CIVIL WARS THROUGH
HISTORY: THE LOGIC OF
VIOLENCE
Stathis N. Kalyvas
Department of Political Science
Yale University
VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR
A very long preoccupation with civil war
 One reason is their violence
 Two features
 Barbarity



Arno Meyer: “If war is hell, then civil war belongs to
hell’s deepest and most infernal regions”
Intimacy
Fratricide: Abel and Cain
 Montherlant: civil war is the war of neighbor against
neighbor, rival against rival, friend against friend

THE QUESTION

How to explain the barbarity and intimacy that
characterize the violence of civil wars?


Note that this is not the same as asking what causes
civil wars
What type of theoretical and empirical account
succeeds in explaining both features at the same
time?
OUTLINE
Features of violence in civil war
 Four intellectual traditions
 A theoretical account
 Some empirics

BARBARITY

Excessive violence; cruelty; atrocity
The term is culturally specific
 Bombs vs. knives

Post 1945 armed conflicts have been primarily
internal with noncombatants as the primary
target
 Number of victims

WWII; Chad 1970s
 Civil wars as residual category of warfare


Identity of victims

Combatants vs. noncombatants

Intimacy between victimizers and victims
INTIMACY
Not all victims of a civil war die from the action
of “intimates,” but many do
 Yet the perception of barbarity is partly
motivated by the occurrence of intimate violence

A HIGH SCHOOL CLASS IN NORTHEAST
BOSNIA
CONVENTIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF
VIOLENCE
Many facts from journalistic reports, historical
case studies, and human rights reports
 …yet, little systematic analysis
 Violence is typically characterized as

Madness
 Hatred
 Evil

No real explanations
 It is possible to reconstruct four intellectual
traditions that have grappled with this question

FOUR INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS
Hobbesian tradition: violence in civil wars is
barbarous because of anarchy
 Recent version: new wars
 Schmittian tradition: violence in civil wars is
barbarous because of polarization/enmity
 Recent version: ethnic conflict
 Foucauldian tradition: violence in civil wars is
barbarous because challenging the sovereign is
transgressive
 Recent version: post September 11 US practices
 Clausewitzian tradition: violence in civil wars is
barbarous because of specific technological features
unique to civil wars
 Recent version: guerrilla war as “dirty war”

ALL APPROACHES HAVE MERITS, BUT ALSO
PROBLEMS




Hobbesian: most civil war contexts do not
produce anarchy (understood as absence of
authority) but proliferation of authorities
Schmittian: Polarization often characterizes
elites rather than masses; intellectuals rather
than average individuals; it is often the
product rather than simply the cause of civil
war and violence
Foucauldian: Violence against the sovereign
can be as barbaric as violence by the sovereign
Clausewitzian: It is not clear what the relation
between warfare technology and violence is
Rather than discuss each of these traditions in
detail, focus on one the and push it to its
analytical and empirical limits
 The Clausewitzian one
 How much leverage do we get?
 The intuition in two pictures

TAL AFAR, IRAQ (SEPTEMBER 2005)
An Iraqi informant in Tall Afar uses a thumbs down to signal that a detainee
should be released.
SOME FACTS
The majority of civil wars (but not all!) are
guerrilla or irregular wars
 Frontlines aren’t clear; rebels blend into civilian
populations
 In other words, there are informational
asymmetries
 Civilians have information about who is who that
armed actors lack but desire

THE ARGUMENT

Informational asymmetries are the causal
link between civil war, on the one hand, and both
the barbaric and intimate dimensions of its
violence, on the other hand
ROADMAP

A few definitions and concepts

Civil war; irregular war; sovereignty and control;
types of violence
A theory of irregular war
 A theory of violence in irregular war
 An empirical demonstration

A MINIMAL DEFINITION OF CIVIL WAR
Armed combat taking place within the
boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity
between parties subject to a common authority
at the outset of the hostilities






“Armed combat” implies a threshold of
organization and violence
“Sovereign units” are primarily states, but may
include a multitude of historical units
Compatible with any cause
Includes wars of resistance against occupation and
colonization
A more precise term: internal or intrastate war
A THEORY OF IRREGULAR WAR
Argument applies to irregular war contexts
 Where violence in bilateral and coercive



e.g. Chechnya, Afghanistan
Excludes cases of unilateral violence or violence
used to expel or exterminate

e.g. Bosnia, Rwanda, Stalin’s purges


Two actors: incumbents and insurgents (same
logic for multiple actors)
No clear frontlines
EL SALVADOR, 1984
KOREA, 1951
SOVEREIGNTY & CONTROL
Sovereignty is divided; monopolies of violence are
localized
 Two types of divided sovereignty

Segmented: two or more distinct “states” within a
state
 Fragmented: two or more rulers on the same piece of
territory within a state


Control: The ability of organizations to control
access to the population and perform state-like
functions; varies spatially and temporally
SUPPORT (“COLLABORATION”)

Why and how people collaborate with armed
actors?
Preferences: class, ethnicity, ideology, etc.
 But also, the dynamics of the war itself
 As the war goes on, the will of armed actors
increasingly shapes the behavior of the civilian
population—through the use of violence
 Most people most of the time value survival over
other considerations


Violence is used by armed actors to induce
civilians to collaborate with them and not with
their rivals
THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM


Armed actors can’t tell the enemy combatant (or
the enemy noncombatant) from the “bystanding”
(or even friendly) noncombatant
Two “solutions”
Collective profiling: target every member of a
suspected group (i.e. select on visible ascriptive
characteristic, location, etc.)
 Individualized: ascertain individual guilt



Violence is

indiscriminate when targeting is collective(i.e. every
man in a village)

selective when targeting is individualized (i.e.
particular individuals)
Choice is dictated by efficiency rather than
morality considerations
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF VIOLENCE
IN CIVIL WAR
Because there is more than one armed actor, they
must take the consequences of their violence into
account
 Indiscriminate violence tends to be
counterproductive


Α U.S. advisor in Vietnam (1960s): “This is a political
war and it calls for discrimination in killing.”
Selective violence is more effective but more
difficult to achieve as it requires a high degree of
information
 Under certain broad conditions, armed actors opt
for selective over indiscriminate violence

JOINT PRODUCTION OF VIOLENCE


Information is asymmetrically distributed
between political actors and individual civilians
Selective violence is the outcome of a transaction
between organizations and civilians through
denunciation



Selective violence is open to problems of “moral
hazard”
Denunciation is often malicious: denouncers use
armed actors to achieve their own ends which
often consist of nothing more than typically
trivial local and private disputes
A US officer, Iraq:

“These people dime each other out like there’s no
tomorrow; … out of a hundred tips we’ve gotten from
Iraqi intelligence, one has worked out.
EAMON COLLINS, IRA
After a while, one aspect of my encounters with people and their
complaints began to depress me. I realized that a lot of people,
often not even republicans, would seek the help of Sinn Fein in
order to draw on the threat of IRA muscle – so they hoped – in
solving their disputes. At times I felt as if people were treating me
as a Mafia godfather. One former work colleague asked me if I
could sort out his son-in-law. Apparently the latter was beating
up his wife, my former colleague’s daughter. I said that it was
none of Sinn Fein’s business. Then my former colleague said:
“Yes, it is. That man is never out of the police station. I am sure
he’s an informer.” I said that he was making a very serious
allegation. I said that if the IRA were to investigate it and find it
to be groundless then they would come looking for the person who
made the allegation. Unfortunately, the allegation that so-and-so
was an informer (was ‘never out of the police station’) became
one that I heard regularly from people who wanted extreme
violence done to their neigbours.
SUPPLY OF DENUNCIATIONS ALWAYS
EXCEEDS EXPECTATIONS
Germany, 1934
 Bureaucrats expressed their surprise about the
quantity of denunciations, especially false
charges, noting that they had reached
“altogether unacceptable proportions”
 The minister of the Interior asked local
authorities to take steps to curb the rapid
expansion of all denunciations, “too many of
which were based merely on conflicts with
neighbors”
 Arrest for political reasons could not be used as
grounds for divorce
 Hitler complained: “We are living at present in a
sea of denunciations and human meanness”

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
21 NOVEMBER 2001
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
21 NOVEMBER 2001
Implication: intimate violence is often the result
of the privatization of politics rather than the
politicization of private life
 …But can we analyze the process of violence
more systematically?

AN OPERATIONAL MEASURE OF CONTROL

Geographical space may
be divided into five zones
of control, from 1
(highest incumbent
control) to 5 (highest
insurgent control); zone
3 is a zone of equal
control
1
2
3
4
5
COLLABORATION
Collaboration is a
function of control
 Individuals collaborate
with the stronger actor



k(c)ins
k(c)inc
in zones 1 and 2 mainly
with incumbents; in zones
4 and 5 mainly with
insurgents.
Zone 3 is the epicenter of
conflict: collaboration
with both sides
Control
1
2
3
4
Defection toward the insurgents
Defection toward the incumbents
5
DENUNCIATION
… is a function of the likelihood of counterdenunciation (high in villages where everything
is visible)
 This means that individuals will denounce only
where one side has control and can deter
retaliation: zones 1 & 2 for incumbents, 4 & 5 for
insurgents
 Surprising prediction: no denunciations in zone 3

PREDICTIONS ABOUT VIOLENCE

Indiscriminate violence will be likely where
information and control are minimal
Zone 5 for incumbents
 Zone 1 for insurgents


Selective violence will be likely where control is
hegemonic but not total
Zone 2 for incumbents
 Zone 4 for insurgents


No violence in zone 3
AN EMPIRICAL TEST





The Argolid region in
Southern Greece
62 villages; population: 45,086
(1940)
Civil war during German
occupation, 1943-44
“Ideological” war; procommunist resistance vs.
right-wing collaborationist
militia
No ethnic, religious, or class
cleavage (5,360 families; 5,090
farms)
CONTROL AND VIOLENCE, JUNE 1944
INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE
SELECTIVE VIOLENCE
DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTIVE VIOLENCE
BY ZONE OF CONTROL
Selective Violence By Zone of Control and Actor
35
30
Violent Villages
25
20
Incumbents
Insurgents
15
10
5
0
1
2
3
Zone of Control
4
5
DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTIVE VIOLENCE
BY ZONE OF CONTROL
Selective Violence, Argolid Sept. 1943-Sept. 1944
1.00
0.90
Proportion of Villages in a Zone of Control
Experiencing Selective Violence
0.80
0.70
0.60
Incumbent Violence
Insurgent Violence
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
1
2
3
Control Zone
4
5
A WAR WITH NO FRONTS
MEKONG DELTA, 1969
VIETCONG VIOLENCE, 1969
(N=61,701 VILLAGES/BIMONTHLY)
1969
0.09
0.08
Percent violent villages
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
1
2
3
Zones of Control
4
5
COLOMBIA
WOULD YOU SAY THAT WHEN A GROUP WAS THE
STRONGEST IN A ZONE, OR HAD MORE CONTROL THAN
OTHERS, WERE THERE MORE DEATHS OR FEWER DEATHS?
100%
More Deaths
Fewer Deaths
90%
80%
Percent Respondents
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
CP
IP
IFARC
IELN
DENUNCIATION IN CONTEMPORARY
COLOMBIA














ACUSO A UN VECINO DE SER MILICIANO DE LA GUERRILLA PERO NO ERA CIERTO
PARECIA QUE TENIAN PROBLEMAS PERSONALES
LAS MUJERES SE ACONSTUMBRABAN A DENUNCIAR A LOS HOMBRES QUE LES
PONIAN CACHOS Y VISEVERSA
INFORMACION QUE UN MUCHACHO ERA PARAMILITAR, Y LA INFORMACION ERA
FALSA. LAS FARC, LOS MATARAN Y LUEGO SUPIERAN QUE ERA UN ERROR. EL QUE
ODIO LA INFORMACION LE TENIA BRONCA AL MUCHACHO
PROBLEMAS POR UNOS ANIMALES QUE DAÑARON UN CULTIVO PRO PASARSE DE
UNA FINCA A OTRA
SE PRESENTABAN MUCHOS CASOS A DIARIO, QUE POR ROBOS, GANADO, ETC
2 HERMANOS, UNO GUERRILLERO Y OTRO CIVIL, EL GUERRILLERO ACUSO AL
HERMANO CIVIL DE SER GUERRILLERO Y LO MATARON
UN TIO DENUNCIÓ A UN PRIMO
ALGUNAS VECES OCURRIA POR BRONCAS ENTRE VECINOS
POR COSAS COMO VIOLENCIA DOMESTICA, PRESTAMOS DE PLATA
RIÑAS PERSONALES, DINERO, ENVIDIA
POR PELEAS ENTRE CIVILES O CHISMES DE LAS MUJERES, DENUNCIABAN A LA
PERSONA Y SI LA ENCONTRABAN CULPABLE LA CASTIGABAN
POR ALGUN PROBLEMA PÈRSONAL, SOBRE TODO POR PELEAS CUANDO ESTABAN
BORRACHOS
CASOS EN QUE CIVILES DENUNCIABAN PORQUE OTROS SE METIERON CON LAS
HIJAS
RIÑAS PERSONALES, CELOS, PROBLEMAS AMOROSOS
WHAT HAVE I SHOWN?
“There is method in madness”
 It is possible to analyze micro-level patterns of
violence systematically
 These patterns conform to a logic that is
primarily strategic and corresponds to a context
of incentives and constraints generated by
irregular wars
 Though the logic is instrumental, the outcomes
are not optimal for the actors involved

Armed actors tend not to use violence where they
need it most (zone 3)
 Civilians fail to settle their accounts where it is
safest to denounce (zones 1 and 5)

MORE…

This context explains a great deal of the
barbarity of civil wars
Dynamics caused by informational asymmetries
 Large case atrocities (i.e. indiscriminate violence)
emerge when and where there is lack of information
(“cheap counterinsurgency”)
 The interplay of selective and indiscriminate violence
is consistent with the varying patterns of violence in
most civil wars


This context also helps make sense of the
intimate character of violence in civil wars

It is not just killers who are involved in killing
FINALLY…
A“ Clausewitzian” perspective helps make sense
of both the barbarity and intimacy of violence in
civil war
 The game on the ground is not a simple reflection
of the game at the top—the local is not the
national writ small but is qualitatively different
 Key implication: ideology/identity could be
epiphenomenal to the violence in civil war in the
sense that violence that looks purely ideological
or identity-based may aggregate a variety of
other processes
 Strategies of intervention ought to be designed
accordingly
