The Value is morality, as the resolution is asking whether targeted killings are MORALLY permissible.
The standard is consequentialism
My criterion for this round will be Consequentialism. Consequentialism best achieves morality
because:
1.) It is the only rational framework for achieving morality since, due to cultural relativism, any
other framework is incoherent and illogical
2.) consequentialism solves the paradox of absolute ethics. When an actor can’t act in a way that
doesn’t violates absolute ethics, this creates a paradox—both action and inaction become immoral.
No actor could then exist without violating ethics. An ends- based framework avoids self-defeating
ethical theories, allowing real action.
3.) Reject ethical frameworks that don’t allow an escape clause in a catastrophe
Alexander and Moore 07 (Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Deontological Ethics,”
November 1, 2007 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/)
The second plausible response is for the deontologist to abandon Kantian absolutism for what is usually called
deontological norms govern up to a point despite adverse consequences; but when
the consequences become so dire that they cross the stipulated threshold, consequentialism takes over
(Moore 1997, ch. 17). A may not torture B to save the lives of two others, but he may do so to save a
thousand lives if the “threshold” is higher than two lives but lower than a thousand.
“threshold deontology.” A threshold deontologist holds that
4.)When weighing catastrophes, consequentialism is the most moral theory
Nielsen 72
Kai
in
(prof. emeritus of philosophy @ University of Calgary, Ethics, Volume 82, “Against Moral
Conservatism”, p. 229-230)
is there anything more reasonable, more morally appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when
doing or allowing some evil cannot be avoided? That is, where there is no avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or lesser evil obtains, should
Surely we must choose between evils here, but
we not plainly always opt for the lesser evil? And is it not obviously a greater evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and die than that the fat man should suffer and die? Blowing up the
fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous
. The consequentialist is on strong moral
ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse
for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even usefully and relevantly adapt here-though for a quite different purpose-an argument of Donagan's. Consequentialism of the kind I have been
arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt." Given the
comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it
Anticonsequentialists often point to the
sanction such killing of the innocent, but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness,
of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did
not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to
made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions, that would be another matter indeed.
inhumanity of people who will
.
prevent seems to me to constitute a moral evasion I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance
is a harsh moral necessity, he allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He
tries to keep his 'moral purity' and avoid
'dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called 'doublemindedness.'
5.)Absolute ethics take a side seat to preventing destruction in a nuclear age
Markusen and Harris 1984, [Eric and John, Professors @ University of Minnesota, and Southwest State
University, “The Role of Education in Preventing Nuclear War,” Harvard Educational Review, vol. 5, n1. pg 282-303]
Knowledge is power, and knowledge entails responsibility. Preventing nuclear war is the greatest ethical priority of our age.
This means that we must examine our attitudes and our priorities in the light of the threat of nuclear war. We must learn about this threat, teach
others, and act upon our knowledge. This will require risks and sacrifices. At the very least, whatever peace of mind
we have managed to maintain will be sorely tested by a concentration of the possibility of mega death. Many of
our customary activities, and those of our friends, will seem trivial when considered in the context of the nuclear threat . We must assume
the responsibility to make great changes in our nation and our world,, even though it will require us to
change our lives. Although these words of Bruno Bettelheim were originally addressed to the question of why the Jews allowed themselves to
become caught up in the lethal madness of the Holocaust, they have much to say to us. When a world goes to pieces and inhumanity reigns supreme,
man cannot go on living his private life as he was won’t do, and would like to do; he cannot – as the loving head of a family, keep the family living
together peacefully, undisturbed by the surrounding world; nor can he continue to take pride in his profession or possessions, when either will
deprive him of his humanity, if not also of his life. In such times, one must radically reevaluate all of what one has one, believed in, and stood for in
order to know how to act. In short, one has to take a stand on the new reality – a firm stand, not one of retirement into an even more private world.
I contend that targeted killings lose the war in Afghanistan, leading to
catastrophic impacts
A.) Is the Link
Civilians will retaliate against drone attacks.
Jane Mayer, writer for the New Yorker on National Defense and author of the book
The Dark Side, October 21, 2009, NPR, “Jane Mayer: The Risks Of A RemoteControlled War”,
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=113978637]
you can't really go around the globe killing people as the United States
government without igniting some kind of retaliation. I think you - once you start killing people on
the other side of the world, you are going to, first of all, kill some of the wrong people,
which this program has done. They've killed a number of innocent people, and you know,
women and children, and you then get members of their family wanting to avenge
them, and you just basically also become morally insulated to a kind of a horrific
thing that's going on, and eventually I think it's going to cause blowback, that basically
that's been the experience historically.
Well, I think it's - my personal sense is
AND Public support is critical to success in Afghanistan
Ashdown ‘7 - Paddy Ashdown, July 21, 2007, fmr British MP and High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, “We are failing in Afghanistan,”
DAWN [leading English language newspaper of Pakistan],
http://www.southasianmedia.net/index_opinion.cfm?category=Security&country=AFGHANISTAN
I recently had a rather heated conversation with a government minister who assured me that we were winning in Afghanistan because "we were
killing more Taliban". But success is not measured in dead Taliban. It's measured in how many more water supplies are being
reconnected; how many more people now have the benefit of the rule of law and good governance; how many have the prospect of a job; and,
above all, whether we are winning or losing the battle for public opinion, which is central to successful
reconstruction. The polls measuring domestic opinion show falling support for the international presence .
The decline has been relatively small, but once this slide begins it can move fast and be difficult to turn
around. Modern war is fought among the people, and so is post-conflict reconstruction. The battle for
public opinion is the crucial battle: if you lose it, you lose full stop. We have to turn this around very
rapidly if we are not to have another, and more painful, failure on our hands after Iraq .
Other authors confirm this, Rogan in 09 writes,
Christopher Rogan, army cadet, “INCREASING THE COMBAT POWER OF THE
SQUAD ON PATROL: THE POTENTIAL OF THE SOLDIER-PORTABLE DRONE AS A
TACTICAL FORCE MULTIPLIER,” March 29, 2009
Nonetheless, it is in the very nature of American military commanders to find every possible way to give the advantage to their troops in a firefight. William H. McRaven,
a former Navy SEAL and special operations theorist, writes that even the some of the most physically fit and skilled warriors in the world can find themselves on the
losing end of a firefight if they do not have some sort of force multiplier—whether it is surprise, speed or firepower—to achieve relative superiority in an engagement.
the new constraints of fighting in a counterinsurgency
environment make the use of traditional combat support options such as indirect
fire nearly impossible. David Kilcullen, a leading expert in counterinsurgency theory, says
that too much firepower can be counterproductive in counterinsurgency. Any form
of overreaching or collateral damage in a firefight does more to damage the
counterinsurgent’s cause than to help him defeat the insurgent. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann,
building on recent comments from David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, indicate that independent drone strikes have no place
in counterinsurgency as they insult the local populace, kill innocent civilians, and
subsequently help the insurgent more than the counterinsurgent.
US troops still need some sort of force multiplier;
As well as hurting public support, targeted killings increase terrorist recruitment
and help their war effort, directly counteracting the US’s efforts in Afghanistan, and
causing the US to lose war.
B.) Is the impact
Morgan 7 (Stephen J, former member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee,
http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639, AD: 7/7/10) jl
They are low on adequate resources and relegated in importance. The former British Commander of NATO forces admitted that last year they
came close to losing Kandahar, the second city. It is not ruled out that much of the south and east could fall into Taliban
hands this year, paving the way for the fall of Kabul, the year after. The Taliban are ferocious fighters, with a messianic fervour
to fight to the death. They bring with them the experience of veterans of the brutal Soviet war and the civil war which followed. Now
regrouped, rearmed, their forces are prepared both for unfavourable open combat of almost suicidal proportions. Furthermore they are
opportunistically changing tactics, both in order to create maximum urban destabilization and to win local support in the countryside. Boasting
of more than 1,000 suicide volunteer bombers, they have also renounced their former policy against heroin cultivation, thus allowing them to
win support among the rural population and gain support from local tribes, warlords and criminal gangs, who have been alienated by NATO
policies of poppy field destruction. Although disliked and despised in many quarters, the Taliban could not advance without the support or
acquiescence of parts of the population, especially in the south. In particular, the Taliban is drawing on backing from the Pashtun tribes from
whom they originate. The southern and eastern areas have been totally out of government control since 2001. Moreover, not only have they not
benefited at all from the Allied occupation, but it is increasingly clear that with a few small centres of exception, all of the country outside Kabul
has seen little improvement in its circumstances. The conditions for unrest are ripe and the Taliban is filling the
vacuum. The Break-Up of Afghanistan? However, the Taliban is unlikely to win much support outside of the powerful Pashtun tribes.
Although they make up a majority of the nation, they are concentrated in the south and east. Among the other key minorities, such as Tajiks and
Uzbeks, who control the north they have no chance of making new inroads. They will fight the Taliban and fight hard, but their loyalty to the
NATO and US forces is tenuous to say the least. The Northern Alliance originally liberated Kabul from the Taliban without Allied
ground support. The Northern Alliance are fierce fighters, veterans of the war of liberation against the Soviets and the Afghanistan civil war.
Mobilized they count for a much stronger adversary than the NATO and US forces. It is possible that, while they won’t fight for the current
government or coalition forces, they will certainly resist any new Taliban rule. They may decide to withdraw to their
areas in the north and west of the country. This would leave the Allied forces with few social reserves,
excepting a frightened and unstable urban population in Kabul, much like what happened to the Soviets. Squeezed by facing
fierce fighting in Helmund and other provinces, and, at the same time, harried by a complementary tactic of Al Qaeda-style urban terrorism in
Kabul, sooner or later, a “Saigon-style” evacuation of US and Allied forces could be on the cards. The net result could be the break-
up and partition of Afghanistan into a northern and western area and a southern and eastern area, which would include the two key
cities of Kandahar and, the capital Kabul. Pastunistan? The Taliban themselves, however may decide not to take on the Northern Alliance and fighting may
concentrate on creating a border between the two areas, about which the two sides may reach an agreement regardless of US and Allied plans or preferences. The Taliban may claim the name
Afghanistan or might opt for “Pashtunistan” – a long-standing, though intermittent demand of the Pashtuns, within Afghanistan and especially along the ungovernable border regions inside
Pakistan. It could not be ruled out that the Taliban could be aiming to lead a break away of the Pakistani Pashtuns to form a 30 million strong greater Pashtun state, encompassing some 18
million Pakistani Pashtuns and 12 Afghan Pashtuns. Although the Pashtuns are more closely linked to tribal and clan loyalty, there exists a strong latent embryo of a Pashtun national
consciousness and the idea of an independent Pashtunistan state has been raised regularly in the past with regard to the disputed territories common to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The area was
cut in two by the “Durand Line”, a totally artificial border between created by British Imperialism in the 19th century. It has been a question bedevilling relations between the Afghanistan and
Pakistan throughout their history, and with India before Partition. It has been an untreated, festering wound which has lead to sporadic wars and border clashes between the two countries and
occasional upsurges in movements for Pashtun independence. In fact, is this what lies behind the current policy of appeasement President Musharraf of Pakistan towards the Pashtun tribes in
along the Frontiers and his armistice with North Waziristan last year? Is he attempting to avoid further alienating Pashtun tribes there and head–off a potential separatist movement in Pakistan,
which could develop from the Taliban’s offensive across the border in Afghanistan? Trying to subdue the frontier lands has proven costly and unpopular for Musharraf. In effect, he faces exactly
the same problems as the US and Allies in Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, fighting Pashtun tribes has cost him double the number of troops as the US has lost in Iraq. Evidently, he could not win
and has settled instead for an attempted political solution. When he agreed the policy of appeasement and virtual self-rule for North Waziristan last year, President Musharraf stated clearly that
he is acting first and foremost to protect the interests of Pakistan. While there was outrageous in Kabul, his deal with the Pashtuns is essentially an effort to firewall his country against civil war
and disintegration. In his own words, what he fears most is, the « Talibanistation » of the whole Pashtun people, which he warns could inflame the already fierce fundamentalist and other
separatist movement across his entire country. He does not want to open the door for any backdraft from the Afghan war to engulf Pakistan. Musharraf faces the nationalist struggle in Kashmir,
an insurgency in Balochistan, unrest in the Sindh, and growing terrorist bombings in the main cities. There is also a large Shiite population and clashes between Sunnis and Shias are regular.
Moreover, fundamentalist support in his own Armed Forces and Intelligence Services is extremely strong. So much so that analyst consider it likely that the Army and Secret Service is
protecting, not only top Taliban leaders, but Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda central leadership thought to be entrenched in the same Pakistani borderlands. For the same reasons, he has not
captured or killed Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership. Returning from the frontier provinces with
Bin Laden’s severed head would be a trophy that would cost him his own head in Pakistan. At best he takes the occasional risk of giving a nod and a wink to a US incursion, but even then
at the peril of the chagrin of the people and his own military and secret service. The Break-Up of Pakistan? Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and
Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-away independent Pashtunistan state
or a “Peoples’ War” of the Pashtun populace as a whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him.
As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the
current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely,
but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then,
the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of
Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new
world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably
including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the
year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication
of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the
fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime,
where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place
outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and
sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic
proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq
would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean
coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border
clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly
nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down
completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course,
open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military
fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against
India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets
by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again
become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It
could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.