of
entertainment becomes the pain and humiliation of others, especially those considered disposable and powerless, who are no longer an object of compassion, but of ridicule and amusement. This becomes clear in the endless
stories we are now hearing from US politicians disdaining the poor as moochers who don't need welfare but stronger morals.
This narrative can also be heard from
conservative pundits, such as New York Times columnist David Brooks, who epitomize this view. According to Brooks, poverty is a matter of the poor lacking virtue, middle-class norms
and decent moral codes. (43)
For Brooks, the problems of the poor and disadvantaged can be solved "through moral
education and self-reliance ... high-quality relationships and strong familial ties." (44) In this discourse, soaring inequality in wealth and income, high levels of unemployment, stagnant economic
What Brooks and other conservatives conveniently disregard are the
racist nature of the drug wars, the strangle hold of the criminal legal system on poor Black
communities, police violence, mass unemployment for Black youth, poor quality education in lowincome neighborhoods, and the egregious effect of mass incarceration on communities of color. Paul Krugman
growth and low wages for millions of working Americans are ignored.
gets it right in rebutting the argument that all the poor need are the virtues of middle-class morality and a good dose of resilience. (45) He writes: So it is ... disheartening still to see commentators suggesting that the poor are
causing their own poverty, and could easily escape if only they acted like members of the upper middle class.... Shrugging your shoulders as you attribute it all to values is an act of malign neglect.
don't need lectures
on morality,
The poor
they need more resources - which we can afford to provide - and better economic opportunities, which we can also afford to provide
through everything from training and subsidies to higher minimum wages. (46) Developing a Language of Critique and Possibility Lastly, any attempt to make clear the massive misery, exploitation, corruption and suffering
produced under casino capitalism must develop both a language of critique and possibility.
It is not enough to simply register what is wrong with US
society ; it is also crucial to do so in a way that enables people to recognize themselves in such
discourses in a way that both inspires them to be more critical and energizes them to do something
about it. In part, this suggests a politics that is capable of developing a comprehensive vision of analysis and struggle that "does not rely on single issues." (47) It is only through an understanding of the wider relations and
connections of power that the US public can overcome uninformed practice, isolated struggles and modes of singular politics that become insular and self-sabotaging. This means developing
modes of analyses capable of connecting isolated and individualized issues to more generalized notions of freedom, and developing theoretical
frameworks in which it becomes possible to translate private troubles into broader more systemic
conditions. In short, this suggests developing modes of analyses that connect the dots historically and relationally. It also means developing a more comprehensive
vision of politics and change. The key here is the notion of translation, that is, the need to translate private troubles into broader public issues and understand how systemic modes of analyses can be helpful in
connecting a range of issues so as to be able to build a united front in the call for a radical democracy. This is a particularly important goal given that the
fragmentation of the left has been partly responsible for its inability to develop a wide political and ideological
umbrella to address a range of problems extending from extreme poverty, the assault on the environment, the emergence of the permanent warfare state, the rollback of voting
rights, the assault on public servants, women's rights and social provisions, and a range of other issues that erode the possibilities for a radical
democracy. The dominating mechanisms of casino capitalism in both their symbolic and material registers reach deep into every aspect of US society. Any successful movement for a radical democracy will have to
wage a struggle against the totality of this new mode of authoritarianism rather than isolating and attacking specific elements of its anti-democratic ethos.
Metadata Education Good
Metadata is going to define privacy in the 21st century – education over it is important.
Latamore 11 (G. Berton, Editor in Chief of Wikibon, “Storage Peer Incite,” Jan 17, 2011,
http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/Cloud_Meta_Data:_Driving_New_Business_Model)//ghs-VA
Traditionally, metadata has been fairly simple and low-level. In the age of cloud services, however, it
is taking on a much more
important role , and it is becoming more complex. If you buy books on Amazon.com, for instance, you are familiar with the suggestions it
provides based on your past purchases. Those are based on an analysis of metadata showing the relationships between books you buy and
other purchasers and other books like those you buy that they purchased. That is getting reasonably complex. But that, we believe, is only the
beginning. In the
future metadata will span the cloud to link data entities on different computers, in different databases, on different
services, to provide services that will become an important part of our lives in the 21st Century. Today that is
impossible, because the basic tools and standards do not yet exist. In their paper "Angels in our Midst: Associative Metadata in Cloud Storage",
Dr. Tom Coughlin and Mike Alvarado present a model architecture based on automated tools they call "Guardian Angels" that watch over data
relationships and create metadata and a mechanism for managing and securing that metadata, the "Invisible College." They presented this
paper at Wikibon's Nov. 2 Peer Incite Meeting. The recording is available in the Wikibon Peer Incite Archive. All this may sound pretty esoteric,
the area of academics and techies in large cloud service providers. But in fact it
is important to every organization doing
business over the Internet, which today is practically every organization in existence . Complex
metadata is the basis for targeted Internet advertising and other automated customer, employee, constituent,
and donor management services. Therefore, every organization has a stake in the issue of developing effective standards and management
tools for metadata. This means that you need to push your vendors to develop and use open metadata standards.
Metadata creates the distinction between what the government can and cannot
collect – it will define privacy in the 21st century.
Wagner 13 (David, holds English and Political Science B.A.s from UC Berkeley, “Why Metadata Is
Shaping The Future of Privacy,” June 7, 2013, http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/jun/07/why-metadatashaping-future-privacy/)//ghs-VA
But what exactly is metadata? What can the government learn from it? And why has the term suddenly appeared at the center of so many
debates on the future of privacy? To get answers on those questions, I called Pam Dixon, director of the San Diego-based think tank World
Privacy Forum. "Metadata, very simply put, is
everything around the conversation but not including the
conversation," says Dixon. "For example, the phone numbers of both parties. Where you were when you made the call and where that
person who you called was. How long your call was. When you called them." Put another way: No, the government can't
eavesdrop on your late-night pizza delivery orders. They'd need a warrant for that. But metadata gives them
access to nearly everything else, like your location, your number, and how long the conversation
lasted. They can use that information to paint a very detailed picture of your life. We know for sure that Verizon records have been hauled in
for the last three months, and probably a lot longer. Senator Feinstein admitted as much when she told MSNBC, "There is nothing new in this
program. The fact of the matter is, that this was a routine three-month approval under seal that was leaked." The order requiring Verizon to
turn over records on all their customers didn't come from a typical court. It was handed down from the FISA court, a secretive judicial entity
authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and expanded under the post-9/11 Patriot Act. "The way
that the FISA
court collected this information is through what's called a business records provision," says Dixon. In the
wake of the Patriot Act, this so-called transactional information is not protected as private information. That's why metadata is such
a significant term — if separates what the government can and can't obtain without a warrant. Dixon
thinks the terms currently attached to metadata, words like "business" and "transactional," are misnomers. "These are actually very personal
records." Dixon says we
should get used to hearing the word metadata. Going forward, the question of what is
and what isn't metadata will shape American privacy law . "That exact question is under discussion by some of the best
minds in privacy," says Dixon. In fact, the
line between non-private metadata and content protected by the
Fourth Amendment is already forming important distinctions in another facet of the government's
surveillance program. On Thursday, The Washington Post revealed that the NSA has also been tapping into the servers of giant tech
companies like Google, Apple, and Facebook since 2007. That probing, undertaken by a previously covert NSA program called PRISM, is
different from the Verizon case because it accesses actual content, like emails and online search histories, not just the metadata.
"Metadata is a very important thing to watch out for," says Dixon. Government officials say that sifting through metadata
helps them track down terrorists and foil potential attacks. They insist that this information doesn't breech any one person's privacy. But Dixon
thinks metadata gives government
says, "It is absolute computer child's play."
agents more than enough clues to hone in on specific individuals. She
Metadata controls the conversation about information risk.
Vellante 11 (David, Co-founder & co-CEO SiliconANGLE Media, industry analyst, entrepreneur, co-host
of theCUBE, “Metadata in the Cloud: Creating New Business Models,” Jan 17, 2011,
http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/Cloud_Meta_Data:_Driving_New_Business_Model)//ghs-VA
As more valuable personal and corporate information is stored in both public and private clouds, organizations
will increasingly
rely on an expanded view of metadata to both create new value streams and mitigate information
risk. By its very nature, cloud architectures allow greater degrees of sharing and collaboration and present new opportunities and risks for
information professionals. Incremental value from cloud metadata will be created by leveraging "associative context" created by software that
observes users and their evolving relationships with content elements that are both internal and external to an organization. This software will
create metadata that allows individuals and organizations to extract even more value from information. These were the ideas put forth by Dr.
Tom Coughlin and Mike Alvarado, who presented these concepts to the Wikibon community from a new paper: Angels in our Midst: Associative
Metadata in Cloud Storage. What is Metadata and Why is it Important? Metadata is data about data. It is high-level information that
includes when something was done, where it was done, the file type and format of the data, the original source, etc. The notion of metadata
can be expanded to include information about how content is being used, who is using the content, and when multiple pieces of content are
being used can relevant and valuable associations be observed? According to the authors, users should think about the different types and
levels of metadata - low-level metadata that provide (for example) information about physical location of blocks, all the way to higher level
metadata that can go beyond descriptive to include judgemental information. In other words, what does this content mean and is it relevant to
a particular objective or initiative? For example, will I like how it tastes? Will it be cosmetically appealing to me? By
leveraging
metadata more intelligently, organizations can begin to extract new business value from information and
potentially introduce new business models for value creation. Underpinning this opportunity is the relationships
between content elements, which the authors refer to as associative metadata. What's Needed to Exploit Associative Metadata? According to
Alvarado and Coughlin, if we're going to create associative metadata we need an agent that can be an objective observer. Since individual
humans often create many of those relationships, software that is intelligent enough to create new metadata around those interactions and
relationships is needed to watch what users are doing. The authors refer to this agent as a "Guardian Angel." Further, to extend the notion of
metadata to an even higher, more rich and complex level, the paper puts forth the notion of "The Invisible College," which is a tool for
managing the relationships between Guardian Angels and a useful framework for creating a more intricate system of data systems. What
Different Types of Metadata Exist? On the call, Todd, an IT practitioner put forth a simple metadata model that included three layers: Basic
metadata - low level data - e.g. block level information about where data is stored and how often it is accessed. File-level metadata - more
complex data from file systems. Content-level metadata - metadata that might be found in content management systems such as file type and
other more meaningful data such as: "Is this email from the CEO?" or "Is the mammogram positive?" Each metadata type is actionable. For
example, basic metadata can be used to automate tiering; file-system data can be used to speed performance, and high-level metadata can be
used to take business actions. The key challenge is how to capture, process, analyze, and manage all this metadata in an expedient manner.
How Will these Metadata be Managed? The authors have put forth in their paper a taxonomy for metadata that is very granular but broken
down along two high levels: Meaning Metadata, Basic Metadata. The paper defines an OSI-like model with a physical layer through operational
into semantic and contextual layers. The definition of these layers, their interaction and management, will be vital to harnessing the power of
this metadata. A key limiting factor is the raw power of systems and the ability to keep pace not only with user interactions but machine-to-
machine (M2M) communications. The community discussed the possibility of a Hadoop-like framework, Hadoop itself or other semantic web
technologies to be applied to evolving metadata architectures. Rather than shoving the data into a big data repository, the idea is to distribute
the metadata and allow parallel processing concepts to operate in tandem. By allowing the metadata to remain distributed, massive volumes of
data can be managed and analyzed in real or near-real time, thereby providing a step function in metadata exploitation. Does such a framework
exist today specifically designed for cloud metadata management? To the community's knowledge, not per se, but there are numerous open
source initiatives such as Hadoop that have the potential to be applied to solving this problem and creating new opportunities for metadata
management in cloud environments. What about Privacy and Security in the Cloud? Cloud information storage is accomplished by providing
access to stored assets over TCP/IP networks, whether public or private. Cloud
computing increases the need to protect
content in new ways specifically because the physical perimeter of the organization and its data are fluid. The notion of building a moat to
protect the queen in her castle is outmoded in the cloud, because sometimes the queen wants to leave the castle. Compounding the
complexity of privacy and data protection is the idea that associations and interactions will
dramatically increase between users, users-and-machines, and machines themselves . According to Alvarado
and Coughlin, not surprisingly,
one answer to this problem is metadata . New types of metadata, according to the authors,
will evolve to ensure data integrity, security, and privacy with content that is shared and created by
individuals, groups, and machines. For example, metadata could evolve to monitor the physical location of files and ensure that
the physical storage of that data complies with local laws that might require that data is not stored outside a particular country. Location
services is currently one of the hottest areas in business but it lacks a mechanism to enable the levels of privacy users desire. The services in the
Internet world are often being introduced under conditions where they are outstripping the ability of infrastructure to provide a mature
framework for issues like corporate policy or effective policy. Mechanism that are described in the paper can make infrastructure more
predisposed to keep new service ideas in sync with necessary protection and other mechanisms which are being added after the fact. If
developers had access to a toolkit before they deploy that is easily accessible, we would be ahead of the game. The authors state the following:
"Whatever data system solutions arise, they will have identifiable characteristics such as automated or semi-automated information
classification and inventory algorithms with significance and retention bits, automated information access path management, information
tracking and simulated testing access (repeated during the effective life time of information for quality assurance), and automated information
metadata reporting." A key concern in the Wikibon community is the notion of balancing information value with information risk. Specifically,
business value constricts as organizations increasingly automate the policing of data and information,
and striking a risk reduction/value creation balance is an ongoing challenge for CIOs. The bottom line is that
the degree of emphasis on risk versus value will depend on a number of factors, including industry, regulatory requirements, legal issues, past
corporate history, culture, company status (i.e. private versus publicly traded), and other issues. When will Architectures and Products Emerge?
Clearly the authors ideas are futuristic in nature, however the value of this exercise is that Alvarado and Coughlin are defining an end point and
helping users and vendors visualize the possibility of cloud computing in the context of creating new business models. The emphasis on
metadata underscores the importance of defining, understanding and managing metadata to create new business opportunities and manage
information risk. The
role of metadata in this regard is undeniable and while solutions on the market are
limited today, they are beginning to come to fruition in pockets. Key developments are occurring within standards
communities to address this opportunity, and the authors believe that these efforts are beginning to coalesce around the Angel and Invisible
College notion. Specifically they cite the evolution of Intel's work on Fodor. As well, clearly mashups using Google mapping capabilities with GPS
triangulation extensively use metadata to create new value. Frameworks like Hadoop could be instrumental in providing fast analytics for big
data and other semantic web technologies are emerging to address these issues. From a storage perspective, few suppliers are actively talking
about this opportunity in their marketing, but several have advanced development projects to better understand how to exploit metadata for
classification, policy automation, collaboration, and the like. Action item: Initial cloud computing deployments have been accelerated due to
the economic crisis, and many have focused on reducing costs. At the same time, numerous organizations are enabling new business models
using cloud platforms. These initiatives are creating truckloads of data and metadata, and users
and vendors must identify
opportunities to both harness and unleash metadata to mitigate information risks and at the same
time create new value pathways. The degree to which this is possible will be a function of an organization's risk tolerance, its
culture, regulatory compliance edicts, and a number of other factors. Whatever the path,
fundamental to managing data in the 21st century .
metadata exploitation will be
McArthur 11 (John, President of Cameron University in Lawton-Fort Sill, Oklahoma with a branch in
Duncan, Oklahoma. Cameron University is a public, master’s degree, “Metadata Helping Organizations
Say Yes to Cloud Services,” Jan 17, 2011,
http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/Cloud_Meta_Data:_Driving_New_Business_Model)//ghs-VA
Well-functioning organizations have developed structures to balance requirements for revenue
creation, cost containment, and risk management to deliver predictable profit and growth. Within most organizations, the IT
department is often charged with many of the cost-reduction initiatives, legal, audit, security, and compliance departments are charged with risk reduction, and the
line-of-business is charged with driving increased value and revenue. The development and evolution of private- and public-cloud services promise decreased costs
for the IT department through super-consolidation and the efficiency of shared infrastructure services. Business units see cloud-based services enabling increased
revenue and value, not only by offering a more scalable and flexible infrastructure but also by leveraging the combined data of the organization and the knowledge
gleaned from other users of the cloud. Those
charged with risk management will be appropriately concerned about
data privacy, data security, data loss, and legal and regulatory compliance for both public and private clouds. That said,
companies that fail to embrace private and public cloud approaches run the risk of revenue stagnation
and high costs, which
promises certain, if slow, death. Cloud metadata is the key to satisfying the concerns of risk
managers , while enabling IT and revenue-producing business units to fully embrace and exploit these
new service-delivery models. Such a model of cloud metadata is detailed in a document created by Tom Coughlin and Mike Alvarado entitled
"Angels in our Midst: Associative Metadata in Cloud Storage." For risk managers concerned about placing data in a shared
infrastructure, the "Basic Data Levels" of metadata, described in the first four layers of the model, can be used to
control access, determine which files and data should be encrypted, and control where data is allowed to move and be shared both within and outside the
walls of the corporation. For risk managers concerned about compliance with security and privacy laws, the
"Meaning Levels" of metadata, described in the top three layers of the model, can enable the analysis of customers and
their relationships while ensuring that customer-unique identifying information is protected. Organizations
need to consider all three dimensions: revenue and value creation, cost control, and risk management. Organizations will have differing views of the appropriate
balance among revenue, cost, and risk, depending upon their industry, company history, financial position, and extent of regulatory oversight, but all three
constituencies must have a seat at the table. It’s always easy to kill something by saying it’s too risky. The inherent risk, however, lies in not finding ways to say ‘yes’
and being left behind. Action item: With the increased availability of private- and public-cloud infrastructure and applications, organizations should bring together
the key stakeholders for revenue growth, cost containment, and risk management. The priority of the stakeholders should be to establish and leverage a new
hierarchy of metadata to enable organizations to manage risk while exploiting the cost benefits and value creation of cloud-based infrastructure.
Floyer 11 (David, Wikibon’s resident CTO. Floyer spent more than twenty years at IBM holding
positions in research, “Metadata for Big Data and the Cloud,” Jan 17, 2011,
http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/Cloud_Meta_Data:_Driving_New_Business_Model)//ghs-VA
You are driving with the family on a long journey at 7p.m. Your dashboard computer displays a selection of restaurants and hotels that meet your budget, culinary
preferences, and location, with a special offer for a family room. There is an attractive offer from a hotel if you drive another 20 miles. Behind this display is derived
from a large amount of data put into context – and the only way to provide such information cost effectively is to use metadata inferences in real or next-to-real
time. Metadata, the data that describes data, becomes
an imperative in the world of “Big Data” and the cloud. As more of the
data is distributed in the cloud and across the enterprise, the model of holding central databases becomes less relevant, especially for unstructured and semistructured data. Moving
vast amounts of data from one place to another within or outside the enterprise is
not economically viable. It is faster and more efficient to select the data locally by shipping the code to the data, the Hadoop model. Good
metadata is a key enabler of this approach. There is already some metadata in place; files have a date created/modified and file size,
JPEGs have data about the camera settings and location, and there are many other examples. But metadata standards are fragmented and incomplete, and cracking
open files to investigate properties requires too much compute and elapsed time. A paper by Tom Coughlin and Mike Alvarado entitled "Angels in our Midst:
Associative Metadata in Cloud Storage" is an interesting attempt to put a framework model (Figure 1) in place for metadata. The authors have taken an OSI-like
layered model, split into to major components:- Basic Data Levels – four layers that focus on traditional metadata Meaning Data Levels – three layers that focus on
meaning and context IT
organizations and vendors should recognize that completely new models of doing
business are evolving that are enabled by an effective metadata model that has industry acceptance.
Within IT, metadata can be used to assist in deleting data, as well as enabling more effective utilization of
data value. Current methods of inferring metadata retrospectively are inadequate.
Nawotka 11 (Edward, Editor-in-Chief of Publishing Perspectives, “Why Metadata is the Key to Your
Digital Future,” July 29, 2011, http://publishingperspectives.com/2011/07/why-metadata-is-the-key-toyour-digital-future/)//ghs-VA
Q: What is Metadata and why is it so important for publishing? Metadata might still sound like something intimidating for some, but it is
actually very simple. Metadata is all of the information associated with a book or publication that is used to produce, publish, distribute,
market, promote and sell the book. This includes very simple things, such as the title, author of a book, cover and format, to much more
complicated data, such as the terms of the publishing contract, rights information, print run, sales data, reviews, etc. It usually takes the form of
a file contained in a database that will contain information for all the publishers books. This file can then be output into a digital file or
spreadsheet that can be used by search engines, retailers and other digital media to display and sell your book. Q: Why is it important for
publishers to continually educate themselves and update their knowledge about Metadata? Metadata
is, essentially, the story of the
book. It tells people everything they need to know about about the book and how to work with it. Without good metadata in
place, every person who comes in contact with the book — from the editor to the printer to the bookseller — will have to recreate
the metadata for the book, which can introduce errors. If one person accidentally spells the author’s name wrong, to take one
example, that might never be fixed and people looking for the book in a computer database would never be able to find book in the system.
The book — and all that investment in time, money and effort — would essentially be lost as well. Formats and devices may change — and we
honestly don’t know what the publishing landscape will look like in five to ten years — but metadata
is the one thing you can
confidently take control of now, no matter what happens in the future. Q: What are the benefits of developing
better metadata? The good news is that getting the metadata right will ensure that people who are looking for your book — whether it’s a
novel or a textbook on biochemistry — will be able to find it when they search for it online. Search
engines, social networks, ebook retailers all depend on metadata to help users find their book. Get it wrong and they’ll never find it and
you’ll lose the sale; get it right and it is going to be the first book that will pop up after a search query. That’s just good sales
and marketing. It’s also all-important for libraries who want to be able to manage their collections and help patrons. Q: How can
publishers incorporate a better metadata strategy into their digital workflow? It is essentially the same as what you do for print, only instead of
doing it for a physical book, you’re doing it for a digital file. The important thing to remember is metadata changes as it moves through the
system as different people at the publishing house work on it. The editor might make revisions to the description of the book’s content, the
marketing department would add details about sales, as would the publicity department after the book goes out into the world. Metadata
also allows you to revise and refine the information as new taxonomies, standards and practices emerge, thus ensuring that your book is
futureproofed. Q: Isn’t metadata just something the digital departments of publishers need to worry about? Simply put, it
needs to be a
part of everyone’s job description . The problem comes when a house instills a “digital director” and everyone else starts to think
“well, that’s not my job anymore.” Metadata is a tool that everyone can use to help make a book a success and keep it alive in
the marketplace much longer. Many people outsource their metadata for e-books to the service providers who also convert and/or distribute
their e-books, which can also work very well — provided they are one in the same. Having
different sets of metadata spread
across too many companies gets complicated when you want to change something and makes fixing
problems when they arise all the more complicated.